You are on page 1of 25

Aratuc vs.

88 SCRA 251
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang
Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of
the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte,
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and
Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by
Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107
voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results. A
Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had
conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in
the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of
Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,
declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the
KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned
resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first
eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning
candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the
Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending
its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.
The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any
appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too
well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought
to have done.

Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board

G.R no. 96266
FACTS: Private respondents filed an application for oil price increase was granted by public no.
the provisional increase. On December 18, 1990 the court dismissed the petition and reaffirm
ERBs provisional increase without hearing pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O no. 172. Prior to the
issuance of said order, a hearing was conducted but the petitioner failed to appear at said
hearing .The petitioner contends that the provisional increase in the prices of petroleum violated
due process for having been issued without notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not ERB orders granting provisional oil increase without prior notice is valid.
HELD: Yes, it is valid. While E. O 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the board
from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase, subject to final disposition of whether or not: to
make it permanent; to reduce or increase it further; to deny the application. Sec. 3, par. e is akin
to temporary restraining order. It outlines the jurisdiction of the grounds for which it may decree
a price adjustment, subject of notice and hearing. However, under Sec. 8, it may order the price
increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to final outcome of the proceeding. The
Board is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority, however,
it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.

Maria Elena Malaga, et al. vs. Manuel R. Penachos Jr. et al.

GR No. 86695 September 3, 1992
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication for an Invitation to Bid for the construction of
a Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that the last day for submission of pre2

qualification requirements (PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened
on 12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm
of 2 December 1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were not
allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having
been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December,
petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the chairman and PBAC members, claiming
that although they submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to
accept them. On the same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order
prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16 December,
defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited
from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by
PD No. 1818, which provides: Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure
project of the government to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official
from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project
Plaintiffs argue against the applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a
state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national
government or of any local political subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818 were applicable, the
prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like
the project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the RTC lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of PD 1818.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality such that it
would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.
HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. This includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
GOCCs. The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institutionrefers to
any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions
relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. It is clear from the above definitions that
ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent
that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body
nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the
procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not intended to
shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the
anomalies in the present case. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly
issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been

Beja Sr. vs. Court of Appeals

207 SCRA 689
FACTS: Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor
in 1975. and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the
General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for
grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations

and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were preventively
suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for
region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On
December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager
also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was
also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was
redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it
to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an
opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two
days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of
administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari
proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and
proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.
HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without
the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857
but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the Jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA.
With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was
created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA
were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council.
Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power to appoint, discipline and remove, and
determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel. On
December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the
Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its
attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the
DOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control
and administrative supervision, Attachment is defined as the lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and
control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the lateral relationship between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program
coordination. With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency
from the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an
agency under a Departments administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference
with respect to appointments and other personnel actions in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law
impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power
to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an
administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the
employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in
accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of
Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to to
subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the
jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA AAB-1-049-89.
The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is
REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.

EUGENIO vs. CSC et al

G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995
FACTS: .Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a
CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board. Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution
which abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of

the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and
authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:
Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for
Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel,
budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of
the Office for Career Executive Service.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board
which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB
HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled
and set aside
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It
cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by
the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commissions power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization
Committee the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up
executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one
functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy and program
coordination. This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited
Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination.
The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing
board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without
voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and
projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its

representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency.

De la Lalana V. Alba
FACTS:In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a
judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges
that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the
courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).

HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who
was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by
virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant
who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents
of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists
between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He
ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that
as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view
be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say
prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by
way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion
into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains
in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from
the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded
power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested
in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it
with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that
in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate
a statute, the former is to be preferred.

Medalla vs. Sayo

103 Phil. 587
FACTS: Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr, is the chief of clinics of the Caloocan City
general Hospital, Caloocan city. Private respondent Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident
Physician thereat. When the position of assistant, hospital administrator of the Caloocan City
general hospital became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan city
mayor Alejandro A. Fider designated and subsequently appointed, as assistant hospital
administrator private respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner,
Dr. Medalla, Jr, Protested Dr. Mackay designation and subsequent appointment alleging among
others that, chief of clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank, the then acting city Mayor Virgililo P.
Robles, who succeeded former mayor, now Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4 th
endorsement dated September 20,1978, sustained Mackay appointment state that as of April

18, 1978 when Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was promoted to assistant hospital administrator from
his previous position of Resident Physician, he was next in rank to the said higher position by
reason of his having completed all academic requirements for the certificate in Hospital
administration contrary to the claim of Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May 2, 1978.
ISSUE: Whether or not that appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as assistant hospital
Administrator is valid
HELD: when a presidential act is challenged before the court of justice, it is not to be implied
there from that the executive is being made subject and subordinate to courts the legality of his
acts are under judicial review, not because the executive is inferior to the courts, but because
the law is above the chief executive himself, and the court seek only to interpret, apply or
implement it a judicial review of the President decision of a case of an employee decided by the
civil service board of appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the
courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all
administrative act of all administrative officer. The court may always examine into the exercise of
power by a ministerial officer to the extent of determining whether it is a legal power that could
have been granted to him and whether it has been exercised in a legal manner. And under the
civil service section 19 (3) of the civil service PD no. 807 the recruitment of selection of
employees for promotion is drawn from the nix-in-rank.

Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals

101 Phil. 490
FACTS: Petitioner-appellant was on and before January, 1953, a watchman of the Floating
Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors Division, Bureau of Public Works. In Administrative Case
No. R-8182 instituted against him for negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6
under him had sunk because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his
care), the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of findings made by a
committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty
of contributory negligence in not pumping the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be
considered resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at
the discretion of the appointing officer. Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to review the decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on
the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies before he instituted
the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not there that the case at bar requires a need to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking for affirmative relief in court?
HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an administrative
remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy
before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-581.) the doctrine is a device based on
considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give
the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.

Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It
was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for
any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna
Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance
of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region?
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a
general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is
a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code,
which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Rizal Empire Insurance Group v. NLRC

FACTS: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein
petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day.
On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist,
with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of
petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations."
In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims
Department and his salary was increased to P450,00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to
the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of
living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he
was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances
and other benefits. On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed
from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed

a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March
14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with
back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on
the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON it is wthin the jurisdiction of SC to review the case
HELD. No Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on
appeal, provides: SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of notice thereof. xxx xxx xxx SECTION 6. No extension of period.
No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be
entertained. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission,
aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985
and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The Revised Rules of the
National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for
interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative
regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Under the abovequoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has
become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.


Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals

GR No. 119761, August 29, 1996
FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco") is engaged in the manufacture of
different brands of cigarettes. The Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate
certificates of trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. The initial
position of the CIR was to classify 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they
were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However,
Fortune Tobacco changed the names of 'Hope' to 'Hope Luxury ' and 'More' to 'Premium More,'
thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. RA No. 7654 was enacted
and became effective on 03 July 1993. It amended Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC. About a
month after the enactment and two (2) days before the effectively of RA 7654, Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93") Reclassification of Cigarettes Subject to Excise
Tax, was issued by the BIR. Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall
of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following day, or on 30 July 1993,
the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9, 598, 334.
00. On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA
upheld the position of Fortune Tobacco and adjudged RMC No. 37-93 as defective.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the due process of law.
HELD: A reading of RMC 37-93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has
been issued, convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as a corrective measure or
merely as construing Section 142(c)(1) of the NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most
importantly, been made in order to place "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion"
within the classification of locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brands and to thereby
have them covered by RA 7654. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it
legislated under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of
notice, of hearing, and of publication should not have been then ignored. The Court is convinced
that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and effective administrative


Tio vs. Videogram

151 SCRA 208
FACTS: Valentino Tio is a videogram operator who assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987
entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. The PD was also reinforced by PD1994 which amended the
National Internal Revenue Code. The amendment provides that there shall be collected on
each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of
five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject
to sales tax. The said law was brought about by the need to regulate the sale of videograms as
it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly
lessen the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Tio countered that there is no factual nor legal basis for
the exercise by the President of the vast powers conferred upon him by the Amendment and
that there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: It cannot be successfully argued that the PD contains an undue delegation of legislative
power. The grant in Sec 11 of the PD of authority to the Board to "solicit the direct assistance of
other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the
heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board"
is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as
to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in
the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a
"fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction
and control of the Board." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and
corruption would not stigmatize the PD as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the
aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.


Mauricio Cruz vs. Stanton Youngberg

GR No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
FACTS: Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which prohibits the importation
of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. It was enacted for the purpose of
preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries.
The Act provides: SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five
existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it
shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from
foreign countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General,
with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely
or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle
has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and livestock of the lands.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or
not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the
legislative powers.
HELD: No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done;
to the latter no valid objection can be made. The Governor-General is authorized to lift the
prohibition, with the consent of the presiding officers of the legislature, if he should determine
after a fact-finding investigation that there was no longer any threat of contagion from cattle. The
lifting of the ban would have been effected through a contingent regulation based on the
prescribed contingency, to wit, the finding that foreign cattle would no longer contaminate the
local livestock.


People vs. Maceren

79 SCRA 450
FACTS: This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in
fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law. On March 7, 1969 Jose
Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario
were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.It was alleged in the complaint that the
five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio
San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz. Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the
complaint. The prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order
of dismissal. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric
current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in Section 11 of the
Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted
by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro
fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. It is noteworthy that
the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the
law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84, prohibiting
electro fishing in all Philippine waters. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting
the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly
prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing,
are devoid of any legal basis. That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deep-sea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking
of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the
kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations. Nowhere in that law is electro fishing
specifically punished. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned. Thus, the lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of
regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.


Metropolitan Traffic Command vs. Gonong

187 SCRA 432
FACTS: On 10 August 1989, Lawyer Dante s. David filed a complaint before the regional Trial
Court alleging that the license plate of his car issued by the Land Transportation Commission
now Land Transportation Office, was removed by the agents of herein Petitioner while the car
was parked somewhere in Escolta, Manila. The complainant further alleged that the car was not
illegally parked. Ultimately complainant and private respondent David raised the issue that there
was no local ordinance or law to justify the removal of his car rear plate number, thus praying for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ f preliminary injunction by the court. On
14 August of the same year, prayer for the issuance of TRO was granted however, after series
of hearing, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Parties in-interest told to present their
respective memoranda before the ruling shall be issued. Subsequently, the respondent judge
ruled that LOI 43 in which the defendant had invoked, did not empower it to detach or remove or
confiscate the plates of any vehicle which are caught illegally parked outside of the designated
parking area (s), further declares that LOI 43 only authorizes the agents of MTC WTD to tow or
remove vehicles or motor vehicles whenever it causes traffic congestion. Undaunted of the
defeat, Petitioner brought the case before the Supreme Court when it should have been
properly raise first, before the Court of Appeals in which the latter has a concurrent jurisdiction
to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court when the validity of a statute is put into test.
On the ground of public interest, the highest tribunal had decided to take cognizance of the
case. On 6 February 1990 a temporary restraining order was issued. Private respondent argued
that Presidential decree 1605(Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Central Powers
Related to Traffic Management, Providing Penalties, and for other Purposes) repeals letter-ofInstruction 43, however the contention of petitioner herein was, the question statute remains in
full- force despite the issuance if PD 1605, and further contends that PD 1605 shall be
considered as special law because it is limited in territorial application.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Letter-of-Instruction 43 is valid? (2) Whether or not the removal or
confiscation of the plate number of any vehicle found to be illegally parked is sanctioned by LOI
HELD: On the first issue, the highest tribunal resolves that, letter-of-Instruction 43 is valid.
However, applicable only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the streets due to some
involuntary reasons and not against those who intentionally breaks traffic laws. Resolving the
second issue, the Court holds that the applicable law to justify the removing and confiscating the
plate number of any vehicle intentionally parked by the owner in an area not designated as
parking sides is Presidential decree 1605. The court found out that the provisions of the two
statutes do not clash each other, LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on public
roads because of involuntary cause while PD 1605 deals with motor vehicles that have
deliberately parked in a place which is not designated as parking area.
Accordingly, the petition was DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, branch 8,
Manila was affirmed. The temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court on February
9 1990 was lifted.


Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres

212 SCRA 298
FACTS: On 01 June 1991, DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres as a result of published stories the
abuses suffered by Filipina housemaids particularly in Hong Kong suspended the placement
and recruitment by the private recruitment agencies. The DOLE itself and POEA took control of
the recruitment and deployment of Filipina helpers bound to Hong Kong. On 01 July 1991,
DOLE Secretary ordered the administrator of POEA to use the facilities of the agencies for the
purpose. On 10 July DOLE Secretary issued memorandum Circulars no. 30 series of 1991
seeking accreditation by the Philippine government from recruitment agencies based in Hong
Kong. On 01 August of the same year, POEA Administrator issued MC no.37 series of 1991 on
the processing of domestic helpers after the request for accreditation was responded positively
by recruitment agencies in based in Hong Kong. On 02, September 1991, petitioner, through its
counsel, filed a petition to annul the DO 16 and MC 30 and 37 thus, preventing the Department
of Labor and Employment and the Philippine Overseas and Employment Administration to
implement the issuances.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not respondents committed a grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess of their rule-making authority in issuing the circulars? (2) Whether or not the issuances
violates the constitution and against the regimes of reasonableness, fairness and equality? (3)
Whether or not the issuances complies the requirement of publication for its validity?
HELD: Resolving the first issue, the court finds that the circulars are valid exercise of the rulemaking power of DOLE Secretary as delegated to the executive Branch of the Government.
Applying article 36 the regulatory power of the Secretary of Labor to restrict and regulate the
recruitment and placement as well as deployment of Filipino abroad. Executive order 797 issued
on May 01, 1982 further provides the DOLEs regulatory functions to regulate the deployment of
foreign Filipino workers. The issuances of those circulars are therefore valid exercise of quasilegislative power of the agency, it cannot be considered as unconstitutional or oppressive or
unreasonable. Resolving the last issue, the issuances are legally invalid, defective and it cannot
be enforced for lack of publication requirement as codified under section 2 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines and section 3 and 4 chapter 2 of the administrative code of 1987. Lack of
publication is an essential requisite for the validity of the law. (Tanada v. Tuvera)
Accordingly, the prohibition was granted. The issuances were all suspended pending the
compliance of publications as required by law.


PCFI vs. Sec. of Education Culture and Sports

153 SCRA 622
FACTS: On 21 February 1987, the Task Force on Private Education under the Department of
Education Culture and Sports had recommended to the DECS several measures or courses of
actions congruent to the governments policy regulating private colleges in the country. On the
said proposal it stipulates that Private schools may increase school fees from 15-20% without a
prior approval from DECS provided that the school shall not exceed the total amount of school
fees of One Thousand Pesos. Petitioner herein, questioned AO 37 and sought for
reconsideration on the basis that the increase was too high or exorbitant. On 10 April 1987, on
the basis that education is a matter of right and considering the public clamor, DECS secretary
issued a modified administrative order authorizing back all Private Higher Educational
Institutions (PHEI) to implement an increase of 10-15% rate in the payment of school fees.
Discontented with the reconsideration prayed for, complainant-petitioner seeks for presidential
intervention to suspend the implementation of the modified AO 37 however; no response was
made by the President of the Philippines. On 20 May 1987, petitioner herein, elevates the
matter to the Supreme Court seeking to prevent the implementation of the said order. Thus, the
filing of petition for prohibition on the ground of public interest, seeking to resolve the following
questions before the Supreme Court;
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Administrative Order 37 issued by DECS Secretary has legal
basis? (2)Whether or not Administrative Order 37 issued by DECS Secretary curtailed the due
process clause enshrined in the constitution?
HELD: On the first issue, the court resolves that under section 57 Batas Pambansa Bilang. 232
or the Education Act of 1982 empowers the Department of Education Culture and Sports to
regulate the educational systems in the country such as the power to promulgate, administer,
supervise educational systems. Furthermore, under Sec. 70 of the same act, contemplates on
the Rule-Making power of the Minister of Education Culture and Sports. Ultimately the court
holds that the power to prescribe school fees is implied with the regulatory power exercised by
the Secretary of Education. To resolve the second issue, the court is in affirmative that in the
exercise of the rule-making (quasi-legislative) power of the secretary of education (formerly
Minister of Education) prior notice and hearing are not essential for the validity of the issuance.
Accordingly, the petition for prohibition was DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the court
reiterates that the rule-making power of the Secretary of Education to prescribe school fees for
private school shall not be exercise unreasonably, further stressed that any issuances will be
subjected by the Supreme Court power of review.


Cario vs. The Commission on Human Rights (CHR)

204 SCRA 483 (G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991)
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers,
among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance
of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to
act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to
them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged
at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the
government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary
of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at
the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives,
the teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order week, with more
teachers joining in the days that followed. Among those who took part in the "concerted mass
actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High
School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA.
However, the Secretary of Department of Education Culture and Sport (DECS) were
administratively charged them on the basis of the principal's report and had given them five (5)
days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days
"pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807".They filed correspondingly to the Commission on Human
Rights for the DECS violation of their peaceful assembly and replacement of them by the other
teachers without validly informing them. The CHR summons the DECS personnel but the latter
declared that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over
the case.
ISSUE: The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the
power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, or even a quasijudicial agency, which has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and
decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights.
HELD: The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that
it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this
country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.


Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava

105 Phil. 173
FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27,
1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June
27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one
who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice
law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the
Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Directors holding an examination for
the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent,
in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely
the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and
training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers and other individuals
who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he
stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has
been questioned formally.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and
the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before
the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of
their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence
of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also
embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the
determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore,
the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the
appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists,
engineers or technical men, which is not the case.


Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations

G.R. No. L-49496
FACTS: This case involved a motion for new trial of the National Labor Union, Inc. The
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., prays for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the
majority of the Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a
new trial, and avers, among others, that (1) Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938,
there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay
off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather; (2) the
supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army; (3) the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer
union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal; and (4) the
exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations is granted.
HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion
and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. Thus, the failure to
grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected
by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with
instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth.
There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. That of having something to support its decision;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
6. Judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision;
7. Should render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know
the various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered.

San Luis vs. CA


174 SCRA 258

FACTS: The instant petition for certiorari and mandamus and/or appeal by certiorari assails the
appellate courts ruling that mandamus lies to compel the reinstatement of a quarry
superintendent in the provincial government of Laguna who was initially detailed or transferred
to another office, then suspended and finally dismissed following his expos of certain
anomalies and irregularities committed by government employees in the province. Engineer
Mariano L. Berroya, and been the quarry superintendent in Laguna since May 31, 1959. In April
and May, 1973, he denounced graft and corrupt practices by employees of the provincial
government of Laguna. On July 20, 1973, Gov. Felicisimo San Luis, issued an order to transfer
Berroya to the Office of the Provincial Engineer. On October 25, 1973, the Civil Service
Commission ordered that Berroya be reverted to his regular position of quarry superintendent.
But instead of complying with the order of the Civil Service Commission, the governor on
December 12, 1973, suspended Berroya for alleged gross discourtesy, inefficiency and
insubordination on February 26, 1974. The Civil Service Commission reiterated its order for the
immediate reversion of Berroya to his former position, and ruled the one (1) year suspension
illegal. In the interim, respondent-appellant provincial governor issued an order on April 81, 1977
dismissing Berroya for alleged neglect of duty, frequent unauthorized absences, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of duty and abandonment of office, which order of dismissal was
appealed by Berroya to the Civil Service Commission. On January 29, 1979, the Civil Service
Commission declared the dismissal unjustified, exonerating Berroya of charges and directing his
reinstatement as quarry superintendent. Berroyas petition for reinstatement having been denied
by the governor despite orders for reinstatement by the Civil Service Commission and despite
factual antecedents aforestated he filed on May 27, 1980 the antecedent Civil Case No. SL1834 for Mandamus to compel his reversion to the position of quarry superintendent with basic
salaries of the entire period of suspension and dismissal and for moral and exemplary damages
and expenses of suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts can review the facts or the decisions rendered by the Civil
Service Commission and the Office of the President.
HELD: Since the decision of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had
long become final and executor y the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well
established in our jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a
final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.