G.R. No.

132761

March 26, 2003

NORMA ORATE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM (MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC.),
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the May 14, 1997 Decision 1of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42280, and its January 29, 1998 Resolution 3 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
On December 5, 1972, petitioner Norma Orate was employed by Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc., as a regular machine
operator.4 Her duties included the following. On March 22, 1995, she was diagnosed to be suffering from invasive ductal
carcinoma (breast, left),6 commonly referred to as cancer of the breast. Consequently, she underwent modified radical
mastectomy on June 9, 1995. 7The operation incapacitated her from performing heavy work, for which reason she was forced to
go on leave and, eventually, to retire from service at the age of 44.
On November 17, 1995, petitioner applied for employees compensation benefits 8 with the Social Security System (SSS), but the
same was denied on the ground that her illness is not work-related. On January 22, 1996, she moved for reconsideration
contending that her duties as machine operator which included lifting heavy objects increased the risk of contracting breast
cancer.9 The SSS, however, reiterated its denial of petitioner's claim for benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program.
Instead, it approved her application as a sickness benefit claim under the SSS, 10 and classified the same as a permanent partial
disability equivalent to a period of twenty-three (23) months. 11 Thus
Respectfully referred is a letter and copies of EC-Sickness Benefit Claim of subject employee for your further evaluation
and review.
Said claim was not considered as EC, however, sickness and disability benefit claims under SSS were approved,
computer print-out hereto attached.12
Petitioner requested the elevation of her case to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed on June 20,
1996, the decision of the SSS in ECC Case No. MS-7938-296. The ECC ruled that petitioner's disability due to breast cancer is not
compensable under the Employees' Compensation Program because said ailment is not included among the occupational
diseases under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; and it was not established that the risk of contracting said
ailment was increased by the working conditions at Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. 13 The dispositive portion of the ECC's decision
reads
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant case is accordingly
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42280. On May 14, 1997, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the ECC, and granted petitioner's claim for compensation benefit under the Workmen's
Compensation Act (Act No. 3428).15 It held that petitioner's breast cancer must have intervened before the effectivity of Title II,
Book IV of the Labor Code on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund on January 1, 1975, hence, the governing law
on petitioner's claim for compensation benefit is Act No. 3428, which works upon the presumption of compensability, and not the
provisions of the Labor Code on employees' compensation. The Court of Appeals further ruled that since Manila Bay Spinning
Mills, Inc. failed to discharge the burden of proving that petitioner's ailment did not arise out of or in the course of employment,
the presumption of compensability prevails, entitling her to compensation. The dispositive portion of the said decision states:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested Decision (ECC Case No. MS-7838-296) is hereby set aside; petitioner
instead should be entitled to the benefits under Act No. 3428, as amended, together with the medical-surgical expenses,
including doctor's bill.
SO ORDERED.16
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 17 arguing that it is the Labor Code which should be applied to her case inasmuch as
there is no evidence that the onset of her breast carcinoma occurred before January 1, 1975. She claimed that the basis of the
computation of her compensation benefits should be the Labor Code and not the Workmen's Compensation Act.
On January 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied her motion for reconsideration. 18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition insisting that her disability should be compensated under the provisions of the Labor
Code and not under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The resolution of the instant controversy hinges on the following issues: (1) What is the law applicable to petitioner's claim for
disability benefits? and (2) Is she entitled under the applicable law to be compensated for disability arising from breast
carcinoma?
The first law on workmen's compensation in the Philippines is Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the Workmen's Compensation
Act, which took effect on June 10, 1928. This Act works upon the presumption of compensability which means that if the injury or
disease arose out of and in the course of employment, it is presumed that the claim for compensation falls within the provisions
of the law. Simply put, the employee need not present any proof of causation. It is the employer who should prove that the illness
or injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment.19
On November 1, 1974, the Workmen's Compensation Act was repealed by the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442). On
December 27, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 626 (which took effect on January 1, 1975) was issued. It extensively amended the
provisions of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund. 20 The law as it now stands
requires the claimant to prove a positive thing that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions. 21 It discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability"
and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. The present system is also administered by social
insurance agencies the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System under the Employees'
Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's
compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. 22
In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,23 we explained the nature of the new employees' compensation
scheme and the State Insurance Fund, as follows
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their
employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There
is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral
Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and
medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of
administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.
On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for
insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these
contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission
administers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the
compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is
automatically paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability
and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called
for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. . . .
In workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date when the claimant contracted the disease. An
injury or illness which intervened prior to January 1, 1975, the effectivity date of P.D. No. 626, shall be governed by the provisions
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while those contracted on or after January 1, 1975 shall be governed by the Labor Code, as
amended by P.D. No. 626.24 Corollarily, where the claim for compensation benefit was filed after the effectivity of P.D. No. 626
without any showing as to when the disease intervened, the presumption is that the disease was contracted after the effectivity
of P.D. No. 626. 25
In the case at bar, petitioner was found to be positive for breast cancer on March 22, 1995. No evidence, however, was presented
as to when she contracted said ailment. Hence, the presumption is that her illness intervened when P.D. No. 626 was already the
governing law.
The instant controversy is not on all fours with the cases where the Court applied the "presumption of compensability" and
"aggravation" under the Workmen's Compensation Act, even though the claim for compensation benefit was filed after January 1,
1975. In the said cases, the symptoms of breast cancer manifested before or too close to the cut off date January 1, 1975, that
it is logical to presume that the breast carcinoma of the employee concerned must have intervened prior to January 1, 1975. Thus

(1) In Avendao v. Employees' Compensation Commission,26 the Workmen's Compensation Act was applied to a claim for
disability income benefit arising from breast carcinoma, though the said claim was filed only in 1976, after the effectivity of the
Labor Code. Per certification of the physician of the claimant, her breast cancer was contracted sometime in 1959, although the
clinical manifestations thereof started only in 1969.

(2) In Cayco, et al. v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,27 the deceased employee's breast carcinoma first showed up
in 1972 or 6 years before she died on April 26, 1978. We ruled therein that the presumption on compensability under the
Workmen's Compensation Act governs since her right accrued before the Labor Code took effect.
(3) In Ajero v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,28 the claimant was confined and treated for pulmonary tuberculosis
and cancer of the breast from January 5 to 15, 1976. In granting the employee's claim for income benefit, it was held that her
ailments, especially pulmonary tuberculosis, must have supervened several years before, when the Workmen's Compensation Act
was still in force.
(4) In Mandapat v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,29 we held that since the deceased underwent radical
mastectomy on May 10, 1975, it is obvious that the tumor in her right breast started to develop even before 1975. We further
noted "[t]hat the onset of cancer is quiet and gradual, in contrast [to] many diseases It takes six to twelve months for a breast
cancer to grow from a size which can just be found to the size actually encountered at the time of surgery."
(5) In Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,30 the deceased employee was confined for cancer of the liver,
duodenal cancer, and cancer of the breast, from September 8-25, 1978, before she succumbed to death October 16, 1978. In the
said case, we recognized that cancer is a disease which is often discovered when it is too late. Hence, we surmised that the
possibility that its onset was even before the effectivity of the New Labor Code cannot be discounted.
(6) In De Leon v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,31 we ruled that the governing law on the claim for income benefit
filed by the mother of the deceased on June 8, 1976 is the Workmen's Compensation Act. The modified radical mastectomy
conducted on the deceased on September 16, 1968 obviously showed that she contracted breast carcinoma before the effectivity
of P.D. No. 626.
Clearly therefore, the "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" under the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be
applied to petitioner's claim for compensation benefit arising from breast cancer. We are not experts in this field to rule that the
onset of her breast carcinoma occurred prior to January 1, 1975, or almost twenty years ago. Hence, the provisions of the Labor
Code govern. For breast carcinoma and resulting disability to be compensable, the claimant must prove, by substantial evidence,
either of two things: (a) that the sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on
Employees' Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the
claimant's working conditions.32
There is no dispute that cancer of the breast is not listed as an occupational disease under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees'
Compensation. As such, petitioner has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her illness
and her working conditions.
Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 33 In
the case at bar, petitioner argued before the SSS and the ECC that her job as machine operator, which required lifting of heavy
objects increased the risk of her contracting breast carcinoma. In addition, she contended that her job in the winding department
exposed her to cancer-causing dyes used in coloring threads. 34In support thereof, she cited the following:
Some industrial chemicals create a cancer hazard for people who work with them. Such chemicals include aniline dyes,
arsenic, asbestos, chromium and iron compounds, lead, nickel, vinyl chloride, and certain products of coal, lignite, oil
shale, and petroleum. Unless industrial plants carefully control the use of such chemicals, excessive amounts may
escape or be released into the environment. The chemicals then create a cancer hazard for people in surrounding areas.
(World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, 1992 ed., p. 119)35
Regrettably, however, said bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not constitute such evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship between her illness and her working
conditions. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions. The claimant must prove a positive
proposition.36 A perusal of the records reveals that there is no evidence that she was indeed exposed to dyes. Even assuming that
she was dealing directly with chemicals, there is no proof that the company where she worked did not implement measures to
control the hazards occasioned by the use of such chemicals.
Indeed, cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance.
Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the deep bowels of the
earth. It makes no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a
housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.37
It is not also correct to say that all disability or death resulting from all kinds of cancer are not compensable. There are certain
cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR,
cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are
generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof. 38 This was not
satisfied in the instant case.
Hence, while we sustain petitioner's claim that it is the Labor Code that applies to her case, we are nonetheless constrained to
rule that under the same code, her disability is not compensable. Much as we commiserate with her, our sympathy cannot justify
an award not authorized by law. It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are

inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of
diseases not covered by law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers
and their families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. This stems from the
development in the law that no longer is the poor employee still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate
employer, hence the necessity of affording all kinds of favorable presumptions to the employee. This reasoning is no longer good
policy. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the
law.39
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42280, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. MS-7938-296, dismissing petitioner's claim
for compensation benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program is REINSTATED.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. TEODOSIO CUANANG, represented by MARC
DENNIS CUANANG, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals,
dated November 21, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 69305, which set aside the decision [2] dated December 4, 2001 of the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. MG-11995-1200.
Carmen T. Cuanang, deceased wife of respondent Marc Dennis Cuanang, was formerly employed as a teacher in the Division
of City Schools, Manila. She was first appointed on October 1, 1972, as Elementary Grade Teacher. She was later promoted to
Teacher I on July 1, 1989 and later on to Teacher II. Carmen Cuanang served as Teacher II until she applied for early optional
retirement on November 9, 1998, after completing almost twenty six years of government service. [3]
From September 14 to September 18, 1997, Carmen Cuanang was confined at the University of
the East Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Medical Center, for Bronchial Asthma and Pneumonia, Rheumatic Heart Disease (RHD) and
Mitral Stenosis.[4] She filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for sickness benefits under Presidential
Decree 626, as amended.[5] The GSIS awarded her Temporary Total Disability (TTD) benefits from November 14-25,
1998. Subsequently, Cuanang was also granted Permanent Partial Disability benefits equivalent to nine months.
Carmen Cuanang died on May 7, 2000 at the age of 65. The immediate cause of her death [6] was determined to be Cardio
Pulmonary Arrest with Acute Myocardial Infarction as the antecedent cause, and Bronchial Asthma and Hypertension as
underlying causes.
Consequently, respondent filed with petitioner GSIS a claim for death benefits under PD 626, as amended. Petitioner denied
the said claim in its letter of July 20, 2000,[7] the pertinent portion of which reads:
After a careful study, the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department, submitted its findings and recommendations as
follows:
Death due to Myocardial Infarction is not compensable under PD 626 since it occurred after retirement and beyond PPD period.
Based on the recommendation of our Medical Department, this office regrets to inform you that your claim can not be favorably
considered. x x x.
Respondent sought a re-evaluation of his claim, which the GSIS denied in a letter dated September 5, 2000.[8]
Respondent then appealed the denial of his claim to the ECC. In its December 4, 2001 decision,[9] the ECC affirmed the
denial by the GSIS of the respondents claim, thus:
The ailment Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) can not be considered work-connected since it is a complication of Rheumatic Heart
Disease, which is a result of her (Carmen Cuanangs) Rheumatic Fever, acquired during childhood. In the same vein, Bronchial
Asthma can not be given due course since Cuanangs death took place beyond the PPD period. Moreover, the fact that
Hypertension was developed after Cuanangs retirement negates compensability since it may be due to factors other than her
work or working conditions.
Undeterred, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, challenging
the above decision of the ECC. On November 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:
The degree of proof required under PD 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means, such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the
development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a

reasonable work connection and not direct causal connection. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmens claim is
based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded, especially where there is some basis in the fact for
inferring work connection. Probability, not certainty is the touchstone.[10]
Hence, the Court of Appeals set aside the assailed decision of the ECC and ordered the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) to pay respondents claim for death benefits under the Employees Compensation Act.
The basic question presented in this petition is whether the resulting death of Carmen Cuanang is compensable under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
We hold in the affirmative.
Petitioner contends that the ailments which brought about the death of respondents wife, Carmen Cuanang, do not fall
within the ambit of the coverage of PD 626, considering that when they occurred she had long retired from government service.
We are not persuaded.
We take our bearings from our pronouncements in the case of Consorcia F. Manuzon v. Employees Compensation
Commission, et al.,[11] In said case, the Employees Compensation Commission denied petitioners claim because the cause of
death of her husband, an assistant professor at the Mindanao State University, which was myocardial infraction, came four and
one half years after his retirement. We held:
We believe otherwise. The evidence clearly shows that during his employment, the deceased suffered from a stroke, a cardio
vascular accident. It was caused by thrombosis or blockage of the arteries. He had to retire because of paralysis caused by that
cardio vascular attack or myocardial infraction. Stated otherwise, the cause of his compulsory retirement due to paralysis arising
from cardio vascular accident is closely related to the cause of his death, which was also a cardio vascular attack or myocardial
infraction. That heart disease developed when he was still working as a professor. It caused his paralysis and his total permanent
disability. The disease was work oriented because of the nature of his employment as a professor. The same disease eventually
caused his death, contrary to the conclusion of both the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission. The Court holds
that the heirs of Mr. Manuzon are entitled to the benefits they are claiming. [12]
In the instant case, the wife of the respondent died a year after her retirement. Clearly, the period between her retirement
and demise was less than one year. Indeed, if a death which occurred almost four and one half years after retirement was held to
be within the coverage of the death benefits under PD 626, as in the Manuzon case, with more reason should a death which
occurred within one year after retirement be considered as covered under the same law. A claim for benefit for such death cannot
be defeated by the mere fact of separation from service.[13]
Further, we agree with the pronouncements of the Court of Appeals that there was substantial evidence to support
respondents claim. Hence, the degree of proof required under PD 626 was satisfied, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [14] Probability and not ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in
compensation proceedings.[15]
In the case at bar, the requisite substantial evidence came from the expert opinion of Dr. Arsenio A. Estreras Jr., a Diplomate
in Internal Medicine who issued the Death Certificate, thus:
Acute Myocardial Infarction generally occurs with the abrupt decrease in coronary blood flow that follows a thrombotic occlusion
of a coronary artery previously narrowed by astherosclerosis. It is common knowledge among medical practitioners that
hypertension is one major risk factor among multiple coronary risk factors that can precipitate an acute coronary acclusion.
(Harrisons Principle of Internal Medicine, 14th ed., pp. 1066, 1110) Mrs. Carmen Cuanang was hypertensive and also had
bronchial asthma. Therefore Acute Myocardial Infarction which she suffered can be a consequence also of her chronic
hypertension vis--vis her rheumatic heart disease. [16]
The aforequoted expert opinion deserves credence considering that we have previously held that no physician, who is aware
of the far reaching and serious effects that his statement would cause on a money claim filed with a government agency, would
issue a certification indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection. [17]
Moreover, this expert opinion is fully supported by the facts leading to Carmen Cuanangs deteriorating health condition, and
ultimately, her death. When the deceased joined the government service on October 1, 1972, she was in perfect health. It was
only in 1997, while she was still in the service, that her condition started to worsen. Her fragile condition necessitated her
confinement at the University of the East Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center from September 14, 1997 to September 18, 1997 for
Bronchial Asthma and Pneumonia; Rheumatic Heart Disease and Mitral Stenosis. [18]
Myocardial Infarction, also known as coronary occlusion or just a coronary, is a life threatening condition. Predisposing
factors for myocardial infarction are the same for all forms of Coronary Artery Disease, and these factors include stress. Stress
appears to be associated with elevated blood pressure. [19] It is of common knowledge that the job of a teacher can be very
stressful. Carmen Cuanangs responsibilities were never limited to the four corners of the classroom. Aside from teaching
students, she also prepared lesson plans, attend seminars, conferences and other school activities, within and outside the school

premises, such as tree planting for the beautification of the school premises and the community, sportsfest programs and
parades, year after year throughout her almost 26 years in government service. During election periods, she was also deputized
by the Commission on Elections to act as an election registrar. In addition, in going to and from the school, she was constantly
exposed to the ravages of the natural elements such as heat, rain and dust. [20] Needless to say, the collective effect of all these
factors can indeed be very stressful especially for someone afflicted with Rheumatic Heart Disease as Carmen Cuanang. It goes
without saying that all these conditions contributed much to the deterioration of her already precarious health.
The first law on workmens compensation in the Philippines was Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the Workmens
Compensation Act, which took effect on June 10, 1928. This Act works upon the presumption of compensability which means that
if the injury or disease arose out of and in the course of employment, it is presumed that the claim for compensation falls within
the provisions of the law. Simply put, the employee need not present any proof of causation. It is the employer who should prove
that the illness or injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment. [21]
P.D. No. 626 further amended Title II of Book IV on the ECC and State Insurance Fund of the Labor Code of
the Philippines (P.D. No. 442, as amended). This law abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation
under the Workmens Compensation Act.[22] For the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant
must prove that: (a) the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Rules on Employees
Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimants working conditions. [23] In other words, if
the claimants illness or disease is not included in the said Annex A, then he is entitled to compensation only if he can prove that
the risk of contracting the illness or disease was increased by his working conditions. [24]
The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies the Government Service Insurance System and Social
Security System under the Employees Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the
employers obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employees right to receive reparation for work-connected death or
disability.[25]
Notwithstanding the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old law, the present law has not
ceased to be an employees compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man
and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice
should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, [26] especially in light of the
compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. [27] Elsewise stated, a humanitarian
impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic
approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants. [28] Verily, the policy is to extend the applicability of the law on
employees compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. [29]
Therefore, claims falling under the Employees Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill its essence as a social
legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in our society. It is only this kind of interpretation that can
give meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code, which states
that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and
regulations should be resolved in favor of labor. [30]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69305 dated November 21,
2002, which set aside the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission, is AFFIRMED. The claim of Teodosio Cuanang for
compensation benefits for the death of his wife, Carmen Cuanang, is GRANTED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989
ZAIDA
G.
RARO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of confusion among the claimants and the
government agencies enforcing the employees' compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of the principles of 94
presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the defunct Workmen's Compensation Act but expressly discarded
under the present compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees' compensation decisions.
The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of "proof of increased risk." There are two
approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational
disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions. The one espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot
prove the necessary work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working
conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state that if there is no proof of the
required work connection, the disease is not compensable because the law says so.

The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its
Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent
headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in
Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.
The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of
time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost.
A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion
for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's
affirming the GSIS decision.
The following issues are raised in this petition:
1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is compensable under
the present compensation laws.
2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws
when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. (p. 17, Rollo)
The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of
various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no
relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels
of the earth. It makes the difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar
worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.
It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational diseases prepared by the Commission
includes some cancers as compensable, namely
Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment
xxx xxx xxx xxx
16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products lymphatic and blood forming vessels; industry
carpenters, nasal cavity and sinuses and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills.
17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic workers.
(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)
The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic
workers to be compensated for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by
specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain
chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting
specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.
The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.
Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines defines "sickness" as follows:
ART. 167. Definition of Terms. As used in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any
illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is by
working conditions. For this purpose, the Co on is empowered to determine and approve occupational and workrelated illnesses that may be considered compensable sable based on hazards of employment. (PD 1368, May
1, 1978).
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines who are entitled. It provides:
SECTION 1.
xxx xxx xxx

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of
an occupational disease under Annex A of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof
must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions . (Emphasis
supplied)
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing the illness was caused by employment and the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust
fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise nonexistent proof cannot be presumed .
In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is
a disease of still unknown origin which strikes; people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a
particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we
cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease .
To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in
the course of employment" provision of the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the
distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and the present scheme.
On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law
discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on
social security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies the Government Service
Insurance System and Social Security System under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a
sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive
reparation for work- connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena
v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192
[1985]; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, et al., GR No. 65680, May 11, 1988).
Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where
regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove
entitlement.
In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the validity of the new law by explaining the present
system as follows:
We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against the constitutionality of the new law on
employee's compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same
law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by
certiorari.
The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its
provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights.
xxx xxx xxx
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries
of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer
opposes his claim There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a
claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the
employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment
of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been
doubled.
On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not
look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own fund to
meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission
administers and settles claims from a fired under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the
compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational
disease is automatically paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of
compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one

employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now
absent.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There is no serious attempt to assail
it on constitutional grounds.
The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be addressed to the
President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's compensation program with its
presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present
scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it better
complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men
and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. (at
pp. 4, 5, and 6)
The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an understanding of the present scheme. There
is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer.
Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer
which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees in trying to
have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not
caused by employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund
against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove
a positiveproposition, that the risk of contracting the is increased by working conditions.
The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which distinguishes it from the old and familiar
system.
Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers throughout the country are required by
law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust
fund. At the time the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined
number of workers who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the said fund and
making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law.
We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or
recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered
by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to winch the tens of millions of workers and their families
look for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or
premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after
proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching
implications.
We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually evaluating the actuarial soundness of the
trust funds they administer. In this way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered
occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers,
increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court
to accomplish.
For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the
decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v.
Employees' Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from those stated
above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the public respondents is AFFIRMED.
GSIS vs RAOET
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,[1] petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) seeks to set aside the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated February 3, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 72820, which overturned and set aside the July 24,
2002 decision[3] of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-13079-302, and granted respondent Jean
Raoets (respondent) claim for income benefits arising from her husbands death.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The respondents husband, Francisco M. Raoet (Francisco), entered government service on July 16, 1974 as an Engineer Trainee at
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). On July 5, 1978, he was appointed as Junior Civil Engineer, and on April 22, 1981, he
rose to the rank of Irrigation Engineer B. On August 1, 1998, he was promoted to the position of Engineer A the position he held
until his death on May 5, 2001. As Engineer A, Francisco supervised the implementation of construction activities of Lateral E and
E-1. He was also tasked to review and check the structural plan and the facilities. [4]

In 2000, Francisco was diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease, and he was confined at
the Region I Medical Center from July 16 to July 25, 2000.[5] As the GSIS considered this a work-related condition, Francisco was
awarded 30 days Temporary Total Disability benefits, plus reimbursement of medical expenses incurred during treatment.
On May 5, 2001, Francisco was rushed to the Dr. Marcelo M. Chan Memorial Hospital because he was vomiting blood. [6] He was
pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. His death certificate listed the causes of his death as follows:
CAUSES OF DEATH
Immediate cause: Cardiac Arrest
Antecedent cause: Acute Massive Hemorrhage
Underlying cause: T/C Bleeding Peptic Ulcer Disease[7]
The respondent, as widow, filed with the GSIS on May 24, 2001 a claim for income benefits accruing from the death of
her husband, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626 (P.D. 626), as amended. On August 31, 2001, the GSIS denied the claim on
the ground that the respondent did not submit any supporting documents to show that Franciscos death was due to peptic ulcer.
On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the GSIS in its decision of July 24, 2002. According to the ECC, it could not
determine if Franciscos death was compensable due to the absence of documents supporting the respondents claim. Since
Francisco had no prior history of consultation relating to peptic ulcer and no autopsy was performed to ascertain the cause of his
death, the ECC could not conclude that Bleeding Peptic Ulcer Disease was the reason for his demise.
The respondent elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Review. She cited the following supporting grounds:
1.

Employees Compensation Commission failed to consider that peptic ulcer is an on and off disease which
does not need confinement in a hospital or clinic or submission to a Doctor of Medicine because it can be
cured by self-medication.

2.

The Employees Compensation Commission failed to consider also that there were medical treatment of
Francisco Raoet of occupational and compensable diseases other than peptic ulcer as shown by the
medical findings of certificates, Xerox copies of which are attached to this petition.

The CA reversed[8] the ECC decision. The appellate court held that while the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation does not list peptic ulcer as an occupational disease, Franciscos death should be compensable since its immediate
cause was cardiac arrest. Thus, the CA ordered the GSIS to pay the respondents claim for death benefits under P.D. 626, as
amended.
The GSIS, this time, appealed through the present petition, raising the following issues:
I.

Whether or not the CA was correct in reversing the decision of the ECC and the GSIS denying the
respondents claim for income benefit under P.D. 626, as amended, for the death of her husband, Francisco.

II.

Whether or not the ailment Acute Massive Hemorrhage t/c Bleeding Peptic Ulcer Disease, which caused the
death of the late Francisco, is work-connected or whether there was any proof to show that the risk of
contracting the same was increased by factors attendant to his employment.

The GSIS reasons out that since the cause of Franciscos death was peptic ulcer, a disease not included in the
occupational diseases listed in Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease was increased by his working conditions. The respondent failed to present any such evidence to support
her claim apart from her bare allegations. In fact, Franciscos medical records disclose that he did not consult his doctors
regarding peptic ulcer. Since no autopsy was performed to ascertain the cause of death, no assurance exists that Bleeding Peptic
Ulcer was indeed the cause of his death.
The GSIS further argues that Franciscos other ailments, i.e., his hypertension and coronary artery disease, had already
been awarded the maximum benefits commensurate to the degree of his disability when he was granted 30 days Temporary Total
Disability benefits, plus reimbursement of medical expenses incurred in the treatment of these illnesses. Thus, no death benefit
for the same diseases can be claimed.
The GSIS also points out that the employees compensation trust fund is presently empty, and claims on this fund are
being paid by the GSIS from advances coming from its other funds. Accordingly, the GSIS argues that the trust fund would suffer
if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law.
In contrast, the respondent claims that the issues the GSIS raised are essentially questions of fact which the Court is now
barred from resolving in a petition for review on certiorari. Thus, she posits that the petition should be denied.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The Procedural issue
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court opens a case for review only on questions of law, not questions
of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists
when the doubt is on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. [9]
In raising questions regarding Franciscos cause of death and its compensability, the GSIS, at first blush, appears to be
raising a basic question of fact the actual cause of Franciscos death. Its question, however, is not on the truth or falsity of the
claimed cause of death, but on whether evidence exists supporting the claimed cause of death. Posed in this manner, the
question is not purely a factual one as it involves the appreciation of how evidence is to be viewed, and whether such evidence
supports or rejects the claimed cause of death. Thus, it is a question we can rule upon in this petition.

From the perspective of the CA decision, the issue is not so much the actual cause of death, but a reading of the cause
of death from the point of view of compensability. This is essentially a legal issue, touching as it does on the issue of
compensability. Hence, it is likewise within the power of this Court to review in this Rule 45 petition.
Factors determining
compensability of death
P.D. 626, as amended, defines compensable sickness as "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease
listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the
same is increased by the working conditions."
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation implements P.D. 626 and requires that for
sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, it must be an "occupational disease" included in the list
provided (Annex "A"), with the conditions attached to the listed sickness duly satisfied; otherwise, the claimant must show proof
that the risk of contracting the illness is increased by his working conditions. In plainer terms, to be entitled to
compensation, a claimant must show that the sickness is either: (1) a result of an occupational disease listed under
Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation under the conditions Annex A sets forth; or (2) if not so
listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.[10]
Based on Franciscos death certificate, the immediate cause of his death was cardiac arrest; the antecedent cause was
acute massive hemorrhage, and the underlying cause was bleeding peptic ulcer disease.
The GSIS maintains that the respondents claim for income benefits should be denied because she failed to present any
proof, documentary or otherwise, that peptic ulcer was the underlying cause for Franciscos death.
We disagree with this position, as we find that the respondent submitted sufficient proof of the cause of her husbands
death when she presented his death certificate. In Philippine American Life Insurance Company v. CA,[11] we held that death
certificates and the notes by a municipal health officer prepared in the regular performance of his duties are prima
facie evidence of facts therein stated. A duly-registered death certificate is considered a public document and the
entries found therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence
establishing a contrary conclusion. We also ruled in People v. Datun[12] that a death certificate establishes the fact of death
and its immediate, antecedent, and underlying causes.
Since neither the GSIS nor the ECC presented any evidence to refute that cardiac arrest was the immediate cause, and
peptic ulcer was the underlying cause of Franciscos death, we accept as established, in accordance with the death certificate,
that the underlying cause of Franciscos demise was peptic ulcer.
The CA decision and Peptic Ulcer
as Compensable Illness
In the assailed decision, the CA focused on Franciscos immediate cause of death cardiac arrest and ignored the
underlying cause of death peptic ulcer. According to the CA, Franciscos death is compensable even if peptic ulcer is not a listed
occupational disease, since Francisco died due to a listed cause cardiac arrest.
The CA is apparently wrong in its conclusion as it viewed in isolation the immediate cause of death (cardiac arrest),
disregarding that what brought about the cardiac arrest was the ultimate underlying cause peptic ulcer. This error, however, does
not signify that Franciscos death is not compensable because peptic ulcer itself, under specific conditions, is a compensable
illness.
Contrary to the CAs conclusion, peptic ulcer is a compensable cause of death, pursuant to ECC Resolution No. 1676
dated January 29, 1981, which unmistakably provides that peptic ulcer is a compensable disease listed under Annex A,
provided the claimant is in an occupation that involves prolonged emotional or physical stress, as among professional
people, transport workers and the like.[13]
Peptic Ulcer is defined as:
[A]n ulceration of the mucous membrane of the esophagus, stomach or duodenum, caused by the action of the
acid gastric juice.
Peptic ulcer is most common among persons who are chronically anxious or irritated, or who
otherwise suffer from mental tension. It occurs about three times as often in men as in women. Symptoms
include a pain or gnawing sensation in the epigastric region. The pain occurs from 1 to 3 hours after eating, and
is usually relieved by eating or taking an antacid drug. Vomiting, sometimes preceded by nausea, usually
follows a severe bout of pain.
COMPLICATIONS. If ulcers are untreated, bleeding can occur, leading to anemia and therefore weakness and
impaired health. Blood may be vomited, and appears brownish and like coffee grounds because of the
digestive effect of gastric secretions on the hemoglobin. There may be blood in the stools, giving them a tarry
black color. In acute cases sudden hemorrhage can occur and may be fatal if not treated properly.
xxxx
Worry and anxiety can contribute to the development of an ulcer and prevent it from healing . If
emotional tensions persist, an ulcer that has been healed by medical treatment can return. Therefore, every
effort is made to help the patient relax. Sometimes counseling or psychotherapy is helpful in relieving
emotional strain.[14] [Emphasis supplied.]
Based on the Annex A list and the accompanying requisite condition for compensability, the question that really
confronts us is: did Franciscos occupation involve prolonged emotional or physical stress to make his death due to
peptic ulcer compensable?

A significant point to appreciate in considering this question is that based on the GSIS own records,[15] Francisco was
diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease, and confined at the Region I Medical Center in July
2000. The GSIS found this ailment work-connected and awarded Francisco 30 days Temporary Total Disability benefits. This
finding assumes importance in the present case because the established underlying causes of the combination of these diseases
are, among others, the stressful nature and pressures inherent in an occupation. [16] This was what the GSIS
acknowledged in recognizing Franciscos total temporary disability.
As already mentioned, Francisco worked as Engineer A with the NIA, a job with enormous responsibilities. He had to
supervise the construction activities of Lateral E and E-1, and review the structural plan and facilities. [17] The stresses these
responsibilities carried did not abate for Francisco when he returned from his Temporary Total Disability; he occupied the same
position without change of responsibilities until his death on May 5, 2001. Thus, Francisco had continuous exposure to prolonged
emotional stress that would qualify his peptic ulcer a stress-driven ailment as a compensable cause of death.
In arriving at this conclusion, we stress that in determining the compensability of an illness, we do not require that the
employment be the sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration of a claimants illness to entitle him to the benefits
provided for. It is enough that his employment contributed, even if only in a small degree, to the development of the disease. [18] In
the recent case of GSIS v. Vicencio, we said:[19]
It is well-settled that the degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence,
which means, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation .
It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmans claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the
contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a workconnection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. It is not required that the employment be
the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of a claimants illness to entitle him to
the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment contributed, even if to a small degree,
to the development of the disease. [Emphasis supplied.]
In this case, the chain of causation that led to the peptic ulcer is too obvious to be disregarded. The pressures of Franciscos work
constant, continuing and consistent at his level of responsibility inevitably manifested their physical effects on Franciscos health
and body; the initial and most obvious were the hypertension and coronary artery disease that the GSIS itself recognized. Less
obvious, but nevertheless arising from the same pressures and stresses, were the silent killers, like peptic ulcer, that might not
have attracted Franciscos attention to the point of driving him to seek immediate and active medical intervention. Ultimately,
when the ulcer-producing stresses did not end, his ulcer bled profusely, affecting his heart and causing its arrest. In this manner,
Francisco died. That his widow should now be granted benefits for Franciscos death is a conclusion we cannot avoid and is, in
fact, one that we should gladly make as a matter of law and social justice.
Purpose of P.D. 626
Understandably, the GSIS may accuse us of leniency in the grant of compensation benefits in light of the jurisprudential
trends in this area of law. Our leniency, however, is not due to our individual predilections or liberal leanings; it proceeds mainly
from the character of P.D. 626 as a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working
class against the hazards of disability, illness, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income. In employee compensation,
persons charged by law to carry out the Constitutions social justice objectives should adopt a liberal attitude in deciding
compensability claims and should not hesitate to grant compensability where a reasonable measure of work-connection can be
inferred. Only this kind of interpretation can give meaning and substance to the laws compassionate spirit as expressed in Article
4 of the Labor Code that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including their
implementing rules and regulations, should be resolved in favor of labor. [20] When the implementors fail to reach up to these
standards, this Court, as guardian of the Constitution, necessarily has to take up the slack and order what we must, to ensure
that the constitutional objectives are achieved. This is simply what we are doing in this case.
Acting on this same role, we remind the GSIS that when it is called upon to determine the compensability of an
employees disease or death, the present state of the State Insurance Fund cannot be an excuse to avoid the payment of
compensation. If the State Insurance Fund lacks the financial capacity, it is not the responsibility of the insured civil servant, but
rather of the State to fill in the deficiency and ensure the solvency of the State Insurance Fund. This is the clear mandate of
Article 184 of the Labor Code, which reads:
Article 184. Government guarantee. The Republic of the Philippines guarantees the benefits prescribed
under this Title, and accepts general responsibility for the solvency of the State Insurance Fund. In case of
deficiency, the same shall be covered by supplemental appropriations from the national government.
In Biscarra v. Republic, we explicitly said:[21]
The fear that this humane, liberal and progressive view will swamp the Government with claims for continuing
medical, hospital and surgical services and as a consequence unduly drain the National Treasury, is no
argument against it; because the Republic of the Philippines as a welfare State, in providing for the
social justice guarantee in our Constitution, assumes such risk. This assumption of such a noble
responsibility is, as heretofore stated, only just and equitable since the employees to be benefited thereby
precisely became permanently injured or sick while invariably devoting the greater portion of their lives to the
service of our country and people. Human beings constitute the most valuable natural resources of the
nation and therefore should merit the highest solicitude and the greatest protection from the
State to relieve them from unbearable agony. They have a right to entertain the hope that during the few
remaining years of their life some dedicated institution or gifted individual may produce a remedy or cure to
relieve them from the painful or crippling or debilitating or humiliating effects of their injury or ailment, to fully
and completely rehabilitate them and develop their "mental, vocational and social potential," so that they will
remain useful and productive citizens. [Emphasis supplied]
The GSIS, therefore, cannot use the excuse of the State Insurance Funds present lack of capital to refuse paying income
benefits to the respondent, whose husband devoted 27 years of his life to government service and whose death was caused by
an ailment aggravated by the emotional stresses and pressures of his work.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
G.R. No. L-65680 May 11, 1989
JOSE
B.
SARMIENTO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (National Power
Corporation), respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General and The Government Corporate Counsel for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 2134 on
August 25, 1983 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying the petitioner's claim
for death benefits as surviving spouse of the late Flordeliza Sarmiento.
The findings of the respondent Commission are as follows:
The record shows that the late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon
City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the
budget division. History of the deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as early as April 1980 as a
small wound over the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy of the mass revealed
cancer known as "differentiated squamous cell carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in various
hospitals, namely, Veterans Memorial Hospital, United Doctors Medical Hospital and Makati Medical Center. In
March 1981, a soft tissue mass emerged on her left upper cheek as a result of which her lips became deformed
and she was unable to close her left eye. She continued treatment and her last treatment at the Capitol Medical
Center on July 12, 1 981 was due to her difficulty of swallowing food and her general debility. On August 12,
1981, she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma. She was 40 years old.
Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by her during employment was serviceconnected, appellant herein filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. On
September 9, 1982, the GSIS, through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out that
parotid carcinoma is "Malignant tumor of the parotid gland (salivary gland)" and that its development was not
caused by employment and employment conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondent System's decision of
denial, claimant wrote a letter dated October 8, 1982 to the GSIS requesting that the records of the claim be
elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review pursuant to the law and the Amended Rules
on Employees' Compensation. (At pp. 17-18, Rollo)
On August 25, 1983, the respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS' decision. It found that the deceased's death causation by
parotid carcinoma is not compensable because she did not contract nor suffer from the same by reason of her work but by reason
of embryonic rests and epithelial growth.
It may be noted that the petitioner was earlier paid GSIS benefits in the amount of P142,285.03 but the claim for employee's
compensation was disallowed.
Hence, the instant petition.
The petitioner, while principally stressing the compensability of the deceased's ailment, attacks the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the law on employees' compensation which superseded the Labor Code and the of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. He alleges that provisions the said law infringes upon the guarantees of promotion of social
justice, substantive due process, and equal protection of laws, and also permits unjust discrimination and amounts to class
legislation in its enforcement. He prays for the application of the Old Workmen's Compensation Act which provided for a
presumption of compensability whenever an ailment supervened during the course of the employment.
We dismiss the petition.
We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attach against the constitutionality of the new law on employee's
compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when his
claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari.

The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find
in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights. It is now settled jurisprudence (see Sulit v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Erese v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 138 SCRA 192; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92) that the new law discarded the
concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" to restore what the law believes is a sensible equilibrium
between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employees' rights to receive reparation for workconnected death or disability.
In the case of De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation, (supra), this Court explained the new scheme of employees' compensation
as follows:
The new law establishes a state insurance fired built up by the contributions of employers based on the saries
of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer
opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a
claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the
employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment
of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been
doubled.
On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not
look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to
meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission
administers and settles claims from a find under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the
compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational
disease is automatically paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of
compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one
employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now
absent. (At pp. 99-100)
The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. These is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional
grounds.
The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be addressed to the President and
Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions,
adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political departments.
The present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to
the greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty
is to apply it.
Under the present law, a compensable illness means any illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by the
Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by working conditions (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276).
Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an occupational disease
considering the deceased's employment as accounting clerk and later as manager of the budget division. The petitioner must,
therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was caused by her employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of her
contracting the fatal illness.
The petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased visited regional and field operations and was, naturally, exposed to
the elements. According to the petitioner, the deceased's field trips necessitated her to take frequent plane travels which caused
deafening and numb sensations in her ears. This, he says, caused her "differentiated carcinoma" which, according to the
certificate of Dr. Ariston Bautista, "apparently started on external auditory canal."
We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of parotid carcinoma is still
not known. A medical authority, however, declares that:
SALIVARY GLANDS
Painless swelling of the parotid glands is often noted in hepatic cirrhosis in sarcoidis, in mumps, following
abdominal surgery, or associated with neoplasm or infections. The common factors may be dehydration and
inattention to oral hygiene. The latter promotes the growth of large numbers of bacteria which, in the absence
of sufficient salivary flow, ascend from the mouth into the duct of a gland. Another cause of a painful salivary

gland is sialolithiasis (salivary duct stone). The submandibular glands are most commonly affected. Pain and
swelling associated with eating are characteristic. Saliva promotes retention of artificial dentures because of its
mucin content. Thus, conditions characterized by diminished saliva flow often adversely affect the ease with
which dentures may be worn. Calcium phosphate stone tend to form because of a high pH and viscosity of the
submandibular gland saliva which has a high mucin content. Stones are removed by manipulation or excision.
Autoimmune sialosis is the MikulicsSjogren Syndrome, a unilateral or bilateral enlargement of the parotid
and/or submandibular gland, and often the lacrimal glands. Occasionally painful, it is associated with
xerostomia (dry mouth) due to impaired saliva formation that is most common in older women. Beriow et al.,
The Merek Manuel, 14th Edition, pp. 2095-2096).
Another author states the following regarding squamous cell carcinoma:
Moreover, when the salivary gland is almost totally destroyed and replaced by epidermoid cancer it may be
difficult or even impossible to ascribe the origin of the growth to salivary gland tissue. Indeed many squamous
cell carcinomas, especially of the parotid, may be metastatic lesions that develop in lymph nodes included
within the parotid. And it is important to stress that the juxtaparotid and intraparotid lymph nodes are not
merely accumulations of lymphoid tissue but nodes with efferent and afferent lymphatics.
Squamous cell carcinomas of the major salivary glands are generally fixed to the skin and the underlying
tissues and, in the case of the parotid, are often the cause of facial palsy.
Epidermoid cancers grow swiftly and the clinical course is usually rapid. A few tumours, however, have been
present for as long as two years before the patient seeks advice. Some patients remain alive and asymptomatic
after radical surgery, but ordinarily the lesions are highly malignant, infiltrating locally and metastasizing to the
regional nodes Distant metastasis is seldom a prominent clinical feature. In the case of the submandibular
gland the tumor may simulate osteomyelitis of the mandible or an abscess in the gland itself, and if such
lesions are incised a chronic sinus is liable to persist until radical treatment is undertaken. (Evans and
Cruickshank, Epithelial Tumours of the Salivary Glands, Vol. 1, p. 254)
Given the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the public respondents which found no proof that the
deceased's working conditions have indeed caused or increased the risk of her contracting her illness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees'
Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 188385

October 2, 2013

BENITO
E.
LORENZO, Petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (DepEd),Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the 24 February 2009 Decision 1 and
11 June 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104853, Affirming the 23 June 2008 Decision 3 of the
Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree (P.O.)
No. 626, as amended, otherwise known as the Employees' Compensation Law.
The facts
This case emanates from a simple claim for Employees Compensation death benefits filed by the petitioner, surviving spouse of
Rosario D. Lorenzo (Rosario), a Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) member with GSIS Policy No. CM-56244, who during
her lifetime served as Elementary Teacher I at the Department of Education (DepEd) for a period covering 2 October 1984 to 27
December 2001.
The records of the benefit claim which was docketed as ECC Case No. GM-18068-0307-08, show that on 1 October 2001, Rosario
was admitted at the Medical City Hospital due to Hematoma on the Tongue, Left Inner Lip and Right Cheek with Associated
Gingival Bleeding.4
It appears that prior to her hospitalization, she was previously diagnosed by the same hospital for Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia
and was in fact confined therein on 31 July 2001 because of Pneumonia which was a result of immuno-compromise secondary to
leukemia. Rosarios health condition was confirmed by means of a bone marrow examination which showed "hypercellular
aspirate with marked myeloid hyperplasia."

There was no other document on record indicating any past medical, family and personal or social history of Rosario. On 27
December 2001,Rosario died of Cardio-Respiratory Arrest due to Terminal Leukemia. 5
Petitioner, being the surviving spouse, claimed for Employees Compensation death benefits from the GSIS. It was denied on the
ground that the GSIS Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department (MEUD) found Rosarios ailments and cause of death,
Cardio-respiratory Arrest Secondary to Terminal Leukemia, a non-occupational diseases contemplated under P.D. No. 626, as
amended.
Unconvinced, petitioner elevated his Employees Compensation claim to the ECC for review and reconsideration under the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation provided in P.D. No. 626.
Upon review, the ECC found the denial of petitioners claim to be in order, stating that:
Leukemia is listed as an occupational disease under P.D. 626, as amended. Under, Annex "A," Item No. 15 of the Amended Rules
on Employees Compensation, Leukemia is considered compensable among operating room personnel due to exposure to
anesthetics.
Considering the above-stated medical facts and the conditions for compensability under P.D. 626, as amended, the denial by the
System of appellants claim for EC Death Benefits is proper.
This Commission believes that the deceaseds Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia is a result of a defective genetic expression in
expanding hematopoietic stem cells (or blood cell precursors) resulting in the uncontrolled production of abnormal blood cells.
"The diagnosis of Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia is established by reciprocal translocation between chromosomes 9 and 12. This
translocation results in the head-to-tail fusion of the breakpoint cluster region (BCR) gene on chromosome 22q11 with the ABL
gene located on chromosome 34.Untreated, the disease is characterized by the inevitable transition from a chronic phase to an
accelerated phase and on to blastic crisis." (Harrisons Principles of Internal medicine, 16th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 637).
The nature of the deceaseds occupation does not increase the risk of developing Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia because the
work does not show frequent and sufficient exposure to substances established as occupational risk factors of the disease.
Further, several non-occupational factors can also increase the risk of this disease. "There is a marked increase in the incidence
of leukemia with age, and there is also a childhood peak which occurs around two to four years of age. Certain immulogic
conditions, some of which are hereditary, appear to predispose to leukemia. Ionizing radiation and benzene exposure are
established environment and occupational causes of leukemia." (Encyclopedia of Occupational Health and Safety: International
Labor Organization, Geneva, 4th Ed., pp. 1, 4). 6
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review of the decision of the ECC with the CA.
In a Decision promulgated on February 24, 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of ECC. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DISMISSED. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED. 7
The CA ruled that under the present law, leukemia, while listed as an occupational disease, is compensable only among operating
room personnel due to exposure to anesthetics. 8 Being a school teacher who is not exposed to anesthetics, Rosarios disease,
though listed under Annex "A" may not be compensable, unless, petitioner could prove that his wifes risk of contracting the
disease was increased by the latters working conditions, which the petitioner failed to do.
The CA went on to state that petitioner has not presented any medical information on the cause of his wifes illness, which could
help in determining the causal connection between Rosarios ailment and her alleged exposure to muriatic acid, floor wax and
paint - hardly considered as radiation exposure which may cause chronic myeloid leukemia.
Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court via a petition for review on certiorari insisting, inter alia, on the error allegedly committed
by the CA in failing to appreciate that P.D. No 626, as amended, is a social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide
meaningful protection to the working class against the hazards of disability, illness and other contingencies resulting in the loss of
income. Such that, the ECC, SSS and GSIS as the official agents charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed by the
Constitution, should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability.
We are called to decide whether or not the ailment of the late Rosario Lorenzo is compensable under the present law on
employees compensation.
This Courts Ruling
We find the Petition unmeritorious.
Sickness, as defined under Article 167 9 (1) Chapter I, Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code of the Philippines refers to "any illness
definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Employees Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by
employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.

In cases of death, such as in this case, Section 1(b), Rule III of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 626, as amended, requires that for
the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must show: (1) that it is the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation with the conditions set therein
satisfied; or (2) that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
Section 2(a), Rule III of the said Implementing Rules, on the other hand, defines occupational diseases as those listed in Annex
"A" when the nature of employment is as described therein. The listed diseases are therefore qualified by the conditions as set
forth in the said Annex "A," hereto quoted:
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be
satisfied:
(1) The employees work must involve the risks described herein;
(2) The disease was contracted as a result of the employees exposure to the described risks;
(3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;
(4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.
xxxx
Occupational Disease Nature of Employment
xxx
15. Leukemia and Lymphoma Among operating room
personnel due to
anesthetics
Gauging from the above, the ECC was correct in stating that, contrary to the earlier finding of the MEUD of the GSIS, Rosarios
disease is occupational, which fact, however, does not thereby result in compensability in view of the fact that petitioners wife
was not an operating room personnel.
As correctly pointed out by the ECC, the coverage of leukemia as an occupational disease relates to ones employment as an
operating room personnel ordinarily exposed to anesthetics. In the case of petitioners wife, the nature of her occupation does not
indicate exposure to anesthetics nor does it increase the risk of developing Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia. There was no
showing that her work involved frequent and sufficient exposure to substances established as occupational risk factors of the
disease.10 Thus, the need for the petitioner to sufficiently establish that his wifes job as a teacher exposed her to substances
similar to anesthetics in an environment similar to an "operating room." 11 This leans on the precept that the awards for
compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions. 12
Indeed, following the specific mandate of P.D. No. 626, as amended, and its Implementing Rules, the petitioner must have at least
provided sufficient basis, if not medical information which could help determine the causal connection between Rosarios ailment
and her exposure to muriatic acid, floor wax and paint as well as the rigors of her work. Instead, petitioner merely insists on the
supposition that the disease might have been brought about by the harmful chemicals of floor wax and paint aggravated by the
fact that the Manggahan Elementary School is just along the highway which exposed Rosario to smoke belched by vehicles, all
contributing to her acquisition of the disease.
We find such factors insufficient to demonstrate the probability that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions of Rosario as a public school teacher; enough to support the claim of petitioner that his wife is entitled to
employees compensation. Petitioner failed to show that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the
conditions in Rosarios work. Not even a medical history or records was presented to support petitioners claim.
In Sante v. Employees Compensation Commission, 13 we held that "x x x x a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute
a Reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such
working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an
adequate basis for a reasonable man x x x to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-tocase basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent, for the duty to prove work-causation
or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real x x x not merely apparent."

At most, petitioner solely relies on a possibility that the demands and rigors of Rosarios job coupled with exposure to chemicals
in paint or floor wax could result or contribute to contracting leukemia. This is but a bare allegation no different from a mere
speculation. As we held in Raro v. Employees Compensation Commission: 14
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing the illness was caused by employment and the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust
fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise nonexistent proof cannot be presumed.
It is well to stress that the principles of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the old Workmens
Compensation Act is expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme. As illustrated in the said Raro case, the new
principle being applied is a system based on social security principle; thus, the introduction of "proof of increased risk." As further
declared therein:
The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies the Government Service Insurance System and Social
Security System under the Employees Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the
employers obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employees right to receive reparation for work-connected death
or disability.15
The case of Sarmiento v. Employees Compensation Commission, 16 cited in Raro case, elaborates, thus:
xxxx
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their
employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no
notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees
Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employees supporting papers and medical evidence
whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The
amount of death benefits has also been doubled.
On the other hand, the employers duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance
companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does not
have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmens compensation.1wphi1 The Commission
administers and settles claims from a fired under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation
process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires
no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.
Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and
controversion cease to have importance.
The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts
favoring the claimant, is now absent. (Emphasis supplied).
All told, this is not to say, however, that this Court is unmindful of the claimants predicament. While we sympathize with the
petitioner, it is important to note that such sympathy must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving
claims for compensation.17
Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to
which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and
deaths occur.18
In light of the foregoing, we are constrained to declare the non-compensability of petitioners claim, applying the provisions of the
law and jurisprudence on the purpose of the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The 24 February 2009 Decision and 11 June 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in C A- G.R. SP No. 104853 are AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-43425 January 22, 1980
JULIO
BISCARRA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Foresty) and the WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION,respondents.
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