1

CHINA'S ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION

ZONE (ADIZ) IN EAST CHINA SEA: MOTIVES AND MODUS OPERANDI
INTRODUCTION
On 23November 2013, China surprisingly had declared an Air Defense Identification
Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea. The Chinese government for the first time
publicly announced itsADIZ that had stunned many countries, especially neighboring
states.In fact, the zone incorporates theairspace and beyond the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands claimed by both China and Japan. Chinas ADIZ also overlapped the Japanese
ADIZ andExclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) including South Koreans ADIZ. In
general, the ADIZ is a portion of airspace adjacent to a countrys territorial airspace
within which the identification, location, and control of foreign aircraft occurs. Such
zones presumably serve national security interests, primarily by providing adequate
early warning of aircraft entering or flying near a countrys territorial airspace.1
Significantly, Chinas ADIZ drew strong protest,not only from the United
States but also from the neighboring countries. Michael D. Swaine, an expert in
China and East Asian security studiesstated that, Chinas ADIZ establishment
hadreceived severe international criticism.Notably, such zone seemingly serves
territorial and national security interests, mainly by providing adequate early warning
of inbound aircraft or flying near a countrys territorial airspace. Seemingly, the
Chinesegovernment does not have a clear consensus on how to respond to those
international criticisms. Beijings action appears to escalate the tension between
China and Japan thus lays certain anxiety on the U.S.-Japan alliance.Primarily, Japan
is worried that the Chinese ADIZ incorporates the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islets.
Secondly, United States Secretary of State John Kerry in his press statement on the
same day pointed outthat the U.S. is concerned about Chinas action, which could
increase tensions in the region, potentially upsetting the status quo.2
1Michael D. Swaine,Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air DefenseIdentification
Zone (ECS ADIZ),China Leadership Monitor(February 2014), p. 2.
2John Kerry, Statement on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, Press Statement
(November 2013). Available at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/218013.htm. [12
February 2015].

Figure 1. China Air Defense Identification Zone.

Source: http://farm8.staticflickr.com/7306/11266289833_a3c54b9385.jpg.
[12 Feb 2015].
WHAT IS AN ADIZ?
Basically, ADIZ is defined as A zone that provides an early warning system to help a
country detect possible incursions into its sovereign airspace. The practice spread,
and nowadays a number of countries have ADIZ, including U.S., Canada, Russia,
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.3 In addition, Norway and the United
Kingdom, India, Pakistan and Canada, among others, with the U.S. having four
(Contiguous U.S. ADIZ; Alaska ADIZ; Guam ADIZ; and Hawaii ADIZ). 4 More
3Demetri Sevastopulo, Q&A: What is an Air Defence Identification Zone?,Financial Times, 29
November 2013. Available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/26cf55ce-58da-11e3-a7cb-00144feabdc0.
html?siteedition=intl#axzz2n8TGD3xK.
4Ruwantissa Abeyratne, In search of theoretical justification for Air Defence Identification Zones,
Journal of Transportation Security, Vol. 5, Issue 1 (March 2012), p. 87. Available at
http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/20/art%253A10.1007%252Fs12198-011-0083-2.pdf?auth66=
1387118989_c8e6875ebf7a22f53f60d7d1ceea54d0&ext=.pdf.

recently, the heightened concerns of states about threats from the air since
September 11, 2001, and the recent resurgence of major military powers have
prompted renewed interest in them.5
The most important treaty is the 1944 Chicago Convention on International
Civil Aviation, the Convention makes it clear in its first article that every State has
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, and defines that territory
in Article 2 as the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the
sovereignty, suzerainty, protection, or mandate of such State. The convention also
restricts the operation of state aircraft, in comparison with civilian aircraft, stating
that No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another
State or land thereon without authorization (Article 3.c). 6What distinguishes an
ADIZ from a countrys national airspace or Exclusive Economic Zone? The technical
definitions lie in the small print scattered through complex treaties and national laws
and regulations. Below are the definitions as a guide to help make sense of the key
terms:
AIRSPACE Under international law, a countrys sovereign airspace extends
to the outer limits of its territorial waters, 12 nautical miles from its coastline. Most
countries require all foreign military aircraft to obtain permission to enter their
airspace and reserve the right to take military action, including shooting them down,
if they do not.

EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) According to the U.N.

Convention on the Law of the Sea, each signatory state can claim an EEZ that gives it
special rights to exploit marine resources up to 200 nautical miles from its coastline.

5Peter A. Dutton, Caelum Liberum: Air Defense Identification Zones outside Sovereign Airspace,
The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 103, No. 4 (October 2009), pp. 691-709. Available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20617039.
6Convention on International Civil Aviation, Ninth Edition, 2006, website of the International Civil
Aviation Organization. Available at http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_cons.pdf.

AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE (ADIZ) An ADIZ has no

basis in international law and is not overseen by any international organization.
Therefore, definitions and rules vary between different countries. Typically, such
zones extend well beyond a countrys airspace to give its military time to respond to
potentially hostile incoming aircraft.7

Figure 2. Contiguous U.S. and Canada ADIZ

Source: National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.
Concerning the tension between national sovereignty and the demands of
widespread air travel, the Convention requires authorization by the concerned state
before regular scheduled flights can take place. It also allows parties for reasons of
military necessity or public safety to restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of

7Jeremy Page, The A to Z on Chinas Air Defense Identification Zone, China Realtime (November
2013). Available at http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/11/27/the-a-to-z-on-chinas-air-defenseidentification-zone/. [10 Oct 2015].

other States from flying over certain areas of its territory (Article 9-a), an important
proviso being that such exclusions must affect all countries equally.
CHINAS ADIZ ANNOUNCEMENT
On November 23, 2013, the Chinese government for the first time publicly
announced the establishment of an ADIZ. At a media conference, Defense
Spokesman Yang Yujun said, Since the 1950s, more than 20 countries including
some major countries and Chinas neighboring countries have successively
established Air Defense Identification Zones.8 A second announcement by the MND
on the same day, presented the rules for Chinas East China Sea ADIZ. The need for
aircraft flying within the zone, regardless of destination, to report the flight plans to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China or the Civil
Aviation Administration of China. In the event that aircraft do not cooperate in the
identification or refuse to follow the instructions, Chinas armed forces will adopt
(undefined) defensive emergency measures.9

EAST CHINA SEA ADIZ

8Andrew S. Erickson, Defense Spokesman Yang Yujuns Response to Questions on the Establishment
of The East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, Andrew S. Erickson: China Analysis from
Original Sources (November 2013). Available at http://www.andrewerickson.com
/2013/11/defense-spokesman-yang-yujuns-response-to-questions-on-the-establishment-of-the-eastchina-sea-air-defense-dentification-zone/.
9 Announcement of the Aircraft Identification Rules for the East China Sea Air Defense Identification
Zone of the P.R.C., Xinhua, November 23, 2013. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/china/2013-11/23/c_132911634.htm.

Figure 3.China Air Zone Tensions, BBC on 28 November 2013.

Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-25116119. [20 September 2015].
China has all the capabilities andwill power to react or to take defensive
measures on any of its airspace intrusions. China also knows that it is necessary to
protect its sovereignty and secures its territorial disputes.In particular, despite the
ADIZ establishment, China had choose to implement the ADIZ in limited, vague and
selective manner. Firstly, China had limit its ADIZ implementation and chosen not to
react against the challenge of the USAF B-52 bombers. China also did not responded
against the Japanese and Koreans surveillance jet-fighters intrusions. Secondly, there
are several vague announcements on how to response to any over flights and
intrusions from the Chinese government. Those announcements comes out at
different time with different intentions and with several unclear sets of instructions or
requirements. Thirdly, China have been selective in implementing its ADIZ. The

Chinese government had protested to the Japanese fighter aircrafts intrusions but
willing to discuss with the South Korean government with regard to the Korean ADIZ
expansion.
Despite the ADIZ announcement to safeguard its sovereignty and does not
target any country; it is perceived that Chinas objectives is to secure its national
interests,to bolster Chinas claims over the disputed islands and to limit any
surveillance activities near its airspace.China appears totake an alternative step in its
territorial expansion strategy while responding to its ruling elites and domestic
pressures. Additionally, the CCP ruling elites are aware that with the ADIZ
implementation, possibly changing the regional status quo and subsequently will
affect Chinas economic growth. However, those elites have decided to implement
the ADIZ to gain the nationalism in order to have continuous support from the public.
Therefore, those ruling elites are able to secure its regime survival.
According to Kevin Bucknall, a professor from the Australian National
University,examines the factors involved why China has chosen to make considerable
changes in its economic policy, foreign economic relations and trade. 10Brantly
Womack,aprofessor in Comparative Government and International Relations at the
Universityof Virginia concludes that the ideological evolution of Chinese foreign
policy was more gradual and complex started in December 1978. The policy had
begun to evolve with the normalization of the relations with the U.S. 11Arnaldo
Goncalves, a professor of Political Science and International Relations in Macau,
China states that China appears as a conservative power,status quofriendly, rather inthan outward, concerned with domestic affairs such as internal stability, progress
anddevelopment, political control over the center, harmony (thus obedience).12

10 Kevin B. Bucknall, China and The Open Door Policy(Sydney: Allen and Unwin Australia Pty Ltd.,
1989), pp. 226-232.
11Brantly Womack, China as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor, CEPS Working Document,No. 282
(January 2008), pp. 2-5.
12 Arnaldo Goncalves, Foreign Policy of People's Republic of China under Deng, Jiang and Hu: a
conservative trend, Working paper n 60,Programa Asia-Pacfico (August 2013), p. 2. Available at
https://www.academia.edu/4353527/Foreign_Policy_of_Peoples_Republic_of_China_under_Deng_Jian
g_and_Hu_a_conservative_trend. [13 Nov 2015].

Additionally, Taylor Fravel, an Associate Professor expert on international

security, China, and East Asia,points out that in the early 2000s, Chinese political
elitesbegan to frame Chinas foreign policy around the concept of peaceful rise. It
was also strategic, designed to convey a benign and non-threateningimage to other
states, reassuring them about Chinas growing capabilities. 13With new leadership,
China had reformed its foreign policy from isolation. With its peaceful rise,
emphasised on good-neighborly and partnership, China had gained its economic
growth and expanded its military power.China is perceived to be one of the potential
threat and destabilizing factors in the region. Despite such perception, Chinas
leadership had downplaythose perceptions with active participations in the
international arena.
Jun Osawa, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for International Policy
Studies in Tokyo added that it could be seen as another effort at creating a buffer
zone, hence can be considered as the new Great Wall in the Sky. 14Ralf Emmers
analysis of Chinas maritime disputes was the interplay between territory, natural
resources, and the power distribution is up-to-date and convincing especially in
drawing links between naval power build-up, prices or prospects of finding oil and
escalations of disputes. However, Emmers overstates the role of nationalism, putting
internal political aspects on an equal level as resource concerns; while Chineses
nationalism can be of certain influence, favoring or disfavoring active-aggressive
policy in maritime disputes.15
T. J. Pempel, aprofessor of Political Science at the University of California
concludes that the region is ripe for cooperation rather than rivalry and those recent
region-building developments in East Asia have had a substantial cumulative effect
on the broader canvas of international politics.16According to Shunji Cui, a British
Academy Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Scienceconcludes
13M. Taylor Fravel, International Relations Theory and Chinas Rise: Assessing Chinas Potential for
Territorial Expansion, International Studies Review, Vol. 12, Issue 4 (December 2010), p.511.
14 Jun Osawa, Chinas ADIZ over the East China Sea: A Great Wall in the Sky, (December 2013).
Available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/12/17-china-air-defense-identificationzone-osawa. [2 March 2015].
15 Ralf Emmers, Geopolitics and Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia,Contemporary Southeast
Asia, Vol. 32, No. 1 (April 2010), pp. 111-113.

that Sino-Japan relation was a continuing historical mistrust, and no doubt that the
relations between Japan and China in the post-Cold War are undergoing a serious
test.In particular, changes in the nature of nationalism in both China and Japan
threaten to drive their peoples further apart.17
John Baylis and Steve Smith describes that Chinas rise in 1990 has been
based on an economic system that is an almost unique blend of capitalism and
communism. Baylis and Smith concludes that policymakers in the United States are
more concerned about the great business opportunities in China than about political
freedom.18China had different foreign policies that are much depended on several
factors. It is worth to note that sovereignty is very important to China. China have the
potential and the will power to change the status quo if its territorial integrity is been
threatened. The economic interestsis the most important with regards to Sino-Japan
and Sino-U.S. relations. Definitely,it have been a motivatingfactor thathad eliminated
the potential regional insecurity.
After the establishment of the PRC and the end World War II, different
ideologies of Chinas Communism and the Western Japanese had hindered bilateral
relations between both nations. As a result, because of differences in ideological
camp, China and Japan are opposing each other. China had directly supporting North
Korea and Japan had indirectly provide its airfield and ports for the U.S. Due to that,
it had generated the political mistrust and security dilemma between China and Japan.
It also increases the nationalism of anti-Japanese, especially for the Chinese peoples.
Even certain defensive roles in Japan can be provocative to China thus created
insecurity to the Chinese due tohistorical animosity and security dilemma.Generally,
China and Japan still face unresolved historical problems, including territorial
disputes, possible rivalry and sentimentsthat cannot be resolved. As a result, the
China-Japan relationship trends such as territorial disputes and security dilemma had
16T. J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia: the Construction of a Region(New York: Cornell University
Press, 2005), pp. 195-215.
17 Shunji Cui, Beyond Rivalry? Sino-Japanese Relations and the Potential for a Security Regime in
Northeast Asia,(October 2010), pp. 171-172.
18John Baylis & Steve Smith,Globalization in the World Politics(New York: Oxford University Press,
2005), p. 14.

10

createdgood and ruthless lessons and experience during the Cold War. Although with
those lessons and experiences, the relations of both countries after the Cold War will
continue to revolve.
Because of the leadership during the Cold War, China and Japan are able to
establish bilateral arrangements that could bring remarkable results. With such
leadership, the historical animosities and disputes can be put aside. With the solid
influence of the leaders, it will further reduce the political mistrust and consequently
reduce the security dilemma between those nations. Certain aspect such as economic
and technological interdependent will reduce the hostility between China and Japan.
With Chinas economic rise and with Japans economic power, both governments
would likely to sustain its economic relations. With the Japanese technology that is
important to Chinas industries for the economic development, the Chinese would
probably prefer to further establish secure economic ties.
The Sino-Japanese relationship is currently in a danger zone and the two
countries are one accident away from another round of high tensions. 19 The 1992
Chinese law on the territorial waters was certainly the turning point, China tried to
deny the Deng Xiaoping declaration of shelving the territorial dispute while Japanese
official response at the time tried to restrain the effect of the Chinese law. Given the
extraordinary degree of economic ties between Japan and China and the seeming
ability of both markets to complement the strengths of the other within an expansive
regional economy, there are compelling incentives to overcome the political schism.20

19 Ibid, p. 35
20Matthew Penney, Foundations of Cooperation: Imagining the Future of Sino-Japanese Relations,
The Asia-Pacific Journal, Japan Focus (February 2015), p. 1.

11

Figure 4. Comparison of ADIZs

Source: Chinas Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).21
Note a. The ROC has asserted that its official ADIZ covers parts of territory administered by the PRC
(on the Chinese mainland) and by Japan (by one degree of longitude over Japans Yonaguni Island).

Primarily, all civil aircrafts are required to submit flight plans for the purpose
of air defense identification except for the Japanese.Second, for China and ROK, all
military aircraft are compulsory to file flight plans before entering those countries
except for the U.S. and Japan; where else the Taiwanese requirement is unclear.
Third, all states owned aircrafts is mandatory to submit the flight plan
beforetransiting China and ROK. However, for the U.S. and Japan, those states
owned aircrafts does not required to submit the flight plan. Lastly, most of those
countries ADIZ does not overlapped with others except for China and
Taiwan.According to the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, when entering the
zone, such as the one declared over the East China Sea, all aircraft are required to
identify themselves, report flight plans, and inform ground control of their exact
position. Such regulations apply to commercial aircraft as well as military aircraft.On
the latter count, Chinas ADIZ fails to uphold the normative principle that military
aircraft simply transiting through an ADIZ should not be obliged to report to the host
country.22

21Ian E. Rinehart andBart Elias, Chinas Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), Congressional
Research Service, R43894 (January 2015), p. 4.

12

China tended to seek same regulatory methods in the East China Sea vis--vis
the U.S., South Korea and Taiwan. The establishment is the result of the territorial
and maritime interests, security dilemma and limiting the United States activities.
The second factor is the technological change that creates further insecurity to China.
From the comparison table, it is clear that China requires flight plan and extended
distance such as the ADIZ. Thirdly, due to the U.S.-Japan alliance and U.S.-Taiwan
military relations, there are manyU.S. led military exercises within those areas. Those
exercises had somewhat further increase the security dilemma to the Chinese.
Therefore, China had created the ADIZ to counter-balance such exercises thus will
limit those activities especially near its territorial airspace and maritime areas. Lastly,
the fourth important factor is coping the domestic pressure. By declaring such
establishment, it will increase the national sentiments against the Japanese. The CCP
ruling elites would probably have continuous support and eventually gain its regime
security. The important aspect such as nationalism most likely will reduce the
domestic pressure. Therefore, with less domestic issues, it will certainly secure the
CCPs position thus it will safeguard the economic growth.
Chinas behavior regarding the ADIZ establishment is due to a range of
contentious events happening in the region. From fishing rights to natural resource
claims and island territories constitutes a major element of growing pattern of
assertiveness between China and its maritime neighbors. Chinese leaders believed
that with its ADIZ covering the disputed islandsperhaps would boost their
arbitration.Additionally, Chinas establishment was as a countermeasure of the
technological development especially against the U.S. and its allies. It is to have the
proportionality against those states as deterrence while protecting Chinas
sovereignty. China seek the strategic advantage with the creation of an ADIZ to
mitigate the technological development especially the U.S. However, the creation is
interpreted as a hostile act driven by territorial disputes and maritime interests.
Chinas move was also seen as the Sino-U.S. security competition that involves
military system and perceived as a strategic arms race. Therefore, it will spur the

22Alice Slevison, An ADIZ with Chinese Characteristics, The Diplomat (October 2015). Available at
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/an-adiz-with-chinese-characteristics/. [1 Nov 2015].

13

existing tension and undermine the stability in the region thus creating the
environment of military conflicts.
Chinas intention is to seek an equal control and regulation to reduce the
military activities over the airspace. Basically, it can be term as necessity and
proportionality for the Chinese in comparison to the ADIZ that had been established
by Japan and South Korea. Under the circumstances, China is able to limit the
military activities especially those exercises involving the U.S., Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan. However, China did not have any discussion or consultation with its
neighbors before the establishment. Therefore, although the establishment is
considered legal, due to overlapping space, it has been protest and criticized by those
nations that are affected.The notion that the East China Sea ADIZ was partly
established to counter U.S. and Japanese Surveillance &Reconnaissance activities
along Chinas maritime periphery.It also to establish parity with Japan and place
further pressure on Tokyo regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute, noted
above, clearly suggests that the oft-repeated statement by both authoritative and nonauthoritative Chinese sources that the East China Sea ADIZ is not directed against
any particular country or target is disingenuous at best.23
In addition with the existing claims, China move to establish South China Sea
ADIZ might have a destabilising effect on ASEAN.It will be asevere interference to
its most important trade route. The ADIZ will disrupt freedoms of navigation and
overflights, and China would probably use force to secure its sovereign territory.
Additionally, China may feel obligated to align the ADIZ with the dashed-line map in
order to strengthen its claim.Nevertheless it might only be a matter of time before
China sets its eyes over the skies of the South China Sea.24
CONCLUSION

23 For example, see Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gangs Regular Press Conference on
November 25, 2013.
24Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Chinas ADIZ over East China Sea: Implications for ASEAN,RSIS
Commentaries, No. 232/2013 (December 2013), p. 2.

14

Even though China had the military capabilities and economic ability, China
is not taking any actions militarily to gain control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands.Instead, China had proved to take a secure way to achieve its expansion and
control over those areas by the establishment of ADIZ in the East China Sea.Chinas
strategy was also base on deterrence concept to gain the proportionality and
reciprocity.China is trying to prove its coercive credibility defending her interests.
Chinas security outlook is to safeguard its territorial and maritime areas thus
defending the territorial disputes to gain control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
However, the ADIZ establishment had created geopolitical tension especially towards
the region. It would likely to have potential regional instability and negative impact
to the relations with those surrounding states. It will eventually deprive the economic
ties and subsequently upset the Chinese economic well-being. Those implications
would likely to disturb the economic wealth to the businesses and its citizen thus will
reduce the popularity and support to the CCP.
China had deep dissatisfaction against the Japanese due to the historical
animosity and national sentiments. Despite the Japanese war reparation and
continuous apology, China is still not satisfied with the terms and failed to appreciate
those efforts.Primarily, the historical animosities and different in ideologies have
created deep mistrust against the neighbors especially the Japanese including the
United States. However, with good leadership, China had seen to achieved excellent
result with its economic growth. Apparently, those leaders had reduced Chinas
security dilemma and consequently lessen the public sentiments against the Japanese.
Although with the U.S. challenge and ROKs jets intrusion, China had chosen not to
react to those intrusions.
The U.S. role and the re-emergence of the territorial disputes had
continuously contributed towards the strategic suspicion and security dilemma.
During Post-Cold War, the U.S. strategic adjustment and the leadership at that time
had shaped China interactions with other states. However, although with those
leaders, China had somehow miscalculated and mismanaged those issues with regard
to the territorial disputes. The shelving of the territorial disputes by those leaders had
complicated the issues that had resulted unforeseen implications. The conflict re-

15

appeared significantly due to economic interests such as fishing rights and natural
resources particularly with regard to Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The issue is not driven
solely by economic interests. The presumed oil andgas reserves in the East China Sea
are certainly tempting for China and couldhelp fuel its future economic development,
but China do not explain theintensity of the emotions involved. Likewise,China has
takenan uncharacteristic stance in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.Having
adopted a very modest andmoderate attitude in world affairs for many years, China is
now becomingincreasingly assertive and willing to stretch its greater economic and
militarystrength.
The Chinese nationalist drift israther dangerous and is perceived as a serious
threat not only by Japan butalso by other, often weaker and less influential,
neighbours of China.Beijings claims and modus operandi represent a serious
challenge to thestructure of the international legal system as well as to widely
agreedmodalities for resolving territorial disputes. China has disputed the
territorialstatus quo in Asia not only in relation to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, but
alsoin the South China Sea.The disputes importance lies in its potential to redefine
the balance of powerin Asia. China is testing both Japan and the U.S., and is
increasingly irritated bythe security belt that the U.S. and its allies have set up around
theChinese coastline.Japans confrontation with China is also radically changing
Tokyos stance. Asthe Japanese is concernedwith Chinas growing economic and
military power,Japan has gradually adopted hedging policies to prepare for
anypossibility that Chinas rising economic, political and military powerbecomes a
security threat.
In conclusion, Chinas ADIZ is primarily directed at Japan despite the
announcement that it did not targeted at any specific nation. It is considered as a
measure of historic anti-Japanese but the creation represents as an inefficient
mechanism because it will escalate geopolitical tension in East Asia. Although both
China and Japan profess their commitment to resolve theEast China Sea dispute
peacefully, efforts to reach a settlementhave failed. Possiblesolutions, including
resortthrough the International Court of Justice and thejoint exploitation of natural
resources in the East China Sea. Despite the on-going discussions of history and

16

current issues related to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it is seen that both Tokyo and
Beijing relations were moving in the right direction due to economic interdependent.
Beijings announcement to establish additional ADIZs have led other states to
speculate China will declare additional ADIZ in the South China Sea, where China
also has maritime disputes with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and
Taiwan. Although such move would certainly encountersthe resistance, there would
be unpredictable consequences and implications to the stability of the region.

17

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