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Turkey between Introversion and

Regional Hegemony : From Ozal to


Davutoglu.
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Posted on August 26, 2014 by nick panayides in
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Nicos Panayiotides * Journalist- Visiting Lecturer of Political Studies American
College
Published (The Cyprus Journal of Sciences Vol 8/ 2010)
ABSTRACT
The aim of this article is to demonstrate Turkeys efforts to become a strong regional
power, using its capability to exert geopolitical influence. It analyzes Turkeys foreign
policy under the prism that Turkish politicians are very well aware, that USA needs
turkish support in the Middle East in order to promote its regional interests. Using as
case referrals the strategy of the Turkish President, Turgut Ozal, during the Gulf
crisis (1991), as well as the Grand Strategy of Turkey under the current minister of
Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Davutoglu, it is trying to illuminate the neo- ottoman model
to the turkish foreign policy and its consequences on the regional states, Greece and
Cyprus. More specifically, this article shows that Turkeys efforts to gain Regional
Hegemony runs at the expense of a fair solution of the Cyprus Problem.

Keywords: Regional Hegemony; New Ottoman Model; Pax Ottomana; Cyprus


Problem; Hegemonic Power

1. Introduction
The founder of the modern turkish state, Kemal Ataturk, having the full knowledge of
Turkeys weakness after World War I[1] and wanting to free his country from every
external binding related to the ottoman heritage, he proclaimed the doctrine of peace
in the country, peace in the world.[2] However, not all subsequent formers of turkish
foreign policy willingly adopted this doctrine. On the contrary, there were- and still
are- those politicians who are flirting with the countrys ottoman past and depending
on international coincidences, they want Turkey to adopt a more active presence and
role in the sub-system that belongs, with whatever this entails. Examples like these,
are the ex President and Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal[3], as well as the policy
followed by Turkeys governing party, of Justice and Development (AKP), with main
inspirer, the current minister of foreign affairs of Turkey, Ahmed Davutoglu. Before,
however, entering into an analytical record of the policy of these two men, we will try
to outline the post cold war environment in which Turkey found itself.
The enormous systemic change that came after the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the redistributions of power caused by it, brought Turkey face to face with new
challenges, new dilemmas, but also facing the need for the redefinition of its role and
interests in the international system. The threat which was in the northeast for over
fifty years eliminated or decreased. Now, the role of the turkish state as the basic
embankment of the West against soviet penetration into the Middle East
differentiated. It acquired borders with new states and was confronted with which
policy to follow against these states, with which it is culturally related. Some of the
countries which acquired their independence from the former USSR are considered to
be of Turkish descent and Ankara-did not- and does not hesitate to use this relation to
promote her influence on the area.[4] A number of analysts of that period have talked
about Ankaras neo-ottoman policy.
The changes in the international and regional distribution of power, after the collapse
of former USSR, were also reflected in other states with aspirations in the region, like
Iran. In addition, the enfeeblement of the power factors of the former Soviet Union
also reduced the capabilities of the client states, of which Russia acted as a
protector. States bordering with Turkey, as Syria, lost their main ally. At the same time
the Palestinians lost the possibility to manoeuvre between the superpowers and as a
result they were forced to accept the Oslo agreement (September 1993) .[5]
2. Turkeys Strategy after The Cold War
In between these developments, Turkey was called to make some important decisions
which would allow it to continue to cash, either way, its important geopolitical
position. Towards the end of the 80s and beginning of the 90s, Turgut Ozal tries to
underline again to the Americans the important geopolitical position of his country.[6]
Using as a means its Islamic identity, but also diverging from the traditional nonadventurist line of non expansion or intervention to surrounding states (Deringil,
1992), Turkey will move towards obtaining a new role in the area, the role of the
regional hegemon. Demonstrating his expansive aspirations, the Turkish politician
will declare in a Greek newspaper (May 1991) that The Dodecanese Islands was
never Greek, they belonged to the Ottoman Empire. If I had been in Ismet Inonus

place in 1944, i would have gone in and taken them. Turkey committed a historic
error in this case. (Deringil, 1992)
Turgut Ozal is considered to be the politician who introduced the neo -ottoman model
to the Turkish foreign policy. What exactly is neo-ottomanism, though? As Yiorgos
Karambelias (2009), notices: Neo-ottomanism is a completion and expansion of
islamism-kemalism, in the field of foreign affairs and regional policy. Confronted
with the weakening of most of Turkeys neighbours, the temptation is born for an
expansive policy with new conditions, a combination of economic, military and
geopolitical power, which uses Islam and the strategic alliance with the West as its
two gateways.
At this point it is useful, for the purpose of our analysis, to refer to how political
scientists set the boundaries of Turkeys history, from the foundation of the Turkish
republic to Ozals prevalence in 1983 (Veremis, 1995). The first period starts with the
foundation of the Turkish Republic by Ataturk (29th October 1923) and ends with
World War II.[7] This period is characterized by the avoidance of any involvement in
the area, beyond the securing of its borders. The Lausanne Treaty, which essentially
certifies the deconstruction of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Arabic state
system, is in a prime position. However, during this period, and specifically in 1939
Turkey, with flexible diplomatic manoeuvres, and in violation of the Lausanne Treaty
gets Alexandretta with the help of France.
The second period ends in 1964 with the crisis in Cyprus. During this period, Turkey
plays the role of the deputy of western interests via the Baghdad Pact (February 1955)
and then CENTO which was under american supervision. It is worth noting that
during this period the Middle East is split into two opposing sides. The first one
consists of states which are supportive and friendly to the West, while the second one
consists of states which are under the Soviet Union. The United Arab Republic (19581961) with the unification of Syria and Egypt will be the beginning of what the
experts in Middle East happenings have called
the Arabic cold war.[8] In
between these developments, one can realize how important Turkey is for the West, as
well as the narrow boundaries in which the strategy of the Greek Cypriot leadership
should be articulated as far as the Cyprus Problem is concerned.
Finally, the third period ends in 1980 and is characterized by Turkeys turn to the
USSR[9] as well as the reviving of its relations with the Muslim states. When Turgut
Ozal came into power in 1983, the main strength of turkish policy was the position his
country held during the second Gulf crisis, having as its main aim to obtain regional
hegemony.
As far as this crisis is concerned (Niblock, 1994), its historical and political boundary
was articulated in the following way: In August 1990, Saddam Hussein accused
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of exceeding their share in oil production by far
and that they deliberately increased petrol prices, which for Iraq, was a cause of war.
Saddam Hussein then demanded from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to forget the 40
billion dollar loans that Iraq owed them. Revisional Iraq under Saddam Husein went a
step further, demanding from Kuwait to give it control of the area of Rumaila which
was rich in deposits, as well as compensation of 2.4 billion dollars for the oil it had

drawn up to that point. Saddam Hussein also demanded from Kuwait to give Iraq
control of certain islands which made access to the Gulf easier.
Numerous efforts from the Arabic governments to avoid the crisis, failed, and as a
result on 2nd August Iraq projects its revisional might, conquering small Kuwait. At
this point let us be allowed to turn our attention to the Cyprus Problem: Twenty seven
years after the Turkish invasion to Cyprus, an expansionist state (Iraq), much more
powerful than small Kuwait, attacks it, violating every international justice norm. The
answer of the international community is known. Nevertheless, when Turkey invaded
Cyprus in 1974, the international community, including the then Great Powers
remained uninterested and did nothing. This, however, was not the case with the
invasion of Iraq into Kuwait, since a mechanism of collective security was set very
soon, and pointed out the victimizer (Iraq) and the victim (Kuwait) and afterwards,
with the Provide comfort project, exerting superior power (24th February 1991)
made the revisional state return to status quo ante. Iraq, which was quite hurt after an
eight year war against Iran, tried again to rearrange its powers. Internal reasons
(prevention of destabilization of the regime due to financial causes) as well as
external reasons (acquiring regional hegemony) indicated its revisional strategy
against Kuwait. All this unfolded in the regional level.
In the international level, the collapse of the bipolar international system and the
emerging of a new structure under the supremacy of the USA, dictated the reengraving of its strategy as well as the reaffirmation of its role in the international
system. The Gulf War and what came after it constituted the occasion for the
consolidation of Pax Americana in the new international system. The hegemonic
power wanted also to safeguard the control of the sub- system of the Middle East
which was rich in oil deposits. Relevantly, in the Gulf crisis, the attitude of the USA
brings in the limelight, the selective actions double moral criteria (Wight, 1991)
when the major games in the region are threatened: The flow and price of oil and a
favorable balance of power for the superpower, with the prevention of appointment of
strengthened local poles of power, harmful for the regional interests of USA. Such
developments may have also destabilizing results for the safety of USAs regional
allies (Turkey-Israel) . From a different point of view, the regional allies of the
superpower (Turkey-Israel) are ready to profit from the redistribution of power,[10]
but also to contribute to their consolidation.
At this point we are obliged to return to Ozals strategy. The Turkish politician,
waiving the reactions in the interior[11], is all ready to profit from the whole crisis.
Ozals statements are indicative of his intentions: My conviction is that Turkey
should leave its previous passive and non decisive policy and follow a more energetic
policy. The reason for which I placed this objective is that we are a powerful country
in the region. (Veremis,1995).
Despite the material profit that his country acquired from its involvement in the
crisis[12], Ozals words were consistent with his actions. He ordered the closure of
the pipeline that transported oil from Iraq to the Mediterranean via Turkey (despite the
economic cost) and allowed the american aviation to use the base in Injirlik for
attacks against Iraq.

So, Turgut Ozal accomplished to underline again to the West that Turkey can always
be useful to the engraving of american strategy in the region. On one hand, as an
important geopolitical axis, with an increased role and prestige in the region, and on
the other hand, as an Islamic state with a cosmic character, which can be the
<<peacemaking state>> through its parliamentary experience, and this will help the
West to handle the <<outcast states>> of the Arabic middle eastern sub- system.
At the regional level, the importance of Turkey for the american strategy is shown.
Consequently, it emerges that states with an important geopolitical position can profit
from the systemic interactions, acquiring thus the power to violate international
justice, and as a result to be intolerant to any efforts for negotiations. Consequently,
regional problems such as the Cyprus Problem are difficult to be solved based on the
rules of international justice. On the contrary, they are perpetuated in the meshes of
power created by the hammering of cliental relations on an exchanging basisbetween the superpower (USA) and its client states (Turkey). Such states are useful as
critical geopolitical axons in important regions on the planet. As the Professor of
International Relations, and excellent expert in geostrategy, Zbigniew Brzezinski
(1998), points out: Turkey is an important geopolitical axis. It stabilises the region of
Black Sea, it checks the access from it into the Mediterranean, it compensates Russia
in Caucasus, it also constitutes an antidote to the Muslim fundamentalism and is
useful as a southern anchorage of NATO.
In his effort to show the potentially vulnerable position the United States will find
itself in, in the event that Turkey is not obedient to the American commands,
Brzezinski adds: An unsteady Turkey would probably start more violence in the
southern Balkans, while it would facilitate the Russian control in the southern
Balkans.
At this point it should be noted that the Turkish intervening policy is not terminated
with the death of Turgut Ozal in 1993, but is also continued by his successors. Turkey
did not hesitate to intervene in the Balkan region with the pretext of the existence
there of Turkish and islamic minorities, but also in order to create balancing processes
against Greece. Once again, it secures its geopolitical position by granting bases to
America.
During the Bosnia crisis (1992-1995), the United States with the help of Ankara will
get involved in the creation of the Croatian-Muslim alliance (March 1994) by
providing equipment and educating the Bosnian Muslims, changing the local balance
against the Serbian side (Uzgel, 2001). During the Kosovo crisis, in order to underline
again its geopolitical position, Turkey will allow the American forces to use two bases
in Western Turkey, strengthening thus the effectiveness of the strategic bombardment
of Yugoslavia, in April 1999.[13] Even though finally the Turkish bases did not need
to be used because of the acceptance by Belgrade of the terms of NATO, this fact
indisputably proves once again the dependence of American geostrategy on Turkey.
Finally, in the critical decade of 1990, Turkey appears to be credited by the West and
mainly the USA with the possibility of exercising geopolitical and strategic influence
in the wider region in which it belongs. From another perspective, the cloak of neo
ottomanism in which Turkey seems to be dressed in, in the region of Caucasus and
Central Asia, brings it in opposition with other powers in the area, namely Russia and

Iran. Also, the whole effort basically contains the element of contradiction because as
we know in the interior of Turkey, when Islam rekindles, then this causes nuisances to
the military. As far as the Cyprus Problem is concerned, however, Ankara with its
strategy, acquires further support for its intransigence.

3.Turkish Geostrategy: Ahmed Davutoglu


and the theory of Strategic Depth.
At this point we will turn our attention to the current Turkish Foreign policy and
specifically to the person considered its absolute reformer, the professor of
geopolitics, Ahmed Davutoglu. Davutoglu, who is the head adviser of the Turkish
Prime Minister, Tayip Erdogan on foreign policy issues, was upgraded in May 2009 to
minister of the foreign affairs of the Erdogan Government. He is the inspirer of the
doctrine of strategic depth (Davutoglu, 2010). This doctrine promises that the
strategic depth, presupposes a geographical and a historical depth. According to the
Turkish professor, Turkey as the contractor country of the Ottoman Empire possesses
important geographic depth. This geographic depth places Turkey in the epicentre of
many geopolitical fields of influence. Consequently, rationalizing the aforementioned,
the Turkish geopolitician indicates that the doctrine of strategic depth requires active
commitment to all the regional sub-systems that border on Turkey. This approach of
the Turkish professor, however, lurks dangers for Turkey itself, as well as for the
regional peace and stability.
It should be noted that, Ahmed Davutoglu, indicates that Turkey should not be
considered a geopolitical region, but a geographic-geopolitical centre (Mazis,
2008). It is the geographic centre of Afro-Eurasia, located at the point where Europe
meets Asia and Africa. It has, therefore a central geographic position and allocates
inhexaustible geographic depth, extended to the Balkans/Europe, Eurasia[14], Asia,
Middle East and North Africa. Relevantly, as we have also seen with the policy of
Ozal and his successors, Ahmed Davutoglu prefers the Turkish foreign policy to be
intensely involved in all the geographic areas that surround it.
More analytically, the planning proposed by the Turk geostrategist abuts in two axes
(Mazis, 2008) of exercise of geopolitical influence:
a) economic/active (private investment in Central Asia and reinforcement of transit
energy role of Turkey)[15] and
b) cultural (intensification and projection of linguistic/cultural kinship, reinforcement
of bonds via the Islamic cultural tool).
Ahmed Davutoglu does not omit to mention the new upgraded geopolitical role he
wants his country to play. In a conference in Sarajevo[16] he mentioned among other
things: We wish for a new Balkan, that will be founded in political values, economic
interdependence, collaboration and political harmony. All this was ensured in the
Balkans. And he adds: We will revive this era, the Ottoman Balkans were a
successful part of History and now it should be reborn.

The Turkish minister of foreign affairs unfolding his thoughts even more, he adds:
We will make the Balkans, Caucasus, the Middle East, along with Turkey, the
epicentre of the international political scene. Studying Davutoglus statements, we
can easily observe that his mentioning of Ottoman Balkans refers to his theory on
geographic depth, while the mentioning of all the all above regions that along with
Turkey will constitute the epicentre of international relations, refers to his theory on
strategic/geographic depth. Underlining the phrase along with Turkey clearly refers
to the fact that Turkey according to Davutoglu- should be the geopolitical centre that
will lead the new period of Pax Ottomana.
All these perceptions of Davutoglu for the reviving of a new regional order in the
area, mean that regional problems like the Cyprus problem- will be solved on
Turkeys terms. Finally, the Turkish politician supports that there is no incompatibility
between Islam and western democracy and he is a warm supporter of Turkeys entry
in the European Union.[17] The geo- economic dimension of the geopolitical vision
should not be overlooked. It should be noted that Turkey is a rising economy and is
a member of the 20 industrial states, G-20. Since 31st December 1995 it has been
commercially connected to the European Union. Main commercial partners of the
country are the EU (59% of exports and 52% of imports), the USA, Russia, Japan and
the Gulf countries (Rakkas, 2009).
At this point, however, we should turn our attention to the Cyprus Problem. To
reinforce the aforementioned, the Turkish minister of the Exterior in a shared press
conference with the Swedish Presidency and the Commission on 21st December 2009
expressed deep disappointment for the decision of Nicosia to freeze the six Turkish
negotiation chapters. Characterizing the decision as one sided, he reported that it
causes more and more concern for Turkey, how long these matters can continue,
which as he supported, have nothing to do with the negotiations, but with certain
irrelevant political matters, thus blocking the way between Turkey and EU. Ahmed
Davutoglu went on to say, that the majority of the member states realise Turkeys
strategic advantages. He also mentioned that these minor matters cannot avert from
the great advantages the European Union acquires, due to its relations with Turkey. As
we observe, the Turkish minister considers the illegal possession of Cyprus from his
country a minor matter, which the European Union should overlook compared to
other advantages that Turkey will offer to her. More specifically, in his book
Strategic Depth: Turkeys International Position, the Turkish Minister mentions:
Even if neither one Muslim Turk existed in Cyprus,Turkey owed to maintain a
Cypriot question. No one country can remain incurious for such an island, that it is
found in the heart of her vital space. Analyzing more his geopolitical reasoning,
Ahmet Davutoglu , adds: Cyprus has a central position in the world continent as it is
found in equal distance from Europe, Asia and Africa.it has the place of constant base
and aircraft carrier, that will touch the pulse of marine ways of Anten and Chormouz,
along with the basins of Gulf and Caspian Sea, that is the most important ways of
connection Eurasia-Africa.A country that ignores Cyprus cannot be active in the
world and regional policies.
So, Davutoglus views regarding Cyprus do not render us optimistic that there is the
required political will from the Turkish political elit for a peaceful settlement of the
Cyprus Problem, where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will live in conditions
of peace and security. The geopolitical perspective under which Ahmed Davutoglu

faces the Cyprus Problem provokes great concerns if Turkey really wants to leave the
two communities to administer their common future.
Moreover, we may add that the Turk geostrategist does not omit in any way to
underline the geopolitical position of his country to the superpower (USA), in his
effort to realise political profits from this position. The policy of no problems with
the neighbours, which aims to settle Turkeys relations with Armenia as well as Syria,
and Ankaras efforts to acquire a mediatory role in the conflict of the United States
with Iran for its nuclear program, aim to send messages to the superpower that Turkey
does constitute this hegemonic stabilizer the Americans can rely on, in order to
solve regional problems which threaten their interests.
However, this direction of alliance between USA and Turkey is not unilateral, as we
also mentioned above. Ahmed Davutoglu seeks to extract political profits and perhaps
the tolerance of American government for the way of resolution of the Cypriot
problem. The Turkish minister of Foreign Affairs himself, in his interview in
Newsweek[18] magazine, when asked what the USA is expecting from Turkey, he
answered the following: If you allow me, the way that this question is formulated
corresponds to the logic of the Cold War. It suggests that there is a superpower, the
United States, which expects various things from its allies. However, alliance means
mutuality. It has to do with communication, not only imposition. If you ask the
minister of Foreign Affairs, Hilary Clinton, to tell you the ten most important matters
of American foreign policy and then you ask me the same question, you will see that
we will report the same things: Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, energy safety, Caucasus,
Balkans. Being a professor of Geopolitics himself and consequently an expert in the
theory of client-state relations between actors of unequal power, Davutoglu sends
the USA the message that in order to take, they will have to give. Additionally,
Davutoglu knows that Americans cannot impose their opinion on Turkey 100 %, but
will have to collaborate if they want to keep with its collaboration- a favorable
distribution of power in the various regional fronts, in which Ankara is willing to act,
with its major strategy on strategic depth.
More analytically, in an alliance where the participants are of unequal power (NATO),
it is very likely for the powerful state (USA) to find itself in what is called the trap of
investment. That is to say, it is in the interest of the powerful side that nothing
happens, which will cancel previous military and political investments. Abiding by
the proportions that are in effect in each individualised case, the United States
interests lie with nothing happening on Turkeys part, that would endanger their
interests in the sensitive region of the Middle East. Ahmed Davutoglu, as an expert in
geopolitics, realises that there is a type of dependence on the USA by Turkey,
specifically with regard to the region of the Middle East, as well as Caucasus.
In the theory of client-state relations (Ifestos, 2000) this is called tyranny of the
weak. The tactics that are adopted vary in every case. They could have to do with the
stubborn and final refusal of the less powerful party to obey the orders of the
hegemonic power, and even the reliable formulation of threats that would cost the
more powerful ally a great deal, even if their own cost is very big. In any case, the
aim of such strategies is not the barren juxtaposition with the Great Power, but
obtaining of concessions on vital interests of the less powerful.

The above apposition of the theory of international relations did not happen
accidentally and it should be seen in absolute interrelation with the geopolitical
position of Greece and how this is appreciated by the hegemonic power (USA). It is a
fact that the american centres of decision-making give priority to Ankara and not
Athens. According to an American document-directive[19] which was made public by
a senior American officer, Greece is not as important any more in the American
planning and all the weight and attention has been turned exclusively to Turkey. More
specifically, the Obama government puts Greece aside until further notice and gives
high and direct priority to Turkey because this way and via Turkey American
interests can be fully served. This means that the Americans want Greece to become
a simple recipient of their objectives through Turkey. And this means that Athens will
become the recipient of increasing American pressure in order to conciliate with
Turkey, with terms, however, detrimental to the Greek interests. Otherwise, the
Ankara will not agree to what Washington is asking.
This type of reasoning is by no means advantageous for the resolution of the Cyprus
Problem while in the triangular relation, Greece constitutes the week-compliable ally
in the region, where it is carried away, in between a mesh of prompts, pressure and
covered threats, into following a policy that many times does not best serve its
national interests. On the contrary, Turkey is the stable-favored ally (Kefala, 1993)
which has additional interests with the hegemonic power: The expansive plans against
Cyprus, while it supports the United States in its wider objectives in the region. In the
event of disagreement between these two types of allies the hegemonic power
supports the objectives of the former (Turkey) against the latter (Greece), even if the
objectives of its obedient ally are absolutely identified with the international justice
and the international laws.
In conclusion, we report that the Turkish foreign policy has entered a new period, that
of active involvement in the direct geographic region of Turkey. Ahmed Davutoglu
seeks to revive a new regional order in the area, where Turkey will be the hegemonic
centre. On their part, the United States consider Turkey a key country for serving their
interests in the region. Therefore, Greece and Cyprus should be particularly careful in
order for this special relationship not to turn out against their own interests.
4. Neo Ottomanism and the United States.
Coming back to the question of neo-ottomanism, it should be marked that the
political strategy of Turgut Ozal during the 90s, as well as that of Turkeys controlling
party, of Justice and Development, having as their most important point, Davutoglus
theories on strategic depth, aim in the appointment of Turkey to a strong regional
superpower.
Using as a compass the Ottoman past of the country and through the cultural relations
with the turkish -speaking and Muslim populations of other states, the Turkish foreign
policy aims to enlarge Turkish influence in the former wider geographic region of the
Ottoman Empire.
Islamists today aspire to continue the efforts of Turgut Ozal for appointment of the
country into a regional power. It should be marked that, in the field of foreign policy,
Kemalism compromised[20] painlessly with neo-ottomanism, while political Islam

on his part, having conscience of its weakness to impose an Islamic State, accepted
the secular-Kemalic character of the Turkish state.
More specifically, during his premiership, Turgut Ozal, restored Islam in the political
and social life of the country as well as in education. Ozals case constitutes an effort
of composition between Islamism and kemalism. At the same time, with regard to the
internal political scene of Turkey he faced the Kurdish populations who live in southeastern Turkey with relative moderation.
As far as Turkeys European perspective is concerned, Turgut Ozal included it to his
wider western orientation and treated it as the final and solid anchorage in the West.
Contrary to the states of Southern Europe that treated their integration to EU as a
golden occasion of democratisation and reforms, but also as a pole against the USA,
Ozal saw the Turkish integration, as a clear occasion of a surge of capital into
Turkey
(Pesmazoglou, 1993). The Turkish politician did not not omit to
underline the strategic importance of his country for the West, but also the
possibilities that were opened for european capitals to invest in Turkey.
Some years after the death of Ozal, the Islamist Nejmetin Erbakan accomplishes to
shape a government in June 1996 but is forced to resign by the military in 1997. It
should be underlined that Erbakan is considered to be the father of political Islam in
Turkey, after he founds the National Order Party in 1970, a political shaping that
had Islam as its main ideological reference. The party in question, which is renamed
in 1973 into the National Salvation Party, was a religious fundamentalist party
which believed in the principles of Islam. Erbakan sought the suppression of the
kemalic principle of segregation of religion and state and declared the need to return
to traditional ottoman structures (Yiallourides, 1997). It should also be marked that
Erbakan then, just as Erdogan today, believed that there should be an autonomous
pole in Turkey, which will be supported exclusively by the principles of Islam.
However, Erbakan was much more counteractive in his ideas than the current Prime
Minister Tayip Erdogan.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, it should be marked that the victory of Tayip Erdogan, in the 2002
elections with the party of Justice and Development (AKP) signals a new period for
Turkey, so much in the interior, as in the regional and international scene. The
undertaking of the ministry of the Foreign Affairs by Ahmed Davutoglu created new
facts. His handlings in the field of foreign policy, are a continuation of Turgut Ozals
vison for the conquest of regional hegemony in the broader region that borders on
Turkey and constitutes its geostrategic depth. Despite the issues[21] in the relations
between Kemalists and Islamists, Tayip Erdogan managed to survive and, with
Ahmed Davutoglu being the head of Turkish diplomacy, he follows a
multidimensional exterior policy, which clears the road to the arabic world, as well as
to countries of Central Asia and Caucasus, without breaking the bonds of the country
with the West. It should be marked that the neo-Ottoman model does not come into
contrast with the objectives of the superpower in the broader region of the Middle
East and Central Asia. On the contrary, it goes together with the effort of the
hegemonic power to consolidate a favorable distribution of power in the sub-system
of the Middle East, via which it will accomplish to promote its geo-economic

interests. From the beginning of his election, Tayip Erdogan rushed to appease any
concerns for the policy he was going to follow. He warmly supports the policy of
Turkeys entry in the European Union and, as far as the big internal problem of the
country -the Kurdish problem- is concerned, he tried to introduce reforms.
As it has already been pointed out, the United States needs the collaboration of
Turkey in the sensitive and frail region of the Middle East and Central Asia. Despite
the past problemsin the relations of the two countries with Turkeys refusal to allow
the use of Turkish establishments during the Gulf war (March 2003), it is certain that
the United States will continue to need Turkeys help (Larrabee, 2008), in order to
fulfill their objectives in the region, especially in the Iraqi front. It should be indicated
that 70% of the military personnel and materials intended for Iraq, passes through
Turkey. Moreover, many of the scenarios of disengagement of the United States from
Iraq include the involvement of Turkey. Consequently, as we have already mentioned,
the dependence of USA from Turkey in the Middle East, does not make us optimistic
for a just and viable solution of the Cyprus Problem.

NOTES
[1] The Lausanne Treaty (23 July 1923) had not ensured what Turkey would consider
safety round its borders. During the period between the two world wars the Turkish
state tries to consolidate a system of safety which will protect it from the threats that
emanated from the surrounding states. There was the threat from Italy, which since
1912 made its intentions obvious by conquering Dodekanisa. In the time when the
Sevres Treaty between the Ottoman state and the allies failed, Italy with Britain and
France had contracted a Trilateral Agreement on Anatolia, which included its division
in spheres of influence and economic exploitation. The disagreement with Britain on
Mosouli was still there. Another matter that troubled the Turks was the matter of
Dardanellia, which according to the Lausanne Treaty, they should be army free. The
safety dilemma for Turkey was underlined even more because of its traditional fear
for Russian intentions. This is also the reason that the Turks approached Britain, when
the problem of Mosuli was solved in July 1926 with its concession to Iraq. Therefore,
Kemal Ataturk, in his effort to solve these problems, approaches Greece and signs a
treaty of reconciliation and neutrality with Eleftherios Venizelos (30 October 1930).

Moreover, Turkeys entry in the Balkan Agreement (9 February 1934) in which


Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia participated, is another effort of the feeble Turkish
state to acquire safety from a common Italian-Bulgarian attack (Athanasopolou,
1999).
[2] It should be underlined that one of the main reasons that Kemal Ataturk did not
want to be involved in risky adventures abroad was the weakness of the Turkish state
in combination with the multifaceted threats it faced (see above). However, after
Ataturks death, revisory tendencies were expressed in the Turkish foreign policy,
having as their main points the effort of revision of the Lausanne Treaty, during the
Tripartite Conference in London, in August 1955. In addition, in 1974, when
Turkey found itself in a position of power, it did not hesitate to violate this doctrine,
as well as international justice, with the invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus.
[3] The moderate islamist, Turgut Ozal was the founder of the centre- right party of
Mother Homeland (ANAP). He was the Prime Minister of Turkey from 1983 up to
1989, when he was elected president. He kept his position up to his death in 1993.
[4] Towards the end of October 1992 when the President of Turkey, Suleiman
Demirel, received the presidents of the newly founded states of Central Asia, of which
the populations are of Turkish descend, he did not hesitate to talk about the Turkish
state which will be extended henceforth not only between the Bosporus and the
Iranian borders but also between the Adriatic sea and the Chinese walls. Therefore,
the Turkish politician in a unique expression of grand vision restored in the turkish
public sphere, the claims of the Ottoman Empire for national homogenisation of the
region from the Balkans up to the western provinces of China. This approach of
Demirels, is an explicit sample of Turkeys effort to become a big regional power in
this unsteady region (Yiallouridis, 2001).
[5] On the Oslo Agreement (September 1993) between the state of Israel and the
Palestinians, see (Morris, 1999).
[6] A state will attempt to change the international system or the regional system in
which it belongs, if the benefit (political, economic) exceeds the cost. In a similar
way, a state will attempt to stop any tendency that undermines or threatens to
undermine its position in the international system (Gilpin, 1983).
[7] We should point out that, since the birth of the first Turkish Republic (29 October
1923) up to 1946, a single-party status quo is in effect in Turkey. It is the period when
the particular military-bureaucracy is consolidated in the country. The majority of
Turkish presidents, with just a few exceptions, such as Jelal Bayar, Turgut Ozal and
finally Abdullah Gull were military officials. In addition, a number of military
officials participate in the Turkish parliament (Grand Turkish National Assembly).
Finally, Kemal Ataturk himself a victorious general, becomes President of the Turkish
Republic (Sarris, 1992).
[8] For this political phenomenon, see (Seale, 1986).
[9] The letter of American president Johnson to the Turkish president Ishmet Inonu in
June 1964, damaged their special relation momentarily and caused intense anti-

americanism in Turkey. As a result, there was a turn of Turkey to the former USSR.
The Soviet Union, on its side, wished for the Russian-Turkish approach because
Turkey possessed the straits of Dardanelle.
[10] The basic american position adopted in 1967, after the six days war was that
Israel should not be required to relinquish territories captured in 1967, without a quid
pro quo form the Arab parties involving peace, security and recognition
(Quant,
1993) .This American stance is obviously against international law. For the American
stance regarding the June 1967 crisis, see also (Quigley, 2005).
[11] Ozal as President maintained every power in the management of international
relations and foreign affairs of his country. Therefore, he exclusively handled the
participation of his country in the Gulf crisis. This caused reactions by the opposition
who believed that this constituted a removal from the Turkish postwar policy of non
involvement in the middle eastern affairs and conflicts. According to the opinion of
Opposition, Ozals policy in this particular matter put Turkey at risk of an Iraqi attack.
There were also reactions from the military status quo, which believed the crisis to be
an intra-arabic issue. The head of the Turkish armed forces, general Nejip Torumbay,
resigned on 3rd December 1990, bringing the generalised reactions of Ozals policy to
the public eye (Veremis, 1995).
[12] Many researchers believe that the involvement of Turkey in the Gulf Crisis, did
not attribute the expected benefits. And this is because after the crisis, the flow of
Kurdish refugees into Turkey increased (Robbins, 2004).
[13] However, as soon as the American personnel reached Turkey, Belgrade accepted
the demands of NATO and the Turkish establishments were not used. (Uzgel, 2001)
[14] For the importance of Eurasia in the planning of the strategy of the Great powers,
(Mackinder, 1962)
[15] How Ankara can exploit Turkeys geographic position elevating its energy transit
role, it is also shown by the construction of the Nabuko pipeline, an ambitious
program of transport of natural gas from Erzerum in Turkey to the Boamgarten an
Den March port, in Austria. The pipeline, the length of which is 3300 km, will cross
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary before it reaches Austria. The whole plan is supported
by the European Union and the United States and its aim is the reduction of Europes
dependence on Russian energy. It is estimated that the pipelines manufacture, which
will cost 8 billion dollars, will be completed in 2014-2015.
[16] Davutoglu on Balkans, Pax Ottomana Politis Newspaper, 27/10/09.
[17] Greece and the phenomenon of Ahmed Davutoglu. The profile and beliefs of the
Turkish Minister of the Foreign Affairs. An interview with the academic Vasilios
Markezinis in the Ethnos tis Kyriakis newspaper, which is republished in the
Simerini newspaper, 27/7/ 2009. Davutoglu supports that the Koran projects a series
of fundamental values without imposing a certain political mechanism of their
application. In regard to Turkeys entry in the EU, the Turkish professor points out
that this will be advantageous for the European Union itself, since this is the only way
it can hope to become a world power.

[18] Ahmed Davutoglus statements in question, in Newsweek magazine, were


published in, Costas Guliamos, Relations between Ankara USA, on a different
basis, Phileleftheros Newspaper, 13/12/2009.
[19] Priority to Turkey against Greece by the USA, Phileleftheros newspaper, 18
July 2009.
[20] This compromise began in the 1950s when the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan
Menderes, allowed the reappearance of political Islam in the Turkish community
during an effort to liberalise the Turkish political system, but also clearly for
electioneering reasons (Constantinides 2009).
[21] The Constitutional Court of Turkey, which constitutes the bulwark of the
Kemalists attempted, in July 2008, to ban the governmental Party of Justice and
Development. In October 2008, giving the basics of the decision to publicity (350
pages) it reported that the Prime Minister of Turkey, Tayip Erdogan seems to be
involved in actions that go against the secularity of the Turkish state Relaunching
of the Turkish state , To Vima newspaper, 25 October 2008.
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