Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 5

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS GADINIS FALL 2016

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS FALL 2016


1. ATTACK OUTLINE
1.1.

2. INTRODUCTION
2.1.

Introduction to the Law of Enterprise Organization


A.

3. ACTING THROUGH OTHERS: THE LAW OF AGENCY


3.1.

Introduction to Agency
A.

3.2.

Agency Formation & Termination


A.

3.3.

Liability in Contract
A.

3.4.

Liability in Tort
A.

3.5.

The Governance of Agency


A.

4. THE PROBLEM OF JOINT OWNERSHIP: THE LAW OF


PARTNERSHIP
4.1.

Introduction to Partnership
A.

4.2.

Partnership Formation
A.

4.3.

Partnership Governance & Issues of Authority


A.

4.4.

Statutory Dissolution of Partnership at Will


A.

4.5.

Opportunistic Dissolution and the Partners Duty of Loyalty


A.

4.6.

Agency Conflicts Among Co-Owners: Fiduciary Duties


A.

4.7.

Limited Liability Successors of the General Partnership


Page 1 of 5

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS GADINIS FALL 2016


A.

5. THE CORPORATE FORM


5.1.

Introduction
A.

5.2.

Creation of a Fictional Legal Entity


A.

5.3.

Limited Liability
A.

5.4.

Transferable Shares
A.

5.5.

Centralized Management
A.

5.6.

State Competition in Corporate Law


A.

6. THE PROTECTION OF CREDITORS


6.1.

Mandatory Disclosure
A.

6.2.

Capital Regulation
A.

6.3.

Fraudulent Transfer & Equitable Subordination


A.

6.4.

Piercing the Corporate Veil


A.

6.5.

Multinationals and Veil Piercing


A.

7. NORMAL GOVERNANCE: THE VOTING SYSTEM


7.1.

The Role & Limits of Shareholder Voting


A.

7.2.

Electing & Removing Directors


A.

7.3.

Shareholder Meetings and Alternatives


A.

7.4.

Proxy Voting and Its Costs


A.

7.5.

Class Voting
Page 2 of 5

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS GADINIS FALL 2016


A.
7.6.

Shareholder Information Rights


A.

7.7.

Techniques for Separating Control from Cash Flow


A.

7.8.

Vote Buying
A.

7.9.

Controlling Minority Structures

A.
7.10. The Federal Proxy Rules
A.
7.11. Case Study: Shareholder Activism
A.

8. NORMAL GOVERNANCE: THE DUTY OF CARE


8.1.

Introduction
A.

8.2.

The Duty of Care & the Need to Mitigate Director Risk


Aversion
A.

8.3.

Statutory Techniques for Limiting Director & Officer Risk


Exposure
A.

8.4.

The Business Judgment Rule


A.

8.5.

The Boards Duty to Monitor: Losses Caused by Board


Passivity
A.

8.6.

Knowing Violations of the Law


A.

9. CONFLICT TRANSACTIONS: THE DUTY OF LOYALTY


9.1.

Duty to whom?
A.

9.2.

Self-Dealing Transactions
A.

9.3.

The Effect of Approval by a Disinterested Party


A.

9.4.

Controlling Shareholders and the Fairness Standard


Page 3 of 5

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS GADINIS FALL 2016


A.
9.5.

Corporate Opportunity Doctrine


A.

9.6.

Executive Compensation
A.

10.SHAREHOLDER SUITS
10.1. Distinguishing between Direct & Derivative Claims
A.
10.2. Solving a Collective Action Problem: Attorneys Fees and the
Incentive to Sue
A.
10.3. Standing Requirements
A.
10.4. Balancing Rights of Boards and Shareholders
A.
10.5. Special Litigation Committees
A.
10.6. Settlement and Indemnification
A.
10.7. When Are Derivative Suits in Shareholders Interests?
A.

11.TRANSACTIONS IN CONTROL
11.1. Seller of Control Blocks: The Sellers Duties
A.
11.2. Tender Offers: Buyer's Duties
A.

12.MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS


12.1.
A.
12.2.
A.
12.3.
A.
12.4.
A.
12.5.

Economic Motives for Mergers


Evolution of the U.S. Corporate Law of Mergers
The Allocation of Power in Fundamental Transactions
Overview of Transactional Form
The Appraisal Remedy
Page 4 of 5

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS GADINIS FALL 2016


A.
12.6. The De Facto Merger Doctrine
A.
12.7. The Duty of Loyalty in Controlled Mergers
A.

13.PUBLIC CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL


13.1. Introduction
A.
13.2. Defending Against Hostile Tender Offers
A.
13.3. Private Law Innovation: The Poison Pill
A.
13.4. Choosing a Merger or Buyout Partner: Revlon, Its Sequels,
and Its Prequels
A.
13.5. Pulling Together Unocal and Revlon
A.
13.6. Protecting the Deal
A.
13.7. Proxy Contests for Corporate Control
A.
13.8. Current US Debate
A.
13.9. Corporations Outside of Business Law
A.

Page 5 of 5

Вам также может понравиться