Arzado-Crisologo Vs Rañon

11/8/2016
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559Phil.169
THIRDDIVISION
[G.R.No.171068,September05,2007]
HEIRSOFMARCELINAARZADONCRISOLOGO,REPRESENTEDBYLETICIAC.DELROSARIO,
MAURICIAARZADONANDBERNARDOARZADON,PETITIONERS,VS.AGRIFINARAON,
SUBSTITUTEDBYSUZIMARAONDUTERTEANDOTHELORAON,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CHICONAZARIO,J.:
ThisisaPetitionforCertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCourtoftheDecision[1]andResolution[2]oftheCourtof
AppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.72552,dated10November2005and12January2006,respectively,whichaffirmedintoto
theDecision[3]dated8August2002oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofBatac,IlocosNorte,Branch18,inCivilCase
No. 387518. The RTC reversed the 11 December 2001 Decision[4] of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
BadocPinili,Badoc,IlocosNorte,inCivilCaseNo.141B.
Records show that on 18 October 1995, Agrifina Raon[5] filed a Complaint[6] against spouses Conrado and Mila
Montemayor(spousesMontemayor)withtheMCTCofBadoc,IlocosNorte,claimingownershipoveranunregistered
residentiallot(subjectproperty)situatedatBrgy.No.2Badoc,IlocosNorte,coveredbyTaxDeclarationNo.420809,
moreparticularlydescribedasfollows:
RESIDENTIAL with an area of 472 sq. ms. (sic) Bounded on the North by Ladera St. on the East by
DionisioLaderaontheSouthbyBuenaventuraArzadonandontheWestbyRafaelLaderaAssessedat
P1700.00underTaxDec.No.420809.[7]
AccordingtoAgrifinaRaon,herfamilyhadenjoyedcontinuous,peacefulanduninterruptedpossessionandownership
over the subject property since 1962, and had religiously paid the taxes thereon. They had built a house on the
subjectpropertywheresheandherfamilyhadresided.Unfortunately,in1986,whenherfamilywasalreadyresiding
inMetroManila,firerazedanddestroyedthesaidhouse.Nonetheless,theycontinuedtovisitthesubjectproperty,
aswellaspaytherealestatetaxesthereon.However,inAugustof1986,herdaughter,ZosieRaon,discoveredthat
thesubjectpropertywasalreadyinthenameofthespousesMontemayorunderTaxDeclarationNo.0010563which
http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/44903
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was purportedly issued in their favor by virtue of an Affidavit of Ownership and Possession which the spouses
Montemayorexecutedthemselves.TheAffidavitwasallegedtohavecreatedacloudofdoubtoverRaonstitleand
ownershipoverthesubjectproperty.
Hence,AgrifinaRaonsoughtaWritofPreliminaryInjunction[8]againstthespousesMontemayorcommandingthem
to cease and desist from further exercising any right of ownership or possession over the subject property. She
furtherprayedthatshebefinallydeclaredthetrueandlawfulownerofthesubjectproperty.
The spouses Montemayor, for their part, alleged that they acquired the subject lot by purchase from Leticia del
RosarioandBernardoArzadonwhoaretheheirsofitspreviousownersforaconsiderationofP100,000.00.[9]
On22July1996,theHeirsofMarcelinaArzadonCrisologo,(representedbyLeticiaA.CrisologodelRosario),Mauricia
Arzadon,andBernardoArzadon(petitioners)filedanAnswerinIntervention[10]claiming,interalia,thattheyarethe
rightfulownersofthesubjectproperty,havingacquiredthesamefromtheirpredecessorsininterest.Theyaverred
thatthereexistednoliensorencumbrancesonthesubjectpropertyinfavorofAgrifinaRaonandthatnoperson,
otherthantheyandthespousesMontemayor,hasaninterestinthepropertyasownerorotherwise.
Per petitioners allegations, their predecessorsininterest, spouses Timoteo and Modesta Alcantara (spouses
Alcantara)boughtthesubjectpropertyfromitsowner,RafaelLadera,on2May1936.ThespousesAlcantarathen
builtahouseofstrongmaterialsonthesubjectpropertywhichservedastheirconjugalhome.Residingwiththem
was Timoteo Alcantaras sister, Augustina AlcantaraArzadon. As the spouses Alcantara died without issue, their
propertieswerelefttoTimoteoAlcantarasnearestofkin,AugustinaAlcantaraArzadonandTiburcioAlcantara,sister
and brother, respectively, of Timoteo Alcantara. Tiburcio Alcantara also died without any known heir thus, leaving
the subject property in Augustina AlcantaraArzadons sole favor. Augustina AlcantaraArzadon is the mother of
petitionersMarcelinaArzadonCrisologo(nowdeceasedandwhoseheirsarerepresentedbyLeticiadelRosario)and
MauriciaArzadon.BernardoArzadonisthesonofMauriciaArzadon.
PetitionersasseveratedfurtherthatBernardoArzadonhadlivedinthehouseconstructedonthesubjectpropertyuntil
1985whenitwasguttedbyfire.Tofurthersupporttheirclaims,petitionersaverredthattheyhadreligiouslypaidthe
realestatetaxesonthesubjectproperty.Finally,bywayofacounterclaim,petitionerssoughtcompensationforthe
damageswhichtheyallegedlysufferedbyreasonofthebaselessfilingoftheinstantsuit.
On22October1999,theMCTCissuedanOrder[11]droppingthenameofthespousesMontemayorfromthecaptionof
thecaseonthegroundthatsometimein1996,LeticiadelRosarioandBernardoArzadonhadrepurchasedthesubject
propertyfromthespousesMontemayorfortheconsiderationofP100,000.00. As a result, the spouses Montemayor
hadnomoreinterestorclaimwhatsoeveronthepropertyinlitigation.
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On11December2001,theMCTCrenderedaDecisioninfavorofthepetitioners.Thedecretalportionthereofreads,
thus:
WHEREFORE,inviewofalltheforegoing,judgmentisherebyrendered:
1.Declaringthe[petitioners]tobethetrueandlawfulownersofonehalf(1/2)portionofthe
undividedwholeofthelotinsuitbymodeofsuccessionpursuantto[A]rticle1001ofthe
[C]ivil[C]odeofthePhilippines
2.Declaring the [petitioners] to have the better right over the other half of the undivided
wholeofthelotinsuitbymodeofprescriptionpursuantto[A]rticle1137oftheCivilCode
ofthePhilippines
3.Dismissingthecounterclaimofthe[petitioners]againstthe[respondents]
4.Ordering[petitioners]topaythecostofthesuit.[12]
First,theMCTCruledthatwhiletheadverseclaimsofAgrifinaRaononthesubjectlotagainstthespousesAlcantara
mayhavestartedin1962,thisadversepossessionwasinterruptedintheyear1977duetothefilingofanadverse
claimbypetitionerMarcelinaArzadonCrisologowiththeOfficeoftheAssessor.In1977,thetaxdeclarationinthe
nameofValentinRaon,AgrifinaRaonshusband,wascancelledandanewtaxdeclarationwasissuedinMarcelina
ArzadonCrisologosname.TheMCTCsaidthattheperiodofpossessionofthespousesRaonintheconceptofan
owner from 1962 to 1977 did not ripen into ownership because their occupation was in bad faith. The Civil Code
requires,foracquisitiveprescriptionofrealproperty,30yearsofuninterruptedpossessionifthesameiswantingin
goodfaithandwithoutajusttitle.
Second,theMCTCheldthatbyvirtueofsuccession,petitionersareentitledtoonehalfofthesubjectproperty.This
isbecauseaccordingtoArticle1001[13]oftheCivilCode,shouldbrothersandsistersortheirchildrensurvivewiththe
widow or the widower (who are without issue), the latter shall be entitled to onehalf of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. The spouses Alcantara died without issue. As between
TimoteoAlcantaraandModestaAlcantara,theformerpredeceasedthelatter.TimoteoAlcantarawassurvivedby(1)
hisbrotherTiburcioAlcantara,whoalsodiedwithoutanyknownheirand(2)hissisterAugustinaAlcantara.Thus,
following the death of the spouses Alcantara, only the children of Augustina Alcantara, namely Marcelina Arzadon
CrisologoandMauriciaArzadon,standtoinheritTimoteoAlcantarasshareinthesubjectproperty.
Moreover,theMCTCdeclaredthatforthepartofModestaAlcantara,therewasnolegalheirwhoclaimedtheother
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half of the property which she[14] inherited from her husband, Timoteo Alcantara who predeceased her. On this
portion, the MCTC held that petitioners exercised rights of ownership and dominion over the same by periodically
visitingthelotandcleaningit.[15] It also held that from 31 August 1977, when petitioners predecessorininterest
Marcelina ArzadonCrisologo filed an adverse claim for herself and for her brothers and sisters which led to the
issuance of Tax Declaration No. 44120 in her name, to 11 December 2001,[16] there is a total of 33 years, three
months and 10 days which is sufficient to claim ownership over the subject property by adverse possession under
Article1137[17]oftheCivilCode.
Onappeal,theRTCreversedandsetasidetheDecisionoftheMCTC.
TheRTCdeclaredthattherespondentRaonswhoareheirsoftheoriginalplaintiffhadacquiredthesubjectproperty
byvirtueofacquisitiveprescription,andthereforeadjudgedrespondentstobetheabsoluteownersthereofthus,in
the8August2002DecisionoftheRTC,itheld:
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,theDecisionofthetrial[c]ourtisherebyREVERSEDandSETASIDE,
andjudgmentisherebyrendered:
1) Declaring the [respondents] as the absolute owners of the parcel of land in suit, having acquired the
samethroughextraordinaryacquisitiveprescription.
Nocosts.[18]
Initsfindings,theRTCdeclaredthatamorecircumspectscrutinyoftheevidenceshowedthatforalongtimefrom
thedeathofthespousesAlcantara,nooneadjudicatedthesubjectpropertyuntothemselves.Althoughpetitioners
and their predecessorsininterest claimed to have successional rights over the subject property, they did not take
action to have the same adjudicated to themselves or, at least, to have the same declared for taxation purposes.
The RTC ruled that petitioners had slept on their rights. On the part of the respondent Raons, in 1962, Valentin
Raon, respondents father, declared the subject property in his name for taxation purposes and paid the
correspondingtaxesthereon.Intheyearsthatfollowed,hiswife,AgrifinaRaon,declaredthesameinhernamefor
taxationpurposes,aswellaspaidtherealestatetaxesonthesubjectproperty.In1977,thelatterevenmortgaged
thesubjectpropertywiththePhilippineNationalBank.Itwasonlyin1977whenpetitionerspredecessorininterest
MarcelinaArzadonCrisologoexecutedanAdverseClaimandNoticeofOwnershipanddeclaredthesubjectpropertyin
hernameandpaiditstaxes.
TheRTCelucidatedinthiswise,towit:
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ItbearstonotethatsincethedeathofTimoteoAlcantarauntiltheyear1977,[petitioners],aswellastheir
predecessorsininterests(sic)hadnottakenanyconcretestepinexercisingtheirsupposedsuccessional
rights over the parcel of land in suit, or at least, the Intervenors should have always [stayed] on their
guard or especially vigilant against anyone who would secure a claim to the said parcel of land, more so
thatValentinRaonandplaintiffAgrifinaRaonwerethenlivingwiththem.Itisveryunfortunatethatit
wasonlyin1977thattheIntervenorsmadeknowntoothersoftheirsupposedsuccessionalrightsoverthe
parcel of land in suit. Relief is denied to a claimant whose right has become stale for a long time,
considering that some other persons like [respondents] had wayback (sic) taken the necessary action in
claimingtheparceloflandinsuit.Itisthevigilantandnotthesleepythatisbeingassistedbythelaws.
(LeditaBurceJacobv.CourtofAppeals,etal.,G.R.No.92159,July1,1993).
Itstandstoreason,therefore,toholdthatbecauseoftheclaimofthe[respondents]tohaveacquiredthe
parceloflandinsuitbyacquisitiveprescription,theIntervenorswhobelatedlyclaimedtobethelegaland
compulsoryheirsofthelateTimoteoAlcantara,asruledbythetrialcourt,hadregrettablyforfeitedtheir
such(sic)successionalrights,simplyduetotheirinactionforalongperiodoftime.Hence,contraryto
thefindingsofthetrialcourt,the[petitioners]arenotentitledtotheonehalf(1/2)portionoftheparcelof
landinsuit.[19]
Likewise, the RTC reasoned that the Notice of Adverse Claim executed by petitioners predecessorininterest
Marcelina ArzadonCrisologo against the Raons in 1977 implied that respondents have been in possession of the
subjectproperty.Onthismatter,theRTCsaid,viz:
Evidently, the trial court considered by implication that the execution by Marcelina Arzadon Crisologo of
said Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership in 1977 to have interrupted the running of the prescriptive
periodonthepossessionbythe[respondents]oftheparceloflandinsuit.Itbearstostresson(sic)this
point,thattheAdverseClaimandNoticeofOwnershipexecutedbyMarcelinaArzadonCrisologoisnothing
but a notice of a claim adverse to the [respondents]. By its nature, its implication is that the
[respondents]havebeeninpossessionoftheparceloflandinsuitinsomeconcept.Butdefinitely,said
Adverse Claim does not, upon its execution, operate to toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive
periodbecausethereisanecessitytodeterminethevalidityofthesame.Andthiscouldonlybedoneby
the filing of the necessary action in court such [as] contemplated in the provisions of Article 1123 of the
CivilCode.Itisonlyon(sic)suchinstancethattheprescriptiveperiodshouldbedeemedinterrupted.And
undisputedly, nothing had been done by the Intervenors after the execution of said Adverse Claim by
Marcelina Crisologo, except of course as they claimed, and as held by the trial court, they started to
possess the parcel of land in suit. Regretably (sic), however, such possession by the Intervenors of the
parceloflandinsuitdoesnotbenefitthemforpurposesofprescription.[20]
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TheRTCalsodeclaredthattheRaonshavebeeninpossessionoftheparceloflandintheconceptofanownersince
1962. Even as they had gone to live in Manila following the burning of the house on the subject property, they
continued to exercise acts of dominion over the same by visiting and looking after the property. The RTC also
consideredinfavoroftherespondents,theadmissionofpetitionerBernardoArzadonandthepetitionerswitnesses
thatValentinRaonandAgrifinaRaonhadbeenstayinginthehouseonthesubjectlotsince1947,whichshowsthat
theyhadbeeninpossessionofthesubjectpropertyforaperiodofmorethan50years.
OnreviewbeforetheCourtofAppeals,theDecisionoftheRTCwasaffirmedintoto.
TheCourtofAppealsheldthatwhenValentinRaonexecutedtheaffidavitdeclaringhimselftobethetrueandlawful
ownerofthesubjectpropertyin1962,thesamewasarepudiationofpetitionerslegaltitleoverit.Therepudiation,
coupledwiththepaymentofrealtytaxes,wasmadewiththeknowledgeofpetitioners,whofailedtoactagainstit.
Thus,from1962uptothefilingoftheactionin1995,respondentscontinuedtoadverselyoccupytheproperty.Inthe
assailed10November2005DecisionoftheCourtofAppeals,itruled:
Moreover,respondentspaymentofrealtytaxesmadewiththeknowledgeandconsentofpetitionersand
wentunchallengedforanumberofyears,indubitablyshowtheirpositiveclaimasownersoftheproperty.
Whileitistruethatbythemselvestaxreceiptsanddeclarationsofownershipfortaxationpurposesarenot
incontrovertibleevidenceofownership,theybecomestrongevidenceofownershipacquiredbyprescription
when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. It is only where payment of taxes is
accompaniedbyactualpossessionofthelandcoveredbythetaxdeclarationthatsuchcircumstancemay
bematerialinsupportingaclaimofownership.
Needless to state, from 1962 onwards, prescription begun to run against petitioners and was not in any
wayinterruptedfromtheirmereexecutionoftheNoticeofAdverseClaimsincethenoticeofadverseclaim
cannottaketheplaceofjudicialsummonswhichproducesthecivilinterruptionprovidedforunderthelaw.
AndevenifWearetoeliminatethequestionofgoodfaithindeterminingtheprescriptiveperiod,evidence
are (sic) still abundant to substantiate respondents thirty years of possession in the concept of owner
commencingfrom1962until1995whenthecomplaintbelowwasfiled.[21]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon which was denied by the Court of Appeals in the following
manner,towit:
AfteracarefulstudyofthegroundsrelieduponbypetitionersWefindnonewmattersraisedtojustifya
modificationmuchless,areversaloftheDecisionsoughttobereconsidered.Toreiterate,evenassuming
exgratiaargumentithatpetitionermerelytoleratedtheRaons(sic)occupancyofthesubjectproperty,it
must be stressed that the execution in 1962 of Valentin Raons Affidavit, the corresponding payment of
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realty taxes and other acts of dominion which went unchallenged by the petitioners, had effectively
severedtheirallegedjuridicalrelation.Sufficeittostatethattheseacts,takenasawhole,vestuponthe
Raonstherighttoclaimownershipoverthesubjectpropertyirrespectiveofwhetherthenatureoftheir
occupationwasrootedfromthemeretoleranceoftheArzadonsorfromabonafidesalebetweenAgrifina
RaonandRafaelLadera.[22]
Hence,theinstantPetition.
The primordial issue in the case at bar is whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that respondents had
acquiredownershipoverthesubjectpropertythroughuninterruptedandadversepossessionthereofforthirtyyears,
withoutneedoftitleorofgoodfaith.PetitionersdisputethefindingsoftheCourtofAppealsandtheRTCindeclaring
thatacquisitiveprescriptionhassetinagainstthemandinfavoroftherespondents.Theyclaimthattheevidence
doesnotsupportrespondentscontentionthattheyhavebeeninpublic,notorious,anduninterruptedpossessionover
thesubjectpropertyintheconceptofanownersince1962asallegedintheirComplaint.Instead,petitionersrelyon
the finding of the MCTC that respondents were not able to prove their adverse claim for an uninterrupted period of
thirtyyears.
At this juncture, we take an opportune look at the applicable rules on the acquisition of ownership through
prescription.
Prescriptionisanothermodeofacquiringownershipandotherrealrightsoverimmovableproperty.[23]Itisconcerned
withlapseoftimeinthemannerandunderconditionslaiddownbylaw,namely,thatthepossessionshouldbeinthe
conceptofanowner,public,peaceful,uninterruptedandadverse.[24] Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and not clandestine.[25] It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional [26] exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriationofittohisownuseandbenefit [27]andnotoriouswhenitissoconspicuousthatitisgenerallyknown
and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood.[28] The party who asserts ownership by adverse
possessionmustprovethepresenceoftheessentialelementsofacquisitiveprescription.
Article1117oftheCivilCodeisinstructive:
Art.1117.Acquisitiveprescriptionofdominionandotherrealrightsmaybeordinaryorextraordinary.
Articles1134and1137oftheCivilCodefixtheperiodsofpossession,[29]whichprovide:
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Art.1134.Ownershipandotherrealrightsoverimmovablepropertyareacquiredbyordinaryprescription
throughpossessionoftenyears.
Art.1137.Ownershipandotherrealrightsoverimmovablesalsoprescribethroughuninterruptedadverse
possessionthereofforthirtyyears,withoutneedoftitleorofgoodfaith.
Fromtheforegoing,itcanbegleanedthatacquisitiveprescriptionofrealrightsmaybeordinaryorextraordinary.[30]
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by
lawwithoutgoodfaithandjusttitle,acquisitiveprescriptioncanonlybeextraordinaryincharacter.[31] Regarding
real or immovable property, ordinary acquisitive prescription requires a period of possession of ten years, while
extraordinaryacquisitiveprescriptionrequiresanuninterruptedadversepossessionofthirtyyears.[32]
Wererespondentsabletosufficientlysatisfythelegalrequirementstoproveprescription?
Torecapitulate,respondentstracedtheirclaimofownershipfromtheyear1962untilthefilingoftheirComplaintfor
OwnershipbeforetheMCTCon18October1995.Tosupporttheirpossession,theyrelyonanAffidavitexecutedon
19 October 1962 by Valentin Raon claiming ownership over the subject property by virtue of an alleged sale. The
MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in declaring that the execution by Valentin Raon of the
Affidavit in 1962 was an express repudiation of petitioners claim over the property. By virtue of such Affidavit,
respondents were able to cancel Tax Declaration No. 02853 in the name of petitioners predecessorininterest
Timoteo Alcantara who was shown to have paid taxes on the subject property in 1950. Hence, in 1962, Tax
Declaration No. 033062 was issued in the name of Valentin Raon. The same was subsequently cancelled by Tax
DeclarationNo.033106,whichwasinthenameofhiswife,AgrifinaRaon.Thesamewaslikewisecancelledin1967
by Tax Declaration No. 420809, similarly under the name of Agrifina Raon. In 1977, however, petitioners
predecessorininterest Marcelina ArzadonCrisologo filed an Adverse Claim and a Notice of Ownership claiming that
thesubjectpropertywhichisnotyetregisteredintheOfficeoftheRegisterofDeedsofLaoagCityisdeclaredunder
Tax Declaration No. 420809 in the name of Valentin Raon for taxation purposes only but that they have been in
possessionofthesaidlandpublicly,peacefullyandcontinuouslywithoutanyinterventionorinterruptionformorethan
15years.
However, a question must be asked: did the Notice of Adverse Claim filed by petitioners constitute an effective
interruptionsince1962ofrespondentspossessionofthesubjectproperty?
Theanswerisinthenegative.
Article1123[33]oftheCivilCodeiscategorical.Civilinterruptionisproducedbyjudicialsummonstothepossessor.
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Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons, Article 1124[34] sets limitations as to when such summons
shallnotbedeemedtohavebeenissuedandshallnotgiverisetointerruption,towit:1)ifitshouldbevoidforlack
oflegalsolemnities2)iftheplaintiffshoulddesistfromthecomplaintorshouldallowtheproceedingstolapseor3)
ifthepossessorshouldbeabsolvedfromthecomplaint.
Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil interruption. For civil
interruptiontotakeplace,thepossessormusthavereceivedjudicialsummons.Noneappearsinthecaseatbar.The
NoticeofAdverseClaimwhichwasfiledbypetitionersin1977isnothingmorethananoticeofclaimwhichdidnot
effectivelyinterruptrespondentspossession.Suchanoticecouldnothaveproducedcivilinterruption.Weagreein
theconclusionoftheRTC,whichwasaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals,thattheexecutionoftheNoticeofAdverse
Claimin1977didnottollorinterrupttherunningoftheprescriptiveperiodbecausethereremains,asyet,anecessity
forajudicialdeterminationofitsjudicialvalidity.Whatexistedwasmerelyanotice.Therewasnocompliancewith
Article1123oftheCivilCode.Whatisstrikingisthatnoactionwas,infact,filedbypetitionersagainstrespondents.
As a consequence, no judicial summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its
affirmanceoftheRTCsruling,theNoticeofAdverseClaimcannottaketheplaceofjudicialsummonswhichproduces
the civil interruption provided for under the law.[35] In the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt
respondents adverse possession since 1962. The period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in
respondentsfavordespitetheNoticeofAdverseClaim.
Fromanotherangle,wefindthat,quiteclearly,questionsoffactexistbeforeus.Thereisaquestionoffactwhen
thedoubtordifferencearisesastothetruthorfalsehoodoffactsorwhenthequeryinvitescalibrationofthewhole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstancesaswellastheirrelationtoeachotherandtothewhole,andtheprobabilityofthesituation.[36]
Thus,wefindpropertheapplicationofthedoctrinethatfindingsoffactsoftheCourtofAppealsupholdingthoseof
thetrialcourtarebindinguponthisCourt.[37]Eventhoughtheruleissubjecttoexceptions,[38]wedonotfindthem
applicableintheinstantcase.
AsfoundbytheRTCandaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals,nothingwasdonebypetitionerstoclaimpossessionover
the subject property from the time their predecessorsininterest had lost possession of the property due to their
deaths.Plainly,petitionerssleptontheirrights.Vigilantibussednondormientibusjurasubveniunt.Thelawcomes
tothesuccoronlytoaidthevigilant,notthosewhoslumberontheirrights.Itwasonlyin1977whentheyattempted
tocalltheattentionofrespondents,whichasearlierdiscussed,didnotevenoperateasaninterruptiononthelatters
possession.TheRTCandtheCourtofAppealsheldthatfrom1962tothetimetheyfiledtheirComplaintbeforethe
MCTCanduntilthepresenttime,respondentsoccupiedwithoutinterruptionthesubjectpropertyintheconceptofan
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owner,therebyacquiringownershipviaextraordinaryacquisitiveprescription.Toreiterate,theRTCsfactualfindings
basedontheevidenceonrecordweremanifestlyinfavorofrespondents,towit:
Thus,bypreponderanceofevidence,ithasbeenestablishedpreponderantlythatthe[respondents]have
beeninpossessionoftheparceloflandinsuitcontinuously,peacefully,publicly,notoriously,uninterrupted
andintheconceptofanownersince1962tothepresent.Thefactthatthe[respondents]havegoneto
live in Manila right after the house built in the parcel of land in suit was burned in 1988, they, however,
then and thereafter intermittently come to Badoc, Ilocos Norte purposely to look after and to visit the
parceloflandinsuit.Actualpossessionoflandconsistsinthemanifestationofactsofdominionoveritof
suchanatureasapartywouldnaturallyexerciseoverhisownproperty.Oneneeds(sic)notto(sic)stay
on it. The acts exercised by the [respondents] over the parcel of land in suit are consistent with
ownership. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
squaremeterofthegroundbeforeitcanbesaidthatheisinpossession[thereof].(Ramosv.Directorof
Lands,39Phil.175,citedinthecaseofSomodiov.CourtofAppeals,etal.,235SCRA307).Itissufficient
thatthe[respondents]wereabletosubjecttheparceloflandtotheactionoftheirwill.
Furthermore, the Court finds it (sic) significant the testimonies of [petitioner] Bernardo Arzadon and his
witnesses Leonila Arzadon and Elpidio Evangelista who categorically testified to the effect that Valentin
Raonand[respondent]AgrifinaRaonhadbeenstayinginthehousestandingontheparceloflandinsuit
since1947.Basically,thedefendantsareboundbytheiradmissionsandalsoboundbythetestimoniesof
thewitnessestheypresented.Andgoingalongwiththeirrespectivetestimonies,from1947to1977orfor
[a] period of thirty (30) years the [respondents] have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit
enoughtoinvokeextraordinaryacquisitiveprescription,pursuanttotheprovisionsofArticle1134[39](sic)
of the New (sic) Civil Code. However, as earlier stated, the [respondents], contrary to the claim of the
[petitioners] and findings of the trial court, have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit
continuously and uninterrupted from 1962 to the present but because of the admissions of the
[petitioners],the[respondents]havebeeninpossessionofthesamefrom1947tothepresentorformore
thanfifty(50)yearsnow.[40]
Theopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionbyrespondentsofthesubjectpropertyforaperiodofmore
than30yearsinrepudiationofpetitionersownershiphadbeenestablished.Duringsuchlengthoftime,respondents
hadexercisedactsofdominionoverthesubjectproperty,andpaidtaxesintheirname.Jurisprudenceisclearthat
althoughtaxdeclarationsorrealtytaxpaymentsofpropertyarenotconclusiveevidenceofownership,nevertheless,
theyaregoodindiciaofpossessionintheconceptofownerfornooneinhisrightmindwouldbepayingtaxesfora
propertythatisnotinhisactualoratleastconstructivepossession.[41]Theyconstituteatleastproofthattheholder
hasaclaimoftitleovertheproperty.[42]Asiswellknown,thepaymentoftaxescoupledwithactualpossessionof
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thelandcoveredbythetaxdeclarationstronglysupportsaclaimofownership.[43]TheCourtofAppealsdidnoterrin
affirming the factual findings of the RTC that respondents had validly established their claim of ownership over the
subjectpropertythroughacquisitiveprescription.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 November 2005 and the
Resolutiondated12January2006inCAG.R.SPNo.72552areAFFIRMED.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
YnaresSantiago,(Chairperson),AustriaMartinez,Nachura,andReyes,JJ.,concur.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Josefina GuevaraSalonga with Associate Justices Delilah VidallonMagtolis and
FernandaLampasPeralta,concurringrollo,pp.109117.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Josefina GuevaraSalonga with Associate Justices Portia Alio Hormachuelos and
FernandaLampasPeraltaid.at128129.
[3]PennedbyJudgeAlejandrinoC.Cabebeid.at6675.
[4]PennedbyActingMCTCJudgeIluminadaM.Inesid.at3164.
[5]Duringthecourseofthetrial,on26June1998,AgrifinaRaondied.ShewassubstitutedbyhersoleheirsOthelo
RaonandZusimaRaonDuterteasplaintiffsCArollo,p.34.
[6]DesignatedasaComplaintforOwnershipwithPrayerforPreliminaryInjunctionIdat1621.
[7]Id.at16.
[8]ThereisnoshowingonrecordsiftheprayerforWritofPreliminaryInjunctionwasfavorablyresolved.
[9]CArollo,p.31.
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[10]Idat2225.
[11]Id.at26.
[12]Id.at6162.
[13]Shouldbrothersandsistersortheirchildrensurvivewiththewidoworwidower,thelattershallbeentitledtoone
halfoftheinheritanceandthebrothersandsistersortheirchildrentotheotherhalf.
[14]TheconclusionwasreachedonafindingthatTimoteoAlcantarapredeceasedhiswife,ModestaValleAlcantara.
[15]CArollo,p.60.
[16]TheDecisionoftheMCTCwasdated11December2001.
[17]Ownershipandotherrealrightsoverimmovablesalsoprescribethroughuninterruptedadversepossessionthereof
forthirtyyears,withoutneedoftitleorofgoodfaith.
[18]Id.at78.
[19]Id.at75.
[20]CArollo,pp.7677.
[21]Rollo,p.116.
[22]Id.at128129.
[23]Calicdanv.Cendaa,466Phil.894,902(2004).
[24]Id.
[25]DirectorofLandsv.IntermediateAppellateCourt,G.R.No.68946,22May1992,209SCRA214,224.
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[26]Id.,citingBlacksLawDictionary(Fifthed.),p.291.
[27]Id.
[28]Id.
[29]Lubosv.Galupo,424Phil.665,672(2002).
[30]Aguirrev.CourtofAppeals,466Phil.32,43(2004).
[31]Id.
[32]Id.
[33]Civilinterruptionisproducedbyjudicialsummonstothepossessor.
[34]Judicialsummonsshallbedeemednottohavebeenissuedandshallnotgiverisetointerruption:
1.Ifitshouldbevoidforlackoflegalsolemnities
2.Iftheplaintiffshoulddesistfromthecomplaintorshouldallowtheproceedingstolapse
3.Ifthepossessorshouldbeabsolvedfromthecomplaint.
Inallthesecases,theperiodoftheinterruptionshallbecountedfortheprescription.
[35] Rollo, p. 116 where the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 10 November 2005 cited the case of Ferrer v.
Bautista,G.R.No.46963,14March1994,231SCRA257,263.
[36]RepublicofthePhilippinesv.Sandiganbayan,426Phil.104,110(2002).
[37]DavidChanv.CourtofAppeals,335Phil.1140,1148(1997).
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[38]Thefollowingaretherecognizedexceptions,towit:(1)whentheinferencemadeismanifestlymistaken,absurd
or impossible (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on
speculations,surmisesorconjectures(4)whenthejudgmentoftheCourtofAppealsisbasedonmisapprehensionof
facts(5)whenthefindingsoffactareconflicting(6)whentheCourtofAppeals,inmakingitsfindings,wentbeyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of trial court (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
withoutcitationofspecificevidenceonwhichtheyarebased(9)whentheCourtofAppealsmanifestlyoverlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusionand(10)whenthefindingsoffactoftheCourtofAppealsarepremisedontheabsenceofevidenceand
arecontradictedbytheevidenceonrecord.[SeeReyesv.CourtofAppeals,328Phil.171,180(1996)Siguanv.Lim,
376Phil.840,849(1999),citingSta.Mariav.CourtofAppeals,349Phil.275,282283(1998).]
[39]ExtraordinaryprescriptionisgovernedbyArticle1137.
[40]CArollo,7778.
[41]RepublicofthePhilippinesv.CourtofAppeals,328Phil.238,248(1996).
[42]Id.
[43]SpousesReyesv.CourtofAppeals,393Phil.493(2000).
Source:SupremeCourtELibrary
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