Action for partition in implied trust prescribes after 10 years

GONZALES v. IAC
Facts:
The land in dispute is registered in the name of Fausto Soy. In 1941, Fausto sold 253 sq. m. To Francisco
Landingin. In 1954, pursuant to a Deed of Donation executed by Fausto, Antonio Soy (son of Fausto) and Gregoria
Miranda (wife) sold 240 sq. m.to Juanito Gonzales and Coronacion Ganaden. In January 1960, Fausto sold another
240 sq. m. To Gonzales and Ganaden and two days later, a TCT was issued in favor of Gonzales, indicating his share
as co-owner of 480 sq. m. and Fausto Soy, 240 sq. m. In1965, Fausto sold another 140 sq. m. to the Gonzales and
Ganaden. April 1965, Respondents Rosita Lopez, Gavino Cayabyab, Agueda and Felipa Ubando, Pedro Soriano,
Teosidia Lopez and Federico Ballesteros(nieces and nephews of Fausto) filed the instant complaint for partition
against Fausto Soy. On the same day they filed a notice of lis pendens and had it annotated on the OCT. Fausto
answered and contested plaintiffs claims, asserting exclusive title in his name. Fausto countered that the
questioned land was never registered in the names of his parents Eugenio and Ambrosia, and that he had been the
registered owner of the premises since 1932.On the basis of evidence adduced ex-parte, the Trial Court held that
respondents and Fausto were co-owners of the lot and ordered the partition thereof. Parties were enjoined
to partition amongst themselves and were to submit the same to the lower court for confirmation. Upon execution,
the sheriff was unable to effect apportionment due to a3rd party claim of Juanito and Coronacion Gonzales, stating
that they were registered owners of 480 sq.m. of the disputed land. The sheriff noted the various improvements
petitioners had introduced (apartment, residential house and piggery). Trial court allowed petitioners to intervene
as indispensable parties, vacating its previous judgment and granting a new trial.
Trial Court
: There is no proof to show that petitioners are co-owners of the property in question because the land has
long been covered by an OCT since 1932 in the name of their predecessor in interest, Fausto Soy.
CA

: Resolved in favor of respondents, declaring that the sale to intervenor-petitioners did not terminate the
trust relationship between the appellants and the appellees. The sale in favor of petitioners shall been forced
against the share of respondents as heirs of Fausto. Issue: Was the disputed land held in trust by Fausto Soy for
his sisters, Emilia, Cornelia and Anastacia (mothers of herein respondents)?
Ruling

: CA decision reversed, order for partition dismissed. Fausto, being predecessor-in-interest, had appeared
to be the registered owner of the lot for more than30 years and his dominical rights can no longer be challenged.
Any insinuation as to the existence of an implied or constructive trust should not be allowed. Even assuming there
was an implied trust, respondents attempt at reconveyance is barred by prescription, which in this case is 10
years, the period reckoned from the issuance of the adverse title to the property which operates as a constructive
notice. The assertion of adverse title, which was an explicit indication of repudiation of the trust for the purpose of
the statute of limitations, took place when the OCT was issued in the name of Fausto Soy in 1932, to the exclusion
of his 3 sisters. Even if there were no repudiation, the rule is that an action to enforce an implied trust may be
circumscribed not only by prescription but also by lachesin which case, repudiation is not required. Respondents
had literally slept on their rights presuming they had any and can no longer dispute the conclusive and
incontrovertible character of Faustos title as they are deemed to have acquiesced therein.

Implied trust; Imprescriptibility of Action

ANCOG vs. COURT OF APPEAL

G.R. No. 112260 June 30, 1997

Facts:

Gregorio Yap died, leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario Diez, and children, petitioners Jovita Yap
Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr.(who was a minor at this time), and private respondent Caridad Yap as his heirs.
Rosario Diez obtained loans from the Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage on the disputed land. The land,
with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property of the spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez.
The bank's lawyer, Atty. Narciso de la Serna, suggested that she submit an extrajudicial settlement
covering the disputed land as a means of facilitating the approval of her application. The suggestion was accepted
and Atty. de la Serna prepared an extrajudicial settlement, which the heirs, with the exception of petitioner Gregorio
Yap, Jr., then only 15 years old, signed. The loan was approved by the bank. Rosario Diez exercised rights of
ownership over the land. She brought an ejectment suit against petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog's husband and son to
evict them from the ground floor of the house built on the land for failure to pay rent.
Thereafter, petitioner Jovita Ancog learned that private respondent Rosario Diez had offered the
land for sale. Petitioner Ancog immediately informed her younger brother, petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. of their
mother's plan to sell the land. They filed this action for partition in the RTC. As private respondent Caridad Yap was
unwilling to join in the action against their mother, Caridad was impleaded as a defendant.
Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and therefore void. They claimed that in
signing the instrument they did not really intend to convey their interests in the property to their mother,
but only to enable her to obtain a loan on the security of the land to cover expenses for Caridad's school fees and
for household repairs.
Issue:

1) Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement was valid. Yes.

2) Whether or not Gregorio Yap is barred by laches? No.

Ruling:

1) In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found no evidence to show that the extrajudicial
settlement was required to enable private respondent Rosario Diez to obtain a loan from the Bank of Calape.
Petitioners merely claimed that the extrajudicial settlement was demanded by the bank. To the contrary, that the
heirs (Jovita Yap Ancog and Caridad Yap) meant the extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective is shown by the fact
that
Rosario Diez performed acts of dominion over the entire Land, beginning with its registration, without any objection
from them. Instead, petitioner Jovita Ancog agreed to lease the land from her mother, private respondent Rosario
Diez, and accepted from her a special power of attorney to use the land in question as collateral for a loan she was
applying from the DBP. Indeed it was private respondent Diez who paid the loan of the Ancogs in order to secure the
release of the property from mortgage.
2) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the claim of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was barred by laches.
In accordance with Rule 74, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, as he did not take part in the partition, he is not bound by
the settlement. It is uncontroverted that, at the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, Gregorio Yap, Jr.
was a minor. For this reason, he was not included or even informed of the partition. Instead, the registration of the
land in Rosario Diez's name created an implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 145 of the Civil Code. (Just in
case) In the case of O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, Art. 1451 was held as creating a resulting trust, which is founded on the
presumed intention of the parties. As a general rule, it arises where such may be reasonably presumed to be the
intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the transaction out
of which it is sought to be established. In this case, the records disclose that the intention of the parties to the
extrajudicial settlement was to establish a trust in favor of petitioner Yap, Jr. to the extent of his share. Rosario Diez
testified that she did not claim the entire property, while Atty. De la Serna added that the partition only involved
the shares of the three participants.

Trust; Resulting trust

G.R. No. 117228 June 19, 1997 RODOLFO MORALES, represented by his heirs, and
PRISCILA MORALES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Seventeenth
Division), RANULFO ORTIZ, JR., and ERLINDA ORTIZ, respondents.

FACTS:
The evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs discloses that the Plaintiffs are the absolute and exclusive owners
of the premises in question having purchased the same from Celso Avelino. They later caused the transfer of its tax
declaration in the name of the female plaintiff and paid the realty taxes thereon. Celso Avelino (Plaintiffs'
predecessor in interest) purchased the land in question consisting of two adjoining parcels while he was still a
bachelor and the City Fiscal of Calbayog City from Alejandra Mendiola and Celita Bartolome, through a "Escritura de
Venta". After the purchase, he caused the transfer of the tax declarations of the two parcels in his name as well as
consolidated into one the two tax declarations in his name. With the knowledge of the Intervenor and the
defendant, Celso Avelino caused the survey of the premises in question, in his name, by the Bureau of Lands. He
also built his residential house therein with Marcial Aragon (now dead) as his master carpenter who was even
scolded by him for constructing the ceiling too low. When the two-storey residential house was finished, he took his
parents, Rosendo Avelino and Juana Ricaforte, and his sister, Aurea, who took care of the couple, to live there until
their deaths. He also declared this residential house in his tax declaration to the premises in question and paid the
corresponding realty taxes, keeping intact the receipts which he comes to get or Aurea would go to Cebu to give it
to him. After being the City Fiscal of Calbayog, Celso Avelino became an Immigration Officer and later as Judge of
the Court of First Instance in Cebu with his sister, Aurea, taking care of the premises in question. While he was
already in Cebu, the defendant, without the knowledge and consent of the former, constructed a small beauty shop
in the premises in question. Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs are the purchasers of the other real properties of Celso
Avelino, one of which is at Acedillo (now Sen. J.D. Avelino) street, after they were offered by Celso Avelino to buy the
premises in question, they examined the premises in question and talked with the defendant about that fact, the
latter encouraged them to purchase the premises in question rather than the property going to somebody else they
do not know and that he will vacate the premises as soon as his uncle will notify him to do so. Thus, they paid the
purchase price and Exh. "C" was executed in their favor. However, despite due notice from his uncle to vacate the
premises in question, the defendant refused to vacate or demolish the beauty shop unless he is reimbursed
P35,000.00 for it although it was valued at less than P5,000.00. So, the Plaintiffs demanded, orally and in writing to
vacate the premises. The defendant refused. As the plaintiffs were about to undertake urgent repairs on the
dilapidated residential building, the defendant had already occupied the same, taking in paying boarders and
claiming already ownership of the premises in question, thus they filed this case. Plaintiffs, being the neighbors of
Celso Avelino, of their own knowledge are certain that the premises in question is indeed owned by their
predecessor-in-interest because the male plaintiff used to play in the premises when he was still in his teens while
the female plaintiff resided with the late Judge Avelino. Besides, their inquiries and documentary evidence shown to
them by Celso Avelino confirm this fact. Likewise, the defendant and Intervenor did not reside in the premises in
question because they reside respectively in Brgy. Tarobucan and Brgy. Trinidad (Sabang), both of Calbayog City
with their own residential houses there. Due to the damages they sustained as a result of the filing of this case, the
plaintiffs are claiming P50,000.00 for mental anguish; monthly rental of the premises in question of P1,500.00
starting from March 1987; litigation expenses of P5,000.00 and P10,000.00 for Attorney's fees.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property acquired is a trust property?

RULING:
NO. A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership in property and
another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the
performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter. The characteristics of a trust are: It is
a relationship; it is a relationship of fiduciary character; it is a relationship with respect to property, not one
involving merely personal duties; it involves the existence of equitable duties imposed upon the holder of the title
to the property to deal with it for the benefit of another; and it arises as a result of a manifestation of intention to

create the relationship. Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the
trustor or of the parties, while implied trusts come into being by operation of law, either through implication of an
intention to create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the trust irrespective of, and even
contrary to, any such intention. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. Resulting trusts are
based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or
interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or
circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with
legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive
trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or
holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.

Implied trust;10 year period to question title

Purita Salvatierra, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 45

Facts:
Enrique Salvatierra died without issues and survived by his brothers Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio, Macario
and sister Marcela. He left them parcel of land as heirs that was extrajudicially partitioned among them. Anselmo,
the son of Macario registered the whole Lot no. 26 with 749 sq. m. land area in his name on May 20, 1980 with a
showing of bad faith knowingly that he only owns 405 sq. m. of land portion in Lot 26 as sold by his father to him
which the latter inherited from Enrique. Lito Longalong and Paciencia Mariano who bought a portion of land
in Lot 26 of 149 sq. m. land area brought an action for reconveyance on the said lot on November 22, 1985.
Anselmo contends that such action already prescribed in 4 years as provided in article 1391 (action be brought for
annulment within 4 yrs upon discovery of fraud.) However, the CA ruled that the prescription periods in the case at
bar is 10 years according to Art. 1144.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescription period runs in 4 years (according to Art. 1391 of the Civil Code) or 10 years
(according to Art. 1144 of the Civil Code)?
Ruling:
With the evidence of fraud and the issue involving a real property, the court ruled that Article 1144 of the
Civil Code provides that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten
(10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title and should govern in the case at bar. The
action has not prescribed.