Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 28

Lecture 13

Safety Practices in Chemical and


Nuclear Industries
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP)

Dr. Raghuram Chetty


Department of Chemical Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology Madras
Chennai- 600 036.

Hazard and Operability Studies

Originated as a hazard identification technique for process


plants

commonly applied in petrochemical, nuclear and food


processing industries

Described as a system of imaginative anticipation of


hazards

Hazard and Operability Studies

HAZOP

always a team activity

concentrates
components

uses well-defined guide words to steer analysis

considers both plausible


consequences of deviations.

on

deviations

in

causes

flows

and

between

possible

Hazard Evaluation Techniques


1960 - 2001

1960 - 2001

1965 - 2001

1970 - 2001

1972 - 1974

1974 - 2001

Safety
Review

Check Lists

Relative
Ranking

PHA

What if

HAZOP

Walk
Through
Inspection

Historical
Lists

ICI Mond
Index

Yes / No

Dow FEI

Preliminary
Hazard
Analysis

Brainstorming

Hazardous Mtls
Hazardous Opns

Hazards
Operability
Analysis
Line by Line
Deviation
Analysis

This presentation only considers the HAZOP technique.

HAZOP is a technique which provides opportunities for people to let their


imaginations go free and think of all possible ways in which hazards or
operating problems might arise, but to reduce the chance that something is
missed it is done in a systematic way.

HAZOP technical approach

Before HAZOP study is started, detailed information on the


process must be available. This includes process flow diagrams
(PFD), piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), detailed
equipment specification, materials of construction, mass and
energy balances

Scope of study explicitly extends to cover unusual circumstances


such as startup, shutdown and plant maintenance

Scope of study does not include making detailed design changes,


although recommendations and follow-up questions should be
produced

HAZOP results are recorded in a tabular format

HAZOP procedures are adopted fully or partly by many


companies around the world.

HAZOP

Identifying potential hazards and operability problems


caused by deviations from the design intent of both new
and existing process plants

HAZOP studies are carried out by an experienced,


multidisciplinary team.

Review all physical aspects of a process (lines,


equipment, instrumentation) to discover potential hazards.

HAZOP will identify hazards: do not give insight into the


probability that they will occur or cause harm.

HAZOP Team Members

Leader

planning and preparation

act as chairman for meeting

ensure follow-up work is


completed
document the analysis

Designer(s), process / project


engineers

may be site representative, operator,


maintenance crew
supply information about the context
in which the system will be used,
e.g. site facilities
ask questions, and help decide
which issues affect safety

Recorder

User(s)

Expert(s)

understand and explain the


plant design
answer questions about the
plant and process

key function is to explore


suggest deviations / causes /
effects
need good knowledge of process
chemistry, or experience of similar
plant
technical specialist

HAZOP - Procedure
A HAZOP Guideword is combined with a Process
Parameter to Identify

Deviation from intended design / operation

Causes of those deviation

Consequences of those deviations

Safeguard to prevent causes and mitigate

Actions ( recommendations ) for design or operation


changes to avoid deviation

HAZOP Procedure in Detail

Begin with a detailed flow sheet. Break the flow sheet into a
number of process units. e.g. reactor area might be one,
storage tank another. Select a unit for study

Choose a study node (vessel, line, operating instruction)

Describe the design intent of the study node. e.g. vessel V1 is designed to store benzene feedstock and provide to
the reactor on demand

HAZOP Procedure in Detail

Pick a process parameter: flow, level, temperature, etc.

Apply a guide word to the process parameter to suggest


possible deviation

If the deviation is applicable, determine possible cause and


note any protective systems

Evaluation of consequences of the deviation (if any)

Recommend action (what? by whom? by when?)

Record all information.

Common HAZOP Analysis Terminology


Term

Definition

Sections of equipment with definite boundaries (e.g.,


a line between two vessels) within which process
Process
Sections (or parameters are investigated for deviations. The
locations on P&IDs at which the process parameters
Study
are investigated for deviations (e.g., reactor)
Nodes)

Intention

Definition of how the plant is expected to operate in


the absence of deviations. Takes a number of forms
and can be either descriptive or diagrammatic (e.g.,
process description, flow-sheets, line diagrams,
P&IDs)

Common HAZOP Analysis Terminology

Simple words that are used to qualify or quantify


Guide Words the design intention and to guide and simulate the
brainstorming process for identifying process
hazards

Process
Parameter

Physical or chemical property associated with the


process. Includes general items such as reaction,
mixing, concentration, pH, and specific items such
as temperature, pressure, phase, and flow

Common HAZOP Analysis Terminology

Deviations

Departures from the design intention that are discovered


by systematically applying the guidewords to process
parameters (flow, pressure, etc.) resulting in a list for the
team to review (no flow, high pressure, etc.) for each
process section. Teams often supplement their list of
deviations with ad hoc items

Causes

Reasons why deviations might occur. Once a deviation


has been shown to have a credible cause, it can be
treated as a meaningful deviation. These causes can be
hardware failures, unanticipated process states (e.g.,
change of composition), external disruptions (e.g., loss
of power), etc.

HAZOP - Procedure
Start

Finish
YES
NO

Select a component

All components analysed?


YES

NO

Select a flow

All flows analysed?


YES

Suggest a deviation
using a guide word
Investigate and
document causes
Investigate and
document effects

NO

All guide words considered?

Record as non-hazardous
deviation, with a
justification

NO

Record as hazard. Make


recommendations for
action if necessary

Does deviation have plausible


causes and hazardous effects?

YES

HAZOP Guidewords
No or Not
More
Less
As well as
Part of
Reverse
Other than

No part of the intention is achieved


e.g. No flow to the reactor
Quantitative increase in the intent
e.g. More flow to the reactor
Quantitative decrease in the intent
e.g. Less flow to the reactor
All intentions achieved, but with additional
effects e.g. Impurities in flow (air, water)
Only some of the intention is achieved
e.g. Part of the reactants to the reactor
Exact opposite of the intention
e.g. Reverse flow into the reactor
Complete substitution
e.g. Another material besides reactants
in the reactor

Common HAZOP Parameters


Flow

Frequency

Pressure

Viscosity

Temperature

Voltage

Level

Information

Time

Mixing

Composition

Addition

pH

Separation

Speed

Reaction

Guide word and process parameter combination


Process
parameter

No,
None

More

Less

As
well
as

Part
of

Temperature

Pressure

pH

Viscosity

Flow

Concentration

x represent valid combination

Reverse Other
than
x

HAZOP Example a P&ID


Valve (normally closed during
operation of the plant)

Manually operated valve

Valve (normally open during


operation of the plant)

Non-return valve

Hydrocarbon
from storage

Drain

Pump

LC

Automation (level
controller)

LC

PG

PG
Settling tank

Drain

Transfer pumps
(one working, one spare)

To reactor
Drain

HAZOP Example output


Guide
Word

NO

Deviation

No flow

Possible Causes
No hydrocarbon available
from storage

Consequences
Loss of feed to reactor.

Transfer pump fails (motor


fault, loss of power, impeller As above
corroded etc.)

MORE

More flow

More
pressure
More
temperature

Level control valve (LCV)


fails to open, or LCV
bypassed in error

Settling tank overfills

Action Required
1) Ensure good
communication with storage
area
2) Install low level alarm on
settling tank
Covered by 2)

3) Install high level alarm


4) Check size of overflow
5) Establish locking-off
procedure for LCV bypass
when not in use

Isolation valve or LCV


Line subjected to full
closed when pump running pump pressure

6) Install kickback on pumps

High intermediate storage


temperature

7) Install warning of high


temperature at intermediate
storage

Higher pressure in
transfer line and settling
tank

HAZOP Example Reactor

An exothermic reaction controlled by cooling water


HAZOP study is performed on this unit to improve the safety of the
process. Using study nodes as the cooling coil (process parameter: flow
and temperature) and the stirrer (Process parameter: agitation)

Item

Study node

Process
parameters

Deviations
(guide
words)

Possible causes

Possible
consequences

Action required

1. 1A

1. Cooling

1. Flow

1. No

1. Control valve fails

1. Loss of cooling,

1. Select valve to fail open


2. Install filter with

coils

closed
2. Plugged cooling coils
3. Cooling water

service failure
4. Controller fails and

closes valve

2.
3.
4.
5.

possible
runaway
dodododo-

5. Air pressure fails,

closing valve

1. 1B

1. High

1. Control valve fails

open
2. Controller fails and

opens valve

1. 1C

1. Low

1. Partially
plugged
cooling line
2. Partial water
source failure
3. Control valve
fails to
respond

1. Reactor cools,

reactant conc.
builds, possible
runaway on
heating
2.
do 1. Diminished

cooling, possible
runaway
2.
do3.
do-

maintenance procedure
Install cooling water
flow meter and low flow
alarm. Install high
temperature alarm to
alert operator
3. Check and monitor
reliability of water
service
4. Place controller on
critical instrumentation
list
5. See 1A.1
1. Instruct operators and

update procedures
2. See 1A-4

1. See 1A.2
2. See 1A.2
3. Place valve on critical

instrumentation list

1D

As well
as

1. Contamination of water
supply

1E

Part of

1.

1F

Reverse

1. Failure on water source


resulting in backflow
2. Backflow due to high
backpressure

1G

Other
than,

1.

Low

1K

Tempera
ture

1L

2A

2B

Stirre
r

Agitatio
n

1. Not possible here

1. None

1. Loss of cooling,
possible runaway
2. do-

1. See1A.2
2. Install check calve

1
Low water supply
temperature

1. None; controller
handles

1. None

High

1. High water supply


temperature

1. Cooling system
capacity limited
temp. increases

1. Install high flow


alarm and/or cooling
water high temp. alarm

No

1. Stirrer motor malfunction


2. Power failure

1. No mixing,
possible
accumulation of
unreacted materials
2. Monomer feed
continues, possible
accumulation of
unreacted materials

1. Interlock with feed


line
2. Monomer feed valve
must fail closed on
power loss

More

1. Stirrer motor controller


fails, resulting in high motor
speed

1. None

Covered under 1C

Not considered possible

Hazard and operability study report


Project title:

Sheet

Project number:

Date:

P&ID number:

Chairman:

Line number:

Study team:

Guide
word

Deviation

Cause

Conseque
nces

of

Safeguards

Action
Num
ber

By

Details

Reply
accepted

HAZOP Action Sheet


Project:

Project no:

Action no:

P&ID no:

Date:

Tape ref:

Action no:

Date for reply:

Description:

Reply:

Signed:

Issued
Return completed form to:

Date:

Returned

Complete

HAZOP Advantages

Meets regulatory requirements

Plant operates better

Less down time

Product quality improved

Employees are happier

HAZOP Weakness

HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious


with a tendency for boredom for analysts.

It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented,


although the technique should be amenable to human
error application.

It tends to generate many failure events with


insignificance consequences and generate many failure
events which have the same consequences.

It stifles brainstorming although this is not required at


the late stage of design when it is normally applied.

HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and


therefore omits many scenarios.

HAZOP Weakness

It takes little account of the probabilities of events or


consequences, although quantitative assessment are
sometime added. The group generally let their collective
experiences decide whether deviations are meaningful.

HAZOP is poor where multiple-combination events can


have severe effects.

It tends to assume defects or deterioration of materials of


construction will not arise.

When identifying consequences, HAZOP tends to


encourage listing these as resulting in action by
emergency control measures without considering that
such action might fail. It tends to ignore the contribution
which can be made by operator interventions.

HAZOP Purpose

It emphasizes upon the operating integrity of a system,


thereby leading methodically to most potential and
detectable deviations which could conceivably arise in
the course of normal operating routine

including "start-up " and "shut-down" procedures

as well as steady-state operations.

It is important to remember at all times that HAZOP is


an identifying technique and not intended as a means
of solving problems nor is the method intended to be
used solely as an undisciplined means of searching for
hazardous scenarios.