Introduction to Berkeley

I. Rationalism versus Empiricism (over-simplified version!)

A. Growth of Science in the 17th and 18th century depended upon two
methods of acquiring knowledge.
1. mathematical reasoning
2. observation
B. Rationalists (on the Continent: Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza) give
priority to mathematical reasoning (especially geometry, for Descartes).
1. true knowledge comes through reasoning alone.
2. rational thought and deduction can reveal the rational structure of the
world.
3. the Principle of Sufficient Reason implies there must be a complete
explanation for every event.
4. scientific laws are derived from self-evident a priori truths.
5. knowledge is a deductive system of truths.
6. observation is an inferior form of reasoning.
7. all truths are knowable a priori.
8. all truths are necessary -- so, universe is deterministic.
C. Empiricists (on the British Isles: Locke, Berkeley, and Hume) emphasize
observation.
1. all knowledge is empirical -- derived from experience.
2. reason is not an important source of knowledge -- reason only reveals
logical connections between our ideas, but never gives us knowledge of what
actually exists.
3. we only perceive our ideas and knowledge consists in the perception of
these ideas (Berkeley goes so far as to claim that only minds and their ideas
are real).
4. There is no a priori knowledge of the world.
II. Biography of Berkeley (1685-1753)
A. born near Kilkenny, Ireland in 1685. Entered Trinity College at 15, received

B.A. at 19.
B. At 19 published a work on mathematics, made a fellow at Trinity and took
holy orders for the Anglican Church.
C. By 28 Berkeley had published his most famous works: A Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues Between
Hylas and Philonous.
D. 1713 -- Berkeley is befriended by the intellectual elite of London (e.g.,
Pope and Swift)
E. 1721 becomes "Doctor of Divinity" and by 1724 has received charter to
start a college in Bermuda.
F. 1728 -- Berkeley moves to Rhode Island with his new wife Anne. He made
close contacts with scholars at Yale College, but the funds for his own school
in Bermuda never came through, so he moved back to London.
G. 1734 -- Berkeley is appointed Bishop of Cloyne, Ireland.
H. 1752 -- Berkeley goes to Oxford to supervise the education of his second
son (eldest son died at age 14, 3 others children died in infancy). In 1753,
Berkeley suddenly dies while his wife is reading to him from the Bible.
III. Structure of the Dialogues
A. First Dialogue: The Argument for Immaterialism, Begun.
1. secondary qualities do not exist outside the mind.
2. primary qualities do not exist outside the mind.
3. no sensible object can exist outside the mind.
B. Second Dialogue: Conclusion of Argument for Immaterialism.
1. Perception can only be explained by the reality of God.
2. Matter cannot really exist at all.
C. Third Dialogue: Objections to Immaterialism
First Dialogue
I. Preliminaries
A. The interlocutors:
1. Hylas -- "materialist"

2. Philonous -- "mind-lover" (Berkeley's own views are expressed by

Philonous)
B. The nature of skepticism -- two versions (pp. 8-9):
1. those who deny commonly accepted truths.
2. those who doubt everything
* note: traditionally, skepticism is an epistemological position -- it has to do
with our alleged lack of grounds for believing what we believe.
C. Hylas accuses Philonous of skepticism for claiming that there is no such
thing as a material substance.
D. Definition of sensible things: that which can be perceived immediately by
the senses (p. 10).
II. Philonous argues that secondary qualities cannot exist outside the mind
(pp. 11-23):
A. Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities
1. Primary Qualities:
a. extension (size) and figure (shape)
b. solidity
c. gravity
d. motion and rest
2. Secondary Qualities:
a. heat and cold
b. tastes
c. odors
d. sounds
e. colors
3. The distinction was first explicitly formulated by Robert Boyle (1627-1704)
and popularized by John Locke ((1632-1704). Recall, however, that Descartes
marks the distinction, though he did not use the words "primary and
secondary qualities."

B. Philonous' central contention:

[1] In sense perception, we perceive nothing certain sensible qualities.
[2] All sensible qualities are nothing but ideas.
--------------------------------------------[3] Therefore, we perceive only ideas
C. Hylas argues that sensible qualities exist outside of and independently of
the mind. That is, he challenges premise [2] above.
D. Analysis of Secondary Qualities
1. heat [p.11]:
[h1] all degrees of heat are equally real.
[h2] Intense heat is only in the mind
------------------------------------[h3] all degrees of heat exist only in the mind
* [h2] is defended by claiming [a] pain exist purely in the mind, and [b] no
distinction can be made between intense heat and the pain associated with
intense heat.
2. taste [p.15]: a similar argument to the one above is made linking
sweetness to pleasure are bitterness to pain. In addition:
[t1] different individuals have very different tastes.
[t2] if different individuals have very different tastes, taste is relative and
cannot exist independently of the mind.
-------------------------------------[t3] taste is relative and cannot exist independently of the mind.
3. odor [p.16]: same as taste -- consider what smells good to a dog!
4. sound [p.17]:
[s1] If sound is a vibratory motion in the air, then sounds may be felt or seen,
but never heard.
[s2] sounds are heard.

-----------------------------[s3] sound is not a vibratory motion in the air.

5. color [p.19]:
[c1] the real properties of an external object cannot change without the
occurrence of a change in the object itself.
[c2] the colors I perceive can change without the occurrence of a change in
the object itself.
------------------------------------[c3] Therefore the colors I perceive are not real properties of an external
object.
Primary Qualities and the Mind.
I. Recall the Relativity Argument (on color):
A. First Step:
[1] The real properties of an external object can't change unless there is a
change in the object itself.
[2] Colors can change without a change in the object itself.
------------------------------------[3] So, colors can't be real properties of external objects.
B. Second Step:
[3] Colors aren't real properties of external objects (conclusion of the first
step).
[4] If colors aren't real properties of external objects, then they are only
ideas.
-------------------------------------------[5] So, colors are only ideas.
II. The Relativity Argument applies to Primary Qualities as well.
A. Extension and Figure: sizes and shapes are perspectival (p. 25).
B. Motion: speed is relative to the observer (p.26)

C. Solidity: hardness and degree of resistance are dependent on the

perceiver, its strength, etc. (pp. 26-27).
D. Philonous concludes: there is no rational grounds for the distinction
between Primary and Secondary Qualities (p. 27).
III. Hylas' Initial Objections and Philonous' Responses:
A. Hylas: Primary qualities may exist in the abstract -- without being relative
to the observer (e.g., absolute extension, motion, etc. -- pp. 27-29).
Philonous: Whatever exists, exist in the particular (i.e., something can be
abstracted from a particular, but every existing thing must at least exist in
the particular).
B. Hylas: One should distinguish the object from the sensation (p.30)
Philonous: first, object = sense object. The object is pictured, but is pictured
with both its primary and secondary qualities. But an unthinking substance is
never perceived. All that is perceived is mind-dependent. (An additionally
argument from the passivity of perception is also offered).
C. Hylas: Sensibles are modes and qualities of a Material Substratum because
what we perceive must have some sort of support (p. 33).
Philonous: If the Substratum supports anything, it must itself be an extended
thing. But extension is a perceived quality, so the Substratum itself requires
support, and so on ad infinitum. If this account is too literal, then no definite
meaning can be given for the Substratum, in which case the term refers to
nothing.
D. Hylas: The phenomenon of distance supports the notion that there are
material objects outside the mind (p.36).
Philonous: The phenomenon exists in dreams as well. Your senses don't tell
you that there are objects outside the mind -- only that you are affected with
certain qualities. Blind person example.
E. Hylas: Two sorts of objects -- sense objects and archetypes of those objects
E.g., the image of Caesar.
Philonous: Even the "archetype" is known by sense experience -- consider the
difference between two individuals who view the image, but one has never
heard of Caesar.
IV. Purpose of the Relativity Argument.
A. We commonly believe the following:
[1] trees, tables, and other things exist in the world independently of the

mind and have in themselves properties like shape, color, etc.

[2] trees, tables, and other things are objects of perception.
B. According to Berkeley, [1] and [2] above are inconsistent:
1. If we insist that [1] is true, we must concede we never perceive these
things, since by the Relativity Argument, we only perceive ideas
2. If we agree that [2] is true, then it follows that such objects do not exist in
the mind-independent world, since they are merely ideas.
Berkeley and God
I. Summary of Berkeley's Argument against the thesis that objects can exist
independently of the mind.
A. Sense objects are inseparable from perception or conception.
B. There is no question as to whether there might be objects that resemble
our ideas: Only ideas can resemble ideas.
C. Locke correctly argues that secondary qualities are mind-dependent, but
he provides no reason for the objectivity of primary qualities (ad hominem).
D. It is not possible to conceive of something possessing primary but not
secondary qualities -- hence the distinction between them is artificial.
E. Values associated with primary qualities such as motion (velocity) are
relative; hence, they are mind dependent.
F. A material "substratum" that supports primary qualities is unintelligible:
either it "supports" the primary qualities literally in which case it itself has a
primary quality (leading to an infinite regress of support) or "support" is an
unexplained metaphor giving no account whatsoever of a mind-independent
matter.
G. Even if there is a material world, there is no explanation as to how this
world could interact with an immaterial mind (the "interaction" or "mindbody" problem).
H. Ideas are inert -- lacking causal power -- so if there were primary qualities,
they too would have to be inert and thus could not cause ideas.
II. Idealism and God.
A. If all the above points are accepted -- Berkeley should accept skepticism
according to Hylas (p.46).
B. Instead, Berkeley defends Theism:
[1] The complexity and beauty of what I see could not have been created by
my mind alone.
[2] Everything that I see is mind-dependent.

[3] There must be a very powerful mind that perceives all things.
[4] Only God has a sufficiently powerful to perceive all these things.
--------------------------------[5] So, God exists.
What is Matter?
I. Appearance and Reality Problem
A. Secondary Quality Realism (SQR): Secondary Qualities (heat, color, taste,
odor) are real properties of objects. They exist independently of the mind.
1. Consistent with Aristotle's causal account of perception (e.g., the heat of
an object is the cause of the experience of heat. Ditto for color, etc.).
2. Called into question by Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, Locke, and Berkeley.
B. Problems with SQR
1. Galileo and Descartes wanted mechanical explanation (in terms of size,
shape, position; along with motion and solidity). Secondary qualities are
explanatory extras.
2. Secondary qualities seem different -- more subjective, more resistant to
mechanical analysis.
3. Boyle & Locke (as well as their predecessors) embrace Primary Quality
Realism (PQR).
C. Berkeley's Strategy:
1. Argue that the appearance is the reality (in a limited sense).
2. Use the Relativity Argument and the Unity of Experience Argument
(intense heat & pain, etc.) to argue against SQR.
3. Show how the Relativity Argument refutes PQR as well.
II. Hylas' Attempts to Save Matter:
A. Matter = objects external to the mind with both their secondary and
primary qualities [refuted by Philonous' Relativity Argument].
B. Matter = Abstract Primary Qualities, e.g., abstract motion [Philonous
argues that abstract qualities are impossible and that primary and secondary
qualities are necessarily conceptually linked together.]
C. Distinguish Sensation or Perception (which are actions) from objects in the
world. [Philonous contends that if the objects in the world are objects of
sense, they are still mind-dependent. He also points out that ordinary senseperception is passive and hence not an action, thus making Hylas' position
contradictory -- sense objects can never be objects of sense!].
D. Fallacy of Division: While individual primary and secondary qualities are
mind-dependent, perhaps an aggregate of them can exist independently of
the mind [Philonous shows that any example of such an entity is evidently

mind-dependent, since the example is obviously being conceived].

E. Matter = Material Substratum (Locke's idea) which supports our perception
of both primary and secondary qualities [Philonous contends that the notion
of support shows the Substratum to be extended and hence a minddependent thing. If the notion is not taken literally, it's hard to make sense of
it at all].
F. Matter = Archetypes involving mediate perceptions. Our knowledge of such
things is inferential rather than immediate. We know of archetypes through
reason, e.g., the image of Caesar versus Caesar himself. [Philonous argues
against this version of representationalism by demonstrating that our ideas
can't resemble archetypes because archetypes are fixed and imperceptible,
while ideas are changing and perceptible.
G. Matter = the Cause of our Ideas. [Philonous contends matter can't be
causes because causes must involve a will. Matter is inactive (p. 51) and thus
can't be a cause. Only mind can cause; and only God's mind is sufficient to
cause all we see].
H. Matter = an Instrument by which God causes our ideas -- a kind of partial
cause. [Philonous shows that an infinite being doesn't need instruments; p.
53].
I. Matter = an Occasion on which God causes us to have our ideas. [Philonous
urges that the mind of God already accounts for our experience; material
occasions are explanatorily superfluous].
J. Matter = Abstract Entities (p.56) [Philonous demonstrates that Hylas has no
notion of abstract entities; he refers to nothing!].
God and Idealism (Dialogue 2)
I. Idealism and Theism
A. Berkeley wants to argue against the growing doctrine of Materialism (the
view that if something exists, it is physical) because he thought the view led
to atheism.
1. If everything that exists is physical and God (by definition) is a nonphysical being, then it logically follows that God doesn't exist.
2. Idealism (the view that if something exists, it is mental) leaves open the
possibility that among the minds that exist is the mind of God.
B. Idealism is consistent with Theism (the view that there is a God), but it is
logically possible that Idealism is true while Theism is false and vice versa.
C. Berkeley argues that the existence of God is required to explain the
diversity and order of our perceptions, and to explain how objects exist when
unperceived by me or anyone else.

D. Berkeley hopes to show that scientific knowledge and empirical method

generally cannot imply materialism.
E. Idealism and Materialism are supposed to be opposite doctrines, but some
claim that the two theses imply each other:
1. Materialism = the mental is the physical.
2. Idealism = the physical is the mental.
F. The Big Three:
1. Materialism (Hobbes -- 1588-1679).
2. Dualism (Plato 428-348 bc --, Descartes -- 1591-1650 --, and Locke -- 16321704).
3. Idealism (Berkeley -- 1685-1753)
II. An interpretation of Berkeley's Argument for the Existence of God (see also
handout B4).
A. Basic argument -- given on page 47.
[1] Sensible things really exist.
[2] If sensible things really exist, there must be a God.
--------------------------------------------[3] Therefore, there must be a God.
B. Berkeley sees this as a version of the teleological argument for the
existence of God.
1. Ordinary teleological argument: "beauty and usefulness of the several
parts of the creations [are] the workmanship of God." (p.47)
2. Idealist teleological argument (more sophisticated version of the basic
argument in A above):
[1] Sensible world = that which we perceive by senses.
[2] Nothing is perceived by senses other than ideas.
[3] Ideas can exist only in a mind.
[4] The order and beauty of the natural world requires perception by an
infinite mind.
[5] Only God has an infinite mind.
-------------------------------------

[6] So, God exists.

3. Comment on Berkeley's argument: The success of the argument depends
largely upon whether or not Berkeley's Idealism is a more plausible account
than either Materialism or Dualism. In other words, the argument could be
simplified as:
[1] Idealism is true.
[2] If Idealism is true, then God exists.
--------------------------------[3] So, God exists.
a. the proof for the existence of God is only as good as the argument for
Idealism.
b. Suppose Idealism is true, does it necessarily follow that God exists?
Perhaps order doesn't require an infinite mind. Perhaps order is only
apparent, not actual.
C. We now have three types of arguments for the existence of God.
1. Cosmological (the causal arguments -- Aquinas, and Descartes' "idea of
God" argument.
2. Ontological (the conceptual arguments -- Anselm and Descartes' Fifth
Meditation argument).
3. Teleological (the design arguments -- Paley and Berkeley's Idealistic
Teleological argument.
D. Note: While Berkeley's argument is teleological, it is also somewhat
cosmological: God is the cause of our ideas.
E. Berkeley's view is to be distinguished from Malebranche.
1. Malebranche believes in a mind-independent world.
2. M. believes in abstract ideas.
III. If God is the cause of our ideas, matter is useless: Instrumentalism and
Occasionalism are both false.

Idealism Vindicated
I. Berkeley's Three Arguments for the Existence of God.
A. Complexity or Teleological (see handout B5 & Dialogues p. 47): The

complexity and order of my ideas implies the existence of an intelligent

designer.
B. Cosmological (see p. 50):
[1] Ideas of sense must have a cause.
[2] Ideas of sense do not depend on the will.
[3] Ideas of sense are not caused by material objects.
[4] Ideas of sense are not caused by other ideas.
----------------------------------------[5] Ideas of sense must be caused by another mind.
C. Continuity Argument (p. 64):
[1] All ideas must be perceived.
[2] Sensible objects are collections of ideas.
[3] Objects continue to exist when not perceived by finite minds.
-------------------------------------------[4] Therefore, there is an infinite mind.
II. Berkeley and Malebranche (p. 48)
A. Similarity: both say that our ideas exist in the mind of God.
B. Dissimilarity: Malebranche is a Dualist and thus believes in matter.
Berkeley is an Idealist, thus denying the existence of matter.
III. If God is the cause of our sensations, matter can play no role in causing
our ideas (pp.50-55).
A. Matter can't have causal properties.
B. Matter is unnecessary as a divine instrument.
C. Occasionalism (the thesis that God arranges our ideas to correspond to
events in the world) is false. Occasionalism was advanced by Malebranche to
solve the interaction problem).
IV. Objections to Idealism (Dialogue Three)
A. H: Knowledge of the way things are is impossible -- we only know
appearances, never reality.
P: Trust senses: the appearance is the reality.
B. H: There can be no idea of God because God is an active agent (ideas
aren't). So, it's not fair to criticize Materialists and Dualists for not having an
idea of matter.
P: I didn't infer the non-existence of matter from the fact that there is no
idea of it. But rather that you have no reason to think that it exists. But
there is reason to think that God exists (see arguments above), so I have a
notion of God even if I have no idea of God.
C. H: There can be no idea of the soul or mind, just as there is no idea of

matter.
P: The existence of mind and its ideas are indubitable; the existence of
matter is not.
D. H: Idealism cannot distinguish perception from imagination or dreaming.
P: They are distinguished by the phenomenal qualities of clarity and
orderliness.
E. H: It is strange to think of ideas as objects.
P: No stranger than thinking that the objects we perceive are unreal -- the
real objects being forever beyond our mental grasp.
F. H: If God is the cause of our ideas, then God is the cause of evil.
P: Evil originates in the will of the individual.
G. H: How can you account for sensory illusions?
P: Illusions are errors in judgment about the relationship of ideas.
H. H: If our ideas exist in the mind of God, doesn't it follow that God feels
pain (this is a problem because pain is regarded as an imperfection).
P: God knows pain, but does not feel it.
I. H: Can't we discover the true objective nature of things through analysis
(e.g., by using a microscope, etc.).
P: What we discover are connections between various ideas -- the object
perceived under the microscope is technically not the same object as
perceived without the aid of the microscope.
J. H: Can two individuals ever see the same object.
P: In a sense no, but identity can be applied when ideas have exactly
similar phenomenal content.
K. H: How can ideas exist "in" a mind?
P: Only metaphorically.
I. H: Can Idealism be reconciled with creation?
P: Ideas = sense object; eternal vs. natural.
L. The union of commonsense with philosophy: Commonsense: the objects of
sense experience are the real objects. Philosophy: the objects of experience
are ideas.