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Appendix A

Formulae

his appendix provides some of the advanced equations used in the


electronic industry for failure identification, as well as miscellaneous information about block diagrams, how and when to use the
appropriate reliability calculations, and so on. Specifically, the following
items are covered:
The Arrhenius equation and the Eyring Type model
The Eyring and Reich-Hakim model
Equations for accelerated factors
Reliability block diagrams
Development of block diagrams from system to units
Equations for the calculation of the MTBF in series
Equations for the calculation of the MTTF in parallel
Equations for the reliability and mean life of complex systems with
cyclical units
Conversion factors for failure rate measurement units

CD-1

CD-2

Appendix A

THE ARRHENIUS EQUATION


RT Ce

Ea
KT

where C is a constant, Ea is activation energy in eV, T is temperature in


K, K is Boltzmans constant 8.625  10-5 eV/0K

Acceleration equation:

r1
Ea 1
1
r2  e K T  T
2
1

where r1/r2 is the acceleration factor.


Activation energy equation:

r 
 T1  T1 
K 1n

Ea  e

r1

Standard deviation equation:

 
t

  1n t50
16

where t50 is the median life or time to 50 percent failure and t16 is the
time to 16 percent failure.

THE EYRING TYPE MODEL


B
1
K
T
RH
1
t 50  Ae
e
E CA
Where A and B are constants
 is the activation energy in eV
T is the temperate in 0K

Formulae

CD-3

K is the Boltzman constant in eV/0K


RH is relative humidity in %
ECA is the electric field in the corrosion area

THE EYRING AND REICH-HAKIM


MODEL

t 50  A e K e T eBeRH

TRH

 G e TRH

E

E

1
CA

1
CA

where G is a factor combining all the constants A, eK ,e B

EQUATIONS FOR ACCELERATED


FACTORS
The equations for acceleration factors associated with temperature and voltage accelerated burn-ins use the following. The Arrhenius equation is:
Accel. factor  exp   1  1
K
Td
Ts
where:
K  Boltzmans Constant, 8.662E - 5eV/0K
 activation energy, eV
Ts  stress temperature, 0K
Td/operating temperature, 0K
The voltage acceleration equation is:
Accel. factor  exp C   VS  VD 
T ox
where:
C  electric field constant
Tox  thickness of gate oxide, A
VS  stress voltage, V
VD  dynamic life operating voltage, V

CD-4

Appendix A

B
Input

Output
C

Input

Output
D

A
E
Input

Output

D
F

Figure A.1 Reliability block diagrams.

The purpose of burn-in is to create accelerated temperature and voltage


stress conditions to screen out early life failures, especially those related to
MOS oxide defects.

FAILURE RATE CONVERSION


Example: If you know that the failure rate is 10 fr/106 hr, you can find the
failure rate in % fr/1,000 hr if you multiply 10 by 10-1, or 10  10-1  1; consequently, the failure rate is 1% fr/1,000 hr. [1 FIT  1 fr/109 hr.; 1 BIT 
1 fr/1010 hr.]. The reader may benefit from the following conversion factors
for failure rate measurement units found abundantly in the literature.

Formulae

When you know:

CD-5

You can find:

If you multiply by:

Failures per
hour, fr/hr

106

%/1,000
% fr/1,000 hr
Percent failures
per 1,000 hours
FITS
BITS
PPM hours, parts
failing per
million
device-hours

10-1
10-1
10-1

%/1,000

fr/ 106 hr
fr/hr
FITS
BITS
PPM hours

10
10-5
104
105
10

FITS

fr/106 hr
%/1,000 hr
fr/106 hr
%/1,000 hr

10-3
10-4
10-4
10-5

Failures per
million hours,
fr/106 hr

BITS

103
104
1

CD-6

Appendix A

System
B
A

Subsystem E
3
6
1

4
7
5

Unit 7
l
b

e
i

d
f

p
w

q
s

Figure A.2 Development of block diagrams from system to units.

T

T 

T  kT

1

System structure

x

e

x n1dx

is the gamma function.

(n) 

1

  1

 

1
2

k

2
.
2

, and
 0.

 2,

k

Single, Weibull
failure rate unit.

2
2

In the
Weibull pdf

Rayleigh pdf

Single, linearly increasing,


failure rate unit. In the

Single, constant
failure rate unit

1


2k

Comment

MTTF

The calculations for MTBF, MTTF, complex systems, and the conversion table have been adapted from : Kececioglu, D. 1991. Reliability Engineering
Handbook. Vol. 2. pp. 57, 2425, 195197. Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey.
(Continued)

Case
number

Table A.1 Equations for the calculation of the MTBF in series.

Formulae
CD-7

Case
number

...

nT = n,.

1T = 1, 2T = 2, . . .

2 
1

T 
2 21
2T  2
2
2

T 
1 11
1T  1
1
1

System structure

1



 1    12 
1

where

i1

 i

n  gamma function.

  1 

  dT,

1 T 
2 2


Gn, z  exxn1 dx

T 


2
1
1 
2
G

2
2
2

MTTF

is the incomplete gamma function.


If
1 
2 
and 1  2  , then
the MTTF becomes

where

e

2 

Table A.1 Equations for the calculation of the MTBF in series.

n series, constant
failure rate units.

Two series, Weibull


failure rate units.

Comment

(Continued)

CD-8
Appendix A

Case
number

...

...

nr

n2

...

n1

n1T  k1T, n2T  k2T2


, . . .,
nr T  krT.

1T  1, 2T  2


, . . .,
nT  n

T 
1
.
nT  2 n
2
n

.
.
.

T 
1
,
2T  2 2
2
2

T 
1
,
1T  1 1
1
1

System structure

and

where




ki ,
i1


i ,
i1

2 x
1
1 e 2 dx.
2  2 

k 1
2

 1
2

2
1   k  2

z 

2

n  gamma function


k2 e k

where


 1 i 
i1



MTTF

  1 

Table A.1 Equations for the calculation of the MTBF in series.

increasing failure rate.

n  r series units, n with a constant


failure rate and r units with a linearly

n series Weibull failure rate units,


all with the same shape parameter
and location parameter
.

Comment

Formulae
CD-9

Case
number

2 
1.

T 
21,
2T  2 2
2
2

T 
11,
1T  1 1
1
1

1T  1, 2T  2 ,

System structure

G n, z 


1e

x

x n1 dx,

n  gamma function,

1
1  2 
1

1
1

   1
 1    12  

and 1  2  , then the MTTF becomes

is the incomplete gamma function. If


1 
2 

and

where

1  1  1  1 2  1  1 
1
1

2
 2 G 1 , 
1 
2 

2
2
2


1
  T 
1  T 
2 2







e
1
2
1

1 1 1
1 2 1 2

MTTF

Table A.2 Equations for the calculation of the MTTF in parallel.


( Continued)

Two parallel, constant failure


rate units.

Two parallel, constant failure


rate units.

Comment

CD-10
Appendix A

Case
number

..
.

i  i,. . . ,n

T 
1,
iT 
i
i

.. 2
.

iT  i , i  1, . . . , n.

System structure

where


n

i =1

1
1

n  gamma function


 i
 1 i  
=1

1

 1 
2

 k1
k =1
1



 1 n1    1 n 

 1 1

. . .

ni 
i =1

. . . 1n1


 1 1   1 3 

 ,

 , i 1,. . .,n, then

  1

If i

. . . 1 n1

12. . .n 1213. . .n13 

MTTF

Table A.2 Equations for the calculation of the MTTF in parallel.

n parallel, Weibull units having the same


shape parameter and location
parameter
.

units.

n parallel, constant failure rate

Comment

(Continued)

Formulae
CD-11

2 3 

2 3 

 2
c 2

 r q   4 c  3  c   rq2




r 3 2

(Continued)

 3  2  o    o   m

 3  2  o    o   m

 2
o 2

 r q   4 o  3  o   rq2




r 3 2

c
c 2 m


6

 6

2  3

c 2
 2
r q 3  c  rq2



r3  3

o
o 2 m
 6   6

o
m


1.5 

2  3

c
m


1.5 

Mean life of circuit

o 2
 2
r q 3  o  rq2



r2  2

c
rq


r 2  2 o rq


Reliability of circuit

r3  3

Circuit

Case
number

Table A.3 Equations for the reliability and mean life of a complex system with cyclical units.

CD-12
Appendix A

11

10

Case
number

Circuit

1 

c 3
 2
 3
r q  6  c  r 2q2  4  c  rq3




r 4  3 

o 3

 2
r q  3 1  o  o   r 2q2




o
o 2
o 3
  6  9    4    rq3




r 4  4r3q 2  8

5 

1 

 o   2  o    o   m
 34 11
6 

1 

 34  53  c   2  c    c   m

 34  53  o   2  o    o   m

 14  13  c   2  c    c   m

1 

 14  13  o   2  o    o   m

(Continued)

Mean life of circuit

o 3
 2
 3
r q  6  o  r 2q2  4  o  rq3




o
 2
 6  o   r 2q2


o o 3 3
 4      rq



 2
r 4  4r3q 2  8 c  6  c   r 2q2


c c 3 3
 4      rq



r4  4

r4  4

Reliability of circuit

Table A.3 Equations for the reliability and mean life of a complex system with cyclical units.

Formulae
CD-13

Circuit

r  reliability of each unit,



m   r dt  1, mean life of each unit
0
  o  c, the total failure rate of each unit

14

13

12

Case
number

c  failure rate in the failing close mode

3 

3 

5 2 c
     c   c  m
 12
2 

3 

5 

5 2 o
     o    o  m
 12
2 

3 

Mean life of circuit

( Continued)

 c   2  c    c   m
 34 11
6 

o  failure rate in the failing open mode



r 4   2  2 c  r 3 q  6 c r 2q2 
 2
 3
6  c   4  c   rq3



r 4   2  2 o  r 3 q  6 o r 2q2 
 2
 2
6  o   4  o   rq3

c 2

 2
  6 c  9  c  4     rq3



 2
r 4   3  c  r 3 q  3 1  c  c   r 2q2

Reliability of circuit

Table A.3 Equations for the reliability and mean life of a complex system with cyclical units.

CD-14
Appendix A

Appendix B
Sample Checklist for
Design Review

his appendix provides the reader with a very detailed checklist and
miscellaneous information about the FMEA. The intent of the checklist is to provide the reader with a structured tool that facilitates the
questions regarding the system, design, process, and/or service. Obviously
the checklist is not exhaustive. The miscellaneous information will guide
the team with the flow of the FMEA, as well as the interrelationships of the
FMEA with other tools in the development process. Specifically, the following information is provided:
Sample checklists for design review
System development process
Considerations for a new product design
Design FMEA procedure
Process FMEA interrelationships
Sequence of FMECA activities and responsibilities
Design review schedule in relationship to program phases
Reliability growth in terms of contract milestones
Critical characteristics

CD-15

CD-16

Appendix B

Checklist
Portions of this checklist are adapted from questions and concerns from
several Ford Motor Company publications and Logistics Engineering and
Management by B. Blanchard (1986) with their permission. These questions will help teams identify missing information and problem areas. Read
each question and answer it Yes or No. If necessary, write comments in
the space provided below each question. Comments should indicate areas
or items that are not complete and need additional information or work.
Engineering Drawings
1. Have all characteristics that affect fit, function, and durability been identified?
Yes
No
Comments:

2. Are tolerances compatible with accepted manufacturing standards?


Yes
No
Comments:

3. Are enough control points and datum lines identified to design functional gauges?
Yes
No
Comments:

4. Are features dimensioned to prevent unnecessary loss of tolerance during normal processing?
Yes
No
Comments:

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-17

5. Have all critical/significant characteristics been identified?


Yes
No
Comments:

6. Have feasibility meetings been held to establish the feasibility of the


design?
Yes
No
Comments:

7. Have prints been drawn using geometric dimensioning and tolerancing


principles with control points and datum lines identified for the design
of gauges and test equipment? Will the gauges facilitate gathering variable data?
Yes
No
Comments:

8. Are there any requirements that must be inspected that cannot be evaluated using the known inspection techniques?
Yes
No
Comments:

9. Are tolerance stack-ups containable for assembly and function?


Yes
No
Comments:

CD-18

Appendix B

10. Are all specified tests and requirements, including heat treat and metallurgical requirements, clearly defined and understood?
Yes
No
Comments:

11. Are required standards for color, grain, and so on available?


Yes
No
Comments:

12. Are there any requirements shown that cannot be evaluated using
known inspection techniques?
Yes
No
Comments:

13. Are tolerance stack-ups containable?


Yes
No
Comments:

Engineering Specifications
14. Is test loading sufficient to provide all conditions (in other words, production validation, ongoing and annual recertification)?
Yes
No
Comments:

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-19

15. Have dimensional or material characteristics that affect ES durability


testing results been included in the control plan?
Yes
No
Comments:

16. Are all specified tests and requirements clearly defined and understood?
Yes
No
Comments:

Materials Specifications
17. Are the intended material suppliers on the approved source list?
Yes
No
Comments:

18. Will material suppliers be required to provide certification with each


shipment?
Yes
No
Comments:

19. Are specified materials, heat treat, and surface treatments suitable for
the intended environment?
Yes
No
Comments:

CD-20

Appendix B

Design FMEA
20. Have operations that affect high-risk failure modes been identified?
Yes
No
Comments:

21. Have previous manufacturing experiences shown that high risk operations are not capable?
Yes
No
Comments:

22. Will new/untried processing techniques be employed that will affect


high-risk operations?
Yes
No
Comments:

23. Have operations for capability studies been identified?


Yes
No
Comments:

24. Have design FMEAs been conducted? (A design FMEA is required on


all parts having critical characteristics and recommended for all new
parts.)
Yes
No
Comments:

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-21

25. Will a process FMEA be conducted?


Yes
No
Comments:

Process Flow Diagram


26. Is a process flow diagram available that shows the sequence of production and inspection stations?
Yes
No
Comments:

27. Was the process FMEA used as an aid to develop the process flow?
Yes
No
Comments:

28. Have provisions been made to send repaired material to an inspection


station before being used?
Yes
No
Comments:

29. Has a list of possible quality problems been identified for off-line operations such as repair and salvage stations?
Yes
No
Comments:

CD-22

Appendix B

30. Should a design of experiments analysis be used to improve capability?


Yes
No
Comments:

31. Are statistical control points identified?


Yes
No
Comments:

Process FMEA
32. Have all operations affecting fit, function, and durability been identified and listed in order?
Yes
No
Comments:

33. Have required corrective actions been planned or taken for high-risk
operations?
Yes
No
Comments:

34. Were historical warranty and consuming plant problems used as aids
in developing the process FMEA?
Yes
No
Comments:

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-23

35. Have provisions been made to conduct process potential studies on


high-risk operations where the possibility of occurrence is the major
factor?
Yes
No
Comments:

36. On operations where the FMEA shows detection as the major factor,
have provisions been made in the quality plan to control the cause
before the operation in question?
Yes
No
Comments:

37. Should a cause-and-effect analysis (fishbone diagram) be used to identify additional causes?
Yes
No
Comments:

38. Have high-risk failure modes and operations that affect them been
identified?
Yes
No
Comments:

39. Have previous manufacturing experiences shown any high risk operations that are not capable?
Yes
No
Comments:

CD-24

Appendix B

40. Will new/untried processing techniques be employed that will affect


high-risk operations?
Yes
No
Comments:

41. Have operations for capability studies been identified?


Yes
No
Comments:

42. Has a process FMEA been conducted? (A process FMEA is required


on all parts that have critical/significant characteristics and is recommended for all processes.)
Yes
No
Comments:

43. Was a check of historical warranty and consuming plant problems used
as an aid in developing the process FMEA?
Yes
No
Comments:

Manufacturing Floor Plan Considerations


44. Are process and quality control stations large enough, well lighted, and
include all necessary equipment and files?
Yes
No
Comments:

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-25

45. Are repair areas logically located to prevent accidental shipment of


defective material?
Yes
No
Comments:

46. Have provisions been made to post visual aids for critical operations?
Yes
No
Comments:

47. Are controls adequate to prevent movement of rejected incoming material to storage or point of use?
Yes
No
Comments:

New Equipment List


48. Has the new equipment list been reviewed and, in your best judgment,
is the equipment adequate?
Yes
No
Comments:

49. Has process potential been demonstrated on the new equipment?


Yes
No
Comments:

CD-26

Appendix B

50. Have inspection gauges been identified to conduct capability studies?


Yes
No
Comments:

51. Has adequate test equipment been provided?


Yes
No
Comments:

52. Have requirements for special gauges been defined?


Yes
No
Comments:

53. Are test capacities sufficient to provide additional sampling when


defectives are found? Is the data recorded?
Yes
No
Comments:

54. Was machine potential established on the equipment builders floor


before delivery?
Yes
No
Comments:

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-27

Comments and Conditions


55. Have causes of field failure modes been identified?
Yes
No
Comments:

56. Have actual or possible causes of consuming plant quality problems


been identified?
Yes
No
Comments:

57. Are design changes needed to make characteristics in question more


workable?
Yes
No
Comments:

58. Have process changes been planned or taken to eliminate all quality
concerns?
Yes
No
Comments:

59. Have control charts and capability studies been planned for characteristics and causes in question?
Yes
No
Comments:

CD-28

Appendix B

60. Are enough personnel available to cover control plan requirements,


layout, ES durability testing, and problem analysis?
Yes
No
Comments:

61. Have provisions been made to certify and routinely calibrate new
gauge and test equipment?
Yes
No
Comments:

62. Is there a procedure for controlling incoming quality from subsuppliers, that requires documentation of rejects and follow-up?
Yes
No
Comments:

63. Is there a procedure available for the installation, maintenance, and


reaction plan for statistical control charts?
Yes
No
Comments:

64. Are forms available for inspections/auditors to log/tally inspection


results?
Yes
No
Comments:

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-29

65. Are routine warehouse audits used to ensure integrity of ongoing controls?
Yes
No
Comments:

Sample Size
66. Are sample sizes sufficient to handle multistation equipment?
Yes
No
Comments:

67. Are sample sizes compatible with preset minimum requirements?


Yes
No
Comments:

68. Are all operators and inspectors provided with an inspection instruction that is keyed to the control plan? Do they have a complete set of
instructions that show how to control the part?
Yes
No
Comments:

69. On operations where the FMEA shows the chance of detection as


insufficient, have provisions been made in the quality plan to control
the cause, (in other words, reduce the occurrence) during or before the
operation in question?
Yes
No
Comments:

CD-30

Appendix B

70. Was a cause-and-effect analysis (fishbone diagram) used to identify


additional causes?
Yes
No
Comments:

Reaction Plan
71. Has a reaction plan been documented?
Yes
No
Comments:

72. Does the reaction plan include responsibilities for production, process
engineering, and quality control?
Yes
No
Comments:

Special Conditions
73. Have all measuring devices been calibrated?
Yes
No
Comments:

New Equipment List


74. Can variables data be generated from the gauge?
Yes
No
Comments:

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-31

75. Have provisions been made to certify and routinely calibrate new
gauge and test equipment?
Yes
No
Comments:

Incoming Material
76. Are intended material suppliers on the approved source list?
Yes
No
Comments:

77. Will material suppliers be required to provide certification data with


each shipment? A certification letter is not satisfactory. Data that show
statistical evidence of stability and capability must be provided.
Yes
No
Comments:

78. Is there a procedure for controlling incoming quality from subsuppliers?


Yes
No
Comments:

Control Plan
79. Has a control plan been established and approved by SQA?
Yes
No
Comments:

CD-32

Appendix B

80. Have dimensional performance or material characteristics that affect


ES durability testing results been included in the control plan?
Yes
No
Comments:

81. Are routine finished-product audits used to ensure integrity of ongoing


controls? Is a feedback system in place?
Yes
No
Comments:

82. Were gauge repeatability and reproducibility (R&R) studies completed?


Yes
No
Comments:

83. Have unusual occurrences been recorded in a log?


Yes
No
Comments:

84. Has the goal that the measurement system variation does not consume
more than one-tenth of the specification tolerance been met?
Yes
No
Comments:

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-33

Quality Improvement
85. Have necessary DOE analyses been used to improve capability?
Yes
No
Comments:

86. Are design changes needed to make characteristics in question more


workable?
Yes
No
Comments:

87. Have process changes been planned or taken to eliminate all quality
concerns?
Yes
No
Comments:

Note: This checklist is not exhaustive. It is offered as a starting point of questioning the system, design, and/or process with the intent of improvement.
The following questions are arranged by system and design. The focus
is to show the level of complexity that a checklist may take. In no way
does this list pretend to be complete. The format and level is based on
B. Blanchards work. It is used here with permission.

System Design
General
1.0 System Operational Requirements
Has the mission been defined? Mission scenarios?
Have all basic system performance parameters been defined?

CD-34

Appendix B

Has the planned operational deployment been defined (quantity of


systems per location)?
Has the system life cycle been defined?
Have system utilization requirements been defined? This includes
hours of system/equipment operation or quantity of operational
cycles per a given time period. Define an operational cycle if used.
Has the operational environment been defined in terms of
temperature extremes, humidity, shock and vibration, storage,
transportation, and handling?
2.0 Effectiveness Factors
Have system availability, dependability, readiness, or equivalent
operational effectiveness factors been identified?
Have quantitative reliability and maintainability factors been
specified? This includes MTBF, MTBM, MDT, M, Mct, Mpt,
Mmax, MMH/OH, Cost/OH, Cost/MA, and so on.
3.0 System Maintenance Concept
Have the echelons or levels of maintenance been specified and
defined?
Have basic maintenance functions been identified for each level?
Have quantitative parameters been established for turnaround time
(TAT) at each level and logistics pipeline time between levels?
Has the logistics pipeline time between levels been minimized to
the extent feasible considering cost? The lack of adequate supply
responsiveness has a major detrimental effect on total logistic
support.
Have level of repair policies been established? Repair versus
discard? Repair at intermediate/depot level?
Have the criteria for level of repair decisions been adequately
defined?
Has the level of maintenance (organizational, intermediate, depot,
or supplier) been defined for each repairable item?

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-35

Have criteria been established for test and support equipment at


each level of maintenance? Software?
Have criteria been established for personnel quantities and/or skills
at each level of maintenance?
4.0 Functional Analysis and Allocation
Have system operational and maintenance functions been defined?
Have reliability and maintainability factors been allocated to the
appropriate system elements (for example, unit, assembly,
subassembly, and so on)
Have cost factors been allocated to the appropriate system
elements?
Have logistic support factors been allocated where appropriate?
5.0 Logistic Support Analysis
Have trade-off evaluations and analyses been accomplished to
support all logistic support requirements?
Are the responses to all questions in the analysis checklist
positive? These questions cover life cycle cost analyses,
maintenance analyses, and logistics modeling.
Does the logistic support analysis data package justify system
design for supportability?
Have trade-off evaluations and analyses been adequately
documented?
6.0 Logistic Support Operational Plan
Has a plan been developed for the design, production, acquisition,
deployment, and integration of the prime equipment and logistic
support elements in the field? This includes a preliminary logistic
support plan and an integrated logistic support plan (ILSP).
Has a plan been developed for the handling of system
modifications in the field?
Has a plan been developed covering system/equipment phaseout?

CD-36

Appendix B

Logistical Support Elements


1.0 Test and Support Equipment
Have the test and support equipment requirements been defined for
each level of maintenance?
Have standard test and support equipment items been selected?
Newly designed equipment should not be necessary unless
standard equipment is unavailable.
Are the selected test and support equipment items compatible with
the prime equipment? Does the test equipment do the job?
Are the test and support equipment requirements compatible with
logistic support analysis?
Have test and support equipment requirements (both in terms of
variety and quantity) been minimized to the greatest extent
possible?
Are the reliability and maintainability features in the test and
support equipment compatible with those equivalent features in the
prime equipment? It is not practical to select an item of support
equipment that is not as reliable as the item it supports.
Have logistic support requirements for the selected test and
support equipment been defined? This includes maintenance tasks,
test equipment, spare/repair parts, personnel and training, data, and
facilities.
Is the test and support equipment selection process based on
cost-effectiveness considerations (in other words, life cycle cost)?
Have test and maintenance software requirements been adequately
defined?
2.0 Supply Support (Spare/Repair Parts)
Are the types and quantity of spare/repair parts compatible with
the level of repair analysis?
Are the types and quantity of spare/repair parts designated for a
given location appropriate for the estimated demand at that
location? Too many or too few parts can be costly.

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-37

Are spare/repair part provisioning factors consistent with logistic


support analysis?
Are spare/repair part provisioning factors directly traceable to
reliability and maintainability predictions?
Are the specified logistics pipeline times compatible with effective
supply support? Long pipeline times place a tremendous burden on
logistic support.
Have spare/repair parts been identified and provisioned for
preoperational support activities (for example, interim supplier
support, test programs, and so on)?
Have spare/repair part requirements been minimized to the
maximum extent possible?
Have test and acceptance procedures been developed for
spare/repair parts? These should be processed, produced, and
accepted on a similar basis with their equivalent components in the
prime equipment.
Have the consequences (risks) of stock-out been defined in terms
of effect on mission requirements and cost?
Has an inventory safety stock level been defined?
Has a provisioning or procurement cycle been defined
(procurement or order frequency)?
Has a supply availability requirement been established (the
probability of having a spare available when required)?
3.0 Personnel and Training
Have operational and maintenance personnel requirements
(quantity and skill levels) been defined?
Are operational and maintenance personnel requirements
minimized to the greatest extent possible?
Are operational and maintenance personnel requirements
compatible with logistic support analysis and with human factors
data?
Are the planned personnel skills levels at each location compatible
with the complexity of the operational and maintenance tasks
specified?

CD-38

Appendix B

Has maximum consideration been given to the use of existing


personnel skills for new equipment?
Have personnel attrition rates been established?
Have personnel effectiveness factors been determined (actual time
that work is accomplished per the total time allowed for work
accomplishment)?
Have operational and maintenance training requirements been
specified? This includes consideration of both initial training and
replenishment training throughout the life cycle.
Have specific training programs been planned? The type of
training, frequency of training, duration of training, and student
entry requirements should be identified.
Are the planned training programs compatible with the personnel
skill level requirements specified for the performance of
operational and maintenance tasks?
Have training equipment requirements been defined?
Acquisitioned?
Have maintenance provisions for training equipment been
planned?
Have training data requirements been defined?
Are the planned operating and maintenance procedures (designated
for support of the system throughout its life cycle) utilized to the
maximum extent possible in the training program?
4.0 Technical Data (Operating and Maintenance Procedures)
Have operating and maintenance procedure requirements been
defined? Have the necessary procedures been prepared?
Are operating and maintenance procedures compatible with
logistic support analysis data? This pertains particularly to the
logic troubleshooting flow diagrams, task sequences, and support
requirements defined in the maintenance analysis.
Are operating and maintenance procedures as brief as possible
without sacrificing necessary information?

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-39

Are operating and maintenance procedures adequate from the


standpoint of presenting simple step-by-step instructions; including
appropriate use of illustrations and tables for presenting data?
Are operating and maintenance procedures compatible with the
level of activity performed at the location where the procedures are
used? Depot maintenance instructions should not be included in
manuals which are used at the intermediate level of maintenance.
The maintenance procedures should be compatible with the level
of repair analysis and the maintenance concept.
Are operating and maintenance procedures written at the skill level
of the individual accomplishing the functions covered by the
procedures? Procedures should be written in a simple, clear, and
concise manner for low-skilled personnel.
Do the operating and maintenance procedures specify the correct
test and support equipment, spare/repair parts, transportation and
handling equipment, and facilities?
Do the procedures include special warning notices in areas where
safety is a concern?
Are the designated operating and maintenance procedures used in
system/equipment test programs?
5.0 Facilities and Storage
Have facility requirements (space, volume, capital equipment,
utilities, and so on) necessary for system operation been defined?
Have facility requirements (space, volume, capital equipment,
utilities, and so on) necessary for system maintenance at each level
been defined?
Have operational and maintenance facility requirements been
minimized to the greatest extent possible?
Have environmental system requirements (for example,
temperature, humidity, and dust control) associated with
operational and maintenance facilities been identified?
Have storage or shelf-space requirements for spare/repair parts
been defined?
Have storage environments been defined?

CD-40

Appendix B

Are the designated facility and storage requirements compatible


with the logistic support analysis and human factors data?
6.0 Transportation and Handling
Are transportation and handling requirements for both operational
and maintenance functions defined? This includes transportation of
prime equipment, test and support equipment, spares, personnel,
and data. National and international requirements should be
identified.
Are transportation and handling environments (temperature, shock
and vibration, exposure to dust and salt spray, storage, and so on)
defined?
Are the modes (air, ground vehicle, rail, sea, or a combination) of
transportation known? A profile or scenario, similar to that
accomplished for mission definition, should be developed showing
the various transportation and handling requirements.
Are the requirements for reusable containers known? Design
information should be developed on reusable containers.
Are the requirements for packing known? This includes labor,
material, preservation, storage limitations, and the processing of an
item for shipment.

Design Features
1.0 Selection of Parts
Have appropriate standards been consulted for the selection of
components?
Have all component parts and materials selected for the design
been adequately evaluated prior to their procurement and
application? Evaluation should consider performance parameters,
reliability, maintainability, and human factors.
Have supplier sources for component part procurement been
established?

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-41

Are the established supplier sources reliable in terms of quality


level, ability to deliver on time, and willingness to accept part
warranty provisions?
Have the reliability, maintainability, and human factors engineers
been consulted in the selection and application of parts? Reliability
is concerned with part failure rates, stresses, tolerances, allowable
temperature extremes, signal ratings, and so on. Maintainability and
human factors are concerned with the part effects on maintenance
times, mounting provisions, human interfaces, and so on.
2.0 Standardization
Are standard equipment items and parts incorporated in the design
to the maximum extent possible (except for items not compatible
with effectiveness factors)? Maximum standardization is desirable.
Are the same items and/or parts used in similar applications?
Are the number of different part types used throughout the design
minimized? In the interest of developing an efficient supply
support capability, the number of different item spares should be
held to a minimum.
Are identifying equipment labels and nomenclature assignments
standardized to the maximum extent possible?
Are equipment control panel positions and layouts (from panel to
panel) the same or similar when a number of panels are
incorporated and provide comparable functions?
3.0 Test Provisions
Have self-test provisions been incorporated where appropriate?
Is the extent or depth of self-testing compatible with the level or
repair analysis?
Are self-test provisions automatic?
Have direct fault indicators been provided (either a fault light, an
audio signal, or a means of determining that a malfunction
positively exists)? Are continuous performance monitoring
provisions incorporated where appropriate?

CD-42

Appendix B

Are test points provided to enable checkout and fault isolation


beyond the level of self-test? Test point for fault isolation within an
assembly should not be incorporated if the assembly is to be
discarded at failure. Test point provisions must be compatible with
the level of repair analysis.
Are test points accessible? Accessibility should be compatible with
the extent of maintenance performed. Test points on the operators
front panel are not required for a depot maintenance action.
Are test points functionally and conveniently grouped to allow for
sequential testing (following a signal flow), testing of similar
functions, or frequency of use when access is limited?
Are test points adequately provided for a direct test of all
replaceable items?
Are test points adequately labeled? Each test point should be
identified with a unique number, and the proper signal or expected
measured output should be specified on a label located adjacent to
the test point.
Are test points adequately illuminated to allow the technician to
see the test point number and labeled signal value?
Can every equipment malfunction (degradation beyond
specification tolerance limits) which could possibly occur in the
equipment be detected through a no-go indication at the system
level? This is a measure of test thoroughness.
Will the prescribed maintenance software provide adequate
diagnostic information?
4.0 Packaging and Mounting
Is functional packaging incorporated to the maximum extent
possible? Interaction effects between modular packages should be
minimized: It should be possible to limit maintenance to the
removal of one module (the one containing the failed part) when a
failure occurs and not require the removal of two, three, or four
modules.
Is the packaging design compatible with level of repair analysis
decisions? Repairable items are designed to include maintenance
provisions such as test points, accessibility, plug-in components,
and so on. Items classified as discard at failure should be

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-43

encapsulated and relatively low in cost. Maintenance provisions


within the disposable module are not required.
Are disposable modules incorporated to the maximum extent
practical? It is highly desirable to reduce overall support through a
no-maintenance design concept as long as the items being
discarded are relatively high in reliability and low in cost.
Are plug-in modules and components utilized to the maximum
extent possible (unless the use of plug-in components significantly
degrades the equipment reliability)?
Are accesses between modules adequate to allow for hand
grasping? Are modules and components mounted such that the
removal of any single item for maintenance will not require the
removal of other items? Component stacking should be avoided
where possible.
In areas where module stacking is necessary because of limited
space, are the modules mounted in such a way that access priority
has been assigned in accordance with the predicted removal and
replacement frequency? Items requiring frequent maintenance
should be more accessible.
Are modules and components, not of the plug-in variety, mounted
with four fasteners or less? Modules should be securely mounted,
but the number of fasteners should be held to a minimum.
Are shock-mounting provisions incorporated where shock and
vibration requirements are excessive?
Are provisions incorporated to preclude installation of the wrong
module?
Are plug-in modules and components removable without the use of
tools? If tools are required, they should be of the standard variety.
Are guides (slides or pins) provided to facilitate module
installation?
Are modules and components labeled?
Are modules and component labels located on top or immediately
adjacent to the item and in plain sight?
Are the labels permanently affixed and unlikely to come off during
a maintenance action or as a result of environment? Is the

CD-44

Appendix B

information on the label adequate? Disposable modules should be


so labeled.
In equipment racks, are the heavier items mounted at the bottom of
the rack? Unit weight should decrease with the increase in
installation height.
Are operator panels optimally positioned? For personnel in the
standing position, panels should be located between 40 and 70
inches above the floor. Critical or precise control should be
between 48 and 64 inches above the floor. For personnel in the
sitting position, panels should be located 30 inches above the floor.
Refer to the latest reference on anthropometric data.
5.0 Interchangeability
Are modules and components having similar functions electrically,
functionally, and physically interchangeable?
Are components with the same part number but provided by
different suppliers completely interchangeable?
6.0 Accessibility
Are access doors provided where appropriate? Are hinged doors
utilized?
Are access openings adequate in size and optimally located for the
access required?
Are access doors and openings labeled in terms of items that are
accessible from within?
Can access doors that are hinged be supported in the open
position?
Are access door fasteners minimized?
Are access door fasteners of the quick-release variety?
Can access be attained without the use of tools?
If tools are required to gain access, are the number of tools held to
a minimum? Are the tools the standard variety?
Are accesses between modules and components adequate?

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-45

Are access requirements compatible with the frequency of


maintenance? Accessibility for items requiring frequent
maintenance should be greater than that for items requiring it
infrequently.
7.0 Handling
For heavy items, are hoist lugs (lifting eyes) or base-lifting
provisions for forklift-truck application incorporated? Hoist lugs
should be provided on all items weighing more than 150 pounds.
Are hoist and base-lifting points identified relative to lifting
capacity? Are weight labels provided?
Are packages, units, components, or other items weighing over 10
pounds provided with handles? Are the proper size handles used,
and are they located in the right position? Are the handles
optimally located from the weight-distribution standpoint?
(Handles should be located over the center of gravity.)
Are packages, units, or other items weighing more than 40 pounds
provided with two handles (for two-person carrying capability)?
Are containers, cases, or covers provided to protect equipment
vulnerable areas from damage during handling?
8.0 Fasteners
Are quick-release fasteners used on doors and access panels?
Are the total number of fasteners minimized?
Are the number of different types of fasteners held to a minimum?
This relates to standardization.
Have fasteners been selected based on the requirement for standard
tools in lieu of special tools?
9.0 Panel Displays and Controls
Are controls standardized?
Are controls sequentially positioned?
Is control spacing adequate?
Is control labeling adequate?

CD-46

Appendix B

Have the proper control/display relationships been incorporated?


Are the proper type of switches used?
Is the control panel lighting adequate?
Are the controls placed according to frequency of use?
Has a human factor engineer been consulted relative to controls
and panel design?
10.0 Adjustments and Alignments
Are adjustment requirements and frequencies known?
Have adjustment requirements been minimized?
Are adjustment points accessible?
Are adjustment-point locations compatible with the maintenance
level at which the adjustment is made?
Are adjustment interactions effects eliminated?
Are factory adjustments specified?
Are adjustment points adequately labeled?
11.0 Cables and Connectors
Are cables fabricated in removable sections?
Are cables routed to avoid sharp bends?
Are cables routed to avoid pinching?
Is cable labeling adequate?
Is cable clamping adequate?
Are connectors of the quick-disconnect variety?
Are connectors that are mounted on surfaces far enough apart so
that they can be firmly grasped for connecting and disconnecting?
Are connectors and receptacles labeled?
Are connectors and receptacles keyed?
Are connectors standardized?
Do the connectors incorporate provisions for moisture prevention?

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-47

12.0 Servicing and Lubrication


Have servicing requirements been held to a minimum?
When servicing is indicated, are the specific requirements
identified? This includes frequency of servicing and the materials
needed.
Are procurement sources for servicing materials known?
Are servicing points accessible?
Have personnel and equipment requirements for servicing been
identified? This includes handling equipment, vehicles, carts, and
so on.
Does the design include servicing indicators?
13.0 Calibration
Have calibration requirements been held to minimum?
Are calibration requirements known?
Are calibration frequencies known?
Are calibration tolerances known?
Are standards available for calibration?
Are calibration procedures prepared?
Is traceability to the National Bureau of Standards possible?
Have the facilities for calibration been identified?
Are the calibration requirements compatible with the logistic
support analysis and the maintenance concept?
14.0 Environment
Has the equipment design considered the following: temperature,
shock, vibration, humidity, pressure, wind, salt spray, sand and
dust, rain, fungus, and radiation? Have the ranges and extreme
conditions been specified and properly addressed in design?
Have provisions been made to specify and control noise,
illumination, humidity, and temperature in areas where personnel
are required to perform operating and maintenance functions?

CD-48

Appendix B

15.0 Storage
Can the equipment and spare parts be stored for extended periods
of time without excessive degradation (beyond specification
limits)?
Have scheduled maintenance requirements for stored equipment
been defined?
Have scheduled maintenance requirements for stored equipment
been eliminated or minimized?
Have the required maintenance resources necessary to service
stored equipment been identified?
Have storage environments been defined?
Has the need for specialized environmentally controlled facilities
been eliminated where possible?
16.0 Transportability
Have transportation and handling requirements been defined?
Have transportation requirements been considered in the
equipment design? This includes consideration of temperature
ranges, vibration and shock, humidity, and so on. Has the
possibility of equipment degradation been minimized if transported
by air, ground vehicle, ship, or rail?
Can the equipment be easily disassembled, packed, transported
from one location to another, reassembled, and operated with a
minimum of performance and reliability degradation?
Have container requirements been defined?
Have the requirements for ground-handling equipment been
defined?
Was the selection of handling equipment based on cost
effectiveness considerations?
17.0 Producibility
Has the design been stabilized (minimum change)?
Has the design been verified through prototype and qualification
testing?

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-49

Is the design such that many models of the same item can be
produced with identical results?
Are the production databases, drawings, and material lists
adequate?
Are common materials used (in lieu of special materials)?
Can standard tooling and existing facilities be used for fabrication,
assembly, and test operations?
Is the design such that rework requirements are minimized? Are
spoilage factors held to a minimum?
Are standard fabrication, assembly, test, and inspection procedures
applicable?
Is the design such that automated manufacturing processes (for
example, robotics or numerical control techniques) can be applied
for repetitive functions?
Is the design definition such that two or more suppliers can
produce the equipment from a set of specifications and drawings
with identical results?
18.0 Safety
Have fail-safe provisions been incorporated in the design?
Have protruding devices been eliminated or are they suitably
protected?
Have provisions been incorporated for protection against high
voltages? Are all external metal parts adequately grounded?
Are sharp metal edges, access openings, and corners protected with
rubber, fillets, fiber, or plastic coating?
Are electrical circuit interlocks employed?
Are standoffs or handles provided to protect equipment from
damage during the performance of bench maintenance?
Are tools that are used near high-voltage areas adequately
insulated at the handle or at other parts of the tool which the
maintenance person is likely to touch?

CD-50

Appendix B

Are the environments protected so that personnel safety is ensured?


Are noise levels within a safe range? Is illumination adequate? Is
the air relatively clean? Are the temperatures at a proper level?
Has the proper protective clothing been identified for areas where
the environment could be detrimental to human safety? Radiation,
intense cold or heat, gas, and loud noise are examples.
Are safety equipment requirements identified in areas where
ordinance devices and the like are activated?
Has a system hazard analysis been completed where required?
19.0 Reliability
Has the system/equipment wear-out period been defined?
Have failure modes and effects been identified?
Are item failure rates known?
Have parts with excessive failure rates been identified?
Has mean life been determined?
Have adequate derating factors been established and adhered to
where appropriate?
Has equipment design complexity been minimized?
Is protection against secondary failures (resulting from primary
failures) incorporated where possible?
Has the use of adjustable components been minimized?
Has the use of friction or pressure contacts in mechanical
quipment been avoided?
Have all critical, useful-life items been eliminated from the
equipment design?
Have cooling provisions been incorporated in design hot spot
areas? Is cooling directed toward the most critical items?
Have all reliability program requirements been met?

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-51

20.0 Software
Have all system software requirements for maintenance activities
been met?
Is the maintenance software complete in terms of scope and depth
of coverage?
Is the software compatible relative to the equipment with which it
interfaces? Is the maintenance software compatible with the
operating software? With other elements of the system?
Is the maintenance software language compatible with system
language requirements in general?
Has the software been adequately tested and verified for accuracy
and reliability?

CD-52

Appendix B

Basic logistic support


requirements

Need
1

Mission requirements analysis

System maintenance concepts

Operational requirements

Maintenance requirements

System analysis

Allocation of qualitative and


quantitative criteria for
support elements

Design criteria and allocation


(prime equipment)
5
System optimization

6
Alternatives

Preliminary logistic
support analysis

Evaluation of alternatives
Logistics
factors

System life cycle

System synthesis
Preliminary design and
analysis of a chosen configuration (prime equipment)

Evaluation of alternatives

8
Preliminary
design date

Updated logistics
support analysis

Corrective
action

Identification of preliminary
logistics resource requirements

System definition/
documentation
Prime equipment and support
element specification(s)
10
Detailed system/
equipment design
Design data, design review,
engineering mock-ups and
prototype models, test and
evaluation, assessment,
modification,
manufacturing data

11
Firm design
data
Corrective
action

Updated logistics
support analysis
Identification of specific
logistics resource requirements
12
Initial provisioning of
logistics resource requirements

13
Production/construction and
integrated test of operational
system (prime equipment)

Coordination
for
compatibility 14

Design and development of


new support items

Acquisitions of logistic
support material

15
System deployed and in
operational use (prime
equipment and support)
17
System phaseout

16
Corrective
action

System operational evaluation


(prime equipment and support)
Reprovisioning of logistic
support elements as required

Figure B.1 Typical process flow diagram of system development process.


Adopted from Blanchard, B. 1986. Logistics Engineering and Management. p. 7.
Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Sample Checklist for Design Review

CD-53

Significant
characteristic
selected

New process is
identical, similar, or
related to
production process

Yes

Yes

List
Cp/Cpk

Stable
control
chart

No

Measure
parts from
prototype run
(min, 30 pcs.)

No

Fix
assignable
causes

Record data
in X and R
chart format

Establish
stability

Calculate
control
limits

List
Cp/Cpk

Yes

Calculate
Cpk from
stable chart

Check
stability

If 30
pieces
are not
available
accumulate
data until
30 or
more are
measured

No

Fix
assignable
causes

Establish
stability

Calculate
Cpk from
stable chart

Figure B.2 Process flow diagram of typical considerations of a new product


to be produced.

CD-54

Appendix B

Make a list of
product/design
requirements

Develop a list of what the product is expected to do,


and what it is expected not to do. Incorporate all
known requirements.

Translate
requirements into
potential failure
mode

The failure mode is the manner in which a part or


assembly could potentially fail to meet the design
intent, performance requirements, and/or customer
expectations.
Effects should always be stated in terms of device
or system performance.

Identify potential
effects and causes If the effect involves potential noncompliance with
of associated
government regulations or could potentially affect
failure
safe vehicle operations, it must be so indicated.

Yes

A potential cause of failure is defined as an indication


of a design weakness. (Be specific.)
Another potential
failure mode?
No
Determine design
verification (DV)

Design verification is meant to prevent the failure


cause(s) from occurring, or to detect the cause or
resultant failure mode should either occur.
To ensure consistency, use the tables in the FMEA
manual to help determine the rankings.
Severity is an assessment of the seriousness of the
effect of the failure mode to the next assembly, the
device, or the customer.

Assign severity,
Occurrence is how frequently the failure mode is
occurrence, and
projected to occur as a result of the specific cause.
detection rankings
Detection is an assessment of the ability of the
design verification program to identify a potential
design weakness before the part or assembly is
released for production.
Calculate risk
priority number
(RPN)
Multiply the severity, occurrence, and detection
rankings together.
Another failure
Yes mode/effect/cause
The concerns with the highest RPNs should be
combination?
considered for recommended actions first. The
intent is to reduce the severity, occurrence, and
No
detection rankings. A process FMEA will be of limited
Rank the RPNs
value without positive and effective corrective actions.
in Pareto fashion
and determine
recommended
Record a description of what action was taken and its
actions
effective/completion date. Estimate and record the
resulting severity, occurrence, and detection
rankings; calculate the new RPNs. If necessary,
Record the actions take action to further reduce the RPN.
taken and
determine
the resulting RPN The design engineer is responsible for assuring that
all recommended actions have been implemented
or adequately addressed.
Follow-up

Figure B.3 Design FMEA procedure.

Mode examples
Deformed
Fractured
Broken weld
Effect examples
Inoperable
False readings
Bad sample
Cannot
assemble
Cause
examples
Overstressing
Incorrect
assembly spec.
Incorrect
material spec.
Undercured

Sample Checklist for Design Review

SQA
quality
system

Feasibility analysis
Process/inspection flowchart
Process FMEA
Floor plan
Historical warranty quality analysis
New equipment list
Is the system Previous statistical studies
approved by
Design of experiments
the customer? Cause-and-effect diagram

(1)

Quality system procedures


Key process/product characteristics
Sample size/frequency
Inspection methods
Reaction plan
Statistical methods
Problem-solving discipline

(3)

(4)

Process potential study

Use the process


FMEA to create the
process sheets

Repair rate objective


Repair cost objective
Field concerns
Plant concerns
Identify
preventative
actions

(2)

Manufacturing control plan


Will SPC and
quality procedures
defined support the
control plan?

CD-55

Statistical training
Implementation
Results

(5)
Process sign-off
Process sheets
Inspection instructions
Test equipment/gauges
Initial samples
Packaging

(6)
Job #1
Should the control plan be
revised based on customer feedback?
Never-ending quality improvement

Figure B.4 Process FMEA interrelationships.

Monitor causes
of concerns

(1) Have key/


critical characteristics been identified for SPC?
(2) Are control charts
used for all key
characteristics?
(3) Does the control
plan have the
customer's concurrence?
(4) Is 100 percent
inspection a
requirement for
operations
in the process?

(5) Is the process


qualified for
sign-off?

Are the control plan


requirements
met in the process?

CD-56

Appendix B

Table B.1 Sequence of FMECA activities and responsibilities.


Component
design engineer

Prepare analyses of all


component failure modes
and associated detection
means. Submit analyses
to system design engineer.

System
design engineer

Determine effects of each


components failure mode
on subsystem. Identify
those component failure
modes that would result
in subsystem failure.

Review critical items list


and recommendations.
Wherever feasible, incorporate design changes
that will produce or reduce
component criticality.
Record action taken for
every critical component.
Prepare recommendations
for those parts that remain
critical. Submit action
taken to reduce component
criticality and recommendations for component
design changes to project
reliability engineer.
Wherever feasible,
incorporate design
changes that will reduce
component criticality
through use of part redundancy, part derating,
redesign to fail-safe, etc.
Submit action taken to
reduce criticality of
components to project
reliablity engineer.

Project
reliability engineer

Prepare failure mode


analysis control log for
components and subsystems. Distribute
component failure modes
analysis forms and
subsytems failure modes
analysis forms to
responsible design groups.
Conduct criticality analysis.
Prepare order list of critical
components. Prepare
recommendations for
criticality reduction. Submit
critical components list
and recommendations to
system design engineer.
Revise critical components
list in accordance with
reduction in parts criticality
through subsystem redesign. Delete those components that are no longer
critical. Prepare additional
recommendations for
those components list
and recommendations
to component designers.
Prepare final critical
components list to identify those components that
are still critical. Submit
final critical component list
to quality control for implementation of special
control of critical components. Distribute copies
of critical components list to
responsible design groups.
As design changes are
made, the entire process
is reiterated to insure that
the critical components
list is compatible with
the latest design.

Adapted from Kececioglu, D. 1991. Reliability Engineering Handbook. Vol. 2, p. 475. Reprinted
by permission of Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Conceptual design review

System analysis
optimization, synthesis,
and definition

Preliminary
system design phase
(validation)

System design review

Detail equipment design,


layouts, part lists,
drawing, support data

Detail design and


development phase
(full-scale development)

Critical design review

Equipment design review

Fabrication, assembly,
test, inspect, and deploy
operational system

Production and/or
construction
phase

Operate and maintain


system in the
field

System use and


life cycle support
phase (deployment)

Adopted from Kececioglu, D. 1991. Reliability Engineering Handbook. Vol. 2, p. 405. Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Feasibility studies,
operational and
maintenance concepts

Conceptual
phase

Table B.2 A typical design review schedule in relationship to process phases.

Sample Checklist for Design Review


CD-57

Bid
proposal

Preprototype

Detailed
design study

Major product
improvement

Full-scale production

Service evaluation

Adopted from Kececioglu, D. 1991. Reliability Engineering Handbook. Vol. 2, p. 402. Reprinted by permission of Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey.

Specified
reliability goal

Service readiness demonstration

Preproduction demonstration

2
3
Reliability monitoring points

Prototype

Reliability
growth curve

Figure B.5 Reliability growth in terms of contract milestones.

Contract
award

Reliability

CD-58
Appendix B

Appendix C
Active Verbs and Nouns
Used for Function

his appendix provides the reader with an example of verbs, nouns,


and functions used in the construction of the FMEA. For obvious reasons, this is not an exhaustive list, but a sample of how the reader may
go about starting the thinking process for the construction of an FMEA.

CD-59

CD-60

Appendix C

Table C.1 Verbs and nouns for system/design FMEA.


Verbs
actuate
amplify
apply
change
close
collect
conduct
contain
control
create
decrease
emit
establish
fasten
filter
hold
ignite
impede
improve
increase
induce

insulate
interrupt
limit
locate
maintain
module
mount
move
prevent
protect
rectify
reduce
repel
rotate
secure
shield
shorten
space
support
time (verb)
transmit

Nouns
appearance
circuit
contacts
contamination
convenience
current
damage
density
dust
effect
energy
features
flow
fluid
force
form
friction
heat
insulation

light
liquid
noise
oxidation
paint
panel
piston
protection
radiation
repair
rust
style
switch
symmetry
torque
vibration
voltage
volume
weight

A partial list of verbs and nouns used in the construction of a system


FMEA is provided.

Active Verbs and Nouns Used for Function

CD-61

Table C.2 Verbs and nouns for process/service FMEA.


Verbs
allow
apply
bake
band
compress
convey
decrease
discard
drive
dry
eliminate
friction
finish
fire
form
generate
improve
lift
load

minimize
modify
move
produce
receive
reduce
remove
resist
restrict
shape
sort
stake
store
support
transmit
transport
weigh
wrap

Nouns
corrosion
current
decor
effort
electricity
energy
environment
equipment
fixtures
force

light
material
motion
power
shape
supplies
tools
torque
voltage
waste

A partial list of verbs and nouns used in the construction of a process


FMEA is provided.

CD-62

Appendix C

Table C.3 Typical functions used in FMEA.


accept
attach
bearing surface
conduct
connect
contain
damp
indicate
insulate
isolate
locate
lubricate
position
protect
provide pivot axis
provide signal

reinforce
remain instact
retain
return to normal position
seal in
seal out
secure
sense
shield
store
support
transfer
transmit
transport
vent

Typical functions used in the construction of an FMEA.

Appendix D
FMEA Samples

his appendix provides samples as opposed to examples of FMEAs.


The reason for this is because some of the FMEAs are quite lengthy
and will detract from the purpose of providing the reader with a
variety of examples in different stages.
System FMEAs
Example 1: Sample of a Generic System FMEA
Example 2: Fidd Quad LSD
Design FMEAs
Example 3: Throttle Body Machine (Print, Flow Diagram,
and Design FMEA)
Example 4: Package/Layout
Example 5: Armature
Product Design and Development FMEA
Example 6: Cooling Fan Assembly
Process FMEAs
Example 7: Nitride Etch
Example 8: Slit Base Laminate
Example 9: GDS Assembly

CD-63

CD-64

Appendix D

Service FMEA
Example 10: Complaint Diagnosis
FTA Development
Example 11: FTA Development of an Air Pumping System
Machine FMEA
Example 12: Modular Oven

Coil shorted or
open

Coil fails to
produce EMF

Fails to open

Fails to operate

Fails to open

Fails to provide
adequate power

Closes relay
contacts when
energized

Energizes and
de-energizes
power circuit

Provides desired
mechanical event

Provides power
circuit fusing

Provides motor
voltage

Battery #2
(relay circuit)

Relay
(relay coil)

Relay contacts

Motor

Circuit breaker

Battery #1
(power circuit)

Example 1 Sample of a generic system FMEA.

Depleted battery
Plates shorted

Contacts fused
Spring failure

Motor shorted

Contacts fused

Depleted battery
Plates shorted

Fails to provide
adequate power

Provides relay
voltage

Switch

Failure
cause
Release
spring failure
Contacts fused

Failure
mode

Fails to open

Function

Sample

Initiates
motor power
function

Item
Identification

Subsystem element

Subsystem

System

None
Battery gets hot
and depletes

None

Motor overheats

None

Does not close


relay contacts

None
Battery gets hot
and depletes

None

Component or
functional assembly

Approved by

Prepared by

System fails
to operate

Maintains energy to
power circuit
through relay

System

None

Maintains power in
motor if relay contacts are closed

High current in
power circuit

Maintains energy
to motor

System fails
to operate

Overheated power
circuit wire if motor
is shorted and circuit
breaker fails to open
Overheated power
circuit wire if motor is
shorted and circuit
breaker fails to open
and switch or relay
fails
Maintains energy
to motor

Does not energize System fails to


power circuit
operate

Fails to operate
relay circuit

Maintains
energy to
circuit relay

Next higher
assembly

Failure effect on

OF

Failure detection
method

Motor not running

Motor continues to run


Smokevisual

Smokevisual

Motor continues to run


Smokevisual

Motor not running

Motor not running

Smokevisual when
power circuit wire overheats

Motor continues to runs

Page

Revision

Date

Remarks

FMEA Samples
CD-65

(No note present)

None

(No note present)

Shorted load to ground

(No note present)

Shorted lead to ground

What is probability of
this double failure mode?

Output shorted to ground

Shows up as off-state
open CCT fault

Inputs shorted to ground

Device permanently off,


status shows OKresolved
by status flag change

S/C to GND
(outputs) (pins 1, 2,
14, 15)

*************************
********NOTES********
*************************

S/C to GND (inputs)


(Pins 3, 4, 12, 13,
5, 11)

*************************
********NOTES********
*************************

(No notes present)

Alternator load dump and


zener failure

(No notes present)

None

(No note present)

Characterization test of
samples to detect

(No note present)

Load dump test at to


60V (final test)

*************************
********NOTES********
*************************

Transient SOA stress on


high V. PNPs

(No note present)

Alternator load dump

Load dump to >60V


(protection zener
failure)

IC is DC protected to 60V,
output turns off at ~35V

Design
verification

*************************
********NOTES********
*************************

O
c
c

Device self-protects and


protects load

Potential cause(s)
of failure

Load dump to 60V

S
e
v

Potential effect(s)
of failure

Potential failure
mode

Example 2 Fidd Quad LSD.

Part
function

Part name
and number

D
e
t

32

12

R.
P.
N.

(Continued)

None

None

None
(outside spec)

Statistical
testing

Recommended
action(s)

CD-66
Appendix D

PW select shorted to GND

S/C to GND (select)


(pin 6)

VCC shorted to GND

GND shorted to GND

Test pin shorted to GND

************************* Recommended pin


********NOTES******** configuration
*************************

S/C to GND (test


pin) (pin 9)

************************* N/A
********NOTES********
*************************

S/C to GND (GND)


(pin 8) [also S/C to
VCC (VCC)]

************************* Lets hope a fuse blows!


********NOTES********
*************************

S/C to GND (VCC)


(pin 7) [also S/C
to VCC (GND)]

************************* HLOS mode not available


********NOTES********
*************************

Potential effect(s)
of failure

Potential failure
mode

Example 2 Fidd Quad LSD.

Part
function

Part name
and number

S
e
v

(No notes present)

Pin 8 and 9 shorted

(No note present)

(No notes present)

None

(No note present)

None

None

None

(No note present)

None

Design
verification

(No note present)

O
c
c

(No note present)

Spanner across battery pin 7


and 8 shorted

(No note present)

Shorted lead to ground

Potential cause(s)
of failure

D R.
e P.
t N.

None

None

None

None

Recommended
action(s)

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-67

Nonfunctioning load

Potential effect(s)
of failure

Semifunctioning load

************************* S/C operation applies


********NOTES******** (I think then shutdown
************************* cycle)

S/C to 5V rail
(output) (pins 1, 2,
14, 15)

************************* Part specifically designed to


********NOTES******** not withstand this condition
*************************

IC input CCT destruction


S/C to VCC (IPs
select, test pin) (pins
3, 4, 12, 13, 5, 11,
6, 9)

************************* S/C operation applies (I limit


********NOTES******** then shutdown cycle)
*************************

S/C to VCC
(outputs) (pins 1, 2,
14, 15)

Potential failure
mode

Example 2 Fidd Quad LSD.

Part
function

Part name
and number

S
e
v

(No note present)

(No note present)

Final test for S/C


operation

Incorrect wiring

Final test for ESD


operation

(No note present)

Final test for S/C


operation

Design
verification

(No note present)

O
c
c

(No note present)

Incorrect wiring

(No note present)

Shorted solenoid, incorrect


wiring

Potential cause(s)
of failure

D
e
t

48

R.
P.
N.

Spec testing

Spec testing

Spec testing

Recommended
action(s)

(Continued)

CD-68
Appendix D

Inputs on permanently

S/C to 5V rail
(inputs) (pins 3, 4,
12, 13, 5, 11)

Operation only in PW mode

Essentially no effect on
************************* FIDD IC
********NOTES********
*************************

(No note present)

(No note present)

None

Shorted lead to 5V rail

No 5V rail (grounded)

S/C to 5V rail (GND)

None

Shorted lead to 5V rail

(No note present)

None

(No note present)

None

Design
verification

(No note present)

O
c
c

(No note present)

Shorted lead to 5V rail

(No note present)

Shorted load to 5V rail

Potential cause(s)
of failure

(No note present)

System logic functionality

S
e
v

************************* Essentially no effect on


********NOTES******** FIDD IC
*************************

S/C to 5V rail
(VCC)

************************* Normal mode not


********NOTES******** available
*************************

S/C to 5V rail
(select) (pin 6)

************************* Device permanently on,


********NOTES******** status OKresolved by
************************* status flag change

Potential effect(s)
of failure

Potential failure
mode

Example 2 Fidd Quad LSD.

Part
function

Part name
and number

D R.
e P.
t N.

None

None

None

None

Recommended
action(s)

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-69

Test pin shorted to GND

Potential effect(s)
of failure

O/C load

Nonreporting loads

Nonresponding loads

************************* Incorporate default to


********NOTES******** normal on select
*************************

O/C (pin 6)
(select)

************************* Incorporate a fare to zero


********NOTES******** to hold demo off in O/C
************************* mode

O/C (pins 3, 4, 12,


13, 5, 11) inputs

************************* O/C loadfault signaled


********NOTES******** via status line
*************************

O/C (pins 1, 2, 14,


15) (outputs)

************************* Designed for O/C or S/C to


********NOTES******** GND, not to 5Vnot
************************* recommended

S/C to 5V rail
(test pin) (pin 9)

Potential failure
mode

Example 2 Fidd Quad LSD.

Part name
and number
Part
function

S
e
v

(No note present)

Modify for float to


zero

Open circuit unconnected


select
(No note present)

(No note present)

(No note present)

Modify for float to


zero

Open circuit unnconnected


I/P

Final test for O/C


operation

(No note present)

Characterization out of
sample

Design
verification

(No note present)

O
c
c

(No note present)

Open circuit/unconnected
load

(No note present)

Shorted load to 5V rail

Potential cause(s)
of failure

2 12

D R.
e P.
t N.

Modify
IC design

Modify
IC design

Spec testing

None,
outside spec

Recommended
action(s)

(Continued)

CD-70
Appendix D

Nonfunctional loads

Potential effect(s)
of failure

Nonfunctional loads

Test pin openCCT

Intermittent load failure

************************* Fault detected during


********NOTES******** operation
*************************

Intermittent load
(pins 1, 2, 14, 15)

************************* Normal operational


********NOTES******** condition
*************************

O/C (pin 9) (test


pin)

************************* Incorporate poly resins in


********NOTES******** input and output lines,
************************* modified ESD

O/C (pin 8) (GND)


loss of GND

************************* If loads connected outputs


********NOTES******** open CCT (no gate voltage)
*************************

O/C (pin 7) (VCC)


loss of supply

Potential failure
mode

Example 2 Fidd Quad LSD.

Part
function

Part name
and number

S
e
v

(No note present)

None

Loose connection to lead

(No note present)

(No note present)

(No note present)

None

None

Modify to protect

(No note present)

None

Design
verification

(No note present)

O
c
c

(No note present)

Unconnected ground to IC

(No note present)

O/C VCC connection

Potential cause(s)
of failure

D
e
t

36

R.
P.
N.

None

None

Modify IC
design

None

Recommended
action(s)

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-71

Overheating chip

Potential effect(s)
of failure

Nonworking system

************************* Doesnt induce practice


********NOTES********
*************************

(No note present)

(No note present)

ESD

ESD, other transient


conditions

Over V spike on inputs

Transients >supply
inputs etc (pins 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13)

Final test/ESD

ESD, other transient


conditions

None

(No note present)

System design
dependent

(No note present)

Design
verification

(No note present)

Loose load connection

(No note present)

Nonapproved loads

O
c
c

(No note present)

Potential cause(s)
of failure

(No note present)

Over V spike on inputs

S
e
v

************************* Less severe than on/off


********NOTES******** transient
*************************

Transients >supply
outputs (pins 1, 2,
14, 15)

************************* Indicator discharges


********NOTES******** through output (SOA)
*************************

Intermittent switching
of load VCC to GND

************************* Not a problem if properly


********NOTES******** heatsinked (I-just under
************************* l-limit point)

Partial short to VCC


(all four loads)

Potential failure
mode

Example 2 Fidd Quad LSD.

Part
function

Part name
and number

D
e
t

R.
P.
N.

Include in
spec testing

Include in
spec testing

None

Ford FMEA
check

Recommended
action(s)

(Continued)

CD-72
Appendix D

************************* *Depends on new turn-on


********NOTES******** valueaffect low V first
*************************
(No note present)

Lifetime drift

Output I reduction

DMOS VT increase

Non-heatsinked device

(No note present)

(No note present)

Potential cause(s)
of failure

************************* Add thermal shutdown!


********NOTES********
*************************
8

Output I reduction

Device overheating

S
e
v
8

Potential effect(s)
of failure

************************* *Serious only if zener V


********NOTES******** becomes < supply V
*************************

Potential failure
mode

Example 2 Fidd Quad LSD.

Part name
and number
Part
function

O
c
c

(No note present)

Life test

(No note present)

Characterization

(No note present)

Design
verification

D
e
t

48

48

R.
P.
N.

Life test

Spec testing

Recommended
action(s)

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-73

Over V liable to trip

Outputs drive limited

************************* Outside designed operating


********NOTES******** range
*************************

Time vs spec drift


supply <5.5V

************************* Could also be problems in


********NOTES******** S/C mode (with no thermal
************************* trip)

Time vs spec drift


supply >30V

************************* Here nonspecified driver


********NOTES******** should not impede
************************* performance

Time vs spec drift


Capability to overdrive I/Ps
input impedance
reduced

S
e
v
3

Potential effect(s)
of failure

************************* Nonspecified drive could


********NOTES******** give marginal performance
*************************

Potential failure
mode

Example 2 Fidd Quad LSD.

Part
function

Part name
and number

(No note present)

(No note present)

None

Dead battery and failed


alternator

System design
dependent

(No note present)

System design
dependent

(No note present)

Design
verification

(No note present)

O
c
c

(No note present)

Use in 24V systems

(No note present)

Use of nonapproved drive


devices

(No note present)

Potential cause(s)
of failure

D
e
t

12

R.
P.
N.

None

Inclusion in
Ford system
FMEA

None

Recommended
action(s)

(Continued)

CD-74
Appendix D

Intermittent load failure

Intermittent input
(pins 3, 4, 12, 13,
51, 11, 6)

Nonworking system

Nonworking system

Time vs spec drift


input impedance
increased

Nonworking system

************************* Nonspecified load of


********NOTES******** reduced impedance could
************************* cause thermal stress

Time vs spec drift


load reduced
impedance

************************* Use of nonspecified load


********NOTES******** often causes unforeseen
************************* problems

Time vs spec drift


load increased
impedance

************************* During fault condition


********NOTES******** device is off
*************************

Potential effect(s)
of failure

Potential failure
mode

Example 2 Fidd Quad LSD.

Part
function

Part name
and number

S
e
v

(No note present)

System design
dependent

(No note present)

Use of nonapproved drive


devices

System design
dependent

Use of nonapproved load

System design
dependent

(No note present)

None

Design
verification

(No note present)

O
c
c

(No note present)

Use of nonapproved load

(No note present)

Loose connection to load

Potential cause(s)
of failure

D
e
t

R.
P.
N.

Inclusion of
FMEA check

Inclusion
of FMEA
check

Include in
Ford system
FMEAs

None

Recommended
action(s)

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-75

605

606

407

Holley

504

S61

502

506

505

Index machine
8 station

Carried to

Insp. -per control plan

Op 240 (sta. 3h)


drill 501
drill 502
Op 250 (sta. 4h)
idle
Op 260 (sta. 5h)
idle
Op 270 (sta. 5v)
f. bore 605
Op 280 (sta. 7v)
f. bore 606
Op 290 manual load

Op 230 manual load

402
404 Spec
601

503
551

501

S52

Example 3 Throttle body machine.

603

401
403 Spec

410

302

303
Center
journal

Throttle body casting


X

Conveyor to

Insp. -per control plan

Op 20 (sta, 2h)
drill 402
dril 410
drill 401
drill 407
Op 30 (sta. 3v)
mill S61
Op 40 (sta. 4h)
ream 402
drill 410
ream 401
ream 407
Op 50 (sta. 5v)
r. bore 605
Op 60 (sta. 6h)
idle
Op 70 (sta. 6v)
ream 601
ream 603
Op 80 (sta. 7h)
tap 410
Op 90 (sta. 7v)
r. bore 606
Op 100 manual bore

Op 10 manual load

Index machine 8 station


Single position way machine

Insp. -per control plan


Stored on rack to run through
washer and leak test later

Op 340 c'drill 504


c'drill 505
Op 350 drill 504
drill 505
Op 360 manual unload

Op 330 bore 506

CNC machine
Op 310 manual load
(4 parts)
Op 320 mill S52

Part stored on rack to run


on CNC center later

Op 300 part washed

Carried to
Washer

Insp. -per control plan

Op 120 (left horz.)


mill S51
Op 130 (right horz.)
ream 303
Op 140 (center vert.)
idle
Op 150 (center horz.)
drill 404
Op 160 manual unload

Op 110 manual load

Single position way machine

Transfers to assembly
by rolling back

- Storage

- Transporttation
- Inspection

- Operation

- Manual
operation

(Continued)

Op 400 manual unload


load on rack

Op 390 leak test

Op 380 manual load

Leak test equip.


(2 position)

Part stored on
rack to cool

Op 370 part washed

Washer

Conveyor to

Insp. -per control plan

Op 180 (right horz.)


f. bore 302
Op 190 (left horz.)
f. bore 503
Op 200 (center horz.)
drill 403
Op 210 (center vert.)
idle
Op 220 manual unload

Op 170 manual load

CD-76
Appendix D

Machined incorrectly:
oversize, out of position,
missing

Machined incorrectly:
oversize,
out of position

4 Op 40 Ream Drill
401 410
402
407

5 Op 50 Rough Bore
605

Example 3 Throttle body machine.

7 Op 70 Ream
601
603

Machined incorrectly:
oversize, out of position,
missing

Machined incorrectly:
bad surface finish
flatness

3 Op 30 Mill
561

6 Op 60 Idle

Machined incorrectly:
oversize, out of position,
missing

2 Op 20 Drill
401 407
402
410

Failure mode

4 = high

Scrap
Primary locator
position problems

Break finish tool

Scrap
Break other tools
Assembly problems

Broken or worn tools


Gauging error

Incorrectly built
roughing tool

Tool inspection
SPC charts

Tool layout

Tool break detectors


SPC charts

Broken or worn tools


Gauging error

SPC chart

Tool break detectors

Visual inspection
Flush lines
SPC chart

Break other tools

Fixed tooling

Current controls

Broken or worn inserts


Chips on fixtures
Gauging error

Gauging error

Scrap

Scrap

Operator loaded part


incorrectly
Broken or worn tools

Scrap

Created

Revised

P.F.M.E.A.

Cause of failure

5 = very high

Effect of failure mode

3 = moderate or significant

Machined incorrectly:

Process

2 = low or minor

1 Op 10 Load

No.

1 = very low or none

P = Probability (chance) of occurrence D = Likelihood defect will reach customer


S = Seriousness of failure to vehicle
R = Risk priority measure (PxSxD)

16

15

16

Date

None

None

None

None

None

None

Recommended
corrective action

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-77

Machined incorrectly:
bad surface finish
flatness

Machined incorrectly:
oversize, out of position,
burrs

11 Op 120 Mill
S51

12 Op 130 Ream
303

Machined incorrectly:

15 Op 170 Load

Example 3 Throttle body machine.

Machined incorrectly:
out of position, missing

14 Op 150 Drill
404

13 Op 140 Idle

Machined incorrectly:

10 Op 110 Load

Machined incorrectly:
oversize, out of position

9 On 90 Rough Bore
606

Failure mode

Machined incorrectly:
not tapped,
shallow tap

Process

8 On 80 Tap
410

No.

Visual inspection

Broken or worn
inserts
Chips on fixtures
Gauging error
Broken or worn tool
Fixture alignment
Gauging error

Scrap
Asm problems
w/TPS

Scrap
Asm problems
w/shaft

Tool break detector


Part buildup
SPC charts
Fixed tooling

Broken or worn tool


Incorrect setup
Gauging error
Operator loaded part
incorrectly

Scrap
Purge failure

Scrap

Fixed tooling

Operator loaded part


incorrectly

Scrap

Flush lines
SPC chart
Throttle efforts
SPC charts

Tool layout

Incorrectly built
roughing tool

Break finish tool

Load monitor
Tool detector
SPC charts

Broken or worn tools


Gauging error

Scrap
Customer failure

Current controls

Cause of failure

Effect of failure mode

16

18

10

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Recommended
corrective action

(Continued)

CD-78
Appendix D

Scrap
Purge failure

Machined incorrectly:
out of position, missing

18 200 Drill
403

Machined incorrectly:
missing holes oversize

21 Op 240 Drill
501
502

Example 3 Throttle body machine.

24 Op 270 Finish bore Machined incorrectly:


605
oversize, out of position,
incorrect depth, bad
finish

23 Op 260 Idle

22 Op 250 Idle

Machined incorrectly:

20 Op 230 Load

Scrap
Customer rejects

Scrap
Asm problems
w/screws

Scrap

Scrap
Asm problems w/shaft
Purge failure

Machined incorrectly:
oversize, out of position,
undersized

17 Op 190 Bore
503

19 Op 210 Idle

Effect of failure mode


Scrap
Asm problems
w/shaft
Purge failure

Failure mode

Process

Machined incorrectly:
oversize, out of position,
undersized

No.

16 Op 180 Bore
302

Cause of failure

Broken or worn tool


Setup error
Gauging error

Broken or worn inserts


Chips on fixtures
Gauging error

Operator loaded part


incorrectly

Broken or worn tool


Incorrect setup
Gauging error

Broken or worn tool


Fixture alignment
Gauging error

Broken or worn tool


Fixture alignment
Gauging error

Current controls

CNC depth control


SPC charts
Functional test

Visual inspection
Flush lines
SPC chart

Fixed tooling

Tool break detector


Part buildup
SPC charts

SPC charts
Tool inspection

SPC charts
Tool inspection

16 *INV

12

15 *INV

15 *INV

(Continued)

None

None

None

None

None

None

Recommended
corrective action

FMEA Samples
CD-79

Process

Failure mode

Machined
incorrectly: bad
surface finish
flatness

Machined
incorrectly: oversize,
out of position,
incorrect depth

Machined
incorrectly: missing
holes

28 Op 320 Mill
552

29 Op 330 Ream
506

30 Op 340 CDrill
504
505

Example 3 Throttle body machine.

Scrap

Machined incorrectly

27 Op 310 Manual
load
(4 parts)

Scrap
Drill off location

Scrap
Asm problems w/AIS

Scrap
Asm problems w/AIS

Customer rejects

Parts not clean:


chips, residue

Scrap
Customer rejects

Effect of failure mode

26 Op 300 Washer

25 Op 280 Finish bore Machined incorrectly


oversize, out of
606
position, incorrect
depth, bad finish

No.

Broken or worn tool


Gauging error

Broken or worn tool


Setup error
Gauging error

Broken or worn
inserts
Chips on fixtures
Gauging error

Operator loaded part


incorrectly

Incorrect
concentration levels
Water design

Broken or worn tool


Setup error
Gauging error

Cause of failure

Visual inspection
SPC chart

CNC depth control


SPC charts
Tool inspection

Visual inspection
Flush lines
SPC chart
Throttle efforts

Fixed tooling

Visual inspection
Monitor levels

CNC depth control


SPC charts
Functional test

Current controls

12

12

16

None

None

None

None

None

*INV None

Recommended
corrective action

(Continued)

CD-80
Appendix D

Fail test

33 Op 390 Leak test

Example 3 Throttle body machine.

Parts not clean:


chips, residue

32 Op 370 Washer

Failure mode

Machined
incorrectly:
missing holes
oversize

Process

31 Op 350 Drill
504
505

No.

P
1

Current controls
Visual inspection
Flush lines
SPC chart

Visual inspection
Monitor levels

Allow cooling time

Cause of failure
Broken or worn tool
Chips on fixtures
Gauging error

Incorrect
concentration levels
Washer design

Part not cooled

Effect of failure mode


Scrap
Asm problems
w/screws

Customer rejects

Scrap

18

(Continued)

None

None

None

Recommended
corrective action

FMEA Samples
CD-81

(No note present)

(No note present)

Final test (PCS)

Faulty processing

Low internal
current source
5

(No note present)

DV, manual
check life test

(No note present)

Check DV/manual

(No note present)

Check DV/manual

Design
verification

(No note present)

O
c
c

Well-understood
problem

Beyond process
*****************
******NOTES****** spec
*****************

***********************
*******NOTES*******
***********************
Resistor tolerances
>20% positive

Excessive packing
requirements

Excess density
Current density
(analysis excess) O/P stages
5

(No note present)

*********************** Well-understood
*******NOTES******* problem
***********************

Inaccurate current
sources

Metal width
too narrow

Excess packing
requirements

Voltage drop
(routing excess)

Potential cause(s)
of failure

(No note present)

Increased leakage/
premature breakdown

S
e
v

*********************** Well-understood
*******NOTES******* problem
***********************

Field plating
inadequate

Example 4 Package/layout.

Part
function

Potential effect(s)
of failure

Engineering release date

Other areas involved

Potential failure
mode

Model year/vehicle(s)

Design responsibility

Part name
and number

Suppliers and plants affected

Recommended
action(s)

3 60 Standard checks

1 10 Standard checks

2 20 Standard checks

2 32 Standard checks

R.
D
e P.
t N.

Failure mode and effects analysis (design FMEA)

Subsystem/name

Rows

(Rev.)

through

Dec 1990

Sept 1990
Jan 1991

Sept 1990

Sept 1990

40

(Continued)

5
Install
process
check

None

None

None

Area/
Action results
individual
responsible & Action S O D R.
P.
compl. date taken ev cc et N.

FMEA date (orig.)

Prepared by

Page

CD-82
Appendix D

Manual layout
inspect

Standard check Dec 1990

(No note present)

(No note present)

Work with worst


case models

Lack of extreme
models

Inaccurate spice
models
5

(No note present)

(No note present)

Incorporated 2 vint
lines

*********************** Design check with


*******NOTES******* new models
***********************

***********************
*******NOTES*******
***********************
Spice model
failure

2 40 Obtain models

Suppression design 1 15 Design-in

Poor design/
layout

Internal interference Intercell interference


(supply V rail)
3

(No note present)

Aug 1990

June 1990

3 105 Standard check Sept 1990

(No note present)

90 08 30

None

None

5
Install
process
check

None

35

R.
P.
N.

(Continued)

Area/
Action results
R.
individual
S O D
D
P.
Action
Recommended
responsible
&
c
e
e
e
c
v
t N.
action(s)
compl. date taken
t

Engineering release date

*********************** Well-understood
*******NOTES******* problem
***********************

Resistance mismatch 5
due to thermal effects

Final test (PCS)

Poor layout
technique

Thermal mismatch

Faulty processing

(No note present)

Design
verification

(No note present)

High internal current


source

Resistor tolerances
> 20% negative

S
O
e
Potential cause(s) c
c
v
of failure

Model year/vehicle(s)

*********************** Beyond process spec


*******NOTES*******
***********************

Potential effect(s)
of failure

Potential failure
mode

Example 4 Package/layout.

Part
function

Part name
and number

Suppliers and plants affected

Potential failure mode and effects analysis (design FMEA)

FMEA Samples
CD-83

Transistors mismatched 5
due to layout

*********************** Well-understood
*******NOTES******* problem
***********************

Matching
transistors

*********************** Resistors mismatched


*******NOTES******* due to layout effects
***********************

*********************** Well-understood
*******NOTES******* problem
***********************
Matching resistors Well-understood
problem

Manual layout
check

Poor layout
techniques

(No note present)

Manual layout
check

Poor layout
technique
(No note present)

(No note present)

(No note present)

(No note present)

(No note present)

Manual layout
inspect

Transistor mismatch
due to thermal effects

Manual layout
inspect

Poor layout
techniques

Thermal mismatch
transistors

Excess packing/
poor layout
(No note present)

Design
verification

(No note present)

Leakage/transient
failure

Potential effect(s)
of failure

S
e Potential cause(s) O
c
v
c
of failure

Model year/vehicle(s)

*********************** Well-understood
*******NOTES******* problem
***********************

Inadequate guard
ring

Potential failure
mode

Example 4 Package/layout.

Part
function

Part name
and number

Suppliers and plants affected

3 120 Visual inspect

3 120 Standard check

3 90 Standard check

1 10 Visual inspect

Sept 1990

Sept 1990

Sept 1990

Sept 1990

Area/
individual
responsible &
compl. date

Engineering release date

R.
D
e P. Recommended
t N.
action(s)

Potential failure mode and effects analysis (design FMEA)

S
e
v

5
Install
inspection
checkpoint

Install
process
check

Install
process
check

None

Action
taken

O
c
c

R.
P.
N.

2 80

1 40

1 30

D
e
t

Action results

90 08 30

(Continued)

CD-84
Appendix D

Incorporate thermal
trip/theta JC testing

***********************
*******NOTES*******
***********************
Package/system:
shorted bonds 12,
3, 1213, 1415

*********************** Could cause system


*******NOTES******* problems
***********************

*********************** Nasty!
*******NOTES*******
***********************
In & PW shorted
Package/system:
shorted bonds
1112, 45
1

(No note present)

(No note present)

Final test

Bonding/holding
problems
1

(No note present)

(No note present)

Final test

Bonding/holding
problems

Final test

(No note present)

Characterization
evaluation

Input and output 2, 3


Package/system:
shorted bonds 23, shorted
1314

(No note present)

Bonding/holding
problems

(No note present)

Out of spec
soldering

Design
verification

(No note present)

S
O
e
Potential cause(s) c
c
v
of failure

Model year/vehicle(s)

*********************** 2 outputs shorted


*******NOTES******* allowing device to
*********************** over heat

Outputs 12 etc.
shorted

Voids in solder
behind chip

Potential effect(s)
of failure

Package: solder
voids

Potential failure
mode

Example 4 Package/layout.

Part
function

Part name
and number

Suppliers and plants affected

2 32

R.
D
e P.
t N.

Final test check

Final test check

Final test check

Characterization

Jan 1991

Jan 1991

Jan 1991

Jan 1991

Area/
individual
responsible &
compl. date

Engineering release date

Recommended
action(s)

Potential failure mode and effects analysis (design FMEA)

None

None

None

None

Action
taken

S
e
v

O
c
c

D
e
t

Action results

90 08 30

R.
P.
N.

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-85

Potential effect(s)
of failure

************************* Bond explodes


********NOTES********
*************************

(No note present)

Bonding/holding
problem

Shorted VCC to GND

(No note present)

Final test

(No note present)

Final test

Bonding/holding
problems

Package/system:
shorted bonds 78

Final test

(No note present)

Final test

(No note present)

(No note present)

VDO/select shorted

Design
verification

(No note present)

************************* Blown bond VDO/


********NOTES******** select if select breaks
************************* device may still operate

Package/system:
shorted bonds 67

************************* System dependent


********NOTES******** fault
*************************

5
Bonding/holding
problems

PW1/Select shorted

Package/system:
shorted bonds 56

Bonding/holding
problems
(No note present)

S
O
Potential cause(s) c
e
of failure
c
v

Model year/vehicle(s)

************************* System dependent


********NOTES******** fault
*************************

Forced into PW2


Package/system:
shorted bonds 1011 mode

Potential failure
mode

Example 4 Package/layout.

Part
function

Part name
and number

Suppliers and plants affected

R.
D
e P.
t N.

Final test check

Final test check

Jan 1991

Jan 1991

Jan 1991

Final test check

Final test check

1991

Recommended
action(s)

Engineering release date

Area/
individual
responsible &
compl. date

Potential failure mode and effects analysis (design FMEA)

None

None

None

None

Action
taken

S
e
v

O
c
c

D
e
t

Action results

90 08 30

R.
P.
N.

(Continued)

CD-86
Appendix D

************************* Also as EPI tank


********NOTES******** bias
*************************

(No note present)

Ill-considered
tunnel bias

Tunnel (tank) bias

Unexpected biasing at
input/output

(No note present)

************************* Well-understood
********NOTES******** problem
*************************
8

Misconnected tank 2
on layout/schematic

EPI tank bias

Increased package/
manufacturing cells

(No note present)

O
c
c

************************* False status fault flag


********NOTES********
*************************
8

Bonding/holding
problems

Status and test out


shorted

Bonding/holding
problems

Potential cause(s)
of failure

Package/system:
shorted bonds 910

(No note present)

GND shorted to test


out

Package/system:
shorted bonds 89

S
e
v

Model year/vehicle(s)

************************* Failure at test


********NOTES******** (apparent non************************* functional OSC)

Potential effect(s)
of failure

Potential failure
mode

Example 4 Package/layout.

Part
function

Part name
and number

Suppliers and plants affected

3 Final test check

1 Final test check

Recommended
action(s)

(No note present)

Manual check

(No note present)

1 16 Standard checks

90 08 30

Sept 1990

Sept 1990

Jan 1991

1991

None

None

None

None

R.
P.
N.

(Continued)

Action results
Area/
individual
S O D
responsible & Action e c e
compl. date taken v c t

Engineering release date

DV/SV check and 1 16 Standard checks


manual schematic
check

(No note present)

Final test

(No note present)

Final test

Design
verification

R.
D
e P.
t N.

Potential failure mode and effects analysis (design FMEA)

FMEA Samples
CD-87

Function

Failure mode

Example 5 Armature.

1 Armature Valves the flow Friction


of fluid in
response to
magnetic field

# Part
name

1 = very low or none

Slow or no ride
switching.
Inferior ride

Effect of failure

2 = low or minor

None
None

None
None
None

12
12

2
2
4

3
3

1
1
1

2
2

2
2
2

2
2

1
1

On/off times
Select fit armature
and flange
assembly
Contamination
testing

Bent or broken air gap


spacer
Small armature to flange
assembly clearance
Contaminated oil

Thermal expansion of
armature and flange
assembly

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Action
done

(Continued)

None

4
2
2
1

On/off times

Bent armature spring

None

4
2
2

Print spec.

Inadequate cylindricity

Thermal chamber

None

4
2
2

Armature length too


short

None

4
2

Print spec.

None

1
Print spec.

None

Correct
action

5 = very high

Inadequate plating

Inspection

Current controls

4 = high

Inadequate surface finish

Contaminants in the
grooves

Nicks/scratches in
armature O.D. or flange
I.D.

Cause of failure

3 = moderate or significant

P = Probability (chance) of occurrence S = Seriousness of failure to vehicle D = Likelihood defect will reach customer R = Risk priority measure (PxSxD)

CD-88
Appendix D

Function

Vehicle sticks in soft


ridge state. Difficulty
handling

Does not achieve full


firm ride. Inferior ride
quality

Does not achieve full


firm ride. Inferior ride
quality

Armature
sticks in open
position

High leakage

Does not seal


against
sealing post

3
3
3
3

2
2
2
1

Durability testing

Master solenoids
tested
Off time

Armature and sealing


post mating surfaces
battered
Sachs portion leaks

Master solenoids
tested
Print spec.

Sachs components
misaligned or damaged
Surface finish too rough

Nicks/scratches in
armature O.D. or flange I.D.

Durability testing

Print spec.

Select fit
armature and
flange assembly

Print spec.

Durability

Current controls

Large armature to
flange assembly
clearance

Air gap spacer too thin,


armature magnetical
locks to it
Armature or air gap
spacer mating surface
too large, adhesion
occurs
Armature and stop
mating surfaces
battered

Slow or no ride
Burr generated by
switching. Inferior ride impact with stop

Friction

Cause of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode

Example 5 Armature.

Provides
sealing
surface
against
sealing post

Valves the
1
Armature flow of fluid in
response to
magnetic field

# Part
name

12

12

12

12

12

12

None

None
None
None

None

None
None
None

None

None
None

None

None

None
None

None

None

None

None

None

Action
done

(Continued)
Correct
action

FMEA Samples
CD-89

Flux core for


coil wire

Hold
armature,
armature
spring, and
air gap
spacer together during
shipment
Contains and
secures in
place flange
assembly,
bobbin
assembly,
and cable
connection

1
Armature

1
Protective
cap

Example 5 Armature.

Housing
Encapsulation

Function

# Part
name

Visual identification

Visual identification.
Jeopardize integrity of
connection between
cable and bobbin coil

Cracks in
encapsulation

Armature, armature
spring, and/or air gap
spacer separate from
encapsulated housing

Vehicle has difficulty


achieving soft ride.
Inferior ride quality

Effect of failure

Poor surface
finish quality

Cap comes
loose

Insufficient
force
generated

Failure mode

1
2

Encapsulation
setup
Encapsulation
setup

Poor encapsulation
operation
Worn mold

Encapsulation
setup

Worn mold

Solenoid exposed to
cold temperature

Section batch
part

Print spec.

On time

Current controls

Poor encapsulation
operation

Cap I.D. too large

Cap improperly
installed

Material flux saturated

Cause of failure

12

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Action
done

(Continued)
Correct
action

CD-90
Appendix D

Function
Cable pulls free of
housing. Jeopardize
integrity of connection
between cable and
bobbin coil

Poor cable
retention

Example 5 Armature.

Encapsulation seeps
between bobbin
terminal and cable
connection, reducing
metal contact areas
Erratic or no ride
response

Erratic ride switching

Locked in firm ride

Effect of failure

Failure mode

Coil integrity
Protects
jeopardized by
components
from environ- encapsulation
mental factors

Housing Contains and


encapsu- secures in
place flange
lation
assembly,
bobbin
assembly,
and cable
connection

# Part
name

Terminal design not


tight enough fit

Encapsulation pressure
is too high

Short to housing

Insufficient cable land to


form proper bond
between cable and
terminal molding
Coil damaged or
broken by
encapsulation

2
2

2
2

1
1

1
2

Groove design
inadequate

Print spec.

Ground check.
Resistance
Encapsulation
setup

Near-level wound
wound bobbins
used

Insufficient cable
bond area in
design

Material choice

No chemical bond
formed between
terminal molding and
cable
Insufficient retention in
groove design

Material choice

No chemical bond
formed between cable
and terminal molding

S
2

P
2

Encapsulation
setup

Current controls

Improper encapsulation
fill

Cause of failure

12

12

12

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Correct
action

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Action
done

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-91

Hold bobbin,
flange, and
housing
together

Housing
assembly

Example 5 Armature.

1 Housing Provides flux


path around
coil
Houses
bobbin and
coil assembly

Protects
components
from environmental
factors

Function

Housing
encapsulation

# Part
name

Insufficient
force
generated
Bobbin and
coil assembly
does not fit
properly in
housing

Flange,
bobbin, and
housing
misaligned

Improper
encapsulation
fill

Failure mode

1
1

On time

On/off time
On/off time
Ground check
On/off time

Bobbin cocked
Coil wire wrapped
beyond
Improper sizing of
bobbin and housing

Dysfunctional solenoid

Flange assembly
oiled

Corrosion on flange
assembly
Material flux saturated

Print spec.

Encapsulation
setup

Encapsulant not
packed well enough to
endure pressure
Improper press fit of
flange and housing

Print spec.

Improper slot design

Burst test

Bobbin terminals not


centered in housing

Section batch part

Improper insertion into


mold

Current controls

Worn mold

Cause of failure

Vehicle has difficulty


achieving soft ride

Erratic or no ride
switching

Encapsulation cracks
when hit with high
pressure. Flange
assembly bows

Housing or bobbin
shows through
encapsulation

Effect of failure

12

12

12

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Action
done

(Continued)
Correct
action

CD-92
Appendix D

Prevents magnetic
and mechanical
surface lock
between armature
and stop from
occurring when
solenoid is
energized

Example 5 Armature.

Air gap
spacer

Sets return
time response
characteristics

Air gap spacers


retention design

Misalignment on air gap


spacer

On time
On/off times
Pressure response
for on/off times
On time

Wear
Air gap spacer not
installed
Leg broken on air gap
spacer
Air gap spacer too thin
Air gap spacer too thick

Erratic ride control


Achieves firm ride
slowly or erratically

Achieves soft ride


erratically, slowly,
or not at all

Armature
movement
restricted

Leg broken or bent on


air gap spacer

Durability
On/off times

Bent spring

Achieves firm ride


slowly

On/off time

Spring rate
measured
Durability

Spring wear

On/off times

Spring rate too low

2
1

On time
Durability

On time

Current controls

No spring installed

Wear between armature


and stop mating
surfaces produces burr

Improper installation
into flange assembly
Material saturated

Cause of failure

Spring side
loads
armature
Spring breaks
Latching when
energized

Armature does
not seal against
sealing post

Does not achieve full


firm ride

Difficulty achieving full


soft ride. Eventual
functional problems

Burr
development

Provides the
solid base for
air gap spacer

Effect of failure
Vehicle has difficulty
achieving soft ride

Failure mode

Provides flux path Insufficient


from tube armature force generated

Function

Armature Provides
spring
return force to
armature

1 Stop

# Part
name

3
3

3
3

12

18

18
9

18

18

18

12

None

None

None

None

None
None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None
None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Action
done

(Continued)
Correct
action

FMEA Samples
CD-93

Example 5 Armature.

1 Molded
Accommodates
cable
electrical
assembly and physical
attachment of
cable to
bobbin coil
assembly

Provides flux
path for coil

Erratic or no ride
response

Solenoid becomes
inactive after time

Water
penetrates
solenoid

Print spec.

Terminals bent too


severely

Material choice or
Poor chemical bond
overmolding
between cable and
design
terminal molding or
between terminal
molding and encapsulant

On time

Component corrosion

Resistance check

1
2

On time

Material flux saturated

Improper terminal
attachment

On time

Print spec.

Improper fits

Improper installation
into flange assembly

2
1

Burst

Improper braze

Vehicle cannot hold


firm ride

Vehicle has difficulty


achieving soft ride

On time

Material flux saturated

On time

Leg bent on air gap


spacer

Achieves soft ride


slowly or erractically
Vehicle has difficulty
switching to soft ride

Off time

Current controls

Spring not properly


seated

Cause of failure

Achieves firm ride


slowly or erratically

Effect of failure

Poor electrical
connection

Insufficient
force
generated

Inadequate
attachment
between disc
and stop

Holds stop to
disc

1 Disc

Insufficient
force generated

Provides flux
path

1 Tube

Spring biases
armature
position

Failure mode

Centers and
holds
armature
spring

Function

Air gap
spacer

# Part
name

18

12

12

12

12

18

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Correct
action

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Action
done

(Continued)

CD-94
Appendix D

Function

Example 5 Armature.

Carries
current from
vehicle to
solenoid

1 Molded
Accommodates
cable
electrical and
assembly physical
attachment of
solenoid to
vehicle

# Part
name

2
Resistance check

Resistance check

Cable wires have been


nicked or twisted to
fracture
Cable wire exposed
and contacting through
insulation

Electrical burning
damage to vehicle
components

Electrical short

Print spec. for


grommet position
Pull-out test

Resistance check

Cable retention groove


design

Resistance check

Erratic or no ride
response

Cable grommet does


not line up correctly with
vehicle connection
Erratic or no solenoid
response after bobbin
terminal to cable
connection breaks

Poor physical
attachment to
vehicle
Insufficient
cable retention

2
Resistance check

Resistance check

Improper wire connector


attachment to cable
Improper connection to
vehicle
Bent or damaged pin
terminals
Poor dry crimp of pin
terminal to wire
Connector clip missing
or cracked
Grommet positioned
improperly

Resistance check

Crack in wire connector

S D

Current controls

Cause of failure

Poor electrical
connection

Erratic or no ride control

Effect of failure

Poor electrical
connection

Failure mode

12

12

18

18

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Correct Action
action done

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-95

Slow ride responses

Friction
between
armature and
flange
assembly

Armature
guide

Example 5 Armature.

Difficulty achieving soft


ride

Air gap spacer


damaged

Seats air gap


spacer

1 Flange
assembly
machined

Vehicle cannot hold firm


ride

Flange
assembly leak

Effect of failure
Vehicle has difficulty
achieving soft ride

Failure mode

Insufficient
force
generated

Provide flux
path

Function

Flange
assembly
premachined

# Part
name

2
2
2
2
2
2

2
1
2
1
1

On/off tests

Air gap spacer broken


or bent
Poor surface finish
Contaminants in oil
Improper fit between
flange and armature
Poor flange roundness
and cylindricity

Section batch
part

Insufficient
encapsulation packing

Print spec.

Insufficient material
strength

On/off tests

Flange assembly
oiled

Corrosion of flange
assembly

Improper groove
dimension

Print spec.

Material flux saturated


Burst test

Burst test

Components damaged
during brazing

Poor braze

Oil flange
assembly

Current controls

Corrosion of flange
assembly

Cause of failure

12

12

18

12

(Continued)

None
None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None
None
None

None

None

Correct Action
action done

CD-96
Appendix D

Holds coil
wire

1 Bobbin

Example 5 Armature.

Connects coil
wire and
cable wire

Function

2 Bobbin
terminal

# Part
name

Improper winding setup

Flash on bobbin

Nonlevel
winding

Resistance check

Improper solenoid
operation

Terminal twisted or
damaged

Resistance check

Twisted terminal

Slow ride response

Resistance check

Terminal did not scrape


insulation away from
coil wire to allow proper
contact

High
resistance

Current controls

Cause of failure

Erratic or no ride
response

Effect of failure

Poor electrical
connection

Failure mode

12

(Continued)

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

Correct Action
action done

FMEA Samples
CD-97

CD-98

Appendix D

Existing conditions
Potential
effect(s) of
failure

Severity

Motor Provide
mechanical
power to
fans;
position
fans
within
shroud

Potential
failure
mode

Detection

Product
function

Occurence

Part
name/
part
no.

Risk
priority
no.
(RPN)

Fan vibration
from
imbalance
and axial
T.I.R.

Audible noise,
vibration;
increased
motor wear

Fan center
of gravity
off axis of
rotation;
axial T.I.R.
causes 2plane
imbalance

Design
lightweight
fan with min.
band mass;
part thickness to favor
uniform mold
flow. DV
tests on
vehicles
to assess
sensitivity to
vibration
inputs

100

Motor
burnout,
bearing or
brush
failure

Loss of cooling
and A/C
function

Overheating,
lack of air
circulation

50

Misassemble Loss of cooling


function
to shroud,
off-center
or crooked

Fan contact
shroud,
noise or
motor burnout

2
Vent holes in
motor case;
fins in fan hub
pull air through
ES, durability
tests
Design for
2
easy assembly,
accurate
positioning in
shroud

42

Power motion 6
motor has
unique mounting configuration. Visual
inspection
during
assembly

108

Power motion 6
motor has
unique mounting configuration. Visual
inspection
during
assembly

180

Maintain dimensional capability within


limits of
tolerence
stack-up

90

Assemble @
120 offnominal
angle,
motor wire
in wrong
location

No-build
condition in
assy. plant

Control
critical
item

Potential
cause(s) of
failure

Symmetrical
spacing of
screw holes;
nonunique
mounting
interfaces

Motor wire
interferes with
engine and
shorts; wire is
too tight and
opens circuit

Fan retainer
compression
too high

Retainer loose,
lost, loose fan
and lost cooling function

Example 6 Cooling fan assembly.

e clip too
close to
shaft and
slot

Current
controls

(Continued)

FMEA Samples

CD-99

(Continued)
Existing conditions

Screws- Attach
motor
motor to
mount shroud

Severity

Provide
mechanical
power to
fans;
position
fans
within
shroud

Potential
effect(s) of
failure

Detection

Motor

Product
function

Potential
failure
mode

Occurence

Part
name/
part
no.

Risk
priority
no.
(RPN)

Fan retainer
compression
too low or
nonexistent

Retainer loose,
excess play
between slot
and e clip;
breakage; lost
cooling

e clip too
far from
shaft and
slot

Maintain dimensional capability within


limits of
tolerence
stack-up

90

Backplate
not swaged
securely

Motor & fan


loose; fan
touches
shroud, stalls;
fan damages
coil; loss of
cooling,
coolant

Designed
interference
of swaged
tangs not
sufficient;
swaging
process not
capable

Swage
method revised; pull
out tests; DV
testing; ES
tests

84

Loosen after Loose motor


allows fan
extended
contact with
service
shroud, stalling motor

Plastic creep
relieves
screw tension, allows
back-out

Maintain dimensional
capability
within limits
of tolerance
stack-up

70

Misapplication

Loose motor
allows fan
contact with
shroud,
stalling
motor

Drive in
crooked,
miss hole or
not fully
tight

Counterbore 2
in screw-hole,
torque-to-fail
much higher
than prevailing

42

Plastic
threads
strip out

Loose motor,
fan contact
with shroud

Shroud
mount boss
splits

Counterbore,
optimize
boss diameter
and height

56

Loose fan,
contact w/
coil, loss of
cooling

Incomplete
installation,
not fully
snapped on

Design motor
and fan for
easy clip
installation
w/tactile
snap on lock

60

T.I.R.
increased; vibration or
noise; fan
dismounts,
loss of cooling

Retainer not
keyed with
respect to
flats on
motor shaft

ES and DV
testing

98

Fan
Attach fan Come loose
retainer and torque after installaplate to
tion
motor

Example 6 Cooling fan assembly.

Control Potential
critical cause(s) of
item
failure

Current
controls

CD-100

Appendix D

(Continued)
Existing conditions
Potential
effect(s) of
failure

Fan does not


Motor shaft
deforms flats reach full RPM,
fan bore
in hole
wears. Loss of
cooling,
vibration from
loose fan
Torque plate
not fully
seated

Engagement
of flats is
reduced
torque plate
hole enlarged
from stress

Example 6 Cooling fan assembly.

Control
critical
item

Severity

Torque Transmit
plate
torque
from
motor to
fan

Potential
failure
mode

Detection

Product
function

Occurence

Part
name/
part
no.

Risk
priority
no.
(RPN)

Torque plate
hole oversized; steel
not proper
thickness or
hardness

Maintain
dimensional
capability
within limits
of tolerance
stack-up, ES
tests

126

Close tolerances of fan


pockets and
legs of
plate

Make assy.
retainer on
unseated
plate
difficult

105

Potential
cause(s) of
failure

Current
controls

P.O.
nitride
etch

Overetch
Nitride voids

Overetch
Underetch
Nitride voids
Dark bond pads

Nitride voids
Dark bond pads

Poor bondability

Nitride voids
Metal shorts

Poor
uniformity

Overetch

Underetch

Scratches

Potential
effects
of
failures

Poor
selectivity

Example 7 Nitride etch.

P.O.
nitride
etch

Process Process
name function

Potential
failure
mode

Process: P.O. nitride etch

Wafer loading
and unloading
Subsequent wafer
inspection

Etch time too


short
High O2 flow
Low RF power

Etch time too long


High O2 flow
Low CF4 flow
High temperature
High RF power

Chamber leak
Wrong gas flow
Wrong pressure
Wrong power

Chamber leak
High O2 flow
Low CF4 flow
High temperature

Potential
causes
of
failure

Daily and weekly


monitors
Subsequent wafer
inspections
SPC

Daily and weekly


monitors
Subsequent wafer
inspections
SPC

Daily and weekly


monitors
Subsequent wafer
inspections
SPC

Daily and weekly


monitors
Subsequent wafer
inspections
SPC

Daily and weekly


monitors
Subsequent wafer
inspections
SPC

Current
controls

5
5

6
6

2
2
7

7
7
7
7
7

5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6

S
E
V

3
2
2
2
2

3
2
2
2

3
2
2
2

O
C
C

Existing conditions (110)

140
100

36
36

3
3
4

54

63
42
42
42
42

45
40
40
40

54
48
48
36

R
P
N

3
3
3
3
3

3
4
4
4

3
4
4
3

D
E
T

Replace A-24-D
reactors
Implement waferhandling system

Replace A-24-D
reactors

Replace A-24-D
reactors

Replace A-24-D
reactors

Replace A-24-D
reactors

Recommended
actions

(Continued)

C.S.
Open
T.S.
Open

D.S.
3/6/94
3/6/94
3/6/94

Open
Open
Open
Open
Open

D.S.
3/6/94
3/6/94
3/6/94

Open
Open
Open
Open

Area/
person
responsible
Completion date

FMEA Samples
CD-101

Backgrind

Poor bondability

Poor bondability

Too thick

Poor bondability

Potential
effects
of
failures

Too thin

Example 7 Nitride etch.

Backgrind

Dark bond
pads

Device:
Process: Backgrind

Process Process
name function

Potential
failure
mode

Subsequent thickness
measurements
SPC

Grinding wheel
dirty
Poor uniformity
within wafer
Poor uniformity
wafer to wafer

SPC

Grinding wheel
dirty
Poor uniformity
within wafer
Poor uniformity
wafer to wafer
Improper machine
setup

Subsequent thickness
measurements

Daily and weekly


monitors
Subsequent wafer
inspections
SPC

Current
controls

4
4
4

4
4
5

S
E
V
7
7

O
C
C
3
2

Existing conditions (110)

Improper
machine setup

Overetch
Not rinsed
properly after
processing

Potential
causes
of
failure

80

64
32
100

4
2
5

48

32

48

36

R
P
N
63
42

D
E
T
3
3

Supply computer
program to assist
operator
Establish periodic
cleaning
Rebuild slide/
ball screw
Rebuild slide/
ball screw

Supply computer
program to assist
operator
Establish periodic
cleaning
Rebuild slide/
ball screw
Rebuild slide/
ball screw

Replace A-24-D
reactors

Recommended
actions

C.S.
Open
C.S.
5/2/94
C.S.
4/30/94

C.S.
5/6/94

D.S.
Open
D.S.
Open
D.S.
5/6/94

D.S.
Open

D.S.
3/6/94
3/6/94

Comp date

Area/
person
respon.

(Continued)

CD-102
Appendix D

Slit
base
laminate/
coverlay

Process
function

Images will
not fit web
or web will
not fit
tooling

Unreliable
part

Scrap

Incorrect
material

Damaged
material
(dents,
wrinkled,
rough
edges)

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

Incorrect
width

Potential
failure
mode

Example 8 Slit base laminate.

Ford
automotive
circuits

Part
name/
part
number

Verified at
laminations
operations

Mislabeled
material

Poor handling

Foreign
material
Cast off

Preventative
maintenance
Clean
equipment
Reject/scrap
material
Operator training
of mechanized
handling equipment

Engineering
maintains route
sheets

Incorrect
documentation

Dull blades

Compare material
part number to
routing

Setup monitored.
Inspected at proceeding operations.

Current
controls

*
6

*
7

Existing conditions

Incorrect setup

Incorrect setup
Incorrect
documentation

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure
6

*
9
Standard web
widths used
and specified
on routing

Recommended
action(s)
and status

Feedback from
next
operation

4 20 BOM
cross-check to
routing sheet
at all
operations

*
8

Shutdown
procedure
implemented

Completed

Completed

Action(s)
taken

2 3 1 6

1 5 3 15

1 3 1 3

* * * *
6 7 8 9

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-103

Process
function

Potential
failure
mode

Example 8 Slit base laminate.

Cutline
quality
Slivers
Slugs
Incomplete
cut

Ford
Pierce and Incorrect
material
automotive index
orientation
circuits
material
web
(coverlay
only)

Part
name/
part
number

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

Machine setup
up and visual
tooling wear

Operator
training

Incorrect
documentation

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure

Die adjustment
and visual
inspection

Orientation
specified on
routings
Compare material
part number to
routing

Current
controls

*
6

Existing conditions

*
7

*
9

Recommended
action(s)
and status

New web
cleaner
planned for
indexing

5 60 Electrical test
for opens due
to slugs left
in pad area

2 10 None

*
8

1st unit
implemented

None

Action(s)
taken

1 4 3 12

* * * *
6 7 8 9

(Continued)

CD-104
Appendix D

Header
assembly

Process
function

Wont fit in
backer
board

LED
twisted

Circuit
not
bonded
to board

Customer
return

Alignment Circuit

of
and board
misaligned
Components
misaligned

No light

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

LED
upside
down

Potential
failure
mode

Example 8 Slit base laminate.

Part
name/
part
number

Didnt roll
enough
Bad PSA

Board drilled
wrong
Operator
error

Bent wrong
Handling
Pin twisted
in fixture

Operator
error
Bent wrong

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure
Current
controls

*
7

*
8

*
9

1
2
None

None

Recommended
action(s)
and status

3 10 2 60

Inspection
and DOE to
define the
precise
material

4 10 3 120 A.I.
NC drill

1 10 1 10

*
6

Existing conditions

Done
5/6/94

Installed
4/5/93

None

None

Action(s)
taken

1 10 1 10

2 10 1 20

* * * *
6 7 8 9

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-105

Dome
assembly

Process
function

Inspection

Domes
slip

Misregistered
retainer

Operator error

Cosmetic

No shim
Inspection

Incoming
Inspection

Wrong
material

Lump in
overlay

Wrong
shim
Operator error

2 10 10 200 100%
inspect

Nothing

Static
fly-out

Field
failure

8 112 Keep good


parts for
comparison

2 10 5 100 Redesign part


for foolproof
design

2 10 7 140 Incoming
SPC

None

None

Recommended
action(s)
and status

Misaligned
dome

10

20

*
9

1 10 1

*
8

Wrong part

*
7

Wont fit
in TI
printer

*
6

Wrong
header

Current
controls
1 10 2

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure
Operator
oriented
wrong

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

Put header Wont fit


upside
in TI
down
printer

Potential
failure
mode

Example 8 Slit base laminate.

Part
name/
part
number

Existing conditions

Done
3/4/94

Done
2/4/94

Done
5/5/94

Done
2/4/94

None

None

Action(s)
taken

1 1 1 1

2 7 3 42

2 10 2 40

2 10 3 60

* * * *
6 7 8 9

(Continued)

CD-106
Appendix D

Process
function

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

Overlay could
come off

Cosmetic

Force to fire
out of spec

Wont test
in house

Domes fall
out

Shim/
circuit not
peeled

Double
shim

Double
domes

Missing
domes

Missing
retainer

Shield
Overlay
misaligned alignment off

Potential
failure
mode

Example 8 Slit base laminate.

Part
name/
part
number

Operator error

Operator error
Static fly-out

Domes stick
together
Put 2 domes

2 shims stick
together
Put 2 domes

Torn release
paper
Operator error

Operator error

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure
Current
controls

*
7

*
8

*
9

5 35

None

None

None
None

1 10 1 10

1 10 1 10

None

None

None

None

Action(s)
taken

None

None

None

None

Recommended
action(s)
and status

2 20

2 10 2 40

2 10 2 40

*
6

Existing conditions
* * * *
6 7 8 9

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-107

Customer
complaint

Missing/
wrong
part
number
Operator error

Operator error

Cosmetic

Inspection

Poor handling

Inspection

Inspection

Inspection

Inspection

Operator error

Missing/
wrong
date code

Electrical
failure

LED bent/
fail bent at
wrapping

Inspection

Void in PSA
Release paper
on

Operator error

Customer
return

Missing
overlay

Inspection

Current
controls

*
7

*
8

*
9

7 35

7 35

5 10 50

2 10 5 100

3 10 7 210

3 10 7 210

5 10 7 350

*
6

Existing conditions

Operator error

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure

Missing
keys at
testing

Customer
return

Customer
return

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

Overlay
loose

Misaligned
Overlay
assembly/ overlay to
circuit
ET

Process
function

Potential
failure
mode

Example 8 Slit base laminate.

Part
name/
part
number

Redesign part
for foolproof
design
Redesign part
for foolproof
design

Redesign part
for foolproof
design

Redesign part
for foolproof
design
Redesign part
for foolproof
design

Redesign part
for foolproof
design

Redesign part
for foolproof
design

Recommended
action(s)
and status

Done
5/10/94

Done
5/10/94

Done
5/10/94

Done
5/10/94

Done
5/10/94

Done
5/10/94

Done
5/10/94

Action(s)
taken

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1

* * * *
6 7 8 9

(Continued)

CD-108
Appendix D

LED
assembly

Process
function

Customer
reject

LED
intermittent

LED
intermittent

Cold
solder
joints

Not
enough
solder

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

Wrong
color
LEDs

Potential
failure
mode

Example 9 GDS assembly.

Part
name/
part
number
Inspection

Inspection

Inspection

Operator
error
Iron temp. low
Bad solder
Contaminated
plating in
circuit
Operator tech
Bad solder
Iron temp. low

Current
controls

*
7

5 10

5 10

9 10

*
6

Existing conditions

Operator error

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure
*
9

Recommended
action(s)
and status

9 450 Solder training


Temp control
monitor

9 450 Solder training


Temp control
monitor
Samples of
soldered
pictures

8 720 Color code


fixture
Electrical
tester
modification
for LEDs
Add color
code in
circuit
Picture page
with color
indicator at
work station

*
8

Done
3/5/94

Done
3/5/94

Done
3/5/94

Action(s)
taken

(Continued)

2 10 1 20

2 10 1 20

2 10 2 40

* * * *
6 7 8 9

FMEA Samples
CD-109

Process
function

Won't light

Lump in
overlay

Failure
overtime
intermittent

Circuit
delamination
(reliability)

Won't light

Too much
solder

Cracked
LEDs

Too much
heat

Bad LEDs

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

Wrong
orientation

Potential
failure
mode

Example 9 GDS assembly.

Part
name/
part
number

Nothing

Inspection

Inspection

Iron not
calibrated
Thicker
solder
Operator tech
Supplier
problem

Inspection

Current
controls

Bending
fixture
Handling

Operator tech
Iron temp
too high

Operator error
Made wrong

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure
*
7

*
8

*
9

4 140

1 10 3 30

1 10 9 90

1 10 10 100

10 10 3 300

*
6

Existing conditions

Incoming
inspection
Supplier
certification

SPC

Redesign

Spec
operator
training

Redesign for
foolproof
design

Recommended
action(s)
and status

Done
5/10/94

Done
5/10/94

Done
5/10 94

Done
5/10/94

Action(s)
taken

1 10 2 20

1 10 3 30

1 1 1 1

5 7 1 35

1 1 1 1

* * * *
6 7 8 9

(Continued)

CD-110
Appendix D

Process
function

Poor resist
adhesion

Scrap

Damaged
material

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

Poorly
cleaned

Potential
failure
mode

Example 9 GDS assembly.

Ford
Copper
automotive clean
circuits

Part
name/
part
number

Reject/scrap
material
Operator training of
mechanized
handling equipment

Poor handling

Operator
controls web
speed based on
cleaning quality

Incorrect web
speed

Cast off

Bath solutions
monitored

Current
controls

Chemical bath
concentration

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure

*
6

*
7

Existing conditions
*
9

3 12

*
8

None
None

None

None

None

Action(s)
taken

None

None

None

Recommended
action(s)
and status

* * * *
6 7 8 9

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-111

Process
function

Incorrect
ink adhesion

Incorrect
image
cure

Loss of
resistance to
etchant
chemical

Conductor
criteria
violated

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

Poor
image
quality

Potential
failure
mode

Example 9 GDS assembly.

Ford
Screen
automotive resist
circuits

Part
name/
part
number

Oven
temperature
and web speed

Tooling wear

Incorrect
setup

Smears

Foreign
material

Dried in ink
in screen

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure

Pre-set electronic
temperature control
and visual inspection
for correct ink color

Thorough vision
inspection every 25
cycles and constant
observation

Current
controls

*
6

*
7

Existing conditions
*
9

2 12

5 80

*
8

None

None

Web cleaner
planned for
screening

100% electrical
test

Recommended
action(s)
and status

None

None

Electrical
testers
designed and
in house

Action(s)
taken

3 4 3 36

* * * *
6 7 8 9

(Continued)

CD-112
Appendix D

Process
function

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

Incorrect
Generates
registration rework and
added setup
time

Potential
failure
mode

Example 9 GDS assembly.

Ford
automotive
circuits

Part
name/
part
number

Incorrect
web width

Improper
setup

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure
Image comparison to
film gauge and
constant visual
inspection

Current
controls
1

*
6
4

*
7

Existing conditions
*
9

5 20

*
8

None

None

Recommended
action(s)
and status

None

None

Action(s)
taken

* * * *
6 7 8 9

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-113

Etch

Process
function

Over- or
underetched

Potential
failure
mode

Example 9 GDS assembly.

Ford
automotive
circuits

Part
name/
part
number

Violation of
conductor
width
criteria
(opens and
shorts)

Potential
effect(s)
of
failures

Etchant concentrations
monitored and
maintained routinely

High etchant
concentration

Poor etchant
resist.

SPCX bar and R


charts.

Current
controls

Incorrect
web width

Potential
cause(s)
of
failure
2

*
6
5

*
7

Existing conditions
*
9

Recommended
action(s)
and status

Standard
etching coupon
implemented to
monitor
operator

5 50 Quarterly CpK
study
computed

*
8
Operators
received
further SPC
training to
improve data
recording
and record
maintenance

Action(s)
taken

2 5 1 10

* * * *
6 7 8 9

(Continued)

CD-114
Appendix D

Decreased ventilation
Increased carbon dioxide retention and respiratory acidosis
Discomfort
Pain

Forced cough
Collapsed airways
Rupture of thin-walled alveoli
Second-degree irritation of tracheobronchical tree
Hemoptysis

Chronic and long term (longer than one month)


Fatigue
Weight loss
Anorexia

Chronic and short term (less than one month)


Hazardous elevation in intrahoracic pressure
Intracranial pressure and blood pressure
Cough syncope
Fractured ribs
Musculoskeletal pain

Effect
Impaired gas exchange
Ineffective breathing pattern
Fear of chest pain
Alteration in comfort

Fear of seeing blood

Example 10 Complaint diagnosis.

(Continued)

Impaired gas exchange

Alteration in nutrition

Alteration in comfort

Alteration in carbon dioxide level

Diagnosis

Quite often this format is also used for corrective actions in lieu of diagnosis and sometimes numerical values are assigned so that a RPN is calculated.

Cough

Chest pain

Complaint

FMEA Samples
CD-115

Effect

Ineffective airway clearance


Impaired gas exchange

Mucous plugs

Increased secretions and/or abnormal fluids retained in lung

Fear of seen blood

Alteration in tissue perfusion

Increased sputum

Impaired gas exchange

Blood-streaked sputum

Ineffective airway clearance

Impaired physical mobility

Obstruction with blood

Hemoptysis

Hypoventilation/hyperventilation

Exhaustion

Fear of breathlessness
Impaired gas exchange

Fatigue

Ineffective breathing pattern

Alteration in comfort

Diagnosis

Emotional distress

Acute and chronic

Accessory muscle change

Barrel chest

Chronic

Restlessness

Diaphoresis

Acute

Example 10 Complaint diagnosis.

Increased and
abnormal
secretions

Dyspnea

Complaint

(Continued)

CD-116
Appendix D

FMEA Samples

CD-117

Horn

Contacts

Switch

Power
supply

Tank

Pump
Timer
Pressure tank
rupture
+

Basic
tank
failure

Overpressure
in tank
Pump operates
too long
Current fed to
motor for too long

Contacts closed
too long

Switch closed
too long
+

+
Basic
contacts
failure

Basic
timer
failure

No command to
open contacts
+

Basic
switch
failure

No command to
open switch
Operator did not
open the switch
+

Timer
sets time
too long
Basic
switch
failure

No command
to operator

Basic
switch
failure

Secondary alarm
failure

Example 11 FTA development of an air pumping system. (Top) A typical air


pumping system. (Bottom) FTA for the air pumping system.

Effects
of failure

Downtime
5 hours

Downtime
3 hours

Downtime
20 min

Downtime
30 min

Downtime
30 min

Overbake
Downtime
30 min

Potential
failure
mode

Does not
heat

Does not
heat

Does not
heat

Does not
heat

Does not
heat

Over
temperature

The oven shall


circulate air to
cure the rocker
panels of the
vehicle

MTBF1500
hrs; MTTR
30 min.

Availability
99.9%

CFM38000
with 5%
contamination

Environmental:
90F 90-99%
relative
humidity

Description

Flame
relay

Defective
gas valve

High
temperature
filter
Gas
regulator

OS

Flame
relay

YC

Defective
damper

Causes

Class

Failure mode analysis

Example 12 Machine FMEA: modular oven.

Subsystem
name:
function and
performance
requirements
Modular oven
to provide heat
for a period of
10 minutes at a
temperature of
350F

54

20

12
30

270

3
3

Gaspressure
switch & PM
Temperature
alarm & gas
pressure
switch
Temperature
alarm

Temperature
alarm
and PM

Temperature
alarm

R
P
N

180

Temperature
alarm

Controls

Eng. S.
Stamatis
6/4/03

None

None

Eng. C.
Stamatis
6/4/03

Eng. D.
Stamatis
6/4/03

Review design Eng. J.


of flame
Roberson
amplifier
6/4/03
manual

Review
warranty &
test data

No action

No action

Review
damper spec
and location

Review relay
spec and
warranty data

Resp. &
completion
date

Action plan
Recommended
action

Redesign 5
flame
switch &
select new
amplifier
card

90

12

(Continued)

36

6
2

Select a
2
new valve
type

72
6

Selected 6
new flame
relay with
higher
temp.
ratings
SAA
3

R
P
N

Action results
S

Action
taken

CD-118
Appendix D

Low air
flow

Underbake
45 min

Defective
fan motors
Broken belt

Clogged
supply lines

Defective fans

Closed
damper
Stuck
damper

Defective
gas train
Dirty filter

None
none

None

None

None

2
2

Temperature
alarm

Air flow
switch

None

None

None

Flame
amplifier

Example 12 Machine FMEA: modular oven.

Paint solvents
conveyor
vibration
80dBa.

High fire
limit switch

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

160

80

80

80

80

96

16

270

270

Eng. Chris
Stamatis
6/4/03

No action

SAA
5

5
Redesign
flame switch
& select
new amplifier
card. Install
automatic
shut off temp
control SAA 5

Install
4
automatic
dampers
into the
new design
ovens.
Install new
type of alarm
4
SAA
Eng. Eric.R SAA
6/4/03
SAA
4
SAA
Eng. James
R. 6/4/03
SAA
4
SAA
Eng. Carla
S. 6/4/03
SAA
4
SAA
Eng. Tim
SAA
S. 6/4/03
4
SAA & review Eng. Harry
procedures for S. 6/4/02
maintenance
manual

Eng.
R. Munro
6/4/03
Eng. E. Rice
SAA
6/4/03
No action
Eng.
Aristea
6/4/03
Review PM
Eng. Boula
schedule and 6/4/03
design of
damper

SAA

540 SAA & limit


switch

16
16
16

2
2
2

2
2

16
2

16
2
2
2

24
3

20

20
2
2
2

30

(Continued)

FMEA Samples
CD-119

Appendix E
FMEA Forms

his appendix provides a variety of FMEA forms. None of them is a


standard for all industries. The intent of this appendix is to give the
reader an idea of how to construct an FMEA form with all the essential information for the optimum results. Every one of the FMEA forms
may be modified to reflect the specific objective of the organization.

CD-121

Potential
failure
mode

Potential
effect(s) of
failure


Potential
cause(s) of
failure

Detection
method

O
C
C

Team

S
E
V

D
E
T

R
P
N

Recommended
action

Page

Prepared by

Figure E.1 A generic FMEA form.

System/
design/
process/
service
function

FMEA date

Type of FMEA

Responsibility
& completion
date

of

Action
taken

S
E
V

O
C
C

Action results

pages

D
E
T

R
P
N

CD-122
Appendix E

Potential
failure
mode

Potential
effect(s) of
failure

Figure E.2 A generic FMEA form.

System/
design/
process/
service
function

Name
FMEA ID
Date

Potential
cause(s) of
failure

Prepared by
Resp. eng.
Release date

Team

Detection
method

O
C
C

S
E
V

D
E
T

R
P
N

Recommended
action

Part
FMEA date
FMEA rev. date
of
Page
Responsibility
and completion
date

pages

FMEA Forms
CD-123

Potential
failure
mode

Potential
effect(s) of
failure


Potential
cause(s) of
failure

Detection
method

O
C
C

Team

S
E
V

D
E
T

R
P
N

Recommended
action

Page

Prepared by

Figure E.3 A generic FMEA form.

System
function

FMEA date

Type of FMEA

Responsibility
and
completion
date

of

Action
taken

S
E
V

O
C
C

Action results

pages

D
E
T

R
P
N

CD-124
Appendix E

Occurrence

Detection

RPN

Design
verification

Figure E.4 A design FMEA form.

Suppliers affected

Other areas involved

Prepared by

Potential
cause(s)
of failure

FMEA date (original)


Revision

Severity

Potential
effect(s)
of failure

Subassembly no./name

Potential
failure
mode

Final assembly no./name

Part function

Part number
Part name
Recommended
action(s)

Potential failure mode and effects analysis (design FMEA)


Responsibility
and
completion
date

RPN
Detection
Occurrence

Severity

Actions
taken

Action results

FMEA Forms
CD-125

Failure
mode

System/
assembly

Product

Failure effects

User

Causes

Validation

O
C
C

S
E
V

D
E
T

R
P
N

of

Recommended
action

Page

Date

Figure E.5 A design FMEA form.

Design
function

Part
Design engineer

Name

System

Action
taken

Responsibility

pages

CD-126
Appendix E

Failure
mode

System/
assembly

Product

Failure effects

User

Causes

Validation

O
C
C

S
E
V

D
E
T

R
P
N

of

Recommendations

Page

Date

Figure E.6 A process FMEA form.

Process
function

Part
Design engineer

Name

System

Action
taken

pages

Responsibility

FMEA Forms
CD-127

Failure
mode

Failure effects

System/
assembly

Vehicle

Figure E.7 A design FMEA form.

Process
function
User S C U L E

Class
Cause(s)

Design
rational/
validation
certification

of

Responsibility

Page

Part assy no.

Date

DESIGN FMEA
Design engineer

Name

System

Status/
target
date

CD-128
Appendix E

Failure
mode

Date

Local/
process

System/
assembly

Failure effects

Figure E.8 A process FMEA form.

Process
function

Name

System

S C U L E

Class
Cause(s)

PROCESS FMEA

Validation
certification

Page

Responsibility

of

Manufacturing engineer

Part assy no.

Status/
target
date

FMEA Forms
CD-129

Occurrence

Detection

RPN

Design
verification

Figure E.9 A process FMEA form.

Suppliers affected

Other areas involved

Prepared by

Potential
cause(s)
of failure

FMEA date (original)


Revision

Severity

Potential
effect(s)
of failure

Subassembly no./name

Potential
failure
mode

Final assembly no./name

Part function

Part number
Part name
Recommended
action(s)

Responsibility
and
completion
date

Potential failure mode and effects analysis (process FMEA)


RPN
Detection
Occurrence
Severity

Actions
taken

Action results

CD-130
Appendix E

Potential
failure
mode

Potential
effect(s) of
failure

C
R
I
T

Potential
cause(s)
mechanism(s)
of
failure
O
C
C
U
R
Current
design
controls

D
E
T
E
C
T

R
P
N

Recommended
action(s)

Figure E.10 The recommended standard design form for the automotive industry.

Item/
function

Core team

Model year

S
E
V

Key date

Component

Design responsibility

System

Subsystem

FMEA number

Responsibility
and target
completion
date

FMEA date (Orig.)

Prepared by

Page

Action
taken

S
E
V

O
C
C

Action results

Rev.

of

D
E
T

R
P
N

FMEA Forms
CD-131

Purpose/
function

Requirements

S
E
V

C
R
I
T
Potential
cause(s)
mechanism(s)
of
failure

O
C
C
U
R
Current
process
controls

D R
E P
T N
E
C
T
Recommended
action(s)

Figure E.11 The recommended standard process form for the automotive industry.

Potential
failure
mode

Potential
effect(s) of
failure

Key date

Model year

Core team

Process responsibility

Item

FMEA number

Responsibility
and target
completion
date
Action
taken

FMEA date (Orig.)

Prepared by

Page
Rev.

S
E
V

O
C
C

Action results

of

D
E
T

R
P
N

CD-132
Appendix E

Circuit
location
(9)

Function(s)
Potential
Enter the
&
failure
part/component
number/name specification(s) mode(s)
(11)
(12)
(10)

Figure E.12 A design FMCA form.

Part number. Enter the part number under consideration.


Assembly number. Enter the number on the part of drawing or part list.
Responsible engineer. Enter the name of the responsible engineer.
Production release date. Enter the date the product is to be released
for production.
(5) Page. Enter the FMCA page number.
(6) Date. Enter the date the page was worked on. Or, enter the revision
date, if it is a revised FMCA.
(7) Line number. Identify the part for which the FMCA is to be conducted.
(8) Cross reference number. Enter the number if there is a cross
reference with other parts or assemblies.
(9) Circuit location. Describe the location of the part on the circuit.
(10) Enter the part/component number/name. Enter the appropriate name.
(11) Function(s) and specification(s). Describe the function the part is to
perform and the specification it is to meet. Make the description as
clear and concise as possible. Be sure you include all functions.
Include pertinent information about the product specification,
such as operating current range, operating voltage range, operating
environment and everything else that is applicable.

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Cross
Line
number reference
number
(7)
(8)

U
N
S
A
F
E
(14)

Base failure
rate B

S
E
Cause(s)
Internal or
V
of
external
failure countermeasures E
R
(15)
(controls)
I
(16)
T
Y (18)
(17)

(20)

(19)

(21)

Risk
priority
number (RPN)

(Continued)

(12) Potential failure mode(s). A failure mode is a design flaw or change


in the product that prevents it from functioning properly. The typical
failure modes are a short circuit, open circuit, leak loosening. The
failure mode is expressed in physical tems of what the customer will
experience.
(13) System effect. The system effect is what a system or module might
experience as a result of a failure mode. List all conceivable effects,
including unsafe conditions or violations of government regulations.
A typical system effect is a system shut-down or a failure of a
section of the product.
(14) Unsafe. Enter 0 for unsafe end product condition.
(15) Cause of failure. The root cause (not the symptom) is the real cause.
Examples: Insufficient/inacccurate voltage, firmware errors, missing
instructions on drawings.
(16) Internal or external countermeasures (controls). Identify the controls
and/or measures established to prevent or detect the cause of the
failure mode. Examples: Perform a derating analysis, perform
transient testing, perform specific testing, identify specific inspection
and manufacturing specifications.

System
effect
(0=unsafe
condition)
(13)

Failure mode
ratio

Production release date (4)


pages
Page (5)
of
Date (6)
Effectiveness

Part number (1)


Assembly number (2)
Responsible engineer (3)

FMEA Forms
CD-133

Circuit
location
(9)

Function(s)
Enter the
and
part/component
number/name specification(s)
(11)
(10)

Potential
System
failure
effect
mode(s) (0 = unsafe
(12)
condition)
(13)

Figure E.12 A design FMCA form.

(17) Severity. An estimate of how severe the subsystem and/or the end
product will behave as a result of a given failure mode. Severity
levels are being scaled from 1 to 10. Number 10 is to be used for
a definite unsafe condition. Number 0 is to be used for a negligible
severity (nuisance). Usually this rating, at this stage, is a very
subjective rating.
(18) Base failure rate (B). A subjective estimate of failure rate
(probability of failure in a billion hours). This is also called inherent
failure rate.
(19) Failure ratio. A subjective estimate of failure rate (probability of
failure in a billion hours). A subjective likelihood in comparison to
the other failure modes. The sum of all failure rates for a part/
component should be equal to 10 percent.

CrossLine
number reference
number
(7)
(8)

of

pages

Base failure
rate B

(20)

(19)

(21)

Risk
priority
number (RPN)

(20) Effectiveness. A subjective estimate of how effectively the


prevention or detection measure eliminates potential failure models.
A typical ranking is the following:
1 = The prevention or detection measure is foolproof.
23 = Probability of failure occurrence is low.
46 = Probability of occurrence is high.
79 = Probability of occurrence is high.
10 = Very high probability. The prevention/detection
is ineffective.
(21) Risk priority number (RPN). The product of severity, base failure
rate, failure mode ratio, and effectiveness.

S
E
U Cause(s)
Internal or
V
N
of
external
E
S
failure countermeasures R
A
(15)
(controls)
I
F
(16)
T
E
Y (18)
(14)
(17)

Page (5)
Date (6)

Responsible engineer (3)

Production release date (4)

Assembly number (2)

Part number (1)

Failure mode
ratio

(Continued)

Effectiveness

CD-134
Appendix E

Enter the
part/component
number/name
(13)

Operation
steps
(14)

Potential
failure
mode(s)
(15)

Figure E.13 A process FMCA form.

(1) Operation name. Enter the name of the operation.


(2) Workstation. Enter the name or number of the workstation.
(3) Responsible engineer. Enter the name of the responsible engineer.
(4) Subassembly number. Enter the subassembly name or number.
(5) Supplier. Indicate where the process is performed.
(6) Original date. Enter the date that the FMCA is due and/or completed.
(7) Production release date. Enter the date the product is to be released
for production.
(8) Page. Enter the FMCA page number.
(9) Revise date. Enter the date of the revision.
(10) Line number. Identify the part for which the FMCA is to be conducted.
(11) Cross-reference number. Enter the number if there is a crossreference with other parts or assemblies.
(12) Circuit location. Describe the location of the part on the circuit.
(13) Enter the part/component number/name. Enter the appropriate name.
(14) List all steps of operation in the process. A good tool to use for
this is the process flow diagram.

Circuit
location
(12)

S
E
V
Internal or
PPM Effectiveness
E
external
(19)
(20)
R
countermeasures
I
(controls)
T
(17)
Y
(18)

Date (9)

Risk
priority
number (RPN)
(21)

Production release date (7)


pages
Page (8)
of

(Continued)

(15) Potential failure mode(s). A process-related failure mode is a


deviation from specification caused by a change in the variables
influencing the process. Examples: Damaged board, misaligned,
discolored, missing, bent, and so on.
(16) Cause of failure. The root cause (not the symptom) is the real cause.
Examples: Transient, human error, machine out of tolerance, ESD
equipment failure.
(17) Internal or external countermeasures (controls). Identify the controls
and/or measures established to prevent or detect the cause of the
failure mode. Examples: Verify tooling to its specification, effective
incoming inspection, testing, and so on.
(18) Severity. A subjective estimate of how severe the subsystem and/or
the end product will behave as a result of a given failure mode.
Severity levels are being scaled from 1 to 10. Number 10 is to be
used for a definite unsafe condition. Number 0 is to be used for a
negligible severity (nuisance).

Cause(s)
of
failure
(16)

Original date (6)

Responsible engineer (3)

CrossLine
number reference
number
(10)
(11)

Subassembly number (4)


Supplier (5)

Operation name (1)


Workstation (2)

FMEA Forms
CD-135

Circuit
location
(12)

Operation
steps
(14)

Potential
failure
mode(s)
(15)

Cause(s)
of
failure
(16)

The prevention or detection is foolproof.


Probability of failure occurrence is low.
Probability of occurrence is moderate.
Probability of occurrence is high.
Very high probability. The prevention/detection
measure is ineffective.

(21) Risk priority number (RPN). The product of severity, PPM, and
effectiveness.

1 =
23 =
46 =
79 =
10 =

(19) PPM. Is the percent failure per 1 million parts.


(20) Effectiveness. A subjective estimate of how effectively the
prevention or detection measure eliminates potential failure
models. A typical ranking is the following:

Enter the
part/component
number/name
(13)

Figure E.13 A process FMCA form.

Line
Crossnumber reference
(10)
number
(11)

S
E
V
Internal or
E
external
R
countermeasures I
(controls)
T
(17)
Y
(18)

Page (8)
Date (9)

Workstation (2)
Responsible engineer (3)

PPM Effectiveness
(19)
(20)

of

Production release date (7)

Subassembly number (4)


Supplier (5)
Original date (6)

Operation name (1)

Risk
priority
number (RPN)
(21)

pages

(Continued)

CD-136
Appendix E

Defect
definition

Cause
category

Figure E.14 An FMEA and causal analysis form.

Case
number

Cause
definition

Stage
created

O
C
C

S
E
V

FMEA date
Page

Type of FMEA

Prepared BY
D
E
T

of

R
P
N

Recommended
action

pages

FMEA Forms
CD-137

Cause
category

Cause
definition

Stage
created

Effect
of
failure

Figure E.15 An FMEA and value engineering analysis form.

*Total dollars for failure = Unit cost of failure  occurrence

Defect
definition

Unit
cost of
failure

O
C
C

S
E
V

D
E
T

R
P
N

Prepared by

Case
number

FMEA date
Page

Type of FMEA

Total
dollars
for failure*

of

Recommended
action

pages

CD-138
Appendix E

Appendix F
Guidelines for RPN
Calculations and Different
Scales

his appendix provides some guidelines for RPN calculations based


on different scales. The scales may be modified depending on the
industry and the application.

CD-139

 or  1 in 10,000

210 in 10,000

1125 in 10,000

2650 in 10,000

 50 in 10,000

Rank*

1  very low

2  Iow or minor

3  moderate or
significant

4  high

5  very high

*All the guidelines and rankings may be changed to reflect specific situations.

S  Severity

D  Detection

Major risk 25125

Major risk 53125

O  Occurrence

Moderate risk 724

Moderate risk 1452

95%
Minor risk 16

Where:

 50 in 100,000

26 to 50 in 100,000

11 to 25 in 100,000

2 to 10 in 100,000

 or  1 in 100,000

Medical
devices

Major risk 9125

Moderate risk 38

Minor risk 12

99%

Interpretation of RPN = S  O  D

 50 in 1 million

26 to 50 in 1 million

11 to 25 in 1 million

2 to 10 in 1 million

 or  1 in 1 million

Electronics or
semiconductor
industry

Minor risk 113

90%

Mechanical or
electromechanical
industry

Table F.1 Numerical guidelines for 15 scale in occurrence, detection, and severity.

 or  1 in 10

 or  1 in 50

Common scale

Catastrophic

High

Significant

Minor

None

General
guidelines
for severity

Major risk 64125

Moderate risk 1863

Minor risk 117

 or  1 in 500

 or  1 in 2000

 or  1 in 10,000

Automotive
industry

CD-140
Appendix F

Infrequent
2 to 10 per 104 to 106

Moderate
11 to 25 per 104 to 106

Frequent to high
26 to 50 per 104 to 106

Very high to catastrophic


 50 per 104 to 106

2  low or minor

3  moderate or
significant

4  high

5  very high or
catastrophic

Detectable before
service is released

Probability of
detection

Safety-related catastrophic
failures

Loss of function

Gradual performance
degradation

Undetectable until
catastrophe occurs

Detectable only by
customer and/or
during service

Detectable before
reaching the
customer

Product operable at reduced Detectable after


performance
release but before
production

Minor nuisance

Degree of severity

*All the guidelines and rankings may be changed to reflect specific situations.

Rare
 1 per 104 to 106

Probability of occurrence
or frequency

1  very low or
none

Rank*

Table F.2 Word description for 15 scale for design FMEA.

Very high

High

Moderate or significant

Low or minor

Very low to none

Likelihood of the defect or defective


product reaching the customer
Guidelines for RPN Calculations and Different Scales
CD-141

Moderate
11 to 25 per 104 to 106
or about once every
two weeks

Frequent to high
26 to 50 per 104 to 106
or almost every week

Very high to catastrophic No build condition. Line shut


down; safety-related or
 50 per 104 to 106 or
every other day or more catastrophic.

3  moderate or
significant

4  high

5  very high or
catastrophic

Detectable after
release to
production

Detectable before
product is released

Probability of
detection

*All the guidelines and rankings may be changed to reflect specific situations.

Undetectable until
catastrophe occurs

Detectable only by
More than 5070 percent no
customer and/or
build condition. Requires high
operator efforts. High inefficiency, during service
low productivity. High scrap;
loss of function in field

Detectable before
Gradual product degradation;
reaching the
moderate inefficiency; reduced
productivity; operator starts to be customer
frustrated

Reduced product performance


and slow creeping in of
inefficiency

Infrequent
2 to 10 per 104 to 106
about once a month

2  low or minor

Minor nuisance; almost no


effects on products

Degree of severity

Rare
 1 per 104 to 106 or
less than once a year

Probability of occurrence
or frequency

1  very low or
none

Rank*

Table F.3 Word description for 15 scale for process FMEA.

Very high. No controls. No actions.


100 percent wrong parts built.

High. Very low control. Action taken


infrequently. 90 percent or above
parts out of specifications.

Moderate or significant or mediocre


control which is not very effective.
Action taken only  or  50 percent
of the time. Increased percentage
or above parts out of print.

Low or minor; very good control.


9095 percent of the time action
taken when process out of control
and parts within spec at all times.

Very low to none; outstanding control.

Likelihood of the defect or defective


product reaching the customer

CD-142
Appendix F

Frequent to high
26 to 50 per 104 to 106
or almost every week

Very high to catastrophic No repeat business. Take it back. Undetectable until Very high. No controls. No actions.
 50 per 104 to 106 or
Very heavy dissatisfaction level
catastrophe occurs 100 percent bad service.
every other day or more

4  high

5  very high or
catastrophic

*All the guidelines and rankings may be changed to reflect specific situations.

Operator frustration. Great


dissatisfaction. Needs to fix
it now. No possible repeat
business

Moderate inefficiency; reduced


productivity; operator starts
to be frustrated; aware of
problem. May or may not fix

Moderate, significant, or mediocre


control which is not very effective.
Action taken only 50 percent of the
time.

Detectable only by High. Very low control. Action taken


customer and/or
infrequently. Tight schedules and
during service
outside forces.

Detectable before
reaching the
customer

Low or minor; very good control.


9095 percent of the time action
taken when process out of control.

Moderate
11 to 25 per 104 to 106
or about once every
two weeks

Detectable after
release

3  moderate or
significant

Reduced service performance;


no rework. Minor inspection

Infrequent
2 to 10 per 104 to 106
about once a month

Likelihood of the defect or defective


product reaching the customer

Detectable before Very low to none; outstanding control.


service is released

Probability of
detection

2  low or minor

Minor nuisance; almost no


effects on service. Great job

Degree of severity

Rare
 1 per 104 to 106 or
less than once a year

Probability of occurrence
or frequency

1  very low or
none

Rank*

Table F.4 Word description for 15 scale for service FMEA.

Guidelines for RPN Calculations and Different Scales


CD-143

Very slight
effect

Slight effect

Minor effect

Moderate
effect

Significant
effect

Major effect

Extreme effect

Serious effect

Hazardous effect. Safety-relatedsudden failure. Noncompliance with


government regulation.

Potential hazardous effect. Able to stop product without mishap;


safety-related; time-dependent failure. Disruption to subsequent process
operations. Compliance with government regulation is in jeopardy.

Customer very dissatisfied. Extreme effect on process; equipment


damaged. Product inoperable but safe. System inoperable.

Customer dissatisfied. Major effect on process; rework/repairs on part


necessary. Product/process performance severely affected but
functionable and safe. Subsystem inoperable.

Customer experiences discomfort. Product/process performance


degraded, but operable and safe. Nonvital part inoperable.

Customer experiences some dissatisfaction. Moderate effect on


product/process performance. Fault on nonvital part requires repair.

Customer experiences minor nuisance. Minor effect on product/process


performance. Fault does not require repair. Nonvital fault always noticed.

Customer slightly annoyed. Slight effect on product or process


performance. Nonvital fault noticed most of the time.

Customer more likely will not notice the failure. Very slight effect on
product/process performance. Nonvital fault noticed sometimes.

No effect on product or subsequent processes.

Criteria

*All the guidelines and rankings may be changed to reflect specific situations.

10

No effect

Hazardous
effect

Rank*

Effect

Table F.5 Severity guideline for process FMEA (110 qualitative scale).

2. If the disagreement jumps one


category, then consensus must be
reached. Even with one person
holding out, total consensus must
be reached. No average, no
majority. Everyone in that team
must have ownership of the
ranking. They may not agree 100
percent, but they can live with it.

1. If the disagreement is an adjacent


category, average out the
difference. For example, if one
member says 5 and someone else
says 6, the ranking in this case
should be 6 (5 and 6 are adjacent
categories. Therefore 5  6  11,
11/2  5.5).

If the team has a disagreement in the


ranking value, the following may help.

If the numerical value falls between


two numbers, always select
the higher number.

Resolution

CD-144
Appendix F

Remote

Very slight

Slight

Low

Medium

Moderately high

High

Very high

Criteria
Failure unlikely. History shows
no failures.
Rare number of failures likely.
Very few failures likely.
Few failures likely.
Occasional number of failures likely.
Moderate number of failures likely.
Frequent high number of failures
likely.
High number of failures likely.
Very high number of failures likely.
Failure almost certain. History of
failures exists from previous or
similar designs.

Cpk

1.67

1.50

1.33

1.17

1.00

0.83

0.67

0.51

0.33

0.33

*All the guidelines and rankings may be changed to reflect specific situations.

10

Almost never

Almost certain

Rank*

Detection

Table F.6 Occurrence guideline for process FMEA (110 qualitative scale).

316

316

134

46

12.4

2.7

.46

.0063

.0068

.00058

CNF/1000

2. If the disagreement jumps one


category, then consensus must be
reached. Even with one person
holding out, total consensus must
be reached. No average, no
majority. Everyone in that team
must have ownership of the
ranking. They may not agree 100
percent, but they can live with it.

1. If the disagreement is an adjacent


category, average out the
difference. For example, if one
member says 5 and someone else
says 6, the ranking in this case
should be 6 (5 and 6 are adjacent
categories. Therefore 5  6  11,
11/2  5.5  6).

If the team has a disagreement in the


ranking value, the following may help.

If the numerical value falls between


two numbers, always select
the higher number.

Resolution

Guidelines for RPN Calculations and Different Scales


CD-145

High

Moderately high

Medium

Low

Slight

Very slight

Remote

No known controls available to detect the failure.

Remote likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Very slight likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Slight likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Low likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Medium likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Moderately high likelihood current controls will detect the


failure.

Good likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Very high likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Current controls almost always will detect the failure. Reliable


detection controls are known and used in similar processes.

Criteria

*All the guidelines and rankings may be changed to reflect specific situations.

10

Very high

Almost impossible

Rank*

Almost certain

Detection

Table F.7 Detection guideline for process FMEA (110 qualitative scale).

2. If the disagreement jumps one


category, then consensus must be
reached. Even with one person
holding out, total consensus must
be reached. No average, no
majority. Everyone in that team
must have ownership of the
ranking. They may not agree 100
percent, but they can live with it.

1. If the disagreement is an adjacent


category, average out the
difference. For example, if one
member says 5 and someone else
says 6, the ranking in this case
should be 6 (5 and 6 are adjacent
categories. Therefore 5  6  11,
11/2  5.5  6).

If the team has a disagreement in the


ranking value, the following may help.

If the numerical value falls between


two numbers, always select
the higher number.

Resolution

CD-146
Appendix F

Very slight
effect

Slight effect

Minor effect

Moderate
effect

Significant
effect

Major effect

Extreme effect

Serious effect

Hazardous effect. Safety-relatedsudden failure. Noncompliance with


government regulation.

Potential hazardous effect. Able to stop product/service without mishap.


Safety-related. Time-dependent failure. Disruption to subsequent process
operations. Compliance with government regulation is in jeopardy.

Customer very dissatisfied. Extreme effect on process/service; equipment


damaged. Product/service incomplete but safe. System incomplete.

Customer dissatisfied. Major effect on service; rework on service


necessary. Product/service performance severely affected but
functionable and safe. Subsystem incomplete.

Customer experiences discomfort. Product/process performance


degraded, but operable and safe. Nonvital service incomplete.

Customer experiences some dissatisfaction. Moderate effect on


product/service performance. Fault on nonvital part requires repair.

Customer experiences minor nuisance. Minor effect on product/service


performance. Fault does not require attention. Nonvital fault always noticed.

Customer slightly annoyed. Slight effect on product or process


performance. Nonvital fault noticed most of the time.

Customer more likely will not notice the failure. Very slight effect on
product/process performance. Nonvital fault noticed sometimes.

No effect on product or subsequent processes.

Criteria

*All the guidelines and rankings may be changed to reflect specific situations.

10

No effect

Hazardous
effect

Rank*

Effect

Table F.8 Severity guideline for service FMEA (110 qualitative scale).

2. If the disagreement jumps one


category, then consensus must be
reached. Even with one person
holding out, total consensus must
be reached. No average, no
majority. Everyone in that team
must have ownership of the
ranking. They may not agree 100
percent, but they can live with it.

1. If the disagreement is an adjacent


category, average out the
difference. For example, if one
member says 5 and someone else
says 6, the ranking in this case
should be 6 (5 and 6 are adjacent
categories. Therefore 5  6  11,
11/2  5.5  6).

If the team has a disagreement in the


ranking value, the following may help.

If the numerical value falls between


two numbers, always select
the higher number.

Resolution

Guidelines for RPN Calculations and Different Scales


CD-147

10

Almost never

Remote

Very slight

Slight

Low

Medium

Moderately high

High

Very high

Almost certain

Criteria
Failure unlikely. History shows
no failures.
Rare number of failures likely.
Very few failures likely.
Few failures likely.
Occasional number of failures likely.
Moderate number of failures likely.
Frequent high number of failures
likely.
High number of failures likely.
Very high number of failures likely.
Failure almost certain. History of
failures exists from previous or
similar designs.

Cpk

1.67

1.50

1.33

1.17

1.00

0.83

0.67

0.51

0.33

0.33

*All the guidelines and rankings may be changed to reflect specific situations.

Rank*

Detection

Table F.9 Occurrence guideline for service FMEA (110 qualitative scale).

>316

316

134

46

12.4

2.7

.46

.0063

.0068

.00058

CNF/1000

2. If the disagreement jumps one


category, then consensus must be
reached. Even with one person
holding out, total consensus must
be reached. No average, no
majority. Everyone in that team
must have ownership of the
ranking. They may not agree 100
percent, but they can live with it.

1. If the disagreement is an adjacent


category, average out the
difference. For example, if one
member says 5 and someone else
says 6, the ranking in this case
should be 6 (5 and 6 are adjacent
categories. Therefore 5  6  11,
11/2  5.5  6).

If the team has a disagreement in the


ranking value, the following may help.

If the numerical value falls between


two numbers, always select
the higher number.

Resolution

CD-148
Appendix F

10

Very high

High

Moderately high

Medium

Low

Slight

Very slight

Remote

Almost impossible

No known controls available to detect the failure.

Remote likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Very slight likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Slight likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Low likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Medium likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Moderately high likelihood current controls will detect the


failure.

Good likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Very high likelihood current controls will detect the failure.

Current controls almost always will detect the failure. Reliable


detection controls are known and used in similar processes.

Criteria

*All the guidelines and rankings may be changed to reflect specific situations.

Rank*

Almost certain

Detection

Table F.10 Detection guideline for service FMEA (110 qualitative scale).

2. If the disagreement jumps one


category, then consensus must be
reached. Even with one person
holding out, total consensus must
be reached. No average, no
majority. Everyone in that team
must have ownership of the
ranking. They may not agree 100
percent, but they can live with it.

1. If the disagreement is an adjacent


category, average out the
difference. For example, if one
member says 5 and someone else
says 6, the ranking in this case
should be 6 (5 and 6 are adjacent
categories. Therefore 5  6  11,
11/2  5.5  6).

If the team has a disagreement in the


ranking value, the following may help.

If the numerical value falls between


two numbers, always select
the higher number.

Resolution

Guidelines for RPN Calculations and Different Scales


CD-149

Appendix G
Guidelines for Designing the
Reasonably Safe Product

his appendix provides a summary of guidelines for designing the


reasonably safe product. Both design and legal considerations are
addressed. All areas identified are affected by the use of an appropriate FMEA.
1. Elements of production defect
The identification of the flaw or flaws relative to manufacturing or
physical property standards
The evidence that the failure or malfunction of the product is
directly attributable to the flaws
The relationship of the failure or malfunction to the expected
performance standards of the product
The causal link between the failure or malfunction and the injury
2. Elements of design defect
The identification of the design flaw or flaws which occasioned the
injury
The delineation of alternative design features
The evaluation of such alternative design features relative to the
expected performance standards of the product as well as
Their effect upon the subsequent usefulness of the product
Their effect upon the subsequent cost of the product

CD-151

CD-152

Appendix G

The comparison of this product with other similar products


The causal link between the design deficiency and the injury
3. Components of an active system design
Foreseeable product elements
Assembly
Testing
Shipping
Communications
Installation
Inspection
Maintenance
Service
Performance
Foreseeable product environment
Foreseeable product users
Foreseeable product uses
4. The product as a system
Component integrity
Assembly consistency
Interface compatibility
Performance and safety standards
Component specifications
Product specifications
Testing: performance, environment, failure
5. Procedure for system design safety
Identify
Product environments
Product users
Product uses
Postulate
Hazards and estimate

Guidelines for Designing the Reasonably Safe Product

CD-153

Probability of occurrence
Seriousness of harm
Delineate
Design, production, testing alternatives
Installation, maintenance, service procedures
Effective communications
6. To reduce harm
Evaluate
Alternatives relative to performance, utility, and costs of product
Incorporate
Appropriate alternatives, procedures, communications
7. Product safety audit
The team
Design, production, quality control, testing, service, legal counsel, technical writing, marketing, safety assurance
The process
Stages
Concept
Prototype
Pilot line
Review
Claims
Complaints
Service reports
Injury data
Court decisions
Incorporate
External and internal standards
Considerations
Product components and features
a. Human factors
b. Foreseeable misuses
c. Warnings and instructions

CD-154

Appendix G

Results
Material and component selection
a. Production methods
b. Design features
c. User communications
d. Production testing
e. Field testing
f. Failure reporting
8. Design and warnings
Design out the hazard; if not
Guard against the hazard; if not
Warn against the hazard
9. Warning design
Must communicate
Type of hazard
Magnitude of risk
Action to minimize risk
10. Warnings: intrinsic elements
Fundamental
Identification of the need
Objective
Colors
Print type
Durability
Symbols
Format
Subjective
Signal words (danger, warning, caution)
Content
Languages
Size
Locations

Guidelines for Designing the Reasonably Safe Product

11. Documentation
Preparation
Considers adverse use
Develops and maintains comprehensive product history
Responses to unfavorable reports
Establishes responsibility for control
Ease of access
Retention
Assistance in design review
Meet legal requirements
a. Statutes of repose
b. Useful safe life
Guidance in litigation
12. Documenting the reasonably safe product
Hazard and risk data
Historical
Field or laboratory
Causation analysis
Design safety formulation
Fault-tree
Failure modes
Effects analysis
Warnings and instruction formulation
Methodology for development and selection
Standards
In-house
Voluntary
Mandated
Quality assurance program
Methodology for procedure selection
Performance of product in use
Reporting procedures
Follow-up data acquisition and analysis
Recall
Retrofit
Instruction and warnings modification

CD-155

CD-156

Appendix G

Decision-making methodology
The how and who of the process
13. Communications
Warnings/instructions
Written for user
Communicated directly to user
Warranties/disclaimers
Legally correct
Communicated directly to buyer
Advertising/catalogs/sales talk
Consistent with specifications, warranties, contracts
Basis of the bargain
14. Lessons from the law
Design must
Account for reasonably foreseeable product misuse
Acknowledge human frailties and actual users
Function in true environment of product use
Eliminate or guard against the hazards
Not substitute warnings for effective design
15. Legal bases for liability
Designer/engineernegligence
Manufacturer/assembler/sellernegligence
Express warranty/misrepresentation
Strict liability

Appendix H
Linkages of FMEA

FMEA LINKAGES:
CONCEPT/SYSTEMDESIGNPROCESS
Concept FMEA
Input information
Customer requirements
Regulatory requirements
Corporate requirements
a. The input information generates the preliminary design specifications, which in turn generate:
* Product/service specific QFDs with technical specifications
ranked by customer wants
* Preliminary requirements for the concept FMEA (formal
beginning of concept/system FMEA)
* Preliminary Parameter Design for targets and system performance
* Evaluation of historical performance information
* Evaluation and/or conducting benchmarking
Output deliverables
Specific system/subsystem or component design specifications
Specific design specifications
GDT information

CD-157

CD-158

Appendix H

a. Validation of criteria through:


* Engineering specifications
* Reliability targets and robustness needs
* Imperatives
* Recommendations for new generic testing now required
DVP input
* Program target values or recommendations
* Program target values or recommendations
* Recommendations for new generic process controls

Design FMEA
Input
Historical design performance information including reliability
data/tests
Block/boundary diagram
P-diagram
Specific system/subsystem or component design specifications
Specific design specifications
GDT information
Validation of criteria through:
a. Engineering specifications
b. Reliability targets and robustness needs
c. Imperatives
d. Recommendations for new generic testing now required
DVP input
e. Design verification methods and schedule
f. Interface matrix
Output deliverables
Prototype control plan
Design information related to potential strategies
Potential critical and or significant characteristics
Reliability and robustness checklist
New design verification specifications; test methods or revised
based on FMEA analysis
Other recommended action for future products or programs
Target performance; review and validation

Linkages of FMEA

CD-159

Process FMEA
Input
Potential critical and/or significant characteristics
Prototype control plans
Characteristic matrix
Process flow and specification information
P-diagram engineering specification tests and requirements
Historical manufacturing/service performance information
Output deliverables
Design and reliability sign-off
Confirmed critical and significant characteristics
Safety sign-off
Production control plans
Pre production control plans
Recommended manufacturing/service actions for product/service
robustness
Other recommended actions for future products or programs
Special note 1: To maximize the FMEA meeting the leader of the team
must know how to handle questions. That means that the leader of any
FMEA team must be able to draw input from all and also be able to guide
the team participant to the set goal. The following format is a general template to follow.
Types of question

Engage the audience


Ensure dialogue and participation
Maintain involvement
Invite additional (as needed) participants
Probe further

Examples
Will someone explain what a histogram
shows?
How do you do that today?
Does anyone have a different opinion?
Cary, you look troubled by that. What
do you think? What are you thinking?
Stephen, do you agree with what
Christine just said?
Lets see a show of hands, how many
have created a Pareto chart?
Could you say more about that?
Would someone else volunteer an
example?
Who havent we heard from yet? Or
this may be rephrased in a more
proactive form by asking: Carla, we
have not heard from you, how do you
feel about what has been said?

CD-160

Appendix H

Draw out participants viewpoints,


their experience, knowledge, skills
and so on
Have participants discuss the issues
and concerns with each other (if necessary, sub-divide them into smaller
teams)

Would someone explain that to the


group in your own words?
Jamie, could you come to the flip
chart (or overhead projector) and
draw that model for the team?
Have you seen similar situations at
your plant? In your department?
What do you agree or disagree with
regarding that? Why?
Does anyone have an example of
FMEA being used effectively?

Check for understanding


Reinforce understanding
Stimulate thinking
Clarify information
Have participants verbalizeas
much as possibleconnections and
learning points
Draw out participation

What questions do you have about


this?
How would that apply in your department?
Tell me more.
Oh?
Can you give us an example?
Who else has seen that?
Timothy, what do you think?
Jamie, would you agree with that?

Check for agreement

How would you modify that in order


to be able to support the statement?

Build consensus

Who cannot agree with that recommendation?


What exactly makes you say that?
What can we do to resolve the problem?
Can you explain why?
Debrief the discussion and/or task at
hand
Obtain participants reactions to the
activityencourage them to be honest and forthcoming without any
threat or retaliation

What were your concerns?


What were you thinking half way
through the task?
What went well? What went wrong or
not so well?
What would you do differently?
What learning will you take back?
How did that make you feel?

Refocus participation
Divert disruptive participation

Can you summarize what your concern is?


Can someone?
What if we capture it on the parking lot so that we can move on?

Linkages of FMEA

Obtain a process check


Keep the session on schedule
Evaluate both progress and learning

CD-161

What questions are there before we


move on?
Does anyone need another minute to
complete your task?
How are we doing? What did you
learn?

Special note 2: As already mentioned, it is essential for the DFMEA


and the PFMEA to have a block diagram and a process flow diagram before
conducting the FMEA. Whereas the block diagram is very easy to draw, the
process flow diagram for most practitioners presents a difficult task. The
difficulty is due to the level of detail that is necessary for an effective
PFMEA. The example in Figure H.1 is for a coffee chopper. The reader will
notice that it is indeed very detailed and one may take a long time to conduct an FMEA for each of the functions.
However, in the flow one will notice that the arrows are of two distinct
kinds: (1) bold and (2) light. The reason for the distinction is that the bold
arrows are primary functions and the FMEA would indeed contribute
value. On the other hand, the secondary functions present items that may be
of value in doing the FMEA. This is a very critical decision and it is up to
the team to define all the appropriate functions/activities of the process. It
is this reason why the process flow diagram is very critical to the PFMEA
and somewhat difficult to draw.
Special note 3: The ultimate goal of any FMEA is to eliminate or at
least reduce the failure. If the failure is eliminated, then the FMEA is obviously effective. However, if the failure is reduced, then the team performing the FMEA must plan for implementation and controlling the design
and/or process. There are at least three issues here:
1. Just because one thinks something should be done does not mean it
will. Part of the plan must be to ensure it gets carried out.
2. One study of strategic failures identified the poor implementation
of the strategy as the reason for failure rather than the strategy.
3. Turning the plan into action requires that people be assigned the
specific tasks to be carried out and a performance monitoring
system be put in place to ensure they do them.

Channel
Rotation

Bean
impacts

Chop
Beans

Spinning shaft

Accept
Hand

Accept
Beans

Desired amount

Dampen
Vibrations

Contain
Chopping

Seal
Power

Reach
Outlet

Accept
Grip

Measure
Beans
Hold
Beans

Enclose
Impact
Noise

Chopped level

Chopping
Done?

Convert
Elec. to
Rotary

Connect
to Outlet

User ready

Figure H.1 Process flow diagram for coffee chopper.

Open to clean
Cleaning
device

Hand force
Hand

110V AC

Hand grip

Open chamber

Unmeasured
beans

Enclose
Power
Noise

Support
Mill

Open for
Cleaning

Hold
Coffee

Safe power
to motor

Force into wall


Hand

Actuate
Power

Seal for
Chop

Clean
Grit

Stuck coffee

Unseal
from
Chopping

Safe to unseal

Disconnect
from
Outlet

Sealed for chopping

Close for
Use

Route
Pour

Retract
from
Outlet

Motor caused
noise into air

Impact caused
noise into air
Vibration into
support surface

Closed from clean

Grit

Coffee

Hand

Hand force

CD-162
Appendix H

Linkages of FMEA

CD-163

A basic control system may be viewed as follows:

Goals

Plans

Implement plans
(actions)

Measurement of
performance

Desired results

Do results meet
goals (plans)?

Yes

No

Continue actions

Are deviations
major?

Yes

No

Stop action
deviations too great

Continue action after


refinements

Figure H.2 A basic control system.

CD-164

Appendix H

Linkages of a typical boundary diagram, P-diagram,


and interface matrix, DFMEA and PFMEA
Problem: Wall mounted assembly
Chassis assembly

Screw (chassis assembly


to enclosure assembly)

Enclosure complete

Hanging bracket

Screw (support brackets


to enclosure sides)

Support brackets

Screw (hanging bracket to


enclosure sides)

Ceiling

Figure H.3 Boundary diagram of the mounted enclosure assembly.

Linkages of FMEA

CD-165

Noise Factors:
Manufacturing variation: Enclosure dimensions; bracket dimensions; enclosure material
properties; bracket material properties
Customer Usage: Number of cycles installation
Environmental: Humidity; high temperature (use); low temperature (warehouse storage)
Neighboring system: See interface matrix
Changes over time: Screw thread/hole relationship; bracket angle (weight);
enclosure warp or rot

Response (Y):
Signal factor
(M)

Wall mounted
enclosure assembly

(Ideal Function)
Secure heated unit
mount to intended
surface

Control Factors:

Error States:

Design reviews
FEA modeling
Development and testing
Surrogate design
Material selection
NVH testing
Durability testing

Does not secure heater unit to


intended surface
Partially withstands some
downward force
Inoperative system damaged wall
Customer dissatisfaction
Noncompliance with regulatory
requirements
High repair cost
Reduction in support
Damage to interior wall

Figure H.4 Wall mounted enclosure P-diagram.

CD-166

Appendix H

Screw
(hanging
bracket to
enclosure
Enclosure sides)
2

Enclosure
Screw (hanging
bracket to
enclosure sides)

Screw
(support
brackets
to
Hanging enclosure
bracket
sides)

1 2

-1

Support
brackets
2

Screw
(Chassis
assembly
to
enclosure
assembly

-1

Chassis
assembly
-1

Wall

-1 -1

-1

-1

-1 2

-1

-1

-1

-1

Hanging bracket
Screw (support
brackets to
enclosure sides)

-1
2

Support brackets
Screw (Chassis
assembly
to enclosure
assembly)

-1 2

Chassis assembly
Wall

P Physically touching

E Energy Transfer

I Information exchange

M Material exchange

Where 2  necessary for function (Required items)


1  beneficial, but not necessary for functionality (Desired items)
0  does not affect functionality (Indifferent)
-1  causes negative effects but does not prevent functionality (Undesired items)
-2  must be prevented to achieve functionality (Detrimental items)

Figure H.5 Wall mounted enclosure interface matrix.

-1

incorrect
fasteners
specified

incorrect
geometry
for case
mounting
holes

Incorrect
geometry
for case
mounting
surface;

YC Incorrect
geometry
for case
mounting
surface;

Figure H.6 Wall mounted enclosuredesign.

Possible
product return;
Potential
hazard if
continued use
(9);

Heater
Customer
cannot be dissatisfaction
secured
Product return
(7)

Secure heater unit to


intended wall surface [To
with stand some
downward force; to
withstand some
sustained wait; to meet
regulatory requirements

Heater
comes
loose, over
time

Potential
Failure
mode

Design Function

Use of carry
over fasteners;
load drop ABC
test; shear test
CDE test;
thermal cycling
test XYZ
Use of carry
over fasteners;
load drop ABC
test; shear test
CDE test;
thermal cycling
test XYZ
Use of carry
over fasteners;
load drop ABC
test; shear test
CDE test;
thermal cycling
test XYZ

Potential effect Crit Sev Potential Occ Design control


causes of
and or method
failure

Prepared By: Diomidis

Team: The Thisvians

Involvement of others:

Release Date: January 20, 2003

Design Responsibility: Cary Stamatis

24

22

23

Historic data indicates


that no action is required
at this time

Historic data indicates


that no action is required
at this time

Historic data indicates


that no action is required
at this time

Responsibility/complition
date

Page __1____ of __2___ pages

Part Name: X-1234 - ABC

FMEA Rev. Date:

FMEA Date: January 17, 2003

Det RPN Recommended action

Design FMEA
Model/ Product:

System/Subsystem name: Wall mount enclosure

Action
taken

(Continued)

Sev Occ Det RPN

Linkages of FMEA
CD-167

YC Incorrect
case
material
specified
YC Incorrect
glue
specified

YC Customer
placed
heavy
load on
top of unit

YC Customer 3
did not
follow
defined
method
(including
wall
surface) to
install
heater
YC Incorrect
2
fasteners
specified
torque

YC Incorrect
case
hardness
specified

Figure H.6 Wall mounted enclosuredesign.

Internal
9
components
are exposed
noncompliance
with
regulations
XYZT(9)

38

Perform accelerated
tests

23
Use of carry
over fasteners;
load drop ABC
test; shear test
CDE test;
thermal cycling
test XYZ
38
Rotor of fan
locked test
123; Use of
carry over
fasteners; load
drop ABC test;
shear test CDE
test; thermal
cycling test XYZ

Historic data indicates


that no action is required
at this time

Investigate adding label S. Stamatis 4/2003 and


at attachment surface to Carla 4/2003
remind user of
installation requirements;
review user guide and
revise as required
1

T. Stamatis 4/2003

C. Stamatis 5/2003

Jamie 4/2003

C. Robinson 3/2003

load drop ABC 38 1


Perform accelerated
test; shear test
tests
CDE test;
thermal cycling
test XYZ
Supplier
3 108 Perform accelerated
recommendation
tests
for glue type;
Load drop XYZ
25 4 Review user guide and
Rotor of fan
revise as required
locked- test 123;
load drop test
ABC; shear test
CDE; thermal
cycling test XYZ

load drop ABC


test; shear test
CDE test;
thermal cycling
test XYZ

(Continued)

CD-168
Appendix H

YC Customer
did not
follow
defined
method
(including
wall
surface)
to install
heater
YC Customer
placed
heavy
load on
top of unit

Figure H.6 Wall mounted enclosuredesign.

Operation
10
Sudden
separation hazard (10);
Noncompliance
from wall
with BEAB
regulations

YC Incorrect
fasteners
specified
length

Rotor of fan
locked- test 123;
load drop test
ABC; shear test
CDE; thermal
cycling test xyx

23

28
Rotor of fan
locked- test 123;
load drop test
ABC; shear test
CDE; thermal
cycling test xyx

Use of carry
over fasteners;
load drop ABC
test; shear test
CDE test;
thermal cycling
test XYZ

Review user guide and


C. Robertson and S.
revise as required;
Stamatis 4/2003
Investigate adding label
at attachment surface to
remind user of
installation requirements

Historic data indicates


that no action is required
at this time

60 Review user guide and


T. Stamatis 4/2003
revise as required;
Investigate adding label
at attachment surface to
remind user of
installation requirements

(Continued)

Linkages of FMEA
CD-169

Figure H.7 Example of process FMEA.

Rework
and
repair

No glue

Apply a continuous
bead of STU glue to
specified location
X bead width, Y
bead height
Nozzle fully
clogged

Process
sheets
visual aids
set up
procedures;
Obvious
operator
visual of
glue
application;
Obvious
visual at
subsequent
operations;
case will
spring open
after
release of
clamps

30

None at this
time

Action
taken

Concurrent signatures (optional):

Approval signatures (optional):

Page__1__ of __2___ pages

FMEA Rev. Date:

FMEA Date: January 31, 2003

Det RPN Recommended Responsibility/


action
completion date

Key production start up: February 10, 2003

Involvement of others:
Occ Current
Process
Controls

Prepared by: Diomidis

Team:

Crit Sev Potential


causes of
failure

Release Date: February 3, 2003

Manufacturing Responsibility:

Potential Potential
Failure
effect
mode

Model/Product;

Part Name:

Item/Function

Supplier involvement:

Process Name: Wall enclosure

Process FMEA

(Continued)

Sev Occ Det RPN

CD-170
Appendix H

Figure H.7 Example of process FMEA.

Container
empty

Low or no
pressure
Process
sheets
visual aids
set up
procedures;
Obvious
operator
visual of
glue
application;
Obvious
visual at
subsequent
operations;
case will
spring open
after
release of
clamps

Process
sheets
visual aids
set up
procedures;
Obvious
operator
visual of
glue
application;
Obvious
visual at
subsequent
operations;
case will
spring open
after
release of
clamps

20

40

Add low
pressure
sensor to cut
off pump or
gun

Add alarm to
container
pump and or
apply Poka
Yoke to the
process

Jamie 4/2003

Carla 5/2003

(Continued)

Linkages of FMEA
CD-171

Figure H.7 Example of process FMEA.

Intermittent
application

Process
sheets
visual aids
set up
procedures;
Obvious
operator
visual of
glue
application;
Obvious
visual at
subsequent
operations;
case will
spring open
after
release of
clamps
4

80

Review design Stephen Stamatis and


of nozzle and Timothy Stamatis 5/2003
surface to be
glued

(Continued)

CD-172
Appendix H

Appendix I
Example of a Concern Resolution,
Block (Boundary) Diagram,
Function Tree, and a P-Diagram
for a Spark Plug

CD-173

CD-174

Appendix I

Table I.1 Concern resolution.

Problem statement: Tracking between Zetec/sigma spark plug and boot to earth

What

Problem
description
What
(object)

IS

IS NOT

All Zetec
and sigma
engine

16v DOHC,
8v DOHC,
HCS, CVH

3 piece and
1 piece lead

one or the
other

Where Where
(on
object)

Differences

Possible causes
Changes

NONE
Zetec and sigma architecture: AYRF plug different
plug gap1.4 mm (higher
voltage required to generate
spark); Plug polarity1 and 2
ve polarity, 3 and 4 ve
polarity; unique boot design.
Harder rubber on HCS boot.
Loosernon supported seal
of boot onto Plug ceramic.
shorter physical contact
length; unique lead design.

List possible cause theories


1. 1.4mm gap requires higher voltage, thus stressing system more -Tracking. 2. Plugs 3 and 4 are
+ve polarity and require higher voltage, thus stressing system more -Tracking. 3. 3 and 4 less dielectric
strength due to positive polarity -Tracking. 4. Boot design has
different material and therefore
gives reduced dielectric sealing
effect at high mileage. 5. Boot
design has different dimensions
and therefore gives reduced
dialectric strength at high usage
6. Boot material deforms to
shape of plug and due to degradation of elasticity due to ageing does not (re)seal on new plug
Boot material loses elasticity and
does not (re)seal on new plug.
Now incorporated into above
point (6)

Tracking
Punctures
burning into
of the boot
the glaze of
or ceramic
the plug.
Burning of
the boot. Plug
not sparking.

Tracking burning into the


glaze of the plug. Burning
of the boot. Plug not
sparking

NONE

Bell-end boot design facilitates


contamination path into
boot/plug seal interface--
reduced dielectric seal

Cylinders 3
and 4 vertical
burn. Any
orientation
relative to the
engine. Over
the complete
length of the
boot/plug
interface

Positive polarity of spark.


Shorter leads.
Leads 1 and 2
un over the top of
cylinders 3 and 4.

NONE

Short 3 and 4 plug leads difficult


to remove, not allowing the
boot/plug seal to be twisted
apart prior to pulling apart --
boot damage -- reduced
dielectric strength

In vehicle testing (at


Lommel) may increase
the likelihood of dirt
contamination versus
Dyno testing

NONE

Fully enclosed (in cylinder head)


--ages thermally--6. No need
to test this theory, as it is now
aligned with item 6 (above).

DVP testing
Where
at Lommel:
(first
observed) 50,000 miles
up to 6
months
duration

Cylinders 1
and 2. One
particular
orientation

Dyno
testing:
600 hours

One
particular
market.
Hottest cells
inplants.
Dynotesting;
C170;CD162,
Zetec
upgrade
DVP testing
at Lommel
October 2002 After plug
When When
and lead
build (Zetec
(first
observed) introduction) replacement
Before plug
after lead
lead removal
removal.
When vehicle
is under load
Where
(seen
since)

Differences and changes

Obtain data
from X to
show is/is
not of NGK
plugs and
"Y' plugs

XYZ

What
(defect)

Get
Information

All markets

Material degradation
information
of X
versus
Dyno
From
corporate
and or
product
development

Fully enclosed (in cylinder head)


plug-- corona staining--
reduced dielectric effect.
Rejected on 1/30/03 meeting

Lack of silicon grease --


reduced dielectric effect

What

What
(pattern
since)

Stable

Increasing or
decreasing
trend

Breaking seal upon plug removal.


Rejected at 1/30/03 meeting

How
Big

How
many
affected

0.10%

 0.1% 
0.1%

Items 1 and 2 from above

What size

n/a

n/a

defects per 1
object
trend

Random and
or cyclical

11
Increasing

Appendix I

Lead

CD-175

Coil

Silicon
Grease

Underhood
temperature;
Underhood
pressure;
Underhood
humidity

Calibration
Spark Plug

Head

Fuel, air and


pressure and
temperature

Figure I.1 Block diagram.

Ask How?

Ask Why?

Spark plug

Produce
a spark

Only allow energy


to flow through
the center of the
electrode

Lead Boot

Provide dielectric
insulation between
the plug and head

Provide an air and


water tight seal to
the plug

Easy assembly of
lead-boot to plug

Allow lead-boot
to slide

Improve
dielectric seal

Exclude air
and water

Silicon
Grease

Figure I.2 Function tree.

Provide dielectric
seal to the lead
boot

CD-176

Appendix I

Control Factors:
Engagement of boot to plug
Internal diameter of the boot
Length of the seal of the boot
Amount of silicon grease in boot
Material composition of the boot
Plug gap
Finished diameter of the plug
Length of plug ceramic
Diameter of terminal stud
Variation in boot internal diameter over time

Input Signal:
Energy at coil

Coil/lead/grease/
plug/head

Ideal Function:
Energy at plug gap

Error State:
Tracking: Energy to
earth via plugs
interface to boot

Noise Factors:
System to system interaction: voltage demand
External environment: contamination of boot; contamination of plug
Piece to piece variation: variation in: engagement of boot to
plug; internal diameter of the boot; length of the seal of the
boot; amount of silicon grease in boot; material composition
of the boot; plug gap; glaze thickness of the plug; finished
diameter of the plug; surface finish of the plug; length of
plug ceramic; taper of plug seat; roll-over of plug;
concentricity of terminal stud; length of terminal stud;
diameter of terminal stud
Customer usage: Service not applying silicon grease to boots;
Method of replacing lead (coil connection versus plug fitment
first); amount of high load cycles by vehicles drivers; steam
cleaning of engine compartment; use of nonauthorized
service; number of lead removals
Wear out (degradation): variation in boot internal diameter
overtime Silicon grease and seal interface face dries out over
time; rubber degraded by temperature; rubber degraded by
temperature ozone; rubber degraded by U.V. light; rubber
degraded by fuel contact; rubber degraded by oil contact;
rubber degraded by coolant contact; plug gap erosion

Figure I.3 P-Diagram.