NAVAL DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:

A STUDY OF THE INDONESIAN NAVY

(TENTARA NASIONAL INDONESIA-ANGKATAN LAUT /TNI-AL)
CDR AHMAD SHAFIRUDIN BIN ABU BAKAR RMN
ABSTRACT
As a developing country, Indonesia faced the usual problems of public funding in
terms of choosing between defence and socio-economic development. As an
archipelagic nation as understood in the concept of Wawasan Nusantara, the
leader(s) of modern Indonesia recognized the need for a strong navy. However, the
TNI-AL development journey was punctuated by the different emphasises in different
leadership periods. From an ill-equipped navy, the TNI-AL grew to become an
established maritime force during President Sukarnos reign in office (1945-1966).
Subsequently, during President Suharto's reign (1966-1998), the navy initially shrank
and then entered a period of moderate development. Notably, the TNI-AL began a
promising development era after the fall of Suharto. The research identified three
important factors: leadership strategic thinking, doctrine, and resources, which were
then analysed. The study found that Indonesian political leaders were the most
important factor in shaping the TNI-ALs development. The TNI-AL was able to
contextualize their doctrine to fit within the Indonesian political environment. The
allocation of resources was also a great challenge to the TNI-ALs development,
primarily due to the issues of resource scarcity and distribution. While the three
factors provide insight into Indonesias experience in naval development, they
indicate an intrinsic dimension(s) of any navys development in term of sea power and
control of maritime domain.
INTRODUCTION
The TNI-AL is a vital component of Indonesias national security and its development
has implications for the Asia Pacific and South-East Asian maritime security
environments. Naval power is important to many nations because so much of the
world is so close to the sea. 1 It is even more important for Indonesia being the largest
archipelagic nation in world. However, as a developing country, Indonesia needs to
prioritise and allocate its resources wisely, different to what rich countries could
choose. As an example, prestige and achieving great power status are among the
drivers for big power to develop a powerful navy.2
The TNI-AL has undergone different phases of development. Three major
factors that have influenced TNI-AL development was identified in this study. First,
the political and military leaderships strategic thinking. Second, the influence of
naval doctrine. Third, the resources that have shaped TNI-AL development. These
three factors are intrinsic to any navys development, but in the Indonesian case, they
provide an understanding of its naval power and Indonesias role as an archipelagic
nation.
Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, was keen and actively supported
naval expansion.3 This was in line with the concept of Wawasan Nusantara that the
country had developed. This concept is the fundamental standpoint of Indonesian
1 N. Friedman, Seapower as Strategy: Navies and National Interests, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, 2001, p.4
2 I. Storey, Naval Modernization in China, Japan and South Korea: Contrast and Compare, in
G. Till & J. Chan, (ed.), Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia: Nature, Causes and Consequences,
Routledge, Oxon, 2014, p. 113.
3 J. Goldrick & J. McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia: A Comparative Study, pp. 64-65.

geopolitics, enumerates the Indonesian archipelagic vision. Further understanding

on Wawasan Nusantara provided by Professor Hasjim Djalal, an Indonesian maritime
law expert in his book Indonesia and the Law of the Sea. According to Professor
Hasjim, the concept has a special meaning for Indonesia. First, due to the country
location between the two land masses of the world and two great waters of the
Pacific and Indian Oceans. Second, the thousands of islands the nation is made off
and third, the significant area covered with water amounting to two-third of its size.4
In addition to that, Professor Hasjim explicitly stated that historically, the
seas between and around the Indonesian islands have played a significant role in its
defence, economic and political matters.5 The sea in Indonesia did not divide the
people. Instead, it has become a unifying factor for the people. Furthermore, the sea
and land has become one unique world for Indonesian people. To them, the word
fatherland in the Indonesian language is traditionally known as tanah air,
meaning the land and the water.6 This demonstrates that Indonesia has understood
itself to be a maritime nation since its early days of independence.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Indonesia successfully fought for its archipelagic status in United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and since independence has understood the critical
area of naval power. However, the TNI-AL development has been inconsistent and far
from satisfactory. As an example, despite poor economic conditions after its
independence, there was a significant naval built up under President Sukarno.
Strangely, Indonesias encouraging economic development during President Suharto
was not accompanied with progressive naval development. Moreover, Suharto
government was backed by strong military influence that could had supported strong
naval posture. In contrast, post-Suharto democratic government with less military
influence had thus far supported and acknowledged the need for naval development.
Indonesia is an important member of Association of South-East Asian Nation
(ASEAN) and an influential player in Asia. 7 It is true being the largest nation, the
biggest economy and most populous nation in ASEAN. The question is, why the TNIAL did developed rapidly during President Sukarno era but then, did not develop as
rapidly during President Suharto period even though it had a strategic doctrine dealing
with maritime security? Also puzzling is why post-Suharto democratic government
started to give attention to naval development and embarked on an ambitious
modernization plan.
TNI-AL DEVELOPMENT
The Netherlands colonised the Indonesian archipelago for over one and a half
centuries beginning in 1789.8 However, the Dutch Navy did not leave anything
behind when the TNI-AL was formed in 1945. Instead, TNI-AL was established based
4 Hasjim Djalal, Indonesian and the Law of the Sea, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, Jakarta, 1995, p. 293.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Shekar Vibhanshu, Indonesia's Rise: Seeking Regional and Global Roles, Pentagon Press.
New Delhi, 2015, p. 14.

on a unique indigenous concept of naval organisation and operation. During Sukarno

period, TNI-AL grew to become an established navy. Subsequently, the TNI-AL
development during Suharto administration was affected and declined considerably
until mid-1970. The TNI-AL development did happened after the invasion of East
Timor in 1975 but it was then settled at a moderate pace. It is moderate because after
the new constructions of frigates, missile craft and submarines in the late 1970s, the
TNI-AL had resorted to second-hand platforms despite of its plan for new
construction. However, the return of democracy had thus far inclined to naval
development and committed to turn TNI-AL into a modern and capable navy. 9
TNI-AL development can be viewed as having undergone three phases. The
first phase covered the years from independence until 1966, when President Sukarno
was in power. The second phase was during the Suharto regime, 1966 to 1998.
Finally, the third phase, post-Suharto period from 1998 to the present. These phases
assist in illuminating changes in the socio-political environment, doctrinal, and the
availability of resources in support of TNI-AL development.
STRATEGIC THINKING OF INDONESIAN LEADERSHIP
Indonesia is the biggest nation in the region and has a significant role to play. National
ideology, foreign policy and socio-economic interest are among the factors
influencing Indonesias international relations. Additionally, the role of the military in
Indonesias modern history complicates Indonesias foreign and domestic policy. 10
More importantly are the perception of the leaders towards naval development in
support of national agendas especially the archipelagic concept.
Indonesian leaders strategic thinking was a critical factor that influence the
development of TNI-AL. From an initial establishment of small naval force, there was
subsequent interest for a powerful navy by Sukarno. Despite Indonesias nonalignment approach, Soviet military assistance was the only source for the nation to
equip themselves in support of national unification, especially in the effort to retake
West New Guinea in 1963. As a result, the TNI-AL accepted Soviet military
assistance. It was transformed into an established navy within a relatively short period
(1956-1962), but at the expense of great technical challenges. However, naval
development during this era ended when Soviet withdrew their support and assistance
as communism was not established in the republic. Adding to the problem was the
unavailability of funds due to economic crisis in Indonesia. The problem was then
passed on to the next government.
The severity of economic problems inherited by the New Order regime caused
the leaders to focus their efforts on solving the issue by engaging economists. A
sudden policy change was introduced and military expenditure sank as a priority. This
was especially bad during the initial period after the regime changeover as the navy
was seen by the leader and the army as aligned to Sukarno and therefore needed to be
corrected. However, naval development was not completely forgotten as the
8 Government of Netherlands Websites. https://www.government.nl/topics/internationalrelations/contents/Indonesia [27 August 2015].
9 J. Goldrick & J. McCaffrie, Navies of South-East Asia: A Comparative Study, p. 61.
10 H. Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University, London, 1978, p. 25.

governments openness and improved relation with the West managed to secure some
foreign assistance.
Indonesias impressive economic condition during Suharto did not benefit to
the navy. A mixture of successful new procurements and second-hand platforms were
received, but the nation always resorted to the cheapest solution. That period proved
to be a very challenging situation for naval leaders. There was significant attention
given to the navy in the mid-1990s upon realising that naval capability was far
behind other regional states. Although modernisation planning of the TNI-AL
occurred, another economic crisis halted the planning.
The early years of democracy were politically volatile. However, it was also a
good opportunity for a new focus on naval development. The unexpected promotion
of a naval Chief of Staff to the traditionally army led TNI Commander in Chief
created an opportunity for the navy to reinvigorate modernization planning. This was
an immediate measure to reduce the influence of the army in central decision making.
More importantly was the continuation of the paused TNI-AL modernisation planning
made possible by the improved economy. During this transition period, naval needs
were given fresh attention which served as the basis of the future fleet modernisation.
Political reformation entered a new dimension when SBY became the
president. He was able to reduce the militarys influence in politics due to his military
leadership experience. Military modernisation was given needed attention but
politicians tended to favour cheaper alternatives such as military assistance from
Russia. The MEF was the highlight of his presidency and it went a long way to
transforming the armed forces into a modern and professional organisation. Despite
his commitment to allocate more funds for defence, the annual defence expenditure
continued to be lower than expected. The emerging naval modernisation plan was
given a fresh mandate when Jokowi became the president.
DOCTRINE
Navies are developed according to the tasks they are expected to perform. 11 In the
process of modernisation, specific objectives need to be formulated to guide naval
development. Naval doctrine plays a significant role in shaping naval posture. In the
case of the TNI-AL, a dedicated naval doctrine (Eka Sasana Jaya) was only
formulated in 1965. Prior to that, the TNI-AL was developed to meet the expected
tasks and guided by specific operating procedures. It was not a surprise because the
TNI-AL was established based on its own indigenous organisation and started as a
very small navy. More importantly, the experiences had helped the organisation to
develop a comprehensive naval doctrine based on fundamental naval principle.
Subsequently, it was known that defence spending was not a priority during
Suhartos period. However, when naval power were needed, the TNI-AL needs were
given serious attention. This was demonstrated during the invasion of East Timor.
Although there were lack of threat, Eka Sasana Jaya doctrine continue to be referred
and successive modernisation plan were put forward by the TNI-AL.

11 G. Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, p. 117.

The fall of Suharto allows the TNI-AL to lobby for resources. In addition to
the diminishing influence of the army, the navys sub-standard capability was
recognized and successfully used to justify for new resources. Additionally,
Indonesias immediate neighbours were fast advancing their navies to a sophisticated
level, a worrying trend in the eyes of Indonesian leaders. Consequently, the TNI-AL
doctrine help to develop long term planning focused on transforming the navy into a
modern and capable force.
In summary, the TNI-AL doctrine and Archipelagic Sea Defence Strategy had
been developed based on fundamental naval power principles. It was used to shape
Indonesias naval development after it was made available in 1965. However, the
failure to implement the modernisation plan during Suharto had prevented TNI-AL
from attaining a progressive development. This situation can be understood as a
compromised since the TNI-AL also contextualised their doctrine to fit within the
Indonesian political environment.
RESOURCES
Resources covers several components. Other than financial capacity, organisational
and institutional capacity that includes human capital and infrastructure play an
integral part in support of naval development. Besides, the underdeveloped potential
of Indonesias maritime and defence industries could play a significant role in
stimulating the economy by providing jobs to the public. 12 The availability of
resources is fundamental to any military or naval development. However, readily
available resources need to be allocated for the navy to develop. It is crucial because
resources is not unlimited and need to be prioritised.
Although TNI-AL attained significant development in early 1960s, lack of funds and
maintenance hampered the TNI-AL progressive development towards the end of
Sukarno era. Lack of resources continued when Suharto came into power. As a result,
a new approach to economic development was introduced by the new government.
In general, the availability of resources during Suharto era was better than
Sukarno period. After a period of recuperation, Indonesian economy had recorded a
remarkable growth until the AFC in 1998. However, funding for the TNI-AL
development remained limited as defence expenditure was not a priority to Suharto
government. Human capital development was affected during the early stage of
Suharto when those believed to be Sukarno supporters were purged out from the TNIAL. However, human capital development was restored in support of modest naval
modernisation in the remaining period of Suharto. The shipbuilding and maintenance
capacities during Suharto period remained underdeveloped despite the effort to
strengthen it. Therefore, the TNI-AL development during Suharto era was primarily
shape by leadership decision to limit funding for the defence despite increased GDP.
The TNI-AL needs were given a fresh attention during post-Suharto
government. Economic recovery was relatively quick and naval development
planning was timely. During this time, allocation for defence were raised. Similarly,
12 Chairil, Sinaga, & Febrianti, Relationship between Military Expenditure and Economic
Growth in ASEAN: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol.1 (2), 2012, p. 119.

human capital development, shipbuilding and maintenance went through a period of

adjustment. The condition was vibrant when SBY came into power. The economy was
good, human capital was adequate and strategic partnerships with international firms
had boosted local shipbuilding and maintenance capabilities. President Joko Widodo
commitment to allocate more funds for the TNI-AL is important for future
development. It is because resources could be sufficient, but it doesnt mean that it
will reach the TNI-AL if it was not allocated.
CONCLUSION
The TNI-AL development is highly subject to political and military strategic
thinking. It was proven by the phases of development which were shaped based on
leadership determination and Indonesia socio-political environment. Indonesian
leadership(s) had demonstrated that the TNI-AL can be developed even when
resources were limited. Similarly, when resources were in abundance, leaders had
limited TNI-AL development to accommodate the socio-political environment. It is
also clear that the TNI-AL development is a function of its doctrine. The TNI-AL
doctrine was developed base on fundamental naval principles. However, the TNI-AL
was able to contextualise their doctrine to fit the Indonesian political environment.
Successive development plans were brought forward by naval leaders to enhance the
TNI-AL capabilities. It was primarily aimed to improve to maritime security domain
and sea control over Indonesias vast maritime area of responsibilities. Although
previous modernisation plan had not been successful, it does not stop the navy to
develop new planning to ensure that the organisation could undertake its mission
effectively. Finally, resources were also among the great challenge to TNI-AL
development. As a developing country, managing and allocating scarce resources in
Indonesia need to be carefully executed. Therefore, the priority given to develop the
navy could be a good indication for the future of the TNI-AL development.

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