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Criticisms against the

courts and judges


Problem Areas in Legal Ethics
Arellano University School of Law Arellano Law Foundation

2014-2015

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE


RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS
AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to
the proper authorities only.

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE


MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR
GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion
for or against a party.

Duty of Lawyers
As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a
lawyer is expected to bring to the fore irregular and
questionable practices of those sitting in court which tend to
corrode the judicial machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable
information that anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it
is incumbent upon him to report the matter to the Court so
that it may be properly acted upon. An omission or even a
delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the
publics trust in, the judicial system. Fudot v. Cattleyla Land,

Inc., G.R. No. 171008

October 24, 2008

Requirements when raising grievances


against judges
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against
erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper
venue and procedure for doing so, precisely because respect
for the institution must always be maintained. - In re: Atty.

Bagabuyo A.C. No. 7006 [2007]

A scurrilous attack
We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent
nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error,
boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the
judicial process. Judge Lacurom v. Atty. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921,

March 10, 2006

Offensive language
They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a court of
technicalities for validly dismissing their defectively prepared
petition.
They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their
view, an incompetent judge.
The Court of Appeals dismissal of the case shows
itsimpatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a
perceived slight on its dignity and such dismissalsmacks of
retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and
impartiality demanded of the appellate court.- Asean Pacific

Planners et. al. v. City of Urdaneta et. al., G.R. No. 162525 [2008]

Intemperate language
His characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as
having been "crafted in order to fool the winning party"; as a
"hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor"; one "you could
have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with
"perfidious character," although the petitioners as plaintiffs
therein and who were the prevailing party in the decision did
not appeal therefrom; and by his charge that the respondent
Judge was "a bit confused with that confusion which is the
natural product of having been born, nurtured and brought
up amongst the crowded surroundings of the non-propertied
class.
- Sps. Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932 January 25,

1995

Foul language
The loathsome epithets hurled by the complainant against the
respondent justices, e.g., "Crooks in Robe," "Swindlers in
Robe," "corrupt justices who were only sowing judicial
terrorism," as well as his vilification of the Chief Justice whom
he called "Chief-Swindler-in-Robe," go beyond the bounds of
acceptable behavior. Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia

Arrienda against Justices, A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005

Proscribed language
Proscribed then are, inter alia:
1. the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem
in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration or
2. tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in
the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the
administration of justice by this Court of offensive and abusive
language or
3. abrasive and offensive language or

4. of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious


statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge or
5. of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks.
- Sps. Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

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Not disrespectful, abusive or slanderous

We cannot say that the use of the adjective "insufficientlyinformed" is disrespectful, abusive or slanderous. Francisco, Jr. v.

UEM-MARA Phil. Corp., et. al., G.R. Nos. 135688-89, October 18,
2007

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Constitutional provision on
parliamentary immunity
A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.-

Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution

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Purpose of parliamentary immunity


Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of
the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success
for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected
from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom
the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.

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Defensor-Santiago case
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the
Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the


mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be
living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment
but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. - Pobre v. Sen.

Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]

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The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in


the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to
future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to
expose what she believed to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar
Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice,
would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent
justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination.
She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced
advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would
not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

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No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect


due to the courts should be allowed to erode the peoples faith
in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist
on similar conduct by others.

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Case against Sen. Defensor-Santiago


dismissed
Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01
and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against
Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI,
Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

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Statements of an accused lawyer


Ed J. Polk was arrested and jailed and his bond revoked because
of his failure to appear for a criminal trial wherein he was
charged as a defendant with driving while intoxicated. Upon his
release from jail Polk issued to the news media from his law
office the following written statement:
I consider this one more awkward attempt by a dishonest and
unethical district attorney and a perverse judge to assure
me an unfair trial.
Questionable conduct on the part of those charged with
administration of justice does little to foster respect for the
law.
- Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]

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Statements were made as a citizen


The critical statements made by Polk were remarks in response
to the manner in which he was treated as a citizen and not
as an attorney. At no time was Polk an attorney of record or in
any way acting in his capacity as an attorney in the criminal
proceedings against him, nor do the remarks purport to be
made in his capacity as an attorney. - Polk v. State Bar of Texas

374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]

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There is no dichotomy of a lawyers


personality
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life.
This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be
an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.

Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma, Adm. Case No. 2474, September 15,
2004

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Violation of Rule 11.03, Canon 11


Judge claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the
motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent
was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge advised him to tone
down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top
of his voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct
contempt, the respondent shouted, Then cite me!. Judge cited
him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The
respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the
courtroom and shouted, Judge, I will file gross ignorance against
you! I am not afraid of you! Judge ordered the sheriff to escort
the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him for direct
contempt of court for the second time.

21

Cont

A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely


disregards the latters role, stature and position in our justice
system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly
threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross
ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent
effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public
confidence in Judge Baculis competence and in his ability to
decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true,
must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided
under the Rules of Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer
cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and
bring the justice system into disrepute. Judge Baculi v. Atty.

Battung, A.C. no. 8920, September 28, 2011

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Intention and disclaimer


not a defense
Atty. Abila's central theme in his written explanation is that he
acted in good faith and was merely motivated by his duty to
defend the interest of his client. His disclaimer of any intentional
disrespect is not a ground for exoneration. His intent must be
determined by a fair interpretation of the language employed by
him. He cannot escape responsibility by claiming that his words did
not mean what any reader must have understood them to mean.

Borromeo v. CA, G.R. No. L-39253 November 24, 1978

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Making threats
In addition, he likewise committed a violation of Canon 11 of
Rule 11.03 by threatening respondent judge that if his motions
were not granted, respondent judge would be administratively
charged. To be sure, the threat made against respondent judge
was not a threat to do him bodily harm. Nonetheless, it was a
threat. Needless to say, disrespectful, abusive and abrasive
language, offensive personalities, unfounded accusations, or
intemperate words tending to obstruct, embarrass, or influence
the court in administering justice or to bring it into disrepute
have no place in a pleading. Prosecutor Tolentino v. Judge

Cabral, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1528, March 28, 2000

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Threat of Impeachment
It is reprehensible for the complainant to threaten the members
of the Court with impeachment. To threaten a judge or justice
with investigation and prosecution for official acts done by him
in the regular exercise of official duty subverts and undermines
the independence of the judiciary.
- Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda against Justices,

A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005

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Offensive language against


complainant proscribed
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive
language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her
relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified,
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyers arguments
whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. By calling
complainant, a "sly manipulator of truth" as well as a
"vindictive congenital prevaricator", hardly measures to the
sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. N.H. Florido v. Atty.

Florido, A.C. No. 5624, January 20, 2004

26

Statements in form of questions still


proscribed
While most of her statements were in the form of questions
instead of categorical assertions, the effect is still the same:
they constitute a stinging affront to the honor and dignity of
the Court and tend to undermine the confidence of the public
in the integrity of the highest tribunal of the land.
She posed the query, "Nasaan ang katarungan? (Where is
justice?)," implying that this Court failed to dispense justice in
her case. - Bildner and Ilusorio v. Ilusorio, et. al., G.R. No.

157384, June 5, 2009

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Direct contempt if submitted in the


same court
In Ang vs. Castro, this Court held that if a pleading containing
derogatory, offensive and malicious statements is submitted in
the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending,
it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to
interrupt the administration of justice. Direct contempt is
punishable summarily. - Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty.

Noel S. Sorreda, A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]

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Post litigation criticisms


The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation
newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings
and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a
contempt of court, even though the case has been terminated,
if the publication is attended by either of these two
circumstances: (1) where it tends to bring the court into
disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or (2)
where there is a clear and present danger that the
administration of justice would be impeded. PP v. Godoy, G.R.

Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995

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Contempt and Disciplinary proceeding


are not the same
A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate
the authority of the court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary
proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to continue
in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from
the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such
office. The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for
contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus be
used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The
principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the
Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by
attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly
administration of justice.

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Cont
Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penalty in a
contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent
charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same manner an attorney's
conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a
subsequent disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his
favor on essentially the same facts leading to conviction. It has likewise
been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to
show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of
law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a
different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by
the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
whereas disciplinary actions in the Practice of law are governed by
file 138 and 139 thereof. - PP v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March

29, 1995

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The test of allowable criticisms of a


judges decision
Whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith,
and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.

Lorenzo Shipping Corp., et. al. v. Distribution Management


Association of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. No. 155849, August 31,
2011

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Degree of lawyers remark or comment


Undoubtedly, lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark
or comment in the furtherance of causes they uphold. For the
felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of
phrase. In re: Complaint against Atty. Pilar, A.C. No. 263, October

28, 1958

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Is the judiciary onion-skinned?


The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by
shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the
character of . public opinion. For it is a prized . privilege to
speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste,
on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however
limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the
bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and
contempt much more than it would enhance respect.- Bridges

v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-271 (1941)

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Admonition to judges
More than once in the past, we had occasion to admonish
judges not to be onion-skinned when confronted by
dissatisfied lawyers or litigants. Their power to punish for
contempt is not a bludgeon to be used for the purpose of
exacting silent submission to their rulings and orders however
questionable or unjust they may be. - Sesbreo v. Judge Garcia,

A.M. No. RTJ-88-272 February 6, 1990

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Free speech in democratic government


"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable. - Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)

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Limited freedom of expression?


It cannot be seriously asserted that a private citizen surrenders
his right to freedom of expression when he becomes a licensed
attorney in this state. The Supreme Court has built a substantial
line of cases where the Constitution has been read to limit and
restrain the state's power to prescribe standards of conduct for
attorneys. - Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]

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Thank you for your attention!!

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