PAKISTANS INDIA POLICY: SHIFT FROM ZIA TO BENAZIR

[India Quarterly, Vol. XLV. No.-1, Jan- Mar, 1989, pp 35-45] PARMINDER S. BHOGAL*

In the words of Sajjad Hyder, an ex-Ambassador of Pakistan in India, The first determinant of our foreign policy is safeguarding Pakistan from India.[1] Pakistans India policy occupies a very significant role in Pakistans overall foreign policy. In other words, Pakistans foreign policy mainly revolves around its India policy, or is Indo centric. The major reason behind such a trend is the historic background of Indo-Pak relations. It will be apt to say that, In large measure, Pakistani feeling (and policy) towards India has been a continuation of the political struggle before partition.[2] Support to the idea of Pakistan among Indian Muslims arose basically from the feeling of fear and insecurity both real and propagandised. The feeling of insecurity was indeed vis--vis the majority Hindu community and their certain dominance over India once it becomes free. This feeling aroused mistrust and hence misunderstanding and this was strengthened by the psychological trauma resulting from the way the sub-continent was divided between India and Pakistan. There was a complete emotional upset of all the people in India and Pakistan because of this.[3] Such a Psychological condition has been a very strong factor behind Pakistans India centric foreign policy. As a result, from the day Pakistan emerged on the world map as a sovereign independent country, the main plank of Pakistans foreign policy has been to obtain a shield against a possible attack from India.[4] The calculations of Pakistans foreign policy-makers, in fact, revolve around the India factor; Pakistans overriding concern vis--vis India, fear of its sheer size and size of all the army.[5] There is a continuous feeling in Pakistan that India has not reconciled to the partition of 1947 and is bent upon destroying and dismembering it. Such a psyche is mainly the result of the deliberate propaganda, which was sustained by the statements of some communal leaders in India, as well as by misinterpreting the broad statements on the part of secular Indian leadership like Jawaharlal Nehru. But such a feeling was aggravated after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.Whatever may be the factors, People in Pakistan do widely believe in this. The leader of the opposition in the Pakistan National Assembly, Mohammad Aslam Khattak remarked during a debate: There is a continuing feeling in Pakistan that India has not reconciled to the partition It is fact that India never reconciled herself to the Partition of Pak-India sub-continent. They always cherish this secret desire and dream that partition may be undone one day. The hostility of India has been a nightmare fir the foreign policy-maker of this country.[6] (Pakistan National Assembly Debates-1964). Again, as Ambassador Sajjad Hyder puts the same fear in this way: To us in Pakistan the reason for this malaise is our perception that beneath a thin veneer, Indian leadership and a sizeable segment of its following continue to regard the formation of Pakistan as an historical error forced on India, that given the opportunity they would like in some way to redress the situation and that in their mind, the 1971 war supported this presumption [7] Apart from the above aetiology there are a number of other factors also behind the evolution of Pakistans foreign policy. These include, the psychological need for parity, interests of the Ruling elites, the fear of being reduced to a satellite state of India and above all using the
*Mr. Bhogal is a research scholar at the School of International studies, Jawaharlal Lal Nehru University-New Delhi.

existing hostility of bilateral relations to justify and rationalize all kinds of foreign aid from all sources as also to legitimize the creation and existence of Pakistan in the eyes of its own public and the world at large. Forty years have passed since then and several developments have taken place during these years affecting Indo-Pak relations. Year 1971 was the watershed year in Pakistani history. Its East wing seceded to become an independent country. This tremendously affected the power balance in the region and as a result several new developments took place in Indo-Pak relations. Pakistans foreign policy and India policy in particular experienced some changes. Eighteen years have passed since then. Though we cannot say that the traditional hostility between the two unfortunate brother nations.[8] has ended, yet it will have to be conceded that now for the past few years there is greater understanding between them. Some of the mistrust and confusion has been allayed and there have been sign of cooperation here and there. Though it is always impossible to guess or to have premonitions about the future, nor is it advisable in the study of international relational, yet certain developments and events show positive trends now and even encourage us to think cautiously that we may be looking towards an era of cooperation, overlooking, if not forgetting the erstwhile conflict and hostility. A GENERAL FRAME-WORK Soon after the sub-continent was divided, a fairly far-fetched opinion was expressed by the first Governor General of Pakistan regarding future relationships between the two states. He said I think that these two states of Pakistan and Hindustan, by virtue of contiguity and mutual interests, will be friends in the sub-continent. They will go to each others rescue in case of danger and will say hands off to other nations. We shall have a Monroe Doctrine more solid then Americas. [9] But this bonhomie and goodwill was not to be the basis or the guiding principle of the mutual politics of India and Pakistan towards each other. On the contrary, historical factors, the nature of partition, the internal weaknesses of Pakistan and the great power pulls in the region began to guide the destinies of the two states. Therefore, the Pakistani elites soon began to be swayed by such factors. As Mushtaq Ahmed remarked, He (Liaquat Ali khan) was deeply aware of the desirability of concord with India also equally conscious of the desirability of attaining it.[10] As a result Pakistan began to follow an India policy based upon conflict and countering, a policy of congenital opposition towards India, so to say. And as the year passed by, it became a marked point on the part of the Pakistani elite to do and behave always in opposition to whatever India wanted, proposed or did. It became their permanent motive to maintain conflict between the two nations. It became a policy of total alienation and estrangement from the India in all respects including economic, social and cultural. A policy of conflict on the part of Pakistan can be ascertained from the following statement: The roots of confrontation between India and Pakistan go deep down in to our history and have to until the cause of justice triumphs, no matter how heavy the odds.[11] Ambassador Sajjad Hyder very rightly observed when he wrote, Pakistans policy towards India is mainly reactive.[12] This conflictual intention is again visible in a very pertinent observation made by the late Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan. He remarked: What should be the foreign policy of Pakistan toward India? I maintain, while wanting to live in peace with India, we shall continue to lean against India till such time that resolution of these problems has been found.[13] Such a confrontational India policy was sought to be justified on the basis of the outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan. As Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto said, Pakistan maintains the

confrontation only to resolve the outstanding disputes [14] But what is the dispute and conflict? Does it end with the solution to the Kashmir and other boundary problems? To quote Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto again: Our countries must ultimately live in peace, but only when conflict has been resolved. Such peaceful co-existence however, remains out of question so long as India strives to impose a cultural, religious and linguistic uniformity upon all its minorities. [15] This clearly shows that the Indo-Pak conflict does not end with a solution to Kashmir and other boundary issues. Most observers attribute Pakistans India policy to its domestic compulsions and its desperate search for identity and legitimacy both internal and external-for its coming in to existence. According to Selig H. Harrison: In Pakistan, the need for an external diversionary symbol to hold together a spiritless body politic, is if anything more conspicuous than India.[16] And this external diversionary symbol could be best provided by none other then the perceived and propagandised Indian threat both real and imaginary. Bhutto amply justified this factor when he said in 1967: It has taken twenty years and two wars (with India) to establish the separate identity of our state with its population of over a hundred and twenty million. [17] This is the raison detre of Pakistans India policy. And therefore, India though a legitimate concern of Pakistan, in view of long common border between two countries, acquired an exaggerated, almost obsessive importance in determining the component and orientations of the newly emerged state (Pakistan).[18] This general frame-work of Pakistans India policy that I have attempted to establish is more relevant to the 1947-71 phase. After this, the foreign policy of Pakistan experienced some changes. Consequently the India policy was also re-oriented. There were some reasons behind this and for the first time we find a faint sentiment of normalisation in Pakistans India policy. But the general content of this policy is equally relevant today as will be seen in the succeeding arguments. It is in the light of this frame-work that I shall be trying to analyse this policy during the period of Gen. Zia and the shift in it, if any, in the succeeding period, i.e., Benazirs on going rule. ZIAS INDIA POLICY Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had realized and initiated the process of environment building, necessary for normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. Several steps had been taken in this direction during his days; after the historic Shimla pact, a number of other agreements trade, shipping, cultural exchange and travel had been reached. And, a people to people level interaction began. Though he kept up a strong anti-India propaganda, mainly because of his domestic compulsion, he successfully made efforts for normalization. With the advent of Gen. Zia, this process came to an abrupt halt. When in 1978 a trade delegation from India arrived in Islamabad to review the trade agreement signed in 1975, the government of Pakistan declined to renew this treaty. And the Pakistan government by an order restricted all trade with India only at the government levels. [19] Similarly, the Pakistan government declined to open land routes (other than Wagah) as stipulated in the visa and travel agreement of 1974. Anti-India propaganda was whipped up, especially on the so-called wrongful stand of India on Afghanistan. The much famous peace offensive on India also need to be discussed here. Gen. Zia adopted the policy of covert war with India. It meant a war on all fronts, barring the actual battlefront. The peace offensive was another strategic move in this regard. Pakistan offered a No war Pact; India instead of accepting it, offered a broader peace treaty which unfortunately impinged upon the sovereignty of Pakistan directly. Pakistani objections were mainly to Indias insistence that Pakistan should make a unilateral declaration not to concede any

base to any foreign power on its territory. This gave Pakistan a clear cut leverage over India and a propaganda tirade followed. This was indeed a diplomatic success to be rejoiced at by Pakistan. No doubt, the Pakistan Ambassador in India was right when he said: For the first time in our history of relations with India, we have been able to force India to take a defensive posture in diplomacy.[20] Pakistan also meddled in Indias internal ethnic problems. The government if India has been accusing Pakistan of aiding and abetting terrorism in Punjab. At the newly formed forum of SAARC also, Zia maintained hostile postures and was successful in lobbying against India on several issues including the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka after the July 1987 Accord. The hall-mark of Zias India policy was a perpetually hostile confrontation but always short of an open war. But the December1987 adventure was too close and the two countries almost came to the brink of an actual war. The Zia era in Pakistan saw the emergence of another new issue between two countries. This was the Siachin glacier issue. A limited war has been going on between two countries on this issue, with considerable losses to both sides. This has further complicated the relations between the two countries. Thus looking at the whole eleven years span of the Zia era in Pakistan we can safely infer that Pakistans India policy during this period was a bundle of contradictions; contradictions in proclamations and practices. It was a rather a hawkish policy phrased in some of the most deceptive words and presented in an enchanting manner. As a result it is often claimed that the military government in Pakistan after taking power in that country has made a special new demarche in extending a hand of friendship to India and has endeavored to accelerate the process of normalization of relations with us. The facts however speak otherwise.[21] According to one observer he produced an absolutely brilliant India policy. Seek peace on the battlefield. Step up the ideological war. Whip up a climate in which the sun of friendship was kept blazing by sweet rhetoric. And in the shadow of that sun arm and give sanctuary to those forces within India which could fight for theocracy. Do not use the Pakistani Army to try and break up India for three very good reasons. First, because it could not, even if it wanted to. Second it was needed to run things at home. Third, there was a far cheaper way of achieving the same aimmake Indians fight themselves. [22] His personal brilliance and finesse apart, such an India policy was highly detrimental for the betterment of Indo-Pak as also for the maintenance of peace in the region. It was rightly observed by the Indian press after his tragic end in the air crash on 17 August 1988. Indo-Pak relations reached their nadir during his rule.[23] An ultra-rightist dominance in Pakistan has always thrived upon its hostility towards India. Because of the lack of popular legitimacy, the legitimacy of a hostile India does help along with other similarly presumed induced and propagandised threats.[24] Apart from the domestic reasons, Zia used the pretext of a hostile India to make the maximum out of the existing international situation in this part of the world. This also helped him in successfully countering the growing India influence in west Asia as also in proving his Islamic credentials both at home and abroad. BENAZIRS INDIA POLICY The finest investment in improving Indo-Pak relations has been made by the people of Pakistan through the process of 16 November.[25] Benazir has been in power now for five months. And her coming to power was hailed not only in Pakistan but also equally warmly in India. Since it was expected, on the basis of her earlier statements from time to time, that her arrival on the Pak scene would help improve bilateral relations between India and Pakistan,

Speculations have been ripe since that day as to what would be her India policy. Will there be a shift from Gen. Zias beaten track, or the sub-continent will continue to be the Continent of Circe? The shift was expected because Premier Benazir has always stressed not only the improvement of ties but also of adding the dimension of friendship to these relations. This she has cherished with a degree of sentiment, common and natural among the people of two nations. She wrote: I symbolize a new generation, I had never been an Indian. I had been born in Pakistan. I was free of the complexes and prejudices which had torn Indians and Pakistanis apart in the bloody trauma of partition. Perhaps the people were hoping that a new generation could avoid the hostility that had now led to three wars, burying the bitter past of our parents and grand parents, to live together as friends. And I certainly felt it possible as I walked the warm and welcoming streets of Shimla. Did we have to be divided by walls of hatred or could we, like the once warring countries of Europe come to terms with other.[26] In India both views exist regarding the shift in Pakistans India policy. There are people who dont see much scope for a change. They argue so on the basis of the traditional nature of IndoPak relations and Benazirs compulsions at home and her precarious condition vis a vis her opposition and armed forces combine. On the contrary, there are also people in all walks of life who are optimistic. There optimism is based upon the following facts: 1. 2. 3. 4. That there is a democratic government in Pakistan. That there has been over a number of years an increasing feeling in the mind of both people that relations be improved. That the change in the overall international environment would be conducive to improvement in relations. That the Indian response towards Pakistan will now be more balanced and accommodative.

What can be the degree of shift, if at all there is going to be one? Though to exaggerate expectations may prove to be an illusion, to deny happy prospects is certainly to be depressive. At best some change can be expected in the general environment in which the countries interact, in the immediate future.[27] Benazir Bhutto, it seems is picking up the threads, from where her late father, Premier Z.A. Bhutto was made to leave. She has already stated that wants the historic Shimla pact to be the basis of relationship with India. She has dismissed the NO-WAR Pact authored by the late Gen. Zia, saying, We could not really understand its logic-How a simple NO-WAR Pact could resolve the different issues between the two countries? We felt that the Shimla Agreement had a legitimacy, and we must approach step by step the problem of resolving the issue to help build the confidence as we emerge from one day to another.[28] She has already emphasized upon the need to improve the people to people relations. As a result of such an approach, visa and travel facilities have been made easier. And according to press reports, bilateral trade between the two countries has doubled in the first three months of the democratic government. SAARC (South Asian Association for regional cooperation) has added a new dimension to improving the Indo-Pak ties. Several programmes to be undertaken under the aegis of SAARC, would positively improve Indo-Pak relations. These include the SAARC passport scheme, the holding of South Asian Cultural Festivals and the SAARC Audio Visual Exchange Programme. (SAVE). [29] Thus India and Pakistan could now, under the auspices of SAARC, have the option of taking all those steps which they otherwise could not because of their domestic political compulsions.

Of late, two issues have been greatly impinging upon Indo-Pak relations; the first being Indian accusations regarding Pak aid and sympathy to the terrorists operating in Punjab, and the second, the Siachin Glacier issue. Of course both are Zia legacies. Regarding the first, Prime minister Ms. Bhutto has assured the Indian Government that she would make maximum effort to stop help to the terrorists. Though she has not been much successful in it, yet for this Ms Bhutto need not be blamed. She is sincere when she says that playing the Sikh card would be disastrous for Pakistan. Her problem is that the mischief mongering in Indian Punjab remains the exclusive preserve of the ISI. Here the Indian government will have to exhibit patience and show restraint considering her precarious condition Vis-a Vis the army and the opposition-ruled Punjab. The other issue is the Siachin Glacier. She has avoided any scathing attack on India regarding this and has expressed a keen desire to resolve this issue through peaceful negotiations under the Shimla Agreement. She notes with regret that this is the first ever violation of the Shimla pact by India. Here also a cooperative and a compromising Indian stand would be helpful in resolving this complicated issue. Talks regarding this are expected to be held in Islamabad some times this year. Thus, from all accounts the first months of Benazir Bhuttos rule are indeed encouraging. There is indeed a noticeable shift in Pakistans India policy. The shift is manifested clearly in two aspects. Severity of propaganda has gone down and measures for the restoration of confidence and goodwill have been taken. Second, the importance of people relationship has been recognized and preliminary steps have been taken in this regard, in this form of relaxed visa and travel facilities. The exchange of information material both through bilateral and SAARC channels has been agreed to. And it has been decided to do more in this regard. However, much will depend upon the stability of the democratic government. Any internal crisis, leading to the destabilization of the government can obstruct this process of normalization. But given the state of affairs now, we can look towards the scheduled meeting of the joint Indo-Pak commissions in July 1989, with a degree of optimism, an expected visit by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto some this year will also be a positive development in this regard. APPRAISAL The most significant development in Pakistans India policy, during Benazirs first months in office, has been to return to the path from where it was deflected to a different course. The very fact that Pakistan now has a democratic government has resulted in a relaxation of the environment governing mutual ties of the two countries. A lot has been achieved in a comparatively short time. Trade has been fully restored and unnecessary embargoes put by the Zia regime, as mentioned earlier, have been withdrawn. Visa and travel facilities have been made more liberal with a promise to very soon do more in this regard. A return to the Shimla Pact has been declared. The significance of this lies in the fact that the Shimla Pact was the result of mutual direct negotiations whereby it was agreed to solve all pending issues on a bilateral level through mutual negotiations step by step. The Shimla Pact also opened the way for talking confidence-building measure, including the steady initiation of people to people relationship by various means. In a nutshell, the Shimla agreement has an ideal mechanism to resolve even a case of a chronic conflict. Another good development arising out of the enhanced confidence and good will between the two countries is its impact on SAARC. We can now expect greater development and consensus within it. Pakistan it seems has decided to refrain from making the SAARC forum into another platform for its unjustified anti Indian propaganda. The last meeting of SAARC in Islamabad was held in an extremely cordial environment and there was a degree of

consensus; as a result, several new measures to strengthen the South Asian fraternity were approved. Another positive signal recently came when Pakistan made a very balanced and restrained observation over the Indian intervention (on the request of President Gayoom) in the Maldivian peril at the hands of the mercenaries. The new regime in Pakistan, keeping its constraints in mind, seems to have decided, along with India, to use the forum of SAARC to understand take those measures, which it otherwise would be unable to take owing to political compulsion at home. The SAARC passport scheme, the SAARC cultural festival and information schemes augur well in this regard. And a few days ago, Prime Minister Benazir expressed her hope that India and Nepal would peacefully sort out their present crisis. It is a great encouragement that unlike in the past, Pakistan this time has refrained from taking undue advantage of this adverse situation between India Nepal. There is thus goodwill; but this is not the end. Indeed, a lot is yet to be achieved before the shift in Pakistans India policy is clearly manifested and sustained over a period of time. It will depend upon a number of factors a part from those directly concerned with India and Pakistan. However, the trend so far has been encouraging and whatever we have achieved in the form of mutual understanding to shun confrontation and return to normalcy is very very significant. To quote Wiston Churchill, this is not the end; it is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.

REFERENCES
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Sajjad Hyder, forign policy of Pakistan (Lahore, 1987),p.149 Keith callard, Pakistan: A Political study (Karachi, 1968),p,17 Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches of Pandit Jawaharalal Nehru. Publications division, Government of India, (new Delhi), 1958,p 257. G.W. Chowdhury, Pakistan: relations with India (Meerut, 1971),p.257 W. Howard Wriggins, The Balancing process in Pakistans foreign policy, in Lawrence Ziring, etc (Ed.) Pakistan : Long view (Durham, 1977),p,303 Quoted by S.S Bindra, Determinants of Pakistans foreign policy (New Delhi, 1988), p.223. Sajjad Hyder, n. 1, pp. 74-75. Parminder S. Bhogal, Indian security environment in the 1990s: The south Asian factor. A paper submitted to the UGC National Seminar on Indias security environment in the 1990s at the department of defense studies, Punjabi university, Patiala, 30, 31 March 1989. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Speeches and writings of MR. Jinnah. Vol. II, Government of Pakistan Publications, Lahore, 1950, p.363. Mushtaq Ahmed, Pakistans foreign policy (Karachi, 1968), p. 103. Z.A Bhutto, Myth of Independence (Karachi, 1969), p. 187. Sajjad Hyder, n. 1, p.74. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Soldier and statesmen (Karachi, 1968), p.156. Z.A. Bhutto, n. 11, p.177. Ibid. 178. Selig H. Harrison Quoted by M. Shanker in Pakistanis Foreign Policy, Mainstream (New Delhi) Vol. XIX, No.40, June 1981, p.6. Z.A Bhutto, n. 11,p. 180. M. Shanker, Pakistans Foreign Policy, Mainstream, Vol. XIX, No. 40, June 1981, p.6. K.D Sharma, Address to Delhi study Circle on the State of Indo-Pak Relations. Also in Mainstream, Vol. XXIII, No.24, February 1985, p.7. Humayun Khan, then Ambassador of Pakistan in India, in an informal personal interview to the author in May 1988. K.D. Sharma, n. 19. M.J Akbar, Power struggle Begins, Times of India Sunday review (New Delhi), 4 September 1988. Times of India, 18 August 1988. Parminder S. Bhogal, n, 8. V.R. Krishna Iyer, Pakistan: General Not Generals Mainstream, Vol. XXVII, No.14, p.35. Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East (London, 1988), p.55.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28. 29.

This view was expressed by Shafkat Kakakhal, Minister Political (then acting Ambassador, of Pakistan in New Delhi, India) during an informal interview with the author soon after Gen.Zias tragic Air accident. He was of the view that while it would be premature to say anything until a new government in Pakistan came to power, a change in the environment in which the two countries interacted could be expected. It would however depend much upon the Indian response to the new government in Pakistan, as well as regional developments around it. Benazir Bhutto in an interview to M.J Akbar, Telegraph (Calcutta), 14 December 1988. Text of SAARC joint communiqu, issued in Islamabad on 31 December 1988, as Published in (Karachi), 1 January 1989.