Prudential Bank vs.

Castro
A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988
Facts:
Acting on the "Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary
Inhibition" filed by respondent Benjamin M. Grecia himself, dated February 8,
1988, praying that the decision of November 12, 1987, and the resolution of
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said decision be set aside
and a new one entered by this Court dismissing the administrative complaint
and exonerating the respondent, the Court RESOLVED (1) the EXPUNGE said
Petition, it being in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration filed
without leave of Court, besides the fact that the first motion for
reconsideration filed by the same respondent had already been denied with
finality on January 12, 1988; (2) to STRIKE OUT Annex "1" of the Petition and
its exclosures, Annex "1" being a xerox copy of a letter dated 04 August 1986
written by Judge Dionisio N. Capistrano to an unknown addressee, for being
immaterial and impertinent to this case for disbarment (Sec. 5, Rule 9, Rules
of Court). The Court will not allow the filing of such kinds of Petitions/Annexes
that are not only irrelevant to the issue and presented out of time as
hereinafter explained, but are also scurrilous and defamatory.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Courts decision is violative of the 1987 Constitution
due to lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the
Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a
member for the writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis.
2. Whether or not a constitutional provision was disregarded in the Courts
Minute Resolution.

Ruling:
The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not
administrative cases. From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the

Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal

certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in
administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated
upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in
AM No. R-510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba v. Deputy Sheriff Pasok,"
cited in the Petition, is but an oversight. But even if such a certification were
required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its decision
were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that.
Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole,
there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be assigned to
write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.

No constitutional provision has been disregarded either in the Courts

Minute Resolution, dated January 12, 1988, denying the motion for
reconsideration "for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been
previously duly considered and passed upon." It bears repeating that this is
an administrative case so that the Constitutional mandate that "no . . .
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be . . . denied
without stating the legal basis therefor" is inapplicable. And even if it were,
said Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial and, therefore, adhered
faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. "Lack of merit," which was one of
the grounds for denial, is a legal basis (see Sec. 3, Rule 45).