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1
R. L. Cardullo, Syrianus' Lost Commentaries on Aristotle, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, xxxiii (1986) pp. 112-24.
2
A. Longo, Les Seconds analytiques dans le commentaire de Syrianus
sur la Metaphysique d'Aristote, in F.A.J. de Haas & M.E.M.P.J. Leunissen (eds), Interpreting Aristotle's Posterior Analytics in Late Antiquity and
the Byzantine Period, Leiden, forthcoming (= A. Longo, Amicus Plato.
Metaphysique, langue, art, education dans la tradition platonicienne de l'Antiquite tardive: Plotin, Theodore d'Asine, Syrianus, Hermias, Proclus, Damascius, Augustin, Milano 2007, pp. 159-170).

There is no evidence that Syrianus wrote a commentary on

the Posterior Analytics 1. Nevertheless, the references to this
Aristotelian logical treatise in Syrianus' surviving commentary
on books B, C, L and M of the Metaphysics show that he had
read it carefully and thought about it in depth 2. Besides, the
main topic of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, namely scientific
knowledge and its methods, seems to have been at the centre
of Syrianus' own philosophical interests. For in talking about
metaphysics as the highest of sciences, the science of all
sciences, Syrianus seriously engaged in commenting upon
and further investigating issues concerning the acquisition of
scientific knowledge and its limitations. In particular, he often

1. Introduction

SYRIANUS ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

AND DEMONSTRATION

Katerina Ierodiakonou
(University of Athens)

SYRIANUS ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DEMONSTRATION

KATERINA IERODIAKONOU

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A. Longo, Siriano e i principi della scienza, Napoli 2005.

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That there can be no scientific knowledge of things in flux is

the view not only of Socrates and Plato and the Pythagoreans,
but also of the author of these words [scil. Aristotle]; but also
that there can be no knowledge of particulars; and these,
whether they be in total flux, as is the doctrine of Heraclitus,
or are constantly coming to be and passing away, but enjoy
permanence as a whole by virtue of their formal cause, as Plato
would have it, or whether one calls them true beings, as Aristotle is wont to do, or indeed declares them to be the sole
realities, as is the position of the Stoics, nonetheless that there

Syrianus' position with regard to the nature of the objects

of scientific knowledge (sa+ e\pirsgsa*) seems at first straightforward: The objects of scientific knowledge cannot be
changeable and perishable beings. Indeed, he points out that
most philosophers who believed that scientific knowledge
should not be identified with sense-perception, adopted this
view:

raised the question about the nature of the objects of science,

and contrasted his Neoplatonic account with that of Aristotle.
Moreover, on the basis of the difference in the objects of the
particular sciences, he came not just to adopt a certain classification, but also to assume a certain hierarchy of the sciences,
which is not the one to be found in Aristotle and his Peripatetic commentators.
In this paper I want to examine these two topics which
seem to have drawn Syrianus' attention: first, the objects and
methods of scientific knowledge, and second, the hierarchy of
the sciences. To this end Angela Longo's recent book has been
of much help 3. My paper simply attempts to throw some additional light on a few passages from Syrianus' commentary on
the Metaphysics, which, I think, can provide us with a more
comprehensive account of his epistemological views.

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e\pirsg*lgm ot\ lo*mom Pka*sxmi jai+ Rxjqa*sei jai+ soi& | Pthacoqei* oi|, a\kka+
jai+ at\s{& dojei& s{& sat&sa cqa*uomsi" a\kka+ lgde+ sx&m jah\ e%jarsa" <a=> ei> se
q<e*oi jasa+ pa&m, x<| o< < Gqajkei* sot ko*co|, ei> se ci* cmoiso le+m a\ei+ jai+ uhei* qoiso, diale*moi de+ jasa+ so+ e<atsx&m o%kom dia+ sg+m ei\dgsijg+m ai\si* am, x<|
Pka*sxm e\he*kei, ei> se jai+ o>msa si| at\sa+ jakoi* g, x<| \Aqirsose*kg| ei> xhem,
ei> se jai+ lo*ma ei#mai ke*coi, x<| oi< Rsxijoi* uarim, o%lx| so* ce e\pirsg*lgm
ei#mai sx&m a\so*lxm paqa+ pa&ri* m e\rsim a\pecmxrle*mom, ei\ lg* si| e\pirsg*lgm
e\he*koi jakei& m sg+m ai> rhgrim.

4
Syrianus, On Aristotle's Metaphysics 13-14. Translated by J. Dillon & D.O'Meara, Ithaca-New York 2006. So+ de+ lg+ ei#mai sx&m q<eo*msxm

So, even if different philosophers chose to postulate different sorts of objects of science, they all agreed that the objects of scientific knowledge cannot be perceptible individuals
or the particulars (sa+ jah\ e%jarsa / sa+ a>sola); rather, scientific
knowledge is always of the universals (sa+ jaho*kot). But this is
where things get complicated; Syrianus clearly distinguishes
different types of universals, and not all of them can be regarded as objects of science.
First, though, let us look at his criticism of Aristotle on
this subject. For Syrianus spends some time refuting Aristotle's perplexing claim in the Metaphysics (1087 a 10 ff.) that we
speak of knowledge in two ways; there is potential knowledge,
whose objects are the universals, and there is actual knowledge, whose objects are the particulars. Syrianus accuses Aristotle of two things; he accuses him of inconsistency and circularity in his reasoning. He claims that, if there were scientific
knowledge of the particulars, it would be inconsistent with
what Aristotle himself said in Posterior Analytics I 24 (86 a 5
ff.), namely that there is no science of the particulars and that
no science can be better or more perfect than that of the
universals. Also, if there were scientific knowledge of the par-

is knowledge of individuals is rejected on all sides, unless one

wants to call sense-perception knowledge (in metaph. 104, 1523; trans. J. Dillon & D. O'Meara) 4.

SYRIANUS ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DEMONSTRATION

KATERINA IERODIAKONOU

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6
So+ de+ jai+ sg+m le+m sx&m jaho*kot e\pirsg*lgm dtma*lei ke*ceim ei#mai,
sg+m de+ sx&m jah\ e%jarsa e\meqcei* y, uameqx&| a\masqe*pomso*| e\rsi dia+ sg+m
pqo+| sot+| pakaiose*qot| uikomeiji* am sa* se e\m soi& | \Apodeijsijoi& | at\s{&
q<ghe*msa, o%si sx&m jah\ e%jarsa ot\j e\cvxqei& ci* cmerhai e\pirsg*lgm, lg*soi ce
dg+ a\lei* mx jai+ sekeiose*qam sg&| sx&m jaho*kot. jai+ x<| e>oijem o< pqx&so|
sqo*po| sot& pqx*sot rvg*laso| o< e\j dt*o jaho*kot jasauasijx&m rtma*cxm,
o=m e\m a>kkoi| a\podeijsijx*sasom ei#mai ke*cei, ot\ poiei& rtlpe*qarla se*keiom
ot\d\ e\pirsglomijo+m e\meqcei* y, a\kk\ e>romsai oi< e\j jaho*kot jai+ leqijg&|
sekeio*seqoi, la*kirsa e\a+m z# sx&m jah\ e%jarsa g< e\ka*ssxm.

5
Syrianus seems to have been particularly interested in the perfection of syllogisms. According to Ammonius' commentary on Aristotle's
Prior Analytics (31, 25-30), he defended the view that syllogisms in the
second and third figures are no less perfect than those in the first figure.

Moreover, Syrianus suggests that, if the objects of scientific knowledge were the particulars, and it is only on the basis
of these that we grasp the universal axioms by induction, then

His statement that knowledge of universals is potential, while

that of particulars is actualised, is clearly that of someone who,
because of his contentiousness towards his predecessors, is
prepared to contradict what is said in his own Analytics, to
the effect that it is not possible to have knowledge of particulars, never mind that this knowledge should be better and
more perfect than that of universals. And it would seem,
then, that the first mode of the first figure, that which derives
a conclusion from two universal premisses, which elsewhere he
describes as the most demonstrative, would not form a perfect conclusion, nor one that is scientific in actuality, but
syllogisms formed from universal and particular premisses
will be more perfect, especially if the particular premiss be
the minor one (in metaph. 164, 4-12) 6.

ticulars, then the syllogisms with a universal and a particular

premiss would be more perfect than the syllogisms in the first
figure with two universal premisses, i.e. than the syllogisms in
Barbara and Celarent, which Aristotle himself thought of in
Posterior Analytics I 8 (75 b 21 ff.) as the type of syllogisms
most appropriate for scientific demonstrations 5:

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7
Dia+ poi* am de+ ai\si* am e>si raue*rseqa e>rsai jai+ cmxqilx*seqa sx&m
leqijxse*qxm jai+ a\podeijsx&m sa+ a\nix*lasa, ei> peq a\po+ sx&m seketsai* xm
at\sa+ di\ e\pacxcg&| g<lei& | t<ui* rsalem ot\j o>msa pqo*seqom;
8
/ G ot#m jt*jk{ g< a\po*deini| a\po+ le+m sx&m leqijxse*qxm kalbamo*msxm
g<lx&m jai+ t<uirsa*msxm sa+ a\nix*lasa, a\po+ de+ sx&m a\nixla*sxm a\podeijmt*msxm
sa+ leqijx*seqa.

One could, of course, attempt to defend Aristotle and

disarm Syrianus' accusations of circularity and inconsistency.
But this is not my concern here. Rather, I want to try to
reconstruct what Syrianus himself believes about the objects
and methods of scientific knowledge. For Syrianus not only
tries to refute what he takes to be the Aristotelian position in
the Metaphysics, either by using Aristotle's own claims from
the Posterior Analytics or by finding logical mistakes in Aristotle's reasoning. He further introduces, and systematically
argues in favour of, his own understanding of reality as well
as of the extent to which we, as human beings, may acquire
scientific knowledge of this reality. That is to say, while commenting on Aristotle's Metaphysics, and more specifically on
book M of the Metaphysics, Syrianus undertakes to explain and
establish his own position on the subject, namely that scientific knowledge is knowledge of the universals.
But what does Syrianus have in mind when he says that

2. The Objects and Methods of Scientific Knowledge

what Aristotle says in Posterior Analytics I 2 (71 b 19 ff.) could

not hold, namely that the axioms of sciences are more intelligible and more familiar by nature than the particulars (Syrian.
in metaph. 90, 19-21) 7. Finally, he claims that, if the objects of
scientific knowledge were the particulars, and it is only on the
basis of these that we grasp the universal axioms of sciences,
then demonstrating the particulars on the basis of the axioms
would be circular (in metaph. 90, 39-91, 2) 8.

SYRIANUS ON SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND DEMONSTRATION

KATERINA IERODIAKONOU

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9
For a more detailed exposition of Syrianus' views on the tripartite structure of reality, cfr. K. Praechter, s.v. Syrianos, in RE IV A/2
(1932), coll. 1728-1775; D. J. O'Meara, Pythagoras Revived. Mathematics
and Philosophy in Late Antiquity, Oxford 1989, pp. 128-141.

scientific knowledge is of the universals? Does he mean that

the objects of science are the Platonic Ideas or Forms? Syrianus (in metaph. 81, 38-83, 11) recognizes three different kinds
of Forms, which are, he thinks, to be found at the three levels
of reality as these are presented in the Line simile of Plato's
Republic VI (509 ff.): The intelligible Forms, which represent
the intelligible level (mogsg+ sa*ni|), are the archetypical paradigms and divine causes from which everything else there is is
generated; these Forms correspond to Plato's Forms or Ideas.
The discursive or intermediate Forms (le*ra ei> dg), which are
found at the discursive level (diamogsg+ sa*ni|), are images of
the intelligible Forms; when these Forms are contemplated by
higher souls, like the divine and demonic souls, they function
not only as cognitive, but also as creative and active principles
(dgliotqcijx&| / dqarsgqi* x|, in metaph. 82, 31), but when
they are contemplated by fallen souls, that is embodied human
souls, they function only as cognitive principles (cmxrsijx&| /
hexqgsijx&|, in metaph. 97, 16). Finally, the third kind of
Forms, which are found at the lowest level, the sensible level
(ai\rhgsg+ sa*ni|), are inseparable from sensible bodies; they
imitate the discursive Forms and constitute the immanent
causes of perceptible individuals 9.
Now, which of these three kinds of Forms are, according
to Syrianus, the objects of scientific knowledge? The Forms at
the intelligible level certainly are not objects of scientific
knowledge. Syrianus explicitly says that we may grasp them
not by definition and demonstration, but by a certain cognitive act, a certain grip or simple insight (e\pibokg*), which is
achieved only through first philosophy or wisdom. For intelligible Forms, being the simplest substances, have no accidents,

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11

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For Proclus' similar view that the Forms at the intelligible level
are not objects of scientific knowledge, cfr. C. Steel, Definitions and
Ideas. Aristotle, Proclus and the Socrates of the Parmenides, in J. J. Cleary
& G. M. Gurtler (eds.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in
Ancient Philosophy, vol. XIX, Leiden-Boston 2004, pp. 103-121.

10
Sot&so de+ ot\j e\m sai& | a<pkotrsa*sai| jai+ jtqi* x| mogsai& | ot\ri* ai|,
ai= pa&m o%peq ei\ri+ sot&so* ei\ri (dio+ lg*se o<qirsai+ lg*se a\podeijsai+ ci* cmomsai,
lo*mz de+ e\pibokz& hexqot&msai, jaha* ugrim at\so*| se pokkavot& ke*cxm" ``o<
de+ mot&| ei> se e>hicem g/ ot>'', jai+ o< hei& o| Pka*sxm" ``wtvg&| jtbeqmg*sz lo*m{
m{& heasg*''), a\kk\ e\m sai& | le*rai| ot\ri* ai|, ai= jai+ a\podeijsai* ei\ri jasa+ sa+
t<pa*qvomsa e<atsai& |. e>vei ca+q ot%sx" soi& | le+m a<pkotrsa*soi| sx&m o>msxm
ot\de+m t<pa*qvei paqa+ so+ ei#mai at\sx&m, x%rse ot\j e>rsim at\sx&m so+ le+m ot\ri* a
so+ de+ a>kko si" dio+ jqei* ssx sat&sa jai+ o<qirlot& jai+ a\podei* nex|.

and thus there is nothing to demonstrate about them, for instance there is nothing to demonstrate about the Idea Animal
or the Idea Star (in metaph. 4, 29-37) 10. Only the soul of the
first philosopher, being awakened by the sensibles, and recalling the discursive Forms, is able to ascend to the first paradigms and come to grasp the divine causes (in metaph. 83, 711). For as Syrianus points out, the human souls have in principle access to the divine causes in virtue of the fact that they
have been created through geometric, arithmetical and harmonic principles analogous to the principles constitutive of the
intelligible Forms (in metaph. 82, 20-2) 11.
But if the intelligible Forms are not objects of scientific
knowledge, neither are the Forms at the sensible level. Syrianus presents the Forms at the lowest level, the immanent
causes of sensible bodies, as inseparable from the perceptible
individuals (a\vx*qirsa), and thus as particulars. And it is interesting that this is also how he seems to interpret Aristotle's
notion of forms. For he talks about the Forms in the sensibles
as if they were the Aristotelian immanent forms (e>mtka ei> dg)
and, without implying in any way that on this point he disagrees with Aristotle, he regards them as particulars. This, of
course, does not mean that his interpretation of Aristotle in
this regard has to be the right one. On the other hand, it is

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Cfr. in metaph. 7, 10; 22; 29, 23 and 36; 35, 32; 53, 9; 82, 27; 91,

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16

14
Soi& | de+ jaho*kot ko*coi| jah\ e<atsot*| se hexqotle*moi| jai+ jorlot&ri sg+m ai\rhgsg+m ut*rim sa+ jah\ at<sa+ rtlbebgjo*sa paqaci* cmesai" dio*peq jai+ g< a\po*deini| peqi+ at\sa+ a\marsqe*uesai.
15
Ke*cx de+ jaho*kot ot\ sa+| e\m m{& (at'sai ca+q jai+ pqo+ sot& jaho*kot
jai+ at\soaqvai* ), a\kka+ sa+| e\m wtvz&.

monstrations are needed of their per se accidents and of their

interrelations (in metaph. 4, 37-5, 2) 14. For instance, we get a
better understanding of what a triangle is, when we actually
demonstrate that the sum of its angles is equal to two right
angles. And we get a better understanding of what kind of a
triangle an equilateral triangle is, when we actually demonstrate that all its angles are equal. So, to acquire scientific
knowledge comes down to fully grasping through demonstrations the intermediate Forms, which on Syrianus' view are said
to be universal principles (jaho*kot a\qvai* ), and more specifically universal formulae (jaho*kot ko*coi) which the lowest
Forms imitate and instantiate. In fact, it is only these Forms
which strictly speaking are, according to Syrianus, universals;
for the Forms in the sensibles are particulars, while the intelligible Forms are before the universals (pqo+ sot& jaho*kot) and
principles by and in themselves (at\soaqvai+ ), in the sense that
nothing participates in them (a\le*hejsa) and they cannot be
predicated of anything (in metaph. 165, 6-7) 15.
But are the universal principles, i.e. the intermediate
Forms, the only types of universals? Syrianus makes sure to
distinguish the universal principles from another type of universals, which Aristotle recognizes, that is the universals
which are produced by abstraction from the sensibles (in metaph. 12, 29-34; 82, 25-9). In particular, while criticizing the
way Aristotle views mathematical objects, Syrianus often underlines the difference between, on the one hand, the universals which the human soul possesses innately and which are
causes of the sensibles, and, on the other, the universals which
are said to be posterior to (t<rseqocemg&) 16 and later-born than

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Ei\ le+m ca+q disso+m so+ jaho*kot, so+ le+m ai> siom sot& ai\rhgsot& so+ de+
t<rseqoceme*|.
21

21; 92, 9; 101, 2; 106, 11; 107, 29; 110, 12 and 19; 136, 37; 161, 25; 163,
7; 177, 16; 194, 1.
17
Cfr. ibid., 29, 36; 31, 23.
18
Cfr. ibid., 107, 29; 179, 22.
19
Cfr. ibid., 7, 22; 29, 23; 106, 11; 161, 26.
20
Cfr. ibid., 136, 36; 163, 7.

This claim used to be made also by these men: if the sciences

are concerned with real objects, universal entities exist; for

(e\picemmglasija*) 17 the sensibles, or secondary and adventitious (e\peirodix*dg) 18, or in mere thought (jas\ e\pi* moiam / e\m
wikai& | e\pimoi* ai|) 19. He claims that only the first are substances, whereas the latter are not (a\mot*ria), even if they
can be said to participate in being; for they are objects of
our imagination (uamsa*rlasa) 20 and formed by abstraction.
In fact, Syrianus says explicitly that, if we are to follow the
Pythagoreans and Plato, there are two ways to talk about the
universals; the universals as posterior to the sensibles and the
universals as causes of the sensibles (in metaph. 91, 20-21) 21.
There is a text, however, in which Syrianus also refers to a
third kind of universals. Commenting on a passage from metaph. M 4. 1079 a 7-9, in which Aristotle remarks that there
are forms of all things of which there are sciences, Syrianus
presents the following Neoplatonic argument for the existence
of universals: if the sciences are about beings, then there are
universals; for the sciences are about universals. Indeed, he
reformulates this argument in accordance, as he himself points
out, with the first syllogism in the third figure, i.e. Darapti: the
objects of science are universals; the objects of science are
beings; hence, some universals are beings. And he further
undertakes to defend the conclusion: not all universals are
beings, for neither the universals posterior to the sensibles
are nor those in the perceptible individuals:

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22
\Eke*ceso le+m t<po+ sx&m a\mdqx&m jai+ sot&so" ei\ peqi+ o>msa ai< e\pirsg&lai, e>rsi sa+ jaho*kot" sx&m ca+q jaho*kot ai< e\pirsg&lai" x<| ei#mai so+m
rtkkocirlo+m e\m sqi* s{ rvg*lasi" sa+ e\pirsgsa+ jaho*kot, <sa+ e\pirsgsa+
o>msa>, sima+ jaho*kot o>msa" ot\ ca+q pa*msa sa+ jaho*kot, ot\ ca+q dg+ jai+ sa+
t<rseqocemg& g/ sa+ e\m soi& | a\so*loi|. a>sopom de+ ot\de+m pa*msa sa+ e\pirsgsa+ o>msa
ei#mai, ei\ sa+ jtqi* x| e\pirsgsa+ kalba*moiso, a\kka+ lg+ sa+ i\asqija+ g/ sejsomija*"
ot\ ca+q e\pirsg&lai jtqi* x| at'sai, lo*mai de+ dijai* x| ot%sx| a/m pqoracoqet*oimso ai< peqi+ sa+ a\i^ dia jai+ jah\ at<sa+ o>msa jai+ a\ei+ x<rat*sx| diajei* lema
pqaclaseto*lemai.

This text suggests, I think, a three-fold distinction of

universals:
(i) the universals which are causes of the sensibles;
(ii) the universals which are posterior to the sensibles; and
(iii) the universals in the perceptible individuals.
It is puzzling, though, in two regards; first, because the universals in the perceptible individuals are not considered as
beings, and second, because Syrianus seems to add the universals in the perceptible individuals as a third type of universals,
although he interprets Aristotle's immanent forms as particulars. Given that nowhere else in his commentary Syrianus
mentions the universals in the perceptible individuals, one
wonders whether the text is interpolated or Syrianus expressed himself a bit carelessly here.

the sciences are concerned with universals. This, then, is a

syllogism in the third figure: the objects of knowledge are
universal; <the objects of knowledge are real objects;> so
therefore, there are some existent universals. For not all universals exist not, for instance, the ``later-born'', nor those
that inhere in individuals. But there is nothing strange in the
claim that all objects of knowledge are real, if one takes that to
refer to the objects of the proper sciences, not, for instance,
the objects of medicine, or carpentry; for these are not
sciences in the proper sense, but one might justly term such
only those which concern themselves with objects which are
eternal and exist by themselves and are always in the same
state (in metaph. 110, 9-16) 22.

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23
Ammon. in isag. 39, 8-42, 26; 68, 25-69, 11; 104, 27-105, 14;
Elias. in isag. 45, 26-48, 30; David. in isag. 113, 11-116, 2; Olymp. prol.
19, 31-4; Philop. in cat. 9, 3-12; Arethas. in isag. 21, 23, 52; Photius. amph. qu. 77; Psellos. in de interp. 10, 19-27.

But what is also interesting, here, is that Syrianus' distinction clearly reminds us of another three-fold distinction of
universals, which became a commonplace for the later Neoplatonic and Byzantine commentators in their attempt to reconcile Plato's and Aristotle's doctrines. I refer to the distinction
which is to be found first in Ammonius' commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge, according to which there are three types of
universals 23:
(i) the universals before the particulars (pqo+ sx&m
pokkx&m), which are identified with the Platonic Ideas;
(ii) the universals after the particulars (e\pi+ soi& | pokkoi& |),
which are concepts or thoughts; and
(iii) the universals in the particulars (e\m soi& | pokkoi& |),
which represent Aristotle's notion of immanent forms.
There is no doubt that the universals after the particulars are
the universals which, on Syrianus' view, are objects of our
imagination and formed by abstraction; after all, it is telling
that both Syrianus and Ammonius characterize such universals
as posterior to the sensibles. Similarly, the universals in the
particulars could be identified with the universals in the perceptible individuals, though it is again problematic whether
such universals were actually understood by the Neoplatonic
and Byzantine commentators as universals, or rather as particulars. However, the point at which Syrianus' and Ammonius'
three-fold distinctions of universals significantly differ concerns the first type of universals, the causes of the sensibles;
for Ammonius clearly identifies them with Plato's Ideas,
whereas Syrianus introduces the further distinction between
intelligible and discursive Forms which complicates things.
And this is what I would like to turn to now.

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In Ammonius' account of universals, the universals before

the many particulars, i.e. the paradigmatic causes, are identified with Plato's Ideas. Thus, to learn by recollection these
first causes is to achieve the knowledge which human beings
can attain. On the other hand, since Syrianus postulates the
existence not only of the intelligible Forms, i.e. the Platonic
Ideas, but also of the intermediate Forms, his model of scientific knowledge slightly diverges from what Plato said about
the attainment of knowledge. According to Syrianus, as I
explained before, the perception of the sensibles, from which
the Forms in the sensibles are inseparable, awakens our fallen
souls and makes possible the recollection not of the intelligible
in the sense of the Ideas or Platonic Forms, but of the intermediate Forms which our souls possess innately; it is only
after the recollection of the intermediate Forms that the
soul of the first philosopher may come to grasp the first paradigms. Now, the reason why Syrianus introduces the intermediate Forms is obviously linked with his decision to assume, following Plato's simile of the Line, the tripartite structure of reality. What is interesting from our point of view,
though, is that Syrianus in this way limits scientific knowledge to knowledge about the intermediate Forms. Furthermore, to successfully attain scientific knowledge requires,
on Syrianus' view, not only to be simply reminded of the
innate Forms; in addition, it also requires to systematically
demonstrate the per se accidents of the intermediate Forms
and their interrelations.
Therefore, Syrianus' account of scientific knowledge
seems to bring together Plato's theory of recollection
with the Aristotelian demands of demonstrative science.
It may be that Syrianus has not usually been portrayed,
unlike other Neoplatonists, as having been particularly anxious to reconcile Plato's and Aristotle's metaphysics, but I
think that when it comes to epistemological issues we do
witness an attempt on his part to let Plato and Aristotle

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Cfr. Procl. in Eucl. 42, 12-43, 1; 69, 13-19; Ammon. in an. pr. 7,
28-9; in isag. 34, 17-20; David. in isag. 88, 8-9.

27

< G roui* a, ugri* , po*seqom sa+| ot\ri* a| lo*ma| e\pirje*psesai sx&m

pqacla*sxm g/ sa+ jah\ at<sa+ rtlbebgjo*sa/ ug*rolem o%si jai+ sa+| ot\ri* a|
jai+ sa+ ot%sx| t<pa*qvomsa, dia+ le+m sg&| a\maktsijg&| sa+| a\qva+| sot& o>mso|
kalba*motra, dia+ de+ sg&| diaiqesijg&| jai+ sg&| o<qirsijg&| sa+| ot\ri* a| sx&m
pa*msxm hexqot&ra, dia+ de+ sg&| a\podeijsijg&| sa+ jah\ at<sa+ sai& | ot\ri* ai|
t<pa*qvomsa rtkkocifole*mg.

24
Cfr. D. O'Meara, Le probleme de la metaphysique dans l'antiquite
tardive, Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie, xxxiii
(1986) pp. 3-22.
25
Cfr. A. C. Lloyd, The Assimilation of Aristotle's Logic, in A. H.
Armstrong (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge 1967, pp. 319-322.
26
For Syrianus' admiration and use of Aristotle's logic, cfr. in
metaph. 74, 3-7; 80, 4-7; Marinus Procl. xiii.

converge 24. And this convergence is not simply of the kind we

find in the Neoplatonic curriculum, as this was established at
least after Porphyry's reinstatement of logical studies 25. That
is to say, Syrianus does not merely admire Aristotle's logic and
support the view that it should be read as preparatory to Plato's metaphysics 26; Aristotelian logic, and in particular Aristotle's theory of demonstration, enters the core of the Platonic
theory of knowledge, since demonstrations become indispensable for the possibility of fully recalling the intermediate
Forms, i.e. of acquiring the kind of scientific knowledge human souls can acquire. It is telling that in presenting the methods of first philosophy or wisdom, Syrianus (in metaph. 4, 249) 27 adds the method of demonstration to the relevant list
found in Middle Platonic texts, and in particular in Didaskalikos (V 156, 26-9). That is to say, Syrianus lists four methods,
and it is his list which later seems to become standard in the
Neoplatonic tradition 28: the method of analysis (a\maktsijg*),
division (diaiqesijg*), definition (o<qirsijg* / dioqirsijg*) and
the method of demonstration (a\podeijsijg*); with the method
of analysis we grasp the principles of beings, with the help of

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For the four methods of first philosophy, cfr. also in metaph. 16,
22-17, 18; 22, 11-31; 36, 8; 55, 33-56, 6.
30
In his commentary on the Phaedrus (134, 12-18), Hermias also
talks of a kind of light which directly proceeds from the Form of the
Good and cannot be grasped even by simple insight (e\pibokg*). For Hermias' commentary as evidence for Syrianus' views, cfr. O'Meara, op.
cit., pp. 124-128.

Now, given that scientific knowledge, according to Syrianus, is about the intermediate Forms, one would expect that
all particular sciences are treated by him as being of equal rank
as sciences. But this is not the case. Syrianus introduces a strict
hierarchy of the sciences starting at the higher level with metaphysics, moving next to mathematics, and finally placing at
the lowest level all other sciences, including physics and medicine. Indeed, he unreservedly considers mathematics as a
science, but when it comes to other particular sciences, he
makes remarks which suggest reservations about their status

3. A Hierarchy of the Sciences

division and definition we contemplate their essences, and

with the method of demonstration we prove their per se accidents 29. In Didaskalikos, on the other hand, we have the
method of analysis, division, definition, and then the method
of induction (e\pacxcijo*m) and syllogistic (rtkkocirsijo*m);
there is no mention of the method of demonstration.
One final remark about Syrianus' views on the objects and
methods of scientific knowledge. Apart from the three levels of
reality, there is also, according to him, a supra-intelligible level
at which the ultimate principles (t<peqot*riai a\qvai* ) are to be
found, namely the One, the monad and the dyad. This level
seems to determine, on Syrianus' account, the limitations of
human knowledge, since he suggests that no knowledge of
these principles is possible (e.g. in metaph. 80, 7-14; 183, 6-8) 30.

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Ei\ de+ sa+ t<po+ sot& cexle*sqot <hexqot*lema> jai+ a\t]ki* y jai+ jahaqo*sgsi jai+ a\jqibei* y jai+ a\kghei* y jqasei& , px&| ot\j a\luo*seqa dei* jmtsai, jai+
o%si peqi+ relma+ jai+ si* lia ce*mg rsqe*uesai cexlesqi* a, jai+ o%si jqei* ssx jai+
heio*seqa sa+ e\m ot\qam{& paqadei* clasa pqot]pa*qvei e>m se s{& dgliotqcij{&
m{& ja\m sz& o%kz wtvz&. x'm dg+ jai+ ei\jo*ma| g< g<lese*qa rt*rsari| e>votra
hexqei& sa* se e\m s{& pamsi+ dia+ jahokijxse*qxm ko*cxm peqikalba*motra
jai+ sa+ e\m soi& | a\qvijxse*qoi| e<atsg&| ai\si* oi|, x<| di\ ei\jo*mxm sx&m e\m at\sz&
pqo+| sg+m a\qve*stpom ot\ri* am a\mapelpole*mg.

as sciences. Which are the criteria, however, on the basis of

which Syrianus tries to justify his lower esteem for sciences
like physics and medicine?
Let me start with some brief remarks about metaphysics or
first philosophy, which is regarded by Syrianus as the science
of all sciences (e.g. in metaph. 2, 18-3, 1; 3, 17-24). And this,
for two reasons: first, because it assists human souls in their
ascent to the archetypal paradigms at the intelligible level; and
second, because it provides the other sciences with their axioms. For instance, it offers to logic the principle of non-contradiction, to physics the principle that nothing comes from
nothing, and to geometry, or mathematics in general, the principle that things equal to something are equal to each other.
The first philosopher acquires knowledge of these principles
not through demonstrations, but by grasping them with his
intellect, whereas all other particular sciences accept them as
axiomatic and demonstrate their claims on the basis of them.
Hence, there is no doubt that the objects of the highest
science, metaphysics, belong to the intelligible level in the
tripartite structure of reality.
Next, mathematical objects are placed by Syrianus, following again Plato's simile of the Line, between the intelligible
and the sensible level of reality, namely at the discursive level
(e.g. in metaph. 3, 24-30; 4, 5-11; 27, 30-37 31; 100, 27-33).
Mathematical objects constitute creative principles of the divine and demonic souls which regulate nature, and at the same
time are innate in the human soul helping us to regain the

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On the astronomers' demonstrations, cfr. A. Longo, Le sostanze

intermedie e le dimostrazioni astronomiche nel prologo del commento di

32
Dio+ jai+ <ai< > a\podei* nei| soi& | a\rsqomo*loi| e\j jaho*kot jai+ leqijx&m pqosa*rexm ci* cmomsai, sg&| le+m jaho*kot sg+m ai\si* am e\vot*rg| dia+ so+
e\m wtvz& sz& so+ pa&m t<uirsamot*rz pqot]pa*qveim, sg&| de+ leqijg&| e\j sx&m
ai\rhgsx&m ei\kglle*mg|.

knowledge lost by embodiment. For since the human soul has

been created on principles analogous to mathematical principles, principles which imitate their archetypical paradigms, it
may use these innate images and rise to a consideration of its
own causes in order to reach the intelligible Forms and beyond. Hence, mathematics deals with distinctions and relations which are prior to the creation of the sensible world
and only mirrored in it, but most importantly they play a
significant part in the soul's ascent to the intelligible Forms
and the ultimate principles. It is for this reason, then, that
Syrianus clearly favours mathematical sciences, in particular
geometry and arithmetic, thinking of them as prior to physics
and closer to metaphysics, and thus as more scientific than all
other particular sciences.
What about the mathematical sciences other than geometry and arithmetic? Syrianus often refers to the peculiarity of
the science of astronomy (e.g. in metaph. 27, 9-13; 97, 10-16),
but also mentions harmonics, optics, and even mechanics (e.g.
in metaph. 61, 24-28; 98, 13-31). These are sciences which,
according to him, deal with the sensibles, but use general
mathematical theorems; and this clearly shows in the way their
demonstrations are constructed. For instance, the premisses of
the astronomers' demonstrations, Syrianus says (in metaph. 82,
36-83, 1) 32, are not all universal. The astronomers use one
universal and one particular premiss; the universal premiss
provides us with the causes of the sensibles, i.e. the mathematical principles which constitute the divine causes and of which
our soul innately possesses knowledge, while the particular
premiss results from observing the sensibles 33. That is to

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six&m e>romsai soi& | a\rsqomo*loi|, ei\ lg+ e\j sx&m jaho*kot ko*cxm, ot=| e>votrim
ai< le+m g<le*seqai cmxrsijx&|, ai< de+ hei& ai cmxrsijx&| se a%la jai+ dgliotqcijx&|, pqoi^ oiem; g/ ca+q sot& a\podeijmt*mai si sot+| a\rsqomo*lot| jai+ sot+|
lahglasijot+| pa*msa| jai+ pqo+| sot*soi| sot+| utrijot+| a\pocmxrse*om, jai+
sot& sa+| a\podei* nei| e\n ai\si* a| ci* cmerhai ot\ sg&| sot& rtlpeqa*rlaso| lo*mg|,
a\kka+ jai+ sg&| sot& pqa*claso| a\porsase*om, g/ le*vqipeq a/m a\luo*seqa sat&sa
le*mz, dei& jai+ sa+| ai\si* a| e\m jaho*kot siri+ ko*coi| pqot]pa*qveim sx&m jas\
ot\qamo+m jai+ jasa+ pa&ram sg+m ut*rim e\pisekeiotle*mxm.

Siriano sui libri M e N della Metafisica di Aristotele, Documenti e studi

sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, xii (2001) pp. 85-124.
34
Px&| ot#m e>si ai< a\podei* nei| e\j sx&m pqx*sxm jai+ oi\jei* xm [jai+ ] ai\-

But how, then, can the astronomers produce proofs on the

basis of appropriately primary causal principles, if they do not
proceed from general reason-principles, which our souls possess cognitively, but the divine souls both cognitively and demiurgically? For either astronomers and all mathematicians,
and indeed all physical philosophers, must give up hope of
scientifically demonstrating any proposition, and abandon
the idea that proofs derive from the causal principle, not just
of the conclusion, but of reality itself, or, as long as both of
these are maintained, it must be the case that the causal principles of all things that are produced both in the heavens and in
the whole of nature pre-exist in some kind of universal reasonprinciples (in metaph. 88, 24-32) 34.

say, the astronomer considers the sensible heaven, but he considers it as one who possesses in his soul the intermediate
Forms, which imitate the archetypal paradigms; he fits together these Forms with what he observes, and thus demonstrates the per se accidents of the heavenly bodies. If this were
not so, Syrianus claims, it would be impossible for the astronomer, and even more for the physicist, to demonstrate anything; but one can produce astronomical demonstrations, since
there is something special about the objects of astronomy,
namely they are sensible but at the same time are eternal
and unchangeable:

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35
Soi& | de+ e\mt*koi| ei> deri jai+ a\so*loi| jai+ ai\rhgsoi& | g>dg jai+ sa+
jtqi* x| rtlbebgjo*sa e\luamsa*fesai, a= ci* cmesai jai+ a\poci* cmesai vxqi+ |
sg&| sot& t<pojeile*mot uhoqa&|. sat&sa de+ pa*kim jasadee*rseqa o>msa sx&m
a\podeijsx&m dia+ sg&| ei\josokoci* a| kgpsa+ ci* cmesai, ot>si ce s{& rou{&
jaho+ rouo*|, a\kk\ i\asqoi& | ei\ st*voi jai+ utrijoi& | jai+ pamsi+ s{& soiot*s{
ce*mei.

Thus, astronomy is about the sensible, but it is still a

science of the universal, because it is about causes which correspond to the divine principles whose power is only imperfectly assimilated by the physical world.
The comparison just mentioned between astronomy and
physics requires, I think, further elaboration. And this especially, since Syrianus claims that physics, together with medicine and the art of building, is not strictly speaking a science
(e.g. in metaph. 110, 13-16; 97, 27-98, 11). For although such
arts do not depend merely on experience, since the medical
doctor, for instance, can explain why he does what he does,
still they should not be regarded as sciences, because they deal
with the sensibles and not with eternal and unchangeable
beings. As I have tried to show, scientific knowledge, on Syrianus' view, is of the intermediate Forms, and it is through
demonstrations that we can prove the per se accidents of these
Forms. In the case of the Forms in the sensibles, however, as
well as in the case of the sensibles, Syrianus says that their
accidents are not known through demonstrations, but they are
rather imagined (e\luamsa*ferhai); and we come to grasp these
lowest beings by conjecturing (ei\josokoci* a), which is, according to him, what physics, medicine and the art of building do
(in metaph. 5, 2-7) 35.
However, one could object that medicine, for instance, is
demonstrative knowledge, because it deals with the universal, in
the sense that it deals with all cases in which a particular symptom is caused by a certain dysfunction of the organism. Or, as
Syrianus himself admits, that medicine, just like rhetoric, deals
with what is common and only incidentally with the particular;

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For a more detailed discussion of this distinction, cfr. A. Madigan, Syrianus and Asclepius on Forms and Intermediates in Plato and Aris-

37

36
La&kkom ca+q sx&m jaho*kot ei\ri+ m ai< se*vmai" cemmx&ri de+ jai+ jqi* motri jai+ sa+ jah\ e%jarsa s{& e>veim sot& joimot& sa+| ai\si* a|" oi#de le+m ca+q
t<cia*feim o< i\asqo+| a>mhqxpom jai+ ot\vi+ Jakki* am" o%sam de+ lesa+ sg&| t%kg|
e\meqcz&, so+ a>solom t<cia*fei dia+ so+ sot+| peqi+ t<ciei* a| ko*cot| pqoeikgue*mai.

But Syrianus' use of the term common (joimo*m), here,

instead of the term universal (jaho*kot), is important; for, I
think, it suggests that what medicine is really concerned with are
the universals which are posterior to the sensibles and objects of
our imagination, rather than the universal discursive formulae
(jaho*kot ko*coi) which are images of the divine causes.
Hence, the first criterion on the basis of which Syrianus
supports his hierarchy of the sciences concerns the objects of
the particular sciences: sciences which deal with the intelligible Forms are more worthy than those which deal with the
intermediate Forms, and those which deal with the intermediate Forms are more worthy than those which deal with the
lowest Forms and the sensibles (in metaph. 25, 26-28). So,
although Syrianus argues in favour of the view, which we do
not find before him, that the characteristics of a science do not
necessarily coincide with those of its objects, for instance that
a science which deals with perishable objects does not need
itself to be perishable (in metaph. 26, 28-27, 3) 37, he still dis-

For it is the case rather that the scientific arts and crafts
concern what is universal; they generate and evaluate the particular also by possessing the causes of the common. The doctor, after all, knows how to cure a man, and not just Callias;
but when man is actualised along with his matter, he cures the
individual by virtue of his previous mastery of the reasonprinciples of health (in metaph. 164, 16-19) 36.

that is to say, medical knowledge is knowledge of general theorems, which can be applied in the case of particular patients:

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38
\G le+m ca+q i\asqijg+ poigsijg* si| ot#ra se*vmg jai+ ai\rhgso+m e>votra se*ko| a\macjai* x| peqi+ ai\rhgsa+ seset*sajem, g< de+ cexlesqi* a hexqgsijg*
si| ot#ra uikoroui* a jai+ jas\ at\so*m, ei\ lg+ peqi+ o>msa rsqe*uesai jai+ jqeisso*mx| o>msa g/ jasa+ sa+ ai\rhgsa*, ot\de+m a/m rpotdai& om diapqa*ssoiso.
39
Ot\ sot*s{ le+m diaue*qei lo*m{ cexdairi* a cexlesqi* a|, a\kk\ o%si jai+
g< le+m vqei* a| a\mhqxpijg&| rsova*fesai jai+ pqo+| so+ vqg*rilom o<qy& sot&
hmgsot& bi* ot veiqotqci* a| se e\ua*psesai jai+ sot& o>msx| o>mso| e>mmoiam ot\
pqoveiqi* fei * * sx&m ai\rhgsx&m sg+m wtvg+m jai+ diajahai* qei so+ sat*sg| o>lla
peqia*cei se pqo+| mo*grim, a\uirsa&ra sg&| pavtse*qa| jai+ loquxsijg&| sx&m
e\mt*kxm rtmsa*nex|. o%lx| de+ kece*rhxram sat*sz diaue*qeim.

totle, Journal of the History of Philosophy, xxiv (1986) pp. 149-171,

esp. pp. 157-162.

To some extent Syrianus' hierarchy of sciences might be

said to reflect Plato's attitude towards physics, but also to be a
reaction to Aristotle's down-grading of mathematics. Moreover, it is worth noting that such an account about sciences
like physics and medicine does not agree with the relevant

4. Conclusion

tinguishes among sciences on the basis of the different ontological status of their objects.
The difference in the objects of sciences is not, however,
the only criterion of Syrianus' hierarchy of sciences. There is
also a difference in the function or the end of sciences. For
instance, medicine, Syrianus says, is a productive art and is
concerned with the sensibles, while geometry is a theoretical
science and has no practical end (in metaph. 97, 6-10) 38. Similarly, the art of surveying is of practical usefulness with regard
to the sensibles, whereas geometry leads the soul away from
the sensible and helps it ascent to the intelligible Forms (in
metaph. 25, 30-35) 39. This second criterion, therefore, brings
the same result as the first. According to Syrianus, there is a
clear distinction between the mathematical sciences and
sciences like physics, medicine and the art of building.

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views expressed by the Peripatetic commentators of Aristotle.

It may be that Alexander of Aphrodisias distinguishes between mathematics and what he calls the stochastic arts on
the basis of the difference in their objects, and thus of the
different degrees of precision in their conclusions, but he
never suggests that the stochastic arts should not be considered as sciences. Indeed, the wavering of opinions on this issue
outlasts Alexander and Syrianus; for the later Neoplatonic and
Byzantine commentators continue to puzzle about the status
of sciences like physics or medicine, but also ethics and politics, without always elaborating their arguments. Thus, to understand Syrianus' views on the hierarchy of sciences, and for
that matter on the objects and methods of scientific knowledge, is in this respect essential.

422