+

David Hume,
Liberty and Necessity
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Section VIII

+
Liberty and
Necessity
intractable dispute: Do we have free
will (liberty), or are choices
causally determined (necessity)?
Hume: Clear definitions of liberty
and necessity needed.
With definitions, dispute dissolves.

+
Introduction
Free will (liberty) and causal determinism (necessity)

The doctrine of liberty

Human beings have free will

The doctrine of necessity

aka, causal determinism
Pierre-Simon Laplace
n

Determinism: all events

causally determined by
antecedent conditions

Laplaces demon: knows laws

of nature and present state of
universe
n Laplace: Demon can predict
all future events.

Is a coin toss determined by

antecedent conditions?

The Clockwork Universe

Section VII, Part II quote (pg. 66 bottom)

Free will and determinism

n

Determinism: future events causally determined past events.

n

Coin tosses?

Compatibilism: Free will and determinism are compatible.

Incompatibilism: Free will and determinism are incompatible.

Compatibilism

Incompatibilism

Determinism

soft determinism

fatalism

Indeterminism

compatibilism

libertarianism

Randomness and freedom

n

Libertarianism: We are free

because determinism is false.
n But how do you know
determinism is false?

Quantum mechanics: 20th

century theory that allows
indeterminacy

Problem 1: Is randomness
freedom?

Problem 2: micro randomness

cancels out at macro level
n Casino example

+ Humes Enquiry,
The definition of necessity
Section VIII, Part I

Defining
determinism
Hume: It is obvious that decisions are
causally determined by antecedent
conditions. (p. 61)

The case for necessity

First argument: human nature
n

Humans share basic character.

n

Most of your actions would be performed by anyone in same

situation.
n

In-class experiment

So, there is a constant conjunction of antecedent conditions and

decisions.

Observer of human nature can predict these actions.

n

So, there is a habitual transition in the mind of an observer

between antecedent conditions and decisions.

+ Which is more likely to stay put in a public

square?
A bag full of money

A feather

Objection to first argument

Human nature doesnt account for everything.
n

People have different characters because of different:

n
n

upbringings and cultures

innate sentiments

In fact, even a single persons character changes throughout

her life.

So, human nature necessitates only certain actions.

The case for necessity

Second argument: peculiar character traits
n

If you know someones peculiar moral character, then their

actions become even more predictable.
n

Example: Humes honest and wealthy friend wont murder him

and steal stuff.

This shows:
n

If you include a deciders peculiar character in the antecedent

conditions, then even more actions are necessitated.

If you know the persons character, youll have a corresponding

habitual transition in your mind.

+ Which is more likely to give way?

The honest prison guard

The thick wall of your cell

Objection to second argument

Some decisions are unpredictable, even if you know
the decider.
n

Some decisions impossible to predict in advance, even

knowing the persons character.

Sometimes a person with an obliging disposition gives a

peevish answer.
n

Hume responds: Theres usually an obvious cause. E.g., he has

the toothache, or has not dined.

So, these actions at least arent necessitated by a persons

character and situation.

A digression about the weather

Questions: Could you have predicted where Hurricane Frances would hit
land? Why not?

The case for necessity

Third argument: a secret structure of parts
n

A coin toss is unpredictable, and so is the weather. But this is

due to the secret and complex arrangement of partsnot
lack of necessity.

When you account for every peculiarity of a persons

character, situation, fleeting motivations, etc., actions are
predictable and uniform.
n

Prediction is still impossible in practice, just like with coin tosses

and weather.

This shows:
n

When everything is accounted for, all actions are constantly

conjoined with antecedent conditions.

Someone who knew all the antecedent conditions would

habitually transition to an idea of the action.

Which is more predictable?

A person deciding what to wear

A tornado deciding on a path

+ Humes Enquiry,
The definition of liberty
Section VIII, Part I

What is meant by liberty?

n

Hypothetical liberty: a power

of acting or not acting,
according to the
determinations of the will; that
is, if we choose to remain at
rest, we may; if we choose to
move, we also may. (p. 63)

Does a prisoner in chains have

hypothetical liberty?

If your actions are causally

determined, do you?

Illustration: argument for

incompatibilism
1.

The laws of nature are not under your control.

2.

The conditions of the universe 1,000 years ago were not

under your control.

3.

If X is causally necessitated by factors outside of your

control, then X is not under your control.

4.

Therefore, if your action was causally determined by the

laws of nature and the conditions of the universe 1,000
years ago, then your action was not under your control.

Compatibilist response: reject

premise 3
n

Prisoner not leaving his cell: necessitated independently of

what he wants.

You not murdering your mother for profit, you not sticking
your hand in a fire: necessitated by affecting what you want.

Did you choose not to want to stab yourself in the eye? Did
you choose not to do it?

+ Humes Enquiry,
Necessity and Responsibility
Section VIII, Part II

Is necessity compatible with moral

responsibility?
n

You are responsible only for

what you can control. (?)

Humes critic: If your actions are

causally determined, then you
cannot control them.

Critic: If determinism is true,

then nobody is responsible.

Humes Response: Responsibility

is compatible with necessity.
n

If necessity is compatible with liberty, then it is compatible

with moral responsibility, too.
n

Drowning child example

Determinism is required for moral responsibility.

n

The more stable a persons disposition towards a bad deed, the

more harshly we judge.
If a persons actions dont reflect his character, then he isnt as
blameworthy.
p. 66 (top)

Is God morally responsible for Ted

Bundys actions?
n

Necessity seems to imply either:

1.

Bundy isnt to blame for his

actions.

2.

God is to blame for Bundys

actions.

Reply to 1: Even if Bundys actions

are part of Gods plan, Bundy
himself is still blameworthy.

Reply to 2: Its so boundless and

ocean of doubt, uncertainty, and
contradiction that it has been
hitherto to exceed all the power of
philosophy.