FIRST DIVISION

ROLAND V. VELOSO,

G.R. No. 149354

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

-versus-

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

January 18, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the Decision[1] dated March 2, 2001 and
Resolution[2] dated August 10, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
59239.

Shangri-la Finest Chinese Cuisine, at No. 4 Times Street, West

Triangle, Quezon City, is a restaurant owned and operated by the Developers
Group of Companies, Inc. Ramon Sy Hunliong (Ramon) was its president and

general manager. Roland Veloso, petitioner, claiming to be a consultant of then

Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco, was an occasional guest at the restaurant.
Before the May 1995 elections, petitioner and then Congressman Cuenco,
while at the said restaurant having dinner, had a conversation with Ramon. This led
to a friendly bet between petitioner and Ramon on whether or not Ferdinand
Marcos, Jr. would win as a Senator. Ramon assured that Marcos, Jr. is a sure
winner, but petitioner claimed otherwise. They both agreed that the loser will host
a dinner for ten (10) persons. After the elections, official results showed that
Marcos, Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence, petitioner won in the bet.
On August 22, 1995, Congressman Cuencos secretary called Eva Anne
Nanette Sto. Domingo (Eva), the restaurants assistant dining manager, to reserve a
dinner for one table corresponding to ten persons on behalf of petitioner. Ramon,
the loser, informed Eva that he would pay for one table, his commitment to
petitioner.
However, when petitioner arrived at the restaurant on August 23, 1995, he
asked that four (4) additional tables be set, promising he would pay for the
same. Hence, Eva had four additional tables prepared in addition to the one under
Ramons account. The Sales Invoice for the additional four tables amounted
to P11,391.00.
When the Sales Invoice was presented to petitioner, he refused to pay,
explaining he was a guest of Ramon. Due to petitioners stubborn refusal to pay,
Eva asked him where she should send the bill. Petitioner instructed her to send it to
Congressman Cuencos office as he was always present there. It turned out,
however, that he was no longer reporting at that office. Hence, the bill was sent to
his address at 63 Benefit Street, GSIS Village, Quezon City, but still, he refused to
pay.
The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand letter to petitioner, but to no
avail.
Consequently, petitioner was charged with estafa before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 31, Quezon City. The Information reads:

That on or about the 23rd day of August, 1995, in Quezon

City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of deceit,
false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the SHANGRILA RESTAURANT, located at No. 4 Times Street, West Triangle,
this City, represented by Eva Anne Nanette Sto. Domingo, in the
following manner, to wit: on the date and in the place
aforementioned, said accused, pretending that he has the money to
pay, ordered that five (5) tables be prepared for his guests with the
total costs of P11,391.00, Philippine currency, but said accused and
his guests after consuming the foods, with intent to defraud,
refused to pay for the bills despite demand, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.

After trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a Decision dated July 6,
1999 finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged and imposing upon him the
corresponding penalty, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Roland V. Veloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa, as defined and penalized in Article 315, paragraph
2nd, sub-paragraph 2-(e), of the Revised Penal Code, and, in default
of any modifying circumstance in attendance, hereby sentences
him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from Four (4) Months of
Arresto Mayor as minimum, to One (1) Year and Eight (8) Months
and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional as maximum,
with the accessories provided by law; to indemnify the offended
party, Developers Group of Companies, Inc., owner and operator
of the Shangri-La Finest Chinese Cuisine Restaurant, in the
amounts of P11,391.00, with interests thereon at the legal rate per
annum from August 23, 1995 until fully paid, and P10,000.00, as
and for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation; and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]

On appeal by petitioner, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City,
in its Decision dated April 7, 2000, affirmed the MeTC judgment, holding that all
the issues being raised by petitioner have been thoroughly considered and passed

upon by the MeTC. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the
RTC.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. On March 2,
2001, the appellate court rendered its Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC,
ratiocinating as follows:
x x x To quote the trial court, having observed the demeanor of the witnesses who
paraded before the Court, we are of the considered view that, between the
affirmations of the witness for the prosecution and the denials of the accused, the
choice is not difficult to make and gave credence to the prosecutions
evidence. The RTC sustained the MTCs assessment, and so must We. The
credibility of witnesses is a matter best assessed by the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
conduct and attitude.
The inconsistencies and contradictions cited by petitioner in the testimony of Sto.
Domingo are on minor details which do not impair her trustworthiness. If any,
they indicate that she is not a tutored witness. Truthful witnesses are seldom
perfect witnesses.
Petitioners argument that he was not prevented from leaving the Shangrila
Restaurant even after he refused to pay the bill for four tables, does not serve him
any. Compelling him to stay because of his failure to pay for his food would have
exposed the person enforcing it to possible criminal charge of coercion. The
victim would then become the villain.
xxx
In sum, as aptly defined by the MTC and RTC the issue boils down to
credibility. The case law is that the assessment of the trial court on this matter is
entitled great weight and persuasion and at times conclusive to the appellate
courts.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the RTC Decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The issue involves the correctness of the MeTCs findings of fact, which
findings were affirmed by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.

An appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review and it
becomes the duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment
whether or not it is an assigned error.[4]
Appellant insists that he is only civilly liable for an unpaid debt.
We reviewed the records very closely and found that petitioner and his
guests, occupying four tables, ate the food he ordered. When asked to pay, he
refused and insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It bears emphasis that the
understanding between petitioner and Ramon was that the latter would pay for only
one table.
We agree with the Solicitor General in his brief for the People that petitioner
employed fraud in ordering four additional tables, partaking of the food ordered
and then illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa under Article
315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code.[5]
After a careful review of the records of the case, we found no reversible
error in the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court thus adopts its
findings of fact and conclusion of law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 59239 finding petitioner
Roland V. Veloso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario,
Jr. and Associate Justice Alicia L. Santos (all retired); rollo, pp. 20-29.

[2]

Id., p. 41.

[3]

Id., pp.114-115.

[4]

People v. Buban, G.R. No. 170471, May 11, 2007, 523 SCRA 118, citing People v. Lab-eo, 373 SCRA 461, 480
(2002).

[5]

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below shall be punished by:

xxx
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over
6,000 pesos but does not exceed P12,000.00.
xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:

xxx
(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn, restaurant x x x without paying therefor,
with intent to defraud the proprietor or manager thereof x x x.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
LYZAH SY FRANCO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 171328

- versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
STEVE BESARIO,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 171335

Present:

- versus -

CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 16, 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In the prosecution for the crime of estafa committed under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, there must be evidence of false representation or false
pretense on the part of the accused to prove reasonable doubt. In this case, the employees
act of soliciting a client despite previous knowledge of several complaints against his or
her employer for failure to deliver the motor vehicle that was the subject of the
agreement, is tantamount to misrepresentation.
Factual Antecedents
These petitions for review on certiorari impugn the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27414 which affirmed with modifications the Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 99-173688, convicting
petitioners Lyzah Sy Franco (Franco) and Steve Besario (Besario) of the crime of
Estafa. The Information filed against petitioners and their co-accused, Antonio Rule, Jr.
(Rule) and George Torres (Torres), contained the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about the first week of June 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud MA. LOURDES G. ANTONIO,
in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which they made to said Ma. Lourdes G. Antonio, to the effect
that they are employees of FINAL ACCESS MARKETING, a business entity engaged
in the sale and financing of used or repossessed cars, and as such could process and
facilitate the sale of a Mazda car 323 bearing plate number PVB-999 worth P130,000.00
provided they be given the amount of P80,000.00 as down payment and by means of
other deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing the said Ma. Lourdes
G. Antonio to give and deliver as in fact she gave and delivered to herein accused the said
amount of P80,000.00, and accused knowing fully well that their manifestations and
representations were false and untrue and were made only to obtain the said amount
of P80,000.00 which amount once in their possession, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert the said amount
of P80,000.00 to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
MA. LOURDES G. ANTONIO in the aforesaid amount of P80,000.00 in its equivalent
amount to the Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.[3]

During arraignment, petitioners entered separate pleas of not guilty. Rule and
Torres failed to appear and, to date, remain at large. After the termination of the pre-trial
conference, trial ensued.

The Version of the Prosecution

Ma. Lourdes G. Antonio (Lourdes) testified that petitioners swindled her. She claimed
that Franco was a friend of her niece and that she has known her for almost a year. In the
first week of June 1998, Franco came to her house and offered to assist her in purchasing
a used car. Franco introduced herself as Assistant Administrative Coordinator of Final
Access Marketing which was engaged in the sale and financing of second-hand and
repossessed vehicles. Franco gave her calling card after their conversation.
Lourdes was interested in the offer of Franco since she and her husband were actually
looking for a used car for their taxicab operation. She therefore contacted Franco to take
up her offer.
On June 26, 1998, Franco and Lourdes went to a showroom on Houston Street, San
Juan, Metro Manila, where Lourdes immediately chose a blue Mazda 323 car with Plate
No. PVB No. 999 from those that were on display.
At around 7 oclock in the evening of July 2, 1998, Franco went to the house
of Lourdes and presented a sales proposal. She was with Besario and Rule, whom she
introduced as her superiors. Rule then made a presentation on the Mazda 323 car
informing Lourdes that she can buy it for P130,000.00 with a downpayment
of P80,000.00 and the balance to be paid in 12 equal monthly installments. Rule also
told Lourdes that the car would be delivered within three days from receipt of her money.
Lourdes agreed to pay the downpayment the following day. Before the petitioners
departed, Rule ordered Franco to sign the sales proposal as sales executive. Lourdes also
signed the document. Rule then issued a receipt dated July 3, 1998 and instructed Franco
and Besario to give it to Lourdes after receiving her downpayment upon their return on
the next day.
The following day, July 3, 1998, Franco and Besario returned to the house of Lourdes to
collect the downpayment of P80,000.00. Besario received and counted the money and
handed it to Franco. After counting the money, Franco returned the same to Besario, who
put it inside the bag he was carrying. They gave to Lourdes the receipt dated July 3, 1998
that was signed by Rule. At the same time, they assured her that the car would be
delivered in three days.
The car, however, was not delivered as promised. Lourdes called up Final Access
Marketings office and was able to talk to the owner/manager, Torres, who assured her
that her downpayment would be refunded or that they would look for a replacement.

Meanwhile, Lourdes and her husband returned to the showroom on Houston Street, San
Juan, where they saw the Mazda car already clean. The security guard told them it was
ready for release in the afternoon.
When the car was still undelivered, Lourdes sought the aid of Hoy Gising, a television
show that broadcasts grievances of people against fraudulent schemes. During a visit to
the shows office, Lourdes learned that 12 other persons were victimized by the group of
petitioners.
Lourdes also met with Atty. Renz Jaime, legal counsel of Final Access Marketing, who
assured her that Final Access Marketing would return her money by August. When he
reneged on his promise, formal demand was made on him to settle the obligation of said
business enterprise.
Erlinda Acosta (Erlinda) was one of the alleged victims of petitioners whom Lourdes met
while airing her complaint in the television program Hoy Gising. Erlinda testified that
she was referred to Besario when she was looking for a second-hand vehicle. She went to
the office of Final Access Marketing in Timog Avenue, Quezon City, and was shown by
Besario several pictures of vehicles from which she chose a Mitsubishi Pajero.
On April 7, 1998, Erlinda and her son met Besario, Rule and their other companions in a
restaurant. They brought the vehicle Erlinda wanted to purchase and her son drove it for
a road test. Thereafter, she agreed to buy the vehicle for P600,000.00. She signed a
Vehicle Sales Proposal and handed to Rule a downpayment of US$3,000.00.
On April 20, 1998, Erlinda delivered to Besario and Rule a managers check in the
amount of P245,000.00 as payment for the entire balance. She was then assured that the
vehicle will be delivered a week later. However, Besario and Rule reneged on their
promise. Erlinda went to the office of Final Access Marketing and complained to Franco
but to no avail. Her motor vehicle was never delivered. Thus, she went to Hoy Gising.
Juanito Antonio corroborated the testimony of his wife, Lourdes. He was present when
petitioners Franco and Besario, together with Rule, went to their house in the evening of
July 2, 1998 with a written proposal for the sale of a vehicle. After his wife signed the
document, she gave a downpayment of P80,000.00. When the car was not delivered on
the date agreed upon, he and his wife went to the office of Final Access Marketing. Upon
their inquiries, the security guard on duty said that the car they purchased already had a

gate pass and would be delivered in the afternoon. However, the said vehicle was never
delivered to them.
The Version of the Petitioners
Franco denied involvement in the alleged conspiracy to commit estafa
against Lourdes. She alleged that it was Torres, the owner of Final Access Marketing,
who was the swindler. And like Lourdes, she was a victim in this case.
Franco claimed that petitioner Besario hired her as a clerk-typist. She was
promoted to the position of Assistant Administrative Coordinator and was authorized to
solicit clients for Final Access Marketing.
Franco learned from her sister that Lourdes wanted to purchase a second-hand
car. She went to see Lourdes and presented to the latter a list of repossessed vehicles. She
gave her calling card to Lourdes before they parted. Later on, Lourdes called and visited
the office of Final Access Marketing, where Franco introduced Lourdes to Besario and
Rule.
Franco accompanied Lourdes to showrooms where the latter chose a blue Mazda
car with Plate No. PVB 999. Rule agreed to sell the car
to Lourdes for P130,000.00. Thus, on the evening of July 2, 1998, she, Besario and Rule
went to the house of Lourdes with a Vehicle Sales Proposal. Franco signed the document
without reading and understanding the same upon the insistence of Rule. Rule then
signed an official receipt and instructed Franco and Besario to return the next day to give
the same to Lourdes after collecting her downpayment. Lourdes was also assured that
the car would be delivered within three days from receipt of the downpayment.
On July 3, 1998, at around 10 a.m., Franco and Besario came back to collect the
downpayment. Lourdes gave her cash payment to Besario, who counted it. He gave said
cash to Franco, who counted it again. When the money was handed back to Besario, he
put it inside a black bag. Thereafter, Franco and Besario went to a restaurant to pick-up
Rule. They rode a taxi and proceeded to the house of Torres, but it was only Besario and
Rule who went inside. Franco went home without receiving a single centavo for her
transportation fare.
When the car was not delivered, Lourdes called Franco who in turn reminded her
boss to expedite its release. However, the continued failure to receive the vehicle
compelled Lourdes to report the incident to Hoy Gising. It was only during this period
that
Franco
learned
of
similar
complaints
from
other

customers. Thereafter, Lourdes called

her
intermittently
asking
for
a
reimbursement. However, the latter could not do anything since her employers no longer
reported to the office. Rule and Torres left Manila and went to Cebu. She was not aware
of their whereabouts at the time of her testimony.
On the other hand, Besario failed to attend several hearings. The notice to appear
and to present evidence sent to him was returned unserved since he moved to another
address without informing the trial court. Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, he was
declared to have waived his right to present evidence. The case was consequently
submitted for decision.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 23, 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision finding petitioners guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, above premises all considered, the Court finding accused
Lyzah Sy Franco and Steve Besario GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime
charged in the Information, the Court hereby sentences said two accused to each suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal as MAXIMUM to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prison mayor as MINIMUM and to suffer all the accessory penalties as provided by
law.
Accused Franco and Besario, jointly and severally are likewise ordered to pay
private complainant Ma. Lourdes Antonio the sum of P80,000.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.[4]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 26, 2005, the CA promulgated its Decision that affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court. It convicted the petitioners for the crime of
estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and modified the
penalty. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated October
23, 2001 rendered by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification to the
effect that the penalty imposed upon each of the appellants is hereby MODIFIED to an
indeterminate sentence of Four (4) years, Two (2) months, and One (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to Thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Accused Franco and Besario are likewise ordered to pay, jointly and severally,
private complainant, Ma. Lourdes Antonio, the sum of P80,000.00 as actual damages.
SO ORDERED.[5]

Hence, petitioners filed separate petitions for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision of the CA. Franco contends that the Court of Appeals decided the case on a
mistaken inference and [misappreciation] of facts bordering on speculations, surmises or
conjectures.[6]
On the other hand, Besario ascribes the following error to the CA:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY DISREGARDING THE LAW, JURISPRUDENCE AND EVIDENCE
WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER BESARIO IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
ESTAFA AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.[7]

In its Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General opposes the petitions by arguing that
petitioners raise[d] questions of fact which are inappropriate in a petition for review
on certiorari. x x x.[8] The Solicitor General also believes the prosecutions evidence was
sufficient to convict petitioners of estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code and that petitioners defenses failed to overturn the evidence showing their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
The petitions are not meritorious.
Exception to the Finality and Conclusiveness
of Factual Findings of the Court of Appeals
[A]s a rule, our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to
the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court, as
findings of fact are deemed conclusive and we are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh
all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.[9] While this rule
is not without exception, there are no exceptional circumstances in these cases that
warrant a departure from the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed by the
CA. Even after considering the merits, the petitions deserve outright denial.

The conviction of Franco and Besario for conspiring to commit estafa

against Lourdes must therefore stand. The prosecution satisfactorily established their
participation in the scheme to defraud Lourdes, their acts were not isolated from but
related to a plot to deceive her. The prosecution likewise proved beyond reasonable doubt
that the well-planned swindling scheme of Franco and Besario resulted to estafa.
Conspiracy must be Shown as Clearly as the
Commission of the Offense[10]
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony
and decide to commit it.[11] Conspiracy must be proven on the same quantum of evidence
as the felony subject of the agreement of the parties. [It] may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators
[prior to], during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or
purpose.[12]
Several circumstances in this case conclusively show Francos role in
defrauding Lourdes. She was the one who personally approached Lourdes and actively
made representations on behalf of Final Access Marketing despite previous knowledge of
the companys failure to deliver the vehicle sold to Erlinda. She offered to
help Lourdes purchase a second-hand car by presenting herself as an Assistant
Administrative Coordinator of said company. She also assisted Lourdes in selecting a car
she wanted to buy. Six days later, Franco arrived with Besario and Rule in the house
of Lourdes after regular business hours. Franco made the necessary introductions and
they commenced with a presentation that persuaded Lourdes to part with her
money. They showed Lourdes a prepared Sales Proposal Agreement that Franco signed
as a sales executive.
Franco, together with Besario, returned the next day to collect the downpayment
of Lourdes. After counting the money and putting it inside a bag, they
assured Lourdes that the car would be delivered within three days. When they failed to
fulfill their promise and their unlawful scheme was unraveled, she did not do anything to
placate Lourdes.
We cannot lend credence to Francos assertion that she only knew of her employers
fraudulent scheme after Lourdes reported the same to Hoy Gising. For sure, before their
former clients reported their anomalous transactions to Hoy Gising, they first lodged

their complaints with the company itself. Hence, we are at a loss why Franco, as the
companys Assistant Administrative Coordinator would feign ignorance of the same. We
also could not understand why after discovering her employers fraudulent transactions,
and after said employers absconded, Franco continued to report to their office. She did
not even bother to inform Lourdes that her employers had already absconded. Finally,
since she made representations to Lourdes that the car would be delivered in three days
time, the least that Franco could have done was to investigate the matter and explain
to Lourdes the companys failure to deliver the car. After all, Franco was a friend
of Lourdes niece.
Besario, for his part, actively conspired with Franco by inducing Lourdes to part
with her money. He also went to the house of Lourdes and induced the latter to make a
downpayment on the car she wanted to purchase and sign the Sales Proposal
Agreement. He and Franco collected the money from Lourdes and promised her that the
car would be delivered three days later even if he had knowledge from the previous
transaction with Erlinda that the delivery would never happen. Thereafter, he could not
be reached or found when the car was still undelivered and their devious plot was
exposed.
Evidently, petitioners actions were in relation to the attainment of a common
objective. They had vital roles in the nefarious scheme to sell a vehicle that they knew
would never be delivered, but for which they obtained a substantial sum of money
from Lourdes.
Having established the existence of a conspiracy between Franco and Besario, the
prosecution proceeded to present evidence to prove that the acts of the petitioners
constituted estafa.
Estafa by Means of Deceit
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code penalizes fraud or deceit when
committed as follows:
xxxx
2. by means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud:
(a)
by using fictitious name, or actions, falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualification, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of the crime of estafa under the foregoing provision are: (1) there
must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means and was thus induced to part with his money
or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[13]
Petitioners presented themselves to Lourdes as persons possessing the authority
and capacity to engage in the financing of used vehicles in behalf of Final Access
Marketing.This was a clear misrepresentation considering their previous knowledge not
only of Erlindas complaint but also of several others as regards the failure of Final Access
Marketing to deliver the motor vehicles bought. Lourdes relied on their
misrepresentations and parted with her money. Almost a week passed by, but petitioners
and Rule did not deliver the said motor vehicle. They also did not fulfill their subsequent
promise to provide a replacement or to refund her payment. When Lourdes visited the
office of Final Access Marketing to demand the return of her money, it was already
closed. She could not locate any of them except for Franco who denied any
wrongdoing. Consequently, she suffered damage.
If indeed they were innocent as they claimed to be, Erlindas complaint to
petitioners and the 12 other similar complaints with Hoy Gising regarding undelivered
vehicles should have dissuaded petitioners from further soliciting customers. The fact
that they continued to offer for sale a second-hand car to Lourdes is indicative of deceit
and their complicity in the conspiracy to commit estafa. The manner in which petitioners
transacted business with Erlinda and Lourdes as well as their awareness of 12 other
similar complaints with HoyGising were sufficient to establish the existence of a modus
operandi.
Francos attempt to escape culpability by feigning ignorance of the previously
failed transactions on the delivery of vehicles by Final Access Marketing cannot be
countenanced.As gleaned from the testimony of Erlinda, Franco was already with Final
Access Marketing at the time these transactions occurred. She was therefore familiar
with the companys procedure and policy on the sales of second-hand vehicles. She even
accompanied Lourdes to showrooms and introduced her to Besario and Rule.
As an employee of Final Access Marketing, Franco was expected to be familiar
with its daily activities. It would be unworthy of belief that she did not know of the

complaints for the unexplained failure of Final Access Marketing to deliver vehicles to its
customers. Human nature and experience would compel her to make queries on her own
to discover the reasons for the non-delivery of the vehicles. Her continued insistence in
soliciting Lourdes as a client by introducing herself as an Assistant Administrative
Coordinator of Final Access Marketing with the ability to provide financing for a vehicle
of her choice is therefore indicative of fraudulent misrepresentation.
The petitioners also contend that they are not criminally liable since the transaction
with Lourdes was a contract of sale. This contention does not deserve serious
consideration.While the fact that they entered into a contract with Lourdes cannot be
denied, the transaction transpired due to their deceit. It was their misrepresentation that
induced Lourdes to sign the Sales Proposal agreement and part with her money.
In denying any criminal wrongdoing, petitioners blame their co-accused, Torres,
whom they claim to be the owner of Final Access Marketing. The shifting of blame is
common among conspirators in their attempt to escape liability. It is a desperate strategy
to compensate for their weak defense. We are not readily influenced by such a
proposition since its obvious motive is to distort the truth and frustrate the ends of justice.
[14]

The Penalty
Having committed the crime of estafa, the petitioners must suffer the proper
penalties provided by law. The law imposes the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount is
over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount swindled
exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed 20 years.[15] To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
reduced by one degree, that is, to prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods. The minimum period of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full
range of the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, which
is six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. With the amount
of the fraud at P80,000.00, there is P58,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. Five years must
therefore be added to the maximum period of the prescribed penalty ranging from six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years. Thus, the maximum
term of the penalty would range from eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one

(21) days to thirteen (13) years. This is in accord with our ruling in People v. Temparada,
[16]
viz:
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when
the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere
within prision correccional minimum and medium (i.e. from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the
five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional since this is within the
range of prision correccional minimum and medium.
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty
of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum in its maximum period,
adding 1 year of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided
that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the
prescribed penalty of prision correccionalmaximum to prision mayor minimum is
not prision mayor minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of
which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the
RPC. Following this procedure, the maximum period of prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor minimum is from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. The
incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court.
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted
by P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year
shall be discarded as was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan in consonance
with the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused. x
x x.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27414 which affirmed with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in Criminal Case No.
99-173688 convicting petitioners Lyzah Sy Franco and Steve Besario of the crime of
estafa is AFFIRMED with further modification that the indeterminate prison term
imposed on each of the petitioners is four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]

CA rollo, pp. 185-199; penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Danilo B. Pine. .
[2]
Records, pp. 360-373; penned by Judge Edgardo F. Sundiam.

[3]

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 373.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 199.
[6]
Rollo of G.R. No. 171328, p. 10.
[7]
Rollo of G.R. No. 171335, p. 17.
[8]
Id. at 197.
[9]
People v. Petralba, 482 Phil. 362, 374 (2004).
[10]
Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 641, 647 (2001).
[11]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 8.
[12]
Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 387,
414-415.
[13]
RCL Feeders PTE., Ltd. v. Hon. Perez, 487 Phil. 211, 220-221 (2004).
[14]
People v. Macaliag, 392 Phil. 284, 299 (2000).
[15]
REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 315.
[16]
G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 258, 283-284.
[4]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 124513

October 17, 2001

ROBERTO ERQUIAGA, and GLENN OROSCO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 24, Naga City, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated August 30, 1995, of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 14904
affirming with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 24, dated
March 31, 1993. The RTC of Naga City had found appellants guilty of estafa.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Honesta Bal is a businesswoman who owned a bookstore. Sometime in May 1989, she was
contacted by Manuel Dayandante @ Manny Cruz who offered to buy her land in Pili, Camarines Sur.
He told Honesta that the company he represented was interested in purchasing her property. On
May 5, 1989, Honestas daughter, Josephine Tapang, received a telegram from Dayandante
informing Honesta that the sale had been approved and that he would arrive with the inspection
team on May 12, 1989.2 On May 19, 1989, Honesta received a call from Dayandante. Her daughter
and she met Dayandante and a certain Lawas @ Rodolfo Sevilla at the Aristocrat Hotel. Dayandante
and Lawas said they were field purchasing representative and field purchasing head, respectively, of
the Taiwanese Marine Products. They persuaded Honesta to purchase cans of a marine
preservative which, could be bought for P1,500 each from a certain peddler. In turn, they would buy
these cans from her at P2,000 each.
The following day, May 20, 19893 Glenn Orosco, one of herein petitioners, appeared at Honestas
store and introduced himself as an agent, a.k.a. "Rey," who sold said marine preservative. Like a fish
going after a bait, Honesta purchased a can which she sold to Dayandante for P1,900. The following
day, May 21, Orosco brought five more cans which Honesta bought and eventually sold to Lawas. It
was during this transaction that petitioner Roberto Erquiaga, a.k.a. "Mr. Guerrerro," was introduced
to Honesta to ascertain whether the cans of marine preservative were genuine or not. 4
On May 24, Orosco delivered 215 cans to Honesta. Encouraged by the huge profits from her
previous transactions, she purchased all 215 cans for P322,500. She borrowed the money from a
Jose Bichara at 10% interest on the advice of Erquiaga who lent her P5,000.00 as deposit or earnest
money and who promised to shoulder the 10% interest of her loan. Soon after the payment, Lawas,
Dayandante, Erquiaga, and Orosco vanished. Realizing that she was conned, Honesta reported the
incident to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, upon examination of the contents of the
cans, discovered that these were nothing more than starch. The NBI likewise uncovered that
the modus operandi and sting operation perpetrated on Honesta had been going on in other parts of
the country, in particular, Cebu, Batangas, Dagupan, Baguio and Olongapo. 5

On December 4, 1989, an Information for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised
Penal Code, was filed against Roberto Erquiaga, Glenn Orosco, Pastor Lawas and Manuel
Dayandante. Said information reads:
That on or about May 24, 1989, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, confederating, conspiring and helping one
another, under a common design or scheme, did then and there, by means of
misrepresentation and deceit, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud herein complaining
witness HONESTA P. BAL, in the following manner, to wit: accused above-named, well
knowing that the two hundred fifteen (215) sealed tins they are selling contain only starch,
misrepresented to the complaining witness that the same is made in Singapore as marine
product preservative and relying on said deceitful misrepresentation, the latter paid the value
of the two hundred fifteen (215) tins of said item at a unit price of P1,500.00 per can or for a
total price of P322,500.00, which turned out to be only starch with no significant commercial
value after the same were examined at the NBI Forensic Chemistry Examination Division,
Manila, thereby defrauding said complaining witness in the aforesaid sum of THREE
HUNDRED TWENTY TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P322,500.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Upon arraignment, Erquiaga and Orosco pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Dayandante was
apprehended only during the latter part of 1992 and was tried separately, while Lawas is still atlarge.
On March 31, 1993, the RTC promulgated its decision finding the petitioners guilty of estafa. The
dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Roberto Erquiaga, a.k.a. "Mr.
Guerrero" and Glenn Orosco, a.k.a. "Rey" guilty of the offense of estafa as defined and
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, beyond reasonable
doubt and, in accordance with the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby
sentences them to suffer the penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor in its medium period,
as minimum penalty to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum penalty. The said accused are ordered to indemnify jointly and
severally Honesta P. Bal, the herein offended party, the sum of Three Hundred Twenty Two
Thousand and Five Hundred (P322,500.00) Pesos, plus interest thereon at the rate of twelve
(12%) percent per annum computed from May 24, 1989 up to the time the said amount shall
have been paid in full, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.7
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the appealed Decision, while affirmed, should be
MODIFIED. The penalty should instead be FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS
of prision correccional as the minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as
maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, Honesta Bal, the amount of P322,500.00 with
interest at 12% per annum starting May 24, 1989 until full payment; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.8

Petitioners filed their separate motions for reconsideration 9 which the appellate court denied "for lack
of merit".10Petitioners now raise before us the following questions of law:
(1) Can the court validly render judgment of conviction based on mere conjectures, surmises
that there was conspiracy to commit the offense, if the evidence presented by the
prosecution is not strong enough to stand the test of reason?
(2) Can the legal maxim "flight is an evidence of guilt" prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence accorded to all accused in criminal case?
(2.1) Are the petitioners duty bound to prove their innocence?
(3) Can the loss in a consummated sale be converted to damages in a criminal case for
estafa without violating the maxim of "caveat emptor?"11
Petitioners contend that the trial court based its decision on mere conjectures and surmises and that
it was biased against them. They likewise assail the finding of conspiracy.12 Finally, they opine that
private complainant should bear her losses under the doctrine of caveat emptor.13
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, dismisses the issues raised by petitioners as
mere "rehash" of their previous arguments before the Court of Appeals, hence redundant. 14 In our
view, the pertinent issue in this case is whether conspiracy to commit estafa and estafa itself had
been adequately established. That petitioners had conspired with each other must be viewed not in
isolation from but in relation to an alleged plot, a sting, or "con operation" known as "negosyo" of
their group. Further, whether such a well-planned confidence operation resulted in the consummated
crime of estafa, however, must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. It
has to be shown as clearly as the commission of the offense. 15 It need not be by direct evidence, but
may take the form of circumstances which, if taken together, would conclusively show that the
accused came to an agreement to commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full
cooperation and participation.16 It may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during
and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common design, concerted action
and concurrence of sentiments.17
We find that the following circumstances together, conclusively show petitioner Glenn Oroscos role
in defrauding Honesta: (1) Glenn a.k.a. "Rey" acted as salesman of the marine preservative. (2) He
providentially surfaced after Dayandante and Lawas had already primed up Honesta regarding
profits she would make buying and selling the product. (3) He conveniently had available a can of
the marine preservative after Dayandante and Lawas told her of the business possibility. (4) He led
Honesta to believe that the contents of the cans were indeed marine preservatives. At the very least,
he kept silent on the real contents of the cans. (5) He pretended to refuse the P5,000 down payment
from Honesta while inducing her to borrow the larger sum of P322,500. (6) He assured Honesta he
still had 50 cans and convinced her to shell out another P1,000 for him to deliver them. (7) He
disappeared with the other accused after their nefarious designs had been unearthed.
Petitioner Roberto Erquiaga, for his part, actively connived with Orosco. He did the following: (1) He
posed as "Mr. Guerrero", a "verifier" of the contents of the cans allegedly containing marine
preservative. (2) He also induced complainant to borrow more money and to hold on to the 215
cans. (3) He offered the P5,000 as down payment for the 215 cans. (4) He made the deal more
enticing for Honesta by promising to pay the 10% interest rate on the loan himself.

Patently, each petitioner played a key role in their devious scheme to sell a useless product, alleged
to be a marine preservative, for which they got a substantial amount from Honesta Bal.
But did the acts of petitioners constitute estafa?
The elements of estafa or swindling under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code18 are the following:
1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the
false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 19
As earlier discussed, Erquiaga misrepresented himself as a "verifier" of the contents of the cans. He
encouraged Honesta to borrow money. Petitioner Orosco misrepresented himself as a seller of
marine preservative. They used aliases, Erquiaga as "Mr. Guerrero"; and Orosco as "Rey". Honesta
fell for these misrepresentations and the lure of profits offered by petitioners made her borrow
money upon their inducement, and then petitioners disappeared from the scene after taking the
money from her.
Petitioners contend that the starch is a kind of marine preservative and that the failure of the
prosecution to prove otherwise should be enough reason to acquit them. 20 This argument deserves
no serious consideration by the Court. Note that what was being offered to Honesta was a
preservative from "Taiwanese Marine Products." What was delivered was ordinary starch in sealed
cans. The scam is quite obvious, though suckers still fall for it.
Petitioners suggest that damages should not be awarded because Honesta was forewarned to buy
at her own risk and because the doctrine of caveat emptor placed her on guard. Petitioners
apparently misapply the doctrine. A basic premise of the doctrine of "Let the buyer beware" is that
there be no false representation by the seller. As discussed earlier, petitioners scheme involves a
well-planned scenario to entice the buyer to pay for the bogus marine preservative. Even the initial
buy-and-sell transactions involving one and then five cans were intended for confidence building
before the big transaction when they clinched the deal involving P322,500. Thereafter, they vanished
from the scene. These circumstances clearly show that petitioners Orosco and Erquiaga were in on
the plot to defraud Honesta. Honesta could hardly be blamed for not examining the goods. She was
made to depend on petitioners supposed expertise. She said she did not open the cans as there
was a label in each with a warning that the seal should not be broken. 21 That Honesta Bal thought
the buy-and-sell business would result in a profit for her is no indictment of her good faith in dealing
with petitioners. The ancient defense of caveat emptor belongs to a by-gone age, and has no place
in contemporary business ethics.
It is not true that Honesta did not suffer any damage because she merely borrowed the money, and
that she showed no proof that she issued a check to pay said debt.22 The prosecution clearly showed
that Bichara had sent a demand letter to Honesta asking for payment. 23 Honesta had borrowed

P322,500 from Bichara for which she assuredly must repay. This constitutes business loses to her
and, in our view, actual damages as contemplated under Article 315, par. 2 (a). 24
Given the facts established in this case, we are convinced that estafa had been consummated by
petitioners who had conspired with each other, and the guilt of petitioners had been adequately
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court as
modified by the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Petitioners Roberto Erquiaga and Glenn Orosco are
found guilty of estafaunder Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. They are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision
correccional as minimum, and TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further,
they are also ordered to pay jointly and severally as indemnity to Honesta Bal the sum of P322,500
with interest of 12% per annum until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

CA Rollo, pp. 154-169.

TSN, February 19, 1991, pp. 4-6; Exhibit "B".

It was May 21, 1989, as per Josephines testimony, TSN, February 5, 1991, p. 11, but she
denied this during her cross-examination, TSN, February 5, 1991, pp. 40-41.
3

TSN, February 19, 1991, p. 16.

Rollo, pp. 44-46; TSN, October 10, 1991, pp. 9-10.

Records, p. 1.

Rollo, pp. 50-51.

Id. at 40-41.

CA Rollo, pp. 172-197.

10

Id. at 212.

11

Rollo, p. 10.

12

Id. at 13-17.

13

Id. at 20-21.

14

Id. at 74.

15

People vs. Legaspi, G.R. No. 117802, 331 SCRA 95, 125 (2000).

16

Ibid.

People vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 128890, 332 SCRA 485, 496 (2000), citing People vs.
Parungao, G.R. No. 125812, 265 SCRA 140, 149 (1996).
17

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).- Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
18

xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by
means of other similar deceits.
xxx
19

Luis B. Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book 2, 14th Edition, p. 763.

20

Rollo, pp. 160-161.

21

TSN, March 5, 1991, p. 10.

22

Rollo, pp. 163-165.

23

Records, Exhibit "B".

24

Supra, note 18