CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 1 DEANS CIRCLE

2016


Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has
been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true today. Following the results of that
elections, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his
reelection will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.


ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs.PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 191618 November 23, 2010 J. Nachura


It is expressly provided in the Constitution in a clear and concise language that the Supreme Court is
vested the authority to be the sole judge in all electoral contests against the President or Vice-President.

Facts:


Atty. Macalintal claims that the PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Article 7, Sec 4 of the
Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET and it violates Art VIII, Sec 12 of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is valid on the ground that the grant of
authority to the SC to be the sole judge of all electoral contests for the President or Vice-President is given in
Article 7, Sec 4, par 7 of the Constitution.


Issue:


Whether the PET is constitutional.

Ruling:


YES. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission to a Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4,
Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the
Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the
additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide
presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001 J. Puno


The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally
is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

Facts:


Former President Estrada was impeached for allegations of wrong doings eventually amounting to
graft and corruption. In the impeachment proceeding before the Senate, 11 senators were sympathetic
towards the president and they succeeded in suppressing the evidence against Estrada which led to an uproar
within the Senate. The PNP and AFP eventually withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at
the EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for snap elections to be held with the local and congressional elections where
he said he would not be running thus the SC declared that he constructively resigned from his post. Arroyo
became the President in lieu of him. Estrada filed for prohibition with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction to
enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting further proceedings in cases filed against him until his term as
president ends. He also wishes to be declared the President still albeit the fact that he is only temporarily
unable to discharge his duties.

77 | P a g e

I.Short title: Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 635 SCRA 783 (2010); 651
SCRA 239 (2011)
II. Full Title: Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, 635 SCRA 783 (2010) J.
Nachura; 651 SCRA 239 (2011) C.J. Corona
III. Topic: Constitutional Law; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Sec. 4 Article VII
IV. Statement of the Facts:
Atty. Macalintal was a legal counsel of Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo against the
Poll protest of election fraud of Fernando Poe Jr. and Loren Legarda. The poll protest
was later thrown out by the Supreme Court acting as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
But on 2010, at a sudden impulse, Atty Macalintal filed an undesignated petition
questioning the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal
and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

This petition however was point out by the OSG as unspecified and without
statutory basis. And that according to Supreme Court the PET was constitutional on the
basis that the grant of authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election
contest for the President and Vice President establishes the PET to rule such purpose.
V. Statement of the Case.
A motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner atty. Romulo Macalintal of our decision
in GR no.191618 dated November 23,2010, dismissing his petition and declaring the
establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal as constitutional.
VI. Issue:
Whether or not the PET is constitutional
Whether or not the PET violates Section 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution for having quasijudicial powers.
VII. Ruling:
1. PET is Constitutional. The Supreme Court cannot agree with his insistence
that the creation of the PET is unconstitutional. We reiterate that the
abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal
from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution is sound and tenable.
Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the rule-making
power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner would
interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who proposed

the insertion of the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive
authority to promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice
Regalado forthwith assented and then emphasized that the sole power ought
to be without intervention by the legislative department. Evidently, even the
legislature cannot limit the judicial power to resolve presidential and vicepresidential election contests and our rule-making power connected thereto.
To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of
the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987
Constitution. The experiential context of the PET in our country cannot be
denied.
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is
plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional
jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests
includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
2. No. the PET doesnt have quasi-judicial powers. The present Constitution has
allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter's exercise of judicial
power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vicepresidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The
power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to
courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET
and the Supreme Court.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which
Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by
the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not
separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v.
State of Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a
nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the
Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners
during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a
microscopic view, like the petitioner's, should not constrict an absolute and
constitutional grant of judicial power.

requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental

and essential requirements of due process in justiciable
cases presented before them. (Samalio vs. Court of Appeals,
454 SCRA 462 [2005])
o0o
G.R. No. 191618.November 23, 2010.*

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.
Remedial Law Constitutional Law Locus Standi Parties On
more than one occasion we have characterized a proper party as
one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an
injury as a result of the act complained of.On more than one
occasion we have characterized a proper party as one who has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a
result of the act complained of. The dust has long settled on the
test laid down in Baker v. Carr: whether the party has alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult questions. Until and unless such actual
or threatened injury is established, the complainant is not clothed
with legal personality to raise the constitutional question.
Same Same Same Same Estoppel His failure to raise a
seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his
unconditional acceptance of the Tribunals authority over the case
he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an
indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Courts
power of judicial review.Although there are recognized
exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance.
Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously
appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in
_______________

*EN BANC.

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Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal

2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at

that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the
Tribunals authority over the case he was defending, translates to
the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper
invocation of this Courts power of judicial review. Even on this
score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.
Same Statutory Construction Presidential Electoral
Tribunal The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide
presidential and vicepresidential election protests while
concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several
cases before this Court involving constitutional and election law
issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003), cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the
invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution and (2) the unanimous holding thereon.
Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed in
Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 424 SCRA 277 (2004), is that
the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential
and vicepresidential election protests while concurrently acting
as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
Same Words and Phrases Verba Legis Verba legis dictates
that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails.Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the words
used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails. This Court, speaking
through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970),
instructs: As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it
should ever be present in the peoples consciousness, its language

as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have

in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision
to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus these are cases where the need
for construction is reduced to a minimum.
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Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal

Same Statutory Construction Ratio Legis Et Anima A

doubtful provision must be examined in light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the
framing of the Constitution.Where there is ambiguity or doubt,
the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful
provision must be examined in light of the history of the times,
and the condition and circumstances surrounding the framing of
the Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful
constitutional provision, and the evils sought to be prevented or
remedied. Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people
ratifying the constitution, and not the panderings of self
indulgent men, should be given effect.
Same Same Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat.Last, ut magis
valeat quam pereatthe Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole. We intoned thus in the landmark case of Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991): It is a well
established rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory.

Same Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) Powers of the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal is plenary Unmistakable from the
foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and
vicepresidential election contests, as well as the rulemaking
power adjunct thereto, is plenary it is not as restrictive as
petitioner would interpret it.Unmistakable from the foregoing is
that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice
presidenti al election contests, as well as the rulemaking power
adjunct thereto, is plenary it is not as restrictive as petitioner
would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., who proposed the insertion of
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Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal

the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive

authority to promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To
this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented and then emphasized
that the sole power ought to be without intervention by the
legislative department. Evidently, even the legislature cannot
limit the judicial power to resolve presidential and vice
presidential election contests and our rulemaking power
connected thereto.
Constitutional Law Courts Supreme Court The conferment
of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an awesome task, includes the means necessary
to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court,
with the duty characterized as an awesome task, includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of
necessary implication. We cannot overemphasize that the
abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the
Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not
unwarranted. A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court
sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which
the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on
the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courts
method of deciding presidential and vicepresidential election
contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise

of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional

provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the
Supreme Court to promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Senate Electoral Tribunal House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal The different electoral tribunals, with the Supreme
Court functioning as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET),
are constitutional bodies.Particularly cogent are the discussions
of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions of the
SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable
conclusion that the different electoral tribunals, with the
Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are constitutional bodies,
independent of the three departments of government
Executive, Legislative, and Judiciarybut not separate
therefrom.
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Same Same The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not a

separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal.By the same token, the
PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court,
albeit it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious
that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully compliesnot
unlawfully defiesthe constitutional directive. The adoption of a
separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and
Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to
highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals
functions as a special electoral court.
Same Same Electoral Contests.The set up embodied in the
Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power.
Same Same The power wielded by Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) is a derivative of the plenary judicial power
allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated
to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of
judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding

presidential and vicepresidential election contests, with full

authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a
derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between
the PET and the Supreme Court.
Same Same The Presidential Electoral Tribunal, as intended
by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e.,
the Supreme Court.We have previously declared that the PET is
not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of
the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not
separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
McCulloch v. State of Maryland proclaimed that [a] power
without the means to use it, is a nullity. The vehicle for the
exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and
specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners
during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the
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Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal

PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioners, should not

constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.
Same Pleadings and Practice Baseless Petitions.One final
note. Although this Court has no control over contrary people and
naysayers, we reiterate a word of caution against the filing of
baseless petitions which only clog the Courts docket. The petition
in the instant case belongs to that classification.

PETITION to question the constitution of the Presidential

Electoral Tribunal.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NACHURA,J.:
Confronting us is an undesignated petition1 filed by
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), that
questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4,2 Article VII of the Constitution: