Special Proceedings Part 1 Cases: SC: The Union Contends That The Court of Appeals Erred

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS PART 1 CASES
1.
G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES

ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and
members, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAAGAS II, as Liquidator
of Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents.
G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the
Pacific Banking Corporation , petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II,
DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG
JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD.,
represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY,
respondents.
NOTES: The principal question in these cases is whether a
petition for liquidation under 29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in
the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of
appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition
to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on
appeal in order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a
liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period of
appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order
appealed from.
Pacific Banking Corporation." The petition was approved,

after which creditors filed their claims with the court.
Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed

under receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines
pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few
months later, it was placed under liquidation and a
Liquidator was appointed.
The Central Bank filed with the RTC of Manila a
petition entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of
February 10, 1992- in his order, respondent judge

disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the
ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days
after receipt of the decision and he ordered the
Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the
ground that it had been filed without authority of
the Central Bank and again, beyond 15 days. The
judge declared his September 13, 1991 order and
subsequent orders to be final and executory and
denied reconsideration.
March 27, 1992-the judge granted the Union's

Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution
Naagas, a new Liquidator, was appointed by the

Central Bank.
In G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union):
Pacific
Banking
Corporation
Employees
Organization (Union for short), petitioner in G.R. No.
109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking payment
of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary increase
differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick
Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC.
RTC:
September 13, 1991-the trial court ordered

payment of the principal claims of the Union
September 16, 1991-Liquidator received a copy of
the order
October 16, 1991-he filed a Motion

Reconsideration and Clarification of the order
December 6, 1991-the judge modified his

September 13, 1991 but in effect denied the
Liquidator's motion for reconsideration
FACTS:
The cases are consolidated.
for
December 9, 1991-the order was received by the

Liquidator
December 10, 1991-he filed a Notice of Appeal
and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record
on Appeal
December 23, 1991-another Notice of Appeal was
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf
of Naagas
CA: The Liquidator filed a Petition for Certiorari,

Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to
set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal. In
its decision of November 17, 1992, the Fifth Division held in
the case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial
court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period
for appealing from any decision or final order rendered
therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the
Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the
decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was
brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the
orders of the lower court and directed the latter to give due
course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on
Appeal he had filed for hearing.
SC: The Union contends that the Court of Appeals erred
seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal filed by
Naagas was filed on time.
In
G.R.
No.
112991
Stockholders/Investors):
(the
case
of
the
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private

respondents filed claims for the payment of investment in
the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks
amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks,
consisting of 154,462 common shares, constituted 11% of
the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged
that their claim constituted foreign exchange capital

investment entitled to preference in payment under the
Foreign Investments Law.
RTC:
September 11, 1992-respondent judge of the RTC

directed the Liquidator to pay private respondents
the total amount of their claim as preferred
creditors
September 16, 1992-the Liquidator received the
order
September 30, 1992-he moved for reconsideration
October 2, 1992- his motion was denied
October 5, 1992- He received the order denying

his Motion for Reconsideration
October 14, 1992-he filed a Notice of Appeal from

the orders of September 16, 1992 and October 2,
1992
October 28, 1992- the judge directed the execution

of his September 11, 1992 order granting the
Stockholders/ Investors' claim
CA: The Liquidator filed Petition for Certiorari,

Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to
set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal. On
December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division ruled in the
case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation
proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the period for
appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein
is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's appeal notice was
filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed
from, deducting the period during which his motion for
reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal was filed
late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the
Liquidator's petition.
SC: The Liquidator contends that the Petition for Assistance

in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation is a
Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple
appeals, in which case the period of appeal is 30 days and
not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment appealed
from.
ISSUES:
Main Issue:
1. Whether a petition for liquidation under 29 of Rep. Act
No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a
special proceeding or an ordinary civil action.
Sub-issues:
2. Whether or not In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the
Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal
was filed on time.
3. Whether or not, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor
Union), the Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
BP Blg. 129 provides:

39. Appeals. The period for appeal
from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment or decision
appealed from: Provided, however, that
in habeas corpus cases the period for
appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from
the notice of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to
take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire
record shall be transmitted with all the
pages
prominently
numbered
consecutively, together with an index of
the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in
special proceedings and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed
under applicable provisions of the Rules
of Court.
4. Whether or not, in G.R. No. 109373, (case of the Labor

Union), the Liquidator can question the order of the court or
appeal from it, in which the liquation plan was already
approved by the Monetary Board.
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129

provides:
5. Whether or not, in G.R. No. 109373, (case of the Labor

Union), the notice of appeal and motion for extension of
time to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central
Bank was filed by the office of the Solicitor General as
counsel for the Central Bank.
(a) All appeals, except

in habeas corpus cases
and in the cases
referred to in paragraph
(b) hereof, must be
taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the
judgment,
order,
resolution or award
appealed from.
HELD:
1. The petition for liquidation under 29 of Rep. Act No. 265,
otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special
proceeding.
19. Period of Appeals.

(b) In appeals in special
proceedings
in
accordance with Rule
109 of the Rules of
Court and other cases
wherein
multiple
appeals are allowed,
the period of appeals
shall be thirty (30) days,
a record on appeal
being required.
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
1. Action defined. Action means an
ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which
the party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.
2. Special Proceeding Distinguished.
Every other remedy, including one to
establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact, shall be by special
proceeding.
Distinction between an ordinary action and a special
proceeding by Chief Justice Moran states:
ACTION (CIVIL ACTION)
The act by which one sues
another in a court of justice
for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a
wrong.
A formal demand of a right
by one against another.
Proper remedy of a party
litigant that seeks to
recover
property
from
another.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
The act by which one seeks
to establish the status or right
of a party, or a particular fact.
A petition for a declaration of

a status, right or fact.
Proper remedy of a party
whose purpose is to seek the
appointment of a guardian for
an insane.
Considering this distinction, a petition for

liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be
classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary
action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or
protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong
against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for
injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor
state a cause of action that can be enforced against any
person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial
court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors
may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the
corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the
petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts
and obligations. The petition only seeks a declaration of the
corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right
of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the
disposition of the corporation's assets.
Also, contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth
Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions
for interpleader. Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles
the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased
persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The
two have a common purpose: the determination of all the
assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the
insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the
administrator or executor are both charged with the assets
for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the
liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed.
The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and
their rights and the determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates,
multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation
of an insolvent corporation. As stated:
A liquidation proceeding is a single
proceeding which consists of a number of
cases properly classified as "claims." It is
basically a two-phased proceeding. The
first phase is concerned with the approval
and disapproval of claims. Upon the

approval of the petition seeking the
assistance of the proper court in the
liquidation of a close entity, all money
claims against the bank are required to be
filed with the liquidation court. This phase
may end with the declaration by the
liquidation court that the claim is not
proper or without basis. On the other
hand, it may also end with the liquidation
court allowing the claim. In the latter case,
the claim shall be classified whether it is
ordinary or preferred, and thereafter
included Liquidator. In either case, the
order allowing or disallowing a particular
claim is final order, and may be appealed
by the party aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval
by the Court of the distribution plan
prepared by the duly appointed liquidator.
The distribution plan specifies in detail the
total amount available for distribution to
creditors whose claim were earlier
allowed. The Order finally disposes of the
issue of how much property is available
for disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the
final phase of the liquidation proceeding
payment of all allowed claims in
accordance with the order of legal priority
and the approved distribution plan.
Verily, the import of the final character of
an Order of allowance or disallowance of
a
particular
claim
cannot
be
overemphasized. It is the operative fact
that constitutes a liquidation proceeding a
"case where multiple appeals are allowed
by law." The issuance of an Order which,
by its nature, affects only the particular
claims involved, and which may assume
finality
if
no
appeal
is
made
therefrom, ipso facto creates a situation
where multiple appeals are allowed.

A liquidation proceeding is commenced
by the filing of a single petition by the
Solicitor General with a court of
competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition
for Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g.,
Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims
against the insolvent are required to be
filed with the liquidation court. Although
the claims are litigated in the same
proceeding, the treatment is individual.
Each claim is heard separately. And the
Order issued relative to a particular claim
applies only to said claim, leaving the
other claims unaffected, as each claim is
considered separate and distinct from the
others. Obviously, in the event that an
appeal from an Order allowing or
disallowing a particular claim is made,
only said claim is affected, leaving the
others to proceed with their ordinary
course. In such case, the original records
of the proceeding are not elevated to the
appellate court. They remain with the
liquidation court. In lieu of the original
record, a record of appeal is instead
required to be prepared and transmitted
to the appellate court.
Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed
in
liquidation
proceedings.
Consequently, a record on appeal is
necessary in each and every appeal
made. Hence, the period to appeal
therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a
record on appeal being required.
(Record pp. 162-164).
2. Yes, In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the
Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal
was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of
receipt of the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not
file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to
perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is
required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special

proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are
allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are
actually separate ones and a decision or final order with
respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the
original record on appeal must remain in the trial court
where other claims may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his
appeal, the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently, the
Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the Liquidator's
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus must be
affirmed albeit for a different reason.
3. Yes, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), the
court find that the Fifth Division correctly granted the
Liquidator's
Petition
for Certiorari,
Prohibition
and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a
notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a record
on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his
receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without
waiting for the resolution of his motion for extension, he filed
on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a
record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in
disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the
Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on appeal.
4. Yes, the Liquidator can question the order of the court or
appeal from it
In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial
court is not limited to assisting in the implementation of the
orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same section
(29) of the law invoked by the Union, the court has
authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if
there is a convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary
and made in bad faith." As this Court held in Rural Bank of
Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:
There is no question that the action of the
monetary Board in this regard may be
subject to judicial review. Thus, it has
been held that the Court's may interfere

with the Central Bank's exercise of
discretion in determining whether or not a
distressed bank shall be supported or
liquidated. Discretion has its limits and
has never been held to include
arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith
(Ramos v. Central Bank of the
Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).
In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not
only of the Central Bank but also of the insolvent bank.
Under 28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the
bank "personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all
actions or proceedings or against the corporation" and he
has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for these
purposes." This authority includes the power to appeal from
the decisions or final orders of the court which he believes
to be contrary to the interest of the bank.
5. Yes, the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time
to file the record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central
Bank was filed by the office of the Solicitor General as
counsel for the Central Bank. On October 22, 1992, as
Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the
trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously
authorized lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign
pleadings in the case. Conformably thereto the Notice of
Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to submit Record
on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I.
Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC.
2.) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, (Twentieth Division), HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR.
35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC
G.R. No. 163604. May 6, 2005
Case: Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee
Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc. Petitioner Apolinaria Malinao
Jomoc, and the Ormoc City RTC, through an order, granted
the petition, on the basis of the Commissioners Report,

declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitionerwife nine years earlier, presumptively dead.
Facts:
1.
2.
3.
Judge Madrona granted the petition by citing

Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article
provides that for the purpose of contracting a valid
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
previous marriage where the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years, the
spouse
present
must
institute
summary
proceedings for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to
the effect of the reappearance of the absent
spouse.
The Republic, through the OSG, sought to appeal
the trial courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal.
The appeal was disapproved since there was no
record of appeal which was filed or served
pursuant to rule 41 of the ROC since it was a
special proceeding. The subsequent MR was also
denied in a following order.
The Republic then filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the CA contending that it wasnt a special
proceeding or a case of multiple or separate
appeals requiring a record on appeal. The CA
denied such petition in both substantive and
procedural grounds: (despite procedural lapses,
still discussed the merits)
a.
Procedural: Not sufficient in form. It failed

to attach to its petition a certified true
copy of the assailed Order dated January
13, 2000 [denying its MR]. It questioned
the order declaring Jomoc presumptively
dead but no record of it was found. And it
should have been dismissed outright in
accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court.
b.
Substantive: The principal issue in this

case is whether a petition for
declaration of the presumptive death
of a person is in the nature of a special
proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal
is 30 days and the party appealing must,
in addition to a notice of appeal, file with
the trial court a record on appeal to
perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the
petition is an ordinary action, the period to
appeal is 15 days from notice or decision
or final order appealed from and the
appeal is perfected by filing a notice of
appeal (Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of
Court).
i.
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule

1 of the Rules of Court, a civil
action is one by which a party
sues
another
for
the
enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention of
redress of a wrong while a
special
proceeding
under
Section 3(c) of the same rule is
defined as a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status,
a right or a particular fact (Heirs
of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del
Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320,
March 2, 1999).
FINDING OF THE CA: Considering the aforementioned

distinction, this Court finds that the instant petition is in
the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary
action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the
trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse
Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or
protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of
action that can be enforced against any person.
Contention of Republic thru OSG: The declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is
not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate

appeals where a record on appeal shall be filed and served
in like manner.
Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court
which enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to
be perfected. The petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of an absent spouse not being included in the
enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of
appeal suffices.
Issue:
WON the case of the declaration of presumptive death is a
special proceeding.
Ruling:
No. The case before the court is in the nature of a summary
proceeding. CA decision is reversed and remanded to trial
court.
>>>By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family
Code, it is gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to
have her absent spouse declared presumptively dead had
for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent
marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a summary
proceeding, following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of
the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains
the following provision, inter alia:
xxx

Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the
procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases
provided for in this Codes requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on

Special Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court
entitled SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS, read:
RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES
x x x,
>>>>There is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria
Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary
proceeding under the Family Code, not a special
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for
which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being
a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of
Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.
On the procedural matter:
On the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners
petition before the appellate court. Petitioners failure to
attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy of the
trial courts order denying its motion for reconsideration of
the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily
fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a
technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by
petitioner, what the appellate court should have done was to
direct petitioner to comply with the rule.
As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts
order granting the petition for declaration of presumptive
death, contrary to the appellate courts observation that
petitioner was also assailing it, petitioners 8-page petition
filed in said court does not so reflect, it merely having
assailed the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of

special proceedings are provided for in the following:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k)
Judicial
approval
of
voluntary
recognition of minor natural children;
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the

subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouses was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance of the
absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes
of Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving
petitioners Notice of Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence

of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of
death provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
***For purposes of discussion on the provisions of the

Family Code and the Rules on Special Proceedings***
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon

which the trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse,
provides:
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in

cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except
in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed
and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
xxx
3. NATCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

AND THE HEIRS OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO
Facts:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana
Esguerra were the registered owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in
Manila and covered by TCT No. 11889.
Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano,
together with his six children, entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate.
Accordingly, a new TCT was issued in the name of
Graciano and the six children. Graciano then
donated equally to his children a portion of his
interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square
meters leaving only 447.60 square meters
registered in his name.
Subsequently, the land was further subdivided into
two separate lots registered under two separate
TCTs, where the first lot covered a land area of
80.90 square meters and the second lot with a land
area of 396.70 square meters. Eventually, Graciano
sold the first lot to a third person but retained
ownership over the second lot.
where they alleged that herein petitioner acquired a

new TCT over the remaining land in the name of
Graciano through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery by making it appear
that the latter executed a Deed of Sale.
After trial, the RTC of Manila rendered a decision,
which held that the deed of sale between Graciano
and the petitioner was prohibited by law and thus a
complete nullity. The court, however, also ruled that
the deed of sale might still be regarded as an
extension of advance inheritance of the petitioner
being a compulsory heir of the deceased.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the lower
court's decision went beyond its jurisdiction when it
performed the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person.
Issue:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general
jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly in
questions as to advancement of property made by the
decedent to any of the heirs?
Held:
In 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner. During

their marriage, he sold his remaining share of the
land to his wife where a new TCT was issued in the
latter's name.
On 07 October 1985, Graciano died
leaving
petitioner and his six children by his first marriage,
as heirs.
Later, herein private respondents filed a complaint
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
The Supreme Court concurred with the decision of the

Court of Appeals. According to the Court, the Regional
Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction, was devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the
real property in favor of herein petitioner. In this case, the
RTC of Manila was not properly constituted as a probate
court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent to his wife, herein
petitioner. The petition was, therefore, dismissed.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CIVIL

ACTION
AND
SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS;
DISTINGUISHED. Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise: ". . . a) A civil action is one by
which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. "A civil action may either be ordinary or special.
Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions,
subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil
action.". . . "c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact." As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a
marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in
a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or
by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special
proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status orright of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no
formal pleadings are required unless the statute
expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or
motion." Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted
authority in Remedial Law expounds further. "It may
accordingly be stated generally that actions include
those proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted
according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating
to actions at law or suits in equity, and that special
proceedings include those proceedings which are not
ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted
according to some special mode as in the case of
proceedings commenced without summons and
prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. . . . A special
proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct
and independent proceeding for particular relief, such
as may be instituted independently of a pending
action, by petition or motion upon notice." Applying
these principles, an action for reconveyance and

annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of
a deceased person such as advancement of property
made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a
special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
2.
ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT

OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSON; JURISDICTION OF
PROBATE COURT; INCLUDES QUESTIONS AS TO
ADVANCEMENT MADE OR ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN
MADE BY THE DECEASED TO ANY HEIRS;
APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. Matters which
involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the
decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate
court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Thus,
under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court,
questions as to advancement made or alleged to have
been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard
and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir. While it may be true that the
Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear
that the same provision contemplates a probate court
when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings". Corollarily, the Regional Trial
Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of
the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher,
inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance
and annulment of title with damages is not, to our
mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question.
Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of
Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a
probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del
Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT INCLUDE DECISION ON

QUESTION OF TITLE OR OWNERSHIP; EXCEPTION;
REQUIREMENTS THEREOF. Analogously, in the train of
decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long
standing principle that although generally, a probate court
may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
collation or advancement or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate
court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold: "In
the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but
merely an allegation seeking appointment as estate
administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement
of estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited
jurisdiction of a probate court. Of equal importance is that
before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that a
certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent
must be ascertained, by deducing all payable obligations
and charges from the value of the property owned by the
deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations
subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir
or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be
ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes.
4.) VDA. DE MANALO VS. CA
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo died intestate and was survived by
his wife, Pilar S. Manalo and his 11 children. He left several
real properties located in Manila and in the province of
Tarlac at the time of his death including a business under
the name and style Manalos Machine Shop. The
respondents of this case -- 8 of the surviving children of the
late Troadio Manalo filed a petition with the RTC of the
judicial settlement of estate of the decedent and for the
appointment of Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof.
On the sate set for hearing of the petition, the trial

court issued an order declaring the whole world in default,
except the government, and set the reception of evidence
of the petitioners therein. However, the court set this order
of general default aside and granted the petitioner in this
case 10 days within which to file their opposition to the
petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by
herein petitioners. Herein petitioners claim that the petition
is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the
same family and therefore, the same should be dismissed
under Rule 16, Section 1 (j) of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be
filed on the ground that a condition precedent for filing the
claim has not been complied with, that is, that the
petitioners therein failed to aver that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made involving members of the
same family prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial
court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of
the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the
failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts
toward a compromise involving members of the same family
have been made prior to the filling of the petition but that the
same have failed.
(2) Whether or not Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of
Court vis--vis Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines would apply as a ground for the dismissal of the
petition by virtue of Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceedings.'
RULING:

(1)
No. It is a fundamental rule that in the
determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief sought in the
complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be
controlling. The petition in question contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of
estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death of the
late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his
residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said death.
The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence
within he country are foundation facts upon which all the
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate
rest. It also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by
the deceased, which are sought to be settled in the probate
proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said
petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of
the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek
judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father,
Troadio Manalo.
Concededly, the petition contains certain
averments which may be typical of an ordinary civil action.
Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of
the said defect in the petition and filed their so-called
Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is
actually an Answer containing admissions and denials,
special and affirmative defenses and compulsory
counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages,
plus attorney's fees and costs in an apparent effort to make
out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its
dismissal.
It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as
a probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and
cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues
which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil
action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect
that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the concomitant
nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the
complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer.
If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a
case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple strategem.
(2)
No. Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from
the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or
persons against another or other in a court of justice in
which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords
him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right,
whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action
filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for
the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.
5.
BEATRIZ
DE
ZUZUARREGUI
VDA.
DE
REYES, petitioner
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PILAR IBAEZ
VDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI, Administratrix, ANTONIO DE
ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI and
PACITA JAVIER, respondents.
FACTS:
Parties/ Heirs:
Petitioner:
Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de
Reyes, illegitimate child of decedent;
Respondents: Pilar Ibaez Vda. de Zuzuarregui,
surviving spouse, and administratix;
Antonio
de
Zuzuarregui,
Jr.,
illegitimate child;
Enrique
de
illegitimate child; and
Zuzuarregui,
Jose de Zuzuarregui, illegitimate

child.
June 17, 1958

probate court order approving
the project of partition by the:
Pilar Ibaez Vda. de Zuzuarregui, 12/16, inclusive of 1/2 of

said assets which pertains to her share in the conjugal
partnership;
Beatriz, 1/16;
Antonio, Jr., 1/16;
Enrique, 1/16; and
Jose, 1/16.
Among the real properties in the project of partition is a
parcel of land covered by and described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42643 located in Antipolo, Rizal:
Area: stated as 83,781 square meters,
Assessed value of P6,430.00.
NOTE: This statement of said area was repeated in said
document four time, that is, in adjudicating the
corresponding portions of said land to:
Pilar (12/15),
Antonio, Jr. (1/15),
Enrique (1/15), and
Jose (1/15).
The petitioner did not have a share in the aforesaid parcel
of land because she relinquished her right thereto "in lieu of
her bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property."
January 29, 1973 the
respondent
administratrix/spouse and the other three
distributes/sons filed a motion to reopen Special
Proceedings No. Q-325 for the purpose of
correcting an alleged typographical error in the
description of the parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 since,
according to them, the correct land area is
803,781.51 square meters and not 83,781
square meters.
The heirs of Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes
filed their opposition to said motion.
March 26, 1973 - The Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City issued an order in
Special Proceedings Q-325, entitled "Intestate

Estate of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.",
approved the motion.
September 19, 1977
- Court of Appeals
affirmed the CFI order after appeal by the petitioner
Petitioners Contention:
According to the petitioner, there was no
such clerical error.
While it is not disputed that the area
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 42643 is 803,781.15 square meters,
the petitioner insists that "the area
intended by the heirs of Don Antonio de
Zuzuarregui, Sr., in the Project of Partition
as approved by the trial court is the area
of 83,781 sq. m. and not 803,781,51 sq.
m.
She claims that she would not have
relinquished her share in said parcel of
land if the true area was not fraudulently
concealed from her at the time the project
of partition was executed. She further
contends that the fact that the description
of the area as 83,781 square meters was
repeated several times is sufficient
evidence to show that such was the area
intended in the project of partition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lot area indicated in

the Project of Partition as approved by the
trial court is a clerical error
RULING:
Petitioners contentions are without merit.
There is, therefore, no reason to disturb, much less
to reverse, the factual finding of the lower court
that a typographical or clerical error was clearly
committed by inadvertence in the project of
partition.
That a special proceeding for the

settlement of an estate is filed and intended to
settle the entire estate of the deceased is
obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for
the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a parcel
of land or a portion thereof undistributed or
undivided because the proceeding is precisely
designed to end the community of interests in
properties held by co-partners pro indiviso
without designation or segregation of shares.
It is readily apparent from the project of
partition that it was meant to be a full and complete
adjudication and partition of all properties of the
estate, necessarily including the entire area of the
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42643. Thus as perceptively posed by the queries
of the respondents, if the intention of the heirs was
to make only a partial adjudication and distribution
of the subject parcel of land, why is it that they did
not make any further disposition of the remaining
balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound
reason would the heirs have in holding in suspense
the distribution of the difference of 720,000 square
meters?
It is well settled that even if a decision has
become final, clerical errors or mistakes or
omission plainly due to inadvertence or
negligence may be corrected or supplied even
after the judgment has been entered.
The correction of a clerical error is an
exception to the general rule that no
amendment or correction may be made by the
court in its judgment once the latter had
become final. The court may make this
amendment ex parte and, for this purpose, it may
resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the
court's findings of facts and its conclusions of law
as expressed in the body of the decision.
6. Uriarte v. CFI
Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition for certiorari against
the respondents Juan Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte,
and the Courts of First Instance of Negros Occidental and of
Manila, Branch IV praying:
annulling the orders of respondent Negros court
dismissing the first instituted SP No. 6344, and the
order
Manila
court
denying
petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and
to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding
No. 51396 (both special proceedings pertaining to
the settlement of the same estate of the same
deceased), and
consequently annulling all proceedings had in
Special Proceeding No. 51396, of the respondent
Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as
follows:
Negros court erred in dismissing its SP No. 6344,
and failing to declare itself 'the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the
deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as prescribed
in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss
its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra,
notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.
Petitioner filed a SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR
MANDAMUS annulling the orders issued by the Negros
Court on disapproving his record on appeal and denying his
motion for reconsideration, and praying to approve his
record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal.
Facts:
On November 6, 1961, petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed a
petition for the settlement of the estate(SP 6344) of Don
Juan Uriarte in the Negros Court, alleging that 1) he is the
natural son of Don Juan and the sole heir. 2) That during
the lifetime of Don Juan, petitioner had filed a petition, Civil
Case 6143, in the Negros Court to be acknowledged as his
natural child. (Intestate Proceeding)

On December , 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the
respondents, filed an opposition to the petition alleging that
he was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who
had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, and also
questioned petitioner's capacity and interest to commence
the intestate proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other
respondent commenced in the Manila Court for the probate
of a document (SP 513896) alleged to be the last will of the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite. (Testate Proceeding). He
also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: 1) as the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was
no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings,
and 2) petitioner had no legal personality and interest to
initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an
acknowledged natural son of the decedent.
Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the Negros Court was the first to take cognizance of the
proceedings in accordance with Rule 75 Sec 1. Petitioner
argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken cognizance
of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
said decedent (SP No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer
had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Proceeding
No. 51396 intended to settle the estate of the same
decedent in accordance with his alleged will, and that
consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred
in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396.(dapat daw
wala gi dismiss ang SP 6344 since una siya, and dapat gi
dismiss ang SP 51396)
Negros court dismissed SP 6344. The motion for
reconsideration filed by Uriarte was denied. The petitioner
then filed a record on appeal. Soon afterwards he also filed
a petition for certiorari directly to the SC. For this reason
the Negros Court dismissed his notice of appeal regarding
SP 6344. He then filed for a petition for Mandamus to
compel the Negros Court to approve his record on appeal
and give due course to his appeal.He also filed an Omnibus
motion to intervene on SP 513896 to annul the proceedings
but this was denied by the Manila Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Negros or the Manila Court

should take cognizance of the case?
Held:
Jurisdiction and nature of a proceeding intended to
distribute an estate
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)],
Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction
over "all matters of probate," that is, over special
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons whether they died testate or intestate. While
their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond
question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First
Instance where the special proceeding should be
commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first
instance in the province in which he resided at the time of
his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
court of first instance of any province in which he had
estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a
non-resident alien like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite
the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the
deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts
of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts
province and city where the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite
left considerable properties.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding
intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on
intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a
"probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his
estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with
settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in
the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court

of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left a last
will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace
the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in
his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved,
the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already
adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for
the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.
The will should have been for probate to the Negros Court,
either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate
motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special
Proceeding No. 6344.
In the first place, the submission of the will aforesaid to the
Manila Court is not in accord with public policy and the
orderly and inexpensive administration of justice as it
unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts
would be involved. In the second place, when respondent
Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had
already informed the Negros Court that the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite had left a will in Spain, of which a copy had
been requested for submission to said court; and when the
other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion
to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted
to the Negros Court a copy of the alleged will of the
decedent, from which fact it may be inferred that, like
Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate
with the Manila Court that there was already a special
proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement
of the estate of the same deceased person. As far as
Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his
opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No.
6344, he had expressly promised to submit said will for
probate to the Negros Court.
But in the case, Manila Court has jurisdictionon account of
laches, wrong venue being a waiveable procedural defect.

In the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is
precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider
in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a
will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19,
1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial
petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner
likewise was served with notice of the existence (presence)
of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of
the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since
August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a
motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All
these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he
filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396
an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the
dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein
up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to
appoint an administrator with the will annexed but also to
admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or
more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to
assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will
by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings
had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium
on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that
this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had
in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same
proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raised too late.
We believe in connection with the above matter that
petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it
is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No.
51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its
reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to
submit
for
determination
the
question
of
his
acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator,
said court having, in its capacity as a probate court,
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased
testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be
declared his acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules
of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249;
Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68
Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
The supplemental petition for mandamus has become moot

and academic. If the said supplemental petition is
successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court
to give due course to the appeal of petitioner for it would
enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no
longer question the validity of said orders.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
judgment is hereby rendered denying the writs prayed for
and, as a result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L21938,
as
well
as
the
supplemental
petition
for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby
dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is set aside. With costs against petitioner.
7. INTESTATE ESTATE OF ROSINA MARGUERITE

WOLFSON, deceased, RICARDO VITO CRUZ, petitionerappellee.
TESTATE ESTATE of ROSINA MARGUERITE WOLFSON,
deceased, MANUEL Y. MACIAS, petitioner-appellant,
ARTURO M. DEL ROSARIO, oppositor-appellee.
FACTS:
Atty. Manuel Y. Macias, herein petitioner-appellant, unaware
that Rosina died with a will and testament, filed in behalf of
Ricardo Vito Cruz a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in his favor over the estate in the Philippines
of the late Rosina, which was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 63866, titled "Intestate Estate of Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson, deceased, Ricardo Vito Cruz was
appointed Special Administrator for the estate of Rosina,
It turned out that Rosina left a will executed in accordance
with the laws of the State of New York and through codicils
executed in accordance with the laws of the State of
California, U.S.A., naming therein the Wells Fargo Bank as
sole executor and the University of Michigan as the
residuary beneficiary.
Said will and codicils of Rosina were presented for probate
in the Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A.. The
said will and codicils were duly probated by said California
court
In a document dated November 10, 1965, duly notarized
and authenticated, the Wells Fargo Bank, as the sole
executor designated in Rosina's will and codicils, appointed
lawyers James M. Ross, Ewald Selph, Rafael D. Salcedo,
Arturo del Rosario, Jesus Bito, Joaquin L. Misa and Mariano
Lozada, all of Manila, Philippines, as its attorney-infact, with
authority among others to file ancillary administration
proceedings for the estate of Rosina and to act as
administrator or administrators of the estate
Pursuant to his appointment as attorney-in-fact of executor

Wells Fargo Bank, Atty. Arturo del Rosario filed on August
13, 1966, a petition in Special Proceedings No. 63866
before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance,
praying that, inasmuch as the decedent left a will and
codicils which were duly probated by the Superior Court of
California, U.S.A., the intestate proceedings in Special
Proceedings No. 63866 be converted into a petition for the
probate of Rosina's will and codicils
Petitioner-appellant Macias, in his own behalf and without
informing his client Ricardo Vito Cruz, filed a similar but
separate and independent petition, which was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 67302 and assigned to Branch VI
of the Manila Court of First Instance, alleging that he has a
legal interest in Rosina's estate and praying for the probate
of Rosina's will and codicils as well as for his (Macias')
appointment as special administrator
Because of petitioner-appellant's claim that he has a legal
interest in Rosina's estate, Judge Cloribel of Branch VI in an
order dated October 27, 1966 set the hearing of the petition
on December 17, 1966 and appointed Macias special
administrator (Annex "2", pp. 18-20, ROA). Accordingly,
petitioner-appellant Macias was issued letters of special
administration on November 12, 1966
Atty. Arturo del Rosario filed an opposition to the petition of
petitioner-appellant for the probate of the will and codicils of
Rosina Marguerite Wolfson in Special Proceedings No.
67302 on the grounds, among others, that Rosina's estate
is the subject of Special Proceedings No. 63866 before
Branch VIII previously filed by petitioner-appellant Macias in
behalf of respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz and before which he
(Atty. Arturo del Rosario) filed on August 13, 1966 a petition
for the conversion of the said intestate proceedings into one
for the probate of Rosina's will and codicils, which was then
pending resolution
Likewise, special administrator Ricardo Vito Cruz filed a
motion dated December 13, 1966 to dismiss the said
petition of petitioner-appellant in Special Proceedings No.
67302 on the grounds, among others:
(1) that Rosina's estate is already the

subject of Special Proceedings No. 63866
(2) that on August 13, 1966, Atty. Arturo
del Rosario filed in behalf of Wells Fargo
Bank a petition to convert the intestate
proceeding in Special Proceedings No.
63866 into a testate proceeding for the
probate of the last will and codicils of
Rosina;
(4) that in filing his petition for the
probate of the will and codicils of Rosina
in Special Proceedings No. 67302 before
Branch VI, petitioner-appellant concealed
from the presiding judge of Branch VI the
fact that appellant previously filed Special
Proceedings No. 63866 in his (Ricardo
Vito Cruz) behalf as well as the fact that
Arturo del Rosario had already filed his
pleading of August 13, 1966 for the
conversion of the intestate proceedings
into a testate one
In a pleading dated December 16, 1966, petitioner-appellant
filed his reply and opposition respectively to the opposition
of Atty. Arturo del Rosario and the motion to dismiss of
Ricardo Vito Cruz, contending:
(1) that the grounds advanced by Atty.
Arturo del Rosario and Ricardo Vito Cruz
are not legal grounds for the dismissal of
Special Proceedings No. 67302, because
he is seeking in this Special Proceedings
No. 67302 his own appointment as
regular, not ancillary, administrator of
Rosina's estate, based simply on his
interest in the estate
(2) that it is enough that a person has an
interest in the will or in the property either
as executor or otherwise to justify his
intervention in the proceedings, citing

Section 1 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules
of Court and Santos vs. Castillo; 1 (3) that
Special Proceedings No. 63866, which is
an intestate proceeding merely for the
administration of Rosina's estate, is not a
probate proceeding; and
petitioner-appellant filed in both Special Proceedings Nos.
63866 and 67302, a motion for the consolidation and joint
hearing of both cases as they relate to the same estate of
Rosina
In an order dated December 23, 1966, Judge Cloribel of
Branch VI ordered the transfer of Special Proceedings No.
67302 to Branch VIII if "the Presiding Judge therein has no
objection to said transfer"
Petitioner-appellant filed an urgent motion for the resolution
of his urgent motion for consolidation of the two cases and
for their joint hearing on January 14, 1967 and of his
urgent ex parte motion for the probate of the will and
codicils of Rosina (Annex "14", pp. 106-109, ROA).
Respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz, through counsel, filed an
opposition thereto in a pleading dated January 12, 1967
claiming that he did not agree to the consolidation of
Special Proceedings No. 67302 nor to its joint hearing with
Special Proceedings No. 63866, and praying that Special
Proceedings No. 67302 be dismissed outright
Pursuant to the agreement of the parties and the order
dated December 23, 1966 in Special Proceedings No.
67302 for the transfer of said special proceedings from
Branch VI, Honorable Manuel Barcelona, then Presiding
Judge of Branch VIII allowed its consolidation with Special
Proceedings No. 63866 in his Branch VIII
Respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz, thru counsel, filed a written
manifestation before Branch VIII praying for the resolution
of his motion to dismiss Special Proceedings No. 67302
since it is now transferred to Branch VIII
then Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, dismissed Special

Proceedings No. 67302
petitioner-appellant filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the aforesaid order of February 20, 1967, followed by an
urgent motion dated March 2, 1967 for suspension of
hearings
ISSUE: whether the consolidation was proper
RULING: Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, 'the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates
of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts.' Pursuant to this provision, therefore all
questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before
Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, where
Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlement of the
testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson
was filed and is still pending."
The salutary purpose of the rule is to prevent confusion and
delay
Consequently, every challenge to the validity of the will, any
objection to its authentication, every demand or claim by
any heir, legatee or party in interest in intestate or testate
succession must be acted upon and decided within the
same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the
same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the
estate should take cognizance of the question raised, for he
will be called upon to distribute or adjudicate the property to
the interested parties.
WE stressed that the main function of a probate court is to
settle and liquidate the estates of the deceased either
summarily or through the process of administration; and
towards this end the probate court has to determine who the
heirs are and their respective shares in the net assets of the
estate.
Section 1 of Rule 73, speaking as it does of "settlement of

the estates of the deceased," applies equally to both testate
and intestate proceedings. And the conversion of an
intestate proceedings into a testate one is "entirely a matter
of form and lies within the sound discretion of the court."
Special Proceedings No. 63866 was first instituted on
January 10, 1966 by petitioner-appellant himself as an
intestate proceedings because he did not know then that
Rosina Marguerite Wolfson died with a will and three
codicils, in behalf of Ricardo Vito Cruz praying for the
issuance of letters of administration in favor of the said
Ricardo Vito Cruz. Said proceedings was raffled to Brannch
VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance.
On October 11, 1965, the will and dicils of the deceased
Rosina were duly probated by to superior court of the State
of California, U.S.A. The Wells Fargo Bank, the sole
executor designated in Rosina's will and codicils, appoint
local lawyers
Pursuant to this appointment as such attorney-in-fact of the
executor Wells Fargo Bank, Atty. Arturo del Rosario
instituted on August 13, 1966 a petition in Special
Proceedings No. 63866, praying that the intestate
proceedings be converted into a petition for probate of
Rosina's will and codicils. On October 25, 1966, petitionerappellant Macias, in his own behalf and without advising his
former client Ricardo Vito Cruz, filed an independent
petition for the probate of Rosina's will and codicils, which
was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 67302 and
assigned to Branch VI of the Manila Court of First Instance
It is thus patent that the second petition filed on October 25,
1966 by petitioner-appellant was about nine (9) months
subsequent to the first petition he filed in behalf of appellee
Ricardo Vito Cruz, now docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 63866 and over two months after Arthur del Rosario
Petitioner-appellant insists that after ordering its
consolidation with Special Proceedings No. 63866, the
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII has no authority to dismiss
Special Proceedings No. 67302 and should hear jointly said

Special Proceedings No. 67302 and Special Proceedings
No. 63866.
Generally, consolidation and joint hearing of the two cases
would have been proper if they do not involve settlement of
the estate of a decedent, which is covered by a special
provision of the Rules of Court, namely Section 1 of Rule
73, the specific command of which should be obeyed. At
any rate, motions for consolidation are addressed to the
sound discretion of the court; and WE do not find that the
trial judge gravely abused his discretion in reconsidering the
prior order for the consolidation of the two special
proceedings for the settlement of the same estate and
dismissing Special Proceedings No. 67302, to warrant the
excercise of Our supervisory authority over the lower court
which has wide discretion in this regard. As a matter of fact,
the Honorable Presiding Judge of Branch VIII exercised
sound discretion in directing the dismissal of Special
Proceedings No. 67302. The trial court is not precluded
from dismissing one case after ordering the consolidation
and joint hearing of the two cases; because under Section 1
of Rule 31, after ordering consolidation, the court "may
make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay."
A court can never be deprived of its power to dismiss a case
pending before it if the subject-matter of such case is the
same as the subject-matter of another case also pending
before it.
There is no difference between the two proceedings. Both
refer to the Philippine estate of the late Rosina Marguerite
Wolfson of which a special administrator has been
appointed to temporarily administer this estate pending the
appointment of a regular administrator. Although Special
Proceedings No. 63866 is entitled "Re Intestate Estate of
Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, etc.", the fact remains that the
hearing on the allowance of the last will and codicils left by
the decedent was already terminated in said proceedings
and, in fact, petitioner Macias participated therein. If such
will and codicils are allowed to probate, all that would be
needed is to change the title of said proceedings from
Intestate to Testate.
8. ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner, vs. JUDGE

TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First
Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD
MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
FACTS: On November 27, 1977, Edward M. Grimm, an
American resident of Manila, was survived by his second
wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, Edward
Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm, and by Juanita
Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his
two children by a first marriage. He executed on January
23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California; one will
disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as
conjugal property of himself and his second wife and the
second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
On March 7, 1978, the two wills and a codicil were
presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm (2 nd wife) and
E. LaVar Tate in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah.
The two children of first marriage, Juanita Grimm Morris and
Mrs. Roberts were notified of the probate proceeding. In its
order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court
admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil.
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two
children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel,
Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley
Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the
intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise
agreement in Utah regarding the estate. In this agreement,
it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be
designated as personal representatives (administrators) of
Grimm's Philippine estate.
Forty- three days after Grimm's death, his daughter of the
first marriage, Ethel, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila
Court of First Instance intestate proceeding the settlement
of his estate and was named special administratrix. The
second wife, Maxine, filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the
pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of
Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special

administratrix. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's
will disposing of his Philippine estate.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted
that Maxine through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco
(partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg), withdrew that opposition
and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel
and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently,
this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah
compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already
found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the
authority and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000
the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by
the deceased, on March 21, 1979 to Makiling Management
Co., Inc., which turned out to be incorporated by Ethel and
her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco.
Six days later, Maxine and her two children replaced
Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who
moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court
considered the motion moot considering that it had already
approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition.
On April 18, 1980, Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's
lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate
properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the
present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's
lawyer, was notified of that motion. Before that motion could
be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed
again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as
counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete.
On September 8, 1980, a petition to annul partition and
testate proceeding was filed by Rogelio A. Vinluan of the
Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda in
Branch 38 of the lower court praying for the probate of
Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979
partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and
the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be
appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be
ordered to account for the properties received by them and
to return the same to Maxine.

DECISION
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they
were defrauded due to the machinations of the Roberts
spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was
illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm
died testate and that the partition was contrary to the
decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas
denied it for lack of merit. Ethel then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the
testate proceeding be dismissed, or alternatively that the
two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20
and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah
compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for
probate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge committed
any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
RULING: We hold that respondent judge did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm
died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838,
Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that
the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in
an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case
should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the
judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue
hearing the two cases.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed.
9.) RUFINA LUY LIM petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED
DISTRIBUTING,
INC.,
ACTIVE
DISTRIBUTORS,
ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION
COMPANY, INC. respondents.
BUENA, J.:
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject
of and be included in the inventory of the estate of a
deceased person?
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for
review on certiorari, the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617,
which nullified and set aside the 2 orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate
court.
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late
Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate
proceedings. Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation,
Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc.,
Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are
corporations formed, organized and existing under
Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered
under the Torrens system.
Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving
spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy,
filed a joint petition for the administration of the estate of
Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were
included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then
filed a motion for the lifting of lis pendens and motion for
exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the
decedent.
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City sitting as a probate
court, granted the private respondents twin motions, in this
wise:
Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended
petition[9] which contained the following averments:
"3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally

owned during his lifetime the following
business entities, to wit: Alliance
Marketing, Inc; Speed Distributing Inc.;
Auto Truck TBA Corp.; Active Distributors
Inc; and Action Company
"3.1 Although the above business entities
dealt and engaged in business with the
public as corporations, all their capital,
assets and equity were however,
personally owned by the late Pastor Y
Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and
officers appearing in the respective
articles of incorporation of the above
business entities were mere dummies of
Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein
only for purposes of registration with the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time,
Savings and Current Deposits with the
following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace
Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City Branches and (b) First
Intestate Bank (formerly Producers Bank),
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
and in other banks whose identities are
yet to be determined.
"5. That the following real properties,
although registered in the name of the
above entities, were actually acquired by
Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with
petitioner, to wit: Auto Truck; Alliance
Marketing
"7. The aforementioned properties and/or
real interests left by the late Pastor Y. Lim,
are all conjugal in nature, having been
acquired by him during the existence of
his marriage with petitioner.

"8. There are other real and personal
properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim which
petitioner could not as yet identify.
Petitioner, however will submit to this
Honorable Court the identities thereof and
the necessary documents covering the
same as soon as possible."
The Regional Trial Court set aside the previous order and
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to reinstate
the annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation had
already been deleted and/or cancelled.
Furthermore, said properties covered by
virtue of the petitioner are included in the
instant petition.
The probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special
administrator and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as
co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after
which letters of administration were accordingly issued.
In a subsequent order the probate court denied anew
private respondents motion for exclusion, in this wise:
"The issue precisely raised by the
petitioner in her petition is whether the
corporations are the mere alter egos or
instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, Otherwise
(sic) stated, the issue involves the
piercing of the corporate veil, a matter
that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court and not the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the
case of Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93
SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by
the regular court was whether the
corporation involved therein was the mere
extension of the decedent. After finding in
the affirmative, the Court ruled that the
assets of the corporation are also assets
of the estate.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon

by oppositors, shows that the SECs
exclusive (sic) applies only to intracorporate controversy. It is simply a suit to
settle the intestate estate of a deceased
person who, during his lifetime, acquired
several
properties
and
put
up
corporations as his instrumentalities.
The probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by
petitioner, issued an order the dispositive portion of which
reads:
the parties and the following banks
concerned herein under enumerated are
hereby ordered to comply with this order
and to produce and submit to the special
administrators, within (5) five days from
receipt of this order their respective
records
of
the
savings/current
accounts/time
deposits
and
other
deposits in the names of Pastor Lim
and/or corporations above-mentioned,
showing all the transactions made or
done
concerning
savings
/current
accounts from January 1994 up to their
receipt of this court order.
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari,
with an urgent prayer for a restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals
questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as
a probate court.
The Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private
respondents, rendered the assailed decision and granted
the SCA for certiorari. And the previous orders are nullified
and set aside.
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

herein petitioner Rufina Luy Lim now comes before us with
a lone assignment of error:
"The respondent Court of Appeals erred
in reversing the orders of the lower court
which merely allowed the preliminary or
provisional inclusion of the private
respondents as part of the estate of the
late deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the
respondent Court of Appeals arrogating
unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey
or to ignore the clear and explicit
provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of
the Rules of Court and thereby preventing
the petitioner, from performing her duty as
special administrator of the estate as
expressly provided in the said Rules."
ISSUE: WON a corporation, in its universality, be the proper
subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate of a
deceased person
Petitioners contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we
affirm the orders issued by the probate court which were
subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of
the rules on jurisdiction over probate proceedings is indeed
in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 7691[17], which introduced
amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
"Section 1. Section
Pambansa Blg. 129
19
of
Batas
Appeal portion--- so SC nani:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction:

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate
and intestate, where the gross value of
the estate exceeds One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in
probate matters in Metro Manila, where
such gross value exceeds Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
of interest, damages of
whatever
kind,
attorneys fees, litigation
expenses and costs,
the amount of which
must be specifically
alleged, Provided, that
interest, damages of
whatever
kind,
attorneys,
litigation
expenses and costs
shall be included in the
determination of the
filing fees, Provided
further, that where there
are several claims or
causes
of
actions
between the same or
different
parties,
embodied in the same
complaint, the amount
of the demand shall be
the totality of the claims
in all the causes of
action, irrespective of
whether the causes of
action arose out of the
same
or
different
transactions;
The Court cited many cases dri na part but the point sa
tanan cases kay kini lang:
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises

jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the gross
value of the estate of the decedent.
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of

land are registered in the name of private respondent
corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY
vs., ALCID[24] is of great essence and finds applicability,
thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is

hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction
of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil
Cases.Metropolitan
Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
1. Exclusive
original
jurisdiction over civil
actions and probate
proceedings,
testate
and intestate, including
the grant of provisional
remedies in proper
cases, where the value
of
the
personal
property,
estate
or
amount of the demand
does not exceed One
Hundred
Thousand
Pesos(P100,000) or, in
Metro Manila where
such personal property,
estate or amount of the
demand
does
not
exceed Two Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P200,000), exclusive
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner

relies heavily on the principle that a probate court may pass
upon title to certain properties, albeit provisionally, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory.
Substantive Issues explained diri:
PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS; PEREIRA vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
"X X X The function of resolving whether
or not a certain property should be
included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the
administrator is one clearly within the
competence of the probate court.
However, the courts determination is only
provisional in character, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action which may be instituted
by the parties."
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of
land covered under the Torrens system and registered in
the name of private respondent corporations should be
included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent
Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the
probate court of whether these properties should be
included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not
conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate
action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and for all
the issue of title.
"It does not matter that respondentadministratrix has evidence purporting to

support her claim of ownership, for, on the
other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title
in their favor, which under the law is
endowed with incontestability until after it
has been set aside in the manner
indicated in the law itself, which, of

course, does not include, bringing up the
matter as a mere incident in special
proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons.
certificate of title issued in the name of

such third parties, the respondent court
should have denied the motion of the
respondent administrator and excluded
the property in question from the
inventory of the property of the estate. It
had no authority to deprive such third
persons of their possession and
ownership of the property."
In regard to such incident of inclusion or

exclusion, We hold that if a property
covered by Torrens title is involved, the
presumptive conclusiveness of such title
should be given due weight, and in the
absence of strong compelling evidence to
the contrary, the holder thereof should be
considered as the owner of the property
in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary
action, particularly, when as in the case at
bar, possession of the property itself is in
the persons named in the title.
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of

the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of
and are registered in the name of private respondent
corporations, which under the law possess a personality
separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate
fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in
favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed.
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong

compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner to
bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased
Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as, " The Property Registration Decree",
proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly

registered under the Torrens system in the name of private
respondents, and as such were to be afforded the
presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court
obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still
proceeded to issue the impugned orders.
Section 48. Certificate not subject to

collateral attack.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in

effect acted in utter disregard of the presumption of
conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents.
- A certificate of title shall not be subject to

collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law."
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case
at bar, the property subject of the controversy was duly
registered under the Torrens system, We categorically
stated:
"Having been apprised of the fact that the
property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of

private respondent corporations are properly part of the
decedents estate but also the private respondent
corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention,
petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime,
organized and wholly-owned the five corporations, which
are the private respondents in the instant case.[25] Petitioner
thus attached as Annexes of the petition for review affidavits
executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among
others, contained averments that the incorporators of
Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual
participation in the organization and incorporation of the
said corporation. The affiants added that the persons whose
names appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide

Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof, are mere
dummies since they have not actually contributed any
amount to the capital stock of the corporation and have
been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their
respective signatures thereon.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality
separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it.
It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons
composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal
indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities
connected with it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible.
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil
may be pierced when a corporation is just but the alter ego
of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of
fraud exist, where public convenience is defeated; where a
wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction
or the notion of legal entity should come to naught.
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case
was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate
court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent
evidence that would have justified the court to impale the
veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by
petitioner on the affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani
Wenceslao
is
unavailing
considering
that
the
aforementioned documents possess no weighty probative
value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative
for us to stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in
evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all
presented during the course of the proceedings in the
lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the
admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from
Our duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner
consistent with the law and jurisprudence.
Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS[35] finds pertinence:

"Affidavits are classified as hearsay
evidence since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another
who uses his own language in writing the
affiants statements, which may thus be
either omitted or misunderstood by the
one writing them. Moreover, the adverse
party is deprived of the opportunity to
cross-examine the affiants. For this
reason, affidavits are generally rejected
for being hearsay, unless the affiant
themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon."
As to the order of the lower court, the Court of Appeals
correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93
acted without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate
court had no authority to demand the production of bank
accounts in the name of the private respondent
corporations.
10. EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9282. May 31, 1956.]
EMILIO ADVINCULA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
JUDGE JOSE TEODORO, SR., Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, and ENRIQUE A.
LACSON, Respondents.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Emilio Advincula seeks a writ of certiorari, to
annul certain orders of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental.
Said Petitioner was, on November 22, 1954,
appointed, special administrator of the estate of his
deceased wife, Josefa Lacson Advincula, in special
proceeding No. 3245 of said court. In due course, he was,
on February 12, 1955, appointed regular administrator of
said estate. After Advincula had qualified as such, the
brothers of the deceased, who left no issue, submitted to
the court, for allowance, a document purporting to be her

last will and testament. Petitioner opposed the probate
thereof upon the ground that it did not bear the signature of
the deceased; that the signature thereon, if hers, was
secured through fraud and duress; and that, the instrument
had not been executed with the requisite formalities.
On May 4, 1955, Respondent Enrique Lacson, one
of the brothers of the deceased, filed a motion praying that
he be appointed administrator of said estate, in lieu
of Petitioner herein, for the reason that said Respondent is
the executor named in the aforementioned alleged will. On
or about May 16, 1955, Attys. Jose Y. Torres and Antonio
Lozada, as counsel for Advincula, filed an opposition to said
motion. When the latter was called for hearing on May 18,
1955, Atty. Lozada was served, in open court, copy of an
amended motion, of Respondent Lacson, for change of
administrator, dated May 14, 1955. It was alleged therein, in
addition to the ground set forth in the first motion:
5. That the present administrator is incompetent,
incapable and unsuitable to the discharge of the trust, he
being foreign to the estate, and without changing or
removing him as such would be disastrous to the estate
and to the heirs named in the will of the decedent.
Atty. Lozada asked a postponement of the hearing
upon the ground that Advinculas main counsel, Atty. Torres,
was in Manila, but his request was denied. Then, after
hearing the argument of opposing counsel, the court,
presided over by Respondent, Honorable Jose Teodoro, Sr.,
Judge, issued, on the same date (May 18, 1955), an order
the pertinent parts of which read:
The Court, after hearing the oral arguments of
both parties, finds the motion for postponement not welltaken and hereby denies the same; and finding the motion
dated May 4, 1955 as amended by the amended motion
dated May 14, 1955, well-founded and the opposition
thereto dated May 16, 1955 not well-founded, said motion is
hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for
the preservation of the property for the heirs, the
appointment of Emilio Advincula as administrator is hereby
revoked and in his stead, the Oppositor, Enrique A. Lacson,
is hereby appointed administrator of this intestate estate,
and same may qualify by filing a bond in the sum of P5,000

and taking and subscribing the corresponding oath of
Office. Once said Enrique A. Lacson has qualified, let letters
of administration issue in his favor.
The former administrator, Emilio Advincula, is
hereby ordered to submit within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof, his final account covering the entire period of his
administration and should it appear that any deficiency has
been incurred by him during his incumbency, his bond shall
answer for said deficiency.
Thereupon, Lacson gave the requisite bond, letters
of administration was issued to him, and he tried to take
possession of the estate of the deceased. A reconsideration
of said order of May 18, 1955, having been denied by
another order, dated May 30, 1955.
Petitioner instituted the present action for
certiorari, against Lacson and Judge Teodoro, to annul his
aforesaid orders of May 18 and 30, 1955, upon the ground
that the same were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Upon the filing of a bond by Advincula, we issued, as
prayed for in his petition, a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining Respondent Lacson and his agents from
interfering, molesting and harassing the Petitioner in the
administration of the estate of the deceased, during the
pendency of this case.
The writ of certiorari prayed for is in order.
Lacsons appointment, in lieu of Advincula, as administrator
of the estate of Josefa Lacson Advincula, is predicated upon
the fact that the former is named executor in the alleged will
of said deceased. The provision therein to this effect cannot
be enforced, however, until after said document has been
allowed to probate, for section 4 of Rule 79 of the Rules of
Court provides:
When a will has been proved and allowed, the
court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person
named as executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the
trusts, and gives bond as required by these rules. (Italics
supplied.)
Besides, the discovery of a document purporting to
be the last will and testament of a deceased, after the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of the latter,

upon the assumption that he or she had died intestate, does
not ipso facto nullify the letters of administration already
issued or even authorize the revocation thereof, until the
alleged will has been proved and allowed by the court.
Rule 83, section 1, of the Rules of Court, is plain and
explicit on this point.
If after letters of administration have been granted
on the estate of a decedent as if he had died intestate, his
will is proved and allowed by the court, the letters of
administration shall be revoked and all powers thereunder
cease, and the administrator shall forthwith surrender the
letters to the court, end render his account within such time
as the court directs. Proceedings for the issuance of letters
testamentary or of administration under the will shall be as
hereinbefore provided. (Italics supplied.)
The amended motion for change of administrator
endeavored to justify the removal of Advincula by alleging
that he is incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to the
discharge of the trust, he being foreign to the estate of the
deceased. By holding, in its order of May 18, 1955, that said
motion is well-founded with nothing, absolutely nothing
else, to indicate the basis of this conclusion
Respondent Judge has impliedly adopted the line of
argument followed in the above quoted allegation of the
amended motion to change administrator. Said argument is,
however, devoid of merit.
It is untenable from the viewpoint of logic and
experience, because a stranger to deceased may be
competent, capable and fit to administer her estate, in much
the same as a member of her immediate family could be
incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so. At any rate,
Advincula is not a stranger, either to her or to her estate, he
bring her surviving spouse and, as such, one of her forced
heirs (Arts. 887, 888, 892, 893, 894, 897 to 900, and 995 to
1001, Civil Code of the Philippines), whether she died
testate or intestate. What is more, he is prima facie entitled
to one-half of all property subject to the authority of the
administrator of said estate, apart from his share of the
other half thereof, as heir of the deceased, for all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of which he is its administrator (Article 165,
Civil Code of the Philippines) unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife (See
Articles 160 and 185, Civil Code of the Philippines). Lastly,

Advincula has not been found guilty of any specific act or
omission constituting one of the legal grounds, enumerated
in Rule 83, section 2, of the Rules of Court, for the removal
of an executor or administrator. Hence, it is clear
that Respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in
removing Advincula and appointing Lacson as administrator
of the estate of the deceased Josefa Lacson Advincula.
Wherefore,
the
aforementioned
orders
of Respondent Judge, dated May 8 and 30, 1955, are
reversed, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this
case
hereby
made
permanent,
with
costs
against Respondent Enrique
A.
Lacson.
It
is SO
ORDERED.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,
Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., and
Endencia, JJ., concur.
11. # 11 - Consolidated Bank vs IAC

Facts:
directed Petitioner to pay Mrs. Vasquez P5,833,333 from

the estate of Don Madrigal.
5. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the
said order grounded on the following reasons:
A. Order was beyond the limited and special jurisdiction of
the
court
B.
No
due
process
was
given
C. Order is a violation of tax laws on payment of estate
taxes
6. Probate court stood by its decisions regarding the first
and second grounds raised by Petitioner. According to the
probate court, the order was made in view of the agreement
executed by all of the heirs. It also cited that the
Administrator was properly apprised of the Motion for
Payment of Lien as well as the date of its subsequent
hearing but they still failed to send a representative. As to
the third ground, the court found merit. It believes that a part
of the approved amount should be withheld to answer for
the estate taxes which it failed to provide in its earlier order.
The court said that P833k must be set aside for any
obligations and liabilities.
1. Don Vicente Madrigal, a resident of Quezon City, died. To

settle his estate, Special Proceedings No. Q-916960 was
filed in RTC Quezon City.
7. When an administrative order was issued by the SC

limiting RTC Pasay's jurisdiction, the probate court required
the parties to show cause why the case should not be
transferred to RTC QC.
2. Judge Agana who was originally assigned in RTC Pasay

was temporarily detailed in RTC QC. During said period, he
was assigned to handle SP No. Q-916960. When he was
made to return to RTC Pasay, he also brought with him the
case records.
8. Two of the heirs manifested their desire to have the case

retained by the current probate court (RTC Pasay). The
Petitioner, on the other hand, did not give its comformity, in
effect, objecting to the retention by the Pasay City probate
court.
3. In the course of the subject estate proceedings, a Motion

for Payment of Lien was filed by Mrs.Vasquez attaching
therewith an agreement executed by and among Don
Madrigal's heirs. In the agreement, the heirs provided that a
reimbursement amounting to P5M be paid to Mrs. Vasquez
for all the expenses in the prosecution/defense cases filed
by one against the other. Said reimbursement shall be taken
from the Estate of Don Vicente or from the proceeds of the
settlement of the claim of Madrigal and Co.
9. Petitioner later on filed an omnibus motion praying for the

return of the case to the court of origin or RTC QC. But the
motion was denied.
4. Petitioner did not attend the hearing on the Motion for

Payment of Lien. Hence, the probate court granted it and
10. When the matter was brought to the CA, The appellate
court upheld due process in the instant case and waiver of
venue.
11. Petitioner argues that there was improper venue,
insisting as a result, that the probate proceedings including
that taken by the Court of Appeals is null. Their failure to
object to the proceedings conducted at Pasay City Regional
Trial Court, should not be taken as a waiver on their part as

to venue because they believed that the proceedings were
only temporary and that the case would subsequently be
returned to Quezon City for further proceedings.
Issue: whether or not there was waiver of venue by inaction
on the part of petitioner.
terminate the proceedings as early as possible and the

continuance of the proceedings before the respondent court
has not caused any damage against the parties and there is
no damage as well against public interest."
Ruling:
12. G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
1. While the Court agrees with the petitioner that venue in

this case should have been laid in Quezon City, petitioner's
inaction has worked against it. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that indeed, petitioner has waived its right to
contest the question of venue.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A.

MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
2. The action in the present case pertains to the probate of

the intestate estate of the late Don Vicente Madrigal, in
which case a regional trial court properly has jurisdiction
over the case, both under the Judiciary Act of 1948, Sec. 44
(e) and under BP 129, Sec. 19(4).
Objection to improper venue should be made in a motion to
dismiss. Until this is done, venue cannot truly be said to
have been improperly laid.
3. It was only when the probate court ordered the petitioner
to pay Mrs Vasquez did the latter raise the issue on
improper venue.
4. The court, of course, notes that Petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss but it was belatedly done
considering that petitioner has already submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court. In fact, petitioner itself had filed no
less than four (4) motions and pleadings with the court a
quo, thereby recognizing its jurisdiction.
5. In closing, SC quoted CA's ratiocination: "We are not
prepared to rule that all the proceedings in the past are null
and void because of venue and send back the proceedings
to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, try the case anew
from the very beginning to where this incident came about
which proceedings might take more than five (5) years
again. We are not prone to do this, conscious of the fact
that one of the primordial objections of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 is the speedy administration of justice but within
the framework of the rule of law. We are not inclined to give
Our affirmance to the petitioner's desire for the said transfer
because the procedure will only militate against the interest
of all the parties considering that everybody is desirous to
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA
B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
FACTS:
Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A.
Malvar, a petition for letters of administration and moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over
the estate of Amado G. Garcia.
Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because

(1)jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest
has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was
improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in
interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased
Amado G. Garcia. That as the surviving spouse, she should
be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix.
Judge Malvar appointed Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix.
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case
before Judge Malvar, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that
three months before his death his residence was in Quezon
City. Virginia G. Fule testified that Amado G. Garcia was
residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death but
upon presentation of the death certificate, it showed that his
residence at the time of his death was Quezon City.
Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a

special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. CA
rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge
Severo A. Malvar for lack of jurisdiction. Virginia G. Fule
forthwith elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the RTC of Laguna has jurisdiction over the
petition.
Held:
NO. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province
in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. This section,
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate,"
is in reality a matter of venue. It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Withal,
the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for
Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection
to improper venue is subject to waiver.
In asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive
her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a
mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her
rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the
enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.

The last place of residence of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision,
Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death
certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death.
With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2,

Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the
petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of
jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should
allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and
last residence of the decedent. The fact of death of the
intestate and his last residence within the country are
foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in
the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate
was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death,
and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on
the court to grant letters of administration.
13.) Jao vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 128314
May 29, 2002
Facts:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of

spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao,
who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively.
Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of
QUEZON CITY over the properties left by their
parents and pending appointment of a regular
administrator, moved that he be appointed as
special administrator.
o He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was
Issues:
gradually dissipating the assets of the

estate.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on
the ground of:
o Improper venue since the actual
residence of their parents was in
ANGELES CITY, PAMPANGA and stayed
only in Quezon City for medical treatment.
o Also, in this petition, Rodolfos argument
strains to differentiate between the venue
provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2, on
ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73,
Section 1, which applies specifically to
settlement proceedings. He argues that
while venue in the former understandably
refers to actual physical residence for the
purpose of serving summons, it is the
permanent residence of the decedent
which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1.
Petitioner insists that venue for the
settlement of estates can only refer to
permanent residence or domicile because
it is the place where the records of the
properties are kept and where most of the
decedents' properties are located.
Perico countered that their deceased parents
actually resided in Rodolfo's house in Quezon City
at the time of their death and it was Rodolfo
himself who supplied the entry appearing on the
death certificate of their mother.
The trial court denied the motion filed by Rodolfo.
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari as well as the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
Hence, this petition for review.
1.
Whether or not the settlement proceedings would

be done, in Pampanga, where the decedents had
their permanent residence, or in Quezon City,
there they actually stayed before their demise
2.
Whether or not the term residence under Special

Proceedings is the same as that of an Ordinary
Civil Action
Held:
1.
QUEZON CITY. Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant

of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of
administration granted in the proper court located
in the province where the decedent resides at the
time of his death.
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If
the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that
the decedents have transferred to petitioner's

Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to
sufficiently refute respondent's assertion that their
elderly parents stayed in his house for some three
to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents' respective death
certificates state that they were both residents of
Quezon City at the time of their demise.
Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up
his late mother's death certificate. To our mind, this
unqualifiedly shows that at that residence to be
Quezon City.
Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in
Ignacio's death certificate, accomplished a year
earlier by respondent. The recitals in the death
certificates, which are admissible in evidence,
were thus properly considered and presumed to be
correct by the court a quo. We agree with the
appellate court's observation that since the death
certificates were accomplished even before
petitioner and respondent quarreled over their
inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the
true situation at the time of their parents' death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of
the decedents' residence at the time of death, over
the numerous documentary evidence presented by
petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by
petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of
death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to
permanent residence or domicile.
2.
YES. IN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTIONS AND IN

SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS,
THE
TERM
RESIDENCE HAS THE SAME MEANING.
Petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he
differentiates between venue in ordinary civil
actions and venue in special proceedings. In
Raymond v. Court of Appeals and Bejer v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one
and the same meaning.
As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue

provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. All told, the lower court and
the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the
settlement of the decedents' intestate estate was properly
laid in the Quezon City court.
14. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF

DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R.
REYES vs. CESAR R. REYES
FACTS:
Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the
registered owners of parcels of land situated in Arayat
Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 4983 and 3598. The spouses have seven
children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia, Aurora,
Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes.
In 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death,
Ismael Reyes was notified by the BIR of his income tax
deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land
located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure to settle
his tax liability and since no payment was made by the
heirs, the property covered by TCT No. 4983 was levied,
sold and eventually forfeited.
Petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the
BIRs tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the property
.
Later, the Office of the City Treasurer sent a notice to Felisa
Revita Reyes informing her that the Arayat properties will be
sold at public for her failure to settle the real estate tax
delinquency from 1974-1981.Oscar Reyes entered into an

amnesty compromise agreement with the City Treasurer
and settled the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes.[9]
On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother
of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of
administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate of
the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of
the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598.
The probate court subsequently issued letters of
administration in favor of Cesar Reyes where the latter was
ordered to submit a true and complete inventory of
properties pertaining to the estate of the deceased. Oscar
Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the
ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the
estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the
properties by redemption and or purchase.[11]
Cesar Reyes filed an inventory of real and personal
properties of the deceased which included the Arayat
properties with a total area of 1,009 sq. meters.On the other
hand, Oscar Reyes filed his objection to the inventory
reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in
favor of the government and he was the one who
subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his
own funds.
Petitioners argue that a probate courts jurisdiction is not
limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what
shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased
person since the probate court has the power and
competence to determine whether a property should be
excluded from the inventory of the estate or not, thus the
Court a quo committed a reversible error when it included
the Arayat properties in the inventory of the estate of Ismael
Reyes despite the overwhelming evidence presented by
petitioner-oppositor Oscar Reyes proving his claim of
ownership.
Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership over the
Arayat properties as testified to by their predecessor Oscar
was based on two (2) grounds: (1) his redemption of the
Arayat properties and (2) the abandonment of the properties
by his co-heirs.

Petitioners claim that private respondent is already barred
from claiming the Arayat properties since he only filed this
petition 16 years after the death of Ismael Reyes and after
the prices of the real properties in Cubao have already
escalated tremendously.
ISSUE: Whether or not a trial court, acting as an intestate

court, hear and pass questions of ownership involving
properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
HELD: NO.
A probate court or one in charge of the proceedings whether
testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to others. The jurisdiction of the probate
court merely relates to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of
deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of
administrators, executors, guardians and trustees.[18] The
question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter
which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.[19]
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action to resolve title
The general rule that question of title to property cannot be
passed upon in the probate court admits of exceptions, i.e.
if the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in
the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudication, such has no application in the instant case
since petitioner-appellee and oppositor-appellant are not the
only parties with legal interest in the subject property as
they are not the only heirs of the decedent; that it was never
shown that all parties interested in the subject property or all
the heirs of the decedent consented to the submission of
the question of ownership to the intestate court.
Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a

probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has
no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of
title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the
decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having
legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly,
to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced.
The facts in this case, however, do not call for the
application of the exception to the rule. It bears stress that
the purpose why the probate court allowed the introduction
of evidence on ownership was for the sole purpose of
determining whether the subject properties should be
included in the inventory which is within the probate courts
competence.
This ruling then, cannot be a final adjudication on the
present
and
existing
legal
ownership
of
the
properties. Whatever is declared herein ought not to
preclude oppositor from prosecuting an ordinary action for
the purpose of having his claims or rights established over
the properties.
This Court, acting as a probate court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction; accordingly, its determination that property
should be included in the inventory or not is within its
probate jurisdiction, but such determination is only
provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted
by the parties.
15. PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK,

petitioner, vs. CA
[G.R. No. 103149. November 15, 2000]
The case under consideration is a petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition of the Philippine Commercial
International Bank (PCIBank) for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, and denying the motion for
reconsideration of PCIBank.
FACTS:
June 5, 1990 - PCIBank filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Davao City, Branch 11 a claim for payment of a loan
account against the decedent, Jesus T. Ang, Sr. (They
executed a surety agreement and real estate mortgage,
respectively, in favor of PCIBanks predecessor-in-interest
(Insular Bank of Asia and America) to secure a loan
extended by it to JA Enterprises)
PCIBank caused the extra-judicial foreclosure

of the mortgaged property and its sale at
public auction to satisfy the outstanding
obligation of the decedent; however, it failed
to recover the full amount of decedents
obligation.
On December 20 and 21, 1989, the deputy

sheriff of Davao City issued two provisional
certificates of sale stating that the mortgaged
parcels of land were sold to the sole and
highest bidder, PCIBank, at an auction sale,
for the amount of P2,080,100.00 and
P1,269,600.00, respectively. Thus, PCIBank
filed its claim against the estate of Jesus T.
Ang, Sr. to recover the deficiency of
P2,703,818.12 and attorneys fees of
P781,325.22.
September 14, 1990, Blanquita L. Ang, wife of the

decedent, filed a motion for leave to intervene in the
proceedings to dispute the claim of PCIBank, attaching a
copy of her complaint-in-intervention. Blanquita Ang
maintained that she had legal interest in the subject of the
claims of petitioner bank, being the legal wife of the
decedent and considering that the property involved
belonged to the conjugal partnership, to which she was
entitled to one-half share. She neither encumbered her
conjugal share nor conformed to any encumbrance. She
was not a party to the execution of the agreements entered
into between the decedent and petitioner bank involving
conjugal property of the spouses Ang.

September 24, 1990, the trial court granted
Blanquitas motion to intervene and ordered her to file
additional copies of her complaint-in-intervention to be
attached to the summons to be served upon defendants-inintervention.
October 24, 1990 - Blanquita Ang filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 11 a petition for
preliminary injunction to enjoin PCIBank and the other
defendants-in-intervention from consolidating title in the
name of PCIBank, canceling any of the certificates of title of
the mortgaged property and issuing new certificates of title
in the name of PCIBank.
November 5, 1990 - PCIBank received a copy of
respondent Blanquita L. Angs petition for preliminary
injunction. Thereafter, PCIBank filed its opposition, stating
that the application was premature because PCIBank had
not received a copy of Blanquita Angs complaint-inintervention.
November 23, 1990 - PCIBank received a copy of the
complaint-in-intervention of Blanquita Ang. Thereafter, it
filed with the trial court an urgent motion for extension of
time to file responsive or any other pleadings to the
complaint-in-intervention.
November 28, 1990 - the trial court issued an order
resetting the date of hearing of the application of preliminary
injunction to December 4, 1990, and notified the parties
accordingly.
December 4, 1990 - At the scheduled hearing, the trial
court denied PCIBanks motion for extension to file a
responsive pleading. The trial court then proceeded to hear
the application for the issuance of preliminary
injunction. PCIBank objected to the continuation of the
hearing on the application for preliminary injunction,
manifesting in open court that since he had not yet filed an
answer to the complaint-in-intervention, the hearing on the
application should not proceed. The trial court overruled the
objection. Consequently, PCIBanks counsel walked out of
the courtroom. The trial court then allowed intervenor
Blanquita Ang to present her evidence ex-parte.
December 6, 1990, the trial court issued an order
granting the application for preliminary injunction and
required the filing of an injunction bond in the amount of

P10,000.00.
1.
December 13, 1990, following the posting of the bond

by respondent Blanquita Ang, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction.
However, on December 12, 1990, the Court of
Appeals, upon petition by PCIBank, issued a temporary
restraining order for respondent judge to desist from
conducting further proceedings in Special Proceedings
Case No. 3215.
December 17, 1990 - PCIBank filed with the Court of
Appeals a Supplemental Petition, insisting that the
enforcement of the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction
issued by the trial court on December 13, 1990 could no
longer be done in view of the restraining order issued by the
Court of Appeals on December 12, 1990.
October 22, 1991 - the Court of Appeals dismissed
PCIBanks petition and supplemental petition for prohibition
and certiorari with preliminary injunction.
December 9, 1991 - the Court of Appeals likewise
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by PCIBank.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Petitioner claims that it was not given sufficient

opportunity to file an answer in opposition to
the application for preliminary injunction due to
its belated receipt of the complaint-inintervention. Since it received a copy of the
complaint-in-intervention on November 23,
1990, there was ample time to prepare an
answer for the hearing set on December 4,
1990. Moreover, petitioner was duly notified of
the hearing on the application for the writ. In
fact, the hearing had been reset and
appropriate notices given to the parties. The
record further showed that petitioners counsel
attended the hearing on December 4, 1990,
but decided not to take part in the proceedings
when his motion for extension of time to file
responsive pleading was denied.
Thus, petitioner was given adequate opportunity to oppose

the application for the writ as well as to file its answer to the
complaint-in-intervention. Petitioner may not presume that
its motion for extension would be granted as a matter of
course. The grant of an extension of time to file a
responsive pleading is discretionary on the part of the court.
2.
Furthermore,
contrary
to
petitioners
contention, the Rules of Court do not
require that issues be joined before
preliminary
injunction
may
issue.
Preliminary injunction may be granted at
any stage of an action or proceeding prior
to the judgment or final order, ordering a
party or a court, agency or a person to
refrain from a particular act or acts. For as
long as the requisites for its issuance are
present in the case, such issuance is valid.
3.
Petitioners contention that the writ of

injunction issued by the trial court effectively
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the

issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction by the Regional
Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 11 in Special Proceedings
Case No. 3215-90, pertaining to the claim of petitioner
PCIBank?
HELD:
No. (The petition lacks merit)

adjudicated ownership of the mortgaged
property in favor of respondent Blanquita Ang
is misplaced. It is only upon expiration of
the redemption period, without the
judgment debtor having made use of his
right of redemption, that ownership of the
land sold in a foreclosure sale becomes
consolidated in the purchaser. The probate
court issued the writ to enjoin petitioner and
other concerned parties from performing any
act which would directly or indirectly enforce
the effects of the extra-judicial foreclosure of
decedents property caused by petitioner
bank, in order to preserve the estate of the
decedent. Consolidation of title would have
the consequence of transferring ownership
since the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes
the absolute owner of the property purchased
if it is not redeemed during the period of one
year after the registration of the sale.
Therefore, at the time the writ was issued
there was yet no issue regarding ownership
because the period for redemption had not
lapsed.
Nevertheless, the probate court may pass upon and
determine the title or ownership of a property which may or
may not be included in the estate proceedings, but such
determination is provisional in character and is subject to
final decision in a separate action to resolve title. Thus, the
allegations of Blanquita Ang that her signatures on the real
estate mortgage documents were forged may be ventilated
in a separate proceeding, requiring the presentation of clear
and convincing evidence.
4.
Petitioner asserts that the writ may not

issue because of the prior issuance of a
temporary restraining order by the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however,
later on withdrew its temporary restraining
order and sustained the injunction issued
by the trial court. The grant or denial of an

injunction rests in the sound discretion of the
court. Considering that there were factual
reasons necessitating the issuance of the writ,
we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in
affirming the issuance of an injunction.
16.) TERESITA DE LEON, ZENAIDA NICOAS, HEIRS OF

ANTONIO NICOLAS, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
PABLO INVENTOR, RAMON NICOLAS
G.R. No. 128781, August 6, 2002
FACTS
Petitioner
De
Leon
was
appointed
administratrix of the estate of Rafael Nicolas
(Sp. Proc. No. C-1679, In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Rafael C. Nicolas). Said
case was consolidated with Sp. Proc No. C1810.
Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas (both
deceased) are the parents of Teresita,
Estrelita, Antonio, Ramon and Roberto.
Antonio (deceased) is represented by his wife
petitioner Zenaida and his other heirs.
Private
respondent
Ramon
(oppositorapplicant in the intestate proceedings) filed a
Motion for Collation, claiming that Rafael,
during his lifetime had gratuitously given real
properties to his children and Teresita had
failed to include them in the estates inventory
(at least 7 lots in Polo, Bulacan and Caloocan
City given to different children).
The RTC issued an Order directed Ramon to
submit pertinent documents for proper
determination if the properties should be
collated. A hearing was set with notice to the
present registered owners (the children) to
show cause why their proeprties should not be
collated.
Ramon submitted an Amended Motion for

Collation with supporting documents attached.
It included two properties not indicated in the
original motion.
Nov. 11, 1994: The Court ordered Teresita to
include only certain lots for Collation
Teresita filed an MR alleging that the
properties subject of the Order were already
titled in their names many years prior and that
their titles may not be collaterally attacked in a
motion for collation. Said motion was denied
on the ground that it was within the jurisdiction
of the court to determine whether the titled
properties should be collated (Sec. 2, Rule 90
final order of the court concerning questions
as to advancements made shall be binding on
the person raising the question and on the
heir).
Teresita filed an MR for the Order denying the
original MR. The RTC issued an Order
requiring Ramon to prove whether the
properties were given gratuitously or for a
valuable consideration.
The RTC removed Teresita from her position
as administratrix on the ground of conflict of
interest considering her claim that she paid a
valuable consideration for the properties
transferred to her and are this not subject to
collation.
Teresita filed another MR, which was denied.
Petitioners filed with the CA e petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction.
The CA found the petition devoid of merit,
ruling that the Order directing the inclusion of
the enumerated properties in the estate had
become final for failure to appeal the order of
collation. The appeal from the Order removing
petitioner as administratrix, however, was
timely appealed.
CONTENTIONS: Petitioners claim that the
properties were sold to them rather than
donated, that the Order was interlocutory and

non-appealable, and that they were deprived
of due process. Private respondent contends
that due process was afforded to petitioners
when petitioner resolved the issue of collation
after hearing.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Nov. 11, 1994 Order
directing the inclusion of the enumerated
properties in the estate was final.
RULING
The petition is partly GRANTED.

1. NO. The Nov. 11, 1994 Order and all other
orders emanating from said Order are merely
provisional or interlocutory, without prejudice
to the heirs, administrator or approving parties
to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title
(NIC: in other words, since interlocutory ra ang
Order, any conflicts regarding title over the
properties can be resolved in an ordinary
action). The CA committed an error in
considering the Order as final or binding upon
the heirs or third persons who dispute the
inclusion of certain properties.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it was ruled in
Garcia v. Garcia: the court acquires jurisdiction
over the properties of the deceased has
supervision and control over said properties.
The court thus has inherent power to
determine the properties included/excluded
from the inventory. Should an heir or person
interested in the properties of a deceased
person duly call the courts attention to the
fact that certain properties, rights or
credits have been left out in the inventory,
it is likewise the courts duty to hear the
observations, with power to determine if
such observations should be attended to
or not and if the properties referred to

therein belong prima facie to the intestate,
but no such determination is final and
ultimate in nature as to the ownership of
said properties.
17. JOSE P. UY and RIZALINA C. UY, Complainants, v.

HON.
JUDGE
TERESITA
DIZON-CAPULONG,
Respondent
A.M. No. RTJ-91-766. April 7, 1993.
A probate court, whether in a testate or

intestate proceeding, can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally. Probate
courts have limited jurisdiction and questions
of title can only be settled in a separate action.
All the court can do is determine whether they
should be included in the property.
The Case:
Sec. 2, Rule 90 of the ROC, which provides

that the final order shall be binding, is invoked
by the petitioner. The Order of exclusion or
inclusion is NOT a final order and is
interlocutory in the sense that it does not
settle once and for all the title to the lots.
Sec. 2, Rule 90 should be interpreted in the
context of Sec. 1. The RTC and CA
erroneously referred to it as an order of
collation when it is nothing more than order of
inclusion. The motion for collation was filled in
the early stage of the intestate proceedings
and nothing indicates that the debts have
been paid nor the net remainder determined.
In other words, the issue on collation is still
premature and the Order was merely for
inclusion.
Even assuming that the assailed Order is a
collation and a final order, it would have no
force and effect upon the parties. Only a final
order is appealable and a final Order must
contain the facts and law on which it is based
(Sec. 14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The
Order in this case does not state the reasons
for ordering collation. Thus, it never could
have become final and would be inoperative.
JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch
172, Metro Manila, is charged 1 with gross incompetence,
gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct in a
complaint filed on 15 November 1991 with the Office of the
Court Administrator by the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina
C. Uy, relative to Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 for
settlement of the estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco
Facts:
The records show that on 21 November 1988, a
certain Herminia R. Alvos, claiming to be a niece of Paz
Ramirez, surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a petition
for settlement of the estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco.
Respondent Judge appointed said Herminia R. Alvos
special administratrix under Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
Counsel for the special administratrix filed an
urgent motion stating that sometime in February 1978 two
(2) parcels of land belonging to the late Ambrocio C. Pingco
and his wife covered by TCT Nos. 7537 and 75101 had
been sold to complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy
who registered the sale with the Register of Deeds of
Manila in February 1989. Consequently, counsel requested
the court to direct the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to
"freeze any transaction without the signature of Herminia
Alvos" involving the properties covered by TCT Nos. B15345 to B-15352, B-15354 to B-15359, TCT Nos. T39565,
T-50276, T-52754, T-220168, TCT. Nos. T-7537 and 75101.
Respondent Judge granted the motion. The Register of
Deeds of Valenzuela reported to the court informing the
latter that a deed of absolute sale executed by the spouses

Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez dated 9 December
1978 was filed with the Register of Deeds, describing
therein fifteen (15) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. B15345 to B-15352, B-15354 to B-15359, and B-163276;
that, by virtue of the deed of sale, new transfer certificates
of title were issued in the name of complainants Jose P. Uy
and Rizalina C. Uy, except for TCT No. B-163276 which
could not be located in the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan
City; that TCT Nos. T-50276 and 52754 were still registered
in the name of Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez, and,
that the status of TCT Nos. T-39565 and T-220168, which
were with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan, could not yet
be determined. Counsel for the special administratrix filed
with the court an urgent motion to cancel the titles issued in
the name of Jose P. Uy stating that the latter was able to
register the titles in his name in February 1989 through
fraud, and the signatures of the vendors on the deed of sale
were forged. Respondent Judge ordered the cancellation of
the titles and the reinstatement of the names of the spouses
Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez or the issuance of
new titles in their names.
Complainant Jose P. Uy filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition to annul the Order of 7 June 1989 of
respondent Judge, with prayer for a temporary restraining
order enjoining the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela from
implementing the Order of 7 June 1989, and that
respondent Judge be restrained from further proceeding
against him. The Court of Appeals granted the petition for
certiorari and prohibition of complainants and set aside the
Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge, and enjoined
her from proceeding against complainant Jose P. Uy in the
intestate proceedings. MR was filed by Alvos but the same
was denied. Alvos then filed with Us a petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, docketed
as G.R. No. 91092.
On 6 February 1990, respondent Judge approved
a project of partition dated 18 August 1990 submitted by
Special Administratrix Herminia R. Alvos, together with Paz
Ramirez (surviving spouse of Ambrocio C. Pingco) and
Alicia Alinsunurin. On 4 February 1991, respondent Judge
granted the ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for

approval of the deed of absolute sale of the parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. B-15350, B-15351, B-15348 and B15349. Instead of complying with the Decision of the Court
of Appeals, respondent Judge directed the Register of
Deeds of Valenzuela to comply with her own Order of 16
January 1991 cancelling the titles of the Pingcos and
ordering the issuance of new titles in accordance with the
project of partition she obstinately approved.
On 8 March 1991, in G.R. No. 91092, We affirmed
the Decision of the Court of Appeals which annulled and set
aside the Order of 7 June 1989 of respondent Judge. Thus
"We find no merit in the petition. Section 6, Rule 87 of the

Rules of Court simply provides that a person who is
suspected of having in his possession property belonging to
an estate, may be cited and the court may examine him
under oath on the matter. Said section nowhere gives the
court the power to determine the question of ownership of
such property. Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of the
sale of a parcel of land under administration and the
consequent cancellation of the certificate of title issued in
favor of the vendee, cannot be obtained through a mere
motion in the probate proceedings over the objection of said
vendee over whom the probate court has no jurisdiction. To
recover the property, an independent action against the
vendee must be instituted in the proper court" (citing Tagle,
Et. Al. v. Manalo Et. Al., 105 Phil 1124).
On 2 April 1991, respondent Judge, in utter

disregard of Our Resolution of March 1991, granted the exparte petition of the Special Administratrix for approval of
the deed of absolute sale of properties covered by TCT
Nos. B-15345 and B-15346 of the Register of Deeds of
Valenzuela and reiterated the rationale of her questioned
Order of 4 February 1991. On 29 April 1991, undaunted by
her reversal by the Court of Appeals and this Court, and in
blatant disobedience to judicial authority, and established
precedents and jurisprudence, respondent Judge again
granted an ex-parte petition of the Special Administratrix for

approval of another deed of absolute sale covering three (3)
more parcels of land originally titled in the name of
complainant Jose P. Uy, to wit: TCT Nos. B-15347, B-15355
and B-15356.
In their complaint, the spouses Jose P. Uy and
Rizalina C. Uy claimed that despite the Decision of the
Court of Appeals of 28 September 1989 and the pendency
of the petition for review by way of certiorari before this
Court, respondent Judge continued issuing various orders
resulting in the issuance of new titles to the properties in the
name of persons stated in the project of partition, to the
damage and prejudice of complainants and that even after
this Court had affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals
that respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain
further proceedings concerning the ownership of the
properties, respondent Judge still, in an attempt to defeat
the proscription imposed by higher judicial authority, issued,
orders approving the sale of the properties to the further
prejudice of complainants.
In her comment, respondent Judge alleges that the
filing of the complaint against her is merely to harass her.
While she admits that her Order of 7 June 1989 was
annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals, which
annulment was affirmed by this Court, she argues that no
temporary restraining order was issued and that before the
Decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated her
Order of 7 June 1989 was already complied with by the
Register of Deeds of Valenzuela. She further contends that
even as she was prohibited from proceeding against
complainants herein, the Court of Appeals did not order the
reversion of the titles to them.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of respondent judge
is meritorious.
Ruling:
No. We are far from persuaded by respondent
Judge.

Time and again We emphasize that the judge is
the visible representation of law and justice from whom the
people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For
the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for the others to
follow. The judge should be studiously careful to avoid even
the slightest infraction of the law. 6 To fulfill this mission, the
judge should keep abreast of the law, the rulings and
doctrines of this Court. 7 If the judge is already aware of
them, the latter should not deliberately refrain from applying
them, otherwise such omission can never be excused.
Every judge should be cognizant of the basic principle that
when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to
be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by
some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any
right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to
that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot
be determined in the courts of administration proceedings.
The trial court, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to
the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. 9 The
failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle
indicates a manifest disregard of well-known legal rules.
Elementary in our statutory law is the doctrine that
when title to land has already been registered and the
certificate of title thereto issued, such Torrens title cannot be
collaterally attacked because the issue on the validity of the
title can only be raised in an action instituted expressly for
the purpose. Corollary to this is the constitutional mandate
that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law. In cancelling the titles of complainants over
their properties on mere motion of a party and without
affording them due process, respondent Judge violated her
sworn obligation to uphold the law and promote the
administration of justice. It has been held that if the law is so
elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know
it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
The foregoing transgressions of respondent Judge
are further aggravated by her refusal to abide by the
Decision of the Court of Appeals annulling her Order of 7
June 1989 which directed the cancellation of the titles of

complainants. She was in fact specifically enjoined from
proceeding against them, yet, despite this Decision,
respondent Judge skill authorized the subsequent transfer
or alienation to other persons of properties titled in the
name of complainants to the detriment of the latter. This
utter disrespect for the judgment of a higher court
constitutes grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of
the public, the bench and the bar. The absence of a
temporary restraining order or an order from the Court of
Appeals to revert the titles to complainants is not sufficient
justification for respondent Judge to issue subsequent
orders contrary to the appellate courts proscription.
Certainly, respondent Judge is fully aware that the
necessary consequence of the appellate courts decision is
to put back the complainants to their former status prior to
the issuance of the annulled order. Consequently, the Order
of 7 June 1989 being void and of no effect, the ownership of
the properties subject of the settlement proceedings
remains vested in complainants and will continue to be so
until declared void in an appropriate proceeding, not in the
intestate proceedings before respondent Judge. Thus, an
order from the appellate court that will revert the titles to
complainants is not necessary as it is already implied from
its decision annulling the questioned cancellation.
18. ORTAEZ-ENDERES VS CA
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that Philinterlife was founded by
the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, who owned at least 51% of the
companys capital stock at the time of his death and that
special proceedings were pending with the RTC of Quezon
City for the settlement of his intestate estate, where Rafael
Ortaez and Jose Ortaez were jointly appointed as special
administrators. Petitioners further alleged that after the
death of Dr. Ortaez and without prior authorization of the
intestate court, of the shares of stock of Dr. Ortaez were
transferred in the names of private respondents through
manipulations, devices and machination and that the shares
of stocks of private respondents belong to the estate of Dr.
Ortaez, hency they are not entitled to exercise their rights

as stockholders of the company.
Petitioners filed before SEC a complaint for the
annulment of transfer of shares of stocks to private
respondents, annulment of sale of corporate properties
authorized by private respondents who compose the
management of the corporation, annulment of subscriptions
on increased capital stocks, accounting and inspection of
corporate books and records, and damages. Petitioners
also prayed for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order against private respondents
to enjoin them from exercising their rights as stockholders of
Philinterlife on the ground that their shares of stock were
acquired through illegal and fraudulent schemes.
The SEC Hearing Officer denied the application of
a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioners
failed to make a valid cause to entitle them to the relief
applied for, and the pretended rights of the petitioners are
still contentious, unsettles and of doubtful character.
When the case was elevated to the SEC En Banc,
it was dismissed. One of the pieces of evidence submitted
is the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife, which showed
that private respondents were owners of Philinterlife shares.
Hence, as stockholders, they are entitled to exercise all the
rights pertaining thereto. With respect to the alleged
extrajudicial partition of the shares of stocks owned by the
late Dr. Ortaez, the matter properly belongs to the
jurisdiction of the regular court where the intestate
proceedings are currently pending. Moreover, the
complainants right must be clear and unquestioned for
equity. The possibility of irreparable damage, without proof
of violation of an actual existing right, is no ground for an
injunction being mere damnum absque injuria.
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA by filing a special
civil action for certiorari, which was dismissed on the ground
that the denial by the SEC of petitioners application was
proper and valid.

ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
SEC when it ruled that petitioners had not established clear
existing legal rights as stockholders on record of
Philinterlife?
19.) [G.R. No. 117417. September 21, 2000]
RULING:
MILAGROS A. CORTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and MENANDRO A. RESELVA, respondents.
No, the CA di not err in upholding SECs decision.
RATIO:
In the instant case, ma. Divina Ortaez-Endered

represented herself to be the Special Administratix of the
Estate of Dr. Ortaez. Records show that neither the estate
of Dr. Ortaez nor the Special Administratix was a party in
the main case filed in SEC. SEC denied the Motion to
intervene filed by the estate of Dr. Ortaez represented by
Special Administratix on the ground that the estate is not a
stockholder of Philinterlife. When the case was elevated to
SEC En Banc and later to the Court of Appeals, the estate
of Dr. Ortaez was not included as petitioners. Not being a
party in the special proceedings, the Special Administratix
does not have any legal personality to seek a review by this
court of the decision of the SEC and the CA.
SEC. 2, RULE 73. Where estate upon dissolution of

marriage. - When the marriage is dissolved by the death of
the husband or wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.
The following requisites must be present before an

injunction can be issued.
1) There must be an existing right to be
protected; an
2) The act against which injunction is to be
directed is a violation of such right.
The Supreme Court agrees with the findings of SEC as
affirmed by the CA that petitioners failed not only to
establish a threatened violation of a right, but they also
failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing the right to
be protected. Petitioners had not established their clear
legal rights to obtain injunctive relief against private
respondents. Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not
designed to protect contingent or future rights. Moreover,
the grant or denial of an injunction rests in the sound
discretion of the lower court.
General Rule:
The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part
of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties.[6] Stated otherwise, "claims for title to, or right of
possession of, personal or real property, made by the heirs
themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or
made by third persons, cannot be entertained by the
(probate) court.
Exception:
When the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional
upon them to submit to the probate court the question of
title to property.
FACTS:
Herein petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent
(petitioner in this petition) Milagros R. Cortes, and Florante
Reselva are brothers and sister and children - heirs of the
late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre
Reselva. During their lifetime, they acquired a property
particularly a house and lot. Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died

ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed a
holographic will which was probated in this case on July 31,
1991, with Milagros R. Cortes, as the appointed Executrix.
After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she
filed a motion before respondent probate court praying that
Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the property, be
ordered to vacate the property at No. 173 Ilaw St., Balut,
Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the
possession thereof. This is the motion which the respondent
court granted in the assailed order of October 18, 1993."[4]
In the Appellate Court, the Regional Trial Court's order was
set aside for having been issued beyond the latter's limited
jurisdiction as a probate court.[5]
The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part
of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties.[6] Stated otherwise, "claims for title to, or right of
possession of, personal or real property, made by the heirs
themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or
made by third persons, cannot be entertained by the
(probate) court."[7]
In the present case, however, private respondent Menandro
A. Reselva, who refused to vacate the house and lot being
eyed as part of the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva,
cannot be considered an "outside party" for he is one of the
three compulsory heirs of the former. As such, he is very
much involved in the settlement of Teodoro's estate.[8] By
way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the
parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them
to submit to the probate court the question of title to
property."[9] Here, the probate court is competent to decide
the question of ownership. More so, when the opposing
parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate
action would be most expensive and inexpedient.[10]
In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in
conflict with that of, the decedent since the former's theory

merely advances co-ownership with the latter.[11] In the
same way, when the controversy is whether the property in
issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to
the decedent, the same is properly within the jurisdiction of
the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the
conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the
decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs.[12]
More importantly, the case at bar falls squarely under Rule
73, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
"RULE 73
"SEC. 2. Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When
the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership
shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of
either."
Hence, in the 1991 case of Vita vs. Montanano we ruled:
"(I)t is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court
for the proper disposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano.
Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both
spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. In
the present case, therefore, the conjugal partnership of
Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in
the testate proceedings of the latter."[13]
Consequently, this case before us should be returned to the
probate court for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
of Teodoro and Lucrecia Reselva prior to the settlement of
the estate of Teodoro.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, without reinstating the assailed order of the
trial court, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals
dated September 9, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33826 is
hereby SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to the court
of origin for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to

costs.
20.) SOLIVIO vs. CA and VILLANUEVA
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban
Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel
"Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without
descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or
nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal
aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of
his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased
father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once,
expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his
plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother
and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on
February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia
talked about what to do with Esteban's properties.
Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place
his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother,
from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping
indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to
carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted
by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the
Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978
in Special Proceeding No. 2540,
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care
of the proceedings leading to the formation of the
foundation and after due publication and hearing of her
petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared
sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
On April 3, 1978, the court declared her the sole heir of
Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to
pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and
proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE

JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia
Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of
the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of
Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased.
Her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81,
Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on
January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil
Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia
Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages.
the said trial court rendered judgment in favor of Concordia,
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the CA.
the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial
court hence, this petition for review.
ISSUES:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings were still
pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from
intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
HELD:
1.
NO. Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain

Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and
recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl,
Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate
are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court,
there being as yet no orders for the submission
and approval of the administratix's inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to
the heir, and terminating the proceedings.

In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in
Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch
23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring
Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself
(Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of
the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in
Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her
motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for
review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that
remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate
action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We
hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the
probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just
and legal distribution of the estate.
published. Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original

petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune."
A court should not interfere with probate proceedings

pending in a co-equal court. The probate court loses
jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered
to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
21.) Vita v. Montano, G.R. No. L-50553 February 19,

1991 MEDIALDEA, J.:
The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings,
or for reopening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through
an independent action, which would be tried by another
court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order
of the probate or intestate court already final and executed
and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed
of.
A complaint was filed before the Court of First Instance

(now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna by plaintiff-appellant
Nazario Vita, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the
estate of deceased Edilberto Vita, seeking to recover from
defendants-appellants Soledad Montanano, Estanislao
Jovellano and Estebana Jovellano the possession of three
(3) parcels of land located in Barrio Talangan, Nagcarlan,
Laguna and their annual yield since January, 1962 in the
amount of P1,100.00 a year. Nazario Vita claims that
during the lifetime of Edilberto Vita, he was the owner and
possessor of these three (3) parcels of land xxx and he was
enjoying the fruits therefrom. When he died on January 23,
1962, Montano et al, through stealth and strategy, took
possession of the above-stated parcels of land and
gathered the fruits therefrom. Notwithstanding demands
from Nazario Vita, Montano et al refused to surrender the
possession of these parcels of land. xxx
2.
NO. The charge of extrinsic fraud is unwarranted.

Concordia was not unaware of the special
proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia. She
admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia
had agreed that the latter would "initiate the
necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and
obligations of the estate.
The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of

the time and place of hearing of the petition is required to be
The publication of the notice of the proceedings was

constructive notice to the whole world. Concordia was not
deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she
had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same.
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in
the proceedings. She stayed away by choice. Besides, she
knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's
mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with
Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had
planned to do.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
In their answer xxx Montano et al deny that the three (3)

parcels of land belong to the estate of Edilberto Vita.
Instead, they claim that the two parcels of land xxx belong
to Soledad Montanano as these were conveyed to her by

Isidra Montanano (her aunt and wife of Edilberto Vita) and
Edilberto Vita in a document signed and executed by them
on November 22, 1938 and ratified by one Mr. Matienzo, a
Notary Public from Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, all copies
of said document were lost during the last war. The parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 is owned in
common by Soledad Montanano, her brother Jose and
sisters Elena and Alodia. It originally belonged to Francisca
Asilo, deceased sister of their grandmother, Micaela Asilo.
Its ownership was transferred to them under the
arrangement sanctioned by Edilberto Vita himself wherein
all the proceeds from the yearly harvests therefrom shall be
spent for the yearly masses to be held for the souls of
Francisca Asilo and Isidra Montanano. This being the case,
Nazario Vita is now estopped from instituting this action.
Montano et al claim also that Edilberto Vita could not have
inherited these parcels of land from Isidra Montanano
as the latter's estate has never been the subject of a
judicial or extra-judicial proceeding. The erroneous
inclusion of these parcels of land in the inventory of the
estate of Edilberto Vita in Special Proceedings No. SC-136
of the Court of First Instance of Laguna does not make
them actually a part of his estate. There is no fixed income
from these parcels of land because since 1962, plaintiffappellant, with unknown persons, has been gathering
whatever crops that may be taken therefrom. xxx
Replying to Montano et als' answer, Vita claims that Isidra
Montanano and Edilberto Vita never executed any
document on November 22, 1938 and if they had, it was
thereafter repudiated, canceled and destroyed, for which
reason, the three (3) parcels of land remained in the
possession of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita; that
upon the death on September 25, 1957 of Isidra
Montanano, who left neither descendants nor ascendants,
her surviving spouse Edilberto Vita succeeded her and took
immediate possession of her estate; and that from the time
defendants-appellants took possession of these parcels of
land, they have continuously gathered the fruits therefrom.

In a petition dated August 20, 1966, Jose, Elena and Alodia
Montanano sought leave of court to intervene in this case.
In the order of the trial court dated April 12, 1967, the
amended answer dated September 10, 1966, which
intervenors-appellants filed jointly with Soledad Montanano,
was admitted as their answer-in-intervention. Incorporated
therein is a counterclaim that Soledad, Jose, Elena and
Alodia Montanano are the co-owners of some properties
enumerated (pp. 43-44, Record on Appeal):
of land covered in the complaint belong to the

estate of Edilberto Vita and it appearing likewise
that the defendants and intervenors have not
shown that the parcels of land covered in the
counterclaim were validly donated to them and that
they have legally accepted the donation made by
Isidra Montanano, the complaint filed by the
plaintiff and the counterclaim filed by the
intervenors are hereby DISMISSED. THIS IS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FILING OF A
SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS (SIC) IN COURT
FOR THE PROPER DISPOSITION OF THE
ESTATE
OF
THE
DECEASED
ISIDRA
MONTANANO, INCLUDING THAT OF HER
SHARE IN THE FRUITS OF THE PROPERTIES
DONATED TO HER DURING HER MARRIAGE
WITH
EDILBERTO
VITA
WHICH
IS
CONSIDERED PART OF THEIR CONJUGAL
PROPERTIES. No assessment is hereby made
with respect to the damages sustained by the
parties as they offset each other, if any.
.
They alleged therein that they acquired ownership of the
three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint, which
are in the possession of Soledad Montanano, and the other
parcels of land mentioned in their counterclaim, which are in
the possession of plaintiff-appellant, by virtue of a
donation mortis causa executed by Isidra Montanano on
November 22, 1938 or by a donation executed by her on
December 20, 1940 which was confirmed by Edilberto Vita.
They pray that these parcels of land be adjudicated to them
in the manner set forth in their counterclaim; that plaintiffappellant be ordered to account for the harvests from these
parcels of land from the time he took possession; and that
they be awarded damages corresponding to their litigation
expenses.
In his reply dated July 4, 1967, plaintiff-appellant denied all
the allegations contained in the answer-in-intervention and
reiterated that there was no such donation executed by
Isidra Montanano. If such donation were really executed,
she was forced to do so at a time when she was not
mentally in a position to execute and sign freely said
document.
On September 15, 1973, the trial court rendered judgment
adverse to all parties, the dispositive portion of which reads
(p. 52, Record on Appeal):
Considering that the plaintiff has not shown by
preponderating evidence that the three (3) parcels
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A SEPARATE PROCEEDING

IN COURT FOR THE PROPER DISPOSITION OF THE
ESTATE OF THEDECEASED ISIDRA MONTANANO IS
NEEDED?
RULING:
NO.
IN THIS CONNECTION, CONTRARY TO THE TRIAL
COURT'S RULING, IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO FILE A
SEPARATE PROCEEDING IN COURT FOR THE PROPER
DISPOSITION
OF
THE
ESTATE
OF
ISIDRA
MONTANANO. UNDER RULE 73, SECTION 2 OF THE
RULES OF COURT, IF BOTH SPOUSES HAVE DIED, THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP SHALL BE LIQUIDATED IN
THE TESTATE OR INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS OF
EITHER. In the present case, therefore, the conjugal
partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita
should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the

latter.
. . . that as the donor guaranteed the right which she
conferred on the donee by virtue of the deed of gift,
wherein, in recompense of the latter's good services to the
former, she donates to her the two parcels of land with their
improvements, said gift is inter vivos and irrevocable, and
not mortis causa, notwithstanding the fact that the
donor stated in said deed that she did not transfer the
ownership of the two parcels of land donated, save
upon her death, for such a statement can mean nothing
else than that she only reserved to herself the
possession and usufruct of said property, and because
the donor could not very well guarantee the aforesaid
right after her death.
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal of plaintiff-appellant is hereby
DENIED whereas the appeal of defendants-appellants is
hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna dated September 15, 1973 is
MODIFIED as follows: 1) the dismissal of the complaint of
plaintiff-appellant is AFFIRMED; 2) the dismissal of the
counterclaim of defendants-appellants and intervenorsappellants is SET ASIDE; and 3) plaintiff-appellant is
ordered: a) to deliver the possession of the properties
donated to defendants-appellants and intervenorsappellants by virtue of the deed of donation dated
December 20, 1940, and b) to render an accounting of
the products harvested therefrom from January 23,
1962 up to the present.

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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS PART 1 CASES

G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES

Pacific Banking Corporation." The petition was approved,

Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed

February 10, 1992- in his order, respondent judge

March 27, 1992-the judge granted the Union's

Naagas, a new Liquidator, was appointed by the

September 13, 1991-the trial court ordered

October 16, 1991-he filed a Motion

December 6, 1991-the judge modified his

December 9, 1991-the order was received by the

CA: The Liquidator filed a Petition for Certiorari,

Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private