IX The Second Punic War, 218 to 201 Bc. Causes of the Second Punic War Neither side had actively xought the Second. Punic War. The simplistie view that Hannibal and the Barcid family had been planning to at tack Rome for a long time out of a bitter desire for revenge was a convenient fiction for both sides. Lt was favored by the Romans because it absolved them of any blame, and it was later accepted by many Carthaginians because it allowed them to make the Barcids alone theit scapegoats in dealing with the Roman victors, etween 238 and 219 a.c. both the Car- thaginians and the Romans adhered to the provisions of the weaty that had ended the First Punic War and che Ebro treaty, which hhad been negotiated with Hasdrubal. The Row mans’ acceptance of friendship with the city of Saguntum, south of the Ebro, broached neither treaty. Tt was a step taken primarily to keep the good will of Rome's valuable ally Massilia and indicated no oficial Ro- man hostility toward Carthaginian activity in Spain, although some Roman senators may well have thought thar should any confit arise in the future, Saguntum could provide a strax tegic base from which to operate, At the time, Hannibal apparently took no exception to the fact that Rome had ruled against a pro: 100 Carthaginian faction in arbitrating a civil dispute at Saguntum, and he was careful not to provoke Saguntum in order to avoid angering the Romans. There were a number of factors, how: fever, that led to mutual fear and misunder- standing that forced both sides into a comer and made them willing to accept and support the declaration of war when an impasse in their relationship was reached. First of all Sagun- tum, encouraged by Carthage's commercial Fival in Spain, Massilia, constantly com= plained to the Roman senate about Hannibal ashe tried to advance his control over all other territory up to the Ebro. In 220, probably to appease Saguntum and Masslia'as well as to check up on Carthaginian intentions, the senate sent ambassadorsto investigate the situ: ation, ‘They pointed out to Hannibal that Saguntum ‘enjoyed fides with Rome and reminded him of the Ebro treaty. To Han- nibal, this action must have seemed like grata itous Roman interference, Probably he also feared that the Romans were now trying to use the Saguntines against Carthage, just as they hhad previously used the Mamertines on Sicily and the rebellious mercenaries on Sardinia He immediately sent his assessment of the for in paren his ne 219, plans They Tiyria Hann the om Carth could ing a On te have posed egos Sardi chose many was p aged Spain would Also, throug chantsvil ing ler: ort ial situation to the Carthaginian senate and asked for instructions. The Carthaginian senate p= parently agreed with his interpretation, io his next act was to besiege Saguntum in ear! 219, ‘That the Romans had no immediate plans to use the Saguntine situation as a pre= text for war against Carthage in Spain is clear ‘They were in the process of sending two con= sular armies in the opposite direction, to Ilyria. When news of Hannibal's attack on Saguntum reached Rome, the senate did not think that the situation was serious enouigh to take any action. The fall of Saguntum in early 218 placed matters in a different light, hhow- ever. It must have stirred up public opinion against Carthage in Rome. Roman prestige was badly damaged by the destruction of acity that had fruitlessly claimed the protection of Roman fides. Despite eatlier reluctance, the senate now had to take serious action against Hannibal. An embassy ofleading senators and the two consuls was sent to Carthage t0 de mand the surrender of Hannibal unless the Carthaginians wanted wat ‘The majority of Carthaginian senators could not tolerate the humiliation of abandon- ing a commander whom they had supported. On wp of the resentment that must already hhave existed over the way in which the Ro- tans at the end of the First Punic War bad im- posed a treaty harsher than the ane originally negotiated and had later robbed Carthage of Sardinia and Corsica, that would have been too much to bear. The Carthas chose war ‘There are 2 number of reasons why many Romans were also in favorof war. There was probably a genuine fear, eagerly encour aged by Massilia, that the Carthaginians in Spain and the Geltic vibes in southern Gaul would eventually join forces to attack Rome. Also, as the lex Claudia of 218 reveals, there was now a significanc group of Romans engaged in overseas trade. With the revival of Carthage through expansion in Spain, Roman mer chants and traders would have Feared stronger ‘compctition and would have wanted to weaken Carthage once more. Finally, there were ‘Te Scand Posie Wor 101 always ambitious aristocrats who sought to in crease their prestige and power through sue cessful military commands. Such men were the two consuls of 218, Publius Cornelius Seipio and Tiberius Sempronius Longus, whose fam: ilies had previously helped to engineer the perfidious Roman seizure of Sardinia and Corsica, Therefore, both sides accepted the enge of war for a second time. Hannibal's War Strategy Hannibal had command of a splendid army—toyal, well trained, and equipped with the beet Spanish swords and spears~but no navy to comple ment and assist it, Roman naval superiority was so great that Carthage could neither safely ransport and supply large armies by sea nor prevent the Romans from establishing beach heads wherever they chose. Their seapower permitted them to wage war on several fronts simukaneously, to invade Africa and Spain, and to land several armies in both countries at Since Hannibal's only strong base and source of manpower and supplies was Spain, and since he liad only one really well-rained and reliable army, his sole chance of success lay in establishing a single front, preferably in aly; for so iong as Rome was in danger, the Romans would be compelled t concentrate the bulk of their forees in Italy. Only an inva ion of Italy would enable him to seize the in- itiative. Only an invasion of Italy would render useless the great Roman navy An even stronger reason behind Han- nibal's decision to invade Italy lay in his hope of cutting at the roots of Roman military Power, which was potentially six or seven times that of Carthage. Only by wrecking Rome's system of alliance and her Italian con: federation could be hope to paralyze and destroy that enormous war potential. He knew thatthe Gauls of northern Italy were already at war with Rome and would rally around him, and he also hoped that her confederate alies in central and southern Italy would break away from their confederation and join him as their liberator102 Tie Seand Baie Wa Roman War Plans The Romans Planned to wage an offensive war, ‘Their unchallenged naval superiority would enable ‘them to seize and hold the initiative at once and to choose the theater of military opera ‘ons. One army under the consul Publius Cornelius Scipio actually landed at Massilia for the invasion of Spain; another assembled in Sicily for an invasion of Africa. The decision to land at Massilia was theoretically good strat- egy since it offered alternate objectives: an in vasion of Spain or the interception of Hannibal in France, should he decide to invade northern Lraly. It aiso permitted the possibility of using the fleet of Massilia for operations in Spanish waters, The Romans partially achieved only ‘ovo of these objectives since they landed at Massilia too late to intereept Hannibal. He was alreatly on his way co the Alps The March to the Alps Around the first of May in 248 n.c., Hannibal set out from New Carthage with about forty thousand in: fantry, si thousand cavalry, and some sixty clepiunts, He erossed the Ebro, passed over the Pyrenees, and in the middle of August -ached the Rhone, which he crossed belore Scipio was able to intercept him. When Scipio discovered that he had arrived 100 late, he ordered his brother to lead the army into Spain while he himself sailed back to Italy in order to lead the two legions in Cisalpine Gaul against Hannibal as he came down the Alps, Hannibal’s route is not known, The two most probable routes into the Aips would have bbeen up the valleys of the Durance or the [sere rivers and into Italy by one af the passes in either the Mont Cenis or Mont Geneve groups. None of the many brilliant victories ‘hat he won afterward has stirred the imagina tion as did this crossing of the Alps. The way was not easy. He suffered great losses because of the dangerous passes, the deep snows and biting frost of late autumn, and most ofall the tweacherous attacks of the mountain tribes. By the time he reached the level plains of nord ern Traly, fe had only about wenty-six thou: sand infantry, four thousand cavairy, and twenty elephants leR. The Insubres and the Boii, already at war with Rome, eagerly joined his army and made up for the lass of med. The elephants, of course, could not be replaced. Altera short rest his army met the Romans at the Ticinus River, The Battle of the Ticinus, 218 B.C, The battle of the Ticinus was a minor cavalry engagement in which Hannibal's Numidian cavalry encircled and defeated Scipio's cave alry, which was inferior in speed, equipment, and training. The consul himself was wounded and would have been taken prisoner had he not been rescued by his own seventeen-year-old= son, also named Publius Cornelius Seipio, the future Africanus, conqueror of Carthage and viewor over Hannibal, The Ror forced to retire south of the Po. Even this minor defeat was serious enough to compel Rome to abandon the planned invasion of Africa and to cransfer the other consul, Titus Sempronius Longus, and his army to northern Lealy. Before ‘their ransler to Italy, the Romans had been able to seize Malta, which controlled communications berween Arica and Sicily, but Hannibal's at- tempt to maintain a single front was already ‘The Battle at the Trebia, 218 B.C. ‘The ewo consuls, Scipio and Sempronius, with ‘a combined force of over forty thousand men, held a strong position on the eastern or right bank of the Trebia, a small southern tributary of the Po, On a bitterly cold December morn ing, Hannibal sent over the river a cavairy d tachment weak enough to be easily defeated and compelied to retreat. Encouraged by their easy victory, the Romans waded in pursuit across the rain-swollen river to the other side; there they were at once attacked and encircled by Hannibal's men, who had lain concealed in heavy underbrush. Only ten thousand Ro- mans succeeded in breaking out of the encirclement and in reaching Placentia (Pia- cenzs), aibal's 1 those « temen control New Ie and, if 1 B.C. and Gs zo)in down suhieh Afr by the on the jnius b coax t Sank a bait cwacks burnin ona ase, F march north « of fai way al forma and w hirty the er Roms Flamirvy, and and the yjoined ea. The placed. 8 B.C. cavalry ounded thenot var-old~ io, the ge and on the sfer the 4s, and > their able 10 al's at already vr right butary r side; circled alec in Ro- of the (Pia cenza). The entire Po valley fell into Han- nial’s hands The loss of northern Italy infuriated those who had promoted the conquest and set ement of that region. They helped to elect as consul for 217 9.¢. Gaius Flaminius, who in his consulship in 223 n,c, had subdued the In- subres and placed the Cisalpina under Roman control. Gnaeus Servilius was the other consul New legions were called into service, and the new consuls were instructed to bold the line land, if possible, recover northern Italy, ‘The Battle of Lake Trasimene, 217 B.C. Servilius took the road to Ariminum, and Gaius Flaminius went to Arvetium (Arez” 20) in Exruria in order to block Hannibal's in- vasion of central Italy. Hannibal did move down into Etruria, but by an unexpected route-—a pass which was most difficult anc which, therefore, had been left unguarded. [After leading his army through terrain flooded by the Arno and losing many men and horses fon the way, he reached Btruria, where Flamn= inius began to follow him closely. He tried to ‘coax the Romans into battle by exposing his flank as he marched past. Flaminius refused to bait but continued to follow closely in his tracks. When widespread looting and the burning of peaceful homes also failed to bring fon a battle, Hannibal adopted an ingenious ruse. He made it appear as ihe were going 10 march against Rome itself. Sucidenly veering eastward toward Perugia, be passed along the north shore of Lake Trasimene, where a ridge of fairly steep hills descends almost to the water's edge to leave a narrow road or passage way along the shore, except whereit retreats 10 form a small plain about five miles ong. He concealed his men in the hills above the plain land waited. Into this plain early one foggy ‘morning Flaminius marched with his army of thirty-shc thousand men. Suddenly Hannibal's men came thundering down the hillsides. In the ensuing wwo-hour battle, most of the Romans were either killed or captured, and Flaminius himself was killed. ‘The same fare ‘Te Scand Panic War 108 afterward befell four thousand cavalrymen whora Servilius had sent down the Flaminian ‘Way, pethaps to support the legions wiped out at Trasimene, ‘The news of Trasimene filled Rome with fear of imminent siege. The fear was ground less because Hannibal knew that the siege of 2 large fortified city without siege engines and a strong supply base would have been foolhardy. ‘Also, the Romans still had fied armies capable of intervening. Hannibal had another plan. ‘This brilliant battle tactician was also a politician and a master of grand strategy. He had invaded Italy in the hope that he might find chinks in the Roman alliance system that hhe might pry open, widen, and exploit. ‘View torious battles were only meansto this end, but since they had so far produced satisfactory results only in the north and not in Etraria or central Italy, he decided to see what could be ‘accomplished further south, Fabius Maximus Cunctator, 217 B.C. defeat at Trasimene, the fear of a siege, daily meetings of the senate, the death of Flaminins, the people’s idol, the eclipse of his faction in the senate, and the return of more conservative senators to control all served t0 revive the dictatorship—an office defunct for thirty years~and 10 introduce the strange, enigmatic Figure of Quintus Fabius Maximus of illustrious lineage and decidedly conser vative views on polities and war. His elevation {office was most unusual and, to hien in p ‘ieular, most unsatisfactory 1k was the ancient custom in times of eri sis for the consuls to transfer, for six months, their Jictors, their military commands (imperia), and executive powers to a dictator who would then appoint his own master of the cavalry. Now that one consul was dead and the other cut off from Rome, Fabius owed his ap ointment to the Genturiate Assembly. [also ‘appointed his master ofthe eavairy, M. Minu: ‘cus Rufos, arash, impulsive, headstrong per- son who was always in disagreement with Pab ius over the conduct of the war10k The Stand Pie Wes Fabius worked out and adopted an ori- ginal but somewhat negative strategy, which did not consist of any new battle tactics—he avoided battles because the Roman cavalry was much inferior to Hannibal's—but_ was rather a kind of psychological warfare based on attrition and exhaustion. It called for the avoidance ofall pitched bactles until Hannibal should inadvertently work himself into an irm- paste and be forced to fight under highly an- favorable conditions. Meanwhile, Fabius kept hhis army always on hilly tertain, where Han- nibal could not use his superior cavalry to advantage, and attempted to wear him down by constantly dogging his hecls, hampering his ‘movements, and preventing him from acquir~ ing allies, feeding his army, or establishing bases. By this frustrating strategy Fabius hoped to prevent Hannibal from achieving the chief objective of his campaign—the destrace tion of the Roman system of alliance. This cautious strategy of Fabius isto this day known as "Fabian, "” and in his own time it earned for hin che tide of Cunetator, or Delayer. Minucius hated his tactics and so did many others whose minds were incapable of grasping their military significance. Naturally the strategy of attrition is a double-edged ‘weapon and puts as hard a strain on the user as fon the enemy. In 217 sc. Minucins appeared before the assembly convened 10 elect new consuls and in a ringing speech declared that Rome hhad not yet brought her full force 10 bear against Hannibal and urged the election of men who would seek a speedy end of the war. ‘The newly elected consuls, Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus, were expected to ake short work of Hannibal ‘The Battle of Cannae, 216 B.C. The ‘ovo consuls, with an army of eighty thousand men, set out to reach Hannibal in Apulia in the vicinity of Cannae, a small fortress but an im: portant supply base near the Aufidus River ‘They placed their infantry in the center in three lines, loser together than usual. ‘The right wing cavalry, commanded by Paulus, stood between the infantry and the Autidus; the left wing, under Varro, stood out on the ‘open plain, Except for the cavalry on the wings, Hannibal arranged his troops in a less conven tional manner than the Romans. His front line, composed mainly of Gauls and Span- iards, bulged forward, Behind them in an echelon formation he posted his heavily armed African veterans, Under a blazing morning sun, the Ro- man infantry advanced against Hannibal's front line, which for some time resisted stub- bornly but was slowly forced by the weight and pressure of the Roman attack to give ground and sag inward. Still they did not permit a breakthrough, The African troops on. the wings stood firm. The more deeply the Romans pressed into this slowly sagging pocket, the more elosely they became packed together. Al this time a cavalry battle was in pro- gress. The Punic left wing attacked and easily destroyed the Roman right wing, which was somewhat cramped for space between the legions and the river. Wheeling around, the victorious cavalry wing attacked the rear of Varro’s left wing, now engaged by Hannibal's right, and completed its destruction. With both wings of the Roman cavalry gone, the Punic cavairy was free to attack the rear of the Roman infantry, ‘The Roman infantry soldiers had al- ready wedged into so tight a pocket that they were no longer able to use their weapons—a helpless mass unable to prevent the horrible massacre that followed. When the battle fended, seventy thousand Romans, including numerous senators ane! nables and the consul Acmilius Paulus, were lefe dead on the field Among those who managed to escape were the consul Varro and two others, Marcellus and the young Publius Cornelius Scipio, who lived to fight Hannibal again. Hannibal's victorious tide bad now reached its erest Haonibal’s victory at Cannae remains a classic example of bartle taeties, for it de- pended not only on an unorthodox disposition ‘oops, but on timing and coordination. If his fast his def plet tha roll nib Ro: wl par the: thei still driv lyri Ha for ott the Teal thas fal thay the ‘ash and fedafidus; wings, 3 front Span: re Ro- nibal’s mm the ly the ageing sacked npr easily fh was nthe the ear of sibal’s With, ©, the of the orrible battle uding field. vrethe \s and >lived ie de- W his crescent-shaped front line had retreated too fast or had permitted a Roman breakthrough, his army would have been cut into wo easily defeated segments. If his cavalry had not com- pleted the destruction of the Roman cavalry in time to strike at the rear of the Roman infan- tay, the results of the battle might have been entirely different. 1 Aftermath The ellect of this blood: fest of all Roman defeats was more serious than that of Lake Trasimene. The Romans ‘were so fearful of a march on Rome that they made feverish preparations for defense, en- rolled all citizens above the age of sixteen, and even organized two slave legions. fore serious still was the fact that Han: nibal almost achieved his war aims. ‘The Roman allies were exhausted; some began to waver in their loyalty. Several towns in Apulia and most of Lucania and Brustium went over to Hannibal. The big cities of Gapua in Cam= pania and Syracuse in Sicily revolted against their alliance with Rome and opened their gates to him. He caprured Tarentum. Bven some of che Latin towns and colonies began t0 complain about taxes and the terrifie drain on their manpower and economy. More setious still, Philip V of Macedon, who was eager 10 drive the Romans from their bridgeheads in Il lyria, concluded a mutual assistance pact with Hannibal in 215 wc. Never did the war picture look brighter for Carthage than in the years berween 216 and 212 pc. After Cannae, the Romans returned to the Fabian strategy of attrition and the avoidance of battles such as Cannae. They now began to concentrate on keeping their lian allies loyal and winning back the cities ‘thathad gone over to Hannibal in order to pre vent Hannibal from provisioning his army in aly or obtaining reinforcements from Car thage. Meanwhile, they prosecuted with vigor the war in Sicily, Illyria, and Spain. These tasks required the expenditure of enormous sums of money and manpower, fora fleet of at least two hundred ships had to be maintained, land twenty-five legions at home and abroad fed and supplied The Sens Pose Wor 105 Because of their enormous manpower ‘and resources, the Romans were abie not only to check Hannibal, but to reconquer the dis loyal cities. Without reinforcement from Car thage or Spain, Hannibal could not protect his Italian allies and, at the same time, keep his ‘army intact, He was forced to stand helplessly by and watch the Romans reconquer his new allies one by one. His helplessness neither in- creased his prestige nor encouraged other cities to revolt against Rome. ‘The Romans won back the Apulian cit- then laid siege to Capua. Hannibal could neither supply Capua with arms and food nor defend it by attacking the Romans. At last he tried to relieve Capua and force the Romans to abandon the siege by a pretended attack upon Rome. When the ruse failed, he had to leave Capua to its fate. The fall of Capuain 211 .c. restored all Carapania to Roman control. Two years later the Cunctator occupied Tarentumn, which Hannibal had captured in 213 8.<, The Siege of Syracuse ‘The year be fore Gapua's defeat, Syracuse fell ater @ long siege led by the famous Roman general, Mar cellus, Ever since the year of her revolt from Rome (214 w.c.), Syracuse had been able to defend herself by means of artillery and other Gevices invented by the mathematician and physicist, Archimedes. During the siege, Car~ thage gave Syracuse litle effective support ex- cept a feeble attempt 10 lend naval assistance ‘The city was finally betrayed by a Spani army captain, 1 was looted after its capture, its art treasures shipped t0 Rome, and its inde pendence destroyed for all time. After the fall of Agrigentum in 240 n.¢., all Sicily fell under the Roman yoke once more The First Macedonian War, 215 to 205 B.C. After his alliance with Hannibal Philip V of Macedon attempted to open 2 sec- ‘ond front against Rome in Greece and the Bal- Kans, In 214 he attacked Roman protectorates and naval bases in Ulyria and hoped, with the help of a Carthaginian fleet, to invade Italy106 The Sond Pie War and assist Hannibal, The expected Carthagi nian eet did not arrive, but a Reman flotilla of fifty ships did. The Romans easly recap- tured the naval bases and some of their former protectorates. In order (o prevent Philip's in tended invasion of Tely, they ereated an ant Macedonian coalition in Greece by an offen: ve alliance with the Aetolian League and with other Greek states, Though Philip con ducted four brilliane campaigns against the Greek coalition, the Greek war served Rome's purpose well by keeping Philip oceupied so ‘that he was unable to give Hannibal any effec ‘ive assistance in Italy. Thus, in both Italy and tie Balkans, a balance of power was estab lished that prevented for a time a delinite con- clusion of the war, ‘The Warin Spain, 21810207 B.C, It \was in Spain that Hannibal lost che first round, of the war. His opponent was the consul of 218 n.c., Publius Cornelius Seipio, who, though not a good bate tactician, understood the meaning of grand strategy. Unable to prevent Hannibal's crossing of the Rhone, he had sent his brother Gnaeus to Spain, where he joined him after the defeat of his own army at the Trebia, The purpose of this Spanish campaign was to deprive Hannibal of his main base and source of manpower and supplies, and to pre= vent Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal from bringing reinforcements to Italy ‘The success of the Spanish campaign hinged on Roman naval supremacy in the Spanish coastal waters. That was established by @ naval encounter in 217 a,c, and by the help of Massilia. In 215 b,c. the two Scipios met Hasdrubal in battle near Thera on the Ebro. Though Hasdrubal employed exactly the same tactics as Hannibal had at Cannee, he lost the battle because his center was 100 ‘weak to prevent a Roman breakthrough before the wings could close in and complete the en circlement. His army was split inta two seg iments, each easily destroyed, and the Seipios followed up their success by the capture of Saguntum in 211 8.c. The Carthaginian posi- tion in Spain was further weakened by the recail of Hasdrubal to North Africa co suppress the revolt of Syphax, a treacherous and un- principled king of the Numidians After Hasdrubal’s defeat, many Spanish tribes went over to the Romans, but after Hasdrubal's return the Scipios later learned hhow treacherous and unreliable their Spanish allies could be, During 211 2.0. many Span- lards deserted, the Roman army was de- stroyed, and the Scipios were slain. Thus died the Scipios, who with meager forees had pow- ecfully contributed to the final viewory of Rome Scipio Africanus The fusure Scipio Afri- canus, son and nephew of the slain Seipios, who bad rescued his father at the battle of the Ticinus, had also been at the battle of Cannae. Alter that disaster he persuaded the remnants ‘of the Roman army to Keep fighting. In 210 5.c., after the death of his father in Spain, he ‘was appointed by the Gencuriate Assembly at his own request 2s commander of the Roman forcesin Spain. Though a private person, hav- ing held no rank higher than that of a curule acdile, he was granted the imperium and the rank of proconsul, an unprecedented occur: Scipio had had a good Greek education, was more individualistic than most Roman aristocrats, and had a better sense of humor. While he showed an unusual degree of kind: hess and clemency to defeated enemies, he could also be unserupulous and deceitful. Asa general, he possessed courage, resourceful- ness, selfconfidence, and the power to inspire confidence in his men. In Spain, Scipio replaced the short Ital ian sword (useful only for stabbing) with a longer Spanish one, which with its well tempered steel point could be used either for stabbing or slashing. Ivis probable, though not absolutely certain, that he also introduced the Spanish javelin (gitum). He broke away from the close otder of the of Roman legion, which was drawn up in three lines, each composed of ten maniples. So heavy a formation could aey the press Pune nish alee srned "de. diced pene yof Afi Fhe 210 he rule the nde he ue vance with terrific foree, but could not easily wheel or tum, and so might be readily out flanked, as at Cannae, Also, it tended to act as a whole and did not permit the individual sol der to fight separately or in smaller units Scipio adopted a new formation similar to that used by Hannibal at Cannae, one capable of expanding or contracting quickly, if required to do so. These innovations required much more drill and training than ever given (0 Roinan armies in the past. The new Roman soldier soon became an efficient instrument of conquest Conquest of Spain After training his ‘troops, Scipio boldly marched through enemy territory in 209 and captured the stronghold of New Carthage by taking advantage of an ua usual opportunity. The defenders had ne- lected the walls ofthe seaward side of the city, where the water usually was deep, A strong orth wind, however, had pushed the water back enough for Roman soldiers to wade through and scale the walls, This piece of luck convinced Scipio's soldiers thar he was di- vinely inspired, a belief that he eagerly encour- aged, and from then on they carried out his orders with blind faith The capture of New Carthage ave Sci pio a fine base, access to local silver mines, a umber of ships, and immense quantities of booty, money, and weapons along with ten ‘thousand Spaniards whom the Carthaginians had held hostage to ensure the loyalty of their compatriots. Scipio generously allowed the hhostages (0 return home with a share of the booty. That act earned him much valuable goodwill among the Spanish tribes Hasdrubal was able to escape with most of his army after being defeaced by Scipio in 208, and he marched away to join Hannibal in Tealy. With Hasdrubal gone, however, it was ccasier for Scipio to defeat the other Carthagi« nian generals in Spain, especially since they did not get on well with each other. Carthagi nian power finally collapsed after the batte of ipa in 207 a.¢., in which Scipio proved hhimsef a master of encircling tactics. Soon the The Seon Pac War 107 whole of Spain was in Roman hands, and even the ancient Phoenician colonies of Gades (Cadiz) and Malaga voluntarily became Ro- rman allies, ‘The Battle at the Metaurus and Death of Hasdrubal, 207 B.C. ‘The years just before Hasdrubal’ crossing of the Alps had not been good for Rome. With 30 many farm ers in the army, agricultural production had declined, many fertile districts had been repeatedly devastated, and famine was wide spread. Had Rome not succeeded in obtaining some wheat from Egypt, the food problem would have been acute. Some of the Italian and Latin allies were so exhausted by the war that they refused to supply Rome with any ‘more men or money Had Hasdrubal succeeded in effecting a junction with Hannibal's army, Rome might have lost the war, but Hannibal did not at- tempt to join his brother in northern Italy for fear of losing Bruuium, his only good base in Traly. He did advance as far noreh as Apulia but found his way barred by four Roman lex sions commanded by one ofthe consuls, Gaius Claudius Nero Moreover, Hascubal’s message to his brother asking him to march into Umbria and meet him near Rome was intercepted. ‘The Romans now knew exactly where he was, Four Roman legions were waiting for him in the north. Then Claudius Nero, leaving a stall part of his army behind to watch Hann: bl, quietly set out for the north and six days later reached the Metaurus River. Suddenly and unexpectedly Hasdrubal found himself matched against the superior strength of two Roman armies. He tried to retreat over the river but it was too Late. His splendid army was destroyed and he himself was killed, Several days laier his severed head was thrown into Hannibal's camp. Hannibal knew then that he had lost the war and sadly withdrew to Brut- sium. ‘Two other misfortunes followed swiftly. In 205 ¥.c, a Punic fleet bringing reinforce:108 The Swand Pate Wor ments and supplies was lost in a storm, That same year Hannibal's brother Mago, who had landed at Genoa with an army, was defeated, wounded, and compelled to withdraw again to Genoa, where he received orders from Car~ thage to set sail for home. During the voyage, he died, The End Approaches In 206 n.c., Scipio returned to Rome and was elected to the consulship, The senate debated how to end the war. Scipio, who had already made a deal with two petty kings of Numidia, Massinissa and Syphax, wanted to invade Africa, Fabius, leader ofthe senate, who did not like the young upstart, his Greek ideas, his air of superiority, and his reckless strategy, vigorously opposed the African venture. Finally Scipio obtained the senate’s re- Iuctant permission to go to Alfica, but not to raise troops. He appealed directly tothe people for volunteers for the African expedition, and about seven thousand enlisted. They, together with the two legions already in Sicily, made up the African Expeditionary Force. Fabius’ cer- tainty that the expedition would fail did not take into account Scipio's extraordinary bold- ness, cunning, and charismatic leadership Nor were these traits appreciated by the conservative-minded M. Porcius Cato (Cato the Elder), who was a quaestor in 204 and was assigned to Scipio in Sicily.* In 204 5.6. Scipio landed near Utica in ‘Tunisia and immediately became involved in the quarrels of two Numidian kings, Syphax and Massinissa, both of whom were in love ‘with Sophonisba, the beautifal daughter of Hasdrubal Gisco, the Carthaginian governor cof Numidia, Syphax, the stronger of the two petty kings, won the hand of Sophonisba, de- posed his rival, and allied himself with Car thage. Massinissa, naw a king without love, land, or throne, found refuge in Scipio's camp. * Some scholars date Cao's quaestorship 0 203, bat that is pbably too early, and the ory tot Cato and Seige quanelled openly 204 se probably an anschtonistic ‘elton of their inter pub hoeity Scipio had perfidiously entered into peace negotiations with Carthage and Syphax for the sole purpose of lulling their suspicions and learning the nature and disposition of their camps, Having learned what he wanted to know, one night he surrounded Syphax's camp, which was constructed of osicts and reeds, and set it on fire. The Carthaginians, thinking that the fire was accidental, rushed out to help, and both armies were attacked and destroyed. Scipio had now proved himself the master of Syphax and Massinissa in guile and lueachery. He would soon be Hannibal's nnaster in battle, ‘Massinissa then captured Syphax, mar ied Sophonisba, and returned to Numidia in teiumpi after winning back all that he had lost. In exchange for benefits received fron Scipio, Massinissa was requested to provide the Roman army sith cavalry, Later Scipio beyan to fear that Sophonisba might charm her husband into an alliance with Carthage. By conferring upon Massinissa a curule chair and certain other hollow honors and benefits, he persuaded him to get rid of Sophonisha by adding a litle poison to her wine. ‘The Carthaginians, imitating Scipio's guile, perfidy, and treachery, opened peace negotiations with him and at the same time recalled Hannibal from Italy. Before leaving, Italy, Hannibal inscribed on a bronze tablet chronicle of all his deeds since crossing the Alps, and he deposited it in the temple of Hera Lacinia near Croton. (Polybius main- tains that he read it.) After Hannibal's arrival in Africa, the peace talks suddenly ceased. The war continued until Scipio and Hannibal fought at Naraggara, which was a three-day march west of Zama, although Zama is the name conventionally given to the battle ‘The Battle of Zama (Naraggara), 202 B.C. Weak in cavalry, Hannibal was forced to adopt innovative tactics. After the standard procedure of posting what cavalry he had to protect both flanks ofthe infantry, he arranged his center in an unusual way, Fiest came ele phants, next che light infantry units, then a space Fina stone besa Spal ino clept the phar did pede tobe Mas Ron the s did pect fore cea lize well Hoan a ser hag agais bats killer who thou In? rend Masi into vyphax their ted to shax's 8 and shed dand IF the cand ibal’s dia in > had from ovide icipio uber wing ablet 3 the Ie of val The sibal day screen of heavy infantry units, then an empry space, then another screen of heavy infantry Finally, placed back some distance in the re stood his veterans from Italy as a fighting reserve. The first three lines of infantry were to be sacrificed in the absorption of the initial Ro- sman attack and used Later 10 attack the Roman ‘The Roman battle order also consisted of two cavalry wings. As he had learned to do in Spain, however, Scipio subdivided the legions into sinall units with spaces between for the clephants to run through without breaking up the formations. ‘Therefore Hannibal's ele- phants had litte effect on the Roman lines but did a great deal of damage when they stam= peded ta his own cavalry wings, which, weak to begin with, were soon put out of action by Massinissa’s caval Hannibal's first line, consisting of some aeelve thousand mercenaries—Ligs ians, Celts, and Moors—resisted the initial Roman attack long and valiantly, but when the second line of Libyans and Carthaginians did not come to their support as quickly as ex pected, they thought themselves deserted and retreated in panic, anly to be cut down by the second advancing line. Hannibal was there- fore forced to bring his reserve units forward earlier than he had planned in order to stabi lize the front lines. After initial surprise, the vwell-disciplined Romans regrouped. The Hannibal's reserve units were hit inthe rear by 2 strong cavalry attacle, Unable to resist the second phase of the Roman offensive, the Car thaginians were crushed. The weakness in cavalry, which Scipio’s treacherous actions against Syphax had created, had been Hann: bal’s undoing. Most ofthe Carthaginians were killed, but Hannibal managed to escape Peace Terms It was Hannibal himself who advised Carthage to ask for peace, even though he knew that the terms would be hard. In 201 a.c., Carthage was compelled to sur render all territories outside of Africa, to recognize the independence of Numidia and ‘Massinissa’s alliance with Rome, to agree not Te Sind Bae Wer $08 to wage war outside of Africa and not even within Africa without Roman permission, to reduce her fleet to ten light criremes or coast guard vessels, and to pay an indemnity of ten thousand talents, payable in fifty years. The power of Carthage as a state was broken for- ever. Peace declared, Scipio returned to Rome to celebrate a magnificent triumph, which his rivals in the senate had petulantly tried to deny hhim, and to have conferred upon him the proud title of Africanus. Reasons for Roman Success Even if Hannibal had won the batle of Zama, C thage would still have lost the war, for its out come had been determined in Italy by Hann bal's failure, despite his victories at Trasimene and Cannae, to wreck the Roman confederate alliance, the destruction of which was the main objective of his total war strategy and his sole hope of ultimate victory. The prime mover and chief architect of Roman vietory was not Scipio Africanus, the victor at Zama, but Fabius Maximus Cunctator, whose favorite tactics of attrition and exhaustion had frus- trated Hannibal's main design and afforded time for the mobilization of Rome's enormous war potential, By delaying he saved the state (conctande resttas rem), While there were, no doubt, rival fac- tions within the Carthaginian governmen Hannibal's efforts were not negated by polit cal problems at home. Carthage supported Hannibal and the war consistently to the best of its ability. It was the strength of the Ro- mans’ system of alliances, founded on a re- markable degree of justice and mutual benefit day, that gave them an overwhelming superiority in human and material resources, which, when couples! with the Roman will 1 use them despite all adversity, ensured Han- nibal’s defeat, ‘The Fate of Hannibal Like Julius Guesar and Napoleon of later history, Hianni= bal revealed unusual talents as an adminise trator during his postwar career, Afier theMO Phe Sond Pai War war, the Carthaginian aristocracy tried to pro- tect its wealth by corruption and by forcing the burden of paying the war indemnity onto the lower classes. The people turned to Hannibal, the popular war hero remembered for his fair ness and good treatment of ordinary soldiers, and elected him shop, or judge, in 195 2.0. Hannibal established a system of taxa- tion based on income and ability to pay and made the government accountable to the peo ple for its expenditures. The financial ad- ruinistration was so efficient that in 191 3,c., only ten years afier Zama, Carthage offered immediate payment of the forty remaining in- stallments of her war indemnity. Rome re~ fused the offer, Commerce and industry re- vived as never before, and Carthage again became one of the busiest ports of the Mediter~ ranean. Nevertheless, Carthage soon lost the benefits of efficient’ administration. Rome bbecame alarmed at the remarkable recovery of Carthage and, acting upon bis political ene mies’ accusation of planning another war, de manded the surrender of Hannibal as a war criminal. To save his life, Hannibal escaped trom Carthage and took refuge in the Eas. Unfortunately, the Romans’ attention now turned in thar direction too. Eventually they hounded him to death in 183 nc. as they added that part of the world to their growing ‘empire (see p. 119), No soanc won dor rhean the seas em} expansio pattern trough, it, Seve more pr force eat n the E braced Minor tending ge hey ‘whom diymate als, hae