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30 YEARS OF THE WORLDS COLDEST WAR

APRIL 13, 1984, WAS THE FIRST TIME INDIAN TROOPS LANDED ON THE ICY HEIGHTS CALLED SIACHEN
GLACIER. HUNDREDS OF DEATHS AND THREE DECADES ON, THE BATTLE ZONE CONTINUES TO INSPIRE
AWE AND FEAR. THE TRIBUNE TAKES STOCK.
BY DINESH KUMAR

HE bumpy road constructed by the Border Roads Organisation after painstakingly cutting
at the mountainside meanders up the imposing rocky Ladakh Range visible from Leh. The
slow ride leads to the worlds highest motorable pass, the Khardung La at 18,380 feet. Its
the highest point on planet earth to which a human being can travel on wheels without having to
walk a step.
From there, the road winds down northwards past small hamlets and villages into the Shyok Valley
through which the Shyok river snakes its way, eventually merging into the Indus river that flows
into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). After some hours of driving, the Shyok river is greeted by
the Nubra river which flows in a southerly direction from the Siachen Glacier.
This point at which the two rivers (known as Yankee point) meet becomes a valley wide enough
for an Indian Air Force (IAF) Antonov-32 transport aircraft to take a U-turn, usually an extremely
hazardous manoeuvre while flying in a valley flanked by imposingly high mountains. A straight drive
from there leads to Partapur where the headquarters of the Armys 102 brigade, colloquially known
as the Siachen brigade, is located.

OXYGEN AT A PREMIUM
A short distance further up from Partapar is Thoise airbase, which serves as the runway closest to
the Siachen Glacier where the IAFs transport aircraft land after some skilful flying through the high
mountains. A signboard put up at this airbase tellingly states, You are breathing 30 per cent less
but pure oxygen.
A right turn from Yankee Point and a short drive on a bridge over the Shyok river leads into the
Nubra valley with the Nubra river to the left. The road goes past the Old Silk Route before
culminating at the snout of the 76 km long Siachen Glacier, the worlds second largest glacier
outside the polar region and also the origin of the Nubra river. From the snout (height
approximately 12,000 feet), the glacier extends 76 km like a giant white tongue to as high as
18,875 feet at its source which is Indra Col (24,493 feet), the northern most tip of India.
It is near the snout blackened over the years due to pollution, human habitation and mixing with
gravel from the mountains where the Army has a major Base Camp equipped with a training
school for soldiers, helipads, a battery of the Swedish-made Bofors 155 mm Howitzer, and a
memorial with the names of soldiers killed either due to weather, terrain or Pakistani fire over the
last three decades among other equipment and facilities.

However, for almost 11 years now, beginning November 2003, both sides are maintaining a
ceasefire in the area leaving soldiers on both sides to contend with weather and terrain, which
arguably is a far bigger threat than the now silent guns of the adversary located on both sides of the
110-km long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) that runs along the Saltoro Ridge.

110 KM TREK IN THE FREEZE

This Base Camp caters for the northern and middle portions of the Siachen Glacier. A second Base
Camp, catering to troops deployed in the southern Siachen Glacier, is located ahead of Thoise.
It is from these two base camps that Army soldiers begin their long arduous trek to the 100-odd
posts located along the AGPL that begins from map grid reference NJ 9842 all the way northwest to
Indra Col, which overlooks the Shaksgam Valley. The altitude of the Saltoro Ridge ranges between
17,800 feet and 25,500 feet, which is barely 3,500 feet less than Mount Everest, the worlds
highest peak.
The Indian Army is strongly positioned on the Saltoro Ridge, which overlooks Gilgit and Baltistan
(POK) in the far distance and is located well ahead of the entire Siachen Glacier. But along with this
major strength is also a pitfall. The nearest road head is located as far as 80 km from the farther
Indian post. In these high killer mountains, 80 km can seem an endless distance for a soldier who
has to spend up to several days traversing the glacier and climbing high peaks to take his position on
one of the scores of Army posts dotting the Saltoro ridgeline.
Such distances in the absence of any possible roads on the glacier poses a herculean logistics
challenge. How does one transport equipment and supplies? A helicopter? Yes, but it comes at a
huge cost. The IAF and the Army Aviation Corps, which flies a range of helicopters the smaller
nubile Cheetah, the larger sturdy Mi-17-1V and the indigenously developed Dhruv advance light
helicopter carry far less than their designated payload.
This is because these helicopters take off from Leh, Thoise and the Base Camp, all of which are
located above 10,000 feet and therefore permit carrying only a substantially reduced payload in the
rarefied atmosphere.
While Cheetah helicopters can fly up to those posts where makeshift helipads have been created,
the much larger Mi-17 and Dhruv helicopters cannot land on these posts and have to mostly airdrop
supplies. But most posts cannot be air-maintained since it is not easy to construct helipads at those
heights. Soldiers here thus have no option but to trek up the spurs of the Saltoro range carrying
supplies on their back.

SURVIVAL IS THE JOB

What mountaineers elsewhere in the world do as a novelty, the average Indian soldier does as a
matter of duty on a routine posting living up to three to six months on icy heights with

temperatures dipping as low as minus 40 degrees Celsius. The farthest post Bana Post at 22,100
feet takes a soldier up to 20 days of trek to reach.
Indeed, this is a cruelly unique part of the country where breathing is at a premium, bathing a
dream, a change of clothes an impossible luxury, and where raging blizzards, sudden deep crevasses
in the glacier and unforgiving avalanches devour soldiers like a hungry monster. Then there is
always the danger of frostbite leading to gangrene and amputation of a limb and high-altitude
pulmonary oedema and memory loss owing to the low content of oxygen.
It is a battlefield fit only for the Gods and not for mortal beings, some would say. Between April
1984 and August 2012, the Indian Army had lost 846 soldiers with many more wounded.
Both sides have deployed a brigade strength (about 5,000 troops) that costs about Rs 5 crore a day
to maintain in the region and comprising Infantry battalions along with a host of supporting units.
Siachen remains one of the Indian Army and Air Forces greatest story of valour, grit, fortitude,
logistics, manoeuvres, battles and skillful flying. Equally important, there would be scores of human
interest stories for every soldier posted in the area. It would arguably surpass the stories of many if
not all militaries in the world.

PAKISTANS FAILED ATTEMPTS

1984
Pakistanis made their way up to the glacier in 1984 and found elements of 4 Kumaon already
entrenched there. The area in question was about 2,300 sq km. After 1984, Pakistan launched
several failed attempts to dislodge the Indian forces.
1987
Another attempt was masterminded by then Brig Pervez Musharraf, who later became the Pakistan
president. He was also the architect of the Kargil misadventure in 1999. Pakistans aim was to
capture Bilafond La. A bitter battle ensued, including hand-to-hand combat, and the Pakistani attack
was repulsed.

1990-1999
Further attempts were launched by Pakistan in 1990, 1995, 1996 and early 1999, just prior to the
Lahore Summit. Under Operation Badr in 1999, Pakistans infiltration across the LoC in the Kargil
sector was undertaken to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh. The idea was to push the
Indian Army out, thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute.

ROLL OF HONOUR
As many as 26 decorations, including a Param Vir Chakra (PVC), five Maha Vir Chakra and 20 Vir
Chakra have been awarded to 11 officers and 15 men. Among them nine are posthumous. There

have also been a number of Kirti Chakra, Shaurya Chakra, Sena Medal and Vayu Sena Medal
recipients.
Naib Subedar Bana Singh of 8 J&K Light Infantry is the only recipient of the PVC so far. In a daring
daylight raid, he led an assault on and captured a Pakistani post, Qaid, atop a 22,000-ft-high peak
after climbing a 1,500-ft ice cliff face, in 1987. The position was renamed Bana Post.

OP MEGHDOOT
Launched 30 years ago, Operation Meghdoot is the longest sustained military operation. After India
learnt of Pakistans intent to occupy the glacier, it beat Pakistan by a week to gain control over the
area. Troops require arctic clothing and personal equipment, most of which is imported. They get
special rations and dietary supplements. State-of-the-art shelters have been made available for them.
Actual stay on the glacier does not exceed three months and on completion of 45 days stay, troops
are eligible for award of the Siachen Medal (above), distinguished by its grey and white ribbon.

THE COST
Indian soldiers killed: Over 850 soldiers
Pakistani casualties: About 1,800
Annual operation cost: Rs 3,000cr

THE GLACIER
Location: East Korakoram range, northern Ladakh
Length: 76 km
Width: 3 km
Height: Peaks up to 25,000 ft high
Coverage: 700 sq km
Average winter snowfall: 35 feet
Min temperature: Minus 50 degrees Celsius
Fauna: Rare species like snow leopard, brown bear and ibex
Battlefield: Worlds highest, coldest, most expensive
Since 2007, India has allowed limited civilian trekking expeditions

MEN WHO MATTERED

Lt Gen ML Chibber: Then GOC-in-C, Northern Command, oversaw the conduct of Operation
Meghdoot. He had also served as Director Military Operations and GOC of a strike corps.

Lt Gen PN Hoon: As GOC, 15 Corps, Srinagar, he planned and executed the operation. He later
served as Director Military Operations and GOC-in-C, Western Command, Chandimandir.
Air Marshal MSD Wollen: A decorated fighter pilot and 71 war veteran, he was Air Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, Western Air Command, and responsible for air support for the operation.
Col Narendra Bull Kumar: He was Commandant, High Altitude Warfare School, and carried out
mountaineering reconnaissance expeditions in Teram Kangri and Saltoro Range.
Lt Col DK Khanna: Commanding Officer, 4 Kumaon, which marched on foot with full equipment
for several weeks across some of the worlds toughest terrain and forbidding climate to occupy the
glacier.
Capt Sanjay Kulkarni: Recently promoted as Lt General, he was the first person to land on Saltaro
Ridge on April 13, 1984, and hoist the Indian flag at Bilafond La. He was awarded Shaurya Chakra.
Sqn Ldr Surinder S Bains and Sqn Ldr Rohit Rai: Posted with 114 Helicopter Unit, they undertook
17 sorties in the early hours of April 13, 1984, to air-drop troops from 4 Kumaon on Saltaro Ridge.

MANNING SIACHEN
The 102 Infantry Brigade, headquartered at Partapur near Thoise, is the principal formation tasked
with occupying and defending the glacier. It is part of the Leh-based 14 Corps, raised after the
Kargil conflict.
The brigade is supported by artillery, air defence, engineer and other logistic elements. Ladakh
Scouts battalions are also deployed in Karu, Nubra, Leh and Partappur areas.
Infantry deployment in the region ranges between five and eight battalions. Troops man outposts
and artillery observation posts; maintain helipads and carry out patrols.
The brigade maintains the Siachen Base Camp, which is the launchpad for inducting troops in the
glacier and also runs the Siachen Battle School for pre-induction training, orientation and
acclimatisation for fresh troops. The base camp is located at about 12,000 feet above sea level, with
the highest posts on the glacier being Pahalwan (20,000 ft) and Indira Col.
IAF helicopters units in Leh, Thoise and Srinagar are deployed for air maintenance of forward posts
and casualty evacuation. Airlifting troops and supplies to Leh, Thoise and advance landing grounds
like Daulat Beg Oldie as well as para-dropping supplies is primarily undertaken by 12 Wing,
Chandigarh. The IAFs latest transporters, C-17 and C-130, are also involved in logistic operations.

TIMELINE
1949: The Karachi Agreement demarcated the Ceasefire Line (now LoC) in J&K but stopped at NJ
9842 as both sides agreed it would be understood to extend thence north to the glaciers. It was
not delineated beyond this point after the armies restored status quo ante after the 1971 war.

1974: Pakistan opened the region for foreign expeditions to Baltoro Glacier, near Mount K2, and to
explore the no-mans land around Siachen.
1977: Col Narinder Kumar, an ace mountaineer, approached by a German rafter keen to undertake
the first descent of the Nubra. He shows a map depicting Siachen as part of Pakistan.
1978: Col Kumar takes the map to the Army top brass and later leads a reconnaissance expedition
to Siachen; tin cans and cigarette packs found with Pakistani names along with German, Japanese
equipment.
1983: Both nations carry out several military expeditions to scan the glacier.
1984: Indira Gandhi orders Army to take control of the glacier; Operation Meghdoot launched;
India occupies it.
1985: Pakistan attacks Bilafond La; fails to dislodge Indian troops.
1986: Two rounds of defence secretary-level talks resolve to seek settlement in accordance with
Simla Agreement.
1987: Infantry battalion dislodges Pakistani troops; captures Qaid Post; talks suspended.
1988: Third and fourth round of secretary-level talks in Islamabad, New Delhi.
1989: Agreement reached on settlement based on troop redeployment; PMs meet in Islamabad,
approve results of fifth round of talks; defence secretaries told to arrive at settlement; military
commanders resume discussions in Rawalpindi; talks suspended.
1992: Foreign secretaries propose resumption of talks on Siachen; no progress made; talks
suspended.
2004: Two rounds of talks in Delhi, but not conclusive.
2005: Ninth and 10th rounds of talks between defence secretaries in Islamabad.
2006: Defence secretary-level talks within the framework of the Composite Dialogue held in Delhi.
2007: Defence secretary level-talks on Siachen held in Rawalpindi.
2011: Defence secretary-level talks in New Delhi; both sides acknowledge ceasefire holding since
2003 and exchanged suggestions towards dispute resolution.
2012: Pak army chief Ashfaq Kiyani proposes demilitarisation of Siachen after avalanche kills 125
Pakistani army men; Indian Army opposes move.

29 MEN IN MINUS 30C ON A BAISAKHI DAY

ITS A LOGJAM NEITHER INDIA NOR PAKISTAN CAN AFFORD, BUT IN A GRIDLOCK THAT INCLUDES CHINA
THERE SEEMS NO WAY THE ADVERSARIES CAN PULL OUT OF THE TREACHEROUS TERRAIN IN THE NEAR
FUTURE.

BY DINESH KUMAR

T around 6 am, exactly 30 years ago, Captain Sanjay Kulkarni (now lieutenant general)
and another Army soldier jumped on to the heavily snow covered Bilafond La (17,881
feet), a tactically important pass located on the Saltoro Range, from a hovering Frenchorigin Indian Air Force Lama (rechristened Cheetah) helicopter.
These two men were the first of a total 29 soldiers belonging to 4 Kumaon Regiment to be helidropped on the Bilafond La (Pass of the Butterflies in Balti language) by the IAF which flew about
17 sorties over the subsequent six to seven hours that fateful Baisakhi Day, when the temperature
hovered around minus 30 degrees Celsius. Within a few hours of their landing, however, the radio
operator was stricken by high altitude pulmonary oedema (HAPO), a common ailment in high
altitude, and therefore had to be airlifted, leaving 28 soldiers on the pass on that day.
Late that afternoon, even as a blizzard set in, Captain Kulkarni planted the first Indian flag on the
pass, thus marking the beginning of the taking of a 110-km long Saltoro ridgeline located ahead of
the 76 km long Siachen Glacier. Known as Operation Meghdoot, which continues even today, that
singular action in this remote northern part of Jammu and Kashmir led to this region turning into,
what is clich-like referred to as the worlds highest, coldest and most expensive-to-maintain
battlefield, as also one of the worlds highest junkyard and garbage dump.
Four days later on April 17, Lance Naik Ramesh Singh of 4 Kumaon died of hypoxia thus becoming
the first casualty in this mountainous wasteland where temperatures dip to as low as minus 50
degrees Celsius (up to as low as minus 100 degrees in crevasses) and where blizzards can rage as
high as 100 km an hour. Lance Naik Singhs name figures topmost on the list of over 800 soldiers
whose names have been etched on a memorial erected at the Base Camp near the snout of the
Siachen Glacier. The number of those wounded or rendered permanently disabled far exceeds the
dead.

THE FIRST BASE CAMPS

Two days after Bilafond La was taken, the Army established two camps en route to the pass as a step
towards building a logistics line. Owing to bad weather, the Army had to wait four days before, on
April 17, a platoon of the Ladakh Scouts, another Infantry unit, led by Major Ajay Bahuguna were
heli-dropped near Sia La (18,337 feet), another tactically important Pass, in five Cheetah and two
Soviet-origin Mi-8 helicopters belonging to the IAF that flew 32 sorties that single day. Owing to
heavy snow, the soldiers were dropped 5 km east of the pass, from where they had to trek up a
treacherous terrain to wrest control of Sia La. In due course, the Army reached Indra Col (24,493

feet), the starting point of the Siachen Glacier where the latter begins from a height of about 18,875
feet. Indra Col is also the de facto tri-junction between India, China and Pakistan.
Initially, the Indian Army only focused on taking the key passes. The race to move up vertically to
the Saltoro ridgeline started after the Pakistani Army failed to dislodge the Indian Army from the
passes. Over time, the Indian Army went on to gain control of the Saltoro ridge, the altitude of
which ranges between 17,880 feet (lowest point) to 25,330 feet (highest point). The Army
gradually established 108 posts along what has come to be termed as the un-delineated Actual
Ground Position Line, or AGPL.
This has placed the Indian Army at a major tactical advantage. The Indian Army is in physical
possession of most of the heights on the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier with the Pakistani
Army reduced to holding posts at lower elevations of western slopes of the spurs emanating from
the Saltoro ridgeline.
The Pakistani Army, which was planning a similar assault in May of that year (details in subsequent
paragraphs) and which is acknowledged by former Pakistani President and Army Chief General
Pervez Musharraf in his book In the Line of Fire, was caught by complete surprise.

ENEMY CONTACT
Owing to bad weather, Captain Kulkarni had been unable to establish radio contact with the base
camp. For, after he did, which was to inform about Lance Naik Ramesh Singhs casualty, the
Pakistani Army intercepted the signal to learn that the Indian Army had established its presence.
The Pakistani Air Force immediately launched helicopters and even fighter aircraft on
reconnaissance missions.
The Indian Army responded swiftly by deploying the late-1960s vintage SA-7 or Strela-2 man
portable shoulder-fired low-altitude surface-to-air missile systems and late-1950s vintage Sovietorigin Zentinaya Ustanovka or Zu-23-2 anti-aircraft guns.
Interestingly, as Nitin Gokhale recounts in his just released book, Beyond NJ 9842 The Siachen
Saga, along with other interesting details of the operation, some of which have been recounted
above, the imported equipment and clothing had arrived from abroad the evening before the launch
of Operation Meghdoot.

WHY APRIL 13
In his book Gokhale quotes Brigadier Channa, who was then brigade commander (Commander 26
Sector) entrusted with launching the assault, as saying that April 13 was deliberately chosen because
it was Baisakhi day, which is celebrated with equal fervour in both India and Pakistan, and when he
expected the guard to be down.
Pakistan had a much shorter distance to cover, had lesser logistical problems I mulled over it and
thought about Baisakhi. Now Baisakhi is celebrated with equal fervour on both sides. People are in a

joyous mood. Their guard is down. It was also the most unlikely date to launch a military operation.
So there you are. 13 April it was. I would concede that it was risky. Some called it suicidal. But that
is exactly why we had to do that day, he says.

IMMEDIATE PROVOCATION
Interestingly, as brought out in his book Pakistan Leadership Challenges, Lieutenant General
(retired) Jahan Dad Khan, then commanding the Pakistani Armys 10 Corps, writes that a company
of the Pakistani Armys Special Services Group had established its presence on Bilafond La only nine
months earlier in end-August 1983 but was ordered to pull out after 10 days owing to bad weather,
for which they had not been equipped.
On August 21, 1983, around the same when Pakistani troops were lodged on Bilafond La, the
Northern Sector Commander of Pakistan handed to his Indian counterpart in Kargil a protest note
claiming that the Line of Control (LoC) from map reference point NJ 9842 joined with the
Karakoram Pass and that the area west of this extended line belonged to Pakistan. It was on receipt
of this note and ground confirmation that the Pakistani Army had occupied Bilafond La that the
Army Headquarters after approval from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the Northern
Command, headed then by Lieutenant General ML Chibber, to prevent occupation of the Siachen
Glacier by the Pakistani Army at the start of the mountaineering season in 1984.
The Pakistani Army had foreseen the Indian move and in a meeting held in December 1983 with
General Zia-ul-Haq, then President and Pakistan Army Chief, had directed the Army to launch a
pre-emptive action in May 1984 to prevent Indian occupation of the passes. Preparatory work had
begun soon after, which included procurement of high-altitude equipment and clothing,
improvement of roads and tracks and recruitment of porters. Instead, the Indian Army acted first,
taking their Pakistani counterparts by surprise. Interestingly, the Pakistanis placed an order for
Arctic-weather gear from a London-based company that also supplied the Indian Army, which, in
turn, was quick to order 300 outfits, twice as many as Pakistan.
We had obviously failed to appreciate the timing of the Indian move and our intelligence agencies
had failed to detect the movement of a brigade size force in this area, wrote Lt General Khan. In
his book, Musharraf concedes that Pakistan lost almost 2,331 sq km of territory.

FIVE WORDS AT THE HEART OF THE DISPUTE

BY DINESH KUMAR

HE origin of the Siachen conflict lies in an omission and to a set of five words dating back
to the Cease Fire Line (CFL) Agreement signed in Karachi 65 years ago on July 27, 1949,
by military representatives of India, Pakistan and the UN Military Observers Group.

It demarcated the 740 km CFL up to Chalunka, Khor and map grid reference NJ 9842 and
thereafter left the remaining portion open with the line thence North to the glaciers. The segment

beyond NJ 9842, seen as an uninhabited and inhospitable terrain, was not demarcated. Neither side
possibly imagined either side occupying that stretch of land. Neither side foresaw the historical
events that were to follow. As of then India had taken the Kashmir issue to the UN and it was hoped
that the matter would be judiciously settled by the then newly created international organisation.
That, owing to a long list of reasons, never happened.
For the subsequent 13 years, the area remained relatively quiet. But this was also the period when
major geo-political shifts were underway. Sino-Indian relations, initially marked by bonhomie,
steadily deteriorated over interpretations of the way the two sides viewed the international
boundary. Taking advantage, Pakistan began cosying up to China based on the maxim my enemys
enemy is my friend. It was also the period when Indias relations with the US began to sour
whereas Pakistan began to openly ally itself militarily with the US. India instead turned to the Soviet
Union, which in turn was beginning to have difficulties with its fellow Communist country, China.

ENTER THE DRAGON

Then followed the Sino-Indian War in October-November 1962 when China seized portions
of the Ladakh region (Aksai Chin) and, in the process, became a third party to the Indo-Pak
dispute over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. A year later, in 1963, Pakistan signed a
boundary agreement with China in which they unilaterally ceded about 5,200 square km of
the Shaksgam Valley to China located north of Indra Col, the starting point of the Siachen
Glacier. With this, now both Pakistan and China flanked the Siachen Glacier and the worlds
second highest peak, the K2, came to be jointly owned by these two countries. Not
surprisingly, Indias protests at Pakistans cessation of territory went in vain.
On December 11, 1972, following the signing of the July 2, 1972, Simla Agreement, India
and Pakistan revalidated the CFL as the Line of Control (LoC) in an agreement signed by Lt
General Premindra Singh Bhagat (Indian Army) and Lt General Abdul Hameed Khan
(Pakistan Army) at Suchetgarh after incorporating all military gains made during the
December 1971 India-Pakistan War at the end of a total nine meetings that began on August
10, 1972. In the Kargil sector in particular, all gains went entirely to India, which acquired
the Turtuk salient just south-west of NJ 9842.
The problem lies with the interpretation of the five words, thence North to the glaciers.
Pakistan interprets it as drawing a line that runs north-east from NJ 9842 to the Karakoram
Pass in China, encompassing the entire Siachen Glacier. India advocates the watershed
principle and interprets it as running up to Indra Col along the Saltoro ridge which arcs
north-west from NJ 9842 and encompassing the entire Siachen Glacier. A vertical straight
line running north would involve cutting through the glacier and entail the north-western

part of the glacier as well as part of the Saltoro Ridge going to Pakistan and the south-eastern
part going to India.

CARTOGRAPHIC ENCROACHMENT
Even so, all seemed well until two sets of developments took place before the Pakistani troops
briefly positioned themselves on Bilafond La in August 1983. The first was cartographic
encroachment that started in the 1960s. The second was Pakistani sponsored mountaineering

expeditions that begun in the 1970s and continued until the Indian Army established its presence on
the Saltoro ridge.
Both the cartographic encroachment and mountaineering expeditions began soon after the cessation
of the Shaksgam Valley following the signing of the 1963 Sino-Pakistan border agreement. Pakistan
initially began licensing western mountaineering expeditions up to east of K2. But the real thrust
came from the US Defense Mapping Agency (later renamed National Geospatal Intelligence
Agency), an international reference point for cartography, when starting from 1967 it began to suo
motu extend the CFL from NJ 9842 east-northeast to a point just west of the Karakoram Pass
(18,136 feet). Pakistan only gleefully followed suit and began granting permits for mountaineering
expeditions.
After signing of the December 1972 Suchetgarh Agreement, Pakistan began permitting
mountaineering expeditions to enter the un-demarcated area comprising the triangle formed by NJ
9842, the Karakoram Pass and Indra Col.
In 1975, a Japanese mountaineering expedition led by H. Katayama climbed Terma Kangri I and
Terma Kangri II, both over 24,000 feet, which were approached through Pakistan via the Bilafond
La. In 1978, a German Siachen-Kondus expedition led by Jaroslav Poncar with Major Asad Raza of
the Pakistan Army as the liaison officer, entered the Siachen Glacier via Bilafond La. A documentary
on this expedition was shown on a German TV channel in 1979.
Interestingly, beginning from 2007, India has begun permitting both Indian and foreign
mountaineering and trekking expeditions in the area. For example, in 2007 alone (July 30 to
September 1), India permitted an Indo-French expedition to Mamostong Kangri Peak, located
about 30 km east of the snout of the Siachen Glacier. On September 6 of the same year, the Indian
Mountaineering Federation sent an expedition comprising six civilians and four Army men to Rimo
Peak located east of the Siachen Glacier and overlooking Aksai Chin.

INDIAN FORAYS
Indias first foray into this region was in 1957, designated by the UN as the International
Geophysical Year. India had then mounted a major multi-disciplinary scientific expedition to the
Siachen region to map the glaciers, geology, and flora and fauna of this then little known area.
It was quite by accident that the Army discovered Pakistans machinations. In 1977, Colonel
Narendra Kumar, a well-known mountaineer who was then commanding the Armys High Altitude
Warfare School at Gulmarg, was approached by a German rafter who wanted to undertake the first
descent of the Nubra River from its source at the snout of the Siachen Gacier. He showed a map
that showed a dotted line connecting NJ 9842 to the Karakoram Pass. Colonel Kumar, nicknamed
Bull, showed the map to Lt General Chibber, who was then Director Military Operations in the
Army Headquarters. He then quickly obtained permission for Colonel Kumar to mount a
reconnaissance expedition to Siachen.

Colonel Kumar thereafter went on a major mountaineering expedition that saw him trekking up to
the glaciers halfway point and then ascending the Teram Kangri II located on the southern edge of
the Shaksgam Valley. The team returned with trash left behind by Pakistani expeditions as evidence
of the latters incursions.
In 1981 Colonel Kumar traversed the entire Siachen Glacier and hoisted the Indian Tricolour at the
farthest end. In the eight weeks spent in the inhospitable region, Colonel Kumar scaled the Sia
Kangri (24,350 feet), which is now in POK; Saltoro Kangri I (35,400 feet), which is with the Indian
Army; Indra Col and skied to the Bilafond La, Sia La and Turkistan La. His exploits were published
in both Indian newspapers and foreign journals in the years 1978, 1982, 1983 and 1984, thereby
becoming a matter of public knowledge. It is quite likely that these publications may have further
alerted the Pakistani Army. In tribute to his reconnaissance that provided the Army vital
information, the battalion headquarters located on the Siachen Glacier is named Kumar Base.
Following Colonel Kumars expeditions in the early 1980s, the Army began launching long-range
patrols to the Siachen Glacier during the summer months between May and August. Prior to
launching its assault on Bilafond La, 4 Kumaon was one such battalion which undertook such
patrols.

LORE OF THE WILD ROSES

Originally known as Saicher Gharni, local folklore has that a small Yarkandi village existed at the
entrance of the Teram Shehr glacier where Yarkandis, natives of Yarkand, an oasis city in the west
end of the Tarim Basin of Chinese Turkistan, would meet the Baltis, inhabitants of Gilgit-Baltistan
region of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Once Yarkandis descended the Ghyari nala and took away a
Balti woman with them.
The Baltis then contacted a cleric who gave them a talisman for placing on the Bilafond la. Against
cleric's instruction of returning via the Nubra valley, the Baltis, after placing the talisman on the
pass, returned the same way they had come. The glacier faced a storm that destroyed the
settlements but spared the wild roses. This gave glacier its name Siachen (Sia-rose, chen-place of),
the land of roses. Today wild roses grow in plenty near the snout and in the lower valleys.
In 1912, two Americans, Fanny Bullock Workman and her husband, William surveyed it for the
first time and found walls of a settlement near Teram Shehr glacier.

WHY THE ICY TANGLE EVADES SOLUTION

AN the Siachen issue be fixed? Both sides have come close to resolving it but each time it
has fallen through. The biggest hurdle lies in the way the two sides view the problem and
the lack of trust that has marked bilateral relations ever since 1947 when the Indian
subcontinent was partitioned and Pakistan came into being. In the case of Siachen, however, both
sides feel tricked and see it as deceit.

India accuses Pakistan of disturbing the status quo by engaging in cartographic aggression and
permitting expeditions by foreign mountaineers assisted by its army. Pakistan views India as the
aggressor and blames India for surreptitiously occupying the Saltoro Ridge ahead of the Siachen
Glacier. But this again is based in the way in which the two sides interpret the line thence North to
the glaciers, which refers to the un-demarcated portion north of NJ 9842.
While Pakistan interprets these words as a line extending in a north easterly direction from NJ 9842
to the Karakoram Pass in Chinese occupied Aksai Chin, India interprets it as following the Saltoro
Range, which begins at NJ 9842 and runs in a north westerly direction, on the watershed principle
all the way up to Indra Col. Both interpretations encompass the massive Siachen Glacier. Neither
interpretation leaves scope for sharing the icy wasteland.
Although some authors have termed Siachen to be the low hanging fruit of the Indo-Pakistan peace
process, it is not that easy. Listed below are several issues that India needs to consider before ever
letting go of the Saltoro Ridge:
i.

ii.

iii.
iv.

v.
vi.

vii.

India has always claimed that the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir belongs to it following
the October 26, 1947, accession. Occupation of the Saltoro Ridge is therefore occupation
of Indian territory and should therefore be non-negotiable.
Any withdrawal or unqualified redeployment without delineating the LoC ahead of NJ 9842
will mean accepting Pakistani claim and negating the August 1948 UN Resolution, the
derivative Karachi Agreement, the July 1972 Simla Agreement and its derivative December
1972 Suchetgarh Agreement.
From the point of realpolitik, by occupying the Saltoro Ride India is better placed to strike a
bargain while settling bilateral territorial disputes with Pakistan in the future.
Since the alignment of the LoC just prior to NJ 9842 was altered by Pakistan by its
occupation of the Gyong Glacier in 1984, the Pakistani argument of the LoC extending
north eastwards to the Karakoram Pass does not hold water, says Major General Sheru
Thapliyal, who has served as General Officer Commanding of 3 Division, which was
entrusted with safeguarding the Saltoro Ridge.
Then again, since the LoC does not extend beyond NJ 9842, the Pakistani argument that
India has altered the status of the LoC by occupying the Saltoro Ridge is not valid either.
With the AGPL currently running up to Indra Col, India now overlooks and borders the
Shaksgam Valley, which would not be the case should India concede Pakistans
interpretation of then North to the glaciers. In the current scenario, China then cannot
ignore India while settling the Shaksgam Valley issue considering that Beijing has steadfastly
maintained that the status of this valley will be decided on the eventual settlement of the
J&K problem.
The Saltoro Ridge serves as a wedge that prevents POK from linking up with China and
assisting the two countries to develop closer geographical proximity in the area. It
overlooks Gilgit and Baltistan to the west and has to be crossed by anyone seeking access

viii.

ix.

x.

xi.

from Skardu in the Gilgit and Baltistan area to the Karakoram Pass which leads into Tibet.
Any Pakistani location in Karakoram would be a threat to India in Ladakh from the north in
addition to Chinese locations in Aksai Chin, states Vikram Sood, a former Chief of the
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).
Beginning with the construction of the Karakoram Highway following Pakistans cessation
of the Shaksgam Valley to China, Beijing is far more active in this region than ever before.
The Karakoram Highway is being expanded in width to 30m in order to permit plying of all
weather heavy transport vehicles. A rail link has been planned and fibre optic cables are
being laid; perhaps eventually an oil pipeline. Pakistans Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea
could eventually be Chinas western port, which in turn would be just 2,500 km from
Xinjiang compared to the current 4,500 km distance to the nearest port on Chinas east
coast. Ceding the NJ 9842-Indra Col-Karakoram Pass triangle to Pakistan would only
further strengthen the Sino-Pakistan footprint on these strategic heights.
India fears that a unilateral withdrawal will result in Pakistan occupying the Saltoro Ride
and the Siachen Glacier which, in addition to geographically linking up with China, will
bring Pakistani forces closer to Leh, thus endangering it, as also the Nubra Valley and the
Shyok Valley where Thoise airbase and Partapur are located. Pakistan will be able to
interdict the Indian Armys lines of communication in this area.
Considering that Indias occupation of the Saltoro Ridge is a sore point with the Pakistani
Army and it has made many attempts to re-take it (General Pervez Musharraf unsuccessfully
led one such charge when he was a Brigadier), Pakistan is likely to be tempted to capture
the Saltoro Ridge in the event of an Indian withdrawal or redeployment. Should Pakistan
occupy the ridgeline and the passes, India will find it virtually impossible to re-take the
rugged mountainous terrain as it does with the Haji Pir Pass (ahead of Uri in Jammu and
Kashmir) that was handed over to Pakistan with the signing of the Tashkent Agreement in
January 1966.
Finally, should India be repeating the mistakes of the past? These include halting the advance
at Uri in 1948 and not capturing Skardu during that war; giving up the Haji Pir Pass in
1966; and returning 93,000 prisoners without settling the Kashmir issue following Indias
victory over Pakistan in 1971.

ITS A NO-WIN FOR BOTH INDIA, PAK

NDIA holds the view that it can consider withdrawing (as would also Pakistan) provided both
Indian and Pakistani military positions in the area are first demarcated, authenticated and
officially recorded on maps to be exchanged. Furthermore foolproof mechanisms are needed to
ensure verification and prevention of Kargil type intrusions as engaged in by Pakistan in 1999. The
issue then can be left for subsequent negotiations for a permanent settlement.

Pakistan rejects this suggestion saying that this will legitimise and accord recognition to Indias
occupation of the Saltoro Ridge. Instead, Islamabad advocates that any Indian withdrawal or
redeployment must be as per deployment of Indian forces post the December 1971 ceasefire. This
means India permanently vacate the Saltoro Ridge and the Siachen Glacier.

CANT TRUST, CANT VERIFY

The biggest problem remains trust. Even if an agreement is reached to pull back forces, how does
each side trust and monitor the other? If either side reneges on the agreement, it will be militarily
difficult to dislodge the other as has been proven with Pakistan unable to oust the Indian Army from
the towering heights of the Saltoro Ridge and the passes. Both assault by ground troops and
employment of precision guided munitions from land and air are difficult in this harsh and
unforgiving terrain.
Satellite surveillance is not very accurate in mountainous terrain. For example, given that even an
average mountain can have inclines at 80 degrees, a one metre resolution actually compresses
features about four to five times the size. Experts say a polar orbit satellite can be over a spot for a
very short time but then its timing over the region can be easily predicted and measures taken to
hide movements. Then again, ground based sensors are difficult to install at those heights in the
rugged terrain. Howling blizzards which are a frequent occurrence could easily render them nonfunctional.
Sceptics in India will always question whether a rogue Pakistani Army general wont launch an
incursion as did General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 across the LoC in the Kargil sector despite very
clearly delineated maps signed by both sides.

PARADOX OF STATUS QUO

India may not have foreseen that the Armys taking of the Bilafond and Sia passes and subsequently
the Saltoro Ridge would, as Lt General ML Chibber says, lead to a permanent military deployment.
But now that India has established military control over the area, it will find it difficult to vacate the
area in the absence of a mutually acceptable agreement that can be verified on ground. The fact
remains that the Pakistani Army has been unable to scale the crest of the Saltoro Range while the
Indian Army cannot come down and abandon the high posts.
The Siachen region has since been condescendingly described by some as a struggle of two men
over a comb, an ego problem between two armies, a futile war to name a few. Perhaps it is all
and more. War is never a pleasant business. Defence expenditure always seems a waste, especially
for developing countries with poverty stricken people. But then so are insurance premiums for the
healthy. Just as one needs an insurance policy to deal with a sudden health problem or death, one
needs an armed force, which theoretically speaking may never be employed, in the event of an
external aggression. The Siachen region presents itself as one of the worlds most hostile terrain

where sustaining human life is difficult. But in a post-Westphalian world, sovereignty and the
sanctity of geographical territory is often more sacrosanct than human lives.
Indeed, as long as the two sides remain deadlocked in Siachen, the Indian Army will forever remain
confronted with the paradox of higher is better (which is good military tactics) and yet at the same
time higher is harder to supply (which makes for bad military logistics).