Case 3:15-cv-01111-MPS Document 49 Filed 06/19/16 Page 15 of 20

FST CV 15 6024364 S
.

suiioi coin-i

SIAMFORO NOR WALE

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEIJUD i C AL Dl SIR

SUPERIOR COURT

Z0l5 AY 2b P L: OO
V.

: JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STAMFORD/NORWALK
: AT STAMFORD

KRISTAN PETERS-HAMUN

MAY 26, 2015

REVI$ED
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a reciprocal disciplinary proceedmg brought pursuant to P. B.

2-3 9. On April 4,

2014 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
Committee on Grievances ofthe United States District Court for the Southern District ofNew York
(748 F. 3d 456 (2014); cert. den.

US

35 SCT 448 (2014)) suspending the respondent

from the practice of law in the Southern District of New York for seven years, nunc pro tune to
Apr11 10, 2008.
Rule 2-39(c) requires the court to take commensurate action unless it is found that any
defense set forth in the answer has been established by clear and convincing evidence. On March
26, 2015 the petitioner filed a preargument memorandum in which the petitioner recommended
commensurate discipline ofseven years suspension, nunc pro tune to April 10, 2008, to end on that
date with automatic reinstatement and without the need for further action of the court. On April
2,2015, six days before the mandated hearing, the petitioner filed a Second Amended Application
For Reciprocal Discipline which contained no recommendation other than that commensurate
action be taken by the court and reciprocal discipline be entered.

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The court conducted an evidentiaxy hearing on April 8, 9 and 21. It is noted that
respondents answer is 38 pages long and is more in the nature of a briefthen it is a P.3.

10-46

answer. Essentially, the answer requests that any disciplinary measure ordered be nimc pro tune
to April 10, 2008. The answer also sets forth reasons why the court should not go beyond that
sanction.
It is well established in this State that commensurate action does not mean identical

action. In re Weisman, 203 Conn. 380,384(1987). Having carefully reviewed the pleadings and
the evidence the court finds that the petitioner has proved a prima fade case that the order of the
Southern District, as affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and the findings contained
therein are true. In order to establish a prima facie case the proponent must submit evidence
which, if credited is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove. Thomas
v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 392 (1999).
The respondent has asked the court to revisit the factual findings made by the various
tribunals which reviewed, anaLyzed and vetted the evidence before them. For example, the
respondent, in her Response to Disciplinary Counsels Preargument Memo, challenges the
findings of fact made by Magistrate Judge Lisa Margaret Smith who conducted an eleven day
evidentiaty hearing in which respondent testified in her own behalf and cross examined witnesses
with the assistance of counsel. The respondent characterizes the findings as conflicted with the
testimony of every witness but one, who was obviously not credible and had a motive to
prevaricate. With this, she asks the court to make its own independent assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses, conclude that they were untruthfi3l and upon such finding exonerate
her so that she suffers no further discipline or at the most suffers an entirely retroactive sanction.
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The court rejects respondents challenge to the credibility ofthe witnesses for three reasons.
First, the evidence which the respondent offered in support of her credibility claim was her own
testimony and the testimony of Robert Abrishamian and Harold Gornian, both of whom testified
that in their business dealings with her as an attorney they always found her credible. While this
testimony reflects positively on her professional reputation for integrity, it does not alter the fact
that at least three ofthe reviewing tribunals found her testimony to lack credibility, viz: Magistrate
Judge Smith, the Committee on Grievances of the US District Court for the Southern District and
the Second Circuit Court ofAppeals. In fact, U. S. District Judge Colleen McMann, writing for the
Committee, stated that: the Committee has no reason to question Judge Smiths credibility
determinations and in particular her conclusion that Ms. Peters was not a credible witness because
-

they are supported by. substantial evidence. She further noted that the respondent was blatantly
untruthful. So, the fact that respondent may have been credible at the time that she dealt with
Abrishamian and Gonnan does not mean inevitably that she was truthful at her evidentiaiy hearing
before Magistrate Judge Smith. Moreover, the Second Circuit opinion confirms and validates those
determinations as well as the Committees finding that the respondent had a culpable state of
mind. Secondly, based on a strict examination of the record, it is fundamental that this court
cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, Pandoiphe sAuto Parts, Inc.,
v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217,220(1980). Therefore, the existing credibility determinations must

642 F.

3d

court defines culpable state ofmind as having venal intent. In re Kristan Peters,
381, 394(201 1).
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stand. finally, while P. 3.

2-39(c) shifts the burden of proof to the respondent by clear and

convincing evidence, the court is unable to say that the respondent has sustained her burden ofproof
with respect to the credibility findings which were made. Notwithstanding, her argument that this
court must make an independent credibility assessment ofthe evidence does not advance her cause
because none of the evidence vitiates the factual findings as confirmed by extensive appellate
review. The respondent has thus failed to safisIr her burden.

The respondent was found to have committed two ethical violations: (1) instructing an

associate in her law firm to mark up certain transcripts so as to bring them under the attorney-client
work privilege for the purpose ofexempting them from a court order and then attempting to mislead
the court as to those events, and (2) copying transcripts in intentional disregard ofthe courts order
and using the transcript in a federal action, in Massachusetts in violation of the courts
confidentiality order.
Respondent argues strenuously that these events constituted isolated incidents in an
otherwise unblemished career of approximately twenty eight years of practice in New York and
other jurisdictions to which she had been admitted, including Connecticut in 2007. The record
clearly shows that as long as she has been admitted in Connecticut there have not only been no
disciplinary actions against her but there is no record of complaints or grievances filed. glie thus
contends that because there is little, if any, likelihood ofa recurrence ofthe acts for which she was
disciplined, there is no preventive purpose of further discipline.
P. 3. 2-39 is part of: a comprehensive disciplinary scheme... established to safeguard
2Credibility must be assessed not by reading the cold printed record but by observing first
hand the witnesses conduct, demeanor and attitude. Briggs v. McWeeny, 260 Conn. 296, 327
(2002).
4

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the administration of justice, and designed to. preserve public confidence in the system and to
protect the public and the court from unfit practitioners

the object of which is not the

punishment ofthe offenderbuttheprotectionofthe court. Burton v. liottolese, 267 Cairn. 1,2526 (2003). The respondents effort to limit the courts authority to the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions only when there is a preventative purpose for such discipline is unduly and unacceptably
restrictive. It is obvious from?. B. 2-37 that an important purpose of attorney discipline is that
it be ameliorative and rehabilitative.
While there maybe some validity to respondents claim that the incidents at issue will never
occur again, the court is perplexed by her steadfast assertions that she was not untruthful before the
disciplinary tribunals. The court also finds unredeeming her lack ofremorse for her inappropriate
conduct,.

arrogantly.. frying to salvage her reputation.3 At trial, respondent approached a

.

state of remorsefulness only by stating with respect to the second charge relating to the
Massachusetts proceeding, that in hindsight she: would have done things differently but she
regretted not getting clarification from Judge Baer that she could not only keep the transcripts but
also could use them. The court does not construe this statement as even an implied admission of
wrongdoing.
Nevertheless, the court was impressed by the fact that respondent has been chastened by the
entire experience which has cost her substantial expense, embarrassment and stigmatization before
her colleagues at the Bar, the courts before which she practices and the public as well. It is likely
that her suspension from practice in the Southern District, an identical suspension from the US

Opinion and otder ofthe Committee on Grievances ofthe United States District Court for
the Southern District ofNew York, M-238, April 2013 at 11.
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District Court for the District of Connecticut and a reciprocal suspension from the New York Bar
for five years, all nunc pro tune to April 10, 2008, both issued in 2015, will negatively impact her
practice and standing at the Bar for the remainder ofher career. While this court regards both 2015
suspensions as largely symbolic, even a symbolic sanction makes a permanent record and carries
an intangible reproach. For this reason this court believes respondent has suffered enough and
therefore concludes that even a retroactive suspension would serve no usefU purpose. Therefore,
this court declines to join its sister courts and imposes no suspension either prospective or
retroactive.
However, the court recognizes a need to monitor the integrity of respondents professional
behavior for a reasonable period of time. The court believes that the appropriate way to do this is
through the lens ofself-examination and the vehicle ofself-reporting. Accordingly, the court orders
the following disciplinary action. For a period ofone year the respondent shall, within ten days of
the event, report to the disciplinary counsel in writing for such action it deems appiopriate, the fact
that any court of this state has determined that respondent has (1) violated an order of the court,
excepting discovery orders pursuant to P. B. 13-14 not involving intentionally false or misleading
answers; (2) intentionally altered a document for an improper purpose; (3) has not been credible in
her dealings with the court or opposing counsel.
So Ordered.
BY THE COURT

J2.)hELEc

10
W1JUL)

r.T.R.

A. WILLIAM MC

4J1
6