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declarations are contradictory than these lose value. Best form of dying
declaration is in the form of questions and answers. If it is in the form of
narrations it is still good because nothing is being prompted and every thing
is coming as such from the mind of the person making it. If a person is not
capable of speaking or writing he can make a gesture in the form of yes or
no by nodding and even such type of declaration is valid. Whenever this is
being recorded in the form of questions and answers precaution should be
taken that exactly what questions are asked and what answers are given by
the patient those should be written. It is preferred that it should be written in
the vernacular which the patient understands and speaks. It is best that it is
recorded by the magistrate but if there is no time to call the magistrate due
to the deteriorating condition of the victim it can be recorded by anybody
e.g. public servant like doctor or any other person. Courts discourage the
recording of dying declaration by the police officers but if there is no body
else to record it dying declarations written by the police officers are also
considered by the courts. If these are not recorded by the magistrate it is
better that signatures of the witnesses are taken who are present at the time
of recording it. In burn cases usually it is debated the person is not capable
of making dying declaration due to the effect of burns or due to the narcotic
sedation given to treat burns. But Gupta and Jani have opined that neither
effect due to burns nor the drugs used to treat burns victims conventionally
affects the higher functions. Therefore they safely concluded that compos
mentis is not affected either by burns or by its treatment 3[3]. If the person
making it is imbecile or is of tender age and was incompetent to testify due
to this reason, that dying declaration would not be valid 4[4] As a measure of
safety original dying declaration should be sent to the court like FIR and its
Photostat should be kept in the case file5[5]. It does not matter that the
person has put a thumb impression or signed it if this is duly witnessed. But
in the court question does arise if a person who can sign puts a thumb
impression. If a literate person putting the thumb impression is in such a
condition that he cannot sign e.g. he was lying in the bed and could not get
up to sign it or it was inconvenient for him to put thumb impression due to
his condition (intravenous drip on the back of hand) or injury e.g. injury on
the right hand in a right handed person. In the absence of such conditions if
there is thumb impression and this is not witnessed by disinterested persons
a doubt may be created whether this was done after the person died to take
revenge by some interested person. There is usually no time limit that dying
declaration becomes invalid if the person died after many months after
making the declaration. Cases are on record when it was considered valid
3
4
5
after 4 months. Even the HISTORY given by the injured recorded by the
doctor in the case file has been considered as dying declaration by the
honorable Court if it is mentioned that the patient told in the history that
incident occurred in such and such manner which was responsible for the
death of the victim6[6]. Hence it is important that if such history is written as
narrated by the victim it should be recorded carefully, keeping in mind the
mentioned finding of the court. First information report got recorded by the
police has been taken as dying declaration by the Honorable Supreme Court,
when the person did not survive to get his dying declaration recorded 7[7].
But when patient remained admitted in hospital for sufficient days i.e. for 8
days FIR cannot be treated as dying declaration 8[8]. A suicidal note written
found in the clothes of the deceased it is in the nature of dying declaration
and is admissible in evidence under Section 32 of Indian Evidence Act9[9].
CASE LAWS:
Paras yadav and others Vs. State of Bihar10[1]
Facts
Accused Paras Yadav and two others assaulted Sambhu Yadav at about 8.00
p.m. and gave him Chhura (knife) blow in abdomen. On hulla (noise) being
raised some public persons and Sub-Inspector of Police, SH. Dinanth Singh
reached the spot while he was on patrolling duty. He recorded the fardbeyan
under section 307 IPC., The victim was shifted to hospital where he
succumbed to the injuries at night of 8th February, 1983. The Sessions Court
convicted the accused by relying on fardbeyan (Ext. 1) which was treated as
dying declaration by the Learned Addl Sessions Judge. After appreciating the
entire evidence on record the High Court has upheld the conviction of the
appellants. Hence, this appeal by special leave is preferred.
Held
6
7
8
9
10
In out view, there is no reason to disbelieve the oral dying declaration and
deposed by number of witnesses and as recorded in fardbeyan of deceased
Sambhu Yadav. The fardbeyan was recorded by the Police Sub-Inspector on
the scene of occurrence itself, within few minutes of the occurrence of the
incident. Witnesses also rushed to the scene of offence after haring hulla
gulla. The medical evidence as deposed by PW-II also corroborates the
prosecution version. Hence, the Courts below have rightly convicted Paras
Yadav for the offence punishable under section 302 IPC.
Gulam Hussain Vs State of Delhi11[2]
Facts
In the instant case the Dying Declaration Exhibit PW 22/B was recorded by
PW 22 ASI Balwan Singh in the hospital on 14-10-1989 at about 6.30 a.m.
after getting an opinion from the Doctor that the injured was fit for
statement. The endorsement of the doctor is recorded as Exhibit PW 22/A.
Legal Issue: Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that
as the statement was recovered by the investigating officer, which was
treated as FIR, the same could not be treated as dying declaration and was
inadmissible in evidence.
Held
The submission has no substance because at the time of recording the
statement PW 22 Balwan Singh did not possess the capacity of an
investigating officer as the investigation had not commenced by then. Such
a statement can be treated as a dying declaration, which is admissible in
evidence under section 32 (1) of the Evidence Act. After critically scanning
the statement of PW 22 ASI Balwan Singh and details of Exhibit PW 22.B, we
have no hesitation to hold that the aforesaid statement was voluntarily made
by the deceased which was reduced to writing and have rightly been treated
as dying declaration after the death of the marker.
11
Admissible
It is not always necessary that a dying declaration should be certified by a
doctor before reliance could be placed on the same. But then in the absence
of any such certificate, the Courts should be satisfied that from the material
on record it is safe to place reliance on such uncertified declaration.
The basic infirmity committed by the High Court is in assuming that for a
dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, it is necessary that the maker
None of the language dictionaries define the word dying declaration jointly
but the words dying and declaration has been shown separately the literal
meaning of which a declaration or statement which is going to die. But if we
go by these meanings the whole meaning of dying declaration will loose its
significance. Therefore this meaning cannot be assigned to the term dying
declaration.
1.3 Meaning given by Law Lexicons
Whartons Law Lexicon, quoting from R v. Perry (1909)2 K.B. 697 has stated
about dying declaration as follows: Deathbed or dying declarations are constantly admitted in evidence. The
principle of this exception to the general rule is founded partly on the lawful
situation of the dying person, which is considered to be as powerful over his
conscience as the obligation of an oath, and partly on a supposed absence of
interest in a person on the verge of the next world, which dispenses with the
necessity of cross-examination. But before such declaration can be admitted
in evidence against a prisoner, it must be satisfactorily proved that the
deceased, at the time of making them, was conscious of his danger and
given up all hopes of recovery.'
Blacks Law Dictionary defines dying declaration as follows: Dying declaration means the statement made by a person who believes that
he is about to die, in reference to the manner in which he received the
injuries of which he is dying, or other immediate cause of his death or in
reference to the person who inflicted such injuries or of a person who is
charged with or suspected of having committed them. Such statements are
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule in a trial for
homicide and occasionally, at least in some jurisdiction in other cases where
the killing of the declarant is the crime charged to the defendant.
The dying declaration is thus the statement by the person as to cause of his
death or as to any of the circumstances relating to death. The words dying
declaration mean a statement written or verbal of relevant facts made by
the person who is dead. Statements made by a person who believes he or
she is about to die, concerning the cause or circumstance surrounding his or
her impending death.
1.5 CONTENT AND SCOPE:
Under common law, a statement made by a person on the point of death is
admissible in evidence even if it is hearsay. That is, if X told Y that Z had
stabbed him, then if Y told a court under oath what X had said, this may be
Dying declaration considered as hearsay because the person who made such
a statement is not available before the court to depose. In addition, the
person who heard from such a dead person and who appears before the
court to depose the facts in question is not in a position to vouchsafe
whether those facts which he heard, from the dying person are true or not.
At the outset, it is necessary to note, that a dying declaration as envisaged
by s.32(1) need not necessarily be from a person who is dying at the time of
making the statement. In addition, at the time of making such declaration, it
is not necessary that he or she should know that there is impending death. In
other words, at the time of making such declaration, there is no legal
mandate that such person must entertain expectation of death.
Moreover, dying declaration can be considered as relevant evidence in both
criminal and civil proceedings whenever the cause of his or her death comes
into question. However, it is settled law that it is not safe to convict an
accused person merely on the evidence furnished by a dying declaration
without further corroboration because such a statement is not made on oath
and is not subject to cross-examination and because the maker of it might be
mentally and physically in a state of confusion and might well be drawing
upon his imagination while he was making the declaration. It is in this light
that the different dying declarations made by the deceased and sought to be
proved in the case have to be considered.
This provision has been made by the legislature; advisedly; as a matter of
sheer necessity by way of an exception to the general rule that hearsay is no
evidence and that evidence which has not been tested by cross-examination,
is not admissible. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the veracity of
the statements made by a witness. In the view of the legislature, that test is
supplied by a solemn occasion when it was made, namely, at a time when
the person making the statement was in danger of losing his life. At such
serious and solemn moment, that person in not expected to tell lies and
secondly; the test of cross-examination would not be available. Thus, a
statement made by a dying person as to the cause of death, has been
accorded by the legislature; a special sanctity which should, on first
principles, be respected unless there are clear circumstances brought out in
the evidence to show that the person making the statement was not in
expectation of death, not that the circumstance would affect the
admissibility of the statement; but only its weight. It may also be shown by
evidence that a dying declaration is not reliable because it was not made at
the earliest opportunity, and, thus, there was a reasonable ground to believe
its having been put into the mouth of the dying man, when his power of
resistance against telling a falsehood, was ebbing away; or because the
statement has hot been properly recorded.
It is, as if the maker of the dying declaration was present in the court,
making a statement, stating the facts contained in the declaration, with the
difference that the declaration is not a statement on oath and the maker
thereof cannot be subjected to cross-examination. If in a given case a
particular dying declaration suffers from any infirmities, either of its own or
as disclosed by other evidence adduced in the case or circumstances coming
to its notice, the court may as a rule of prudence look for corroboration and if
the infirmities by such as render the dying declaration so infirm as to prick
the conscience of the court, the same may be refused to be accepted as
forming safe basis for conviction. In the case at hand, the dying declarations
are five.
However, it is not the number of dying declarations, which will weight with
the court. A singular dying declaration not suffering from any infirmity and
found worthy of being relied on may form the basis of conviction. On the
other hand if every individual dying declaration consisting in a plurality is
found to be infirm, the court would not be persuaded to act thereon merely
because the dying declarations are more than one and apparently
consistent.
The admissibility is founded on principle of necessity.
A dying-declaration not being a deposition in Court, neither made on oath
nor in the presence of the accused nor therefore not tested by crossexamination is yet admissible in evidence as an exception to the general rule
against the admissibility of hearsay. The admissibility is founded on the
principle of necessity. The weak points of a dying declaration serve to put the
court on its guard while testing its reliability and impose on the court an
obligation to closely scrutinize all the relevant attendant circumstances. [See
Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab 1971 (1) SCJ 871] One of the important
tests of the reliability of the dying declaration is a finding arrived at by the
Court as to satisfaction that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and
capable of making a statement at the point of time when the dying
declaration purports to have been made and/or recorded. The statement
may be brief or longish. It is not the length of the statement but the fit state
of mind of the victim to narrate the facts of occurrence which has relevance.
If the court finds that the capacity of the maker of the statement to narrate
the facts was impaired or the court entertains grave doubts whether the
deceased was in a fit physical and mental state to make the statement the
court may in the absence of corroborate evidence lending assurance to the
contents of the declaration refuse to act on it.
In Bhagwan Das v. State of Rajasthan - AIR 1957 SC 589] the learned
Sessions Judge found inter alia that it was improbable if the maker of the
dying declaration was able to talk so as to make a statement. This Court
while upholding the finding of the learned Sessions Judge held the dyingdeclaration by itself insufficient for sustaining a (SIC)con charge of murder. In
Kako Singh @ Surendra Singh Vs State of M.P. -AIR 1982 SC 1021 the dying
A dying declaration under English Law means the statement of a person who
has died explaining the circumstances of his death. According to English Law,
the statement is relevant only when the charge is that of murder or
manslaughter. In cases of homicide, statements made by a person, since
deceased, are admissible to prove the cause and circumstances of the man's
death. Such statements are called 'dying declarations'. But such
statements under the English law should be made when he was in "settled,
hopeless expectation of imminent death". In Halsbury's Laws of England, the
law as to dying declaration has been stated thus:
Upon the trial of an indictment for murder or manslaughter, and only in such
cases a verbal or written statement made by the deceased person whose
death is thus subject of the charge although that statement was not upon
oath and was not made in the presence of the defendant, is admissible in
evidence either against or for the defendant, provided that it was made at a
time when all hope of living had left the mind of the declarant that is, the
declarant must have entertained a settled hopeless expectation of death,
death being imminent or impending, but he need not have been expecting
immediate death. So Many cases have been decided which illustrate the
application of this principle, and show in what circumstances dying
declarations have been held to be admissible or inadmissible in evidence.
Dying declaration is nothing but a statement, written or oral, made by a
person who is dead. Such statement is relevant under section 32.
Their admissibility rests on the principle that a sense of impending death
produces in a man's mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and
virtuous man under oathNemo moriturus praesumuntur mentiri. "The
general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is that they
are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death,
and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood
is silenced, and the mind induced by the most powerful considerations to
speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so awful is considered by the law
as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath
administered in a court of justice"
The fact that the deceased believed that his death was impending may be
shown by statements made by him at the time, or by evidence that his
physical condition or the nature of the wounds inflicted upon him was such
that he must have so believed A dying declaration, which on the face of it is
incomplete, is inadmissible. The question whether the deceased had such a
belief in impending death as to make a declaration admissible as a dying
declaration is for the judge and not for the jury. A statement made in the first
instance under such circumstances as to render it inadmissible as a dying
declaration may be admitted as evidence, if it is afterwards repeated by the
deceased or by some other person at his request and assented to by him
under circumstances which would have rendered it admissible, if it had been
then made for the first time. It is not objection to the admissibility of a dying
declaration that it was made in answer to leading questions, though that fact
may affect its weight as evidence. The constant reiteration of the words "I
am dying" by a woman who had taken poison was held to be insufficient "as
the expression of the real idea of impending death" [R v. Abbot, 67 JP 151]
but "I am dying, look to my children", was held sufficient [R v. Goddard, 15
Cox 7],
The pales of a considerable interval between the making of the declaration
and the death of the deceased does not render it inadmissible if at the time
when it was made he had the apprehension that death was impending. A
dying declaration by a person who is, by law, incompetent, as a witness is
inadmissible. The Indian law on the subject differs materially from the
English rule.
2.1 DISTINCTION BETWEEN ENGLISH AND THE LAW IN INDIA
The first clause is widely different from the English law upon the subject of
dying declaration, according to which: (a) this description of evidence is not
admissible in any civil case; and (b) in criminal cases only in the single
instance of homicide, that is, murder or manslaughter, where the death of
the deceased is the subject of the charge and the circumstances of the death
are the subject of the dying declaration. Both in England and America,
evidence of this description (dying declarations), is not admissible in any civil
case and in criminal cases it is not admissible upon charges other than
homicide; or as to homicides other than that of the declarant. On the other
hand, under the Indian Evidence Act the statement is relevant whatever may
be the nature of the proceeding, in which the cause of the death of the
person who made the statement comes into question. Further, according to
English law, certain conditions are required to have existed at the time of
declaration, namely, it is necessary that the declarant should have been in
actual danger of death; secondly, that the should then have had a full
apprehension of his danger and lastly, that death should have ensued. The
existence of the latter condition is of course as necessary under that Act as
under the English rule, inasmuch as the statement is admissible only in
cases in which the cause of the death of the person who made it comes into
question. But, under this Act, the statement is relevant whether the person
who made it was or was not at the time when it was made, under
expectation of death.
Under the Indian Law for a declaration to be relevant under s 32(1), it is not
necessary that the declaration should have been made when the person
making the same was in actual danger of death and had given up all hope of
recovery at the time when he made the declaration. [Poolakkal Klinchli v
State 1986(2) Crimes 225 (Ker) (DB)] Therefore, whether the declarant was
or was not in actual danger of death, and knew or did not know himself to be
in such danger, are considerations, which will not affect the admissibility of
this kind of evidence in India. But these considerations ought not to be laid
aside in estimating the weight to be allowed to the evidence in particular
cases. Under the Law which was in force prior to this Act (s 371, Act 25 of
1861) s 29, Act 2 of 1865, and which with one modification relating to the
entertainment by the deceased of hopes of recovery was similar in this
respect to the English law, it was held that before a dying declaration could
be received in evidence, it must be distinctly found that the declarant knew
or believed at the time he made the declaration, that he was dying or likely
to die. Of course, before the statement can be admitted under this section,
the declarant must have died. Where a person making a dying declaration
chances to live, his statement cannot be admitted in evidence as a dying
declaration, [Mati Singh v State AIR 1964 SC 900] though it may be relied on
under s. 157 to corroborate the testimony of the complainant when
examined in the case. The statutory provision in s. 164 Criminal Procedure
Code should be followed if the statement in inculpatory and in the nature of
a confession.
Hence, under the English Law, it is essential to the admissibility of dying
declaration that the declarant must have entertained a settled hopeless
expectation of death. But he need not have been expecting immediate
death. Indian law does not put any such restrictions. It is not required under
Indian law that the maker should be under the expectation of imminent
death, nor is it restricted to the case of homicide only. Before a dying
declaration may be admitted, it must be proved that the maker is dead. If
the maker survives, it may be used to corroborate or contradict his
statement.
2.2 SUMMARY:
(1) Under the Indian Law of Evidence ,a dying declaration is relevant whether
the person who made it was or was not,at the time when it was made under
expectation of death that is, it is immaterial whether there existed any
expectation of death at the time of the declaration. In a Calcutta case it has
been observed that the necessity of recording a dying declaration arises only
when the hopes of life are given up [Tehal v. S, AIR 1979 SC1347]. . It is
common sense that there is no need to record dying declaration until that
stage is reached or it is apprehended that a person will not survive.
1. However, in English law the position is different, it is held that before a
dying declaration was admitted it should be proved that the person making it
knew that he was dying or believed himself to be in danger of approaching
death?
2. The admissibility of dying declaration is not confined to the case of
homicide
only, but it would be admissible, whatever the charge may be, provided the
cause of
death comes under enquiry: In India in a charge of rape, a woman's
which they are made. Their creditability and value will also vary with the
circumstances of each particular case and the nature of the recording
Estoppel' in its broadest sense is a legal term referring to a series of legal
and equitable doctrines that preclude "a person from denying or asserting
anything to the contrary of that which has, in contemplation of law, been
established as the truth, either by the acts of judicial or legislative officers, or
by his own deed, acts, or representations, either express or implied." [1]
This term appears to come from the Old French estoupail (or a variation),
which meant "stopper plug", referring to placing a halt on the imbalance of
the situation. The term is related to the verb "estop" which comes from the
Old French term estopper, meaning "stop up, impede."