UPDATES OF CASES ON PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2010-2016

(JUNE)
Prof. AMPARITA STA. MARIA, LL.B., LL.M. GRADUATE LEGAL STUDIES INSTITUTE ATENEO
SCHOOL OF LAW

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Absence of Essential Elements Marriage

Christine Joy Capin-Cadiz v. Brent Hospital and
Colleges, Inc., (G.R. No. 187417, February 24,
2016)
FACTS:
Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of
respondent Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc.
(Brent) at the time of her indefinite suspension
from employment in 2006. Cadiz was suspended
for Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior
Resulting to Unwed Pregnancy. Cadiz became
pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent imposed the
suspension until such time that she marries her
boyfriend in accordance with law. Cadiz then
filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for
Unfair Labor Practice, Constructive Dismissal,
Non-Payment of Wages and Damages with
prayer for Reinstatement.
ISSUE:
W/N the condition requiring Cadiz to first enter
into marriage before she can be admitted back to
employment
HELD:
Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and
discriminatory. It forces Cadiz to marry for
economic reasons and deprives her of the
freedom to choose her status, which is a
privilege that inheres in her as an intangible and
inalienable right. Brent must prove two factors
necessitating its imposition: (1) that the
employment qualification is reasonably related
to the essential operation of the job involved;
and (2) that there is a factual basis for believing
that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly
perform the duties of the job. Brent has not
shown the presence of neither of these factors.
Perforce, the Court cannot uphold the validity of
said condition.

9, 1993. The marriage contract stated that the

couple was issued a marriage license from
Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993.
In July 2003, Syed went to the Office of the
Civil Registrar to secure a copy of the marriage
license in relation to a bigamy case filed by
Gloria. However, the Municipal Civil Registrar
issued a certification declaring that the office has
not issued a marriage license to Syed and Gloria.
It further verified that the marriage license
indicated in Syed and Glorias marriage contract
was issued to a different couple.
The RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage
license issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona. CA ruled that there was a valid
marriage license because the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically
state that a diligent search for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.
HELD:
The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.
In the case of Cario v. Cario, it was held that
the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that
their office had no record of a marriage license
was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license.

ART. 4, 35
Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 18396, January 30,
2013)
FACTS:
The case stems from a supposed marriage
ceremony between Syed and Gloria on January
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Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan (G.R. No. 201061,

July 3, 2013)

was not sufficient proof of absence of marriage

license.

HELD:
The purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally
had no valid marriage license because the Local
Civil Registrar confirmed that the Marriage
License of Benjamin and Sally did not match the
Marriage License series issued for the month of
February 1982. The Civil Registrar also said that
it did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568
to the couple.

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry

Book on Application for Marriage License and
License Issuance available in this office, no
record could be found on the alleged issuance of
this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in
favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and
MS. GINA M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.

Such certification from the local civil registrar is

adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license and absent any suspicious circumstance,
the certification enjoys probative value, being
issued by the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license. Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, xxx "shall be void from the beginning."
Raquel G. Kho v. Republic of the Philippines
and Veronica B. Kho, (G.R. No. 187462, June
01, 2016)
Petitioner was able to present a Certification
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar "has no record nor
copy of any marriage license ever issued in
favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and
Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose
marriage was celebrated on June 1, 1972. Based
on the Certification issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar,
coupled with respondent's failure to produce a
copy of the alleged marriage license or of any
evidence to show that such license was ever
issued, the only conclusion that can be reached
is that no valid marriage license was, in fact,
issued.

This Certification does not prove petitioners

first marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license. It does not categorically state
that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not
exist.
To prove that a marriage was solemnized
without a marriage license, "the law requires that
the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very
least, supported by a certification from the local
civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties.
The Certification from the Office of the Civil
Registrar that it has no record of the marriage
license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it
does not categorically prove that there was no
marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not
dissolved through mere certifications by the civil
registrar.

Not sufficient proof that there was no marriage

license.
Vitangcol v. People, (G.R. No. 207406, Jan. 13,
2016)
Ruling: In this case the Supreme Court ruled that
the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar
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Art. 26
David A. Noveras v. Leticia T. Noveras
(20 August 2014, G.R. No. 188289)
FACTS:
David and Leticia Noveras were married in the
year 1988 in QC. They resided in California,
USA and eventually acquired US citizenship.
They had 2 children.
In 2003, Leticia claims that David abandoned his
family and lived with one Estrellita Martinez in
Aurora. Upon learning that David had an affair
Leticia divorced him in California. The Superior
Court of California granted Leticia custody of
both children and all the US properties. With
respect to the properties in the Philippines,
Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation of
conjugal properties.
Did not file for recognition therefore under
Philippine law, they are still both Filipinos.
The trial court ruling adopted the California
Courts ruling.
The CA modified the decision on appeal by
directing the equal division of the Philippine
properties between the spouses. With respect to
the common childrens presumptive legitime, the
appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay
their children the amount of P520,000.
ISSUE:
W/N the spouses divorce is valid in our
jurisdiction.
W/N the petition for separation of absolute
community of property should be granted.
W/N the distribution of the properties ordered by
the CA correct?
HELD:
NO, the divorce is not valid and the trial court
should not have acknowledged the divorce
decree.
The foreign judgment and its authenticity must
be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the aliens applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign

judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact. Under Section 24
of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a
sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved
by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a
copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody thereof.
Based on the Records only the divorce decree
was presented. The required certificates to prove
its authenticity, as well as the California law on
divorce were not presented. Even if we apply the
doctrine of processual presumption as the lower
courts did with respect to the property regime of
the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely
a different matter because, to begin with, divorce
is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the
Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the
divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still
legally married in the Philippines.
The petition for separation of absolute
community of property should be granted. The
records are replete with evidence that Leticia
and David had indeed separated for more than a
year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. More significantly they filed for
Divorce in California. These facts show that
reconciliation is highly improbable.
The Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of
David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil
Code clearly states that real property as well as
personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation
shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan-Lee (G. R. No.
183622, February 08, 2012)
Under the principle of comity, Philippine
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by a spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. The
divorce must first be proven by the divorce
decree itself.
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The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment

itself. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of
the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
Norma A. Del Socorro, for and in behalf of her
minor child, Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem v.
Ernst Johan Brinkham Van Wilsem
(10 December 2014, G.R. No. 193707)
FACTS:
Norma and Ernst, a Dutch national, married in
1990. In 1994, they had a son, Rodrigo. Then the
marriage ended and a Divorce Decree was
issued by the Court of Holland. Norma and
Rodrigo returned to the Philippines. According
to the petitioner, respondent pledged monthly
support to their son, but this never happened.
Ernst eventually came to the Philippines again
and remarried in Cebu. He received a demand
letter for support, but refused to answer it.
Hence, the petitioner filed a complaint affidavit
for violation of Sec. 5 para. E(2) of R.A. 9262
for the latters unjust refusal to support his minor
child with the petitioner.
The lower court ruled that since respondent is a
foreign national, the law on support and R.A.
9262 have no application.
Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family
Code, contending that notwithstanding the
divorce decree, respondent is not excused from
complying with his obligation to support his
minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that
there is no sufficient and clear basis for financial
support. Respondent added that by reason of the
Divorce Decree, he is not obligated to petitioner
for any financial support.

W/N a foreign national has an obligation to

support his minor child under Philippine law;
and
W/N a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his failure to
support his minor child.
HELD:
Petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 in
demanding support from respondent, who is a
foreign citizen, since Article 15 stresses the
principle of nationality. In other words, insofar
as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically
the provisions of the Family Code on support,
the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By
analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners
such that they are governed by their national law
with respect to family rights and duties.
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in
position to invoke the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to
the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e., the laws of
the nation to which they belong even when
staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code,
Article 15).
This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioners
son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have
a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands
in advancing his position that he is not obliged
to support his son, he never proved the same.
In view of respondents failure to prove the
national law of the Netherlands, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not
properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law. Thus, the law
in the Netherlands is presumed to be the same
with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children
and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

ISSUE:
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Moreover, foreign law should not be applied

when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
To give justice is the most important function of
law; hence, a law, or judgment that is obviously
unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or
contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law,
judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parents obligation
to support his child nor penalize the
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still
duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied of financial support when the latter is
entitled thereto.
R.A. 9262 also applies to the petitioner. Since
the respondent is living in the Philippines, there
is basis for the claim of the petitioner that the
territoriality principle in criminal law, in relation
to article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to
the case.
Void ab initio marriages Art. 26, 35
Fujiki v. Marinay (G.R. No. 196049, Jun. 26,
2013)
FACTS: Fujiki a Japanese National married
Marinay in the Philippines. Fujiki was not able
to bring Marinay to Japan and they eventually
lost contact. Marinay remarried another
Japanese national but claimed she was being
maltreated. She contacted Fujiki and they
reestablished their relationship. Fujiki sought
judgment from the Japanese courts for nullity of
Marinays second marriage on the ground of
bigamy which was granted.

Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for Judicial

Recognition of Foreign Judgment and
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground
of bigamy. The RTC dismissed the petition
based on the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages which provides that it is
only the husband or wife who can file a
declaration of nullity of marriage.
HELD: The Rules on Declaration of Nullity and
Annulment do not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. The rules also do
not apply if the ground is Bigamy. The parties in
a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor
the wife under the law. Since the recognition of a
foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of
the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Fujiki has the personality to file
a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only
needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
under the Rules of Court.
Article 34
Santiago v. People (G.R. No. 200233, July 15,
2015)
Four months after Leonila G. Santiago and
Nicanor Santos were married, they were charged
with bigamy. Santiago pleaded not guilty while
Santos died during the pendency of the suit.
The prosecution presented evidence that Santos
had been married to Estela Galang when he
asked Santiago to marry him. Santiago argued
that she could not be accused for bigamy
because she believed that Santos was still single
when they married. She argued that (1) her
marriage to Santos was void to the lack of a
marriage license; and (2) the prosecution had to
prove that her second marriage was valid for her
to be convicted of bigamy.
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The RTC convicted Santiago of bigamy, and said

that her marriage with Santos did not need a
marriage license as per Article 34 of the Family
Code because they cohabited long before their
marriage.
Santiago appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)
claiming her conviction was misplaced because
of the absence of a marriage license. She added
that their marriage does not fall under any of
those marriages exempt from a marriage license,
because they did not previously lived together
exclusively as husband and wife for at least five
years. She alleged the records showed that she
married Santos in 1997, or only four years since
she met him in 1993. The CA affirmed her
conviction.
HELD:
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the
accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity. After a careful perusal of
facts, it is clear that the second marriage was
void because the cohabitation of Santiago and
Santos were less that the five-year requirement.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the
exact opposite of this demonstrable fact.
However, despite such flaw in the second
marriage, we chastise this deceptive scheme that
hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit
marriage in an effort to escape criminal
prosecution.
The States penal laws on bigamy should not be
rendered nugatory by allowing individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment
(Tenebro v. Court of Appeals).

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Office of the Court Administrator v. Necessario

(A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013)
In this Administrative case, the Supreme Court,
(in ruling against judges who irregularly
solemnized marriages from 2003 to 2007), made
a statement that for the exception under Art. 34
to apply, the parties should have been
capacitated to marry each other during the
entire period [of five years of cohabitation] and
not only at the time of the marriage.
Art. 35 Void ab Initio Marriages
Montaez v. Cipriano (G.R. No. 181089, Oct.
22, 2012)
FACTS: On April 8, 1976, Lourdes married
Socrates. On January 24, 1983, while the first
marriage has not yet been judicially dissolved,
Lourdes married Silverio. Lourdes filed a
petition in 2001 to nullify her marriage with
Socrates for psychological incapacity. The first
marriage was declared null and void in 2003
In a case for bigamy filed against her, Lourdes
alleged that since her marriage was declared
void ab initio in 2003, there can be no bigamy.
RTC ruled that bigamy was not committed by
the respondent. The subsequent marriage was
solemnized in 1983 prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code; hence, the existing law at that
time did not require judicial declaration of
nullity as a condition to remarry.
ISSUE: W/N the declaration of nullity of
respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal
of the action for bigamy filed against her.
HELD: No, the declaration of nullity of the first
marriage does not justify the dismissal of the
bigamy case. The subsequent judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage would not change
the fact that she contracted the second marriage
during the subsistence of the first marriage. As
long as there is no judicial declaration, the
marriage is presumed to be existing. Therefore,
he/she who contracts a subsequent marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
first marriage can be prosecuted for bigamy.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same
must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage

is so declared can it be held as void, and so long

as there is no declaration, the presumption is that
the marriage exists.
Castillo v. Castillo, (G.R. No. 189607, April 18,
2016)
In 1972, respondent Lea married Benjamin
Bautista (Bautista). In 1979, Lea married
petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato). In May
2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that
his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her
subsisting marriage to Bautista. Lea opposed the
Petition, and contended among others that her
marriage to Bautista was null and void as they
had not secured any license therefor, and neither
of them was a member of the denomination to
which the solemnizing officer belonged. In
2002, Lea filed an action to declare her first
marriage to Baustista void. In 2003, the RTC
declared Lea's first marriage to Bautista null and
void ab initio. In 2004, Lea filed a Demurrer to
Evidence claiming that the proof adduced by
Renato was insufficient to warrant a declaration
of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it
was bigamous.
The RTC denied respondent's demurrer stating
that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was
subsisting when she married Renato in1979,
makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus
rendering it void ab initio. The RTC stressed that
so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior
marriage is valid and existing; that even if
respondent eventually had her first marriage
judicially declared void, the fact remains that the
first and second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed
to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first
marriage to Bautista before contracting her
second marriage with Renato.
Ruling: The validity of a marriage and all its
incidents must be determined in accordance with
the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In
this case, the law in force at the time Lea
contracted both marriages was the Civil Code.
The children of the parties were also born while
the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981,
and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this
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case using the provisions under the Civil Code

on void marriages.
This Court has held in the cases of People v.
Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v.
Amante, that the Civil Code contains no express
provision on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage. This
Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v.
Court of Appeals, that the requirement of a
judicial decree of nullity does not apply to
marriages that were celebrated before the
effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the
children of the parties were born while the Civil
Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that
those cases continue to be governed by Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the
then-prevailing rule:
Since the second marriage took place and all the
children were born before the xxx effectivity of
the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

ISSUE: W/N respondent is guilty of bigamy.

HELD: Yes, what makes a person criminally
liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.

The subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is

valid in view of the invalidity of her first
marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a
marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab
initio before the second marriage was contracted
is immaterial as this is not a requirement under
the Civil Code marriage license. That there was
no judicial declaration that the first marriage was
void ab initio before the second marriage was
contracted is immaterial as this is not a
requirement under the Civil Code.
People v. Odtuhan (G.R. No. 191566, Jul. 17,
2013)
FACTS: Respondent contracted marriage with
Jasmin in 1980. Thirteen years after, he married
Eleanor. However, his first marriage was
declared void ab initio because it was celebrated
without a marriage license. Meanwhile, the
second spouse died. Respondent was charged
with bigamy. He raises the defense that the facts
in the information do not charge an offense of
bigamy since his first marriage was void ab
initio; hence, there is an absence of an essential
element in the crime of bigamy.
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Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen (G.R. No. 189121,

July 31, 2013)
FACTS:
Eliseo Quiazon died, leaving behind his wife,
Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, two legitimate
daughters, Jenneth and Maria Jennifer Quiazon,
his common-law wife, Maria Lourdes Belen, and
their daughter, Elise Quiazon. After his death,
Elise, represented by her mother, filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration before the RTC.
Elise claims that she is the natural child of
Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other. Insisting on her claim, she
impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to
Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for
having been contracted during the subsistence of
the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico
(Filipito).
A marriage certificate issued by the Diocese of
Tarlac was presented as proof of the previous
marriage.
To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth
signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same
petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left her real
and personal properties.
To preserve the estate of her father and to
prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought
her appointment as administrator of her late
fathers estate.
ISSUE:
W/N Elise may impugn the void marriage
between Eliseo and Amelia Quiazon.
HELD:
YES. The existence of the previous marriage
between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently
established by the Certificate of Marriage. In the
absence of any showing that such marriage had
been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous
and, therefore, void ab initio.
In a void marriage, it is as though no marriage
has taken place. Thus, it cannot be the source of
rights. Any interested party may attack the

marriage directly or collaterally and may be

questioned even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage. There is no doubt that
Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia,
may impugn the existence of such marriage even
after the death of her father.
ART 36
Aurelio v. Aurelio (G.R. No. 175367, June 06,
2011)
The following are the guidelines to aid the
courts in the disposition of cases involving
psychological incapacity:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision;
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
FC as regards the husband and wife, as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision;
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts;
(8) The trial court must order the fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Sol. Gen. issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, to the
petition.
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Republic v. Galang (G.R. No. 168335, June 6,

2011)

Dio v. Dio
(G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011)

It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert

opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code if the totality of evidence shows
that psychological incapacity exists and its
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability
can be duly established, citing Marcos v.
Marcos.

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a

VOID marriage, regardless of its cause, the
property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner
and respondent in the case before the Court.
Article 50 of the FC only applies to Arts. 40 &
45 and does not apply to marriages declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties as
the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules
on co-ownership.

Pimentel v. Pimentel
(G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010)
The subsequent dissolution of their marriage
will have no effect on the alleged crime
(frustrated parricide) that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage.
Republic v. Encelan (G.R. No. 170022, Jan. 9,
2013)
HELD:
Psychological incapacity contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations, not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.
For sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling to constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.
Otherwise, the alleged sexual infidelity and
abandonment are merely grounds for legal
separation.
Camacho-Reyes V. Reyes,
(G.R. No. 185286, Aug. 18, 2010)
A recommendation for therapy does not
automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by
clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to
manage behavior. The recommendation that
respondent should undergo therapy does not
necessarily negate the finding that respondents
psychological incapacity is incurable.

Marietta N. Barrido v. Leonardo V. Nonato

(20 October 2014, G.R. No. 176492)
Held:
Article 147 is applicable, not Article 129. The
marriage between Nonato and Barrido was
declared void for psychological incapacity under
Article 36. Article 147 states that if the marriage
is void, wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares, and the property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies
when the following elements are present: must
be capacitated to marry each other; live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife;
and their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void.
ART. 38
Vda. de Carungcong v. People
(G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010)
ISSUE: If marriage gives rise to ones
relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of
ones spouse, does the extinguishment of
marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the
relationship by affinity?
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HELD: We hold that the second view is more

consistent with the language and spirit of Article
332(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The second
view (the continuing affinity view) maintains
that relationship by affinity between the
surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased
spouse continues even after the death of the
deceased spouse, regardless of whether the
marriage produced children or not.

ART. 39
Isidro Ablaza v. Republic
(G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010)
In 2000, Petitioner filed in the RTC in Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of the marriage contracted on December 26,
1949 between his late brother Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato, alleging that the
marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had
been celebrated without a marriage license, due
to such license being issued only on January 9,
1950.

beneficiaries. Edgardo passed away in January

2005.
Edna filed her claim for death benefits as
Edgardos wife, but the Social Security
Commission (SSC) denied this because records
showed that Edgardo had previously submitted
E-4 forms in 1982 designating Rosemarie Azote,
his spouse and son Elmer as beneficiaries.
The SSC dismissed Ednas petition stating that
(1) Edgardo did not revoke the designation of
Rosemarie as his wife-beneficiary; (2)
Rosemarie was still presumed to be Edgardos
legal wife; and (3) the NSO records revealed that
Edgardo and Rosemarie wed in 1982 thus
making Ednas and Edgardos marriage as not
valid without showing that his first marriage was
annulled or dissolved.
ISSUES:
W/N the SSS can determine the validity of
Ednas marriage to Edgardo considering
Rosemarie or Elmer did not appear or contest
Ednas claim.
W/N Edna is entitled to Edgardos SSS death
benefits as his legitimate wife.
HELD:

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC explicitly provides the limitation that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. However, this specifically
extends only to marriages covered by the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but,
being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.
ART 40
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION v.
AZOTE
(G.R. 209741, April 15, 2015)
FACTS:
Edgardo and Edna Azote married in 1992, and
their union produced six children. Edgardo, a
member of the Social Security System (SSS)
submitted to the SSS two E-4 forms in 1994 and
2001designating Edna and their six children as

Yes. Although the SSC is not intrinsically

empowered to determine the validity of
marriages, Section 4(b)(7) of R.A. 8282 (Social
Security Law) requires the SSC to examine
available statistics ensure that benefits go to the
right beneficiaries.
No. Edna is not qualified to be Edgardos
legitimate wife, thus she is not entitled to SSS
death benefits. She could not adduce evidence to
prove that Edgardos earlier marriage was either
annulled or dissolved, or whether there was a
declaration of Rosemaries presumptive death
before Ednas marriage to Edgardo.

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ART 41.
Republic v. Narceda
(G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013)
HELD:
No appeal can be had of the trial court's
judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Hearing of a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding.
Article 247 of the Family Code provides that the
judgment of the trial court in summary court
proceedings shall be immediately final and
executory. Thus, by the express provision of law,
the judgment of the RTC is not appealable.
Republic v. Sareogon, Jr.,
(G.R. No. 199194, Feb.10, 2016)
HELD: By express provision of law, the
judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a
matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be
had of the trial courts judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however,
that an aggrieved party may file a petition for
certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family
Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death may file a petition for certiorari with the
CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment
thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
From the Decision of the CA, the aggrieved
party may elevate the matter to this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
The degree of diligence and reasonable search
required by law is not met
(1) when there is failure to present the persons
from whom the present spouse allegedly made
inquiries especially the absent spouses relatives,
neighbors, and friends,

(2) when there is failure to report the missing

spouses purported disappearance or death to the
police or mass media, and
(3) when the present spouses evidence might or
would only show that the absent spouse chose
not to communicate, but not necessarily that the
latter was indeed dead. Because of this, Joses
efforts to locate the missing Netchie are below
the required degree of stringent diligence
prescribed by jurisprudence.
REPUBLIC v. Tampus,
(G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016)
FACTS:
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus (Nilda) was
married to Dante L. Del Mundo (Dante) on
November 29, 1975. Three days after, Dante, as
member of the AFP, was assigned to a combat
mission in Jolo, Sulu. Since then, Nilda heard no
news from Dante. In a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death which she filed
33 years after, Nilda testified that she exerted
efforts to find Dante by inquiring from his
parents, relatives, and neighbors, who also did
not know his whereabouts; and that after 33
years without any kind of communication from
him, she firmly believes that he is already dead.
HELD: Other than making inquiries with
Dantes parents, relatives, and neighbors, Nilda
made no further efforts to find her husband. She
never called or proceeded to the AFP
headquarters to request information about her
husband. She did not even seek the help of the
authorities or the AFP itself in finding him.
Nilda did not present Dante's family, relatives, or
neighbors as witnesses who could have
corroborated her asseverations that she earnestly
looked for Dante.
Because of this, Nilda failed to actively look for
her missing husband, and her purported earnest
efforts to find him by asking Dante's parents,
relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict
standard and degree of diligence required to
create a "well-founded belief' of his death.
ART. 42
Celerina J. Santos v. Ricardo T. Santos
(8 October 2014, G.R. No. 187061)
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FACTS:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband,
respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had
filed a petition for declaration of absence of
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage.
Celerina and Ricardo were married in 1980.
According to Ricardo, when the family business
did not prosper, Celerina convinced him to allow
her to work abroad as a domestic helper. She left
the Philippines and was never heard from again.
He also exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He
claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date
of his RTC petition since Celerina left. He
believed that she had passed away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about the
petition only in October 2008. She filed a
petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She claimed that
her residence was Quezon City, which was also
the conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo
left in May 2008. She also claimed that she
never resided in Tarlac and worked as a
domestic helper. She referred to a joint affidavit
executed by their children to support her
contention that Ricardo made false allegations.
She also argued that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the petition because it had
never been published in a newspaper.
The CA issued the resolution dismissing
Celerinas petition for annulment of judgment
for being a wrong mode of remedy. CA ruled
that filing of a sworn statement before the civil
registry declaring her reappearance under Article
42 of the Family Code to be the proper remedy.
HELD:
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the
Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper
remedy when the person declared presumptively
dead has never been absent. The choice of

remedy is important because remedies carry

with them certain admissions, presumptions, and
conditions. The Family Code provides that it is
the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded
belief by the present spouse that the absent
spouse is already dead, that constitutes a
justification for a second marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage. In turn, the
Family Code provides the presumptively dead
spouse with the remedy of terminating the
subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
ART 92.
Muoz v. Ramirez
(G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010)
In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda
inherited the residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption of
conjugal ownership pursuant to Articles 92 and
109 of the Family Code. The residential lot,
therefore, is Erlindas exclusive paraphernal
property.
Article 120 of the Family Code provides the
solution in determining the ownership of the
improvements that are made on the separate
property of the spouses, at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of
either or both spouses. When the value of the
paraphernal property is considerably more than
the conjugal improvement, said paraphernal
property does not become conjugal property.
ART.116
Dela Pena v. Avila
(G.R. No. 187490, February 08, 2012)
In the case Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, the phrase
"married to" is merely descriptive of the civil
status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to
mean that the husband is also a registered owner.
"Since there is no showing as to when the
property in question was acquired, the fact that
the title is in the name of the wife alone is
determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e.,
belonging exclusively to said spouse. (Conjugal
Partnership of Gains)
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ART. 117
Beumer v. Amores
(G.R. No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012)
FACTS:
Beumer, a Dutch National, and Amores, a
Filipina, was married on March 29, 1980. After
several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental
declared the nullity of their marriage on the
basis of the formers psychological incapacity.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and prayed
for the distribution of several properties claimed
to have been acquired during the subsistence of
their marriage.
Beumer testified that while the four other lots
were registered in the name of his wife, these
properties were acquired with the money he
received from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit.
ISSUE: W/N Beumer has the right to claim
reimbursement from the purchase of the real
properties subject to the dissolution
proceedings?
HELD:
NO. In the case of Muller v. Muller, the Court
held that one cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the prohibition against foreign ownership
of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
The Court cannot grant reimbursement to
petitioner given that he acquired no right
whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue
of its unconstitutional purchase. A contract that
violates the Constitution and the law is null and
void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and
produces no legal effect at all. (Distinguish
from Borromeo v. Descallar (2009)
relationship under Art. 148)
ART.121
Aguete v. Philippine National Bank
(G.R. No. 170166, April 6, 2011)
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in
the contract, that contract falls within the term "x

x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal

partnership."
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is
enough that the benefit to the family is apparent
at the signing of the contract. Where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family
business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that
such obligation will redound to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
ART. 122
Pana v Heirs of Juanito, Sr.
(G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10, 2012)
FACTS:
Prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana, his
wife Melecia, and others of murder before RTC
Surigao. The RTC acquitted Efren but found
Melecia and another person guilty and sentenced
them to the death. The RTC ordered those found
guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims,
jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 each as moral damages,
and P150,000.00 actual damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the
deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC ordered
the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of
real properties registered in the names of Efren
and Melecia.
ISSUE: W/N the conjugal properties can be
levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of
wifes civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: YES, the conjugal properties may be
levied and executed in light of the fact that
Melecia has no exclusive properties.
No prior liquidation of those assets is required.
Article 122 states that at the time of liquidation
of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall
be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned. However, the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the
FC must first be sufficiently covered by conjugal
properties before other properties may be levied
and executed.
Spouses Aggabao v. Parulan, Jr. And Parulan
(G.R. No. 165803, September 1, 2010)
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Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of

conjugal properties made after the effectivity of
the Family Code. The sale was made on March
18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity
of the Family Code. :
Article124.The administration and
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the
wife for proper remedy, which must be availed
of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
The power of administration does not include
acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are
acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to
dispose cannot proceed from an authority to
administer, and vice versa.
ART. 124
FLORES v. LINDO
(G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011)
Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family
Code provide that the powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without the written
consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent shall
be void. However, both provisions also state that
the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the
offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31
October 1995. The Special Power of Attorney
was executed on 4 November 1995. The
execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the
other spouse that perfected the continuing offer
as a binding contract between the parties,
making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a
valid contract.
ART. 129

Quiao v. Quiao (G.R. No 176556, July 04,

2012)
FACTS: Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint
for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B.
Quiao (Brigido). RTC rendered a decision
declaring the legal separation thereby awarding
the custody of their 3 minor children in favor of
Rita and all remaining properties shall be
divided equally between the spouses subject to
the respective legitimes of the children and the
payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children because Brigido is
the offending spouse.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT
EARNED denotes the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the
separate properties of each [of the] spouse and
the debts. It further held that after determining
the remainder of the properties, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children
because the offending spouse does not have any
right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2)
of the Family Code.
HELD: In the normal course of events, the
following are the steps in the liquidation of the
properties of the spouses:
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall
be made, separately listing the couple's conjugal
properties and their separate properties. In the
instant case, the trial court found that the couple
has no separate properties when they married.
xxx
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal
partnership shall pay the debts of the conjugal
partnership; xxx
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or
exclusive properties of the husband and of the
wife shall be returned to each of them. In the
instant case, since it was already established by
the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of
them.
The listed properties above are considered part
of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily,
what remains in the above-listed properties
should be divided equally between the spouses
and/or their respective heirs. However, since the
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trial court found the petitioner the guilty party,

his share from the net profits of the conjugal
partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family
Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the
absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal
partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the
guilty party's favor.
ART. 130
Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr. Et. Al. v. Servacio and
Go
(G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011)
Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of
the Family Code, any disposition of the conjugal
property after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership must be made only after the
liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided
share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely
sell and dispose of his undivided interest to
Servacio, but not the interest of his co-owners.
The proper action in cases like this is the
DIVISION of the common property as if it
continued to remain in the possession of the coowners who possessed and administered it
[Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile,
Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the
co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion
that might not be validly sold to her.
Art. 147
VIRGINIA OCAMPO V. DEOGRACIO
OCAMPO (G.R. No. 198908, August 03,
2015)
In a void marriage, as in those declared void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, the
property relations of the parties during the
period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family
Code provides that in the absence of proof to
the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been

obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry,

and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party
of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Properties acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry should, therefore, be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. Thus, the trial court and the
appellate court correctly held that the parties will
share on equal shares considering that Virginia
failed to prove that the properties were acquired
solely on her own efforts.
Attempts to establish respondent as an
irresponsible and unfaithful husband, as well
as family man were made but the testimonies
adduced towards that end, failed to fully
convince the Court that respondent should be
punished by depriving him of his share of the
conjugal property because of his indiscretion.
Thus, the presumption remains that said
properties were obtained by the spouses'
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
jointly owned by them in equal shares.
UY V. SPOUSES LACSAMANA (G.R. No.
206220, August 19, 2015)
FACTS: Uy filed with the RTC a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Documents
against his alleged wife Rosca and the spouses
Lacsamana to whom his wife sold two parcels of
land. Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband
of Rosca; that they lived together as husband
and wife from the time they were married in
1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived
apart. Uy and Rosca had eight children. Uy
alleged that he and his wife acquired 2 parcels of
land in 1964, but in gross and evident bad
faith, Rosca executed and signed a false and
simulated Deed of Sale in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana.
Rosca argued that she was never married to Uy.
She testified that sometime before or during
World War II, she and Uy cohabited and settled
in Batangas. The couple attempted to
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formalize their marital union with a marriage

ceremony.

that the subject property is not co-owned but is

paraphernal.

[Rosca argued that she was never married to

Uy. She testified that sometime before or during
World War II, she and Uy cohabited and settled
in Batangas. The couple attempted to
formalize their marital union with a
marriage ceremony. ]

ART. 148
Ventura v. Spouses Paulino
(G.R. No. 202932 October 23, 2013)
In unions between a man and a woman who are
incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership
over the properties acquired during the
subsistence of that relationship shall be based on
the actual contribution of the parties.
In Borromeo v. Descallar, it was held that it is
necessary for each of the partners to prove his or
her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and
equal contribution do not apply.

However, the celebration was not consummated

because of the bombings which occurred on the
day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were
unable to secure a marriage contract. Rosca
alleged that Uy had an affair with another
woman and sired children with her which led to
their physical separation before the year 1973.
HELD: Uy and Rosca were not married. Hence,
the sale contracted by Rosca is valid. There is a
presumption established in our Rules "that a
man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. "Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.
However, this presumption may be
contradicted by a party and overcome by other
evidence. Marriage may be proven by testimony
of one of the parties to the marriage, or one of
the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the
person who officiated at the solemnization of
the marriage, has been held to be admissible
to prove the fact of marriage. Documentary
evidence may also be shown.
The best documentary evidence of a marriage is
the marriage contract itself. Uy was not able
to present any copy of the marriage
certificate. The presumption of marriage has
been sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there
is plethora of evidence showing that Uy and
Rosca were never actually married to each other.
Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he
was legally married to Rosca, their property
relations would be governed by Article 147 of
the Family Code which applies when a
couple living together were not incapacitated
from getting married. The provision states that
properties acquired during cohabitation are
presumed co-owned unless there is proof to
the contrary. We agree with both the trial and
appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove

Soledad L. Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna

(23 July 2015, G.R. No.
171914)
FACTS:
JLL obtained a divorce from Eugenia from the
Dominican Republic, and on the same day,
contracted another marriage, with Soledad
Lavadia, the respondent. JLL and Soledad
returned to the Phils. where they lived as
husband and wife. JLL organized a law firm and
bought a condominium unit to be used as the
office of the law firm. When JLL died, the firm
was dissolved. The condominium unit was
partitioned, and the pro-indiviso share of JLL
was determined to be 25/100. This was claimed
by his son from his first marriage, Gregorio.
The property, including law books, office
furniture, and equipment, is subject to the
complaint by Soledad against the heir of JLL.
The RTC ruled that the property was acquired
through JLLs sole industry, and that Soledad has
no right as owner. She was, however, declared as
the owner of the law books.
HELD:
The divorce did not dissolve the marriage
between JLL and Eugenia. Pursuant to the
nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this
case by virtue of JLL and Eugenia having
remained Filipinos until JLLs death. JLLs
marriage to Soledad, being bigamous, was void,
and the properties acquired during their marriage
are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
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Art. 148 of the Family Code provides that only

the property acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned in common
and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima facie presumed
to be equal. However, for this presumption to
arise, proof of actual contribution was required.
Soledad failed to prove that she made an actual
contribution to purchase the condominium unit.
Also, it is logical that Soledad, not being a
lawyer, had no participation in the law firm or in
the purchase of books for the law firm.
Art. 152:
Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan (G.R. No. 178288
Aug. 15, 2012)
FACTS: The court issued a judgment against
Sps. Fortaleza which resulted to the execution of
their conjugal house.
ISSUE: W/N he family home can be executed.
HELD: A family home is exempt from
execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code, provided such claim for
exemption should be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Failure to do so estops the party from
later claiming the exemption.
In this case, reasonable time for purposes of the
law on exemption does not mean a time after the
expiration of the one-year period for a judgment
debtor to redeem the property.
ART. 155
DE MESA v. ACERO (G.R. No. 185064,
January 16, 2012)
The foregoing rules on constitution of family
homes, for purposes of exemption from
execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before
August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family
home either judicially or extrajudicially in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code;
Second, family residences constructed after
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be
family homes and thus exempt from execution
from the time it was constituted and lasts as long
as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein;

Third, family residences not judicially or

extrajudicially constituted as a family home
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but
were existing thereafter, are considered as family
homes by operation of law and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code
is a personal privilege granted to the judgment
debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the
sheriff, but by the debtor him/herself before the
sale of the property at public auction.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a
family home and, thus, should have been exempt
from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have
asserted the subject property being a family
home and its being exempted from execution at
the time it was levied or within a reasonable
time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming
the exemption of the property from execution.
ART. 160
Eulogio v. Bell (G.R. NO. 186322, July 8,
2015)
In a 1998 decision, the RTC ruled that the
mortgage cannot bind the property in question
which was owned by the Bells for violating
Article 160 of the Family Code since the
mortgage was not consented to in writing by a
majority of the beneficiaries of the family home.
In 2004, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution
upon the Bells family home. The Bells claimed
that the property cannot be sold because it is a
family home and that the Eulogios ploy to relitigate the issue had long been settled with
finality (res judicata) by the 1998 RTC decision.
The CA ruled that the RTC decision in 1998
only declared their house and lot as a family
home, not the issue of whether it may be sold in
execution.
HELD:
Respondents family home cannot be sold on
execution under Article 160 of the family Code.
The issue of whether the property in dispute
exceeded the statutory limit of Php300,000 has
already been determined with finality by the trial
court. Its findings necessarily meant that the
property is exempt from execution.
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To warrant the execution sale of respondents

family home under Article 160, the Eulogios
must establish that (1) there was an increase in
its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from
voluntary improvements on the property
introduced by the persons constituting the family
home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and
(3) the increased actual value exceeded the
maximum allowed under Article 157.
The Eulogios have not proven that they are
protected by the exceptions under Articles 155
and 160 of the Family Code.
Art. 172
Salas v. Matusalem (G.R. No. 180284 April
10, 2013)
HELD:
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of
the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in
the birth certificate, the placing of his name by
the mother, doctor, registrar or other person is
incompetent evidence of paternity.
A baptismal certificate considered as public
documents but only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so
specified. They are not competent evidence of
the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
childs paternity.
Rodolfo S. Aguilar v. Edna G. Siasat (28
January 2015, G.R. 200169)
Facts:
Spouses Aguilar died, intestate and without
debts. Their estate include two parcels of land
which is the subject of the controversy.
Petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC
a civil case for mandatory injunction with
damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat,
alleging that he is the only son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he
discovered that the subject titles were missing,
and he suspected that someone from the Siasat
clan had stolen the same.
In her Answer, respondent claimed that
petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir
of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who
was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of
generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner

is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar

spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased
his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter
inherited the conjugal share of the former; that
upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar,
her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as
she had no issue; and that the subject titles were
not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping
by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.
To prove filiation, petitioner presented school
records stating that Alfredo Aguilar is
petitioners parent; ITR indicating that
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his mother and
Alfredo Aguilars Social Security System (SSS)
Form E-1 dated October 10, 1957, a public
instrument subscribed and made under oath by
Alfredo Aguilar during his employment with
BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb
marks indicating that petitioner, who was born
on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent.
Respondent offered an Affidavit previously
executed by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar
announcing that she and Alfredo have no issue,
and that she is the sole heir to Alfredos estate.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners SSS E-1 Form, a
public document, is sufficient to establish
legitimate filiation with his father, Alfredo
Aguilar and W/N respondent has personality to
impugn legitimacy of the petitioner.
HELD:
Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 satisfies the
requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship of petitioner to the Aguilar spouses
under Article 172 of the Family Code. Filiation
may be proved by an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, and such due recognition in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act
of acknowledgment of the child, and no further
court action is required.
As to petitioners argument that respondent has
no personality to impugn his legitimacy and
cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy, and that
the action to impugn his legitimacy has already
prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of
the Family Code, the Court has held before that

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Article 263 (Old Civil Code provision of Art.

170 of the FC)
refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child, to assert and prove that a person is not a
mans child by his wife. However, the present
case is not one impugning petitioners
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely
that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose,
but that she is not a child of Jose at all.
Nevertheless, since the petitioner has shown that
he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses,
then he is also the heir to the latter's estate.
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO V.
KAREN SANTOS
(G.R. No.
197099, September 28, 2015)
In the instant case, the filiation of a child herein respondent - is not at issue. Petitioner
does not claim that respondent is not the
legitimate child of his deceased brother Rufino
and his wife Caridad. What petitioner alleges is
that respondent is not the child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad at all. When
petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child
of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad in
the proceedings below, jurisprudence shows that
the trial court was correct in admitting and
ruling on the secondary evidence of respondent even if such proof is similar to the evidence
admissible under the second paragraph of Article
172 and despite the instant case not being a
direct action to prove one's filiation.
We do not agree with the conclusion of both
courts a quo. The appellate court itself ruled that
the irregularities consisting of the superimposed
entries on the date of birth and the name of the
informant made the document questionable. The
corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, further confirmed
that the entries on the date of birth and the
signature of the informant are alterations on the
birth certificate which rendered the document
questionable. To be sure, even the respondent
herself did not offer any evidence to explain
such irregularities on her own birth certificate.
These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged
birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow

the presumption of regularity attached to

respondent's birth certificate.
[irregularities consisting of the superimposed
entries on the date of birth and the name of the
informant made the document questionable. The
corroborating testimony of Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, further confirmed
that the entries on the date of birth and the
signature of the informant are alterations on the
birth certificate which rendered the document
questionable. ]
ART. 175
Jesse U. Lucas V. Jesus S. Lucas (G.R. No.
190710, June 6, 2011)
FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition
to establish FILIATION with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the
RTC. Jesse alleged that he is the son of Elsie
who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S.
Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents
which include (a) petitioners certificate of live
birth (no father stated); (b) petitioners baptismal
certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma,
showing that he graduated from Saint Louis
University in Baguio City with a degree in
Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation
from the same school; (e) Certificate of
Recognition from UP College of Music; and (f)
clippings of several articles from different
newspapers about petitioner, as a musical
prodigy.
HELD:
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the
DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or
good cause for the holding of the test.
The same condition precedent should be applied
in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
SURNAMES and 176
Grande v. Antonio (G.R. No. 206248
February 18, 2014)
FACTS:
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Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio for a period

of time lived together as husband and wife,
although Antonio was at that time already
married to someone else. Out of this illicit
relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis
and Jerard Patrick. The children were not
expressly recognized by respondent as his own
in the Record of Births of the children in the
Civil Registry.
The parties relationship eventually turned sour,
and Grande left for the United States with her 2
children. This prompted Antonio to file a
Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition
with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental
Physical Custody, Correction/ Change of
Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. Appending the
petition was a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.
ISSUE: W/N Antonio may compel the use of his
surname for his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation.
HELD: NO. The general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or
her mother (Art 176 of the Family Code). The
exception provided is, in case his or her filiation
is expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or
when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child
may use the surname of the father.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged
by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, Antonios
prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental
authority is given to the mother, then custody
over the minor children also goes to the mother,
unless she is shown to be unfit.
As to the matter of the change of surname of the
illegitimate children. There is no legal basis for
the court to change the surname of the children.
To do otherwise would be to contravene the
explicit and unequivocal provision of the law.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to
decide if they want to use the surname of their
father or not. It is not the father (herein
respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.

BBB v. AAA, (G.R. No. 193225, February 09,

2015)
FACTS: When BBB married AAA, the birth
certificate of CCC (who was AAAs son by a
previous relationship) was amended to make it
appear that he was a legitimated of BBB and
AAA. In a VAWC case against BBB, the PPO
included support for CCC. BBB raises the issue
of CCC not being his child.
HELD: BBB cannot raise the issue of CCCs
status and filiation in the instant petition. In
Tison v. CA, the Court held that "the civil status
[of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally." The
childs legitimacy "cannot be contested by way
of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose." The instant
petition sprang out of AAAs application for a
PPO before the RTC. Hence, BBBs claim that
CCC is not his biological son is a collateral
issue, which this Court has no authority to
resolve now.
Support (Art. 194 )
Lim Lua v. Lua (G.R. No. 175279-80, Jun. 5,
2013)
FACTS:
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage with
respondent Danilo Y. Lua, and for support
pendent lite amounting to P500,000. Respondent
on the other hand, refused and manifested that
he is only willing to give as much as 75,000 as
support. The RTC ruled that based on the
evidence presented the proper amount to paid
should be 115,000. This was not assailed by any
party thus, it became final and executory. Issues
once again arose, when respondent in complying
with its obligation, deducted from the amount of
support in arrears, the advances given by him to
his children and petitioner representing the value
of two expensive cars bought by respondent for
his children plus their maintenance cost, travel
expenses and purchases through credit card of
items other than groceries and dry goods.
HELD:
The amount of support which those related by
marriage and family relationship is generally
obliged to give each other shall be in proportion
to the resources or means of the giver and to the
needs of the recipient. Such support comprises
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everything indispensable for sustenance,

dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family.
Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought
by respondent for his children plus their
maintenance cost, travel expenses, etc., should
have been disallowed, as these bear no relation
to the judgment awarding support pendente lite.
Any amount respondent seeks to be credited as
monthly support should only cover those
incurred for sustenance and household expenses.
Art. 198: Interlocutory Orders on Support
Calderon, Ma Carminia v. Roxas, Jose Antonio
and CA
(G.R. No. 185595, Jan 9, 2013)
FACTS: Complaint of declaration of nullity of
marriage was filed by Calderon against husband
Roxas. Trial court granted support pendente lite,
ordering Roxas to support minor children. Upon
motion, the support was reduced. The order to
reduce support was appealed from, but was
denied by CA.
ISSUE: Whether orders on the matter of support
pendente lite are interlocutory or final.
HELD: Orders on matters of support pendente
lite are interlocutory. It decides an incidental
matter but is not a final decision on the main
issue of the case. The proper remedy is a special
civil action, not an appeal of the interlocutory
order. Thus, CA properly dismissed the appeal.
Art. 203
Gotardo v. Buling (G.R. No. 165166,
Aug. 15, 2012)
HELD: Since filiation is beyond question,
support follows as a matter of obligation; a
parent is obliged to support his/her child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. The amount is
variable and, for this reason, no final judgment
on the amount of support is made as the same
shall be in proportion to the resources or means
of the giver and the necessities of the recipient.
It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the
necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.
Designation of Parental Authority (Art. 213)

Beckett v. Sarmiento(A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326,

Jan. 30, 2013)
FACTS:
Geoffrey, an Australian citizen,
was previously married to Eltesa, a Filipino
citizen. Said marriage bore a child Geoffrey, Jr.
The couple were subsequently divorced and by
virtue of a compromise agreement, custody over
Geoffrey, Jr. was granted to Geoffrey who took
his son with him to Australia, subject to yearly
Christmas visits here. In one of the Christmas
visits, Geoffrey consented to have Geoffrey, Jr.
stay with Eltesa even after the holidays,
provided she return the child on January 9, 2011.
However, on the said date, Eltesa did not return
Geoffrey Jr., hence, this prompted Geoffrey to
file a petition for violation of RA 7610 and
prayer for the issuance of a writ of Habeas
Corpus.
During the conference on the application for
habeas corpus, Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years
old, displayed inside the courtroom hysterical
conduct, shouting and crying, not wanting to let
go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the father,
was a total stranger. Despite Geoffrey Jr.s
outburst, Judge Sarmiento issued an Order,
directing Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to
Geoffrey. For some reason, the turnover of did
not materialize.
Hence, Geoffrey sought the immediate
implementation of the Order. But instead of
enforcing said order, Judge Sarmiento, issued
another order giving Eltesa provisional custody
over Geoffrey, Jr. . It is Geoffreys main
contention is that Judge Sarmiento can no longer
grant provisional custody to Eltesa in light of the
adverted judgment on compromise agreement.
HELD:
Respondent judge, in granting provisional
custody, did not disregard the res judicata rule.
The matter of custody, to borrow from Espiritu
v. Court of Appeals, is not permanent and
unalterable [and] can always be re-examined and
adjusted. The situation of the parents and even
of the child can change, such that sticking to the
agreed arrangement would no longer be to the
latters best interest.
Under, the Family Code, in parental authority
the Court shall take into account all relevant
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considerations, especially the choice of the child

over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen
is unfit. Geoffrey Jr., at the time when he
persistently refused to be turned over to his
father, was already over 7 years of age. As such,
he was very much capable of deciding, based on
his past experiences, with whom he wanted to
stay.
RA 7610
People v. Caballo (G.R. No. 198732, Jun 10,
2013)
Facts:
AAA, then 17 years old, met
Caballo, then 23 years old. The two became
sweethearts. Sometime in 1998, Caballo
persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with
him. This was followed by several more
incidents of sexual congress.
Issue: W/O Caballo is guilty of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610.
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or
due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for
rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be;
Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve

(12) yeas of age shall be reclusion temporal in

its medium period, x x x
(c) x x x
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610 are the following:
1.
The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2.
The said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and
3.
The child, whether male or female, is
below 18 years of age
(Jojit Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760,
July 20, 2011)
Held:
A child is deemed exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse when the
child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under coercion or influence
of any adult, syndicate or group. Consent is not
material in cases under RA 7610.
Moreover, the abuse is
punishable whether habitual or not. In the case,
Caballos actuations of assuring AAA of his love
and promise to marry may be classified as
coercion and influence within the purview
of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. These were
meant to influence AAA to set aside her
reservations and eventually give into having sex
with him, in which he succeeded.
Interpretation was criticized as early as in
Olivarez v. CA, G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005
J. Carpio, dissenting: The Information failed to
allege the second essential element of the crime
as defined in Section 5 of RA 7610 [The said act
is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse],
thus, Olivarez cannot be convicted for violation
of RA 7610. The Information is void to charge
Olivarez for violation of Section 5 of RA 7610.
Otherwise, Olivarez would be deprived of his
constitutional right to be informed of the charge
against him.
This special circumstance already exists when
the accused performs acts of lasciviousness on
the child. In short, the acts of lasciviousness that
the accused performs on the child are separate
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and different from the childs exploitation in

prostitution or subjection to other sexual
abuse.
Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused
performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child
who is neither exploited in prostitution nor
subjected to other sexual abuse.
The phrase other sexual abuse refers to any
sexual abuse other than the acts of
lasciviousness complained of and other than
exploitation in prostitution. Such other sexual
abuse could fall under acts encompassing
[O]bscene publications and indecent shows
mentioned in Section 3(d)(3) of RA 7610.
George Bongalon v. People, (G.R. No. 169533,
March 20, 2013)
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact
by the RTC and CA that the petitioner struck
Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped
Jayson on the face, we disagree with their
holding that petitioners acts constituted child
abuse under RA 7610. The records did not
establish beyond reasonable doubt that his
laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to
debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of
Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson.
With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that
specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being that was so essential in the crime of child
abuse. Crime is slight physical injuries.
Virginia Jabalde y Jamandron v. People, (G.R
No. 195224, June 15, 2016)
Jabalde is guilty of slight physical injuries only
and not child abuse under R.A. 7610. Jabalde
was accused of slapping and striking Lin, but the
records do not show that Jabalde intended to
debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of Lin as a human being. The laying
of hands on Lin was an effect of Jabaldes
emotional outrage after being informed that her
daughters head was punctured which made her
think that she was already dead. Dr. Munoz
stated that the abrasions may have been mildly
inflicted. This runs contrary to the accusation
that she intended to abuse or maltreat Lin,
because if she did, she could have easily hurt the
7 year old boy with heavy blows. As a mother,

the idea of the death of her child caused an

instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her
own child from harm and danger in the form of
the mild abrasions inflicted on Lin. Having lost
the strength of her mind, she lacked the intent to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being that is
essential in the child of crime abuse.
Felina Rosaldes v. People, (G.R. No. 173988,
October 8, 2014)
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a
child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only
when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused
to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being should
it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is
punished under the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner "went overboard in disciplining
Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old
boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on
the left thigh and when she held him in the
armpits and threw him on the floor; and as the
boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him
to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a
sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further
held the boy up by his ears and pushed him
down on the floor."
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher,
could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil,
her infliction of the physical injuries on him was
unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy
even fainted from the violence suffered at her
hands. She could not justifiably claim that she
acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her
physical maltreatment of him was precisely
prohibited by no less than the Family Code,
which has expressly banned the infliction of
corporal punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority.
Such established circumstances proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the petitioner was guilty of
child abuse by deeds that degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of
Michael Ryan as a human being.
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