[A.M. SDC-97-2-P.

February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI,
Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the
4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be
friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the
above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith,
a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya
addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to
terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as
represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's
branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said
sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on
the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed
with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract,
even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the
contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and
manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your
sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
1 | Legal Ethics

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San
Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually
went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T.
Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as
fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his
housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at
the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind
and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa
& Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI,
who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured
and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the
contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances,
that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and
abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and
the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be
the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February
21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons
already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance
of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996
to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to
the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in
relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he
was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and
began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage,
and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia
Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she
appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through

manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger,
manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the
essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting
that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She
closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately
disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably
with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding
Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty.
Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the
authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining,
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive
Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief
Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link"
between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk
of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a
Royal Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive,
even obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the
complaint in order that he might comment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk
of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia
Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently
bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from
his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
2 | Legal Ethics

months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that
there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had
merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege,
saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he
entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26,"
were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated
by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); [8] and as far as he
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for
postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this
had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of
any man unduly prejudiced and injured." [10] He claims he was manipulated into
reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank
contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him
later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and
follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed
agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi
somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the
next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in
connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out,
receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays
for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious,
malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court
with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of
Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier
letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M.
Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made
"malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and
blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written
inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** **
prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by
"deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa &
Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority
and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely
acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a
total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
(RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands
that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and **
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest." [17] More than once has this Court
emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an
agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most
junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs
or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively
intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has
3 | Legal Ethics

a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner
consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify
resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the
Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not
use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise
improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his
strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.
[21]
While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been
admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an
"attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members
thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is
confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of
no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use
of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege,
the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the
use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned
that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate
of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a
great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this
Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
4 | Legal Ethics

commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues,
who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to
the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by
this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed
must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN
TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the
event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title
to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition.
Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to
him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it
to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of
arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his
client was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he
lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this
petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which
he earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will
become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)
5 | Legal Ethics

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused
to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen
had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself,"
and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the
defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On
June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on
July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a
copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on
said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the
judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove
that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration,
Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which
he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration,
however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already
perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on
appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the
appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by
plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the
opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court
RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for
the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966
(pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of
time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece
of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction &
Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the
running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest
decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration,"
citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by
this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967
and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendantappellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8,
1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions
between this case and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965,
relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant
further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning
the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to
the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the
motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those
raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much
earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila
Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in
the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court
issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the
brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the
Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably
because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of
November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and
Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on
the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case,
and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion
for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September
8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date
was ordered expunged from the records.
6 | Legal Ethics

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his
"Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading
that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as
well as its individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it is
unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action
on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we
waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was
reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to
surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested
"that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero
vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28,
1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that
since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely
and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty.
Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him."
Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for
permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7)
"to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for
such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident
submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer
questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could
observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation
"in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest
latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter
was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology.
Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of
lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7,
St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For
with what judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure you measure, it
shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see

the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not

consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can
thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the
speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam
in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the
beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see
clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's
eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you,
even to do you also to them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements
mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of
what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he
vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the
Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification,
into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of
the noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the
Court that notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you
remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural
things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your
respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for
JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His
Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance
of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the
opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with
emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines
today, that even our own President, said: "the story is current,
though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice
in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war.
There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is
a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by

TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND
AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of
justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings
will bear us on this matter, ...

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not
the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the
members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of
necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We
never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But
in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on
your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not
performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness,
confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God
given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free
speech.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for

charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all
in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from this
COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas
and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our
particular case.

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the

further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by
our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

7 | Legal Ethics

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us.
Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O
Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE,
what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE,
what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any
abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering that yours
is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated
so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be
found in all courts and government offices. We have added only two
more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that
no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb
in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED,
not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect
or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the.
impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the
members of this Court and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what
has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was
intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide
as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose
between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the
members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold
the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court,
there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended
as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite
aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions
8 | Legal Ethics

by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and
the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very
careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates
the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most
petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been
lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand
critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to
petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every
petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon
us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which
present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the
particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the
same petition different reasons may read different justices to the
same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even
confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been
suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for
denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress
has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the
Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of
260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same
three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its
work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for
refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different
reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in
concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review
undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963
(60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated
its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of
merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief
Justice Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question

has been raised before; and we held that these "resolutions" are
not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They
merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in
view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even
ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and
so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing,
the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the
Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the
practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are
often merely ordered "dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from
the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for
compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into
accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this
Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another
hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not
a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The
following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be
considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor
has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the
exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing
examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and
correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable
9 | Legal Ethics

decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a
number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen
knew or ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the
running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion
upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time
and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally
articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in
general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which
provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing
and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three
days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no
motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such
notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is
nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v.
Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil.
81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41
Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason
is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing
the Court would have no way to determine whether that party
agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on
his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period
within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's
judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of
the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from
himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he
made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his
professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no
justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction
each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why
lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only
the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a
judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially
recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the
court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our
official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the
press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer
for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's
integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of
justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who
assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where
those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave
durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every
lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of
their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary
is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and
as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels
the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place
accorded to him in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen
to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful
manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the
judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6
F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of
the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In
written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of
courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the

10 | Legal Ethics

doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the
expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality
or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They
are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney
can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the
judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and
expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity
to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our
judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other
class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and
upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W.
212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to
seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their
duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the
merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be
profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect
to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are
not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all
good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to

observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The
first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance."

campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel
precedents.

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by
express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted
to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws,
but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and
judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts.
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their
tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and
temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but
discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army.
The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the
foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl.
481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of
right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer,
L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,
11 | Legal Ethics

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to

public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer
which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands
condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge
or a court is beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do
not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed
at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as
such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of
justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then
the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and
circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal
judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients
a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a
prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal
Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to
find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the
accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into
disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the twoyear suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that
time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to
two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial
office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit
to the criticism members of the bar may make regarding the
capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence
and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart.

116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex
parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a
libelous publication by an attorney, directed
against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of
such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its
author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of
graver character than those made by the respondent here. But, in
our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are
permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest
observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and
fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that
the public confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld,
and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re
Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,
representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set
aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave
the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter
began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that
my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in
the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic
action as the law allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly
work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not
irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is
proper ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right
and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper
authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the law
demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of
the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive
conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers
of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into
12 | Legal Ethics

disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot

be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt
to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions,
and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up
in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the
court into disrepute with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were
bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or
decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was
ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the
authority of the court against whose members it was made, bring its
judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased
arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of
justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the
guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that
freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and
decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and
criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of
legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of
his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar,
as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil
rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for
submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the
court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he
fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the
result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in
the profession of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial
officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on
the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial
action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney
of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his
duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the

power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial

officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify
an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to
the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be
encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in
a case decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to
criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for
them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the
performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to
subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and
in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made
by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the
administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty
of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring
possible temporary observations more or less vituperative and
finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have
been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against
a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of
propriety and privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack,
direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and
integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper
conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this
court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity
to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a
newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members
to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose
undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the
respondent for 30 days, saying that:

13 | Legal Ethics

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one
most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such members
does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well
as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial
determination is of prime importance under our system and ideals
of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment
that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials,
whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be
served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But
such right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar
who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client
and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at
all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth
and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion
is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired
by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a
community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant
misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through
its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the
affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he
lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such
conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself
demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by
an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms
criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and
confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall,"
and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar,
and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed
that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated
than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the
said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he
had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better
right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a

widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or

umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions
discoverable, short of assigning to the court emasculated
intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If
the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or
the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of
its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the
court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct
motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it
is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every rightminded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six
months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of
professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the letter
addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very
purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the
insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of
acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a
communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose.
Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry
attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and
could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial
capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to
assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent
such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and
for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent,
addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in
any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not
constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d
Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this
letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his other acts
charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different
principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so
far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the
Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to
14 | Legal Ethics

which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from

the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as
a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed
as an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus
assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which
the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his
obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers.
"This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the
judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
(U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction,
as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an
assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and
a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words
addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from
criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by
authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the
court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a
citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it
held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial
officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a
cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the
court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if
only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the
building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to
the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else
set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by
taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man
would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a
professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly
decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a
personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and
reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and
will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div.
136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1
N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it
appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter
to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in
reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense.

The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that,
while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter
should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has
power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel
learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of
judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with
robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long
before the general public may feel that they may redress their
fancied grievances in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be
anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall
into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in
this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an
attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which
the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not
holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct
of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the
attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred
in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge]
as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney."
As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application
to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7
Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v.
Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's
Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl.
481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been
so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as
may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for
18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being
under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable
attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude."
There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in
general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in
his general conduct of a case.

15 | Legal Ethics

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the
trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this
sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal
profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a
case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make
him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he
expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by
lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a
crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate
criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence
in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave
professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser
appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of
the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted
outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence.
Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of
courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different bases and
calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence
of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his
motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the
rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and
rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of
which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires.
The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution
would be resting on a very shaky foundation,

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made
disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an
intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby
charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of
the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press
Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who,
invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper,
caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that
our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more
putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go
much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he
denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and
glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first
measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for
its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt,
despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech,
this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be
published in the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or
comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and
still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel
Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court
with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is
one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing
the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members
of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his
statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus
embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for
the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into
disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .

16 | Legal Ethics

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to
say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the
law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the
one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine
the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the
Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a
member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto,
like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation
to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he
may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as
being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce
Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen"
into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in
disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our
condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments
of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in
the motion for reconsideration, implications there are which
inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this
Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency
of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the

law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions

of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as
making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute
governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of
all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the
jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It
pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by
the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted
statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the
jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this
Court. They bring into question the capability of the members
and some former members of this Court to render justice. The
second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel
labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the
interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them
involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that,
in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be
invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls
over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now
seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court
had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much
of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first
stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking
thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in
contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations
were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said
examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption
of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect
that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated.
Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:

17 | Legal Ethics

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or

influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily
punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends
to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal
contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in
the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second
kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to
vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring
them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the
first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there
is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the
newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or
without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the
court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public
confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his
statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the
judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for
contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said
appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for
contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the
tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his
sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of
the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and
ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the
pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The
sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by
removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of
an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is
the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice
of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and

exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of
continued membership in the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is
an inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one which
is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its
existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of
attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such
a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot
be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to
practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the
inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to
exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to
all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public and of the
courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court
which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is
almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of
attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and
exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but
as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of
a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the
Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make
an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here
in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on
Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its
way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade
against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all
calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its
members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind
18 | Legal Ethics

"but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and
its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent
injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of
his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an
account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he
expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he
rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures,
virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon
him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism.
They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract
public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its
members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no
redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment
to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics.
As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any
other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be,
above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating,
fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and
healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment
and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to
attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and
must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are
the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This
is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the
proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into

the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense
a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any
tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against
the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its
members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their
distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real
sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself,
not the individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to
discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as
it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it
be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that
fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all
cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the
imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be
visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of
Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The
discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course,
primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary
and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be
19 | Legal Ethics

scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never
be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing
that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day,
Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an
advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added
glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances.
His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance
nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that
suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same
should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence
grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting
support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a
person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is
lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that
authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to
Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall
last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this
Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be,
as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor
General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee,
Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful

Candidates of 1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and
concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953."
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate
(for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).
Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations
held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination
papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who
had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent
in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75
per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and
passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See
Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages
of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for,
and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced
the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.
The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that
request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments
adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially
the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their
unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on
June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an
election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR
EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX
UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Resolution

March 18, 1954

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the

Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule
numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar

20 | Legal Ethics

candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the
August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per
cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations;
seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five
bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent
in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for
the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in
any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that
he may take.

1947

749

340

1948

899

409

11

1949

1,218

532

164

1950

1,316

893

26

1951

2,068

879

196

1952

2,738

1,033

426

1953

2,555

968

284

12,230

5,421

1,168

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the
revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law
as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply
the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To
avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No.
972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to
be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared
valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or
not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as
well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended
to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law,
the following statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic
Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946

(August)

206

121

18

1946

(November)

477

228

43

21 | Legal Ethics

TOTAL

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only
586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act,
or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section
2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different
examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating,
however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their
latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by
Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore
1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed
in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were
denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented
similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by
Republic Act No. 972, although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no
sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the
legal profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have
been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned
petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of
the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various
aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E.
Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista,
in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the
Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad
Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V.
Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for
petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio
Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has
greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted
almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has
been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after
the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in
order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar,
those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author
Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the
Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading
materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law
soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed.
And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality
total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies
1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of
the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations.
The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An
adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially
of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate
mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was
an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were
abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made
available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also published
them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without
restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged
editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine
Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by
the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of
applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had
an identical case of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we
daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which
has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by
the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to
improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From
the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of
a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others,
the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW,
441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of
Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in
his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not
within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that
has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY,
81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme
court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law
under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College
promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

22 | Legal Ethics

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes
for either of them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals,
given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise
any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of
twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite
qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice
in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as
follows:

no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and

burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of
the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by
the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no
other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions.
We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with
the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains
nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college
should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting
a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it
was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the
legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it
operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to
determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them
had previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing
power which they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with
the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions
which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The
prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and
the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this
particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with
the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence
in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over
this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from
the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the
admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant
leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant
possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar
may be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act.
(p. 93.)

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who
failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question
of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence
in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it
provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College
conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications
that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does
not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from
the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it
does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New
York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and
their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because
of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial
power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly
"constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress
by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a
legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function
requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College
being an institution of established reputation, and having a law department
under the charge of able professors, the students in which department were
not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the
institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly,
considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required by
the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary
examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which
23 | Legal Ethics

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely
different on the matter of admission of the practice of law.

these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the
highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if
previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted
to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of
the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of
this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441,
in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to
practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the
following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the
history of the English speaking people so far as we have been able to
ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of
the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has
been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has
always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute
Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an
assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and
Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for
admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is acting
within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such
qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its
judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the
power of the court to impose other and further exactions and qualifications
foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct,
independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch
enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its
department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in
the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought
of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist.
State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs.
Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon
which the administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this
respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to
the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it
was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by
any other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility
fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
24 | Legal Ethics

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship.
The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the
courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful
bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice
and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over
their bars, at least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries
prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly
subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the
right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as
was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235,
"constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be
regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to
practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to
isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the
inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power
exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity
and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate
independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this
institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who
should constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the
Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps
the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the
three great departments of government separate and independent of one
another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial
department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is
inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of
the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the
absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may
legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental
merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest.
When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of
attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class
from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications
do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot
go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the
proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to
compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment.
It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise the power of
appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the

authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the
practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey
(In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals,
attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as
members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex
parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18
L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs.
Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D.
43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually
exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the
court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an
attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any
one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of
an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter
where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a
consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the
laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning
and sound moral character. This arises from the need of enlightened
assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant.
It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was
said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470,
471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege
burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than
private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself,
an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with
the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of
government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has
been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without
exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the
bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court
entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its
powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of
such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications
of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and
to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice
Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13,
15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of
common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who
25 | Legal Ethics

is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and

for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to
practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the
court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court,
holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the
nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient
legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the
parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest
court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years
preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the
possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel
moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional
character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the
parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and
are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry
the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for
professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and
can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex
parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere
ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in
numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the
matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the
court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a
judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be
entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly
considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial
functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded
everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need
not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have also
been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court.
Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is
an inherent power of the court. A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of
California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature
respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial
and legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial
departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that
shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to
the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations
with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the
time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and
not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial
decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of
the other departments of the government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law,
p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by
requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very
plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling
them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing
what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry.
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to
1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court
during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this
Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no
less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that
may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the
practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution
provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

26 | Legal Ethics

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal
equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary
power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this
Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the
matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress
may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the
authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme
Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit
that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary
power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may
admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of
individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement
the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better
service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of
its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and
supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce
rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter
and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes
to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without
diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar
respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high
virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal,
amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the
judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient
administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the
profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in
the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper
constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took
examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently
enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may
be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government
appointed Guaria and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This
tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this
case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination,
on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of
Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred
and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to
read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the
Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in
good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to
the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the
authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court,
judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court
of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney
General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in
the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila,
city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal,
attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province,
may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without
an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing
such fact to the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant
took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the
examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average
of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he
was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75.
We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to
the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the
applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when
he presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant
him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first
satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that
occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and
ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the
applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the
prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court"
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office
of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind
the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the
above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context
generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a
proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the
admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the
apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to
have the power exercised.
27 | Legal Ethics

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States,
articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court
continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission
and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted,
and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving
the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power
conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as
transcending its rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions
enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under
the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have
accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as satisfactory
evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we
had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior
to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the
applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other
jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it
further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required
qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do
not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself
satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning
and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice
in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only
four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to
practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the
responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval
of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government
service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would
be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his
case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be
given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without
prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the
ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 4849.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also
to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to
make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme
Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those
students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two
years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied
in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three
years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme
Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class
legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by
virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the
general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is
entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the
law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in
force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting
clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every
application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court
in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant
commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college,
shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent
changes in said rules". In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that
up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to
the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law school
regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law
studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least
36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual
proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any
student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such
time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course
of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a
satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now
required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is
by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and
privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of
legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special
legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the
28 | Legal Ethics

legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take
part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of
evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the
requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done
by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The
right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the
holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for
litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while
attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its
operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that
purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in
general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be
some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having
no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs.
People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E.
454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by
experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill.
48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and
practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor,
65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall
serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any
classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to
engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons
who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is
subdivided into two classes First, those presenting diplomas issued by
any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those
who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time
in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon
examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and
as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are
dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of
time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a
diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may
prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the
qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date
of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not.
Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves
to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes
named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who
commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would
complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the
3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before
December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to
the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly
useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear
any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is

for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons.
(pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the
legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also
held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:

disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress

approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and
whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the
passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it
clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In
re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the
legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications
upon which courts must admit and license those applying as attorneys at
law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That
power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike
and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature
to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr.
Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S.
Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen
of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he
may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all
persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be
considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all
vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as
sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for
their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the
"estate" acquired in them that is, the right to continue their prosecution
is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is
fundamental under our system of government that all similarly situated and
possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even
statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to
establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper
qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged,
and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such
examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of
the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon
this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517;
see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W.
345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am.

Jur. 151-153 as follows:

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to
practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of
legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once established his
right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning
and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter
affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public
an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the
general average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of
the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained
classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953,
1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the
same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior
to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his
right to an equal consideration.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the

Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without examination, all who
had served in the military or naval forces of the United States during the
World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were
29 | Legal Ethics

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a

classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the
person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based
upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the
constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real
differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore,
any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based
on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other
individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference
between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and
the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation
to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural
cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their
rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a
clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that
class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in
1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5
per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe
the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules
require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably
followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the
abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has
been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its
retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional.
What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in

which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain
the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in
the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949,
74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was
considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by
reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the
passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized.
Now, it is desired to undo what had been done cancel the license that was issued
to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed
law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done
by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per
cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify
them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that
is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed
law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the
general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to
the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law
attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment
of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the
Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of
Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement
the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And
this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because
it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to
which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite
intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the
laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already
different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said
law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was
abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is
that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946
to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time.
This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and
annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious
that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within
the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers;
second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law
suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following
reasons, to wit:

30 | Legal Ethics

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar
examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared
to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees
the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the
opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members
of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an
arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility
of the Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the
petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said
resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise
and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter
and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory
rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its
promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this
Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar,
inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial
functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the
primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision
on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing
rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law
makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the
admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to
what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1,
the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the
examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the
examinations in those years, shall continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent
and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening
and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the
judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have
announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the

Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for
the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional
and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to
the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955
inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10,
article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in
the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in
the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more,
without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having
passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has
become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So
ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."

31 | Legal Ethics

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7,

1977.

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign
Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that,
as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of
law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues
that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of

32 | Legal Ethics

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised
herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine
Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P.
Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to
submit their respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their
valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with
appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the
services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be
the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it
proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective
position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search,
evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth, marriage,
property, or business registration, obtaining documents like clearance,
passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to

respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of

acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only
one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

xxx xxx xxx

Article 26. . . .
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the
public, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent is
offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as
earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced,
first of all, to the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of
legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical
services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements
subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all
the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of
the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal
support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary
to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services,"
as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are
being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

33 | Legal Ethics

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a
man and woman entered into accordance with law for the establishment
of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences
of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to
Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves
to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered
"the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such
as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a
motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the

inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes

marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse,
this particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages
celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be
concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or
committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the
place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers
legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence
is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which
are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be

better performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer
will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are
(equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection
of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection
of the public. Technological development in the profession may be
encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal
practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to
perform all of its services, but only if such services are made available
exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then
be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between which service may
be offered to the public in general and which should be made available
exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however,
may require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from
causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the
services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal
forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will
greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead
encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by nonmembers of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be
no choice but to prohibit such business.

34 | Legal Ethics

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services

ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or
induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or
otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may
not be prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such
matters, it must be required to include, in the information given, a
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of
action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or
capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted
before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot
recommend any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible
sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed
exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But

nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for
profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and
without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities.
Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to
the legal profession, but before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must
conform to each and every provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues
stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the
regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to
be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications,
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal
services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of
law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of
deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to look after
their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law,
and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing competent
lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the
Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to
the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business
name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to
35 | Legal Ethics

engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is

a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also
misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the
Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law and
for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that
it merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the
general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s)
of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons
and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment
of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments
Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid
law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from the
danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be
engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year
course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course and
then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified
to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to
the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study
and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with the
general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish
these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable Court
may decide to make measures to protect the general public from being
exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of
being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While
it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case
that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity
staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without
being qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems
to give the impression that information regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions, declaration of
absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's
name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems
brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers
36 | Legal Ethics

involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic,
when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on
the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit
cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited
law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to
solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal
Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which
is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one
has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only
by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for
said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the
trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular
needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of
the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act could
become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is
not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go
about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the
public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers
or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the
same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it
can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge
of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful practice
of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render
effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and regulations.
He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law
forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law,
and his use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what measures
he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not
only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men
have considerable acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate moulds our conduct
not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving
others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house
statutes, and who draws plans and specification in harmony with the
law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies
that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites,
in support of some measure that he recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion,
they are not, provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
37 | Legal Ethics

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to

engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect to the
building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function
would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for
licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been
pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow
of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important
body of the industrial relations experts are the officers and business
agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the
larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to
delegate special responsibility in employee matters to a management
group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and
without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants
like the defendants have the same service that the larger employers get
from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized
profession for which appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who customarily perform
a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical education
given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his
work for any particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to
his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and
psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he
must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the limits
the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice
or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into
the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his
work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part
of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the
employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective bargaining,
with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law. Anyone
may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly

skilled in the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is free
to accept the employment whether or not he is a member of the bar.
Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on
a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who
are not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed rightof-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or
if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But I need not reach a definite
conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative
agencies of the federal government, especially before trial examiners of
the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the federal
government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress,
may regulate the representation of parties before such agency. The
State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such
determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one
whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations
Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by
other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and ther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant
may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful
calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the
bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client
as a whole.

38 | Legal Ethics

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he
is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding
services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with
a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on
the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may
be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving
information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which
publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is
amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a
solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is
urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out,
constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the
public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS
THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book

assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does

not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to
a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant's
publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person in a
particular situation in their publication and sale of the kits, such
publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of
law . . . . There being no legal impediment under the statute to the
sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial
law or the prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the
judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing
house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having
any personal contact with any prospective purchaser. The record
does fully support, however, the finding that for the change of $75
or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of
personal contacts concerning particular problems which might arise
in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and
assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice
and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation,
annulment of separation agreement sought and should be affirmed.
(State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at
p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly nondiagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the services
"involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice of
law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual
inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage.
With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See
Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second

paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph)
fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes
exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this
score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial
construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and
doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take
into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to
inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and
appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in
proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in
the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal
rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the
case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the
legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several
cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of
law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:

39 | Legal Ethics

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It
is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation
of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173,
176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

40 | Legal Ethics

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973
ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A.
139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither
be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by
trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission
and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized
legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving

information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like
foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory
to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices, corporate
legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and nondiagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies
of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by
the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice,
contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the
January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines
Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main
purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor,"
Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic,
with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue
in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields
can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These
specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
41 | Legal Ethics

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start
by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how
you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And
once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes.
"Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be
taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like
a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole heir,
and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which
would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for
the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other heirs
contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of
the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be published
and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported
facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a onestop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings.
Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather,
are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only
a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is
an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed
to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would
wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of
law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the
bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a
lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the
conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed
to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education
and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights
claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law
those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in
legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial
department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in
the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be
aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent,

there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines
for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even
been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in
the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what
may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not
duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf
of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope
and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an
attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be
hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into
the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons
who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of
value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity
to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his
talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests

42 | Legal Ethics

on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in
the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by
the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of
business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or
skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering
them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice
with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be
the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service
to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right
and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it
and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal byproduct of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and
define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical
and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation,
43 | Legal Ethics

degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of

honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of
references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot
be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical
which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated
or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of
the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication
of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone
directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for
which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees
charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold
that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the abovementioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in
said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated
therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule,
such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the

canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as
in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to
these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent
would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media
and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the
face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to
regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to
disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid
a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal
Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the
purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect
since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be
promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the
present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against
unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern
and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for
44 | Legal Ethics

the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof.
That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such
action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as
Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics
as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for
appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly
only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably
have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college
degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.'
(Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes
practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
Black defines "practice of law" as:
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary
of Budget and Management, respondents.

45 | Legal Ethics

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It
is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation

of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters
connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract
and Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered
to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending
or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or
acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings
on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body,
the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)

46 | Legal Ethics

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953
ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader
terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice
of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a

manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of
the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the provision "who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in
COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance
with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of

the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set
forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

47 | Legal Ethics

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either
be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways
synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in
private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners.
(Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois],
[1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of
delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership
and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger
or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers
do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota,
1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or
out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]).

Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most
publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer.
Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their
entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public
image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not
reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate
lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this
wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is
one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar
and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work
also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is]
loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer
has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the
surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a
number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing
numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal
services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax
practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an
importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative
agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed
both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a
social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are
emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning,"
has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many
decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much
else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in

predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in
the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those

trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to

48 | Legal Ethics

multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling

such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts
and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged
in similar types of complex decision-making.

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated
from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the
work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to
see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of
the business.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would

require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a

multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to

as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only
for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle
most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the
legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein,
to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm,"
so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method
of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management
issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,

49 | Legal Ethics

including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides

counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders,
promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer
vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors

are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system
dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio
of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can
be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It
needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets

50 | Legal Ethics

of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key
aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified
body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and
varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more
complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the
basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business
Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their
work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office.
On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared
null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been
paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
51 | Legal Ethics

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty.
Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank
Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in
Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of membercountries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the
Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group,
served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies
as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former SecretaryGeneral (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation
hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also
made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability
and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo)
( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper
No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis
supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays
down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the
World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in
legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts,
an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (
Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the
set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a
failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are,
men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4,
Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327,
the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by
the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If
he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service
Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It
also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.
To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four
(4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson
v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2)
Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

52 | Legal Ethics

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President

with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.

exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only

upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective
power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for
has been clearly shown.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Additionally, consider the following:

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my
written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing
because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by
the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident
from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself
that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what
the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not
lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar,
who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of
persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected
President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition
be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified,
how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
53 | Legal Ethics

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,

may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea
asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah
agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an
iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes.
This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah
was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator
of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin?
Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter,
not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543

April 26, 1991

PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.
CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY.
ARSENIO FER. CABANTING,respondents.
LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw,
Arsenio Fer. Cabanting and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC
Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the exercise of their legal profession
committed in the following manner:
1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.
In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana
allegedly bought a parcel of land, where they built their residential house, from a
certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original owner. However,
they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.
Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo
Jovellanos to settle the land dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short)
another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia spouses since both were relatives
and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the
Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of
sale written in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a
different property. Paulino and Serapia were not able to settle their differences.
(Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).
On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a
complaint against Paulino for the recovery of possession with damages. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus
Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).
Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of
Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty. Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in
lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty.
Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the signature of

54 | Legal Ethics

the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B)

was executed purporting to be a sale of the questioned lot.
On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered
a decision in favor of plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the
belief that the said document is not authentic. (Report, p. 14)

executed by the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino

Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul and declare void the said
sales (p. 7, Report)
2. Administrative Case No. 1543.

Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary
Injunction before the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a
workable solution concerning his house. While the petition was pending, the trial
court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this
case has already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14,
1973, a writ of execution was issued.

A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the
grandparents of Lydia Bernal (complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during
the last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the living donor) executed a
deed of confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights
over the property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still
offered to sell the same property in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen
the deed of donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the property).

On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty.
Jovellanos and the remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer.
Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative Case No. 1302).

On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw
allegedly prepared and notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather
(deceased at the time of signing) with her grandmother's approval.

On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative

Case No. 1302) against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly
violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation by a counsel.

Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint
against her (Lydia Bernal) and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public
document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated the counsel for lack of
evidence, while a case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.

On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.

On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as

Administrative Case No.1543) against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.

On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment

proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw
for his participation in the forgery of "Compraventa Definitiva" and its subsequent
introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos
and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of
Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly
rigging Civil Case No. V-2170 against her parents. On August 17, 1975, Constancia
Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:

Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974,
the resolution of the Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of
the Second Division both dated December 3, 1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302,
1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.

1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:

Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3,
1976, all of these cases were ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.

In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with
one Lydia Bernal had a deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before
him as Notary Public by one Santiago Bernal in favor of Lydia Bernal when
as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal had died already about eight years
before in the year 1965.

On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.1wphi1 When Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit
Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We referred the investigation of
these cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch
50, Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.

2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:

In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged
threats against the person of complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the
transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in
confabulation with Rosa de los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public,
executed and ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in favor of said Rosa
de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds were not in fact
55 | Legal Ethics

The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, under the sala of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.

After investigation, Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of

cases against Atty. Jovellanos and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of
Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in Administrative Case No.
1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he recommended the
suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him guilty of
malpractice in falsifying the "Compraventa Definitiva."

appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to
conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the
judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in
progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes
malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly,
this malpractice is a ground for suspension.

The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:

The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no
attorney-client relationship between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the
latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No. V-2170. The transaction is not
covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.

I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation

of Art. 1491 of the New Civil Code.
II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in
falsifying notarial documents.
III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V2170.
I
Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:
The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall
apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they make take part by virtue of their
profession.
Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It
is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get
the better of the sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this
prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste, 40 O.G. p. 78)
and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).
Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the
litigation is pending. (Director of Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs.
Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).
In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot
after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said
to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also
from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. (Gan
Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the
56 | Legal Ethics

II
It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00
in consideration of his executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would
show that Paulino bought the property. This charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is
settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative
testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al.,
L40804, Jan. 31, 1978). When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is
not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los
Reyes vs. Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).
Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony,
even if not corroborated by another witness, deserves credence and can be relied
upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so delicate and confidential that it
would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence.
There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a
deed of sale, and its subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the
administration of justice as an officer of the court.
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84
SCRA 622), but not at the expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs.
La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his
client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's
cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at
liberty to resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to
employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as
are consistent with truth and honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most
important of them is mindfulness that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T.
Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer whose acts
show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA

112). Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source

of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in
order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them. (Noriega vs.
Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law
profession.
The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be
dismissed for lack of evidence.
During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full
on direct examination, but she never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several
subpoenas for cross-examination were unheeded. She eventually requested the
withdrawal of her complaint.
Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him.1wphi1 He enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is
proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February 9,
1989), Since Atty. Antiniw was not accorded this procedural due process, it is but
proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.

Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the
Valencias are neighbors and only two meters separate their houses. It would not be
believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer, would hold a meeting with the
heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the intention of inducing them to sue the
Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences between the parties in a
meeting held in his house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an involuntary
witness to attest to the holding of the conference.
Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of
brotherhood among them. One of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar.
A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his brethren in the law profession,
with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in law: strive
mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote
conspiracy.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw
DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the
roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against
Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case
No. 1543 DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative

Case No. 1543 should be dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance
by complainant for lack of interest does not ipso factoresult in the termination of a
case for suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122 SCRA
448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was
no evidence to substantiate the charges.
The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is
predicated on the information furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the
personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence, hearsay. "Any evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on
the witness stand." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p.
486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is inadmissible.
The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in
Administrative Case No. 1391 was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her
additional charges.
III
There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative
cases conspired in executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the
Civil Case No. V-2170.

57 | Legal Ethics

January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report
dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court,
and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's]
Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the
Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an
appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of
the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and
practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On August 16,
1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally
expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were
thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments
relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide
sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar
Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine
Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing
for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The
measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and
took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the

58 | Legal Ethics

legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated,
out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry
out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for
the same purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the
Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar
integration and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability
(practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied therein are the views,
opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the
Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body
in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material
upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this
time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with

power to do so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up
by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession
based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice
and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion
of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the
Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench
and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar
integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the
Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial
support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua
non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear
in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.

59 | Legal Ethics

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and

adjective law, and make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal
profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within
its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it,
and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting
officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of
local practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not
lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to
obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for
practising attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession
throughout the country;

constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither
confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be
constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional
rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the
dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the
Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in
issue, the Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees

schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide
involvement of the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious
problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in
the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
60 | Legal Ethics

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege,

moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and
to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is
far and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective
action; but there can be no collective action without an organized body; no
organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses;
therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the
support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most

efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court

that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean
that the Court levies a tax.

1. Freedom of Association.

A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while

the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate
the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push through
an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to
impose such an exaction.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of

his constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to
associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to
pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership
in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the
quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in
order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper
subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of
the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the
Bar.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest
promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential
inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of
annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in
any manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions
taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which
said member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of
speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should
become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the
very purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a
"free speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection
would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The
conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse
to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by
his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has
never yet been exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the
agencies of Government.

2. Regulatory Fee.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.

61 | Legal Ethics

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although

the requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the
members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and
through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more
effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory power by the Court,
because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar
integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for
new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration
of the Bar at this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity
as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar
integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the
members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and
more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated
Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)
avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for
the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge by
the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the
public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected
from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration,
Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened;
cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar
integration have failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in
England, Canada and the United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated
Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand,
it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness,
energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the
administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics
compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently
conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of
a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration,
62 | Legal Ethics

while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are noncommital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups
all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of
unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local
Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of
the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in
favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are
non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for
Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the
mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article
VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in
accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.