SOCIAL JUSTICE AS JUSTIFICATION LIMITS OF USE

L-80609
PLDT v. NLRC
Cruz, J.
Summarized by Cristelle Collera
Appeal by PLDT from an NLRC decision granting separation pay as financial
assistance to an employee it dismissed for cause (dishonesty). SC disallowed NLRCs
decision insofar as it granted separation pay.
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
Marilyn Abucay private respondent; former traffic operator of PLDT
PLDT petitioner; employer
FACTS
1. Two customers, Dr. Helen Bangayan and Mrs. Consolacion Martinez,
complained to PLDT that private respondent Marilyn Abucay demanded and
received from them P3,800.00 to facilitate the approval of their applications
for telephone installation.
2. PLDT investigated the complaint, and Abucay was found guilty and separated
from the service.
3. Abucay appealed to the MOLE, claiming that she had been illegally removed.
MOLE dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
In its decision, MOLE stated that the complainants were not totally
blameless (since the deal between them and Abucay happened
outside company premises, and they gave the P3,800.00 without any
receipt). It granted Abucay separation pay of one month pay for every
year of service (she served 10 years) as financial assistance.
4. Both Abucay and PLDT appealed the decision to the NLRB, which affirmed
the decision. Abucay took no further action.
5. PLDT now appeals the grant of financial assistance to the SC, averring that:
An employee dismissed for cause is not entitled to neither
reinstatement nor backwages, and is not allowed any relief at all, their
dismissal being in accordance with law.
Since Abucay was awarded with 10 months worth of pay, despite her
removal for cause, she was rewarded instead of punished for her
dishonesty.

6. NLRC avers that Abucay was sufficiently punished by her dismissal, and that
the grant of financial assistance was to help her get back on her feet after
working for PLDT for so long.
OSG cited past decisions where the employees were dismissed for
cause but allowed separation pay on grounds of social and
compassionate justice.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. W/N the separation pay given to respondent Abucay was valid NO.
General rule: The separation from work of an employee for a just
cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided in the
Code1.
The cases that OSG cited were the exceptions to the above rule,
based on considerations of equity, defined as justice outside law, being
ethical and jural rather than legal, grounded on conscience and not
positive law.
o The Constitution, in Art. XIII, expressly recognizes the vital role
of labor and promotes social justice, particularly the protection
of the rights of workers. These mandates justify the award of
separation pay in proper cases, even though the dismissal is for
cause.
o However, these past decisions have not been consistent as to
the justification for the grant of separation pay, and the amount
of such award. The Court feels that distinctions are in order; this
policy needs to be reexamined to be fair to both labor and
management.
In some cases, the grant of separation pay to an employee dismissed
for cause may be both just and compassionate, esp. if they have
worked for some time with the company.
o Examples of dismissals for cause under which separation pay
may be given: loss of confidence in employer; working mother
not going to work to take care of her child.
But where the cause of separation is more serious than efficiency, if it
is no longer incompetence but clear dishonesty, the law must be more
discerning.
Henceforth, separation pay shall only be allowed as a measure of
social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly

1 Sec. 7, Rule 1, Book VI, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
2

dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting

on their moral character.
o The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance
wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged. This great policy of our Constitution is not
meant for the protection of those who have proved they are not
worthy of it.
Thus, the grant of separation pay to Abucay is unjustified.
o The fact that she has worked with PLDT for 10 years should be
taken against her as it reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty to the
company.
The Court also rules that separation pay, if found due under the
circumstances of each case, should be computed at the rate of one
months salary for every year of service, without prejudice to special
agreements between the employer and employee.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petiton granted. NLRC decision affirmed in toto, except for the grant of
separation pay as financial assistance, which is hereby disallowed.
DOCTRINE
In cases of dismissal for cause, separation pay is allowed as a measure of
social justice only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for
causes other than serious misconduct or moral turpitude.
Separation pay in cases of dismissal for cause = monthly salary x no. of years
in service
RELEVANCE TO THE LESSON
In this case, Abucay was terminated for gross dishonesty, an offense involving
serious misconduct. Thus, the SC ruled that she wasnt qualified for the
separation pay that the NLRC granted.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
Padilla, J. (concurring): Concurs in result. Does not agree with the rate of
separation pay to be awarded in cases of valid termination; believes that it should
be up to the NLRCs discretion.
Fernan, C.J. (dissenting): Agrees with J. Padilla re: rate of separation pay to be
awarded. Those who have less in life should have more in law.

Grino-Aquino, J. (dissenting): Believes that the SC should not rationalize

compassion, votes to affirm grant of financial assistance to Abucay.