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DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9237-8
Abstract This paper explores several paths a distinctive third wave of extended
cognition might take. In so doing, I address a couple of shortcomings of first- and
second-wave extended cognition associated with a tendency to conceive of the
properties of internal and external processes as fixed and non-interchangeable. First,
in the domain of cognitive transformation, I argue that a problematic tendency of the
complementarity model is that it presupposes that socio-cultural resources augment
but do not significantly transform the brains representational capacities during
diachronic development. In this paper I show that there is available a much more
dynamical explanationone taking the processes of the brains enculturation into
patterned practices as transforming the brains representational capacities. Second, in
the domain of cognitive assembly, I argue that another problematic tendency is an
individualistic notion of cognitive agency, since it overlooks the active contribution
of socio-cultural practices in the assembly process of extended cognitive systems. In
contrast to an individualistic notion of cognitive agency, I explore the idea that it is
possible to decentralize cognitive agency to include socio-cultural practices.
Keywords Extended cognition . Fixed-properties . Dynamical properties . Cognitive
transformation . Cognitive assembly
Introduction
In philosophy of mind and cognition, the model known as extended cognition (EC)
expresses the view that many of our genuinely cognitive processes are composed of
physical vehicles running on machinery distributed across parts of the brain, body,
and materialcultural environment (Clark 2011; Menary 2010a, b, c; Rowlands
2010; Sutton 2010; Wheeler 2010). My independent aim in this paper is to explore
M. D. Kirchhoff (*)
Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: michael.kirchhoff@students.mq.edu.au
M.D. Kirchhoff
an issue that I do not believe has been pursued elsewhere in the literature on EC,
namely the relationship between EC and, what I shall call, the fixed-properties view
of internal and external processes (FP). Throughout this paper, I hope to show that
it is possible to move EC along both faithfully and fruitfully by downplaying this
tendency to treat the properties of the internal and external as fixed and instead
explore an alternative route to EC.
To get an understanding of FP, we can contrast FP with what I call the dynamical
properties view (DP). Unlike FP, DP holds that the plastic brain gets enculturated
through development in socio-cultural practices (Roepstorff et al. 2010, p. 1052).
This is the first part of DP. The second part is as follows. Unlike FP, DP does not
assume, when having to explain the integration/assembly of cognitive systems, that
the individual organism is the most active element. DP implies that the assembly of
cognitive systems is the result of richly dynamical and distributed elements, where
there is no collapse into individualism like in FP. To flesh out DP in more detail, I
focus on two domains.
The first of these domains is sometimes referred to as cognitive transformation (Menary 2010b), where I focus on the transformation of neuronal
representational capacities as a result of enculturation. To make sense of this, I
discuss three examples: (1) Ntnen et al.s (1997) study on phoneme perception
suggesting a diachronically mediated re-shaping of certain cortical areas of the
brain by the brains participation in structured socio-cultural practices; (2)
Dehaenes (2005) neuronal recycling hypothesis suggesting that our uniquely
human capacity for exact mathematical reasoning is partly biologically inherited
and partly a result of enculturation into socio-cultural practices; and (3) Wheelers
(2004) philosophical work on language and off-line cognition, where Wheeler
argues that the brain must recapitulate certain structural features of language in
order for humans to engage in off-line cognition. The second domain is the
construction of cognitive systems typically referred to as cognitive assembly
(Clark 2008; Hutchins 2008, 2011a; Kirchhoff and Newsome 2011; Sterelny
2010). I want to signpost a couple of important issues here. First, unlike
individualist approaches to cognitive assembly (Clark 2008), addressing cognitive
assembly via DP implies a non-individualistic conception of cognitive agency.
Second, unlike synchronic perspectives on cognitive assembly (Clark 2008), DP
aims to explain synchronic assembly (in part) from diachronic considerations.
Thus, in contrast to DP, FP is the view that the properties of biological processes
and the properties of socio-cultural processes remain non-interchangeable, both
diachronically and synchronically.
Scope of the critical exploration and strategy
Nothing of what I have to say in this paper will undermine the credibility of the EC
research program, in the sense that what I shall critically explore are tendencies or
assumptions left unquestioned. Hence, I do not claim that there is a necessary
relationship between EC and FP. So, the more conservative aim is to establish that
leaving FP behind opens a space for interesting research on EC topics. Let that be
the first proviso. The second is that I shall not be arguing that EC in general is
committed to FP. First, I do not argue that parity-based arguments are committed to
M.D. Kirchhoff
1998, p. 99), Wheeler (2010, 2011) conceives of the PP as the only viable route to
EC (Walter 2010, p. 286). Nevertheless, because first- and second-wave EC share a
commitment to complementarity, but do not equally share the endorsement of the PP,
I focus here on the PP. The PP stresses the following: If we confront some task, a
part of the world functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we
would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part
of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process. (Clark and Chalmers
1998, p. 8; and reprinted in Clark 2008, p. 77). The PP focuses on functional
isomorphism of inner and outer processes. In support of the PP, Clark and
Chalmers developed the case of the neurobiologically impaired Otto and his
notebook. Otto is a victim of a mild form of Alzheimers disease. Over time, Otto
has written down useful information in his notebook in a similar way to storing
information in biological memory. According to Clark and Chalmers, because the
dispositional information in Ottos notebook is functionally poised to guide action in
a functionally similar way as non-occurrent beliefs in biological memory, the
information in Ottos notebook should be considered as cognitive belief-like states.
Importantly, the PP by itself is not meant as an argument for EC but rather to
encourage us to look at various cases of cognitive extension behind a veil of
metabolic ignorance, (Clark 2011, p. 449). Given this picture, then, the PP acts as a
kind of heuristic device (Menary 2010a, p. 5) designed to suspend what Clark calls
biochauvinistic prejudice (2008, p. 77).
Second-wave extended cognition
Second-wave EC shares the complementarity view of Clarks version of firstwave EC. But this second wave of EC is critical of arguments based on parity
and functional isomorphism. Generally, it is EC in its integrationist, historical,
and cognition-in-the-wild mode. Even so, second-wave EC is best understood not
as a substantial doctrine departure from first-wave EC; but rather, as a refinement
and (perhaps) attunement to a more empirically and enactive oriented approach
to EC. However, even if the two waves are compatible, they are also distinct, in
the sense that most proponents of second-wave EC argue that the PP is either
wrong or incomplete as a motivation for EC in general (Sutton 2010, p. 200).
Within second-wave EC, there are two approaches with slightly different views or
inflections: the first starts from a principle of complementarity (Sutton 2010),
whereas the second focuses on integration and manipulation (Menary 2007).
Sutton builds his case for complementarity arguing, among other things, that the
PP does not encourage attention to the distinct features of the components in
particular cognitive systems [], and because of this downplaysor even
collapsesdifferences between inner and outer resources []. (Menary 2010a, b,
c, d, p. 198). As a result, the PP fails to study the deep mechanistic dissimilarities
between inner and outer parts and on how they complement and operate
together in driving more-or-less intelligent thought and action. (Sutton et al. 2010,
p. 525). Against functional isomorphism, complementarity EC both predicts and
requires (Rowlands 2010, p. 89) such disparate but complementary processes
between culturally engineered props and artifacts and the brains biological modes
of processing. For Menary, complementary is also an important aspect of cognitive
integration (2006, p. 330). Sharing Suttons critical stance towards the PP, Menary
builds his case for second-wave EC on the manipulation thesis:
The manipulation thesis as a constituent thesis of cognitive integration is first
understood to be an embodied engagement with the world, []. Secondly it is
not simply a causal relation, bodily manipulations are also normativethey are
embodied practices developed through habit and training and governed by
cognitive norms. (2007, p. 84).
Important for Menarys version of second-wave EC is that some cognitive
processes are (partly) made up ofconstituted, composed ofan individuals bodily
manipulation of external structures and that such manipulations are embedded in
the wider social, semantic, and normative cognitive niche (2010d, p. 611). An
important focus of Menary-style EC is the idea of cognitive transformation. In
particular, Menary thinks that the PP fails to explain how bodily manipulations alter
the informational and physical structure of the cognitive niche, thereby transforming
human cognitive capacities. Also, nothing in the PP tells us about how such
manipulations literally result in the transformation of body schemas required for
manipulation of external elements and in transformation of both representational and
cognitive capacities (2010b, p. 561).
Toward a third-wave extended cognition
Following Sutton (2010), this paper explores what a third-wave version of EC might
look like. I take my starting point in the following specifications:
If there is to be a distinct third wave of [EC], it might be a deterritorialized
cognitive science which deals with the propagation of deformed and
reformatted representations, and which dissolves individuals into peculiar loci
of coordination and coalescence among multiple structured media [].
Without assuming distinct inner and outer realms of engrams and exograms,
the natural and the artificial, each with its own proprietary characteristics, this
third wave would analyze these boundaries as hard-won and fragile
developmental and cultural achievements, always open to renegotiation.
(2010, p. 213; italics added)
The first feature mentioned is the framing a deterritorialized cognitive science.
This is both a radical and fascinating proposal. Although I cannot deal with it
sufficiently, since doing so will take us too far astray, more detail is required. Despite
ECs core claim that we should not privilege the boundaries of the biological
organism in settling the question of what is cognitive and what is not, or,
alternatively, what is internal to a cognitive system and what is external, certain
strands of EC end up setting the bar for cognitive inclusion by appeal to what is
internal to the skin-and-skull boundary of an individual organism. This is evident if
we consider first-wave ECs parity argument for EC. Briefly, the PP works
accordingly: (1) locate an external element taken to perform a functional role in
intelligent behavior; (2) locate or imagine a scenario in which the same functional
M.D. Kirchhoff
role is realized by an internal mechanism; (3) then ask the question, should we
count the internal mechanism in (2) as part of the cognitive system?; (4) if the
answer is yes, then (1) qualifies for cognitive inclusion. So, despite employed to
overcome any sharp separation between inner and outerbetween fluid
biology and stable culture (Sutton 2006, p. 242)the PP ends up privileging the
internal on matters of cognitive inclusion for the external (Di Paolo 2009, p. 10).
The relationship between what is external and what is internal to a cognitive
system is most certainly complicated; nonetheless, it is not at all clear that sticking to
the old internal and external distinction will be helpful in settling this debate.
Moreover, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the question of what is
supposed to be internal to a cognitive system and what is external is pitched at a
synchronic, individualist level, thereby encouraging an object-based view of
cognitive systems. If one acknowledges, as Hutchins does (1995, 2008, 2011a, b),
the socio-culturally distributed nature of cognitive systems and consequently of
cognitive agency (more on this in the Cognitive assembly: EC, FP, and DP
section), the criteria for what it means to be internal to a cognitive system become
even more opaque. EC, of course, can still pursue the all important boundary
inquiries into which processes, relations, systems, and mechanisms are cognitively
relevant. However, if Sutton is correct, EC should not presuppose any clear-cut
boundaries between internal and external.
This brings us to the second interesting feature, namely that third-wave EC deals with
deformed and reformatted representations. This idea of deformed and reformatted
representations takes third-wave ECs focus on a decentralized and deterritorialized
cognitive science even further. What does Sutton means by this? One way to get a grip
on this allows me to comment critically on the complementarity framework endorsed by
Sutton himself. Building on Donalds (1991) theory of engrams (biological memory
records) and exograms (culturally encoded public representations) as a signature mark
of complementarity, Sutton points out that exograms are often discrete, modality and
task independent, and much more durable than engrams. However, following
Hutchins, this distinction between two disparate (but complementary) representational
formats has the unintended side effect of rendering cultural practices invisible.
(2008, p. 2017) In line with the enactivist approach (Stewart et al. 2011), what makes
a material pattern into a representation is a process of enactmentof bringing forth of
meaning. Within this framework, cognition is an active embodied and heavily
embedded process (Hutchins 2011b, p. 429). Hence, to even engage with exograms as
representations, it is necessary to bodily engage a material pattern as a memory
record (Hutchins 2008, p. 2017) within structured and patterned socio-cultural
practices. Thus, exograms are not simply memory records outside the brain with
properties different from engrams; but rather, exograms are constantly reformatted
according to the non-symbolic features of physical materials, cultural norms for their
use, and embodied activities of individuals (Ingold 2000). There is a second way to
understand the framing of deformed and reformatted representations, and it is this I
shall pursue in depth in this paper. Instead of looking at the meshed composition of
exograms, Suttons framing encourages analysis on the effects of enculturation on the
plastic brains own representational capacities. I signpost this here, and nothing else,
since a large part of the Cognitive transformation: EC, FP, and DP section is devoted
to fleshing out the idea of the enculturated brain.
The third, and final, suggestion in the above passage is the claim that third-wave
EC dissolves individuals into peculiar loci of coordination and coalescence among
multiple structures media. Echoing Latour (1999) and his decentralized notion of
agency, I understand this as a direct call to free EC from its present individualistic
tendencies and to do so by taking socio-cultural practices, and diachronic
contributions, seriously in addressing the issue of cognitive assembly and the
underlying notion of cognitive agency. In fact, on a DP-oriented third-wave EC,
cognitive assembly and agency are best understood as self-organizational processes
distributed across brains, bodies, people, norms, and socio-cultural practices and
structuresnone of which have any analytical priority. However, driving assembly
is not the same as effecting a significant internal transformation. So, apparently
one can have DP-style assembly without DP-style transformation. I bring this worry
here in order to avoid confusion about FP in cognitive transformation and FP in
cognitive assembly. Generally, FP-style assumptions involve keeping boundaries
fixed and separate. In cognitive transformation, FP arises because of a tendency to
claim that the properties of external elements augment but do not transform the
psychological innards of the individual. In cognitive assembly, in contrast, FP comes
into play because of certain individualistic tendencies delegating all the causally
active roles to the organism, thereby deactivating the dynamical role of the
environment in co-driving cognitive assembly. Hence, FP is not only indicative of
a non-transformative view of representational capacities but also of prioritizing the
individual as the loci of coordination and control in cognitive assembly.
M.D. Kirchhoff
M.D. Kirchhoff
an unavoidable consequence of the basic logic of the [EC] paradigm. (2004, p. 709)
This is an interesting argument in part because it shows DP-style considerations within
EC and in part because it is pitched against what I argue is Clarks FP assumption on
cognitive transformation. As I shall reiterate this argument, it consists of the following
steps (Wheeler 2004, pp. 7089):
1. In cases of on-line, distributed (extended) mathematical reasoning, the internal
mechanisms will be directly causally coupled with certain properties of
mathematical symbols located in the environment.
2. According to Clark, it is the coordination dynamics between biological and nonbiological elements that augment and empower cognition.
3. In cases of off-line mathematical reasoning, there are, by hypothesis, no such
environmental factors onto which the internal mechanisms can integrate with
or lock onto.
4. According to Clark, in cases of on-line and off-line mathematical reasoning,
fundamentally the same inner processing mechanisms are active in both cases.
5. However, if certain properties of external mathematical symbols are
essentially part of our capacity for mathematical reasoning, and if these are
absent in cases of off-line mathematical reasoning, then certain internal
surrogates must recapitulate certain structural properties of those external
mathematical symbols.
6. Therefore, off-line mathematical reasoning requires inner representations that
recapitulate certain structural properties of external symbol systems, namely
those structural properties that are non-trivial contributing factors in on-line
distributed mathematical performance.
Premises 4 and 5 carry the heaviest explanatory burden. However, we can begin
by noting that the first two premises articulate an interactively coordinated system
composed of domain-general connectionist-style mechanisms with public symbol
systems. In accordance with EC, our human capacity for linguistic reasoning is the
joint product of neural networks organized exhaustively in terms of highdimensional patterns of activation and similarity metrics and environmentally
realized symbol systems (Clark 1997; Sutton 2010).
In unpacking premise 4, I focus on responding to a potential worry one might have
against DP in the domain of cognitive transformation. One could argue that the real
power of Clarks phrase complements but does not profoundly alter the brains own
basic modes of representation (1997, p. 198; italics added), is that it resists the
orthodox view that language-like features such as productivity and systematicity can be
explained only if a classical representational format (one which features a languagelike combinatorial syntax) is understood to be a fundamental feature of the neural
economy at some higher, non-implementational level. (Wheeler 2004, p. 710) There
is absolutely nothing in either Wheelers argument or in the alternative to FP I am
exploring that heralds anything like a return to a language of thought architecture
(LOT). Wheeler gives two compelling reasons for this. First, unlike a LOT,
mathematical reasoningregardless of accomplished on-line or off-linedoes not
require that there is any sort of domain-specific processing device organized so as to
encode language-like symbols. According to Wheeler, we can easily hold onto the
M.D. Kirchhoff
everyday practices while at the same time shaping them. Patterns appear to be
emergent phenomena that are currently not sufficiently explained by its
constitutive factors, i.e., individual behavior or intersubjectivity. (2010, p. 1051).
A patterned practice analysis is important because it sets up a perspective from
which to explore important shifts in dynamical properties, viz., how patterns of
practices at the socio-cultural level reshape the patterning of cortical connectivity
and activity, and in the same way the social practice forms patterns, large-scale
brain signals as well as other psychophysical signals generated during particular task
performance can be analyzed to expose significant patterning. (2010, p. 1052) To
underpin their claim, Roepstorff et al. turn to a study on the effects of enculturation
on the brain, Ntnen et al.s (1997) study on phoneme perception. This study
indicates some important cortical transformatory effects facilitated by the brains
participation in certain patterned, socio-cultural practices.
Based on a mismatch negativity paradigm, where subjects are exposed to
unattended sounds in certain rhythmic patterns, Ntnen et al. have established that
the primary auditory cortex in the left hemisphere is highly sensitive to changes in
predictable sound patterns (1997, p. 432). In the first set of these experiments
(1997), Ntnen et al. utilized Finnish and Estonian language speakers because of a
relatively small discrepancy between the two languages in terms of vowel structure,
except that Estonian vowel space includes an additional vowel, //, not found in
Finnish. In the experiment, the speakers were also presented as deviants a prototype
of this sound, along with vowels existing in both languages (/o/ and //), and a nonprototypical vowel (located between/e/ and //) (1997, p. 432; Roepstorff et al. 2010,
p. 1053). The upshot was that Finnish speakers showed significantly higher
mismatch negativity when exposed to prototypical vowels in their native language
than when exposed to the Estonian vowel //. Ntnen et al. take this finding to
show that this language-specific prototypical effect suggests the existence of neural
traces of language-specific phoneme representations. (1997, p. 433)
The neuronal recycling hypothesis: arithmetic and reading
The final piece of evidence running against FP-style assumptions and favoring a DPbased explanation of cognitive transformation comes from neuroscience and the
development of arithmetic and reading abilities. Especially Dehaenes neuronal
recycling hypothesis (NRH) is interesting here (2005). Why should one think that
Dehaenes work supports DP? One of the most compelling ideas of the NRH is that
when the brain recruits and utilizes cognitive tools during ontogenetic development
this may lead to a recycling or pre-empting of biological mechanisms so that these
acquire a new function from their evolved function (Dehaene 2005; Nieder and
Dehaene 2009). This accommodates Wheelers point: that during participation in
socio-cultural patterns of stable mathematical practices, certain cortical areas of the
brain undergo a transformation in representational format enabling off-line
mathematics to occur. Second, because of these recycling processes, the organism
itself may undergo certain losses in cognitive abilities. If FP had been the case, this
loss of abilities would have been hard to explain. For instance, in learning to read
and engaging in regular patterns of reading such practices will partially reduce
A biological precursor to discriminate small quantities, e.g., 12, 23, etc. This
capacity is a cross-species capacity found in preverbal children, dolphins,
chimps, rats, etc.
A biological precursor to discriminate magnitudes between objects and numbers,
e.g., 8 is larger than 4. This capacity is also a cross-species capacity.
An enculturated numerical system enabling humans to reason in a discrete and
symbolic format required for exact mathematical competence.
M.D. Kirchhoff
Evidence supporting the result that approximate reasoning is stored in a nonlinguistic format and that exact, discrete, and symbolic reasoning is stored in a
language-dependent format is given in Dehaene et al. (1999). In one experiment,
RussianEnglish bilinguals were trained on 12 cases involving exact and
approximate sums of two-digit numbers presented in one of their two languages
(1999, p. 970). In the exact addition task, subjects were required to select the correct
sum of two numerically close numbers, e.g., the English trained subjects were asked
to add Twelve + Four and then select the correct sum from Sixteen and Fourteen
(1999, p. 970). In the approximate addition task, subjects were asked to estimate the
result and select the closest number, e.g., the English trained subjects were asked to
add Twelve + Four and estimate the result by choosing the closest number
Eighteen and Six (1999, p. 970). After being trained on the 12 cases of two-digit
numbers, subjects were then tested on the same sums. What Dehaene et al.
interestingly found was that on the exact addition problems, response time decreased
when having to perform exact calculation in their untrained language, whereas
subjects show an increase in response time when performing exact calculation in
their trained language, regardless of they were trained in Russian or English (1999,
p. 971). In contrast, performance on the approximate addition task was unaffected by
switching between trained and untrained language. According to Dehaene et al. such
studies provide evidence that:
[D]emonstrate that exact calculation is language-dependent whereas
approximation relies on non-verbal visuo-spatial cerebral networks. (1999, p. 970)
The evidence from off-line mathematical reasoning, the view of enculturation of
cortical areas in the case of phoneme perception, and the acquisition of exact
mathematical reasoning lend support to DPcertain neural transformations take the
form of a re-shaping or reformatting process, where diachronic development in
socio-cultural practices significantly transforms a sub-set of the brains cortical
representations from primarily non-linguistic to linguistic. A quick return to the
evidence on phoneme discrimination might help shed further light on this issue.
There is evidence that human infants from birth are capable of discriminating
phonemic patterns in their native language and non-native languages suggesting that
phoneme discrimination is based in non-verbal auditory networks (Bertoncini et al.
1987). What is interesting is that during the first year of their lives, infants show a
decrease in their phoneme discrimination abilities. After their first year, the infants
only show sensitivity to the phoneme structure of their native language (Werker and
Lalonde 1988). Such evidence fits the enculturated brain hypothesis. As Roepstorff
et al. point out: diachronic development in stable and predictive patterns of sociocultural practices sculpts the patterns of neural activity to the ones found at the
socio-cultural level:
In the cases here discussed, the differences in patterning, exposure to different
languages with different structures of the phonetic space, may co-locate with
differences in culture in the sense that Finns appear to have one type of brain
while Estonians appear to have a different type of brain. (Roepstorff et al.
2010, p. 1053)
M.D. Kirchhoff
the process of recruitment and assembly here-and-now that Clark thinks that the
brain is primarily the responsible mechanism (Clark 2011, p. 459). In his (2008),
Clark refers to a series of experiments by Gray and Fu (2004) in order to empirically
substantiate the HOC. What these studies show is that the neural control system is
indifferent to the source of informationwhether it is in-the- head or in-the-world
located informationsuch that the brain (based on the timecost involved in
information retrieval) determines whatever mix of resources are recruited to solve a
problem. Following Gray and colleagues, Clark takes the lesson from these
experiments to be that our problem-solving performances take shape according to
some cost function or functions that, in the typical course of events, accord no
special status or privilege to specific types of operations (motoric, perceptual,
introspective) or modes of encoding (in the head or in the world). (Clark 2008, 121)
As Clark sums up the results to support the HOC:
Concerning the process of recruitment, it is indeed the biological brain (or
perhaps some of its subsystems) that is in the drivers seat. That is to say, it is
indeed some neurally based process of recruitment that (following Gray et al.)
turns out to be so pointedly unbiased regarding the use of inner versus outer
circuits, storage, and operations. (2008, 122).
Part #1 of FP in cognitive assembly
Like Dennett (1991), who sees the human mind as consisting of a semianarchic
coalition of elements, interconnected and competing, Clark sacks the idea of an allpowerful, hidden agent inside the brain whose job is to do all real thinking and
which is able to intelligently organize those teams of internal and external supporting
structure. (Clark 2008, p. 136) Clark thinks that the control is itself fragmented
and distributed, allowing different inner resources to interact with, or call upon,
different external resources without such activity being routed via the bottleneck of
conscious deliberation or the intervention of an all-seeing, all-orchestrating inner
executive. (2008, pp. 1367) Consequently, Clark decentralizes the cognitive agent
responsible for cognitive assembly into a fragmented and distributed mix of internal
self-organizing processes.
My claim is that it is at this particular stage that the first part of FP emerges in
Clarks account, since when decentralizing the inner homunculus to self-organizing
and fragmented processes, he ends up bounding all of these dynamical elements
within the biological boundaries of the organism: it is the biological organism that
[assembles] the [] extended machinery []. (Clark 2008, p. 123) FP is the failure
of decentralizing the notion of cognitive agency sufficiently to include patterned
socio-cultured practices. Following Hutchins (2011a), the individualist assumption
of cognitive agency in the HOC threatens to isolate the activity of the brain from the
dynamics of socio-cultural practices on both synchronic and diachronic time-scales
(2011a, p. 411). That is, if the boundaries of cognitive agency do not outweigh the
individual organism, and if the dynamics of socio-cultural practices in cognitive
assembly are taken to play only secondary roles, then the dynamics of cognitive
assembly must derive from the biological brain and body. Hence, by endorsing an
individualist notion of cognitive agency, Clark ends up privileging the organism-
centered mechanisms as the driving and most active loci around which extended
architectures organize and dissolve.
Part #2 of FP in cognitive assembly
According to Hutchins, A straightforward way to deal with [cognitive assembly] is to
abandon the assumption that the biological brain is the essential element. Doing so, of
course, requires that one look elsewhere for the apparently impartial forces that assemble
cognitive systems. (2011a, p. 439) In shared spirits with Roepstorff et al. (2010), the
proposal favored by Hutchins is that a good start on understanding this process of
recruitment would be to notice the role of cultural practices in the orchestration of softassembly of extended systems. (2011a, p. 440) As Hutchins emphasizes, The
ecological assemblies of human cognition make pervasive use of cultural products.
(2011a, p. 445)
My claim is that we can find a second part of FP in cognitive assembly when
considering how Clark responds to Hutchins challenge. First, Clark argues that
Hutchins fails to appropriately separate the different time-scales of the processes
concerned in cognitive assembly: to distinguish evolutionary and developmental
from synchronic time-scales. As Clark says: I think Hutchins is failing to attend to
important differences concerning the shape and timescale of the processes
concerned. My own targets, in the discussion in SSM of cognitive assembly, were
processes operating in the here-and-now. (2008, p. 459) Clark does not want to
deny that some spinning is done by socio-cultural practices on diachronic timescales. As Clark says, cultural practices really do provide me with both a
prestructured recipe for success, a well-honed cultural practice (schooling) to help
me benefit from that recipe, and a pre-selected set of supporting materials and
structures (pen, paper) all ripe for assembly into a new problem-solving whole.
(2011, 459) However, what Clark wants to deny is that the assembly process itself is
being spun and maintained by cultural practices synchronically: even here, it is still
the individual biological brains [] that are, in the here-and-now, the most active
orchestrating elements in this process. (Clark 2011, p. 459) FP here is a
consequence of Clarks view of cognitive agency, since neglecting to take seriously
the dynamical role of socio-cultural practices in the here-and-now, precludes taking
seriously the dynamical contribution of socio-cultural practices on diachronic timescales as well.
Cognitive assembly: EC and DP
Case #1: mental institutions
Clarks intuition is that the dynamical processes responsible for cognitive assembly
reside at only one level: the individual organism. Maybe it is possible to find
individual cases where the appropriate level is indeed the individual organism.
However, the problem with encapsulating cognitive agency at the individual level is
that we can find cases where the individual level is insufficient in order to explain
the assembly of extended cognitive systems (Protevi 2009; Theiner et al. 2010). On
Hollan et al.s account: in distributed cognition, one expects to find a system that
M.D. Kirchhoff
or who it is that spins, selects, and coordinates the assembly process in the case of
legal practicesthis could not take place primarily in the individual biological
organism. In fact, patterned practices would seem to do much of the spinning and
maintaining in the case of legal practices. Essentially, DP-driven explanations of
cognitive assembly enable at least two things: first, decentralizing cognitive agency
to include socio-cultural practices; and second, extended cognitive systems that exist
at a larger scale than merely individualist approaches focusing on integration or
incorporation of tools into the profile of a single individual.
Case #2: memory in Elizabethan theater companies
Consider now Tribbles (2005) impressive analysis of collective memory or joint
action in Elizabethan theater companies (Sutton 2010). Applying the framework of
distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995) to understand the processes of collective
action and memory in Elizabethan theater companies, Tribble provides a novel and
highly impressive analysis of what not only have impressed but (more importantly)
puzzled historians of English drama.
These companies would perform a staggering number of plays; up to six different
plays per week; and without frequent time for rehearsals and the full texts of these
plays. As Tribble informs us, between 1594 and 1597 a leading player such as
Edward Alleyn has to secure and retain command of about 71 different roles, of
which number 52 or 53 were newly learned. (2005, p. 136) Given the rather
staggering demands on human memory, this raises the puzzle: how did these groups
actually manage to learn or memorize so many plays with so many changing roles?
Tribble offers an analysis of how socio-cultural practices, including the regular use
of artefacts form elements of a cognitive structure that, in constraining and limiting,
also enables an extra-ordinary level of achievement. (2005, p. 142) Especially the
role of stage doors and the playing platform; plots or scripts; and a culturally
situated, intergenerationally mediated apprenticeship system is analyzed. In the
study, the stage doors play a powerful double-role. First, over diachronic time, the
interactions within the cognitive niche alter the informational structure of the situation.
By continuously exploiting the size and locational distribution of doors, the local
environment comes to drive and constrain, orient and re-orient, the behavioral
opportunities of the actors. Second, in line with Hutchins (2011a) and Sterelny (2010),
Tribble shows how the ability of the actors to establish and maintain their grasp of the
situation is acquired through participation in socio-cultural practices in inter-personal
space. A third component of Tribbles analysis pertains to how a specific culturally and
cross-generationally mediated apprenticeship system enculturates the process of
inclusion into Elizabethan theater practices (Tribble 2005, pp. 15355). The
apprenticeship system is hierarchically structured. Following Hutchins (1995) analysis
of a similar system aboard naval vessels, Tribble shows how novices come to acquire
the necessary skills by being thrown into situationsguided by more experienced
actorswere it becomes a real possibility for the novice actors to perform successfully
both computationally and theatrically.
It is not clear why socio-cultural practices (including socio-cultural technologies)
could not play a dynamically orchestrating role in the assembly of extended
cognitive systemsnot even if these are partly constructed over diachronic time-
M.D. Kirchhoff
scales. Right here, however, we are moving beyond the HOCit is very hard (if not
impossible) to shoehorn collaborative memory in the case of Elizabethan theater
groups with the HOC. As Hutchins pinpoints, few of the dynamic loops that link
people to their environments are invented by the people who exploit them. (2011a,
p. 441) In Elizabethan theater companies, a substantial part of the assembly process
seems to be performed by dynamics of an apprenticeship system functioning on both
intergenerational time-scales and synchronic time-scales. Moreover, when Sterelny
remarks that it is true when Clark claims that an organic brain chooses and assembles
the resources that make much problem solving possible [], but that in many critical
cases, those brains belong to members of the previous generation, not to the agent faced
with the problem [], (2010, p. 479), he means quite literally that the cultural practices
of prior generations shape our epistemic access to the world by constraining what to
attend to and to see when so attending. (Hutchins 2011a, p. 441) Consequently, the
most active orchestrating elements in the process of joint action and memory in
Elizabethan theater companies outweigh the organism.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have explored some of the paths a distinctive third wave of extended
cognition might take. The critical-constructive view offered is that there is room
enough in extended cognition to do so without discrediting the validity of extended
cognition in general. In cognitive transformation cases, I argued that a potentially
problematic assumption concerning the complementarity framework is that it
presupposes that non-biological resources augment but do not transform the brains
representational capacities. In contrast to this tendency, I have attempted to show
that a much more dynamical model is available for the extended cognition theorist,
namely to view the enculturation processes on the brain as transforming the brains
representational capacities. In cognitive assembly cases, I argued that another
problematic tendency is an overly individualistic notion of cognitive agencyone
that places all the active and dynamical elements inside the organism, thereby
treating socio-cultural practices as only indirectly involved in the assembly of
extended cognitive systems. In contrast to this individualistic starting point, I have
argued that a much more distributed model is available to the fan of extended
cognition, namely to conceive of cognitive agency as socio-culturally distributed
across social groups, cognitive tools, and patterned practices.
Acknowledgments An Australian Research Council (ARC) Discovery Project Grant (DP1095109) and
an International Macquarie University Research Excellence Scholarship (no. 2011180) has funded this
project. Thanks to Richard Menary, John Sutton, and Will Newsome for helpful discussions. I am
especially grateful for the highly constructive comments made by two anonymous referees. Any mistakes
are mine and mine alone.
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