Hazing

Artemio Villareal v People. Feb 1, 2012

Facts:
In Feb 1991, 7 freshmen students of ADMU School of Law signified
their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam Belleza,
Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera,
Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa
(neophytes).
On the night of Feb 8, the neophytes were met by some members of
the fraternity at the lobby of ALS. They all proceeded to Rufos
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of
Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what
to expect during the initiation rites. They were informed that there
would be physical beatings and that they could quit at any time. The
rites were scheduled to last for 3 days. After their briefing, they were
brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.
1st day: As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked
towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the
Aquilans delivered physical blows to them.
They were also subjected to the Indian Run, which required the
neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each
row delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which
obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the
wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped,
or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were held
at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged
with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation
rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or
with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies
Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity

to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the

neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.
2nd day: the neophytes were made to present comic plays and to play
rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite
the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a wrong
answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The
neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they
endured on the first day.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that
the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and
Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity
members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the
neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain.
Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it
sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last
session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to
be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by
Lennys shivering and incoherent mumblings. When his condition
worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans. 26 were
jointly tried in one case and 9 in another case.
The 26 were held guilty by the trial court of homicide. However, the
CA modified the trial courts decision and set aside the finding of
conspiracy. CA modified the criminal liability according to individual
participation:

1 died therefore 25 left. 19 were acquitted because their guilt

was not established with proof beyond reasonable doubt. 4
were guilty of slight physical injuries. 2 (Dizon and Villareal)
were found guilty of homicide.
For the case of the other 9, the case was dismissed as to 5 people
because of violation of the right to speedy trial.
Issue:
Whether Dizon and Villareal should be held liable for the crime of
murder.
HELD:
No. According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives
attributed by the CA to Dizon and Villareal were baseless, since the
statements of the accused were just part of the psychological
initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes; that
there is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez;
and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part
of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members
during their initiation rites.
The testimony of Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial
proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for
those of Villareal.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we
refer to the entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the
incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of witness
Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would
be subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them. They
knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. While
beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the
formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas father
for stealing the parking space of Dizons father.
According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those
of the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation

employed by the Aquila Fraternity. Thus, to the court's

understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological
pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the
initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could justify
giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity
initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that
the accusations were untrue and made-up.
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must
not be automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation
to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of the
fraternity's psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was
not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really
had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the
veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lenny's co-neophyte,
Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it
was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up. Even the trial
court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting
intent to kill: The cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed
toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the
fraternity initiation rites x x x.
Verily, the Court cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon
guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on
the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot
and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt of such intent. Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of
the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity
members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.
However, the absence of malicious intent does not automatically
mean that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of
criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that
are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3
thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were
tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of

Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations

owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the
process. With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medicolegal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of
the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to all those who
directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical
injuries. The Court's finding of criminal liability for the felony of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall cover only accused
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon.
WHY SPL IS IN THIS CASE.
At the time of the case, there was no anti-hazing law yet. Thus, the
court having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law
and the core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised
Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto.
Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the
principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is
further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical
crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the
act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. For the
foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to
rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict
physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases,
considering the contextual background of his death, the unique
nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing. Had the AntiHazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity
members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing
punishable by reclusion perpetua(life imprisonment). Since there
was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are
constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death.
NOTE
Villareal's case was dismissed since he died. His criminal liability
was extinguished by his death.

ANTI-WIRE TAPPING
Edgardo Gaanan v IAC. Oct 16, 1986
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in
the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for
the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with
the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After
they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a
telephone call to Laconico.

Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct

Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco
Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault
Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor.

When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant Atty.

Edgardo Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation
through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed
conditions for the settlement.

Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if

he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'.
Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to
deliver the money.

Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for

withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.

Complainant instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the

office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who
earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant
himself should receive the money.

(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had
been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had
been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no
longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself
in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault
against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students
of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another
section of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case
earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's

When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant

was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Since Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent, complainant Pintor charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
Trial court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. IAC affirmed holding that the
extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear
the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is
covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
Issue:
1. W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or
arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200 - NO

Held:
1. The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones
are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening
or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of
enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains
that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was
being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension
telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most
popularly known communication device.
When the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of
telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape
recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a
mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from
the provisions of the Act.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or
recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the
spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1
of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping"
the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this
case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there
for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in
order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular
clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No.
4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be

construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature,

that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping
the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties
being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common. A
person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other
end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the
risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a
telephone unit which shares its line with another.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be
construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as
in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is
included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute
must be construed as not including an extension telephone.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not
only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension
telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater
importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of
recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone
conversation.
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage,
through punishment, persons such as government authorities or
representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order
to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users.
Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable
must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No.
4200 or others of similar nature.

Socorro Ramirez v CA. Sept 28, 1995

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in
the RTC-QC alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in
a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy."
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of
the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation in the amount of P16k.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a
tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
Private respondent then filed a criminal case before the RTC for
violation of RA 4200.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation
of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the
Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged
do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the
violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a
communication by a person other than a participant to the
communication.
However, CA declared the trial courts order null and void, saying that
the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" that
the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the
taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the
unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than
those involved in the communication. Petitioner also avers that the
substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the

Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a

violation of R.A. 4200.
Finally, petitioner argues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a
"private communication," not a "private conversation" and that
consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private
respondent was not illegal under the said act.
Issue:
W/N petitioner is guilty of violating RA 4200 YES
Held:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a
device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal
for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of
a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than
or different from those involved in the private communication.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports
the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our
lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by
the parties themselves or by third persons.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of

the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing,
intercepting
or
recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense.

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private

communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to
impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act
of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act
of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation,