PUBOFF

Law 156 [The Law on Public Officers]
AY 2015-16, 1st Semester

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Public Office and Public Officers
1) Definitions
1
Mechem
Public office: The right, authority, and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at
the pleasure of the creating power, an individual
is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. [the accepted
definition; other statutory definitions are only for
purposes of said laws.]
An agency for the State
Characteristics
o delegation of sovereign functions
o created by law and not by contract
o oath
o salary
o continuance and duration of the position
o scope of duties
o designation of the position as an office
Public Officer: A person invested with a public
office; one who does an act or a series of acts
for the State
Agpalo
Public office refers to two concepts: as a
functional unit of government or as a position.
Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292)
Introductory Provisions, Sec. 2(9). Office refers, within
the framework of governmental organization, to any
major functional unit of a department or bureau including
regional offices. It may also refer to any position held or
occupied by individual persons, whose functions are
defined by law or regulation.
RA 3019, Sec. 2(b)
(b) "Public officer" includes elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt
service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government as defined in the preceding subparagraph.
RA 6713, Sec. 3(b)
(b) "Public Officials" includes elective and appointive
officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or non-career service, including
military and police personnel, whether or not they
receive compensation, regardless of amount.
1
The basic premise of Mechems treatise on public officers is that public office is
a form of agency and that public officers are agents. However, the similarities
between agents in private law and agents in public law are limited.
D2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes
Class Notes
Purpose of Public Office is the common good.
Public Office is created in the interest and
benefit of the people; thus belongs to the people.
It is not so much a right but more a responsibility.
EO 292
Introductory Provisions, Sec. 2(14) "Officer" as
distinguished from "clerk" or "employee", refers to a
person whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual
nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the
performance of the functions of the government. When
used with reference to a person having authority to do a
particular act or perform a particular function in the
exercise of governmental power, "officer" includes any
government employee, agent or body having authority to
do the act or exercise that function.
Sec. 2(15) "Employee", when used with reference to a
person in the public service, includes any person in the
service of the government or any of its agencies,
divisions, subdivisions or instrumentalities.
Revised Penal Code
Art. 203. Who are public officers. For the purpose of
applying the provisions of this and the preceding titles of
this book, any person who, by direct provision of the law,
popular election or appointment by competent authority,
shall take part in the performance of public functions in
the Government of the Philippine Islands, of shall
perform in said Government or in any of its branches
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a
public officer.
2) Purpose and Nature

Public Office is a Public Trust
Constitution, Art. XI, Section 1. Public office is a public
trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times,
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
This provision is reproduced verbatim in EO 292,
Introductory Provisions, Sec. 32.
EO 292, Introductory Provisions
Section 35. Ethics in Government. All public officers and
employees shall be bound by a Code of Ethics to be
promulgated by the Civil Service Commission.
Karichi Notes
Public officers are public servants
They are subject to the highest standards of
accountability and service
Agpalo: Nature and responsibilities of public officers
under the 1987 Constitution are not mere rhetorical
words or idealistic sentiments but are working standards
1
and attainable goals that should be match with actual

deeds.
Personal feelings must never be allowed to
compromise the public trust character of a public
office which binds public officers to a continuing
accountability to the people.
Public Office is not Property
Right to hold a public office is not a natural right.
It exists only because and by virtue of some law
expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it.
Public office is personal to the officer and cannot
be transmitted to her heirs upon death, i.e., the
heirs of a protestant in a pending election
contest cannot substitute to continue the protest
upon the latters death.
Public officers right is in the nature of a privilege
entitled to protection.
Salary becomes private property for purposes of
due process only when it has been earned or
accrued.
Security of Tenure is Property for Purposes of Due
Process
Public office is not property but is nevertheless a
protected right in the sense that it cannot be
taken away from the holder without due process;
however it is not a vested right.
An office may be considered property in
controversies relating to the question as to which
of two persons is entitled thereto.
The right to office is nevertheless protected by
the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution (Morfe v. Mutuc).
Public Office is not a Contract
It does not create a contractual relation with the
public [How about the public trust?]
Contractual employees of the Government are
considered public officers (Preclaro v. SB)
For purposes of the law on plunder (RA 7080), a
person may become a public officer by virtue of
a contract executed between him and the
government (Agpalo)
As
to As to object As to subject
creation
matter/scope
PUBLIC
incident of to carry out continuous
OFFICE
sovereignty government duration and
duties
duties
(for
affecting all the duration
persons
of tenure)
CONTRACT by will of generally
limited
in
the parties binds only duration and
subject to the
specific in its
limitations
contracting objects
imposed by parties
law
NLTDRA v. CSC (1993)
SUMMARY: Garcia was initially appointed deputy RD
under permanent status. The NALTDRA was later
restructured and she was then issued an appointment
under temporary status for not being a member of the
bar.
DOCTRINE: After abolition, there is in law no occupant.
Thus, there can be no tenure to speak of. It is in this
sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question
of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
If the newly created office has substantially new,
different or additional functions, duties or powers, so that
it may be said in fact to create an office different from the
one abolished, even though it embraces all or some of
the duties of the old office it will be considered as an
abolition of one office and the creation of a new or
different one.
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate
in an office, or even an absolute right to it.
Except constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.
Distinctions
Public office v. Public contract
Public office v. Public employment: Public office
is, in a sense, an employment. But the key
distinction is the delegation of some sovereign
function of the government, in the performance
of which, the public is concerned. Under the
Revised Penal Code, this distinction is
immaterial.
o Maam: Is repair of the Law Centers air
conditioning a sovereign function?
o Sovereign functions include execution &
enactment of laws; adjudication of
controversies
o Officers have responsibility for results
3) Elements
a. Created
by
constitution/law/delegated
authority
Power to create office includes the
power to modify, abolish, provide funds,
and fix positions and salaries.
Inherently
legislative.
Under
the
Constitution & EO 292, power of the
President is to reorganize bureaus and
offices, etc. under the Executive branch.
b. Invested with authority to exercise some
portion of the States sovereign power for the
public interest
the essential element of public office
2
c.
Powers and functions are defined by

constitution/law/legislative authority
d. Duties pertaining thereto are performed
independently, without control of a superior
power other than law, unless they are those of
an inferior/subordinate officer, created or
authorized by the legislature and placed by it
under the control of a superior officer or body
e. Continuing in nature
As to duration, must be continuing and
not intermittent; but not necessarily
permanent.
4) Creation of Public Office

a. Constitutional creation e.g., COA, CSC,
COMELEC, Office of the Ombudsman. Offices
created by the Constitution can only be
abolished/modified
through
constitutional
provision and not by Congress
b. Legislative creation Creation of public office is
primarily a legislative function. Power to create is
supreme and discretionary but limited by the
Constitution.
c. Presidential creation limited to the bureaus,
agencies, or offices of the Executive branch.
President may inactivate or transfer to another
the functions of an office.
5) Kinds/Classifications
As to nature of functions: Civil and military
As to legality of title to office: De jure and de facto
As to creation: Constitutional and statutory
As to department: Executive, legislative, and judicial
As to branch served: National and local
As to discretion: Quasi-judicial and ministerial
As to compensation: Lucrative (coupled with interest)
and honorary
SOTC v. Mabalot (2002)
SUMMARY: SOTC Garcia issued MO No. 96-745
addressed to the LTFRB Chairman Lantin, directing him
to transfer regional functions of the LTFRB to the DOTCCAR Regional Office.
DOCTRINE: A public office may be created through any
of the following modes:
By the Constitution (fundamental law)
By law (statute duly enacted by Congress)
By authority of law
Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan (1995)
SUMMARY: DOST engaged the services of Jaime Sta.
Maria Construction Company as project engineer.
Preclaro, who was hired under contract, allegedly asked
for an amount of P200k from the company as
contractors profit to write off certain deductives. He was

charged with violation of RA 3019.
DOCTRINE: Preclaro is a public officer. RA 3019, Sec.
states that the definition of public officer includes
elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified
or
exemption
service
receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government.
The word includes used in defining a public officer in
Sec. 2(b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive.
Under PD 807, there are 2 classifications: Career
Service and Non-Career Service. Preclaro belongs to
the latter.
Maniego v. People (1951)
SUMMARY: Maniego, an appointed laborer placed in
charge of issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic
violations, was charged with direct bribery.
DOCTRINE: Under the RPC, public officers include all
those "who, by direct provision of law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in
the performance of public functions in the Philippine
Government, or shall perform in said government or any
of its branches, public duties as an employee, agent or
subordinate official or any rank or class." For the
purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard
distinction in the law of public officers between "officer"
and "employee".
Laurel v. Desierto (2002)
SUMMARY: Former VP Laurel was named Honorary
Chairperson of the National Centennial Committee.
Expocorp was formed for that purpose. Laurel was
named as CEO, incorporator, and director.
Allegations of corruption were hurled against him and
became the subject of senate inquiry. Ombudsman
approved the filing of an information against Laurel et al.
DOCTRINE: Laurel is a public officer for purposes of the
OMB acquiring jurisdiction. The NCC performs executive
functions. The NCC was precisely created to execute the
foregoing policies and objectives, (embodied in Art. XIV
of the Constitution) to carry them into effect. The
President, upon whom the executive power is vested,
created the NCC by executive order. The NCC also had
a role in the countrys economic development. Even
assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation,
petitioners position as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of
Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC.
Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of
Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and
functions as NCC Chair.
Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas (1995)
SUMMARY: Petitioners assail the validity of Resolution
No. 94-3170 of the CSC and the authority of the CSC to
issue it. Fernandez served as the Director of the Office
3
of Personnel Inspection and Audit (OPIA) while De Lima

was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel
Relations (OPR) of the Central Office of the CSC. The
Resolution merged the OPIA and OPR into the
Research and Development Office (RDO).
DOCTRINE: The changes in internal organization were
rendered necessary by the decentralization and
devolution of the CSCs functions to Regional and Field
Offices.
The term public office is frequently used to refer to the
right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law,
by which, for a given period either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of government, to be exercised by that
individual for the benefit of the public. Such
reassignment did not involve any violation of the
constitutional right of petitioners to security of tenure
considering that they retained their positions of Director
IV and would continue to enjoy the same rank, status
and salary at their new assigned stations which they had
enjoyed at the Head Office.
Segovia v. Noel (1925)
SUMMARY: Segovia was appointed justice of the peace
on January 21, 1907. When he reached the age of 65 on
July 1, 1924, he was ordered by the SOJ to vacate the
office pursuant to a law. Noel acted as justice of the
peace. Segovia filed a quo warranto action to inquire into
the right of Noel to occupy the office. HELD: Law should
be given prospective effect
DOCTRINE: It is a fundamental principle that a public
office cannot be regarded as the property of the
incumbent, and that a public office is not a contract.
Though there is no vested right in an office, which may
not be disturbed by legislation, yet the incumbent has, in
a sense, a right to his office. If that right is to be taken
away by statute, the terms should be clear in which the
purpose is stated.
Dario v. Mison (1989)
SUMMARY: Pres. Aquino promulgated Proclamation No.
3. Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a
Memorandum, in the nature of Guidelines on the
Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders. A
total of 394 officials and employees were given notices
of separation.
DOCTRINE: There is no question that the administration
may validly carry out a government reorganization
insofar as these cases are concerned, the reorganization
of the Bureau of Customsby mandate not only of the
Provisional Constitution, but also of the various
Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive in her
capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-87
revolutionary government. In removals undertaken to
comply with clear and explicit, constitutional mandates,

the Government is not hard put to prove anything, plainly
and simply because the Constitution allows it. In
separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue
of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried
out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of
functions, the Government is obliged to prove good faith.
Mathay v. CA (1999)
SUMMARY: CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 30,
directing all Civil Service Regional or Field Offices to
recall, revoke and disapprove within one year from
issuance of the said Memorandum, all appointments in
CSUs created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 on
the ground that the same never became law. For
Quezon City CSU employees, the effects of the circular
were temporarily cushioned by the enactment of City
Ordinance NC-140, s.1990, which established the
Department of Public Order and Safety ("DPOS").
DOCTRINE: By ordering Mayor Mathay to "reinstate"
private respondents pursuant to Section 3 of the
Ordinance, the CSC substituted its own judgment for
that of the appointing power. This cannot be done. Even
assuming the validity of Section 3 of the Ordinance, the
absorption contemplated therein is not possible. Since
the CSU never legally came into existence, the private
respondents
never
held
permanent
positions.
Accordingly, as Mathay correctly points out, the private
respondents' appointments in the defunct CSU"were
invalid ab initio. It is axiomatic that the right to hold
public office is not a natural right. The right exists only by
virtue of a law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it.
6) De Facto Officers
De facto doctrine: A person, who, by proper authority, is
admitted and sworn into office, is deemed to be rightfully
is such office, until, by judicial declaration in a proper
proceeding, he is ousted therefrom, or his admission
thereto is declared void.
Basis: to prevent chaos resulting from multiple suits
against the actions of every official whose claim to office
may be open to question; to ensure orderly government
function despite technical defects in title to office.
Situations
1. Officer by reputation/acquiescence (when
people, without inquiry, submit to/invoke his
action, supposing him to be an officer)
2. Officer by appointment/election who has failed to
conform to some precedent or condition
3. Officer by defective appointment, because of
ineligibility, want of appointing authority, or
defect in exercise of appointing authority, which
is UNKNOWN to the public
4
4. Officer appointed/elected pursuant to an

unconstitutional law, before declaration of such
fact. (doctrine of operative fact)
De jure officer: One who has lawful right to an office in
all respects, but has either been ousted from it or never
actually taken possession of it.
DE JURE OFFICER
DE FACTO OFFICER
rests on right
rests on reputation
has lawful right or title to has
possession
and
office
performs duties under
color of authority without
being technically qualified
in all points of law to act
cannot be removed in a can be removed in a direct
direct proceeding
proceeding
USURPER
DE FACTO OFFICER
no color of authority/lawful has color of authority/ title
title
simply assumes office public does not know/not
even if public knows him to ought to know lack of title
be a usurper
acts are null and void
acts are valid insofar as
rights of the public and 3rd
persons are concerned
may become de facto
officer if assumption of
office is acquiesced in
Double occupancy of a single office is not allowed when
the law provides for only one incumbent.
A de facto officer and a de jure officer cannot
hold office at the same time.
There cannot be two de facto officers in
possession of an office for which one incumbent
is provided for by law. Officer with the better title
prevails.
When de jure officer is also the de facto officer,
lawful title and possession are united and there
cannot be another de facto officer.
Elements of de facto officership: See Tuanda v.
Sandiganbayan, infra
Effect of office created under unconstitutional statute
First view: Occupant is not even a de facto officer
because the 1st element is not satisfied (no legal office
to speak of). Occupant is a usurper.
Second view: Occupant is a de facto officer, at least
before the declaration of unconstitutionality, where strict
adherence to the effect of unconstitutionality will lead to
uncertainty, confusion, and inconvenience, for the sake
of public policy and protecting private rights.
Legal effects of de facto officers acts
As to the officers themselves acts are VOID.
De facto officer cannot justify his acts as valid
and binding in any suit to which he is a party. He
is estopped from taking advantage of his own

lack of title.
As regards the public and 3rd persons acts are
VALID UNTIL the de facto officers title is
adjudged insufficient. Authority of de facto officer
cannot subject to collateral attack & cannot be
assailed by 3rd persons, who have the right to
assume that the de facto officer is legally
qualified.
Assailing de facto officership
cannot be done collaterally; must be done
directly by quo warranto
suit must be filed by claimant/de jure officer or
the State thru OSG/prosecutor
de facto officer is entitled to due process
Right to compensation
General rule: De facto officer cannot maintain action to
recover salary because his acts are void as to himself.
Exception: Compensation may be recovered for services
required by the office, rendered by de facto officer acting
without bad faith (e.g., Malaluan case).
Exception to exception: When de facto officer was
merely designated and not appointed.
De jure officer cannot compel payment of salary
for period when de facto officer discharged the
position in good faith while still in possession of
the office (see Monroy case).
If the tenure of the de facto officer was found
wrongful (i.e., he is in bad faith), de jure officer
may recover from him.
Usurper is liable to de jure officer for salaries
received by the former.
Disbursing officers have a right to rely on the
apparent title of the de facto officer.
Dimaandal v. COA (1998)
SUMMARY: Zosimo Dimaandal was originally holding
the position of Supply Officer III when he was designated
Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration
by Gov. Mayo of Batangas in 1993. Pursuant to such
designation, he filed a claim for the difference in salary
and Representation and Transportation Allowance
(RATA) of Assistant Provincial Treasurer and Supply
Officer III for the whole year of 1993 in the total amount
of P61,308.
DOCTRINE: Designation is simply the mere imposition
of new or additional duties on the officer or employee to
be performed by him in a special manner. It does not
entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the
person so designated the right to claim the salary
attached to the position. As such, there being no
appointment issued, designation does not entitle the
officer designated to receive the salary of the position.
For the legal basis of an employees right to claim the
5
salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved

appointment to the position.
Menzon v. Petilla (1991)
SUMMARY: No Governor had been proclaimed in the
province of Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government
Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E.
Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. Aurelio D. Menzon,
a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was
also designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the
Vice- Governor. The provincial treasurer of Leyte,
Florencio Luna allowed the payment to the petitioner of
his salary as acting Vice-Governor.
DOCTRINE: Concededly, the appointment has the color
of validity. The respondents themselves acknowledged
the validity of the petitioners appointment and dealt with
him as such. Upon the principle of public policy on which
the de facto doctrine is based and basic considerations
of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him
the salary due him for the services he actually rendered
as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte.
Malaluan v. COMELEC (1996)
SUMMARY: Electoral protest between Malaluan and
Evangelista. The COMELEC found petitioner liable for
attorneys fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and
unearned salary and other emoluments from March,
1994 to April, 1995, en masse denominated as actual
damages.
DOCTRINE: Malaluan was not a usurper because, while
a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without
any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of
an elective office under color of election thereto. He was
held to be a de facto officer who, in good faith, has had
possession of the office and had discharged the duties
pertaining thereto and thus legally entitled to the
emoluments of the office.
Flores v. Drilon (1993)
SUMMARY: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
13(d) of RA 7227, which provides That for the first year
of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor
of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the
chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic
Authority as violative of 7(1), Art. IX-B, 1987 Const.
DOCTRINE: Elective officials are not allowed to hold
such posts. The only exception is if the Constitution so
provides. The SBMA posts are not ex officio to the
position of Mayor of Olongapo City. 7(1), Art. IX-B
expresses the policy against the concentration of several
public positions in one person, so that a public officer or
employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus
be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an
affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Gordon
may be considered a de facto officer.
Torres v. Ribo (1948)
SUMMARY: F. Martinez, provincial treasurer, as

chairman, Gregorio Abogado, provincial fiscal, Vicente
Tizon, assistant civil engineer in the district engineers
office, Evaristo Pascual, chief clerk in the office of the
division superintendent of schools, and W. Enage, acting
district health officer, canvassed the votes for provincial
governor and other officers and proclaimed Mamerto S.
Ribo as Governor-elect. Vicente Tizon and Evaristo
Pascual sat as members representing the district
engineer and the division superintendent of schools
respectively.
DOCTRINE: The appointment of a substitute member is
personal and restricted and his powers must be
performed directly and in person by the appointee. An
officer to whom discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it
to another, since the powers of the board of canvassers
are not purely ministerial. Pascual and Tizon are not de
facto officers. An officer de facto is one who has the
reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet
is not a good officer in point of law. He must have acted
as an officer for such a length of time, under color of title
and under such circumstances of reputation or
acquiescence by the public and public authorities, as to
afford a presumption of appointment or election, and
induce people, without inquiry, and relying on the
supposition that he is the officer he assumes to be, to
submit to or invoke his action. They acted without
appointment, commission or any color of title to the
office. There was no acquiescence, public or private, in
their discharge of the position.
Tuanda v. Sandiganbayan (1995)
SUMMARY: Delia and Bart were designated as
industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural
labor sectoral representative respectively, for the
Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by
then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of
Local Government. Mayor Tuanda then filed an action
with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City to
declare null and void the designations of Delia & Bart as
sectoral representatives. An information was filed before
the Sandiganbayan for violation of RA 3019 for refusing
to pay P108,900 representing respectively Delia and
Barts per diems, salaries and other privileges and
benefits.
DOCTRINE: They are not de facto officers. The
conditions and elements of de facto officership are the
following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence
by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office
in good faith.
One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the

aforestated elements are present. There can be no de
facto officer where there is no de jure office, although
there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office.
Monroy v. CA (1967)
SUMMARY: Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor
of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his
certificate of candidacy as representative of the first
district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with
the Commission on Elections. Three days later, or on
petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of
candidacy. The Commission on Elections, per resolution
approved the withdrawal. Felipe del Rosario, then the
vice- mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as
municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had
forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of
candidacy in question. Monroy ordered to reimburse, as
actual damages, the salaries to which del Rosario was
entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to the
time he can reassume said office.
DOCTRINE: General rule - "that the rightful incumbent
of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the
salary received by the latter during the time of his
wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office
in good faith and under color of title" that applies in the
present case. The resulting hardship occasioned by the
operation of this rule to the de facto officer who did
actual work is recognized; but it is far more cogently
acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been
formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer
principally, but rather for the protection of the public and
individuals who get involved in the official acts of
persons discharging the duties of an office without being
lawful officers. A de facto officer, not having good title,
takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account
to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he
received during the period of his wrongful retention of
the public office.
Gen. Manager, PPA v. Monserate (2002)
SUMMARY: Monserate started her government service
in 1977 as Bookkeeper II in the Port Management Office,
PPA, Iloilo City. Barely a year later, she was promoted to
the position of Cashier II and then as Finance Officer in
1980. Ramon Anino, who ranked second to Monserate
per the Comparative Data Sheet earlier quoted, filed an
appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board. CSC ruled
that Monserates claim that she is more qualified than
Anino is not relevant to the issue before this Commission.
In cases of protest filed or appealed to the Commission,
the main question to be resolved is whether or not the
appointee meets the qualification standard. CA reversed.
It ordered Monserates reinstatement without awarding
backwages.
DOCTRINE: Monserate was denied due process.

However, while Aninos appointment to the contested
position is void he is nonetheless considered a de facto
officer during the period of his incumbency. A de facto
officer, not having a good title, takes the salaries at his
risk and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for
whatever salary he received during the period of his
wrongful tenure. Monserate is entitled only to backpay
differentials for the period starting from her assumption
as Administrative Officer up to the time of her actual
reinstatement to her rightful position as Division
Manager.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary (1991)
SUMMARY: 2 petitions filed by Civil Liberties Union and
Anti-Graft League of the Philippines seeking a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO No. 284 (and
DOJ Opinion 73, 129 and 155) issued by President
Corazon Aquino on July 25, 1987. Petitioners argue that
the above provisions add exceptions to Sec 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution other than those provided by
the Constitution by allowing members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
other government offices or positions.
DOCTRINE: In Sec. 13, Art. VII there is no qualification
of the position being in the Government. The
disqualification is ABSOLUTE. While EO 284 was
declared unconstitutional, the prohibition against holding
dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be
construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of said
officials office.
II. COMMENCEMENT
RELATIONS
OF
OFFICIAL
A. Eligibility and Qualifications

1. Definitions
Eligibility
state or quality of being legally fitted or qualified

to be chosen.
eligibility to public office is continuing in nature
must exist both at the commencement and
during the occupancy of an office
Eligible
legally fitted or qualified to hold public office
2
Civil Service Law , Sec. 5(8)
(8) Eligible refers to a person who obtains a passing
grade in a civil service examination or is granted a civil
service eligibility and whose name is entered in the
register of eligibles.
Ineligibility
the lack of qualifications prescribed by law or the
Constitution for holding public office
Ineligible
legally or otherwise disqualified to hold an office
disqualified to be elected to an office
disqualified to hold an office, of elected or
determining training needs, and as aid in the inspection

and audit of the agencies personnel work programs.
It shall be administered in such manner as to continually
provide incentives to officers and employees towards
professional growth and foster the career system in the
government service.
(2) The establishment, administration and maintenance
of qualification standards shall be the responsibility of
the department or agency, with the assistance and
approval of the Civil Service Commission and in
consultation with the Wage and Position Classification
Office.
When should qualifications be possessed?
2 views on time of possession, when law or the
Constitution is silent:
1. Qualification must be possessed at the time of
commencement of the term or induction to office
(rule applied in Frivaldo).
2. Qualification must be possessed at the time of
election or appointment.
Agpalo: Appointive officers must have the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications as of the date of the
appointment.
Qualifications must be possessed not only at the time of
commencement of term/appointment but also for the
duration of the offices term/tenure.
appointed to it
subsequent acquisition of qualifications by an

ineligible appointee will not validate a void
appointment. A new appointment must be made.
Qualification (2 senses)
endowment or accomplishment that fits one for

office
act which a person, before entering upon the
performance of duties, is required to do (e.g.,
oath, bond)
Civil Service Law, Sec. 22
Section 22. Qualification Standards.
(1) A qualification standard expresses the minimum
requirements for a class of positions in terms of
education, training and experience, civil service
eligibility, physical fitness, and other qualities required
for successful performance. The degree of qualifications
of an officer or employee shall be determined by the
appointing authority on the basis of the qualification
standard for the particular position.
Qualification standards shall be used as basis for civil
service examinations for positions in the career service,
as guides in appointment and other personnel actions, in
the adjudication of protested appointments, in
EO 292, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A will hereinafter be referred to as the Civil

Service Law.
2. Nature of Right to Hold Public Office

NOT a natural right ,i.e.,merely statutory
Exists
only
by
express
or
implied
creation/conferment by law
To hold public office, one must be eligible and
possess the qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution and the law.
Election/appointment of an ineligible or
unqualified person does not give rise to a right to
hold office.
NOT a constitutional right
No constitutional right to hold public office.
It is a political privilege which depends upon the
favor of the people, coupled with reasonable
conditions for the public good.
Prospective public employees must comply with
reasonable, lawful, and non-discriminatory
requirements and terms laid down by law.
3. Power of Congress to prescribe qualifications

In general: Congress is empowered to prescribe
qualifications, provided these are not in excess of its
constitutional
powers
or
is
inconsistent
with
constitutional provisions (same principles apply to
disqualifications).
8
In congressionally created offices: Congress can impose

qualifications and disqualifications, provided it does not
impinge on any express provision of the Constitution
In constitutionally created offices: When the Constitution
specifies the eligibility requirements of a constitutional
office, the criteria are exclusive. Congress has no power
to impose different qualifications other than those set by
the Constitution.
In offices with constitutionally-prescribed qualifications
Many mandatory constitutional provisions as to
qualifications are not self-executing, and are mere
general pronouncements to be enforced by legislation.
Examples: examination requirement; Art. XIII, Sec.
17(2); and Art. XII, Sec. 20.
4. Restrictions and Construction

Presumption in favor of eligibility
A person elected/appointed to an office is
presumed to be eligible.
Unless excluded by some legal disqualification,
all persons are normally and equally eligible to
public office
Basis: Public policy; extension of the principle
which states that provisions which tend to limit
the candidacy of any person for public office
must be construed in favor of the right of the
voters to exercise their choice
Liberal construction
Right to public office is strictly construed against
ineligibility.
Eligibility is the general rule, ineligibility the
exception. A citizen therefore may not be
deprived of this right without proof of some
specific disqualification specifically declared by
law.
But courts should not unreasonably construe
laws just to uphold the right to office.
5. General and Particular Qualifications

Qualifications usually prescribed
Citizenship
o aliens are generally not eligible for
public office
o government is established for citizens,
thus its functions must be discharged
through citizens
Age
o age limitations often beyond age of
majority
o founded on public policy; cannot be
cured by popular will
Suffrage/Registration
Residence
usually imposed with respect to offices

for political subdivisions
o for election purposes residence is
synonymous to domicile
o there must be intention to reside,
personal
presence,
and
conduct
indicative of intent to reside
Education and/or Literacy
o Generally, more educated persons are
better suited to public office.
o Laws
may
impose
educational
qualification
when
position
has
specialized demands, to enable proper
and intelligent discharge of the office.
o Literacy
requirement
is
not
constitutionally prohibited, especially if it
reasonably relates to the duties of the
position.
Political affiliation
o Generally proscribed, however, there
are certain positions which require
partisan representation:
o Const., Art. VI, Sec.17 members of
SET and HRET
o Const., Art. VI, Sec. 18 Commission
on Appointments
o LGC 45(b) Permanent vacancies in
Sanggunian must be filled from within
the same political party
Passing of examination provided for in the Civil
Service Law, to implement Constitutional
mandate that entrance to the civil service should
be according to merit and fitness.
Prohibited qualifications
Religion
o Const., Art. III, Sec. 5: No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights. (see Pamil v. Teleron
under Election Law)
Property holding
o De Leon says that it can be
constitutional in America
o In the Philippines, this has been ruled as
discriminatory and violative of equal
protection and due process guarantees.
o Maquerra v. Borra: Surety bond
requirement for candidates, to be
forfeited if candidate fails to obtain at
least 10% of votes, is unconstitutional.
In effect it is an imposition of property
qualifications which is inconsistent with
the principles of republicanism and
social justice underlying the Constitution.
9
Citizenship
RA 9225
August 29, 2003
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH
ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title this act shall be known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any
provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, naturalborn citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ______, solemnly swear (or affrim) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be
deemed citizenship of the Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage
must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003"
and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall

meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe
and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to
their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took
that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any
public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office
in the country of which they are naturalized citizens;
and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or noncommissioned officers in the armed forces of the country
which they are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or
provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid,
any other section or provision not affected thereby shall
remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders,
rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause This Act shall take effect
after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general
circulation.
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC (1992)
SUMMARY: Ortega commenced a proceeding against
Labo for the cancellation of his COC on the ground that
he made a material misrepresentation therein; he stated
that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
DOCTRINE: In the absence of any official action or
approval by the proper authorities, a mere application
for repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an
automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine
citizenship. Labos disqualification does not necessarily
entitle Ortega as the candidate with the next highest
number of votes to proclamation as the mayor of Baguio
City. While Ortega may have garnered the second
highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the
fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign
will.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC (1996)
10
SUMMARY: Frivaldo and Lee have been gunning it out

for the Sorsogon governorship since 1988. Frivaldo won
in 1988 and 1992 even though the SC declared him an
alien (and thus disqualified under the LGC) twice. In the
1995 election, Frivaldo ran again. Lee sought to
disqualify Frivaldo on the ground of the SC decisions.
COMELEC initially disqualified Frivaldo but did not
remove him from the list of candidates, so he was voted
for again and won. After the election, COMELEC
affirmed Frivaldos disqualification and ordered the
proclamation of Lee. Frivaldo was repatriated on the
afternoon of June 30, 1995, while Lee was proclaimed
governor on that same night. Frivaldo filed a petition with
the COMELEC to annul Lees proclamation and for his
own proclamation, claiming that he had already qualified
even before Lee was proclaimed. COMELEC granted
the petition, hence this recourse to the SC, who sided
with Frivaldo, holding that the will of the Sorsogon
electorate must prevail and a 3-time election loser
should not be proclaimed governor. SC held that the
qualifications under the LGC must be possessed at the
start of the term of office so Frivaldo was qualified
because he became a citizen on that exact day. To be
sure, SC held that the repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted
to 1994, when he filed his application, declaring that the
law under which Frivaldo was repatriated was a curative
statute which can be made to retroact.
DOCTRINE: The citizenship requirement in the LGC is
to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of
the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of
office to which he has been elected. PURPOSE OF THE
CITIZENSHIP QUALIFICATION is to ensure that
persons who owe allegiance to nations other than the
Philippines do not govern the country or any part thereof.
Since an elective official begins to govern only upon his
proclamation and on the day mandated by law as the
start of his term, the citizenship qualification should be
possessed only at this point.
The voter requirement was included not to reiterate the
need for nationality but to require that the official be
registered as a voter in the area he seeks to govern.
LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter
but does not require the official to actually vote.
Registration, NOT actual voting, is the core of the
requirement. The purpose of the law in requiring an
elective official to be a registered voter is to ensure that
the prospective official is actually registered in the area
he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
Bengson v. HRET (2001)
SUMMARY: Cruz lost his Filipino citizenship by reason
of his enlistment in the US Marine Corps. Without the
consent of the RP, he pledged allegiance to the US. RP
citizenship was lost, as per Section 1(4) of
Commonwealth Act No. 63. Cruz was naturalized as US

citizen. Cruz reacquired his RP citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630. Cruz was elected as the
Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan.
Bengson filed an action quo warranto
DOCTRINE: Cruz is a natural-born citizen. There are
two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship
correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born
citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the
time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. In respondent Cruzs case, he lost his Filipino
citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Mercado v. Manzano (1999)
SUMMARY: Edu Manzano garnered the highest vote for
Makati Vice-Mayor but his proclamation was suspended
in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a
certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that Edu was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States
DOCTRINE: Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Considering the citizenship
clause of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship. Dual allegiance refers to the situation in
which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship
is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individuals volition. By filing a certificate of candidacy
when he ran for his present post, Edu elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship.
AASJS member Calilung v. Datumanong (2007)
SUMMARY: Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the
1987 Constitution that states, Dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with
by law.
DOCTRINE: What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces
his foreign citizenship. What happens to the other
11
citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No.

9225.
Residence
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC (1995)
SUMMARY: Imelda filed her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte, providing information that she is a
resident of seven months in the constituency where she
seeks to be elected immediately preceding the election.
Montejo, also running for the same position, filed a
Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging
that Imelda did not meet the constitutional requirement
for residency (must have been a resident for not less
than one year). She thus amended her COC, changing
seven months to since childhood. This amendment
was not admitted because it was filed out of time, so
Imelda filed her amended COC with COMELEC in
division. The COMELEC in division found the petition for
disqualification meritorious and struck off the amended
as well as original COCs. SC decided otherwise; for
purposes of election laws, residence is the same as
domicile. Imelda has sufficiently shown that her domicile
was Leyte, and hence, is qualified.
DOCTRINE: DOMICILE: a place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent
RESIDENCE: implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence
of a person in a given area, community or country.
RESIDENCE FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: For political
purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these
concepts have evolved in our election law, what has
clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile.
ELEMENTS OF CHANGE OF DOMICILE: 1. An actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which
correspond with the purpose.
For Local Government Positions
Rodriguez v. COMELEC (1996)
SUMMARY: Rodriguez won the post of Governor.
Marquez filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that
Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice as he has a case filed
in the US for fraud and theft. SC in the Marquez decision
defined a fugitive of justice as not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution, and
remanded the case to the COMELEC. Rodriguez alleges

that he left the US before charges were filed and had no
intent to evade, and thus cannot be a fugitive of justice.
COMELEC held that he was one. Rodriguez again ran
and won as Governor. Marquez and COMELECs
EVALUATION seeks a redefinition and insists that one
becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact that he
leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against
him, SC disagreed. Intent to evade on the part of a
candidate must therefore be established by proof that
there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge
has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a
"fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez
cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial
post.
DOCTRINE: The definition thus indicates that the intent
to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's
flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there
can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing
subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction.
Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan (1999)
SUMMARY: Francisco and Lenlie Lecaroz, father and
son, were convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 13 counts
of estafa through falsification of public documents. They
were accused of their alleged refusal to allow Jowil Red
to assume his post as KB Chairman.
DOCTRINE: The concept of holdover when applied to a
public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and
the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term.
Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory
provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in
office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has
qualified. The oath of office taken by Jowil Red before a
member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no
authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted
to no oath at all. Since Red never qualified for the post,
Lenlie remained KB representative to the Sanggunian,
albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a
de jure officer, or at least a de facto officer entitled to
receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining
to the position.
B. Disqualifications
1. General Disqualifications
In general, individuals who lack the qualifications

prescribed by law or the Constitution are
ineligible or disqualified from holding public
office.
Appointment of an ineligible/unqualified person
is a nullity.
12
2. Specific Disqualifications
Mental/Physical Incapacity
Idiot or other person non compos mentis is
incapable of accepting or holding public office.
But blindness, etc. does not automatically
disqualify a person from holding public office as
long as he is qualified in all other respects.
Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 12:
SECTION 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has
been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment
for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more
than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to
hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided
shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified.
Impeachment
Const., Art. XI, Sec. 3(7)
Section 3 (7). Judgment in cases of impeachment shall
not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of
the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial,
and punishment, according to law.
Who are the impeachable officers? President,
VP, Members of SC and of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman
Grounds: culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of
public trust, other high crimes.
Sinco: Impeachment penalties are merely
incidental to the primary intention of protecting
the people as a body politic.
Removal/suspension from office
Grounds
for
suspension/removal
include
disqualifying acts.
Does suspension/removal itself disqualify one
from holding the same or another office?
Generally, this must be provided for by law.
Removal from office bars the removed officer
from filling out the vacancy for the unexpired
term but it does not disqualify him to take
another office or be appointed/elected to a new
term for the same office.
Judgment of ouster may not preclude offender

from entering in a succeeding term to which he
has been elected before judgment was
rendered; same principle applies to preemptive
resignation.
Previous tenure of office
Const., Art. VII, Sec. 4: The President is not
eligible for any re-election regardless of length of
time served.
President through succession is disqualified only
if she has served as such for more than 4 years.
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, the
Ombudsman, and her deputies are appointed
without reappointment; Ombudsman and
deputies are also disqualified from running for
elective office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.
Consecutive terms
VP limited to 2 consecutive terms
Senator limited to 2 consecutive terms
Representative and elective local officials other
than barangay officials limited to 3 consecutive
terms
Office newly created or emoluments of which have been
increased
Const., Art. VI, Section 13. No Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall
he be appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the
term for which he was elected.
Prohibition
applies
only
to
offices
created/emoluments increased by Congress
Emoluments include all fees and compensation
the officer is entitled to receive by law
Candidacy for elective position
Const., Art. IX-B, Section 6. No candidate who has lost
in any election shall, within one year after such election,
be appointed to any office in the Government or any
Government-owned or controlled corporations or in any
of their subsidiaries.
Reiterated in the Civil Service Law, Sec. 54(2)
Separate provision applies to members of
Constitutional Commissions
Under the Local Government Code
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
13
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)

years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the
oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political
cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those
who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of
this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 94. Appointment of Elective and Appointive
Local Officials; Candidates Who Lost in an Election. - (a)
No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no elective or appointive local
official shall hold any other office or employment in the
government
or
any
subdivision,
agency
or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Holding Multiple Offices/Incompatible Offices
Civil Service Law, Sec. 54(3)
(3) Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.
No constitutional right to hold incompatible
offices
Rule stems from States legitimate interest in
preventing one person from holding multiple
offices
Purpose is to prevent offices of public trust from
accumulating in a single person and to prevent
individuals from deriving, directly or indirectly,
any pecuniary benefit by virtue of dual positionholding.
Even if duties do not conflict, consolidation of
government functions in a single person could
adversely affect freedom of expression of other
persons.
Effect: Acceptance of a second incompatible
office creates a vacancy of, or implied
resignation from, the first office.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra
SUMMARY: 2 petitions filed by Civil Liberties Union and

Anti-Graft League of the Philippines seeking a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO No. 284 (and
DOJ Opinion 73, 129 and 155) issued by President
Corazon Aquino on July 25, 1987. Petitioners argue that
the above provisions add exceptions to Sec 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution other than those provided by
the Constitution by allowing members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
other government offices or positions.
DOCTRINE: In Sec. 13, Art. VII there is no qualification
of the position being in the Government. The
disqualification is ABSOLUTE. While EO 284 was
declared unconstitutional, the prohibition against holding
dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be
construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of said
officials office.
Dela Cruz v. COA (2001)
SUMMARY: COA issued a memorandum stating that
EO 284 had been declared unconstitutional insofar as it
allows Cabinet members, their deputies, and assistants
to hold other offices; and directing its designated
auditors in all national government offices to immediately
cause
the
disallowance
of
additional
compensation/remuneration given to and received by
government officials affected by the decisions ruling on
the multiple position rule.
DOCTRINE: The ex officio position being actually and in
legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already
paid for and covered by the compensation attached to
his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the
Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary
Board as an ex officio member thereof, he is actually
and in legal contemplation performing the primary
function of his principal office in defining policy in
monetary banking matters, which come under the
jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance,
therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or
an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such
euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such
additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
Flores v. Drilon, supra
SUMMARY: Sec. 13, par. (d), RA 7227 provided that for
the first year of its operations from the effectivity of the
Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
14
appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of

the Subic Authority. The Mayor of Olongapo then was
Gordon. The constitutionality of said provision was
assailed by Flores et al., mainly citing Sec. 7, first par.,
Art. IX-B, of the Constitution: [n]o elective official shall
be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his tenure. SC
declared the provision UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Mayor of
Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject
posts are public offices. SC also discussed the
difference between the first and second paragraphs of
Sec. 7 Art. IX-B.
DOCTRINE: While the second paragraph authorizes
holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent
by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to the
government post, except as are particularly recognized
in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of
the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President,
who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a
member of Congress who may be designated ex officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
The distinction between the first and second paragraphs
was not accidental when drawn, and not without reason.
It was purposely sought by the drafters of the
Constitution as shown in their deliberation: in the case
of appointive officials, there will be certain situations
where the law should allow them to hold some other
positions.
The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to
appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be
extended to elective officials who are governed by the
first paragraph.
Public Interest Center v. Elma (2006)
SUMMARY: Elma was appointed and took his oath of
office as PCGG Chairman. Thereafter, during his tenure
as the PCGG Chairman, he was appointed Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) and took his oath of
office as CPLC the following day. However, he waived
any remuneration that he may receive as CPLC.
DOCTRINE: There is no legal objection to a government
official occupying two government offices and performing
the functions of both as long as there is no
incompatibility. The force of the word, in its application to
this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each
other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by the
same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which
would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully
and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the
incumbent of the other. The force of the word, in its
application to this matter is, that from the nature and
relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not

to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and
antagonism which would result in the attempt by one
person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of
one, toward the incumbent of the other.
Being an elective official
Const., Art. IX-B, Section 7. No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure.
including Government-owned or controlled corporations
Purpose: Minimize spoils system
Disqualification subsists only during the tenure
(not term) of the elective official.
May be appointed if official forfeits the elective
office.
Reiterated in the Civil Service Law [Sec. 54(1)]
Liban v. Gordon (2009)
SUMMARY: Petitioners filed with the Court a Petition to
Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat
in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of
Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while
respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors, as provided in 13,
Art. VI of the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: The PNRC is not government-owned but
privately owned. A government-owned or controlled
corporation must be owned by the government, and in
the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its
capital stock must be owned by the government. In the
case of a non-stock corporation, by analogy at least a
majority of the members must be government officials
holding such membership by appointment or designation
by the government. Under this criterion, and as
discussed earlier, the government does not own or
control PNRC.
Oath
EO 292, Introductory Provisions, Secs. 40-42
Section 40. Oaths of Office for Public Officers and
Employees. All public officers and employees of the
government including every member of the armed forces
shall, before entering upon the discharge of his duties,
take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend the
Constitution that he will bear true faith and allegiance to
it obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities will well and faithfully
discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office
or position upon which he is about to enter and that he
voluntarily assumes the obligation imposed by his oath
15
of office, without mental reservation or purpose of

evasion. Copies of the oath shall be deposited with the
Civil Service Commission and the National Archives.
Section 41. Officers Authorized to Administer Oath.
(1) The following officers have general authority to
administer oath: Notaries public, members of the
judiciary, clerks of courts, the Secretary of the either
House of the Congress of the Philippines, of
departments, bureau directors, registers of deeds,
provincial governors and lieutenant-governors, city
mayors, municipal mayors and any other officer in the
service of the government of the Philippines whose
appointment is vested in the President.
(2) Oaths may also be administered by any officer
whose duties, as defined by law or regulation, require
presentation to him of any statement under oath.
Section 42. Duty to Administer Oath. Officers authorized
to administer oaths, with the exception of notaries public,
municipal judges and clerks of court, are not obliged to
administer oaths or execute certificates save in matters
of official business and with the exception of notaries
public, the officer performing the service in those matters
shall charge no fee, unless specifically authorized by
law.
Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, supra
DOCTRINE: The oath of office taken by Jowil Red
before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who had
no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and
amounted to no oath at all. An oath of office is a
qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite
to the full investiture with the office. Only when the public
officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath does his
right to enter into the position become plenary and
complete. Until then, he has none at all. And for as long
as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful
occupant.
Profession/Prohibited Practice
Abeto v. Garcesa (1995)
SUMMARY: The complaint charges Garcesa with
having misrepresented himself as a full-fledged lawyer
and having acted as one of the authorized reps of Abeto
in labor cases filed with Regional Arbitration Branch VI of
NLRC Bacolod despite the fact that he is a court
employee.
DOCTRINE: The provisions of Memorandum Circular No.
17 of the Executive Department are not applicable to
officials or employees of the courts considering the
express prohibition in the Rules of Court and the nature
of their work which requires them to serve with the
highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, in order
to maintain public confidence in the Judiciary. This
prohibition is directed against "moonlighting," which

amounts to malfeasance in office.
Rabe v. Flores (1997)
SUMMARY: Flores was a court employee who did not
report her business interests over market stalls in her
sworn statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth,
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections, and Identification of Relatives in the
Government Service.
DOCTRINE: Although every office in the government
service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from
an individual than in the judiciary. Personnel in the
judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner
as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from
any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior,
not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in
their everyday life. They are strictly mandated to
maintain good moral character at all times and to
observe irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage
public decency. (n.b.: This case was cited in CJ
Coronas impeachment.)
Relationship with Appointing Authority/Nepotism
Public office is a public trust, so
appointments thereto must be based solely
on merit and fitness, uninfluenced by any
personal or filial consideration.
Constitutional prohibition on the relatives of
the President from becoming members of
Constitutional Commissions, Ombudsman,
Dept. Secretary, Usec., or chair of
bureaus/offices, including GOCCs.
The prohibition covers all kinds of
appointments, be they original, promotional,
transfer, or reemployment, regardless of
status. It also includes designation.
Section 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments in the
national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in
any branch or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, made in
favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending
authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the
persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are
hereby prohibited.
As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members
of the family referred to are those related within the third
degree either or consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operation of the
rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a
confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and
(d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines:
Provided, however, That in each particular instance full
16
report of such appointment shall be made to the

Commission.
The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be
applicable to the case of a member of any family who,
after his or her appointment to any position in an office
or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same
office or bureau, in which event the employment or
retention therein of both husband and wife may be
allowed.
(3) In order to give immediate effect to these provisions,
cases of previous appointments which are in
contravention hereof shall be corrected by transfer, and
pending such transfer, no promotion or salary increase
shall be allowed in favor of the relative or relatives who
are appointed in violation of these provisions.
Guarantee: Appointment papers must be
accompanied by a certification of the
appointing/recommending authority stating that
he is not related to the appointee within the 3rd
degree of consanguinity/affinity.
Debulgado v. CSC (1994)
SUMMARY: Mayor Debulgado of San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental, appointed his wife Victoria as City
General Services Officer. Victoria has been serving the
city government since 1961 so this is considered as a
promotion for her. The Debulgados now argue that the
prohibition against nepotic appointments is applicable
only to original appointments and not to promotional
appointments.
DOCTRINE: Victorias promotional appointment was
properly disapproved for being a nepotic appointment.
Looking into the textual analysis of Sec. 59, Book V of
the Revised Admin Code, its IRR and the CSC Omnibus
Implementing Rules, the appointment prohibited by the
rule on nepotism covers ALL appointments without
distinction. The prohibition was cast in comprehensive
and unqualified terms. The legal prohibition against
nepotism does not apply only to original appointments to
Civil Service but also to promotional appointment.
CSC v. Dacoycoy (1999)
SUMMARY: CSC found Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on
2 counts as a result of the appoint of his 2 sons, Rito and
Ped, as driver and utility worker, and their assignment
under his immediate supervision and control as the
Vocational School Administrator at Balicuatro College of
Arts and Trades.
DOCTRINE: Under the definition of nepotism, one is
guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of
a relative within the 3rd civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of any of the ff.
a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the

appointee.
In the last 2 situations, it is immaterial who the
appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a
violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is
extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the
bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee.
Misconduct/Crime
Purpose of disqualification: To assure public
confidence in the essential integrity of the
government, persons convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude are usually disqualified
from holding public office.
Promotes honesty and integrity in candidates for
and holders of public office
Question of whether the disqualification attaches
upon commission of crime or only upon
conviction depends to some extent on wording
of applicable statutory or constitutional provision
Violation of municipal ordinances
o To be disqualifying, the ordinance must
involve at least a certain degree of
evildoing, immoral conduct, corruption,
malice, or want of some principle
reasonably related to requirements of
the office
o But this does not mean that only acts
punished by national law are crimes or
go into a persons criminal record.
o Law
of
Municipal
corporations
distinguishes
between
acts
not
essentially
criminal
relating
to
regulations for promotion of peace,
order, comfort, and safety (jaywalking,
traffic rule violation) and acts intrinsically
punishable as public offenses.
Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC (2015)
SUMMARY: Erap, after plunder conviction, was
pardoned by GMA. In 2013, he ran for Manila Mayor.
Risos-Vidal sought his disqualification. COMELEC ruled
that he is qualified to vote and be voted for in public
office as a result of the pardon granted to him.
HELD: COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in ruling that the pardon restored Estradas
right to be voted for public office. The proper
construction of the text of the pardon should result in the
conclusion that it is meant to restore all civil and political
rights to Estrada including the right to be voted for
public office. This flows from the constitutional principle
Denotes cases not in the outline but mentioned in class/assigned by Maam.
17
that the pardoning power of the President is plenary. It is

subject only to the limitations set forth in the Constitution
and cannot be limited by legislative action. This principle
has been upheld in jurisprudence and in the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Thus, Risos-Vidals interpretation of the pardons text
based on RPC 36 and 41 should be rejected. These
provisions do not operate to limit the pardoning power
such that the remission of the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification must be expressly
stated in the pardon. Rather, they mean that the pardon
of the principal penalty does not carry with it the
remission of the accessory penalties unless the
President expressly includes said accessory penalties in
the pardon. In Estradas pardon, the phrase (h)e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Law,
jurisprudence and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights all recognize the right to seek public
elective office as one of the basic political rights. The
effect is that the pardon removed Estradas
disqualification to seek the Manila mayoralty under LGC
40 and OEC 12. The whereas clause providing that
Estrada committed to no longer seek public office does
not make the pardon conditional, for a whereas clause is
not an operative part of a statute or enactment and only
serves to state its purpose.
C. Acquisition of Right or Title to Office

1. Appointment
Definition
Selection by the authority vested with the power,
of an individual who is to exercise the functions
of a given office
Act of designation by an executive officer, board,
or body, to whom that power has been
delegated, of the person who is to exercise the
duties and responsibilities of the given position
Commission Formal evidence of appointment
(usually a written document); written authority
from a competent source given to the officer as
a warrant for the exercise if the powers and
duties of the office to which he is commissioned.
Power to appoint
Inherently belongs to the people, who then vest
the power in certain persons by Constitution or
laws [hence, election vs. appointment]
When the people have designated it to certain
public officials, power to appoint is generally
seen as an executive function
However, appointments by the other branches

can be made as an incident to the discharge of
functions within their respective spheres.
May be absolute or conditional.
o Power is absolute if the choice of the
appointing authority is conclusive,
provided the chosen person is eligible.
o Power is conditional when the assent or
approval of some other body or officer is
necessary to complete the appointment
Nature of power: Executive and discretionary
Essentially an executive function
Discretionary upon the officer, hence reviewable
only on ground of grave abuse of discretion.
o Cannot be compelled by mandamus
o Appointing power has the right of choice
which he may exercise freely according
to her judgment, deciding for herself
who is best qualified among those who
have the necessary qualifications and
eligibilities.
o Prerogative of the appointing power
which may be exercised without liability,
unless there is bad faith, malice, or
oppression in the exercise of the power
CSC has no power to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified.
It also has no authority to direct the appointment
of a substitute or a successful protestant/
However, CSC can revoke an appointment
initially approved in disregard of applicable
provisions of law and regulations.
Restrictions on the power to appoint
In general
o Appointee should be eligible and
qualified.
o Appointment must be made for the
public benefit. Appointing authority
cannot appoint himself.
o Appointment cannot be made to an
office which is not vacant.
Constitutional restrictions (In Arts. VII, VIII, IX,
and XI)
Statutory restrictions
Form of appointment
2 views
o Appointment must be written or be
evidenced by some form of written
memorial because it affects the public
interest, thus it should be authenticated
in a way that the public may know when
and in what manner the duty has been
performed
18
Right of appointee to the office depends

upon the fact of appointment and not
upon the ability to establish a written
evidence of appointment. When the law
does not require a specific form or
manner of appointment, it may be made
orally (Ykalina v. Oricio).
When appointment completed
If the appointment power is absolute, the
commission can be issued once the choice of
the appointee is made.
If the appointment power is conditional, the
commission can issue only when the assent or
confirmation of the confirming power.
In either case, appointment becomes complete
when the last act required of the appointing
power is performed.
Approval of the CSC for appointments under the
civil service, though mandatory, is a mere
attestation that the appointee is qualified. If the
appointee is eligible, the CSC has no choice but
to attest to the appointment.
Acceptance
See Velicaria-Garafil v. OP
de Leon: Acceptance is not necessary to
completion or validity of appointment but is
necessary for the possession of the office.
Acceptance may be express (e.g., filing of a
required bond) or implied (when the appointee
enters into the discharge of the office without
formal acceptance)
Acceptance is necessary for full possession,
enjoyment, and assumption of responsbilities of
of office. Appointee cannot impose conditions on
his acceptance of office.
GR: Acceptance of appointment cannot be
compelled.
EX: In certain cases, acceptance is mandatory:
o Compulsory military service (Const., Art.
II, Sec. 4)
o Refusal to enter into an elective office is
a felony under the RPC
o Able-bodied males may be required by
the State, in exercise of the police power,
to assist in the protection of the peace
and order of the community (US v.
Pompeya).
Revocation
Final and complete appointment
GR: Final and complete appointment is not
subject to reconsideration or revocation.
Revocation must be made before the
appointment is complete
EX: Officer is removable at will of the appointing

power. Here there is technically no removal
since loss of confidence is considered expiration
of term
When appointee has assumed the position
Once an appointee has assumed the position
and his appointment is approved by the CSC, he
acquires a legal right to the position which is
protected by law and the Constitution (see
Aquino v. CSC).
Removal then must be done only after notice
and hearing
Irregularities in an appointment must be deemed
cured by the probational and absolute
appointment of the appointee, unless the
appointment is an absolute nullity or there is
fraud on the part of the appointee.
Protestant is more qualified than appointee
Completed appointment cannot be revoked
merely on such ground; however, the first
appointee must possess the minimum
qualifications required by law.
SUMMARY: Requisites of valid appointment
Vacant position
Authority of the appointing power
Act or evidence of the act of appointment
Qualification and eligibility of the appointee
Acceptance of the appointment by the appointee
As stated in Velicaria-Garafil v. OP, infra (WRT
Presidential appointments):
(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of
the authority
(2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of
the transmittal
(3) a vacant position at the time of appointment
(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of
the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
PLM v. IAC (1985)
SUMMARY: Esteban transferred to the Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila. He was initially extended an ad
interim appointment as VP for Administration by the
president, Dr. Blanco. This ad interim appointment was
renewed several times.
DOCTRINE: An ad interim appointment is an
appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The
appointing power has the right of choice which he may
exercise freely according to his judgment deciding for
himself who is best qualified among those who have the
necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The general
19
rule is that the power of appointment must remain

unhampered by judicial intervention. However, when the
law is violated or hen there is grave abuse of discretion
the courts have to step in.
Luego v. CSC (1986)
SUMMARY: Luego was appointed Administrative Officer
11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City. CSC found the
private respondent better qualified than the petitioner
and directed that Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the
position of Administrative Officer 11, in place of Luego
whose appointment was revoked.
DOCTRINE: Appointment is an essentially discretionary
power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition
being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there
are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide.
Regis v. Osmea (1991)
SUMMARY: Regis was appointed by Cebu City mayor
Duterte as driver, Motorized Division of the Cebu Police
Department. He was issued subsequent appointments to
the same position on Jan 8, 1960, December 21, 1961,
and November 7, 1963. On April 14, 1964, petitioner
was removed from his position in the Cebu Police
Department without prior investigation or hearing.
DOCTRINE: Whereas a temporary appointment is
designed to fill 'a position needed only for a limited
period not exceeding six months,' a provisional
appointment, on the other hand, is intended for the
contingency that 'a vacancy occurs and the filling thereof
is necessary in the interest of the service and there is no
appropriate register of eligibles at the time of
appointment.' A provisional appointment may be
extended only to a person who has not qualified in an
appropriate examination but who otherwise meets the
requirements for appointment to a regular position in the
competitive service x x x (NB: there is no longer a
classification for provisional employees under the

current Civil Service law)
Achacoso v. Macaraig (1991)
SUMMARY: Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed
Administrator of the POEA on October 16, 1987, and
assumed office on October 27, 1987. On January 2,
1990, he filed a courtesy resignation, in compliance with
a request from the President. However, he protested his
replacement and declared he was not surrendering his
office because his resignation was not voluntary but filed
only in obedience to the President's directive. The
Solicitor General concedes that the office of POEA

Administrator is a career executive service position but
submits that the petitioner himself is not a career
executive service official entitled to security of tenure.
DOCTRINE: The mere fact that a position belongs to the
Career Service does not automatically confer security of
tenure on its occupant. Such right will have to depend on
the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on
his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have
the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be
appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception
to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting
capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The
purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to
prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by
authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the
selection of a permanent or another appointee.
An acting appointee is separated from office through
expiration of the term. His term is understood at the
outset as without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure
of the appointing authority.
Marohombsar v. Alonto (1991)
SUMMARY: On March 22, 1988, the petitioner was
designated as officer-in-charge of the Office of the
Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs (OVCAA) of MSU
in a concurrent capacity with her position then as
Vice-President for External Studies. On January 2, 1989,
the Office of the Vice-President for External Studies was
merged with the OVCAA and, as such, the functions of
the former were to be exercised by the latter. The
petitioner was appointed acting Vice-Chancellor for
Academic Affairs on the same day. The Board of
Regents of the MSU, on May 16, 1989, approved her
appointment as acting Vice-Chancellor for Academic
Affairs
DOCTRINE: A bona fide appointment in an acting
capacity is essentially temporary and revocable in
character and the holder of such appointment may be
removed anytime even without hearing or cause. The
essence of an acting appointment is its temporary nature.
It is a stop gap measure intended to fill an office for a
limited time until a permanent appointment is extended
or a new appointee is chosen. However, neither can the
appointing power use the principle of temporary
appointments to evade or avoid the security of tenure
principle in the Constitution and the Civil Service Law.
This is similar to the rule that the head of an office
cannot arbitrarily convert permanent positions to
primarily confidential items so that he can more freely
fire and hire or rehire subordinates at his personal
discretion. In this case, the intent to make the petitioner
serve at the pleasure of the respondent MSU President
asked in the mid-terms. Yun lang naalala ko hahaha
20
is obvious. The petitioner is a career official of MSU for

over 27 years.
Sinon v. CSC (1992)
SUMMARY: Pursuant to the reorganization of the DA,
there was an evaluation of certain employees for twenty
nine position of MAO in Region II, Cagayan. The list
prepared by the Placement Committee included Sinon
but excluded Banan. Banan filed an appeal with the
DARAB for re- evaluation of the qualification of all those
included in the aforementioned list made by the
Placement Committee. DARAB released Resolution No.
97, approved by the Secretary of the DA, where Sinon
was displaced by Banan. However, Sinon received an
appointment as MAO for Region II in Cagayan as
approved by Regional Director on the basis of the first
evaluation made by the Placement Committee. Banan
filed an MR, asserting that she is more qualified than
Sinon. CSC granted the MR and gave due course to
Banans appointment.
DOCTRINE: No GAD on the part of the CSC. There was
no statement in the assailed CSC resolution directing
Banans appointment. It was simply an affirmation of
Banans appointment as recommended by DARAB and
approved by the DA Secretary. This is in compliance
with 4 of RA 6656 which mandates that officers and
employees holding permanent appointments shall be
given preference for appointment to the new positions
in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their
former positions.
Camarines Sur v. CA (1995)
SUMMARY: Dato was appointed as Private Agent. On
October 12, 1972, he was promoted and was appointed
Assistant Provincial Warden by then Governor Felix
Alfelor, Sr. Because he had no civil service eligibility for
the position he was appointed to, private respondent Tito
Dato could not be legally extended a permanent
appointment. Hence, what was extended to him was
only a temporary appointment. Thereafter, the temporary
appointment was renewed annually. Governor Alfelor
then approved the change in Dato's employment status
from temporary to permanent upon the latter's
representation that he passed the civil service
examination
for
supervising
security
guards.
DOCTRINE: Such lack of a civil service eligibility made
his appointment temporary and without a fixed and
definite term and is dependent entirely upon the
pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that Dato
obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment
as his having passed the supervising security guard
examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary
appointment into a permanent one. In such a case, what
is required is a new appointment.
Gloria v. de Guzman (1995)
SUMMARY: The PAFCA Board issued Resolution No.

91-026, which declared that "All faculty/administrative
employees are also subject to the required civil service
eligibilities", in accordance with pertinent civil service law,
rules and regulations. Thus, private respondents were
issued only temporary appointments because at the time
of their appointment, they lacked appropriate civil service
eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary
qualification standards for their respective positions.
DOCTRINE: Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not
the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be considered
by the appointing authority are: performance, degree of
education, work experience, training, seniority, and,
more importantly, as in this case, whether or not the
applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the
appointing power. The position of Board Secretary II, by
its nature, is primarily confidential, requiring as it does
"not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for
the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which
ensures freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state." In other
words, the choice of an appointee from among those
who possessed the required qualifications is a political
and administrative decision calling for considerations of
wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the
service which can best be made by the Head of the
office concerned.
Acquisition of civil service eligibility by a
temporary appointee does not entitle him, as a
matter of right, to a permanent (re)appointment.
Matibag v. Benipayo (2002)
SUMMARY: PGMA extended an ad interim appointment
to Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman. His appointment
was forwarded to the Commission of Appointments but
remained unacted upon. PGMA renewed Benipayos ad
interim appointment several times since the Commission
of Appointments failed to act on the appointment.
Petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment to the
COMELEC is a temporary appointment that is prohibited
by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity
of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim
appointment takes effect immediately. An ad interim
appointment can be terminated for two causes specified
in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of
his ad interim appointment by the Commission on
Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of
21
Congress without the Commission on Appointments

acting on his appointment. A by-passed ad interim
appointment can be revived by a new ad interim
appointment because there is no final disapproval under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving
beyond the fixed term of seven years.
Erasmo v. Home Insurance & Guaranty Corp. (2002)
SUMMARY: Erasmo appealed the status of her
temporary appointment to the CSC, which held, in its
resolution, that a CES eligibility is required to a CES
position, and even if one possesses such eligibility, still
the appointment cannot be considered permanent
unless an appointment to the rank has been granted by
the President of the Philippines. In dismissing her appeal,
the CSC ruled inter alia that Erasmo is not protected by
the security of tenure clause under the Constitution
because she was holding her position of Vice-President
under a temporary status.
DOCTRINE: Erasmos promotional appointment as VicePresident of TS/GCIG is merely temporary in nature. Her
appointment papers clearly indicate it. This is because
Erasmo does not possess a career executive service
eligibility which is necessary for the position of VicePresident of TS/GCIG, it being a career service
executive office. Her new appointment, being temporary
in character, was terminable at the pleasure of the
appointing power with or without a cause, and petitioner
does not enjoy security of tenure.
Padilla v. CSC (2003)
SUMMARY: Padilla assumed the permanent position of
Clerk II in the then Ministry of Labor and Employment.
She was then promoted to the position of Labor
Development Assistant. She then resigned from the
service.
Later on she took the Career Service
Examination (Professional Level) and passed. She then
re-applied at the DOLE. She was appointed as Casual
Research Assistant and the same was extended. From
January 1989 until December 1989, Padilla occupied the
position of Casual Technical. Her item was abolished by
virtue of RA 6758. She was offered the position of Clerk
II for which the Selection Board deemed her qualified.
However, she declined the offer. She was appointed
Casual Clerk III, effective until the end of June 1990.
After the expiration of her appointment as a casual
employee, she was no longer given any position.
DOCTRINE: Like removal for just cause, voluntary
resignation results in the abdication of all present and
future rights accorded to an employee and in the
severance of all work-related ties between the employer
and the employee. When she returned to work for
respondent DOLE, the same was not a continuation of
her previous service but the start of a new work slate.
Petitioner could not therefore demand from respondent

DOLE her reinstatement to a permanent position under
Section 24(d) of PD 807 inasmuch as she was never
unjustly removed. Having accepted the position of a
casual employee, Padilla should have known that she
had no security of tenure and could thus be separated
from the service anytime
CSC v. dela Cruz (2004)
SUMMARY: Dela Cruz was employed at the ATO of the
DOTC, first as a Check Pilot II and then was
promotionally appointed. Calamba of the Aviation
Security Division of the filed a protest before the DOTC
questioning the appointment, claiming that respondent
did not meet the 4-year supervisory requirement for said
position. This was dismissed. On appeal, the CSC- NCR
upheld the protest of Calamba and recalled the
appointment. Upon clarification, the CSC-NCR granted
Calambas appeal. Dela Cruz filed an MR, which was
denied. The CA, however, reversed the resolution and
affirmed the appointment of Dela Cruz.
DOCTRINE: Dela Cruzs multifarious experiences and
trainings in air transportation were taken into account
when he was chosen for the subject position.
Promotions in the Civil Service should always be made
on the basis of qualifications, including occupational
competence, moral character, devotion to duty, and, not
least important, loyalty to the service. The last trait
should always be given appropriate weight, to reward
the civil servant who has chosen to make his
employment in the Government a lifetime career in
which he can expect advancement through the years for
work well done. Political patronage should not be
necessary. His record alone should be sufficient
assurance that when a higher position becomes vacant,
he shall be seriously considered for the promotion and, if
warranted, preferred to less devoted aspirants
CSC v. Darangina (2007)
SUMMARY:
Darangina
was
a
development
management officer V in the Office of Muslim Affairs
(OMA). On September 25, 2000, he was extended a
temporary promotional appointment as director III. On
October 11, 2000, the CSC approved this temporary
appointment effective for one (1) year from the date of its
issuance unless sooner terminated. OMA Exec. Director
Tomawis, on October 31, 2000, terminated Daranginas
temporary appointment on the ground that he is not a
career executive service eligible.
DOCTRINE: He is not entitled to reinstatement. As a
rule, no person may be appointed to a public office
unless he or she possesses the requisite qualifications.
The exception to the rule is where, in the absence of
appropriate eligibles, he or she may be appointed to it
merely in a temporary capacity. Such pre- termination of
22
a temporary appointment may be with or without cause

as the appointee serves merely at the pleasure of the
appointing power. Where a non-eligible holds a
temporary appointment, his replacement by another
non-eligible is not prohibited.
Corpuz v. CA (1998)
SUMMARY: Corpuz was appointed the MTRCBs legal
counsel. The appointment was approved by Asst.
Regional Director of the CSC-NCR. Subsequently, he
was designated Attorney V under the Salary
Standardization Law. The MTRCB passed a Resolution
declaring the appointments of MTRCB administrative
and subordinate employees null and void. CSC: Corpuz
had already acquired security of tenure in the said
position.
DOCTRINE: Where the power of appointment is
absolute, and the appointee has been determined upon,
no further consent or approval is necessary, and the
formal evidence of the appointment, the commission,
may issue at once. Where, however, the assent or
confirmation of some other officer or body is required,
the commission can issue or the appointment may be
complete only when such assent or confirmation is
obtained. In either case, the appointment becomes
complete when the last act required of the appointing
power is performed. Until the process is completed, the
appointee can claim no vested right in the office nor
invoke security of tenure.
Lapinid v. CSC (1991)
SUMMARY: Lapinid was appointed by the PPA to the
position of Terminal Supervisor. Junsay contended that
he should be designated instead, in view of his
preferential right to the position. CSC: ruled in favor of
Junsay, on the ground that he scored higher in the
evaluations.
DOCTRINE: The CSC has no power of appointment
except over its own personnel. Neither does it have the
authority to review the appointments made by other
offices except only to ascertain if the appointee
possesses the required qualifications. Departure from
the Luego doctrine by the CSC after the date of the
promulgation of this decision shall be considered
contempt and shall be dealt with severely.
Gen. Manager, PPA v. Monserate, supra
DOCTRINE: Appointing authority has wide latitude of
discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified
persons to vacant positions in the civil service. However,
the moment the discretionary power of appointment is
exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and
functions of the position, such appointment cannot
anymore be revoked by the appointing authority and
appoint another in his stead, except for cause. Here, no
iota of evidence was ever established to justify the
revocation of Monserate's appointment by demoting her.

Her security of tenure guaranteed under the 1987
Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2, par. (3)] should not
be placed at the mercy of abusive exercise of the
appointing power
When the CA reinstated Monserate to her legitimate post
as Manager II in the Resource Management Division, it
merely restored her appointment to the said position to
which her right to security of tenure had already attached.
Her position as Manager II never became vacant since
her demotion was void. In this jurisdiction, "an
appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil service
is null and void ab initio.
Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President (2015)
SUMMARY: All petitions question the constitutionality of
PNoys EO 2 for being inconsistent with Const.,
Art.VII15. EO 2 sought to Recall, Withdraw, and
Revoke Midnight Appointments.
DOCTRINE: EO No. 2 is constitutional, and petitioners
are midnight appointees because their appointments
were not completed before the ban took effect.
Appointment to a government post is a process that
takes several steps to complete. Any valid appointment,
including one made under the exception provided in 15,
Article VII must consist of the President signing an
appointees appointment paper to a vacant office, the
official transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably
through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper by
the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by
the appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or
his or her assumption to office.
a. Appointment by the President
Const., Art. VII, Sec. 16
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may
be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank
in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress,
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
23
Certain appointments by the President are

subject to Constitutional restrictions.
Kinds of Presidential appointments
Regular made while Congress is in session.
Mere nominations which must be approved by
the Commission on Appointments.
Ad interim made while Congress is in recess
or not in session
Permanent lasts until lawful termination. Both
regular and ad interim appointments are
permanent appointments.
Temporary lasts until a permanent
appointment is issued
Ad interim appointment
Const., Art. VII, Sec. 16, 2nd paragraph
Does not apply to appointments which need no
confirmation by the CA
Permanent in nature but effective only until
rejection by the CA or the next adjournment of
Congress
Since ad interim appointment is made during
Congressional recess,
it
is
made
in
transgression of the theory of checks and
balance since it is in effect a grant of appointing
power without legislative confirmation.
May be recalled before confirmation
Temporary appointments
Power to appoint includes the power to make
temporary of acting appointments.
REASON: The whole includes the parts. General
power to make permanent appointment includes
the power to make temporary ones.
EXCEPTIONS
o specific prohibition in law or the
Constitution (e.g., in the Constitutional
Commissions)
o when
temporary
appointment
is
repugnant to the nature of the office to
be filled
Temporary appointments do not need COA
confirmation because it is not a permanent
appointment.
3 steps in the Presidential appointment process
1. Nomination President has sole discretion on
who to nominate.
2. Confirmation Power belongs to Congress as a
check on the appointing power of the President.
o The
President
cannot
confer
confirmatory power to the CA where the
Constitution vested the sole discretion to
appoint in the President without need of
confirmation.
3. Issuance of commission not the appointment

itself but serves as evidence of appointment. Not
mandatory but usually inseparable from the
appointment because there is often nothing to
show that an appointment has been made other
than the commission.
COA Confirmation
Only those in the 1st group require confirmation
Congress
cannot
impose
confirmation
requirement by statute
Heads of offices not called bureaus (SEC,
Insurance Commisson, etc.) no longer require
confirmation.
Presidents voluntary act of submitting a nonCOA appointment to COA and COAs
subsequent action on such submission, would
be without or in excess of jurisdiction (Bautista v.
Salonga)
Sarmiento v. Mison (1987)
SUMMARY: Pres. C. Aquino appointed Salvador Mison
as Commissioner of the BOC without submitting a prior
nomination to the Commission on Appointments and
securing its confirmation. Sarmiento & Arcilla seek to
enjoin Mison from performing the functions of the Office
of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs on the
ground that Mison's appointment is unconstitutional for
not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
DOCTRINE: 4 groups of officers whom the President
shall appoint
1. Heads
of
the
executive
departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution;
2. All other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law
3. Those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint;
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone
(refers to the 3rd sentence).
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination
and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments, the President appoints.
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 16
1st sentence
Not all Cabinet-rank officers are heads of
departments.
24
Other officers whose appointments are

constitutionally vested in the President
1. Regular members of the JBC
2. Lower court judges, Sandiganbayan
justices, Ombudsman and deputies
3. Chairs and Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commissions
4. Members of the regional consultative
commission
2nd sentence
Not otherwise provided for by law
o Where Congress omits to provide for
appointment to said office
o Where Congress provided for an
unconstitutional manner of appointment
Those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint
3rd sentence
Congress is the one vesting the power. It may
vest such in:
o the President alone
o in the courts
o in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards
Lower in rank refers to officers subordinate to
those enumerated officers in whom respectively
the power of appointment may be vested
Calderon v. Carale (1992)
SUMMARY: RA 6715 was passed, amending the Labor
Code. 13 of the law amended Art. 215 of the Code. It
provided that the appointment of the NLRC Chairman
and Commissioners shall be made by the President,
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
DOCTRINE: RA 6715 is unconstitutional because it
amends Art. VII16:
By adding to the 1st sentence more officers who
must be confirmed by the CA
By changing the 2nd sentence in imposing CA
confirmation on appointments which are
entrusted only to the President
In effect, RA 6715 is unconstitutional insofar as it
requires CA confirmation of appointments to the
Chairmanship and Commissionerships of the
NLRC.
There was a deliberate intent on the part of the 1986
ConCom to depart from the pre-1986 appointment
regime where the CA had confirmatory power over
almost all presidential appointments, which led to
abuses.
De Castro v. JBC (2010)
SUMMARY: Then-CJ Puno was set to compulsorily
retire on May 17, 2010, a few days after the presidential
elections which took place on May 10, 2010. Main

petition seeks to enjoin the JBC from moving on with the
appointment of his successor.
DOCTRINE: 15, Art. VII did not apply to appointments
in the Judiciary, on the basis of the records of the
Constitutional Commission. In Re Valenzuela overturned.
Aytona v. Castillo (1962)
SUMMARY: Outgoing President Garcia appointed
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank.
Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day,
at noon, President-elect Macapagal assumed office; and
on the next day, he issued AO No. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments
made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all,
350 midnight appointments made by the Garcia. On
January 1, Macapagal appointed Castillo as ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted quo
warranto against Castillo.
DOCTRINE: The appointments were invalid. It was not
for Garcia to use powers as incumbent President to
continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail
himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan
purposes. (NB: This case is the basis for the current
constitutional provision on midnight appointments.)
In re Valenzuela and Vallarta (1998)
SUMMARY: President Ramos signed the appointments
of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as
Judges of the RTC of Br. 62, Bago City and of Br. 24,
Cabanatuan City, respectively. All the appointments had
been signed on March 30, 1998
DOCTRINE: During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII
of the Constitution, the President is neither required to
make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so;
and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that
the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts
within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited
by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments
comes into effect once every 6 years. The appointments
of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made
during the period of the ban. They come within the
operation of the prohibition relating to appointments.
While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is
undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in
this case of any compelling reason to justify the making
of the appointments during the period of the ban.
Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, supra
DOCTRINE: The President exercises only one kind of
appointing power. There is no need to differentiate the
exercise of the Presidents appointing power outside,
just before, or during the appointment ban. The
Constitution allows the President to exercise the power
of appointment during the period not covered by the
appointment ban, and disallows (subject to an exception)
25
the President from exercising the power of appointment

during the period covered by the appointment ban. The
concurrence of all steps in the appointment process is
admittedly required for appointments outside the
appointment ban. There is no justification whatsoever to
remove acceptance as a requirement in the appointment
process for appointments just before the start of the
appointment ban, or during the appointment ban in
appointments falling within the exception. The existence
of the appointment ban makes no difference in the
power of the President to appoint; it is still the same
power to appoint. In fact, considering the purpose of the
appointment ban, the concurrence of all steps in the
appointment process must be strictly applied on
appointments made just before or during the
appointment ban.
b. Appointment under Civil Service Qualification
Standard
Const. Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(2)
Section 2. (2) Appointments in the civil service shall be
made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to
positions which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical, by competitive
examination.
Appointment under the Civil Service is governed
by the Civil Service Law (EO 292, Book V) and
its related statutes and issuances
(1) Appointment through certification. An appointment
through certification to a position in the civil service,
except as herein otherwise provided, shall be issued to a
person who has been selected from a list of qualified
persons certified by the Commission from an appropriate
register of eligibles, and who meets all the other
requirements of the position.
All such persons must serve a probationary period of six
months following their original appointment and shall
undergo a thorough character investigation in order to
acquire permanent civil service status. A probationer
may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory
conduct or want of capacity any time before the
expiration of the probationary period: Provided, That
such action is appealable to the Commission.
Scope
of
the
Civil
Service:
All
branches,
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government,
including GOCCs with original charters.
Positions in the Civil Service are classified into
Career and Non-Career positions.
Classes of Service
1. Career Service Sec. 7
a. Characteristics
i. Criteria of merit and fitness
ii. Use of competitive examinations
or highly technical qualifications
iii. Opportunity for advancement to
higher career positions
iv. Security of tenure
b. Positions Included
i. Open Career positions
ii. Closed Career positions
iii. Positions
in
the
Career
Executive Service (CES)
iv. Non-CES
Career
officers
appointed by the President (e.g.
Foreign Service Officers)
v. Commissioned officers and
enlisted men of the AFP
vi. Personnel of GOCCs not under
the non-career service
vii. Permanent laborers (skilled,
semi-skilled, or unskilled)
c. Classes of Positions Secs. 5 & 8
i. First Level
1. Positions
included:
Clerical, trades, crafts,
and custodial service
positions
2. Nature: Involve nonprofessional or subprofessional work in a
non-supervisory
or
supervisory capacity
3. Education requirement:
Less than 4 years of
collegiate studies
ii. Second Level
1. Positions
included:
Professional, technical,
and scientific positions
2. Nature:
Involve
professional, technical,
or scientific work in a
non-supervisory
or
supervisory capacity
3. Education requirement:
At least 4 years of
college work up to
Division Chief level
iii. Third Level: Positions in the
Career Executive Service
2. Non-Career Service Sec. 9
a. Characteristics
26
i. Criteria other than usual tests of

merit and fitness utilized for the
career service
ii. Limited tenure
1. Specified by law
2. Coterminous
with/subject to pleasure
of appointing authority
3. Project-based
b. Positions Included Secs. 9(1)-(5)
i. Elective officials and their
personal or confidential staff
ii. Secretaries and other officials of
Cabinet rank who hold their
positions at the pleasure of the
President and their personal or
confidential staff(s)
iii. Chairman and members of
commissions and boards with
fixed terms of office and their
personal or confidential staff
iv. Contractual
personnel
or
project-based
personnel,
requiring special or technical
skills not available in the
employing agency, to be
accomplished within a specific
period, which in no case shall
exceed one year, and performs
or accomplishes the specific
work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of
direction and supervision from
the hiring agency
v. Emergency
and
seasonal
personnel
Recruitment and Selection of Employees 21
1. Principles 21(1)
a. Equal opportunity
b. Attracting best qualified persons
c. Criteria of merit and fitness cf. 26
d. Use of competitive examinations 26
e. In-house screening process 21(4)
2. Filling of Vacancies
a. In general 21(5)
(5) If the vacancy is not filled by promotion as provided
herein the same shall be filled by transfer of present
employees in the government service, by reinstatement,
by re-employment of persons separated through
reduction in force, or by appointment of persons with the
civil service eligibility appropriate to the positions.
b. In the 1st level of the Career Service 21(2)
c. In the 2nd level of the Career Service 21(3)
d. Vacancies filled by promotion 21(6)

3. Qualification Standards 22
4. Examinations
a. Definition 5
(9) Examination refers to a civil service examination
conducted by the Commission and its regional offices or
by other departments or agencies with the assistance of
the Commission, or in coordination or jointly with it, and
those that it may delegate to departments and agencies
pursuant to this Title, or those that may have been
delegated by law.
b. When required 21(7)
(7) Qualification in an appropriate examination shall be
required for appointment to positions in the first and
second levels in the career service in accordance with
the Civil Service rules, except as otherwise provided in
this Title: Provided, That whenever there is a civil service
eligible actually available for appointment, no person
who is not such an eligible shall be appointed even in a
temporary capacity to any vacant position in the career
service in the government or in any government-owned
or controlled corporation with original charter, except
when the immediate filling of the vacancy is urgently
required in the public interest, or when the vacancy is
not permanent, in which cases temporary appointments
of non-eligibles may be made in the absence of eligibles
actually and immediately available.
c. Who administers 21(8)
d. For members of cultural communities 25
e. Results
i. How released 23
ii. Register of Eligibles 24
Approval of the Civil Service Commission
GR: ALL Appointments to the Civil Service
require the approval of the CSC
EX: Presidential appointees, soldiers, police
officers, firefighters, and jailguards.
All appointments to the CSC must be submitted
by the appointing authority to the CSC for
approval within 30 days from issuance,
otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective
30 days thereafter.
APPROVAL of the CSC is more properly called
an ATTESTATION, since all the CSC can do is
to determine if the appointee is qualified for the
position and if the pertinent rules were followed.
Juco v. NLRC (1997)
SUMMARY: Juco filed a case for illegal dismissal with
the DOLE. LA dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He then
filed a case before the CSC. CSC: NHC is a GOCC
organized under the Corporation Code and does not
have an original charter. It is thus outside the jurisdiction
27
of the CSC as provided for in Const., Art. IX2(1). Juco

again filed with the DOLE. LA Caday, ruled in favor of
Juco. NHC was ordered to reinstate him and pay him
backwages from the time of his dismissal. NLRC
reversed for lack of jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE: NHC was created in 1959 under the old
Uniform Charter of Government Corporations and was
incorporated under the old Corporation Law. Its shares
are 100% owned by other government entities (SSS,
GSIS, DBP, NIDC & PHHC). It is therefore a GOCC
whose employees are under the Labor Code, i.e., it is
not a GOCC with original charter. GOCCs incorporated
under the Corporation Code are governed by the Labor
Code and come under the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
EIIB v. CA (1998)
SUMMARY: EIIB was directed by the CSC to submit all
its appointments. EIIB did not comply and asserted an
express exemption on the basis of 3 enactments:
PD1458, LOI 71 (implementing PD 1458), and EO127.
DOCTRINE: PD1458 only exempted EIIB from Civil
Service Rules and Regulations relative to appointments
and other personnel actions, but not from the Civil
Service Law or Civil Service Rules and Regulations
relative to any other matter. Also, the argument that it
was part of the intelligence community was found to be
of no merit since the NBI, similarly a member of such
community, submits to the CSC the appointments of all
its personnel. It is clear that the civil service within the
contemplation of the Constitution is comprehensive in
scope. The civil service within the contemplation of the
aforecited constitutional provision is comprehensive in
scope. It embraces all officers and employees of the
government,
its
branches,
subdivisions
and
instrumentalities. Even employees of corporations
owned or controlled by the government, with original
charters, are covered thereby.
Chua v. CSC (1992)
SUMMARY: Lydia Chua is an employee of the National
Irrigation Administration. RA 6683 was approved,
providing benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation. She contends that she is entitled to such.
CSC, on the other hand, contends otherwise as she is
merely a contractual employee, which is excluded from
the coverage.
DOCTRINE: Coterminous status shall be issued to a
person whose entrance in the service is characterized by
confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is
subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure. A
coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like
casual and emergency employees.
The Court sees no solid reason why the latter are
extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but
the former are not.
Cuevas v. Bacal (2000)

SUMMARY: Bacal holds the position of CESO rank III.
She was Regional Director of the PAO before she was
designated Acting Chief Public Attorney by President
Ramos. However, a certain Carina Demaisip was
appointed chief public defender by President Estrada.
The position of Chief Public Defender was formerly
called Chief Public Attorney and which position
respondent was currently holding. She filed a quo
warranto with the CA questioning her replacement. The
CA ruled that her removal was without cause and in
violation of her right to tenure.
DOCTRINE: Bacals security of tenure was not violated.
A permanent appointment can be issued only to a
person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed, including the appropriate
eligibility prescribed. The mere fact that a position
belongs to the Career Service does not automatically
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does
not possess the required qualifications. Such right
depends on the nature of his appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lack of it. Also, security of
tenure in the career executive service is acquired with
respect to rank and not to position.
PAGCOR v. Rilloraza (2001)
SUMMARY: Rilloraza, Casino Operations Manager, was
administratively charged with dishonesty, grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to best interest of the
service, and loss of confidence for failing to stop his
bosses from playing in the casino. PAGCOR argued that
he occupied a primarily confidential position.
DOCTRINE: Rilloraza was not a confidential employee,
nor was he guilty of grave misconduct (only simple
neglect). Every appointment implies confidence, but
much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the
occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The
latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude
of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily
close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse
without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.
Rillorazas duties do not evince such level of confidence.
Luego v. CSC, supra
DOCTRINE: The CSC is not empowered to determine
the kind of nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving
or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law. Unlike the
Commission on Appointments, which can review the
wisdom of an appointment, the CSC has no such power
under the Civil Service Decree. Its authority is limited to
a non-discretionary one, i.e., to determine if the
appointee meets all the conditions required by the law.
28
Aquino v. CSC (1992)

SUMMARY: Aquino who was then holding the position
of Clerk II, Division of City Schools of San Pablo City,
was designated as OIC of the Division Supply. Later on,
Dela Paz was extended a promotional appointment to
the same position. CSC RO approved her. Aquino filed a
protest with the DECS Secretary and was thus
appointed to the position on the ground that Aquino has
advantage over Dela Paz in terms of education,
experience and training and that the latter has no
relevant in-service training course attended and
completed. Dela Paz appealed to the MSPB who upheld
the appointment of Dela Paz. However, the CSC
reversed and found such appeal meritorious.
DOCTRINE: Once an appointment is issued and the
moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil
service under a completed appointment, he acquires a
legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is
protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution,
and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation
of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and
with previous notice and hearing. Dela Paz already
acquired security of tenure. Luego does not apply in this
case.
Delos Santos v. Mallare (1950)
SUMMARY: De los Santos was appointed by the
President as City Engineer of Baguio. After 4 years,
Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the
President to the same position so De los Santos was
directed to report for another assignment. The latter
refused to vacate the office. When the City officials
refused to pay his salary, De los Santos questioned
before the SC the legality of his removal and Mallares
appointment on the ground that as an official of the Civil
Service, he cannot be removed except for cause as
provided under Sec. 4, Art. XII of the Constitution.
DOCTRINE: De los Santos could not be removed except
for cause; hence, he is entitled to remain in office as City
Engineer of Baguio. Sec. 2545 is absolutely
irreconcilable with the constitutional prohibition under
Sec. 4, Art. XII; thus, it is no longer in effect. The office
of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policydetermining, nor highly technical as to be beyond the
protection of Sec. 4, Art. XII. Sec. 4, Art. XII which
provides that No officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause as
provided by law protects the entire Civil Service,
whether classified or unclassified, except positions
"which are policydetermining, primarily confidential or
highly technical in nature."
Tria v. Sto. Tomas (1991)
SUMMARY: Tria had sent a confidential report regarding
the nonfeasance of a lawyer within the FMIB to the
Office of the President after no action was taken when

he submitted his report to the FMIB Deputy
Commissioner. While he was away on leave, the Asst.
FMIB Commissioner sent him two Memos directing him
to submit a written explanation why no disciplinary action
should be taken. Failing to receive and respond to the
Memos, Tria was thereafter dismissed while he was still
away on the ground of loss of confidence.
DOCTRINE: It is the nature of the position which finally
determines whether position is primarily confidential,
policy determining, or highly technical.
Therefore, he could not be legally removed on the
ground of loss of confidence. It is the nature of the
position which finally determines whether a position is
primarily confidential, policy determining or highly
technical. Executive pronouncements can be no more
than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case
of conflict.
Laurel v. CSC (1991)
SUMMARY: The position of Batangas Provincial
Administrator became vacant due to resignation.
Benjamin Laurel was designated Acting Provincial
Administrator by his Governor brother, to remain in office
until the appointment of a regular Provincial
Administrator, unless the designation is earlier revoked.
DOCTRINE: The position of Provincial Administrator is
embraced in the Career Service under PD 8075 as
evidenced by the qualifications prescribed therefor as to
education, experience, and eligibility; as well as the
definition and characterization of the position in the
Manual of Position Descriptions. The rule on nepotism
covers both designation and appointments. (NB: No
longer good law. The PA is now a primarily confidential
position.)
Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Gonzales
(2013)*
SUMMARY: Gonzales was appointed Camarines Norte
Provincial Administrator. She was dismissed, but
reinstated by order of the CSC. One day after her
reinstatement, she was dismissed again, this time for
lack of confidence, being the occupant of a primarily
confidential position. CSC reversed on the ground that
Gonzales was a permanent appointee, and that the CSC
ruling on the nature of the administrator position cannot
be made to retroact to Gonzales who was appointed
prior to said ruling. CA upheld the CSC. On appeal, the
SC reversed the CSC and the CA.
DOCTRINE: Overturned Laurel dictum on the
confidentiality nature of the Provincial Administrator
position. Congress, through RA 7160, has reclassified
the provincial administrator position as a primarily
confidential, non-career position, as indicated by
functions of the position as provided for in said law.
29
Gonzales security of tenure was not violated by the valid

Congressional act.
Grio v. CSC (1991)
SUMMARY: Demaisip was appointed as Provincial
Attorney, but he resigned, and Arandela took his place.
When Governor Grio assumed office, he reappointed
Demaisip, replaced Arandela. Demaisip removed the
other legal officers previously appointed and replaced
them. Merit System Protection Board ruled in favor of
Arandela et al, stating that they were illegally terminated
by Governor Grio. CSC affirmed.
DOCTRINE: The tenure of officials holding primarily
confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence,
because their term of office lasts only as long as
confidence in them endures, and thus their cessation
involves no removal. It is possible to distinguish
positions in the civil service where lawyers act as
counsel in confidential and non-confidential positions by
simply looking at the proximity of the position in question
in relation to that of the appointing authority. Occupants
of such positions would be considered confidential
employees if the predominant reason they were chosen
by the appointing authority is the latter's belief that he
can share a close intimate relationship with the occupant
which measures freedom of discussion, without fear
of embarrassment or misgivings of possible betrayal of
personal trust on confidential matters of state.
CSC v. Salas (1997)
SUMMARY: Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR as a
member of the Internal Security Staff of the casino at the
Manila Pavilion Hotel. He was later dismissed from
service on the ground of loss of confidence due to
allegedly having been involved in proxy betting. In
denying his appeals, the Merit Board and the CSC found
that Salas was a confidential employee who therefore,
was not dismissed. His term merely expired. The CA
reversed, finding that Salas was not a confidential
employee.
DOCTRINE: Salas is not a confidential employee. A
confidential employee is one whose position is primarily
confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only
confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties
of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or
freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or
confidential matters of state. Taking into consideration
the nature of his functions, his organizational ranking
and his compensation level, Salas cannot be considered
a confidential employee. As set out in the job description
of his position, one is struck by the ordinary, routinary
and quotidian character of his duties and functions which
do not show a primarily close intimacy to his appointing
authority.
Obiasca v. Basallote (2010)

SUMMARY: Basallote was originally appointed as
Administrative Officer II of Tabaco National High School.
However, her papers were not forwarded to the CSC.
She was advised to go back to her original position of
Teacher I. Meanwhile, Obiasca was also appointed to
the same position and such was attested to by the CSC.
Basallote appealed to the CSC, which recalled
Obiascas appointment. Obiasca went to the CA and
argued that Basallotes appointment did not comply with
the requirement of Sec. 9(h) of PD 807 which provided
that every appointment is required to be submitted to the
CSC within 30 days from issuance
DOCTRINE: The CSC resolution appointing Basallote
and recalling Obiascas appointment has become final
and executory due to failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Second, that PD 807 has been amended by
EO 292 which deleted the 30-day requirement. It also
found that the failure to submit respondents
appointment to the CSC was not because of her own
fault but because of the malfeasance of certain
individuals. Despite with the non-compliance of a CSC
rule because: (1) there were valid justifications for the
lapse; (2) the non-compliance was beyond the control of
the appointee and (3) the appointee was not negligent,
the appointment was still valid.
c. Remedy to Question Title
ROC 66
RULE 66
QUO WARRANTO
SECTION 1. Action by Government against
individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public
office, position or franchise may be commenced by a
verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which,-by
the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the
forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act. (1a)
SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor
must commence action. The Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has
good reason to believe that any case specified in the
preceding section can be established by proof, must
commence such action. (3a)
30
SEC. 3. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor

may commence action with permission of court. The
Solicitor General or a public prosecutor may, with the
permission of the court in which the action is to be
commenced, bring such an action at the request and
upon the relation of another person; but in such case the
officer bringing it may first require an indemnity for the
expenses and costs of the action in an amount approved
by and to be deposited in the court by the person at
whose request and upon whose relation the same is
brought. (4a)
SEC. 4. When hearing had on application for permission
to commence action. Upon application for permission
to commence such action in accordance with the next
preceding section, the court shall direct that notice be
given to the respondent so that he may be heard in
opposition thereto; and if permission is granted, the court
shall issue an order to that effect, copies of which shall
be served on all interested parties, and the petition shall
then be filed within the period ordered by the court. (5a)
SEC. 5. When an individual may commence such an
action. A person claiming to be entitled to a public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised
by another may bring an action therefor in his own
name. (6)
SEC. 6. Parties and contents of petition against
usurpation. When the action is against a person for
usurping a public office, position or franchise, the petition
shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be
entitled thereto, if any, with an averment of his right to
the same and that the respondent is unlawfully in
possession thereof. All persons who claim to be entitled
to the public office, position or franchise may be made
parties, and their respective rights to such public office,
position or franchise determined, in the same action.
(7a)
SEC. 7. Venue. An action under the preceding six
sections can be brought only in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the
respondent or any of the respondents resides, but when
the Solicitor General commences the action, it may be
brought in a Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in
the Court of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court. (8a)
SEC. 8. Period for pleadings and proceedings may be
reduced; action given precedence. The court may
reduce the period provided by these Rules for filing
pleadings and for all other proceedings in the action in
order to secure the most expeditious determination of

the matters involved therein consistent with the rights of
the parties. Such action may be given precedence over
any other civil matter pending in the court. (9a)
SEC. 9. Judgment where usurpation found. When the
respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or
unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position
or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such
respondent be ousted and altogether excluded
therefrom, and that the petitioner or relator, as the case
may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may
be rendered determining the respective rights in and to
the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to
the action as justice requires. (10a)
SEC. 10. Rights of persons adjudged entitled to public
office; delivery of books and papers; damages. If
judgment be rendered in favor of the person averred in
the complaint to be entitled to the public office he may,
after taking the oath of office and executing any official
bond required by law, take upon himself the execution of
the office, and may immediately thereafter demand of
the respondent all the books and papers in the
respondent's custody or control appertaining to the office
to which the judgment relates. If the respondent refuses
or neglects to deliver any book or paper pursuant to
such demand, he may be punished for contempt as
having disobeyed a lawful order of the court. The person
adjudged entitled to the office may also bring action
against the respondent to recover the damages
sustained by such person by reason of the usurpation.
(15a)
SEC. 11. Limitations. Nothing contained in this Rule
shall be construed to authorize an action against a public
officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause
of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such
office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for
damages in accordance with the provisions of the next
preceding section unless the same be commenced
within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment
establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question.
(16a)
SEC. 12. Judgment for costs. In an action brought in
accordance with the provisions of this Rule, the court
may render judgment for costs against either the
petitioner, the relator, or the respondent, or the person or
persons claiming to be a corporation, or may apportion
the costs, as justice requires. (17a)
Quo warranto = (by) what warrant
31
It is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the

title to a public office. If there is no dispute as to
who has title, and there is a usurper, mandamus
is the proper remedy.
Title to office cannot be collaterally attacked. It
can only be assailed by direct action, i.e., quo
warranto.
Action can be brought only by the Government
or a person claiming to be entitled to the office.
Person bringing the action must show a clear
legal right to the office. A mere contingent
interest, or a claim based on a temporary
appointment or a designation, cannot be the
basis for quo warranto action. Petitioner who did
not have the requisite qualifications at the time
of his appointment cannot be said to have such
clear legal right.
Quo warranto action cannot prosper if brought
beyond the prescribed period (exception:
Cristobal v. Melchor).
Filing of a quo warranto complaint suspends the
1-year
period.
However,
administrative
proceedings do not.
warranto in Election Quo warranto in general
Quo
Law
Issue is eligibility of
candidate
Plaintiff
does
not
necessarily
become
rightful occupant of the
office
Electoral
proceeding
under
the
Omnibus
Election Code
Filed within 10 days from
proclamation
May be filed by any
losing candidate
Issue
is
validity
of
appointment
Plaintiff may be declared
the person legally entitled
to the office and court will
order that he be placed
therein
Prerogative writ to compel
a person to show his title
to a public office or
franchise
Presupposes
that
respondent is already
holding office
Only one who claims a
right to the office and will
be entitled to assume it in
case of successful suit
may file
Tarrosa v. Singson (1994)

SUMMARY: Singson was appointed Governor of the
Bangko Sentral by President Ramos, effective on July 6,
1993. Tarrosa filed suit as a taxpayer to enjoin Singson
from performing his functions as BSP Governor until the
Commission on Appointments confirms his appointment.
Tarrosa argues that Singsons appointment has to be
confirmed by the CoA pursuant to RA 76536 (the BSP

Law).
DOCTRINE: Tarrosas petition is in the nature of a quo
warranto proceeding as it seeks to oust Singson on the
allegation that the latter is unlawfully holding or
exercising the powers of BSP Governor. The question of
title to an office, which must be resolved in a quo
warranto proceeding, may not be determined in a suit to
restrain the payment of salary to the person holding such
office, brought by someone who does not claim to be the
one entitled to occupy the said office.
Mendoza v. Allas (1999)
SUMMARY: In 1989, Mendoza was the Director III of the
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the
Bureau of Customs. In 1993, he was temporarily
designated as Acting District Collector of Cagayan de
Oro and Allas was appointed as Acting Director in his
place. However, in 1994, he was terminated from his
position in view of Allas appointment as Director III by
the President. Mendoza filed a petition for quo warrant
against Allas before the RTC. RTC granted his petition
and ruled that he was illegally terminated from office and
that the appointment of Allas was void. On appeal, the
CA granted Mendozas MTD and its decision became
final. However, when Mendoza moved to have the RTC
decision executed, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA
denied said motion, on the ground that the contested
position vacated by Allas was now being occupied by
Godofredo Olores.
DOCTRINE: CA correctly denied the motion for
execution. Mendoza cannot be reinstated nor paid with
back salaries. The petition for quo warranto was filed by
Mendoza solely against Allas. What was threshed out
before the trial court was the qualification and right of
Mendoza to the contested position as against Ray Allas,
not against Godofredo Olores. A judgment in quo
warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in
office, even though such successor may trace his title to
the same source.
Class Notes: What could have Mendoza done to
escape the effect of the SC ruling? Could he have
impleaded Allas successors?
Romualdez-Yap v. CSC (1993)
SUMMARY: While on leave for medical reasons,
Romualdez-Yap, PNBs Senior VP assigned to the Fund
Transfer Department, was separated from the service.
The CSC upheld her separation on the ground that the
PNB was undergoing a reorganization, and pursuant to
its plan, the FTD had to be abolished. The CSC decided
that the abolition was made in good faith. Assuming
there was bad faith in Yaps termination, she was
actually barred from assailing it seeing as she did not
32
seasonably assert her right thereto, or within a year from

her ouster.
DOCTRINE: A person claiming to be entitled to a public
office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised
by another may bring an action for quo warranto (Rule
66, Sec. 6, Rules of Court). The petitioner therein must
show a clear legal right to the office allegedly held
unlawfully by another. An action for quo warranto should
be brought within 1 year after ouster from office; the
failure to institute the same within the reglementary
period constitutes more than a sufficient basis for its
dismissal since it is not proper that the title to a public
office be subjected to continued uncertainty. An
exception to this prescriptive period lies only if the failure
to file the action can be attributed to the acts of a
responsible government officer and not of the dismissed
employee.
2. Election (to be discussed under Election Law)
33
III. DUTIES & RESPONSIBILITIES WHILE

IN PUBLIC OFFICE
A. Powers and Duties
1. Source of Power and Authority
In the Philippine constitutional scheme,

governmental authority comes from the people.
The people, directly or through their chosen
representatives exercise the power to:
o create offices and agencies as they
deem desirable for the administration of
public functions
o declare in what manner and by what
persons they shall be exercised
o prescribe the quantum of power
attached to each department; and the
conditions upon which its continuation
depends.
Mechem: Right to be a public officer or to
exercise the powers of a public office must be
based on some provision of the public law
2. Construction of Powers and Duties
Public officials exercise POWER, not RIGHTS

(#Hohfeld).
According to Mechem, public office is an agency,
the State being the principal and the public
officer the agent. As such, there is no
presumption of authority.
In the absence of a valid grant, public officers
are devoid of power.
Express grants of power are usually subject to
strict interpretation and will be construed as
conferring only those which are expressly
imposed or necessarily implied.
3. Delegation of Power
An officer creates rights against the State or the
public authority he represents ONLY while he is

keeping strictly within the limits of his authority,
as so construed.
The authority of a public officer is a matter of
public record, of which every interested person
is bound to take notice, so it is presumed that all
persons who deal with a public officer have
knowledge of his authority.
However, persons who deal with a public officer
are charged with the ascertainment of the scope
of the public officers authority as this is
circumscribed by the applicable legal provisions.
On the other hand, every citizen has the right to
assume that a public officer knows his duties
and performs them in accordance with law. It
would be unjust to penalize a citizen for bona

fide reliance upon information officially given.
Doctrine of apparent authority in private agency

does not apply to private officers.
Ratification
Although the act of a public officer may not be
binding on the state because he has exercised
his powers defectively (i.e., act was voidable),
his acts may be ratified.
Ratification does not apply if the officer had no
power to perform the original act.
Without ratification, the State cannot be
estopped by the unauthorized or illegal acts of
its agents.
Ratification by superior officer only extends
insofar as the superior officers own authority
4. Scope of Authority
Authority of public officers is prescribed by the

law or the Constitution or both.
Authority of public officers consists of:
o powers expressly conferred by law
under which the officer has been elected
or appointed
o powers expressly annexed to the office
by the creating law or another law
referring to it
o powers attached to the office as
incidents to it
Classification of Powers and Duties

1. As to nature
Nature of a power or duty must be determined
from the nature of the act and not by the office of
the one exercising the power or duty.
A public officer may exercise both ministerial
and discretionary functions.
The key distinctions are the mandatory character
and the involvement of judgment in the act
concerned
a. Ministerial
When the power or duty is absolute,
certain, and imperative, involving merely
execution of a specific duty arising from
fixed and designated facts
Officer has no discretion as to the
interpretation of the law; and the course
to be pursued is fixed by law
Involves enforcement or administration
of a mandatory duty at the operational
level, even if professional expert
evaluation is required.
Scope of ministerial duties DO NOT
INCLUDE passing upon the validity of
34
laws, instructions, or proceedings which

are prima facie valid and requiring his
action.
A ministerial officer must obey the
instructions set upon
him and a
showing
of
unconstitutionality
or
invalidity will not excuse him from doing
his duty
Remedy to compel a ministerial action is
mandamus. If duty is threatened to be
violated by some positive official act, the
remedy is injunction.
DELEGATION: Ministerial duties are
delegable unless expressly prohibited by
law; but the delegate must be guided by
the discretion of the officer originally
tasked to the duty.
b. Discretionary
Require the exercise of reason in the
adoption of means to an end; and
discretion in determining the choice
and/or manner of action.
Discretion
o faculty conferred upon public
officers by law of acting officially
in
certain
circumstances,
according to the dictates of their
own judgment or conscience,
uncontrolled by the judgment or
conscience of others (Blacks)
o essentially a power to make a
choice between two or more
courses of action which are all
lawful
o limited to sound discretion, i.e.,
exercise
should
not
be
capricious,
arbitrary
or
oppressive
Quasi-judicial
o duty of looking into facts and
acting upon such facts using
discretion which is of a judicial
nature
Reviewable only on the ground of gave
abuse of discretion
DELEGATION: Discretionary duties are
not delegable unless delegation is
allowed by law, as it is presumed that an
officer performing discretionary duties
was chosen because of his fitness and
competence to exercise discretion, e.g.,
Torres v. Ribo.
2. As to obligatoriness of the power or duty
a. Mandatory
Powers and duties of public officers are
generally mandatory although the
language of law may be permissive,
where they are for the benefit of public
or individuals.
b. Permissive
Mere authorization to do an act does not
create a mandatory duty
Statutory provisions on the time and
mode of discharging duties, e.g. those
designed for order and uniformity in
public business
If the language of the law is permissive
and the duty does not affect 3rd persons
and is not clearly beneficial to the public,
it will not be construed as mandatory
3. As to relation of the power or duty to officers
subordinates
a. Control
Power to manage, direct, or govern
Includes the power to set aside the
official action of subordinates and to
substitute ones own judgment for those
of the former.
Power to set rules in the doing of an act
If not followed, Officer may [1] undo the
act, [2] have it re-done, or [3] do it
himself
Necessarily includes supervision
b. Supervision
Mere oversight; seeing that rules set by
others are being followed.
May order work to be done or re-done to
comply with the pre-set rules.
Cannot lay down own rules.
Constitution, Art. XI, Secs. 1, 17, 18
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be
required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his
assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or
flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public
in the manner provided by law.
35
Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State

and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by
law.
SALN
RA 6713, Section 8. Statements and Disclosure.
Public officials and employees have an obligation to
accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and
the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities,
net worth and financial and business interests including
those of their spouses and of unmarried children under
eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial
Disclosure. All public officials and employees, except
those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and
casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a
Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried
children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.
The two documents shall contain information on the
following:
(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs,
assessed value and current fair market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand
or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;
(d) liabilities, and;
(e) all business interests and financial connections.
The documents must be filed:
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the
service.
All public officials and employees required under this
section to file the aforestated documents shall also
execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of their
assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of
the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate
government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, such documents as may show their assets,
liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests
and financial connections in previous years, including, if
possible, the year when they first assumed any office in
the Government.
Husband and wife who are both public officials or
employees may file the required statements jointly or
separately.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and

the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections shall be filed by:
(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the
national office of the Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of
the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator;
and all national executive officials with the Office of the
President.
(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the
Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;
(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, with the Office of the President, and
those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in
their respective regions; and
(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil
Service Commission.
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. It shall be
the duty of every public official or employee to identify
and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and
information, his relatives in the Government in the form,
manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service
Commission.
(C) Accessibility of documents. (1) Any and all
statements filed under this Act, shall be made available
for inspection at reasonable hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying
or reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time
they are filed as required by law.
(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be
required to pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of
reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as
the cost of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available
to the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of
the statement. After such period, the statement may be
destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.
(D) Prohibited acts. It shall be unlawful for any person
to obtain or use any statement filed under this Act for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and
communications media for dissemination to the general
public.
RA 3019, Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities.
Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval
of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month
of January of every other year thereafter, as well as
upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his
resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and
36
file with the office of the corresponding Department

Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of
an independent office, with the Office of the President, or
in the case of members of the Congress and the officials
and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary
of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement
of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts
of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year:
Provided, That public officers assuming office less than
two months before the end of the calendar year, may file
their statements in the following months of January.
Section 9. Penalties for violations.
(b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of
Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not
less than one hundred pesos nor more than one
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the
discretion of the Court.
The violation of said section proven in a proper
administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for
removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no
criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
Morfe v. Mutuc (1968)
SUMMARY: Questioned provision is RA 30197, which
mandates every public officer to submit within 30 days
after its approval or after his assumption to office and
within the month of January every other year thereafter
and upon termination, a statement of assets & liabilities.
Lower court ruled that it is unconstitutional. SC reversed,
holding that it was not violative of several constitutional
rights (due process, privacy, against unreasonable
search and seizure, against self-incrimination).
DOCTRINE: Nothing can be clearer than that the AntiGraft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute was precisely
aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty
in the public service. It is intended to further promote
morality in public administration. A public office must
indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its
objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent
of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of
such character. The times demanded such a remedial
device.
5. Specific Duties
RA 6713
SECTION 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees.
In the performance of their duties, all public officials
and employees are under obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. All public
officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working

days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams
or other means of communications sent by the public.
The reply must contain the action taken on the request.
(b) Submit annual performance reports. All heads or
other responsible officers of offices and agencies of the
government and of government-owned or controlled
corporations shall, within forty-five (45) working days
from the end of the year, render a performance report of
the agency or office or corporation concerned. Such
report shall be open and available to the public within
regular office hours.
(c) Process documents and papers expeditiously. All
official papers and documents must be processed and
completed within a reasonable time from the preparation
thereof and must contain, as far as practicable, not more
than three (3) signatories therein. In the absence of duly
authorized signatories, the official next-in-rank or officer
in charge shall sign for and in their behalf.
(d) Act immediately on the public's personal
transactions. All public officials and employees must
attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the
services of their offices and must, at all times, act
promptly and expeditiously.
(e) Make documents accessible to the public. All
public documents must be made accessible to, and
readily available for inspection by, the public within
reasonable working hours.
SECTION 8. Statements and Disclosure. Public
officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish
and submit declarations under oath of, and the public
has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth
and financial and business interests including those of
their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen
(18) years of age living in their households. x x x
Rabe v. Flores (1997)
SUMMARY: Administrative complaint for "Conduct
Unbecoming a Government Employee, Acts Prejudicial
to the Interest of the Service and Abuse of Authority", by
Rabe, against Flores, Interpreter III at the Regional Trial
Court, Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, for taking advantage
of her position as a court employee by claiming a stall at
the extension of the Public Market; and taking the law
into her hands when she destroyed Rabes stall and
brought the materials to the police station
DOCTRINE: Section 8 of RA 6713 provides that it is the
"obligation" of an employee to submit a sworn statement,
as the "public has a right to know" the employee's
assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business
interests. Section 11 of the same law prescribes the
criminal and administrative penalty for violation of any
provision thereof. Paragraph (b) of Section 11 provides
37
that "(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper

removal or dismissal of a public official or employee,
even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
Failure of Flores to disclose her business interest which
she herself admitted is inexcusable and is a clear
violation of RA 6713.
PAGC v. Pleyto (2011)
SUMMARY: Pleyto was a DPWH Undersecretary who
was found guilty of violating Sec. 8, RA 6713 and Sec.7,
RA 3019 for his failure to declare in his SALNs his wifes
business interests and financial connections. The PAGC
recommended his dismissal from service which the OP
approved. The CA reversed the order, prompting the
PAGC to file this petition. HELD: The failure of Pleyto to
disclose his wifes business interests was a violation of
the aforementioned laws. Petitioner was negligent for
failing to comply with his duty to provide a detailed list of
his assets and business interests in his SALN. He was
also
negligent
in
relying
on
the
family
bookkeeper/accountant to fill out his SALN and in
signing the same without checking or verifying the
entries therein. Petitioners negligence, however, is only
simple and not gross, in the absence of bad faith or the
intent to mislead or deceive on his part, and in
consideration of the fact that his SALNs actually disclose
the full extent of his assets and the fact that he and his
wife had other business interests. Such simple
negligence warrants the penalty of forfeiture of salaries
and not dismissal.
DOCTRINE: In the case of public officials, there is
negligence when there is a breach of duty or failure to
perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence
when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
Class Notes: What makes Pleyto different from Flores?
That he was USec. and Flores was a mere interpreter?
6. Norms of Conduct
RA 6713
SECTION 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and
Employees. (A) Every public official and employee
shall observe the following as standards of personal
conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. Public officials and
employees shall always uphold the public interest over
and above personal interest. All government resources
and powers of their respective offices must be employed
and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and
economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public
funds and revenues.
(b) Professionalism. Public officials and employees
shall perform and discharge their duties with the highest
degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and

skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion
and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to
discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as
dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
(c) Justness and sincerity. Public officials and
employees shall remain true to the people at all times.
They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights
of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public
order, public safety and public interest. They shall not
dispense or extend undue favors on account of their
office to their relatives whether by consanguinity or
affinity except with respect to appointments of such
relatives to positions considered strictly confidential or as
members of their personal staff whose terms are
coterminous with theirs.
(d) Political neutrality. Public officials and employees
shall provide service to everyone without unfair
discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or
preference.
(e) Responsiveness to the public. Public officials and
employees shall extend prompt, courteous, and
adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise
provided by law or when required by the public interest,
public officials and employees shall provide information
of their policies and procedures in clear and
understandable language, ensure openness of
information, public consultations and hearings whenever
appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and
systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape
and develop an understanding and appreciation of the
socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country,
especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. Public officials and
employees shall at all times be loyal to the Republic and
to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally
produced goods, resources and technology and
encourage appreciation and pride of country and people.
They shall endeavor to maintain and defend Philippine
sovereignty against foreign intrusion.
(g) Commitment to democracy. Public officials and
employees shall commit themselves to the democratic
way of life and values, maintain the principle of public
accountability, and manifest by deeds the supremacy of
civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times
uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to country above
loyalty to persons or party.
(h) Simple living. Public officials and employees and
their families shall lead modest lives appropriate to their
positions and income. They shall not indulge in
38
extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any

form.
Guiding principle: Public office is a public trust.
Samson v. Restrivera (2011)
SUMMARY: Samson agreed to help Restrivera to have
the latters land registered under the Torrens System.
Petitioner said that the expenses would reach P150,000.
She accepted P50,000 from Restrivera to cover the
initial expenses. However, the land was discovered to
have been government property. Petitioner failed to
return the P50k, prompting respondent to sue her for
estafa. Restrivera also filed an administrative case
before the Ombudsman.
DOCTRINE: In the aftermath of the aborted transaction,
Samson still failed to return the amount she accepted.
Her belated attempt to return the amount was intended
to avoid possible sanctions and impelled solely by the
filing of the estafa case against her. While it may be true
that she did not actually deal with the other government
agencies for the processing of the titles of the subject
property, petitioner's act of accepting the money from
respondent with the assurance that she would work for
the issuance of the title is already enough to create a
perception that she is a fixer.
B. Rights & Privileges

1. Right to office
RA 6758
August 21, 1989
AN
ACT
PRESCRIBING
A
REVISED
COMPENSATION AND POSITION CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM IN THE GOVERNMENT AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Section 1.
Title. - This Act shall be known as the
"Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."
Section 2.
Statement of Policy. - It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay
upon
substantive
differences
in
duties
and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the
positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard shall
be given to, among others, prevailing rates in the
private sector for comparable work. For this purpose,
the Department of Budget and Managements (DBM) is
hereby directed to establish and administer a unified
Compensation and Position Classification System,
hereinafter referred to as the System, as provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended, that shall be
applied for all government entities, as mandated by the
Constitution.
Section 3.
General Provisions. - The following
principles shall govern the Compensation and Position
Classification System of the Government:
(a)
All government personnel shall be paid just and
equitable wages; and while pay distinctions must
necessarily exist in keeping with work distinctions, the
ratio of compensation for those occupying higher ranks
to those at lower ranks should be maintained at
equitable levels, giving due consideration to higher
percentage of increases to lower level positions and
lower percentage increases to higher level positions;
(b)
Basic compensation for all personnel in the
government and government-owned or controlled
corporations and financial institutions shall generally be
comparable with those in the private sector doing
comparable work, and must be in accordance with
prevailing laws on minimum wages;
(c)
The
total
compensation
provided
for
government personnel must be maintained at a
reasonable level in proportion to the national budget;
(d)
A review of government compensation rates,
taking into account possible erosion in purchasing
power due to inflation and other factors, shall be
conducted periodically.
Section 4.
Coverage. - The Compensation and
Position Classification System herein provided shall
apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or
part-time basis, now existing or hereafter created in the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and government financial institutions.
The term "government" refers to the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the
Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but
shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus, offices,
boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils,
authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state
colleges and universities, local government units, and
the armed forces. The term "government-owned or
controlled corporations and financial institutions" shall
include all corporations and financial institutions owned
or controlled by the National Government, whether such
corporations and financial institutions perform
governmental or proprietary functions.
Section 5.
Position Classification System. - The
Position Classification System shall consist of classes
39
of positions grouped into four main categories, namely:

professional supervisory, professional non-supervisory,
sub-professional supervisory, and sub-professional
non-supervisory, and the rules and regulations for its
implementation.
Categorization of these classes of positions shall be
guided by the following considerations:
(a)
Professional Supervisory Category. - This
category includes responsible positions of a managerial
character involving the exercise of management
functions such as planning, organizing, directing,
coordinating, controlling and overseeing within
delegated authority the activities of an organization, a
unit thereof or of a group, requiring some degree of
professional, technical or scientific knowledge and
experience, application of managerial or supervisory
skills required to carry out their basic duties and
responsibilities involving functional guidance and
control, leadership, as well as line supervision. These
positions require intensive and thorough knowledge of a
specialized field usually acquired from completion of a
bachelor's degree or higher degree courses.
The positions in this category are assigned Salary
Grade 9 to Salary Grade 33.
(b)
Professional Non-Supervisory Category. - This
category includes positions performing task which
usually require the exercise of a particular profession or
application of knowledge acquired through formal
training in a particular field or just the exercise of a
natural, creative and artistic ability or talent in literature,
drama, music and other branches of arts and letters.
Also included are positions involved in research and
application of professional knowledge and methods to a
variety of technological, economic, social, industrial and
governmental functions; the performance of technical
tasks auxiliary to scientific research and development;
and in the performance of religious, educational, legal,
artistic or literary functions.
These positions require thorough knowledge in the field
of arts and sciences or learning acquired through
completion of at least four (4) years of college studies.
(c)
Sub-Professional Supervisory Category. - This
category includes positions performing supervisory
functions over a group of employees engaged in
responsible work along technical, manual or clerical

lines of work which are short of professional work,
requiring training and moderate experience or lower
training but considerable experience and knowledge of
a limited subject matter or skills in arts, crafts or trades.
These positions require knowledge acquired from
secondary or vocational education or completion of up
to two (2) years of college education.
(d)
Sub-Professional Non-Supervisory Category. This category includes positions involves in structured
work in support of office or fiscal operations or those
engaged in crafts, trades or manual work. These
positions usually require skills acquired through training
and experience of completion of elementary education,
secondary or vocational education or completion of up
to two (2) years of college education.
Section 6.
Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades of the Compensation
and Position Classification System. - All positions in the
government covered under Section 4 hereof shall be
allocated to their proper position titles and salary
grades in accordance with the Index of Occupational
Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades of the
Compensation and Position Classification System
which shall be prepared by the DBM.
XXX
COA Auditing Rules
Sec. 243. Salaries and Wages Regular Pay (801).
This account is used to record the pay proper of regular
government employees for services rendered.
Sec. 244. Salaries and Wages Part Time Pay (802).
This account is used to record the pay proper of parttime government employees for services rendered.
Sec.
245. Salaries and Wages-Casual/Contractual
(803). This account is used to record the pay proper of
casual and contractual government employees for
services rendered.
Sec.
246. Personnel Economic Relief Allowance
(PERA) (804). This account is used to record
allowances granted to all appointive national
government employees occupying itemized plantilla
positions, casual and contractual employees and
uniformed personnel of the AFP, DILG and NAMRIA
pursuant to the annual appropriations act.
40
Sec. 247. Additional Compensation (ADCOM) (805).

This account is used to record the payment of allowance
authorized under Administrative Order No. 53 dated
May 17, 1993 granted to all government personnel
whether regular or casual; and those on temporary
status or contractual personnel whose employment is in
the nature of a regular employee.
Sec. 248. Representation Allowance (RA) (806). This
account is used to record representation allowance
granted to authorized officials and employees while in
the actual performance of their respective functions.
Sec. 249. Transportation Allowance (TA) (807). This
account is used to record allowance granted to
authorized officials and employees for transportation
expenses, which shall be paid from appropriations
provided for their respective offices.
Sec. 250. Clothing Allowance (808). This account is
used to record allowance granted to government
officials and employees for office uniforms at such
amount as may be authorized by applicable General
Appropriations Act, which may be given in kind or in
cash.
Sec. 251. Honoraria (809). This account is used to
record payment for services rendered by government
personnel performing activities or discharging duties in
addition to, or over and above their regular functions,
and payment for services of personnel with expertise or
professional standing in recognition of his broad and
superior knowledge in specific fields.
Sec. 252. Hazard Pay (810). This account is used to
record compensation paid to employees who are
working or assigned in difficult, dangerous, strife-torn or
embattled areas as certified by the Department of
National Defense, and whose lives are directly exposed
to work conditions which may cause injury, sickness or
death or harmful change in the human organism, such
as; exposure to harmful chemicals, wastes and
pollutants, micro-organisms and other harmful elements,
or situations that endanger life or health as certified by
authorized government agency.
Sec. 253. Overtime and Night Pay (811). This account
is used to record payment for working in excess of the
minimum total hours set for a given period to
regular/casual/contractual employees of the agency.
Sec. 254. Holiday Pay (812). This account is used to
record compensation paid to government employees
who rendered authorized services on holidays.
Sec. 255. Christmas Bonus (813). This account is used
to record Christmas bonus given to government officers
and employees as authorized by law.
Sec. 256. Cash Gift (814). This account is used to
record cash gift granted to government officials and
employees as authorized by law.
Sec. 257. Productivity Incentive Benefits (815). This

account is used to record incentive benefits for the
recognition of government officers and employees'
productivity and performance as authorized by law.
Sec. 258. Other Bonuses and Allowances (816). This
account is used to record the payment of other bonuses
and allowances not classified under the specific
accounts as authorized by law, such as subsistence,
laundry, living quarters, allowance, etc.
Sec. 259. Life and Retirement Insurance Contributions
(817). This account is used to record the governments
share in premium contributions to life insurance and
retirement funds of the GSIS.
Sec. 260. PAG-IBIG Contributions (818). This account
is used to record the government's share of premium
contributions to the Home Development Mutual Fund
(HDMF).
Sec.
261. PHILHEALTH Contributions (819). This
account is used to record the governments share in
premium contributions to health insurance funds
maintained with the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PHIC).
Sec. 262. ECC Contributions (820). This account is
used to record the government's share in premium
contributions to the Employees' Compensation
Commission (ECC).
Sec. 263. Pension and Retirement Benefits (821). This
account is used to record pensions and retirement
benefits of government officers and employees and/or
their dependents for past services rendered.
Sec. 264. Terminal Leave Benefits (822). This account
is used to record payment for the money value of the
total accumulated leave credits of government officials
employees upon retirement or voluntary separation.
Sec. 265. Health Workers Benefits (823). This account
is used to record benefits given to health workers.
Sec. 266. Subsistence and Quarters Allowances (824).
This account is used to record subsistence and quarters
allowances given to authorized government officials and
employees.
Sec. 267. Longevity Pay (825). This account is used to
record longevity pay given to government officers and
employees as authorized by law.
Sec. 268. Other Personnel Benefits (830). This account
is used to record benefits not classified under any of the
specific personnel benefits accounts, such as
monetization of leave credits, loyalty cash award,
medical insurance premium, medical/hospital expense,
executive check up, etc.
Rights of public officers are generally measured
by the Constitution or the law under which the
officer was appointed.
Baybay Water District v. COA (2002)
41
SUMMARY: Directors and employees of the Baybay

Water District were being paid additional compensation
to the per diems authorized by the LWUA, RATA and
other transportation allowances. These were disallowed
by the Resident Auditor and affirmed by the COA. They
argue that P. D. No. 198, 13 which expressly prohibit
additional compensation to the directors was expressly
repealed by the Salary Standardization Law.
HELD: Said provision expressly provides that directors
are only entitled to per diems granted by the Board and
expressly prohibits any additional compensation. The
Salary Standardization Law did not repeal said provision
as the said law applies only to certain classes of
positions (professional supervisory, professional nonsupervisory, sub-professional supervisory and subprofessional non-supervisory) which do not include
directors of water directors. The latter are in fact limited
to policy-making and are prohibited from the
management of the districts.
Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan (1999)
SUMMARY: Mayor Rodrigo, Mejica, and Treasurer
Facundo are being charged for estafa with the
Ombudsman. This arose from an Accomplishment
Report, approved by Rodrigo, in relation to an
electrification project for the Municipality of San Nicolas.
Supposedly, the project was 97.5% finished, and the
corresponding payment was effected. However, the
Provincial Auditor found, as per a COA Evaluation, that
only 60% was finished and so he issued a Notice of
Disallowance of funds, after which the estafa complaint
was filed, and the corresponding information issued.
Petitioners challenged the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction,
arguing that since he was receiving a monthly salary of
P10k, this was equivalent to a fourth step increment in
Grade 24 under the Salary Schedule.
DOCTRINE: An officials salary is determined by the
Grade accorded to his position (not the other way
around), and ultimately by the nature of his position. This
meant looking into the difficulty and responsibilities and
level of qualification requirements of the work connected
with the position. This is in consonance with the policy of
RA6758, which bases differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities,
and likewise with the Constitutional policy of taking into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to
the position.
Tejada v. Domingo (1992)
SUMMARY: A memorandum was issued by Domingo,
the Chairman of the COA, interpreting and implementing
18 of RA 6758, reducing the salaries of petitioners
Tejada and Ching (removed the additional emoluments).
The SC ruled that such interpretation is in accordance
with the constitutional mandate of the COA,
DOCTRINE: Legislative and executive pronouncements

unerringly reveal a two-pronged strategy to preserve and
enhance the independence and integrity of the COA and
make its personnel loyal to none other except that
institution and beholden to nobody but the people whose
coffers they must guard with dedication and
responsibility
Santos v. CA (2000)
SUMMARY: Petitioner was a MeTC Judge from 19831992. Upon optional retirement, he received retirement
gratuity pursuant to RA 910 for years in the government
service; and five years thereafter he regularly receiving a
monthly pension. In 1993, he reentered the government
service as part of the MMA. Petitioner opted for
voluntary
separation
from
service
upon
the
reorganization of the MMA into the MMDA, pursuant to
RA 7924. He asserts that in the computation of his
separation benefits under RA 7924, the years of his
government service credited should include those years
in the Judiciary. The CSC found no merit in his
contention and held that petitioners options were only
either (1) to refund the gratuity he received under RA
910, as amended, after he retired from the MeTC and
get the full separation pay for his entire years in the
government with the MeTC plus his years in service as
Director III in the defunct MMA, at the rate of one and
one-fourth salary for every year of service; or (2) to
retain the gratuity pay he received for his services as
MeTC Judge but an equivalent amount shall be
deducted from the separation benefits due from the
former MMA for his entire government service. CA
affirmed. HELD: No, years in judiciary not included. To
credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the
computation of his separation pay under RA 7924
notwithstanding the fact that he had received or had
been receiving the retirement benefits under RA 910
would be to countenance double compensation for
exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC
Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court
against double compensation for exactly the same
services.
DOCTRINE: Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution
proscribes
additional,
double,
or
indirect
compensation. No elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law.
2. Security of Tenure
Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec.2(3)
Section 2. (3) No officer or employee of the civil service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.
42
Security of tenure means that no officer or employee in

the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed except
for cause provided by law and after due process or after
he shall have been given the opportunity to defend
himself. It is a basic feature of the Civil Service system.
In this sense, public office is a property right,
because it cannot be taken away without due
process. Thus it is also a social justice measure,
considering that the public office may be the sole
means of livelihood of the officer.
Security of tenure also means that a public
officer is entitled to remain in office until
retirement or expiration of his term.
For cause means reasons which the law and
sound public policy recognize as sufficient
grounds for suspension or removal. It means
legal cause and not mere causes deemed
sufficient in the exercise of the appointing
powers discretion.
Security of tenure has a substantive (for cause)
and a procedural aspect (due process).
Sec. 46(b) of the Civil Service Law lays down 30
causes for disciplinary action.
An employee may be dismissed without
proceedings, as long he is notified and is
directed to show cause for his non-dismissal. If
the disciplining authority does not find the
explanation satisfactory, the dismissal is valid
but the employee may challenge it before the
proper forum.
Security of tenure only applies to permanent
appointees. Security of tenure attaches upon the
completion of the appointment and the
assumption of the position by the appointee (see
discussion on Appointment).
Security of tenure covers both the career and
non-career
services.
However,
Cabinet
secretaries,
confidential
employees,
and
coterminous employees do not have security of
tenure.
Confidential employees: Although they may be
removed for loss of confidence, this must be
based on facts from which loss of confidence
can be implied or deduced.
Temporary employees cannot be arbitrarily
dismissed (although they do not have security of
tenure). [CAA v. IAC, 1992]
GR: An officer or employee with a permanent
appointment who accepts a temporary
appointment to another position without
reservation or upon his own volition is effectively
divested of security of tenure.
Acceptance of a temporary appointment

means that the officer or employee has
abandoned his former position, and
being temporary in character, the same
is terminable at the pleasure of the
appointing authority, with or without
cause (Pabu-aya v. CA).
o A permanent appointee who accepts a
temporary, fixed-term appointment to a
another position loses his right to
security of tenure in the former position
(Romualdez III v. CSC).
Lacson v. Romero (1949)*
SUMMARY: Negros Oriental Provincial Fiscal Lacson
was appointed to the Tarlac post. He refused to assume
the position. His replacement, Romero, assumed the
Negros Oriental fiscalship. When Romero entered
appearance in a case as Fiscal, Lacson opposed.
Lacson filed quo warranto.
DOCTRINE: There is no power in this country which can
compel a man to accept an office .Since Lacson refused
the Tarlac post, he remains Negros Oriental Fiscal. The
two positions are physically incompatible and an
appointment to one amounts to removal from the other.
But for a removal to be valid there must first be an
investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing
and an opportunity to defend himself. No officer or
employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law.
Provincial Fiscal as a civil service official may not be
removed from office even by the President who
appointed him, and even with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, except for cause.
Lacson v. Roque (1953)*
SUMMARY: Manila Mayor Arsenio Lacson made a radio
rant against a Judge who acquitted a Police Chief whom
Lacson had sued. The judge, who was called an
ignoramus, filed a libel suit against Lacson. President
Quirino imposed preventive suspension on Lacson,
pursuant to a Presidential policy on suspension for
officials under criminal prosecution. SC held that the
suspension was illegal.
DOCTRINE: Where the cause for removal is specified,
the specification amounts to a prohibition to remove for a
different
cause.
The
Presidents
untrammeled
discretionary power to remove does not apply to
appointed officers whose term of office is definite, much
less elective officers. The cause for suspension must
relate to and affect the administration of the office and
must be restricted to something of a substantial nature
directly affecting the rights and interest of the public.
Suspension is a qualified expulsion, and whether termed
suspension or expulsion, it constitutes either temporary
43
or permanent disfranchisement. It is an ad interim

stoppage or arrest of an official power and pay. When
the "suspension is to continue until the final disposition"
of a criminal prosecution, like Lacson's suspension, it
might become a virtual removal.
Tabora v. Montelibano (1956)*
SUMMARY: Tabora was a warehouseman in NARIC.
He was suspended pending an investigation over sacks
lost in the warehouse where he was in charge. The
investigating committee recommended his dismissal;
and he was charged with qualified theft and malversation.
Although he was acquitted, he was not allowed to return
to work, so he appealed for reinstatement. Upon denial
of his appeal, he went to court, but the trial court
dismissed on the ground that the NARIC Charter
exempted NARIC employees from the Civil Service rules
because NARIC was empowered to promulgate its own
employee policies. SC reversed, holding that NARIC is a
government corporation performing governmental
functions. Thus it is covered by the Civil Service rules.
The grant of power to formulate employee policies does
not empower NARIC to arbitrarily dismiss its employees.
Taboras removal was not for cause as he was acquitted
and he was not afforded procedural due process in the
administrative investigation which led to the filing of
charges against him. He should be reinstated.
DOCTRINE: A grant of power to a government
corporation to formulate employee policies does not
include the power to remove employees without cause.
The security that GOCC employees would hold their
office or employment during good behavior and would
not be dismissed without justifiable cause to be
determined in an investigation, where an opportunity to
be heard and defend themselves in person or by counsel
is afforded them, is intended to foster honesty and
efficiency in GOCCs. To do away with it would lead to
inefficiency and most likely to dishonesty on the part of
the officers and employees and abuse on the part of the
board of directors.
Termination must be made with notice to the officer
concerned.
3. System of Incentives and Rewards; Right to

compensation
RA 6713, Sec. 6
SECTION 6. System of Incentives and Rewards. A
system of annual incentives and rewards is hereby
established in order to motivate and inspire public
servants to uphold the highest standards of ethics. For
this purpose, a Committee on Awards to Outstanding
Public Officials and Employees is hereby created
composed of the following: the Ombudsman and
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as CoD2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes
Chairmen, and the Chairman of the Commission on

Audit, and two government employees to be appointed
by the President, as members.
It shall be the task of this Committee to conduct a
periodic, continuing review of the performance of public
officials and employees, in all the branches and
agencies of Government and establish a system of
annual incentives and rewards to the end that due
recognition is given to public officials and employees of
outstanding merit on the basis of the standards set
forth in this Act.
The conferment of awards shall take into account,
among other things, the following: the years of service
and the quality and consistency of performance, the
obscurity of the position, the level of salary, the unique
and exemplary quality of a certain achievement, and
the risks or temptations inherent in the work. Incentives
and rewards to government officials and employees of
the year to be announced in public ceremonies
honoring them may take the form of bonuses, citations,
directorships in government-owned or controlled
corporations, local and foreign scholarship grants, paid
vacations and the like. They shall likewise be
automatically promoted to the next higher position with
the
commensurate
salary
suitable
to
their
qualifications. In case there is no next higher position
or it is not vacant, said position shall be included in the
budget of the office in the next General Appropriations
Act. The Committee on Awards shall adopt its own
rules to govern the conduct of its activities.
Right to compensation (see RA 6758 and COA Auditing
Rules, supra)
Compensation is not an element of public office.
A public office may be accepted without
compensation (LOL).
Right to compensation is not the creation of a
contract but is an incident to the office, to which
the law attaches the compensation.
Amount of compensation is fixed by law.
Basic requirements for payment of salary under
COA Auditing Rules
1. Existence of legally created position with
fixed compensation or emolument
attached to the position
2. Issuance of valid appointment
3. Rendition of service being paid
4. Payment to the right person
Compensation includes salary, per diem, and
honorarium.
o Salary Compensation given as base
pay of the position or rank as fixed by
law or regulation, excluding all bonuses,
44
per diems, allowances, and overtime

pay.
o Per diem Daily allowance for extra
expenses incurred by the officer in the
performance of his duties, given when
the officer is away from their permanent
station.
o Honorarium something given in
appreciation for service rendered, a
voluntary donation.
Non-garnishment of salary
o Salary of a public officer or employee
may not, by garnishment, attachment, or
order of execution, be seized before
being paid to him, and appropriated for
the payment of his debts.
o Money intended for payment of
government
employees
salaries
remains government property until the
sums are physically delivered to the
employees. State money cannot be
garnished.
Agreements affecting compensation
o An agreement by a public officer
respecting his unearned or unaccrued
compensation may be considered
invalid as against public policy where it
tends to pervert such compensation to a
purpose other than that for which it was
intended, and to interfere with the
officers free and unbiased judgment in
relation to the duties of his office.
Thus the prevalent practice
among public employees of
using their salary ATM cards as
loan collateral may be illegal.
o Agreement to take lesser compensation,
pay part of salary back to the public
treasury, or to donate part of it to a 3rd
person is illegal.
o Sale or assignment of unearned salaries
and emoluments is also void for being
against public policy.
o An agreement to divide compensation
with a person who assists the officer in
obtaining the appointment is invalid, if
made with respect to the unearned
salaries.
Constitutional regulation of compensation
o Congress is prohibited from decreasing
the salary of the President, VicePresident,
SC
Justices,
judges,
Constitutional
Commissioners,
Ombudsman and her deputies during

their term.
o Congress may increase their own
salaries but the increase will not take
effect until expiration of the full term of
the members who approved such
increase.
Double compensation
o Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec. 8
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor
accept without the consent of the Congress, any
present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any
foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as
additional, double, or indirect compensation.
o Vice-President, Cabinet secretaries, and their
deputies are prohibited from receiving additional
compensation from ex-officio positions they may
hold (see CLU v. Executive Secretary and
companion cases).
o Other officials and employees who are duly
appointed to another position in a concurrent
capacity may be allowed to receive additional
compensation in the form of allowances or
honoraria, in the discretion of the President.
o See Santos v. CA on double compensation WRT
pensions.
o Agpalo, citing Bernas: A retiree receiving a
government pension can still receive such
pension if he accepts another government
position to which compensation is attached.
4. Rights under Civil Service Law and rules under

Administrative Code of 1987
1) Right to lodge complaints and grievances Sec. 37
Section 37. Complaints and Grievances. Employees
shall have the right to present their complaints or
grievances to management and have them adjudicated
as expeditiously as possible in the best interest of the
agency, the government as a whole, and the employee
concerned. Such complaint or grievances shall be
resolved at the lowest possible level in the department or
agency, as the case may be, and the employee shall
have the right to appeal such decision to higher
authorities.
Each department or agency shall promulgate rules and
regulations governing expeditious, fair and equitable
adjustment of employees' complaints or grievances in
accordance with the policies enunciated by the
Commission.
In case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting
45
all the available remedies under existing laws and

procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to
the Public Sector Labor Management Council
constituted under section 46, for appropriate action.
a) Public Sector Labor-Management Council Sec.
45
2) Right to self-organization Secs. 38-45 (see
discussion infra)
a) Coverage
i) General Rule Sec. 38(1)
ii) Exceptions - Sec. 38(2)
(1) Members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines
(2) Police officers and policemen
(3) Firefighters and jail guards
iii) Limitation
on
Right
for
High-Level
Employees Sec. 39
b) Protection of the Right Sec. 40
i) Non-discrimination on basis of membership
Sec. 40(1)
ii) Prohibition on yellow-dog provisions Sec.
40(1)
c) Regulation of Employee Organizations Sec. 41
i) Prohibition on government control Sec.
40(2)
ii) Registration Sec. 41
iii) Certificate Sec. 42
iv) Appropriate Organizational Unit Sec. 43
v) Recognition of Sole and Exclusive
Representative
(1) Majority rule Sec. 44(1)
(2) Voluntary recognition Sec. 44(2)
(3) Certification election - Sec. 44(3)
3) Right to leave of absence - Sec. 60
Section 60. Leave of Absence. - Officers and employees
in the Civil Service shall be entitled to leave of absence,
with or without pay, as may be provided by law and the
rules and regulations of the Civil Service Commission in
the interest of the service.
4) Compensation
a) Standardization of compensation Sec. 4
b) Salary increase or adjustment Sec. 28
c) Additional or double compensation Sec. 56
Section 56. Additional or Double Compensation. No
elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional or double compensation unless
specifically authorized by law nor accept without the
consent of the President, any present, emolument,
office, or title of any kind from any foreign state.
Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as
5. Personnel Actions
Personnel action denotes movement or progress

of personnel in the civil service
Must be done in accordance with such rules,
standards, and regulations as may be
promulgated by the CSC
a. Promotion
(2) Promotion. A promotion is a movement from one
position to another with an increase in duties and
responsibilities as authorized by law and usually
accompanied by an increase in pay. The movement may
be from one department or agency to another, or from
one organizational unit to another in the same
department or agency.
Section 32. Merit Promotion Plans. Each department or
agency shall establish promotion plans which shall be
administered in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Service law and the rules, regulations and
standards to be promulgated by the Commission. Such
plans shall include provisions for a definite screening
process, which may include tests of fitness, in
accordance with standards and guidelines set by the
Commission. Promotion Boards may be organized
subject to criteria drawn by the Commission.
Usually accompanied by increase in pay
means that pay hike is not a necessary element
of promotion. Pay increase is never
determinative of whether or not a promotion has
been bestowed on an employee.
Conversely, the pay of employees may be
increased without promoting them.
Promotion is in the nature of a gift, which may be
validly refused and acceptance of which may not
be compelled.
Factors that may be considered in promotion
(2007 Omnibus Rules, Rule VI, Sec. 5)
o Performance rating
o Education and training relevant to the
vacant position
o Work experience and outstanding
accomplishments
o Physical fitness
o Attitudes and personality traits which
have a bearing on the vacant position
o Potential and capability to perform the
duties of the vacant position and higher
positions
Next-in-Rank Rule
Rule VI, Secs. 3 and 4, 2007 Omnibus Rules
Implementing EO 292, Book V.
Sec. 3. A next-in-rank position refers to a position,
46
which, by reason, of the hierarchical arrangements of

positions in the department or agency or in the
government, is determined to be in nearest degree of
relationship to a higher position as contained in the
agencys System of Ranking Positions.
Sec. 4. An employee who holds a next-in-rank position
who is deemed the most competent and qualified,
possesses an appropriate civil service eligibility, and
meets the other conditions for promotion may be
promoted to the higher position when it becomes vacant.
However, the appointing authority may promote an
employee who is not next-in-rank but who possesses
superior qualifications and competence compared to a
next-in-rank employee who merely meets the minimum
requirements for the position.
This rule applies only to promotion. It
presupposes that long-serving employees have
gained not only superior skills but also greater
dedication to the public service (LOL).
The rules merely provide for a preference. The
appointing authority can appoint someone else.
Mandatory application of the next-in-rank rule
defeats the discretion of the appointing authority.
The reasons for disregarding the rule must be
made known to the next-in-rank.
The overriding consideration is the fostering of a
more efficient public service.
Automatic Reversion Rule
Sec. 13, 2007 Omnibus Rules Implementing EO 292,
Book V
Rule VI, Sec. 13. All appointments involved in a chain of
promotions must be submitted simultaneously for
approval by the Commission. The disapproval of the
appointment of a person proposed to a higher position
invalidates the promotion of those in lower positions and
automatically restores them to their former positions.
However, the affected persons are entitled to the
payment of salaries for services actually rendered at a
rate fixed in their promotional appointments.
see Divinagracia v. Sto. Tomas
Panis v. CSC (1994)
SUMMARY: Panis questions the appointment of Veloso
to the position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for
Administration of the Cebu City Medical Center. The
Court held that: 1) the position was validly created; 2)
there was a valid screening process and 3) the next-inrank principle alleged by petitioner to have been
disregarded only applied in cases of promotion. In this
case, there was a creation of a new position.
DOCTRINE: The next in rank rule specifically applies
only in cases of promotion. This case involves a new
office and a position created in the course of a valid
reorganization. Assuming nonetheless that a vacancy

actually occurred that can be filled up only by promotion,
the concept of "next in rank" does not impose any
mandatory or peremptory requirement to appoint the
person occupying the next lower position in the
occupational group of the office.
Divinagracia v. Sto. Tomas (1995)
SUMMARY: Mancita was the Municipal Planning and
Devt Coordinator of the Mun. of Pili for 5 years when the
Mayor of Pili terminated her services allegedly pursuant
to a regoranization and subsequently appointed Nacario,
who was then holding the position of a Municipal Budget
Officer, to the same position. Nacario was replaced in
her previous position as MBO by several persons until
the appointment of San Luis to the same. When Mancita
appealed her case to the Merit Systems and Protection
Board, the latter ruled in her favour and further ordered
her reinstatement to the position of MPDC then occupied
by Nacario. When Nacario asked the CSC on the status
of her employment pursuant to the MPSB decision, the
CSC opined that the reinstatement of Mancita to the
position of MPDC was not a valid cause for Nacario's
termination, and that since Nacario was the former
Municipal Budget Officer she had the right to return to
that position pursuant to Sec. 13, Rule VI of the Rules
Implementing EO 292 which mandates the return of an
appointee, in a chain of promotions, to his former
position once his appointment is subsequently
disapproved. HELD: Nacario is entitled to return to her
former position as Municipal Budget Office of Pili,
despite the present occupation of San Luis of said
position, after the RTC directed the reinstatement of
Mancita to the position of MPDC. Alexis D. San Luis
cannot hold on to the position of Municipal Budget
Officer. On the other hand, Prescilla B. Nacario who is
protected by law in her security of tenure should be
reinstated thereto.
Before a public official or employee can be automatically
restored to her former position, there must be:
1) a series of promotions
2) all appointments are simultaneously submitted to the
CSC for approval; and
3) the CSC disapproves the appointment of a person
proposed to a higher position.
Santiago, Jr. v. CSC (1989)
SUMMARY: Customs Collector I Santiago was
promoted to Customs Collector III, passing over
Customs Collector II Jose, who protested to the MSPB.
BOC Commissioner defended his choice. MSPB and
CSC reversed him and ordered Joses promotion
because he is the next-in-rank and had better
educational qualifications than Santiago. SC reversed
the CSC and upheld the discretion and prerogative of
47
appointing authorities over the next-in-rank rule. The

next-in-rank rule only provides for preference in
consideration, not preference in appointment; so the
appointing authority is still legally allowed to appoint
persons other than the official next-in-rank. Here the
appointing authority was justified in exercising his
discretion and had meritorious reasons to appoint the
more assiduous Santiago who won accolades for his
successful anti-smuggling pursuits over the apparently
more educated Jose who could not be bothered to
assume a post in Bicol. CSC has no authority to reject
an appointment on the ground that someone else is
better qualified for a position since that would amount to
encroachment on the appointing authoritys discretion.
DOCTRINE: The next-in-rank rule does not create a
mandatory preference. What it does provide is that they
would be among the first to be considered for the
vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by
promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other
modes of appointment. One who is next-in-rank is
entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the
higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he
and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither
grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a
ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote
such person to the next higher position.
Abila v. CSC (1991)
SUMMARY: Eleria, Administrative Officer III, protested
Abilas appointment to Administrative Officer IV. The
Merit System Protection Board, after initially dismissing
the protest, later on appeal resolved to revoke Abilas
appointment and directed instead the OIC or Mayor to
appoint Eleria on the ground that Eleria held a position
next in rank to that of the vacancy, thus gave her
promotional priority. The CSC affirmed the Boards
decision. SC ruled for Abila, stating that the Next-inRank rule relied on does not mean that a right is vested
on the next in rank. First, it only applied in cases where a
vacancy is filled by promotion, which did not happen in
the case at bar. Also, that the rule is not absolute,
meaning that even if there be a promotion that occurs,
what the rule states is that the next in rank would be one
of the first to be considered, thus giving the appointing
authority wide discretion is selecting the appointee.
DOCTRINE: The next-in-rank rule invoked by the CSC
applies only where a vacancy is filled by promotion, a
process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer to
another position higher either in rank or salary. There is
no legal fiat that a vacancy must be filled only by
promotion; the appointing authority is given wide
discretion to fill a vacancy from among the several
alternatives provided for by law. One who is next-in-rank
is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to
the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that

he and no one else can be appointed.
Medenilla v. CSC (1991)
SUMMARY: Medenilla was first a contractual employee
of the DPWH (Public Relations Officer II) who was
eventually detailed as Technical Assistant, then she was
appointed
as
Supervising
Human
Resource
Development Officer. Dellosa et al contested her
appointment, stating that it should be one of them, since
they were next-in-rank. CSC held that Medenilla did not
possess the qualifications for the position, but the SC
ruled otherwise, and ruled that the next-in rank rule no
longer applies, considering her experience as well as
other training she underwent (see held).
DOCTRINE: Preference given to permanent employees
assumes that employees working in a Department for
longer periods have gained not only superior skills but
also greater dedication to the public service. This is not
always true and the law, moreover, does not preclude
the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or
necessary talents into the government service
Next-in-rank rule must give way to the exigencies of the
public service.
Lustero v. IAC (1991)
SUMMARY: Palomar was permanently appointed
Supply Officer III, subject to the final outcome of the
protest filed by Lusterio. Such protest questioned
Palomars qualification to the position since he allegedly
lacked the required experience. Palomars appointment
was rescinded by the CSC which found him unqualified.
Lusterio was found qualified and thus assumed the
position. The RTC reversed the CSC finding and held
that Palomar was qualified. The IAC affirmed. HELD: As
correctly found by the trial court and the respondent IAC,
Palomar meets all the requirements for the position of
Supply Officer III. Thus, even if petitioner is also
qualified, the appointing authority had the discretion to
determine who of those qualified should be appointed to
the contested position. The Merit Systems Board, the
Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President
committed an error, amounting to grave abuse of
discretion, when they rescinded the appointment of the
private respondent and directed the appointing authority
to appoint the petitioner. Even if assuming the petitioner
then occupied a next-in-rank position, that fact alone did
not make it mandatory for the appointing power to
appoint him to the contested position. The Civil Service
Decree merely provides that when a vacancy occurs in a
position in the second level of the Career Service, the
employee in the government service who occupies the
next lower positions in the occupational group under
which the vacant position is classified and in other
functionally related occupational groups and who are
48
competent, qualified and with the appropriate civil

service eligibility, "shall be considered for promotion". It
does not say "shall be promoted".
DOCTRINE: the rule is that if both persons competing
for a position are qualified for the position then neither
the Merit Systems Board, the Civil Service Commission,
or the Office of the President, nor the courts below or
this Court, can substitute the judgment of the appointing
authority in appointing private respondent to said
position.
b. Transfer
(3) Transfer. A transfer is a movement from one position
to another which is of equivalent rank, level, or salary
without break in service involving the issuance of an
appointment.
It shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the
interest of public service, in which case, the employee
concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If
the employee believes that there is no justification for the
transfer, he may appeal his case to the Commission.
The transfer may be from one department or agency to
another or from one organizational unit to another in the
same department or agency: Provided, however, That
any movement from the non-career service to the career
service shall not be considered a transfer.
Rule VII, Sec. 5, 2007 Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of EO 292
Sec. 5. A transfer is a movement from one position to
another which is of equivalent rank, level, or salary
without break in service involving the issuance of an
appointment.
The transfer may be from one department or agency to
another or from one organizational unit to another in the
same department or agency: Provided, however, That
any movement from the non-career service to the career
service shall not be considered a transfer.
Transfer shall not be considered disciplinary when made
in the interest of public service, in which case, the
employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons
therefor. If the employee believes that there is no
justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to
the Commission.
Heads of oversight agencies and their staff are
prohibited from transferring or being appointed to any
position
in
the
department/agency/office/local
government unit which his unit is assigned or designated
to oversee within one year after the termination of such
assignment/designation.
The prohibition contemplates only transfer of officials of
those offices/units who are in a position to exert
pressure or influence on the new or accepting agency

but not to cover those occupying clerical and skilled
positions such as clerks and drivers.
An employee who seeks appointment by transfer or
promotion to another office shall first secure permission
from the head of the department or agency where he is
employed.
The permission to seek transfer to another office shall be
valid for 30 days from the date it was granted but it may
be renewed for another 30 days upon the request of the
employee.
A head of a department or agency shall not propose or
make an appointment for the transfer or promotion of an
employee to his department or agency until the written
consent of the head of the department or agency where
the employee is employed is obtained.
Transfer may be imposed as an administrative
remedy/penalty.
GR: Unconsented transfers are tantamount to
illegal removals, being violations of security of
tenure.
EXCEPTIONS
o Temporary appointees
o CES personnel appointed to specific
ranks (not positions)
o Periodical reassignment of officers by
the agency head to improve service
(provided that the officers may be legally
transferred)
o Transfer pending investigation
This rule presupposes that the officer is
appointed to particular station. An officer merely
assigned to a station can be transferred or
reassigned to any station without violating
security of tenure.
o Where the appointment does not
indicate a specific station, the appointee
may be transferred or assigned provided
the transfer does not affect a substantial
change in title, rank, or salary (e.g.,
Revenue Officers under the BIR and
Election Officers under RA 8189).
A transfer which results in a demotion,
promotion, advancement, or reduction; or a
transfer which is aimed at luring the employee
away from his permanent position, must be done
with the employees consent
Temporary transfer is permissible even without
employees consent.
People v. Reyes (1995)
SUMMARY: Maniego transferred Ebio to a position that
was effected on January 14, 1992. Ebio filed with the
COMELEC a complaint regarding the transfer as it
49
violated BP 881, which prohibits the transfer of any

employee in the civil service 120 days before the May 11,
1992 synchronized national and local elections. The
Court, however, agreed with the RTC that no offense
was committed since the Resolution enforcing the penal
provision only took effect on January 15, 1992.
Vinzons-Chato v. Natividad (1995)
SUMMARY: Pursuant to E.O. 132 which approved the
streamlining of the BIR, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue Vinzons-Chato transferred Salvador Blas, a
Revenue District Officer, from his post in San Fernando,
Pampanga under District 21 to Tuguegarao, Cagayan
under District 14. In turn, a Solon Alcantara was ordered
to report to Blas former post. Blas contested said
transfer arguing that it was made without his consent
and would cause his dislocation and demotion or a
diminution in rank, status, and span of duties and
responsibilities since the revenue district in Tuguegarao
has a smaller pool of personnel and only of the
revenue capacity of Pampanga. HELD: Transfer was
valid. His transfer was part of a nationwide reshuffle or
reassignment of revenue district officers designed to
improve revenue collection and was made in the
exigencies of the service. Similar to the case in DECS v.
CA, such policy may have been based on the
experience that when officials have stayed long enough
in one station, there is a tendency for them to become
stale and unchallenged by new situations and
conditions, and that some administrative problems
accumulate for a good number of years. Moreover, his
transfer to the Tuguegarao revenue district did not entail
any diminution in rank, salary, status and
responsibilities. That the Tuguegarao revenue district is
smaller than that in San Fernando, Pampanga has no
basis because the classification of RDOs into Class A-1,
A, B, C and D has been abolished and all RDOs are now
considered to be of the same class.
Vinzons-Chato v. Zenorosa (2000)
SUMMARY: Rigodon in the BIR. Martinez was Assistant
RDO in BIRs Paco-Pandacan district office. The retiring
RDO recommended her as replacement, but BIR
Commissioner LVC appointed someone else. Martinez
protested. The DOF Grievance Board ordered the BIR to
comply with its own Merit Promotion Plan. Instead of
complying, LVC issued an order reassigning 14 officials
to various posts. In the said order, Martinez was recalled
to the BIR Head Office and she was replaced by Marcelo.
Martinez filed suit to stop implementation of the
reassignment order, claiming that LVC issued it in bad
faith/vindictiveness after she protested her nonpromotion. Trial court granted TRO, and later a WPI, but
SC reversed, holding that BIR Commissioner LVC was
authorized to reassign BIR personnel as exigencies of
the service may require from time to time, to prevent

revenue officers from developing patronage networks.
Such reassignments do not diminish salary or rank.
There was no demotion even if the new assignment was
not compatible with Martinez expertise since public
office is a public trust, and a contrary stance would
subordinate government projects to the individual
preferences and opinions of civil service employees.
DOCTRINE: The BIR Commissioner is authorized to
assign or reassign internal revenue officers and BIR
employees as the exigencies of service may require,
without demotion in rank and salary in accordance with
Civil Service Rules and Regulation. Such reassignment
of revenue officers entails the prevention of familiarity
and patronage between BIR officers and taxpayers of a
particular area. To sustain a contention that a transfer
constitutes a demotion simply because the new
assignment is not to a public officers liking would be to
subordinate government projects, along with the great
resources and efforts they entail, to the individual
preferences and opinions of civil service employees.
Such contention would negate the principle that a public
office is a public trust and that it is not the private
preserve of any person.
Cuevas v. Bacal, supra
SUMMARY: Bacal holds the position of CESO rank III.
She was Regional Director of the PAO before she was
designated Acting Chief Public Attorney by President
Ramos. However, a certain Carina Demaisip was
appointed chief public defender by President Estrada.
The position of Chief Public Defender was formerly
called Chief Public Attorney and which position Bacal
was currently holding. She filed a quo warranto with the
CA questioning her replacement. The CA ruled that her
removal was without cause and in violation of her right to
tenure. HELD: Respondents security of tenure was not
violated. The position of Chief Public Attorney of the
PAO requires a CES Rank Level I while Respondent
was just CESO III at the time. As respondent does not
have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public
Attorney, her appointment to that position cannot be
considered permanent, and she can claim no security of
tenure in respect of that position.
DOCTRINE: A permanent appointment can be issued
only to a person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed. The mere fact that a
position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant
even if he does not possess the required qualifications.
Such right depends on the nature of his appointment,
which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. Also,
security of tenure in the career executive service is
50
acquired with respect to rank and not to position.

c. Detail
(6) Detail. A detail is the movement of an employee from
one agency to another without the issuance of an
appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited
period in the case of employees occupying professional,
technical and scientific positions. If the employee
believes that there is no justification for the detail, he
may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending
appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be
executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
Section 58. Prohibition on Detail or Reassignment. No
detail or reassignment whatever shall be made within
three (3) months before any election.
Rule VII, Sec. 8, 2007 Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of EO 292
Sec. 8. A detail is the movement of an employee from
one department or agency to another which is temporary
in nature, which does not involve a reduction in rank,
status or salary and does not require the issuance of an
appointment.
The employee detailed receives his salary only from his
mother unit/agency.
Detail shall only be allowed for a maximum period in
case of employees occupying professional, technical,
and scientific position. If the employee believes that
there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his
case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to
detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise
ordered by the Commission.
[see also CSC-MC 21, s. 2002]
In case of doubt, an order of detail is presumed
to be made in good faith.
A detail made as a preliminary step to removal,
as a lure away from a permanent position, as a
means for indirect termination or forced
resignation, is illegal.
Republic v. CA (1990)
SUMMARY: Lopez protested Corpuzs appointment as
CYRC Director because he had a better right to the
position. This was resolved in favor of Corpuz. After,
Lopez began filing numerous cases against Corpuz and
the CYRC staff, most of which were dismissed. DECS
Minister Laya then temporarily detailed Lopez to the
MECS Legal Office in the exigencies of the service. 6
months later, Lopez returned to the CYRC as Asst
Director withouth prior authorization. This caused
Corpuz to issue a Memo advising that Lopez would not
be considered an active member of the Staff. Corpuz

requested Lopez to submit an official order terminating
his detail, which Lopez failed to do.
DOCTRINE: Lopez brought it upon himself to not be
recognized as part of the CYRC staff due to his noncompliance with the Directors orders. More importantly,
while the lower courts were correct in saying that the
DECS Ministers directive was defective in that the
term detail was used instead of re-assignment, the
official intent of such directive was clear: to move Lopez
away from the CYRC and locate him in the head office.
A "detail" is the movement from one Department or
Agency to another which is temporary in nature (Section
4, Rule VI, Civil Service Rules on Personal Actions and
Policies) whereas a "re-assignment" is the movement of
an employee from one organizational unit to another in
the same Department or Agency (Section 5)
d. Reassignment
(7) Reassignment. An employee may be reassigned
from one organizational unit to another in the same
agency: Provided, That such reassignment shall not
involve a reduction in rank, status or salary.
Rule VII, Sec. 10, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of EO 292
Sec. 10. A reassignment is the movement of an
employee from one organizational unit to another in the
same department or agency which does not involve a
reduction in rank, status, or salary, and does not require
the issuance of an appointment.
[see also CSC Resolution 04-1458, Dec. 23, 2004 ]
Reassignment
is
a
valid
management
prerogative, but if it results in reduction of rank,
status, or salary, it in effect a constructive
dismissal, e.g. floating assignments.
Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, supra
SUMMARY: Fernandez was Director of the Office of
Personnel Inspection and Audit (OPIA) and Lima was
Director of the Office of Personnel Relations (OPR) in
the CSC. A Resolution was signed by Chairman Sto.
Tomas and Commissioner Ereneta merging OPIA and
OPR to create the Research and Development Office
(RDO). The SC ruled that such Reso is valid as the
Revised Admin Code recognizes reassignment as a
management prerogative vested in any agency or
51
department in the civil service, thus there was no

violation of security of tenure.
DOCTRINE: Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of
the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes
reassignment as a management prerogative vested in
the Commission and, for that matter, in any department
or agency of government embraced in the civil service
Teotico v. Agda (1991)
SUMMARY: Agda was appointed Chief Fiber
Development Officer (Range 73) of the Fiber
Development
Authority
(FIDA)
effective
upon
assumption of office. This appointment did not indicate
any specific station or place of assignment. He was
subsequently designated Agda as "Acting Regional
Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II, then he was
"temporarily re-assigned" "in the interest of the service,"
at the main office of the Administrator to perform special
functions. Agda questions the temporary reassignment.
After a lot of motions filed, Agda filed a petition via Rule
65 and for a preliminary injunction with the RTC. The
RTC granted his petition and furthermore, ordered the
CSC to reinstate Agda to his position as Fiber Regional
Administrator, FIDA, Region I. HELD: The RTC
committed GAD in ordering the reinstatement of Agda.
Agda was not appointed as Fiber Regional
Administrator, FIDA Region I, but as CHIEF FIBER
DEVELOPMENT OFFICER; he was not appointed to
any specific station. He was merely designated as Acting
Regional Administrator For FIDA Regions I and II. Not
having been appointed to any specific station, he could
be transferred or assigned to any other place by the
head of office where in the opinion of the latter his
services may be utilized more effectively.
DOCTRINE: Where an employee is not appointed to any
specific station, he could be transferred or assigned to
any other place by the head of office where in the
opinion of the latter his services may be utilized more
effectively
Cario v. Daoas (2002)
SUMMARY: Cario was ordered reassigned to a
position in Region II. She sought the opinion of the CSC
Regional Director regarding the legality of her
reassignment. The CSC RD ruled in her favor.
Respondents appealed this to the CSC. On the basis of
such opinion, she continued to report for work in Region
I. She was, however, sent a memo that she was dropped
from the rolls and considered AWOL. The CA dismissed
Carios appeal. The SC ruled that she was justified in
not reporting to her reassigned post in Region II on the
basis of the legal opinion rendered by the CSC RD,
which should be accorded presumption of regularity.
Pastor v. Pasig City (2002)
SUMMARY: Pastor is the appointed Budget Officer of

the Mun. of Pasig. In 1992, she was reassigned by
Mayor Eusebio to the Office of the Mun. Administrator
pending investigation of reports against her concerning
her issuance of Advice of Allotments without sufficient
cash collection. After 3 years with no case filed against
her, Pastor asked for her reinstatement from the CSC.
Mayor Eusebio contested this arguing that her
reassignment was for exigencies of service and did not
involve any diminution of salary or rank as department
head. CSC ruled in Pastors favour and ordered her
reinstatement as Budget Officer or assignment to an
office where she can perform as head of a department.
Instead of being reinstated, Pastor was reassigned to
another unit of the now city government as head of the
Pasig City Hall Annex in Karangalan. She contested this
arguing that said position was inexistent and that she
was not actually a head of a department as she had
nothing to oversee. CSC again ruled in her favour but
CA reversed. HELD: Pastor must be reinstated as
Budget Officer of Pasig. Pastors reassignment to
different offices in the local government of Pasig City is
indefinite. She has been on virtual floating assignments
which amount to a diminution of her rank, hence
impermissible under the law.
DOCTRINE: A reassignment that is indefinite and results
in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect a
constructive removal from the service.
e. Reinstatement
(4) Reinstatement. Any person who has been
permanently appointed to a position in the career service
and who has, through no delinquence or misconduct,
been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a
position in the same level for which he is qualified.
Rule VII, Sec.6, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
EO 292
Sec. 6. Reinstatement is the reappointment of a person
who has been previously appointed to a career service
and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct,
been separated therefrom or the restoration of one who
has been exonerated of the administrative charges filed
against him.
Reinstatement: restoration to a state or condition
from which one has been removed or separated.
It is within the CSCs power to order the
reinstatement of government employees who
have been unlawfully dismissed.
However, the issuance of a new appointment is
discretionary on the appointing power; thus, it
cannot be compelled by mandamus.
52
An employee who claims that he has been

illegally removed must prosecute his claim to the
office within the prescribed period, otherwise, he
is deemed to have waived his right.
When a government employee has been illegally
dismissed and his reinstatement is later ordered,
for all legal purposes he is considered as not
having left his office, so that he is entitled to all
the rights and privileges to accrue to him by
virtue of the office he held.
A reinstated employee is entitled to back
salaries as a separate relief, when the
suspension of the employee is held to be
unlawful or the suspended employee is later
found to be innocent. The award is limited to 5
years worth of unpaid salaries.
o An employee who was not completely
exonerated, i.e., penalty was reduced,
is not entitled to back salaries.
An officer claiming back his office is not entitled
to salary during the pendency of the case
(Angara v. Gorospe).
Cristobal v. Melchor (1977)
SUMMARY: Cristobal, a private secretary in the Office of
the President, was among several Malacaang
employees terminated on New Years Day 1962. After
some of the dismissed employees were re-hired, Exec.
Sec. Mutuc assured Cristobal that he would be re-hired
too, but he wasnt. Some of his co-workers sued for
reinstatement. SC upheld the reinstatement of these
suing co-workers in Ingles v. Mutuc. In 1969, Cristobal,
invoking Ingles, asked for his own reinstatement. The
Executive Secretary rebuffed him 5 times, so in 1971
Cristobal went to court. The suit was treated as quo
warranto as Cristobals replacement was later impleaded
therein. CFI dismissed the suit for belated filing under
ROC 6616, which mandates that the quo warranto
petition be filed within 1 year from the cause of ouster.
On appeal, SC reversed. Cristobals situation merits a
relaxation of the 1-year period, because the record
shows that he did not abandon his appeal for
reinstatement. He did not file the action within the 1-year
period ONLY because he relied upon the continued
reassurance of the government officials concerned that
he would be reinstated. Moreover, he had the Ingles
ruling to support him. SC thus concluded that laches
cannot be invoked against Cristobal and the Ingles ruling
should be applied to his case.
DOCTRINE: The filing of a quo warranto petition outside
the 1-year period is excused if the delay is attributable to
an act of the government or its responsible officials.
Where the cause of action is of such a nature that a suit
to enforce it would be brought on behalf, not only of the
plaintiff, but of all persons similarly situated, it is not

essential that each such person should intervene in the
suit brought in order that he be deemed thereafter free
from the laches which bars those who sleep on their
rights.
Sabello v. DECS (1989)
SUMMARY: Sabello previously held the rank of
Elementary School Principal I. However, he was
convicted for a violation of RA3019 for having been
involved in an illegal disbursement of government funds,
and sentenced to a years imprisonment as well as to
suffer disqualification to hold public office. Sabello was
later granted absolute pardon by the President, and
thereafter applied to reinstatement to government
service. Although he was reinstated, it was only to the
position of a classroom teacher. Sabello now prays that
he reinstated to his former position, and for back
salaries.
SC granted the petition. Although generally discretion
lies with the appointing authority as to re-appointments,
the Court ruled that should the petitioner be unduly
deprived of what is rightfully his, discretion should now
be qualified by giving justice to the petitioner. The SC
found no circumstance to justify a diminution in rank, and
so as justice and equity dictate, Sabello should be
returned to his former position.
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the question of whether
or not petitioner should be reappointed to his former
position is a matter of discretion of the appointing
authority, but under the circumstances of this case, if the
petitioner had been unfairly deprived of' what is rightfully
his, the discretion is qualified by the requirements of
giving justice to the petitioner. It is no longer a matter of
discretion on the part of the appointing power, but
discretion tempered with fairness and justice.
Monsanto v. Factoran (1989)
SUMMARY: Monsanto (Asst Treasurer, Calbayog City)
was convicted by Sandiganbayan of the complex crime
of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Monsanto
was eventually extended absolute pardon by then
President Marcos, which she accepted. She now
contends that she is entitled to reinstatement and
backwages.
DOCTRINE: The absolute disqualification or ineligibility
from public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
falsification of public documents. It is clear from the
authorities referred to that when her guilt and
punishment were expunged by her pardon, this
particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth,
petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office
which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in
considering her qualifications and suitability for the
53
public post, the facts constituting her offense must be

and should be evaluated and taken into account to
determine ultimately whether she can once again be
entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the
pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it
cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo
the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Cabagnot v. CSC (1993)
SUMMARY: Aklan Provincial Government was
reorganized, providing for a new staffing pattern. Aklan
Governor Corazon L. Cabagnot issued a Memorandum
inviting all provincial employees to apply for positions in
the new staffing pattern, subject to the evaluation of the
Provincial Placement Committee. 21 aggrieved
employees jointly appealed to Governor Cabagnot
questioning their new proposed appointments. They
prayed that they be appointed to the positions they
applied for which they are eligible, trained, and
experienced. CSC ordered the reinstatement of
appellants to their positions or positions comparable
without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries.
DOCTRINE: The CSC is not revoking any appointment
made by Cabagnot. It is merely ordering the
reinstatement of private respondents whom it found to
have been demoted or terminated. It correctly found that
a glaring disparity exists between the former positions
held by private respondents and the positions proposed
to them by petitioner.
Gloria v. de Guzman, supra
SUMMARY: Ramos et al were employees of the
Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA),
which later became Philippine State College of
Aeronautics (PSCA). The Board of Trustees of PAFCA
issued a Reso which required faculty/admin employees
to be subject to civil service eligibilities, resulting to them
being issued temporary appointments, only to last for a
year. Ramos et al contend that the temporary 1 year
appointment is not valid. SC ruled that such is valid,
given that discretionary power is vested in the Board of
Trustees.
DOCTRINE: Reinstatement is technically issuance of a
new appointment which is essentially discretionary, to be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to
his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. Such exercise of the discretionary power of
appointment cannot be controlled, not even by the Court
as long as it is exercised properly by the appointing
authority.
f. Reemployment
EO 292, Book V, Sec. 26(5)

(5) Reemployment. Names of persons who have been
appointed permanently to positions in the career service
and who have been separated as a result of reduction in
force or reorganization, shall be entered in a list from
which selection for reemployment shall be made.
of EO 292
Sec. 7. Reemployment is the reappointment of a person
who has been previously appointed to a position in the
career service but who has been separated as a result of
reduction in force, reorganization and/or voluntary
resignation.
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment to
any office or position during his tenure of office. A
person who lost in a election shall not be eligible for
appointment or reappointment to any office in the
government or government-owned or controlled
corporation within one year following such election.
A person who resigned from the civil service during the
three-month period before any election, whether national
or local, to promote the candidacy of another, shall not
be eligible for reappointment during the six-month period
following such election.
Other personnel actions in the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of EO 292
of EO 292
Sec. 9. Secondment is a movement of an employee
from one department or agency to another which is
temporary in nature and which may or may not require
the issuance of an appointment but may either involve
reduction or increase in compensation.
Secondment shall be governed by the following general
guidelines:
(a) Secondment for a period exceeding one year shall
be subject to approval by the Commission.
(b) Secondment to international bodies/organizations
recognized by the Philippine government may be
allowed.
(c) Secondment shall always be covered by a written
agreement between the mother agency and the
receiving agency and concurred in by the employee
seconded. Such agreement shall be submitted to the
Commission for record purposes.
(d) Payment of salaries of seconded employees shall
be borne by the mother agency. In case of higher
compensation covered by a duly issued appointment
within the Philippine government, the same may be
used for purpose of computing his retirement benefits
but not for the purpose of commutation of leave credits
54
earned in the mother agency. In case of a lower

compensation, the mother agency shall pay the
difference. This rule does not apply in cases of
secondment to international agencies.
(e) The seconded employee shall be on leave without
pay in his mother agency for the duration of his
secondment, and during such period, he may earn
leave credits which are commutable immediately
thereafter at and payable by the receiving agency.
Class Notes: Secondment across the 3 great
branches of government is not allowed. Thats
why UP Law faculty (under the Executive) who
were appointed to SC had to choose between
the SC appointment and their position in UP Law
(A
high-ranking
justice
opposed
the
appointments daw).
of EO 292
Sec. 11. A demotion is the movement from one position
to another involving the issuance of an appointment with
diminution in duties, responsibilities, status, or rank
which may or may not involve reduction in salary.
Agpalo: Although the law is silent as to its
applicability in disciplinary actions other than
dismissal, due process requirement also applies
to demotions, because it also affects the
employment of the officer (citing Leonardo v.
NLRC).
An assignment or detail to a lower position with
a lower compensation is in effect a demotion
tantamount to removal when no cause is shown
or when it is not a part of any disciplinary action.
The fact that the employee would be receiving
the same salary as that of the previous position
does not mean that there is no demotion
(Cabagnot v. CSC).
of EO 292
Sec. 12. Separation is a voluntary or involuntary
termination of employment.
6. Right to Self-Organization
Const., Art. III, Sec. 8
Section 8. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Const., Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(5)
Section 2(5). The right to self-organization shall not be
denied to government employees.

Civil Service Law, Secs. 38-45
Section 38. Coverage. (1) All government employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, can form, join or assist employees'
organizations of their own choosing for the furtherance
and protection of their interests. They can also form, in
conjunction with appropriate government authorities,
labor-management committees, work councils and other
forms of workers' participation schemes to achieve the
same objectives.
(2) The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to the
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
including police officers, policemen, firemen and jail
guards.
Section 39. Ineligibility of High-Level Employees to Join
Rank-and-File Employees' Organization. - High-level
employees whose functions are normally considered as
policy-making or managerial or whose duties are of a
highly confidential nature shall not be eligible to join the
organization of rank-and-file government employees.
Section 40. Protection of the Right to Organize. (1) Government employees shall not be discriminated
against in respect of their employment by reason of their
membership in employees' organizations or participation
in the normal activities of their organizations.
Their employment shall not be subject to the condition
that they shall not join or shall relinquish their
membership in the employees' organizations.
(2) Government authorities shall not interfere in the
establishment,
functioning
or
administration
of
government employees' organizations through acts
designed to place such organizations under the control
of government authority.
Section 41. Registration of Employees' Organization. Government employees' organizations shall register with
the Civil Service Commission and the Department of
Labor and Employment. The application shall be filed
with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department
which shall process the same in accordance with the
provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Applications may also be filed with the Regional Offices
of the Department of Labor and Employment which shall
immediately transmit the said applications to the Bureau
of Labor Relations within three (3) days from receipt
thereof.
Section 42. Certificate of Registration. - Upon arrival of
55
the application, a registration certificate shall be issued

to the organization recognizing it as a legitimate
employees' organization with the right to represent its
members and undertake activities to further and defend
its interests. The corresponding certificates of
registration shall be jointly approved by the Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission and the Secretary of Labor
and Employment.
Section 43. Appropriate Organizational Unit. - The
appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer's
unit consisting of rank-and-file employees unless
circumstances otherwise require.
Section 44.
Sole
and
Exclusive
Employees'
Representatives. (1) The duly registered employees' organization having
the support of the majority of the employees in the
appropriate organizational unit shall be designated as
the sole and exclusive representative of the employees.
(2) A duly registered employees' organization shall be
accorded voluntary recognition upon a showing that no
other employees' organization is registered or is seeking
registration, based on the records of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, and that the said organization has the majority
support of the rank-and-file employees in the
organizational unit.
(3) Where there are two or more duly registered
employees'
organizations
in
the
appropriate
organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall,
upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election
and shall certify the winner as the exclusive
representative of the rank-and-file employees in said
organizational unit.
Section 45. The Public Sector Labor-Management
Council. - A Public Sector Labor-Management Council is
hereby constituted to be composed of the following: The
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as Chairman;
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, as ViceChairman; and the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary
of Justice and the Secretary of Budget and
Management, as members.
The Council shall implement and administer the
provisions of this Chapter. For this purpose, the Council
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
implement this Chapter.
Under the CSC Guidelines on Prohibited Mass
Action, employees under the Civil Service are
generally not allowed to strike.
Mass action done outside of office hours may be
allowed and shall not be deemed prohibited, as
long as such would not result in disruption of

work.
Prohibited concerted activity refers to any
collective activity undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their
employees' organization, with the intent of
effecting work stoppage or service disruption in
order to realize their demands or force
concessions, economic or otherwise it includes
mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts of
similar nature (GSIS v. Kapisanan).
Government agencies shall not approve mass
leaves substantially intended to enable
employees to join prohibited mass actions.
Officials who approve such mass leaves shall
also be subject to sanction.
Mass leave occurs when 5 or more employees
of the same agency apply for leave
simultaneously or at the same time under
circumstances evidencing collusion or common
design to participate in a prohibited mass action.
TUPAS v. NHA (1989)
SUMMARY: TUPAS petition to hold a certification
election to determine the exclusive bargaining
representative of the workers in NHC was denied, on the
ground that the NHC being a GOCC, its workers were
prohibited from forming, joining, or assisting any labor
organization for purposes of collective bargaining.
SC ruled for the conduct of the election. The right to
unionize is explicitly recognized and granted to
employees both in the governmental and private sectors.
Whether the employees are covered by the Labor Code
or the Civil Service rules, certification elections may still
be held.
DOCTRINE: The right to unionize or to form
organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to
employees in both the governmental and the private
sectors.
Subsequent statutory developments have
rendered academic even the distinction between the two
types of government-owned or controlled corporations
and the laws governing employment relations therein, as
hereinbefore discussed. For, whether the employees of
NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the civil
service laws, a certification election may be conducted.
SSS v. CA (1989)
SUMMARY: Main question of this case is whether or not
SSS employees have a right to strike. The SSS
Employees Association staged a strike. SSS filed for a
TRO, which was granted. SC ruled that from the intent of
the framers of the Consti, as well as other pertinent laws
and jurisprudence, there is NO right to strike.
DOCTRINE: Since the terms and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law, government
56
workers cannot use the same weapons employed by

workers in the private sector to secure concessions from
their employers.
Bangalisan v. CA (1997)
SUMMARY: 800 public school teachers staged mass
action from September 17-19, 1990, protesting against
the failure of the public authorities to implement in a just
and correct manner certain laws and measures intended
for their material benefit. They were placed under
preventive suspension.
DOCTRINE: While the Constitution recognizes the right
of government employees to organize, they are
prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which
will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
services. The right of government employees to organize
is limited only to the formation of unions or associations,
without including the right to strike. The ability to strike is
not essential to the right of association. In the absence
of statute, public employees do not have the right to
engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS
(2006)*
SUMMARY: GSIS employees went on strike.
Management initiated investigations against the
employees for possible sanction. KMG sought to enjoin
the investigation on the ground that their strike was not
illegal so they could not be made to answer for their
actions. W/N the mass action by GSIS employees is
prohibited under the Civil Service rules so as to entitle
GSIS to make its employees answerable for participating
therein
HELD: Under the 1987 Constitution, public sector
workers may unionize but they may not strike without
special provision of law. As held in Jacinto v. CA and
Gesite v. CA, the right of public sector workers to
organize is subject to standards for allowable limitations,
such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association,
considerations of national security, and prevention of
disruptions in the delivery of public services. It was
further held in Gesite that public employees going on
unauthorized disruptive absences to join mass actions
may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
The definition of prohibited concerted activity covers
any collective activity undertaken by government
employees, whether or not through employees
organizations; and includes mass leaves and pickets. It
would thus be a trivialization of the Civil Service rules if
the employees were to be excused from accounting for
their actions in the picket.
It was immaterial that the mass action was not
undertaken to press for economic demands or additional
material benefits. Law and jurisprudence do not

distinguish as to the purpose of mass action.
7.
Other rights: Leave of Absence, GSIS

Retirement,
Absences,
Insurance,
Employees Compensation
RA 6713
SECTION 6. System of Incentives and Rewards. A
system of annual incentives and rewards is hereby
established in order to motivate and inspire public
servants to uphold the highest standards of ethics. For
this purpose, a Committee on Awards to Outstanding
Public Officials and Employees is hereby created
composed of the following: the Ombudsman and
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as CoChairmen, and the Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, and two government employees to be appointed
by the President, as members.
It shall be the task of this Committee to conduct a
periodic, continuing review of the performance of public
officials and employees, in all the branches and
agencies of Government and establish a system of
annual incentives and rewards to the end that due
recognition is given to public officials and employees of
outstanding merit on the basis of the standards set forth
in this Act.
The conferment of awards shall take into account,
among other things, the following: the years of service
and the quality and consistency of performance, the
obscurity of the position, the level of salary, the unique
and exemplary quality of a certain achievement, and the
risks or temptations inherent in the work. Incentives and
rewards to government officials and employees of the
year to be announced in public ceremonies honoring
them may take the form of bonuses, citations,
directorships in government-owned or controlled
corporations, local and foreign scholarship grants, paid
vacations and the like. They shall likewise be
automatically promoted to the next higher position with
the commensurate salary suitable to their qualifications.
In case there is no next higher position or it is not
vacant, said position shall be included in the budget of
the office in the next General Appropriations Act. The
Committee on Awards shall adopt its own rules to
govern the conduct of its activities.
a. Retirement Pay and Benefits
The grant of benefits to government officials and
employees is provided by law.
Retirement and benefit laws are scattered in
various codes and Republic Acts. Generally,
government employees are granted vacation,
57
sickness, maternity, and terminal leaves,

termination pay, and retirement benefits.
Retirement laws are liberally construed (see
Borromeo v. CSC)
The basic principle is that, being remedial in
character, a statute creating pensions should be
liberally construed and administered in favor of
the persons intended to be benefited thereby
(Ortiz v. COMELEC).
One of the basic benefit laws is the GSIS Law.
GSIS Law (RA 8291)
RA 8291 provides for compulsory coverage.
Membership in the GSIS takes effect upon
assumption of office
Covers all government employees, including
elective officials, except uniformed personnel of
the AFP and PNP, and employees who do not
receive basic pay or salary.
Members of the Judiciary and the Constitutional
Commissioners are exempted from the
mandatory contribution schedule.
Benefits
o Retirement benefits
o Separation benefits
o Unemployment/involuntary
separation
benefits
o Disability benefits
o Survivorship benefits
o Funeral benefit
o Life insurance benefit
Pensions
Pensions are regular allowances paid to an
individual or group of individuals by the
government in consideration of services
rendered, or in recognition of merit, civil or
military.
Nature of pensions (Ortiz v. COMELEC)
o Pension is not a gratuity but rather a
form of deferred compensation for
services performed and his right thereto
commences to vest upon his entry into
the retirement system and becomes an
enforceable obligation in court upon
fulfillment of all conditions under which it
is to be paid.
o Retirement benefits receivable by public
employees are valuable parts of the
consideration for entrance into and
continuation in public employment.
o They serve a public purpose and a
primary objective in establishing them is
to induce able persons to enter and
remain in public employment, and to
render faithful and efficient service while

so employed.
o Pensions are in the nature of retained
wages, given to employees for giving
the best years of their lives in the
service of the country.
In a mandatory-contribution pension plan such
as the GSIS, employees have a contractual or
vested right in the pension, where the pension is
part of the terms of employment. Once the
employee retires, he acquires a vested right to
the benefits which is protected by the due
process clause (GSIS v. Montesclaros)
In the face of clear State policy, government has
the burden of proving that applicant is not
qualified for a pension.
Pension v. gratuity
o Gratuity is that paid to the beneficiary for
past services rendered purely out of
generosity of the giver or grantor. It is a
mere bounty given by the government in
consideration or in recognition of
meritorious services and springs from
the appreciation and graciousness of the
government. (Ortiz v. COMELEC)
o Benefits under a scheme such as the
GSIS are not gratuities but are
contractual
obligations
of
the
government.
o SL/VL credits are compensation for
services rendered, but accumulated
leave credits given as terminal leave pay
are considered gratuities (Borromeo v.
CSC).
Borromeo v. CSC (1991)
SUMMARY: CSC Chair Borromeo retired in April 1986.
He asked COA to include COLA and RATA in
determining his terminal leave pay. COA did not object,
so CSC asked DBM for the release of Borromeos
terminal leave differential. DBM refused, arguing that
terminal leave does not include allowances such as
COLA and RATA. CSC acquiesced in the DBM opinion
and told Borromeo to raise the matter with the SC. SC
ruled for Borromeo and HELD that RATA and COLA
should be included in determining his terminal leave pay.
DOCTRINE: While the implementation and enforcement
of leave benefits are matters within the functions of the
CSC as the central personnel agency of the government,
the duty to examine accounts and expenditures relating
to leave benefits properly pertains to the COA. Where
government expenditures or use of funds is involved, the
CSC cannot claim an exclusive domain simply because
leave matters are also involved. Retirement laws are
58
liberally construed and administered in favor of the

persons intended to be benefited. All doubts as to the
intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree
to achieve its humanitarian purposes.
Santos v. CA, supra
SUMMARY: Santos was MeTC Judge from 1983-1992.
Upon optional retirement, he received retirement gratuity
pursuant to RA 910 for years in the government service;
and five years thereafter he regularly receiving a monthly
pension. In 1993, he reentered the government service
as part of the MMA. Petitioner opted for voluntary
separation from service upon the reorganization of the
MMA into the MMDA, pursuant to RA 7924. He asserts
that in the computation of his separation benefits under
RA 7924, the years of his government service credited
should include those years in the Judiciary. The CSC
found no merit in his contention and held that petitioners
options were only either (1) to refund the gratuity he
received under RA 910, as amended, after he retired
from the MeTC and get the full separation pay for his
entire years in the government with the MeTC plus his
years in service as Director III in the defunct MMA, at the
rate of one and one-fourth salary for every year of
service; or (2) to retain the gratuity pay he received for
his services as MeTC Judge but an equivalent amount
shall be deducted from the separation benefits due from
the former MMA for his entire government service. CA
affirmed. HELD: No, years in judiciary not included. To
credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the
computation of his separation pay under RA 7924
notwithstanding the fact that he had received or had
been receiving the retirement benefits under RA 910
would be to countenance double compensation for
exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC
Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court
against double compensation for exactly the same
services.
DOCTRINE: Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution
proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation.
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation,
unless specifically authorized by law.
Lopez v. CA (1992)
SUMMARY: Manapat retired after 20 years of service
from the City of Manila. He was later reemployed and
served until he was 65, which is the compulsory
retirement age. He then had a total of 35 years of service.
He applied for retirement benefits under RA 1616, for
which he will receive a larger amount. The City insists
that he must retire under RA 660 instead of RA 1616. He
filed for a petition for mandamus, which the RTC denied
but granted by the CA. The Court held that the option
under which law he will retire belongs to Manapat.
Further, a petition for mandamus may lie to compel the

City to grant the retirement claim.
GSIS v. COA (2004)
SUMMARY: COA disallowed certain benefits given by
GSIS to its employees. GSIS assailed the disallowances
on certiorari. Pending the case, some GSIS employees
retired. GSIS thus deducted the amounts of the
disallowed benefits from the retirees retirement pay. The
retirees complained with the GSIS Board, but the case
went up to the SC as well. The two cases were
consolidated, and SC held that some of the
disallowances were proper while others were not. The
retirees moved for clarification of the judgment, asking
the SC to rule on the issue of whether or not the GSIS
was authorized to make the deductions in the first place.
SC decided the case as an exception to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction and held that the GSIS was not
authorized to make deductions from retirement benefits
of its employees unless the deductions are for liabilities
in favor of GSIS.
DOCTRINE: Retirement pay of public officers may not
be withheld and applied to their debts to the government.
[M]onetary liability in favor of GSIS in RA 829139
refers to indebtedness of the member to the GSIS other
than those which fall under the categories of pecuniary
accountabilities exempted under the law. The general
policy of retirement laws and jurisprudence is to exempt
benefits from all legal processes or liens, but not from
outstanding obligations of the member to the GSIS. This
is to ensure maintenance of the GSIS fund reserves in
order to guarantee fulfillment of all its obligations under
RA 8291
The general rule in retirement law is that retirement
benefits cannot be withheld and subjected to deductions
for liabilities to the government. COA disallowances are
not liabilities in favor of the GSIS. A contrary
interpretation would mean that the GSIS can simply treat
any liability as one in its favor and deduct it despite
express provision of law to the contrary. The exempted
liabilities contemplated include unpaid premiums and
loan balances to the GSIS which are not incurred in
connection with the employees work.
b. Representation by Government Lawyers
A public official who is sued in a criminal case is
actually sued in his personal capacity inasmuch
as his principal, the State, can never be the
author of a wrongful act, much less commit a
crime. Thus, the Solicitor-General cannot
represent a public officer-accused in a criminal
case; or in a civil suit for damages arising from
such criminal act. (Urbano v. Chavez).
59
Alinsug v. CA: The key to resolving the issue of

whether a local government official may secure
the services of private counsel, in an action filed
against him in his official capacity, lies in the
nature of the action and the relief that is sought.
Albuera v. Torres: Provincial governor sued in
his official capacity was allowed private
representation, where the complaint contained
other allegations and a prayer for moral
damages, which, if due from the defendants,
must be satisfied by them in their private
capacity.
Mancenido v. CA: If the public officer could
result be held personally liable for the damages
sought, he can be represented by private
counsel.
Vital-Gozon v. CA (1992)
SUMMARY: Dr. de la Fuente was demoted after the
reorganization of the Ministry of Health. CSC declared
the demotion void and illegal in a resolution which had
already become final and executory. However, when the
CSC was asked to execute said judgment, it said it
couldnt because it had no coercive power, thus
suggesting dela Fuente file in court a petition for
mandamus, which dela Fuente did with the CA, likewise
praying for damages. Initially, it granted only the prayer
for mandamus but in a subsequent amended resolution,
the CA deleted that portion of its initial resolution
disallowing said damages. Now, Gozon and the OSG
are contesting this amended CA decision, arguing that
no modification could be made because it had already
become final executory, and in fact had already been
executed upon motion of dela Fuente. SC ruled for dela
Fuente. It stressed that the juridical situation he found
himself in was not of his making, and is a consequence
of circumstances not attributable to his fault. The CSC
was in error in refusal to execute its resolution, and the
CAs initial decision barring the claim of damages. The
Court found that the amended decision of the CA was
correct in being treated as a divisible judgment such that
even if the reinstatement portion of the decision had
already been executed, dela Fuente would still be
allowed to pursue his damages claim.
DOCTRINE: The grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge
cases, should normally and logically be deemed to
include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the
judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise
provides.
The Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to
represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case.
This observation should apply as well to a public official
who is haled to court on a civil suit for damages arising
from a felony allegedly committed by him (Article 100,

Revised Penal Code). Any pecuniary liability he may be
held to account for on the occasion of such civil suit is
for his own account. The State is not liable for the same.
A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General likewise has
no authority to represent him in such a civil suit for
damages.
When a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond
review, satisfaction being the last act and end of the
proceedings, and payment of satisfaction of the
obligation thereby established produces permanent and
irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who
acquiesces in and voluntarily complies with the
judgment, is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom.
On the other hand the question of whether or not a
judgment creditor is estopped from appealing or seeking
modification of a judgment which has been executed at
his instance, is one dependent upon the nature of the
judgment as being indivisible or not
Mancenido v. CA (2000)
SUMMARY: Mancenido and other teachers filed an
action for mandamus and damages against the
provincial board of Camarines Norte, the school board,
provincial governor, provincial treasurer, and provincial
auditor to pay the teachers claim for unpaid salary
increases. They are contending that the private attorney
could not represent the public respondents as only the
OSG can represent instrumentalities of the National
Government. SC held that notwithstanding the fact that
the TC granted mandamus, petitioners appealed to the
CA since the TC did not award damages. In view of the
damages sought which if granted, could result in
personal liability, respondents could not be deemed to
have been improperly represented by private counsel.
DOCTRINE: Province of Cebu v. IAC: SC declared that
where rigid adherence to the law on representation
would deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid
grievance, the hiring of private counsel would be proper.
c. Extension of Tenure
Cena v. CSC (1992)
SUMMARY: Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena
requested the DOJ Secretary through the LRA that he
be allowed to extend his service to comply with the 15year service requirement to enable him to retire with full
benefits of old-age pension under Section 11, par. (b) of
PD 1146.
DOCTRINE: Application of the law is always in a caseto-case basis. There is no justifiable reason why Cena
must not be allowed to continue his service to comply
with the 15-year requirement. By limiting the extension of
service to only 1 year would defeat the beneficial
intendment of the retirement provisions of P.D. 1146.
60
Rabor v. CSC (1995)

SUMMARY: Rabor, a utility worker in the Office of Mayor
of Davao, requested an extension of his service as may
be necessary to comply with the 15 year service
requirements of the Retirement Law. At the time of his
request, he was already 68 y.o. and has rendered 13
years and 1 mo. of govt service. CSC and Mayor
Duterte denied his request. In his recourse to the CSC,
Rabor based his claim on the ruling Cena v. CSC which
allowed such an extension to a government employee
who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65
years, but at the same time has not yet completed 15
years of government service required. HELD: Request
for extension denied. CSC Memorandum Circular No.
27, par. (1) which limited said grant to a period not
exceeding 1 year is valid, contrary to the pronouncement
in Cena v. CSC. Pursuant to Sec. 12, EO 292, the CSC
has the power to take appropriate action on personnel
matters in the Civil Service including extension of service
beyond retirement age and evaluate qualifications for
retirement. The limitation of permissible extensions of
service after an employee has reached 65 years of age
is germane to the foregoing provisions of the present
Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological
processes associated with ageing in human beings are
in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service
that may be expected from individual persons.
d. Immunity from Arrest
Constitution, Art., VI, Sec. 11
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall
be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
Jimenez v. Cabangbang: The 2nd sentence of
Art. VI, Sec. 11 is known as the speech and
debate clause. It protects legislators from suits
arising from utterances made in the discharge of
their official functions.
Taada & Fernando: The speech and debate
clause is to be construed liberally. Thus, it
covers every act resulting from the nature and in
execution of the office. It may even extend to
cases where the legislator is outside the
premises of Congress. However, for the
protection to apply, Congress must be in session.
People v. Jalosjos (2000)
SUMMARY: Jalosjos, a congressman of the First District
of Zamboanga del Norte, was convicted for statutory
rape on 2 counts and acts of lasciviousness on 6 counts.
Pending appeal, he filed a motion with the SC to be

allowed to fully discharge his duties as a Congressman
including attendance at sessions. His main argument is
that by virtue of his re-election, he has the duty to
perform his functions as a Congressman. HELD: His reelection does not exempt him from statutes which apply
to validly incarcerated persons in general. The functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. If
allowed to attend the congressional sessions, the
accused would be virtually made a free man. When the
voters of his district elected Jalosjos to Congress, they
did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that
he could achieve only such legislative results which he
could accomplish within the confines of prison.
e. Executive Privilege
Neri v. Senate (2008)
SUMMARY: Neri, former Dir. Gen. of NEDA, was invited
by the Senate for an inquiry in aid of legislation in
relation to the NBN-ZTE deal. On Sept. 26, 2007, he
narrated the bribery attempt by then COMELEC Chair
Abalos in exchange for approval of the project. He
allegedly relayed such attempt to PGMA. However, on
further questions, he invoked executive privilege,
particularly on (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve it after being told about
the bribe. Relentless, Senate issued a subpoena ad
testificandum to Neri requiring him to testify on Nov. 20.
Exec. Sec. Ermita on behalf of the Office of the
President, however, requested the Committees to
dispense with Neris testimony invoking executive
privilege. Neri did not appear on said date; thus, the
Senate Committees issued a show cause letter requiring
him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
Unsatisfied with Neris explanation, the Senate
Committees cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest
and detention. HELD: The communications elicited by
the 3 questions are covered by executive privilege
particularly the presidential communications privilege
and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy
or foreign relations since it (1) involved protected
communication ie. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries (2) received by Neri, a
member of the Presidents cabinet who is in "operational
proximity" with the President and (3) the Senate
Committees have not shown the need to limit said
privilege. There being a legitimate claim of executive
61
privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order is

constitutionally infirm.
DOCTRINE: Right to information on matters alleged to
be of public concern may be limited by law such as
those provisions concerning confidential matters
acquired by public officers in their official capacity
PRESIDENTIAL
DELIBERATIVE
COMMUNICATIONS
PROCESS
PRIVILEGE
PRIVILEGE
Definition communications,
advisory opinions,
documents or other recommendations
materials that reflect and deliberations
presidential decision- comprising part of
making
and a process by which
deliberations and that governmental
the President believes decisions
and
should
remain policies
are
confidential
formulated."
Applies
Applies to decision- Applies
to
to
making
of
the decision-making of
President
executive officials
Origin
Rooted
in
the Rooted in common
constitutional principle law privilege
of separation of power
and the President's
unique
constitutional
role
Coverage Applies to documents Does not apply to
in their entirety, and documents in their
covers final and post- entirety
decisional materials as
well as pre-deliberative
ones
Other rights of public officers
Right to property, devices, and inventions
Title to public office carries with it the right to the
insignia and property thereof.
Rules on title of officer to records, discoveries
and inventions
o Records, etc. are indispensable to
proper conduct of the office officer
may not take them as his own property
o Records, etc. are not indispensable to
proper conduct of the office and
prepared apart from official duties
officer may acquire a property right
therein and remove them upon leaving
office
Inventions of a public officer are his property,
unless he was hired precisely to make
inventions.
Right to recover reward for performance of duty

Applies with specificity to police officers, soldiers,
etc.
Rule: Officer cannot recover reward offered by
the public for an act which was part of his official
duty to perform.
Under the NIRC, revenue officers and their
relatives up to the 6th degree of consanguinity or
affinity are not allowed to recover informers
rewards for tax law violations, but they may
recover informers reward for smuggled goods.
C. Liabilities
1. In General (RA 6713)
Public officers are protected from liability, to a
certain extent, so that the vigorous and effective
administration of government may not be
hampered. The protection extends only to acts
done in good faith within the scope of the office.
However, a public officer may be sued in his
personal capacity, for acts committed beyond
the scope of his authority; or to compel him to
perform his duties when he refuses to do so.
An individual has no cause of action against a
public officer for a breach of duty owing solely to
the public. The redress must be through public
prosecution.
Three-fold liability
A public officer has a three-fold responsibility for
violations of duty or for wrongful acts or
omissions administrative, civil, and criminal. A
single act may result in three-fold liability.
Action for each separate liability can proceed
independently of the others; and may be
pursued simultaneously or successively.
o Imposition and service of administrative
penalty does not bar imposition and
service of criminal penalty
Criminal
Civil
Administrative
When
it Law
Individual
Violation of duty
arises
attaches
or person is a violation of
penal
is damaged the public trust
sanction to by
the for which the
the
violation
officer may be
violation
subjected
to
disciplinary
action
Issue
W/N officer W/N officer W/N
officer
committed
is liable to breached
the
a crime
the
norms
and
affected
standards
of
individual
public service
62
Evidentiary
Standard
Applicability
of
Procedural
Rules
Purpose
Proof
beyond
reasonable
doubt
Strict
Preponder
ance
of
evidence
Substantial
evidence
Strict
Liberal;
technical rules
not binding
Punishmen
t of crime
Private
recompens
e
Protection of the
public service
constitutional principle of public office as public

trust, hence unconstitutional.
3. Civil Liability
2. Administrative Liability
Arises from the principle that public office is a

public trust. Violation of duty is a violation of the
public trust for which the officer may be
subjected to disciplinary action as provided
under specific laws and/or the terms and
conditions of his employment (the Civil Service
Law).
Governed by administrative law
Liability is independent and distinct from criminal
and civil liability
Dismissal of a criminal case on ground of
insufficient evidence is not a bar to
administrative proceedings, and vice versa.
Disposition of civil or criminal case does not
inevitably govern or affect administrative liability,
and vice versa.
Prejudicial question does not apply to
administrative cases.
Administrative discipline is not penal in nature.
Its purpose is the improvement of public service
and preservation of popular faith and confidence
in government (Ombudsman v. Tiongson).
Condonation doctrine
Re-election operates as a condonation of an
officials past misconduct. Thus, an elective
official cannot be held administratively liable for
acts committed during previous terms.
Basis: Each term is separate. Thus, the rule will
apply regardless of the date of filing of the
complaint as long as the acts complained of
were committed prior to the date of re-election
(even if 4 days prior thereto, as in Garcia v.
Mojica).
Condonation does not apply to appointive
officials, because they are not voted upon.
Neither does it cover civil or criminal liability.
See Carpio-Morales v. CA, where SC held that
the
condonation
doctrine
violates
the
New Civil Code, Arts. 27, 32, 34

Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss
because a public servant or employee refuses or
neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty
may file an action for damages and other relief against
he latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a
periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due
process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private
property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11)
The
privacy
of
communication
and
correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to
petition the government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in
any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness
in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness
against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt,
or from being induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and
63
unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or

inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been
judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or
not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary
damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable
from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police
force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
person in case of danger to life or property, such peace
officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city
or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor.
The civil action herein recognized shall be independent
of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of
evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Tuzon v. CA: One purpose of NCC 27 is to end
the "bribery system, where the public official, for
some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the
performance of his duty until he gets some kind
of pabagsak" (citing Paras).
NCC 27 presupposes that the refusal or
omission of a public official to perform his official
duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable
negligence. In any event, the erring public
functionary is justly punishable under this article
for whatever loss or damage the complainant
has sustained.
EO 292, Book I, Secs. 38-39
Section 38. Liability of Superior Officers. (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done
in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a
clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
(2) Any public officer who, without just cause, neglects
to perform a duty within a period fixed by law or
regulation, or within a reasonable period if none is fixed,
shall be liable for damages to the private party
concerned without prejudice to such other liability as
may be prescribed by law.
(3) A head of a department or a superior officer shall not
be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty,
negligence, or misfeasance of his subordinates, unless
he has actually authorized by written order the specific
act or misconduct complained of.

Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. -No
subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for
acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his
duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent
acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals,
public policy and good customs even if he acted under
orders or instructions of his superiors.
Public officer who acts within the scope of his
assigned tasks and in the performance of his
official duties is not liable for damages.
Mistakes committed by public officers are not
actionable, unless the mistake was motivated by
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
faith.
As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial,
quasi-judicial or executive, is not personally
liable to one injured in consequence of an act
performed within the scope of his official
authority, and in line of his official duty. It has
been held that an erroneous interpretation of an
ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount
to bad faith, that would entitle an aggrieved party
to an award for damages (Tuzon v. CA).
Requisites for recovery of damages arising from
acts of public officers
o Violation of duty or commission of a
wrongful act by public officer
o Damage done to an individual
Requisites to hold the officer personally liable
o Allegation and proof of malice or bad
faith
o Officer must be sued in both official and
personal capacities
If there is contributory negligence on the part of
plaintiff, officer cannot be held liable.
The President is generally not liable for official
acts. He may, however, be impeached; or sued
after his term expires.
Other executive officials are also not liable for
official acts, unless the official did not act in
accordance with law, since it is incumbent upon
a competent public official to know the law
governing his conduct.
Legislative officials are not only exempt from
liability but are also granted special privileges by
the Constitution.
Judicial officers cannot be held liable for official
acts committed within their jurisdiction.
Judges cannot be held liable for damages
arising from the exercise of the judicial function
(although judges may be criminally or
64
administratively liable). The rule does not extend

to purely ministerial acts.
Quasi-judicial officers are also not liable for
official acts done in the exercise of their quasijudicial powers. Like judges, they may also be
held liable for ministerial acts.
Ministerial officers are liable if the private
individual has a special and direct interest in the
performance of the duty, and the officer fails or
neglects to perform the duty; or fails to perform it
properly (see definition of ministerial acts supra).
o Requisites: Plaintiff must show that he
sustained a special and peculiar injury,
and that it resulted from a breach of duty
owed to him by officer.
o However, the officer is not liable if he
performed the duty in the prescribed
manner and with due care and diligence.
o 3 kinds of defaults in performance of
ministerial duties
1. Nonfeasance neglect or
refusal to perform an act which
is the officers legal duty to
perform
2. Misfeasance failure to use
required degree of care, skill,
and diligence
3. Malfeasance doing something
which the officer has no legal
right to do
Superior officers
o GENERAL RULE: They are not liable for
the acts of their subordinates.
o EXCEPTIONS (See also EO 292, Book I,
Sec. 38, supra)
1. Superior employs unfit or
improper persons
2. Superior fails to require due
conformity to the prescribed
regulations,
where
he
is
required
to
see
that
subordinates are appointed or
qualified in a proper name
3. Superiors
negligence
in
oversight
furnishes
the
opportunity for default
4. Superior directed, authorized, or
cooperated in the wrong
5. Superiors liability is expressly
provided by law.
Subordinates are liable to the same extent as
other officers, since the extent of immunity from
civil liability is determined by the nature of the

act and not by the name of the office.
Liability on contracts executed on behalf of the
government
o GENERAL RULE: Officer is not liable on
contracts executed in behalf of the
government
o EXCEPTION: Officer does not disclose
that the government is his principal; or
does not indicate that the contract is
being executed in an official capacity.
o Authority of the officer is strictly
construed. Persons who deal with a
public officer are charged with the duty
of ascertaining that the proposed act is
within the scope of the officers authority.
o EO 292, Book I, Secs. 47-49, 51
Section 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or
conveyances may be executed for and in behalf of the
Government or of any of its branches, subdivisions,
agencies, or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, whenever demanded
by the exigency or exigencies of the service and as long
as the same are not prohibited by law.
Section 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property.
- Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless
the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in
another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality.
Section 49. Authority to Convey other Property. Whenever property other than real is authorized to be
conveyed, the contract or deed shall be executed by the
head of the agency with the approval of the department
head. Where the operations of the agency regularly
involve the sale or other disposition of personal property,
the deed shall be executed by any officer or employee
expressly authorized for that purpose.
Section 51. Execution of Contracts. (1) Contracts in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be executed by the President unless authority
therefor is expressly vested by law or by him in any other
65
public officer.
(2) Contracts in behalf of the political subdivisions and
corporate agencies or instrumentalities shall be
approved by their respective governing boards or
councils and executed by their respective executive
heads.
Liability for unexplained wealth
o RA 1379
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer
or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion
to his salary as such public officer or employee and to
his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, said property shall be presumed
prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x
Section 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show
to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State, and
by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall
become property of the State: Provided, That no
judgment shall be rendered within six months before any
general election or within three months before any
special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this
case to the corresponding Executive Department for
administrative or criminal action, or both.
RA 1379 covers all property unlawfully acquired
by public officers, even if its ownership is
recorded or held by relatives or associates; or
transferred after the effectivity of the Act; or
donated during the incumbency.
RA 1379 imposes on the officer the burden of
proving that donations made to him during his
incumbency are lawful. It also creates a prima
facie presumption of unlawful acquisition.
The forfeiture proceeding under RA 1379 is civil
in nature and not criminal (Almeda v. Perez).
Liability of accountable officers
o EO 292, Book V, Title I, Subtitle B, Secs
50-52
Section 50. Accountable Officers; Bond Requirements. (1) Every officer of any government agency whose
duties permit or require the possession or custody
government funds shall be accountable therefor and for
safekeeping thereof in conformity with law; and
(2) Every accountable officer shall be properly bonded in
accordance with law.
Section 51. Primary and Secondary Responsibility.
(1) The head of any agency of the Government is
immediately and primarily responsible for all government
funds and property pertaining to his agency;
(2) Persons entrusted with the possession or custody of

the funds or property under the agency head shall be
immediately responsible to him, without prejudice to the
liability of either party to the Government.
Section 52. General Liability for Unlawful Expenditures. Expenditures of government funds or uses of
government property in violation of law or regulations
shall be a personal liability of the official or employee
found to be directly responsible therefor.
Liability for wrongful disbursement of funds
o EO 292, Book VI, Chapter 5, Secs. 40
and 43
Section 40. Certification of Availability of Funds. - No
funds shall be disbursed, and no expenditures or
obligations chargeable against any authorized allotment
shall be incurred or authorized in any department, office
or agency without first securing the certification of its
Chief Accountant or head of accounting unit as to the
availability of funds and the allotment to which the
expenditure or obligation may be properly charged.
No obligation shall be certified to accounts payable
unless the obligation is founded on a valid claim that is
properly supported by sufficient evidence and unless
there is proper authority for its incurrence. Any
certification for a non-existent or fictitious obligation
and/or creditor shall be considered void. The certifying
official shall be dismissed from the service, without
prejudice to criminal prosecution under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code. Any payment made under such
certification shall be illegal and every official authorizing
or making such payment, or taking part therein or
receiving such payment, shall be jointly and severally
liable to the government for the full amount so paid or
received.
Section 43. Liability for Illegal Expenditures. - Every
expenditure or obligation authorized or incurred in
violation of the provisions of this Code or of the general
and special provisions contained in the annual General
or other Appropriations Act shall be void. Every payment
made in violation of said provisions shall be illegal and
every official or employee authorizing or making such
payment, or taking part therein, and every person
receiving such payment shall be jointly and severally
liable to the Government for the full amount so paid or
received.
Any official or employee of the Government knowingly
incurring any obligation, or authorizing any expenditure
in violation of the provisions herein, or taking part
therein, shall be dismissed from the service, after due
notice and hearing by the duly authorized appointing
official. If the appointing official is other than the
66
President and should he fail to remove such official or

employee, the President may exercise the power of
removal.
Cojuangco v. CA (1999)
SUMMARY: PCSO Chairman Carrascoso did not want
to pay the winnings of Dandings racehorses. Eventually,
PCSO paid. Danding moved to execute decision.
Question is on bad faith (recovery of damages). TC said
there is bad faith, but CA reversed, ruling that
Carrascoso was merely relying on PCGG instructions.
SC ruled that there is no bad faith, but nominal damages
are in order, based on NCC 2221 which allows award of
nominal damages if there is violation of a right (and in
this case, there is).
DOCTRINE: To hold public officers personally liable for
moral and exemplary damages and for attorneys fees
for acts done in the performance of official functions, the
plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts
characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence. But even if their acts had not been so
tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal
damages if they had violated the plaintiffs constitutional
rights.
Tecson v. Sandiganbayan (1999)
SUMMARY: Luzana filed 3 cases: 1) administrative case
before the DILG, 2) a civil case for damages, and 3)
complaint with the Ombudsman against Tecson, for
violation of RA 3019 when he willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally requested and received for his benefit the
amount of P4,000.00, for and in consideration of the
issuance of a permit to operate an investment business,
in favor of one Salvacion Luzana, a person for whom the
accused has in fact received and obtained a mayors
permit or license.
DOCTRINE: A public official or employee is under a
three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a
wrongful act or omission.
If such violation or wrongful act results in
damages to an individual, the public officer may
be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured
party.
If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the
erring officer may be punished criminally.
Finally, such violation may also lead to
suspension, removal from office, or other
administrative sanctions.
Ocampo v. Ombudsman (2000)
SUMMARY: Ocampo failed to remit training fees to
NIACONSULT. This prompted NIA President Eclipse to
file an administrative case before the Ombudsman for
serious misconduct and/or fraud or willful breach of trust.
A criminal case was also filed. While the case is pending,
petitioner filed a Manifestation stating that the criminal
complaint of estafa was dismissed. He therefore

manifests that the administrative case can no longer
stand on its own and should be dismissed.
DOCTRINE: The dismissal of the criminal case will not
foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or
give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The lack or
absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there
is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in
civil cases. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence"
rule in administrative proceedings. Considering the
difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the
procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in
criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings
and conclusions in one should not necessarily be
binding on the other.
Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan, supra
DOCTRINE: Section 56 imposes upon the Provincial
Auditor the duty to file a complaint before the
Tanodbayan (now the Ombudsman) when, from the
evidence obtained during the audit, he is convinced that
"criminal prosecution is warranted." The Provincial
Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of
disallowance and the motion for re-inspection pending in
his office before he institutes such complaint so long as
there are sufficient grounds to support the same.
The right to due process of the respondents to the
complaint, insofar as the criminal aspect of the case is
concerned, is not impaired by such institution. The
respondents will still have the opportunity to confront the
accusations contained in the complaint during the
preliminary investigation.
They may still raise the same defenses contained in their
motion to lift the disallowance, as well as other defenses,
in the preliminary investigation. Should the Provincial
Auditor later reverse himself and grant respondents'
motions, or should the COA, or this Court, subsequently
absolve them from liability during the pendency of the
preliminary investigation, the respondents may ask the
prosecuting officer to take cognizance of such decision.
The prosecuting officer may then accord such decision
its proper weight.
The exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation
does not mean the automatic dismissal of the complaint
against them. The preliminary investigation, after all, is
independent from the investigation conducted by the
COA, their purposes distinct from each other. The first
involves the determination of the fact of the commission
of a crime; the second relates to the administrative
aspect of the expenditure of publics
Lacson v. Executive Secretary (1999)
67
SUMMARY: Lacson et al, Chief Superintendents of

PNP, were indicted as accessories for multiple murder in
Amended Informations filed with the Sandiganbayan for
their alleged involvement in the rub-out against 11
members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang. They argued
that the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over their cases since RA 7975 limited the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to cases where one or
more of the principal accused are PNP officials with the
rank of Chief Superintended or higher and since they
were mere accessories, the highest ranking principal in
the informations has the rank only of a Chief Inspector.
Pending resolution of said issue, RA 8249, which
amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word principal from the phrase principal
accused in Sec. 2 (par. a and c) of RA 7975, took effect.
Said law was also made to apply to cases pending with
the Sandiganbayan were no trial has commenced.
Lacson et al now assails the constitutionality of said law.
HELD: Secs. 4 and 7 of RA 8249 are constitutional.
There is no violation of equal protection or procedural
due process by virtue of the enactment of an ex post
facto. However, Sandiganbayan has no exclusive
original jurisdiction over the cases since the latter failed
to meet the 3 requisites required; in particular, the
amended informations are wanting of specific
factual averments
to
show
the
intimate
relation/connection between the offense charged and
the discharge of official function of the offenders.
see also: Vital-Gozon v. CA, supra
4. Criminal Liability
RPC, Title VII
Title Seven
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
xxx
Chapter Two
MALFEASANCE AND MISFEASANCE IN OFFICE
Section One. Dereliction of duty
Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. Any
judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in
any case submitted to him for decision, shall be
punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
Art. 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. Any
judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in
any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished
by arresto mayor and temporary special disqualification.
Art. 206. Unjust interlocutory order. Any judge who

shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or
decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum period and suspension; but if he shall have
acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance
and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly
unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.
Art. 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice.
The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of
malicious delay in the administration of justice.
Art. 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and
tolerance. The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon
any public officer, or officer of the law, who, in dereliction
of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from
instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of
the law, or shall tolerate the commission of offenses.
Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor.
Revelation of secrets. In addition to the proper
administrative action, the penalty of prision correccional
in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to
1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any
attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, by
any malicious breach of professional duty or of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his
client, or reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by
him in his professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-atlaw or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having
undertaken the defense of a client or having received
confidential information from said client in a case, shall
undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same
case, without the consent of his first client.
Section Two. Bribery
Art. 210. Direct bribery. Any public officer who shall
agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of this official duties, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present
received by such officer, personally or through the
mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine [of
not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three
times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty
corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same
shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of
the execution of an act which does not constitute a
68
crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer

the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph;
and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the
officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional, in
its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the
value of such gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised
was to make the public officer refrain from doing
something which it was his official duty to do, he shall
suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine [of not less than the value of
the gift and] not less than three times the value of such
gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding
paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special
temporary disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs
shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators,
appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other
persons performing public duties. (As amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).
Art. 211. Indirect bribery. The penalties of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, and
public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer
who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his
office. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June
10, 1985).
Art. 212. Corruption of public officials. The same
penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted, except
those of disqualification and suspension, shall be
imposed upon any person who shall have made the
offers or promises or given the gifts or presents as
described in the preceding articles.
There are other crimes in the Revised Penal
Code which may be committed only by public
officers, or impose specific penalties when
committed by them.
Under the RPC, crimes committed by public
officers are divided into:
o Malfeasance and misfeasance in office
o Frauds and illegal exactions and
transactions
o Malversation of public funds and
property
o Infidelity of public officers
o Other offenses and irregularities
RA 3019
Section 9. Penalties for violations. (a) Any public officer
or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or
omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this
Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less

than one year nor more than ten years, perpetual
disqualification from public office, and confiscation or
forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited
interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and other lawful income.
Any complaining party at whose complaint the criminal
prosecution was initiated shall, in case of conviction of
the accused, be entitled to recover in the criminal action
with priority over the forfeiture in favor of the
Government, the amount of money or the thing he may
have given to the accused, or the value of such thing.
(b) Any public officer violation any of the provisions of
Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not
less than one hundred pesos nor more than one
thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the
discretion of the Court.
The violation of said section proven in a proper
removal or dismissal of a public officer, even if no
Jaca v. People: The good faith of LGU officials
who are tried for violations of RA 3019 is
measured from the viewpoint of their official
duties.
Collective inaction in the face of irregularities in
the course of performance of duties; as well
indifference to individual and collective duties to
ensure that laws and regulations are observed in
the disbursement of the funds of the LGU can
only lead to a finding of conspiracy of silence
and inaction (Sistoza v. Desierto).
However, in Arias v. Sandiganbayan it was ruled
that: All heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinates and on
the good faith of those who prepare bids,
purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations,
because there is simply so much paperwork to
be signed. There has to be some added reason
why he should examine each voucher in such
detail. There are hundreds of documents, letters,
memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers
that routinely pass through his hands. The
number in bigger offices or departments is even
more appalling. There should be other grounds
than the mere signature or approval appearing
on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and
conviction.
SC has since applied Arias not only to criminal
but also to civil and administrative liability; and
even to the existence of probable cause for the
69
filing of an information in the context of a

conspiracy allegation (Jaca v. People).
Elements of a RA 30193(e) violation (Estino v.
People)
1. Accused is a public officer discharging
administrative,
judicial,
or
official
functions
2. Accused acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith, or gross and
inexcusable negligence
3. Accuseds act caused undue injury to
any party, or gave to any private party
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or
preference in the discharge of his/her
functions
RA 1379
Section 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show
to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully
acquired the property in question, then the court shall
declare such property, forfeited in favor of the State, and
by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall
become property of the State: Provided, That no
judgment shall be rendered within six months before any
general election or within three months before any
special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this
case to the corresponding Executive Department for
administrative or criminal action, or both.
Section 12. Penalties. Any public officer or employee
who shall, after the effective date of this Act, transfer or
convey any unlawfully acquired property shall be
repressed with imprisonment for a term not exceeding
five years, or a fine not exceeding ten thousand pesos,
or both such imprisonment and fine. The same
repression shall be imposed upon any person who shall
knowingly accept such transfer or conveyance.
RA 6713
SECTION 11. Penalties. (a) Any public official or
employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office
or employment in a casual, temporary, holdover,
permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation
of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding
the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not
exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on the
gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the
appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable
by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be
prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of
Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in
the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction,
disqualification to hold public office.

(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative
proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or
dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no
(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as
co-principals, accomplices or accessories, with public
officials or employees, in violation of this Act, shall be
subject to the same penal liabilities as the public officials
or employees and shall be tried jointly with them.
(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an
action against any person who obtains or uses a report
for any purpose prohibited by Section 8 (D) of this Act.
The Court in which such action is brought may assess
against such person a penalty in any amount not to
exceed twenty-five thousand pesos (P25,000). If another
sanction hereunder or under any other law is heavier,
the latter shall apply.
Public officers are also criminally liable for
violations of the OEC, NIRC, LGC, and the
Government Auditing Code (PD 1441).
D. Disabilities and Inhibitions

1. Under the Constitution
Practice of Profession and Prohibited Interests
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 14
Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his
term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his
office.
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 13
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
70
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall

strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity
within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not,
during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
Constitution, Art. IX-A, Sec. 2
Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission
shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of
any profession or in the active management or control of
any business which, in any way, may be affected by the
functions of his office, nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in
any franchise or privilege granted by the Government,
any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities,
Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 8, par. 2
Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the time of
their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized
probity and independence, and members of the
Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for
any elective office in the immediately preceding election.
The Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more,
been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same
disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in
Section 2 of Article 1X-A of this Constitution.
Engaging in Partisan Political Activity
Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(4)
Section 2. (4) No officer or employee in the civil service
shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering
or partisan political campaign.
The prohibition is reiterated in Sec. 55 of the
current Civil Service Law, and also appears in
previous iterations of the Civil Service Laws.
Partisan Political Activity = an act designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to a public office.
Thus, the public officer is not guilty of partisan
political activity if the person he is promoting is
not yet a candidate (see Penera v. COMELEC).
Agpalo: Political officers defined as officers not

connected immediately with the administration of
justice or the execution of the mandates of a
superior officer - are exempted from the
provision.
o Examples:
President,
cabinet
secretaries, elective officials.
Holding multiple positions

Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec. 7
Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.
including Government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries
Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 12
Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of
other courts established by law shall not be designated
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions
Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4)
Section 5. (4) No member of the armed forces in the
active service shall, at any time, be appointed or
designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or any of their subsidiaries.
see B. Disqualifications, supra, and cases
therein
CLU v. Executive Secretary
The intent of the framers of the Constitution was
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President
and his official family in so far as holding other
offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned.
Sec. 13, Art. VII provides for an absolute
disqualification, not being qualified by the phrase
"in the Government." The prohibition imposed on
the President and his official family is therefore
all-embracing and covers both public and private
office or employment.
While all other appointive officials in the civil
service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their
tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may
do so only when expressly authorized by the
71
Constitution itself.
Sec. 7, Article IX-B: general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and
employees
Sec. 13, Article VII: exception applicable only to
the President, the Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Hence, the qualifying phrase "unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution" in Sec. 13, Article
VII cannot possibly refer to the broad exceptions
provided under Section 7, Article IX-B.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple
offices or employment must not be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said officials office.
Rationale for non-appointment of soldiers to
civilian positions: In a true democracy, soldiers
do not run governments but fight wars.
Double compensation
see Right to Compensation, supra
Acceptance of gifts or titles from foreign governments
Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec. 8
Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall x x x accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any
kind from any foreign government.
Founded on just jealousy of alien influence in
domestic affairs and intended to prevent such
influence (Malcolm and Laurel; Cooley).
Only official gifts and titles are prohibited. Private
or personal gifts are allowed (Sinco).
Prohibition against certain financial transactions
Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 16
Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial
accommodation for any business purpose may be
granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned
or controlled bank or financial institution to the President,
the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional
Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity
in which they have controlling interest, during their
tenure.
Prohibition does not apply where the loan is not
for any business purpose or if the official does
not own a controlling interest in the debtor firm.
2. Under existing laws

Civil Service Law, Secs. 55-59

Section 55. Political Activity. - No officer or employee in
the Civil Service including members of the Armed
Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote
nor shall he use his official authority or influence to
coerce the political activity of any other person or body.
Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent
any officer or employee from expressing his views on
current political problems or issues, or from mentioning
the names of candidates for public office whom he
supports: Provided, That public officers and employees
holding political offices may take part in political and
electoral activities but it shall be unlawful for them to
solicit contributions from their subordinates or subject
them to any of the acts involving subordinates prohibited
in the Election Code.
Section 56. Additional or Double Compensation. - No
elective or appointive public officer or employee shall
receive additional or double compensation unless
specifically authorized by law nor accept without the
consent of the President, any present, emolument,
office, or title of any kind from any foreign state.
Pensions and gratuities shall not be considered as
Section 57. Limitations on Employment of Laborers. Laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, shall
not be assigned to perform clerical duties.
Section 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and
municipal governments or in any branch or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of
the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising
immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members
of the family referred to are those related within the third
degree either or consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operation of the
rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a
confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and
(d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines:
Provided, however, That in each particular instance full
report of such appointment shall be made to the
Commission.
72
The restriction mentioned in subsection (1) shall not be

applicable to the case of a member of any family who,
after his or her appointment to any position in an office
or bureau, contracts marriage with someone in the same
office or bureau, in which event the employment or
retention therein of both husband and wife may be
allowed.
(3) In order to give immediate effect to these provisions,
cases of previous appointments which are in
contravention hereof shall be corrected by transfer, and
pending such transfer, no promotion or salary increase
shall be allowed in favor of the relative or relatives who
are appointed in violation of these provisions.
RA 6713, Sec. 7
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and
employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Financial and material interest. Public officials
and employees shall not, directly or indirectly, have any
financial or material interest in any transaction requiring
the approval of their office.
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto. Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as
officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent,
trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated,
supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly
allowed by law;
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private
enterprise which has a regular or pending official
transaction with their office.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period
of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of
subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with, in
which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise
apply.
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential
information.
Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge,
confidential or classified information officially known to
them by reason of their office and not made available
to the public, either:

(1) To further their private interests, or give undue
advantage to anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. Public officials
and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or
indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan
or anything of monetary value from any person in the
course of their official duties or in connection with any
operation being regulated by, or any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office.
As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the
Congress consents to:
(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or
employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and
received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;
(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a
gift in the nature of a scholarship or fellowship grant or
medical treatment; or
(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of
travel grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely
outside the Philippine (such as allowances,
transportation, food, and lodging) of more than nominal
value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent
with the interests of the Philippines, and permitted by
the head of office, branch or agency to which he
belongs.
The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
subsection, including pertinent reporting and disclosure
requirements.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or
prohibit any educational, scientific or cultural exchange
programs subject to national security requirements.
LGC 89-90, 93
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest.(a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official
or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
(1) Engage in any business transaction with the local
government unit in which he is an official or employee
or over which he has the power of supervision, or with
any of its authorized boards, officials, agents, or
attorneys, whereby money is to be paid, or property or
any other thing of value is to be transferred, directly or
indirectly, out of the resources of the local government
unit to such person or firm;
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games
licensed by a local government unit;
(3) Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited
in favor of such local government unit for unpaid taxes
or assessment, or by virtue of a legal process at the
instance of the said local government unit;
73
(4) Be a surety for any person contracting or doing

business with the local government unit for which a
surety is required; and
(5) Possess or use any public property of the local
government unit for private purposes.
(b) All other prohibitions governing the conduct of
national public officers relating to prohibited business
and pecuniary interest so provided for under Republic
Act Numbered Sixty-seven thirteen (R.A. No. 6713)
otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees" and other
laws shall also be applicable to local government
officials and employees.
Section 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are
prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in
any occupation other than the exercise of their functions
as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian
members who are also members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil
case wherein a local government unit or any office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government is the
adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an
officer or employee of the national or local government
is accused of an offense committed in relation to his
office.
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in
administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the government
except when the sanggunian member concerned is
defending the interest of the government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession
even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do
not derive monetary compensation therefrom.
Section 93. Partisan Political Activity. - No local official or
employee in the career civil service shall engage directly
or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part
in any election, initiative, referendum, plebiscite, or
recall, except to vote, nor shall he use his official
authority or influence to cause the performance of any
political activity by any person or body. He may,
however, express his views on current issues, or
mention the names of certain candidates for public office
whom he supports. Elective local officials may take part
in partisan political and electoral activities, but it shall be
unlawful for them to solicit contributions from their

subordinates or subject these subordinates to any of the
prohibited acts under the Omnibus Election Code.
NCC 1491-1492
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons
who may be under his guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale
may have been entrusted to them, unless the consent of
the principal has been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the
estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the
State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or
institution, the administration of which has been intrusted
to them; this provision shall apply to judges and
government experts who, in any manner whatsoever,
take part in the sale;
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property
and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law. (1459a)
Article 1492. The prohibitions in the two preceding
articles are applicable to sales in legal redemption,
compromises and renunciations.
RA 7653, Secs. 20 & 27
Section 20. Outside Interests of the Governor and the
Full-time Members of the Board. - The Governor of the
Bangko Sentral and the full-time members of the Board
shall limit their professional activities to those pertaining
directly to their positions with the Bangko Sentral.
Accordingly, they may not accept any other employment,
whether public or private, remunerated or ad honorem,
with the exception of positions in eleemosynary, civic,
cultural or religious organizations or whenever, by
designation of the President, the Governor or the fulltime member is tasked to represent the interest of the
Government or other government agencies in matters
connected with or affecting the economy or the financial
system of the country.
74
Section 27. Prohibitions. - In addition to the prohibitions

found in Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 6713, personnel of
the Bangko Sentral are hereby prohibited from:
(a)
being an officer, director, lawyer or agent,
employee, consultant or stockholder, directly or
indirectly, of any institution subject to supervision or
examination by the Bangko Sentral, except non-stock
savings and loan associations and provident funds
organized exclusively for employees of the Bangko
Sentral, and except as otherwise provided in this Act;
(b)
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
gift, present or pecuniary or material benefit for himself
or another, from any institution subject to supervision or
examination by the Bangko Sentral;
(c)
revealing in any manner, except under orders of
the court, the Congress or any government office or
agency authorized by law, or under such conditions as
may be prescribed by the Monetary Board, information
relating to the condition or business of any institution.
This prohibition shall not be held to apply to the giving of
information to the Monetary Board or the Governor of the
Bangko Sentral, or to any person authorized by either of
them, in writing, to receive such information; and
(d)
borrowing from any institution subject to
supervision or examination by the Bangko Sentral shall
be prohibited unless said borrowings are adequately
secured, fully disclosed to the Monetary Board, and shall
be subject to such further rules and regulations as the
Monetary Board may prescribe: Provided, however, That
personnel of the supervising and examining departments
are prohibited from borrowing from a bank under their
supervision or examination.
NIRC 270-71
SEC. 270. Unlawful Divulgence of Trade Secrets. Except as provided in Section 71 of this Code and
Section 26 of Republic Act No. 6388, any officer or
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue who
divulges to any person or makes known in any other
manner than may be provided by law information
regarding the business, income or estate of any
taxpayer, the secrets, operation, style or work, or
apparatus of any manufacturer or producer, or
confidential information regarding the business of any
taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him in
the discharge of his official duties, shall upon conviction
for each act or omission, be punished by a fine of not
less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) but not more
than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000), or suffer
imprisonment of not less than two (2) years but not more
than five (5) years, or both.
SEC. 271. Unlawful Interest of Revenue Law Enforcers

in Business. - Any internal revenue officer who is or shall
become interested, directly or indirectly, in the
manufacture, sale or importation of any article subject to
excise tax under Title VI of this Code or in the
manufacture or repair or sale, of any die for printing, or
making of stamps, or labels shall upon conviction for
each act or omission, be punished by a fine of not less
than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) but not more than
Ten thousand pesos (P10,000), or suffer imprisonment
of not less than two (2) years and one (1) day but not
more than four (4) years, or both.
RA 3019, Secs. 3-6
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition
to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public
officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules
and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other part,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself
or for another, from any person for whom the public
officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or
obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government
permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to
be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept
employment in a private enterprise which has pending
official business with him during the pendency thereof or
within one year after its termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply
to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request,
without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable
75
time on any matter pending before him for the purpose

of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material
benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his
own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
(h) Directly or indirectly having financing or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal
gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or
act requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of
which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in
such approval, even if he votes against the same or
does not participate in the action of the board,
committee, panel or group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against
those public officers responsible for the approval of
manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction
or acts by the board, panel or group to which they
belong.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit,
privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for
or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or
advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one
who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential
character, acquired by his office or by him on account of
his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing
such information in advance of its authorized release
date.
The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or
benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or
offering or giving to the public officer the employment
mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging
or untimely release of the confidential information
referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall,
together with the offending public officer, be punished
under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently
or temporarily disqualified in the discretion of the Court,
from transacting business in any form with the
Government.
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall
be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or
exploit or take advantage of such family or close
personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or

receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some business,
transaction, application, request or contract with the
government, in which such public official has to
intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or
relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil
degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include
close personal friendship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all giving rise
to intimacy which assures free access to such public
officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be
unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by
consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of
the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of
the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene,
directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the Government: Provided,
That this section shall not apply to any person who, prior
to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to
whom he is related, has been already dealing with the
Government along the same line of business, nor to any
transaction, contract or application already existing or
pending at the time of such assumption of public office,
nor to any application filed by him the approval of which
is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials
concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites
provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant
to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official
capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
Section 6. Prohibition on Members of Congress. It shall
be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress
during the term for which he has been elected, to
acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any
specific business enterprise which will be directly and
particularly favored or benefited by any law or resolution
authored by him previously approved or adopted by the
Congress during the same term.
The provision of this section shall apply to any other
public officer who recommended the initiation in
Congress of the enactment or adoption of any law or
resolution, and acquires or receives any such interest
during his incumbency.
It shall likewise be unlawful for such member of
Congress or other public officer, who, having such
interest prior to the approval of such law or resolution
76
authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty

days after such approval to retain such interest.
PD 46
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 46 November 10, 1972
MAKING IT PUNISHABLE FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS
AND EMPLOYEES TO RECEIVE, AND FOR PRIVATE
PERSONS TO GIVE, GIFTS ON ANY OCCASION,
INCLUDING CHRISTMAS
WHEREAS, under existing laws and the civil service
rules, it is prohibited to receive, directly or indirectly, any
gift, present or any other form of benefit in the course of
official duties;
WHEREAS, it is believed necessary to put more teeth to
existing laws and regulations to wipe out all conceivable
forms of graft and corruption in the public service, the
members of which should not only be honest but above
suspicion and reproach; and
WHEREAS, the stoppage of the practice of gift-giving to
government men is a concrete step in the
administration's program of reforms for the development
of new moral values in the social structure of the
country, one of the main objectives of the New Society;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief
of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant
to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972,
and General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do
hereby make it punishable for any public official or
employee, whether of the national or local governments,
to receive, directly or indirectly, and for private persons
to give, or offer to give, any gift, present or other
valuable thing to any occasion, including Christmas,
when such gift, present or other valuable thing is given
by reason of his official position, regardless of whether
or not the same is for past favor or favors or the giver
hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in
the future from the public official or employee concerned
in the discharge of his official functions. Included within
the prohibition is the throwing of parties or
entertainments in honor of the official or employees or
his immediate relatives.
For violation of this Decree, the penalty of imprisonment
for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5)
years and perpetual disqualification from public office
shall be imposed. The official or employee concerned
shall likewise be subject to administrative disciplinary
action and, if found guilty, shall be meted out the penalty
of suspension or removal, depending on the seriousness
of the offense.
Any provision of law, executive order, rule or regulation
or circular inconsistent with this Decree is hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.

This Decree shall take effect immediately after its
publication.
Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of November, in
the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
77
IV.
TERMINATION
RELATIONS
OF
OFFICIAL
RA 6713
RA 7160
A. Expiration of Term
Term: a fixed and definite time prescribed by law

by which an officer may hold an office.
o time during which officer may claim to
hold the office as a right; interval after
which incumbents shall succeed one
another
o not affected by hold-over
o terms seek to assure continuity in the
discharge of public functions
Tenure: period during which the incumbent
actually holds office.
Upon expiration of term, the officers rights,
duties, and authority as such ceases, unless he
is authorized to hold-over. The right of the
occupant to hold the office is terminated.
If the appointment is at the pleasure of the
appointing power or to a confidential position,
the term is the time for which the appointing
power has confidence or pleasure in the
appointee. Once these are lost, the term
expires. Same rule applies to appointees whose
terms are not fixed by law in the sense that there
is no removal in such cases.
Non-renewal of an appointment without valid
cause at the end of the term is a valid mode of
termination.
An office created for the accomplishment of a
single
act
is
terminated
upon
the
accomplishment of such act.
Laws creating public offices usually fix the dates
of terms.
o Commencement date is usually fixed at
some appreciable time after election or
appointment (e.g. June 30 for elective
officials), to give the officer time to
prepare and/or qualify.
o No time is fixed: On the date of election
or appointment
o Where the term runs from a certain date,
that date is excluded from the
computation.
o Congress has the power fix terms of
officers. However, it cannot change
terms fixed by the Constitution; and it
may not shorten a term by refusing to
make appropriations for the salary of an

officer.
Hold-over
o Status of an officer whose term has
expired or whose services have been
terminated but is made to continue
holding office until his successor is
appointed and qualified.
o Hold-over applies only when the office
has a term fixed by law. It does not
apply to offices with indefinite terms.
o Purpose: Prevent hiatus in office and
interruption in government service
o If hold-over is not provided for by law,
the prevailing view is that the incumbent
may do so unless hold-over is expressly
or impliedly prohibited.
o Hold-over in constitutionally-fixed term
offices is not permitted, unless the
Constitution provides for it.
o Determination of applicability of a
general hold-over clause to a particular
officer
If the constitution provides for a
hold-over in general terms, its
application will not be limited to
constitutional officers.
Guiding
principle:
The
construction of a statute by
those charged with its execution
should be followed, unless it is
clearly wrong.
An officer authorized by law to hold-over
remains a de jure officer. If the hold-over is not
authorized, he is a de facto officer.
Achacoso v. Macaraig, supra
SUMMARY: Non-CES eligible appointed POEA Admin,
tendered courtesy resignation; now seeks reinstatement.
DOCTRINE: One who holds a temporary appointment
has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be
terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there
being no need the show that the termination is for cause
Acting appointee is separated by a method of
terminating official relations known in the law of public
officers as expiration of the term. His term is understood
at the outset as without any fixity and enduring at the
pleasure of the appointing authority. When required to
relinquish his office, he cannot complain that he is being
removed in violation of his security of tenure because
removal imports the separation of the incumbent before
the expiration of his term. This is allowed by the
Constitution only when it is for cause as provided by law.
The acting appointee is separated precisely because his
78
term has expired. Expiration of the term is not covered

by the constitutional provision on security of tenure
Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, supra
DOCTRINE: The concept of holdover when applied to a
public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and
the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term.
It is usually provided by law that officers elected or
appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only
for that term but until their successors have been elected
and qualified.
Where this provision is found, the office does not
become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is
no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the
present incumbent will carry over until his successor is
elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term
fixed by law (Mechem).
Gloria v. de Guzman, supra
DOCTRINE: There was no termination to speak of.
Termination presupposes an overt act committed by a
superior officer. There was none whatsoever in the case
at bar. At most, Loleng gave notice to the petitioners of
the expiration of their respective contracts, Petitioners
appointment or employment simply expired either by its
very own terms, or because it may not exceed one year,
but most importantly because the PAFCA was dissolved
and replaced by the PSCA.
A primarily confidential appointees term expires upon
the appointing authoritys loss of confidence in the
appointee. A removal on this ground is not really a
removal.
B. Retirement
Blacks: Termination of one's own employment

or career, esp. upon reaching a certain age or
for health reasons; may be voluntary or
involuntary.
Compulsory retirement of public officers is
governed by special laws, e.g. GSIS Law, which
requires retirement for employees who have
reached the age of 65 with at least 15 years of
service (see Retirement benefits, supra). SC
justices serve until the age of 70.
Reaching the age limit results in the compulsory
and automatic retirement of the public officer.
An application for optional retirement cannot be
unilaterally withdrawn by the applicant (Rubio, Jr.
v. Sto. Tomas).
An employer is authorized to request the
optional retirement of an employee who, by
reason of disqualification, is unable to perform
satisfactorily and efficiently the duties of his
position (Rubio, Jr. v. Sto. Tomas)
Retirement of an officer does not render moot an

administrative case against him filed before his
retirement (Sy Bang v. Mendez).
C. Death/Permanent Disability
NCC 37
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural
person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is
acquired and may be lost.
Death of the incumbent necessarily renders the
office vacant.
If authority is jointly exercised by 2 or more
officers, only a partial vacancy arises. Survivors
may execute the office if joint action of all the
members is NOT expressly required.
Permanent disability covers both mental and
physical disability.
Mechem: If the officer resigns while insane and
the appointing authority accepts the resignation
without knowledge of the insanity, and a
successor is duly appointed, the loss of the
office must fall upon him who resigned it.
D. Resignation
Definition
see Ortiz v. COMELEC
AmJur: Formal renunciation or relinquishment of
public office
Mechem: The act of giving up an office
Right to resign of public officers
At common law, the right to resign was heavily
regulated in view of the public interest in
government service, i.e. the public has a right to
the service of all its citizens.
Mechem, citing Hoke v. Henderson: It is not true
that an office is held at the will of either party. It
is held at the will of both. Every man is obliged,
upon a general principle, after entering upon his
office, to discharge the duties of it while he
continues in office, and he cannot lay it down
until the public, or those to whom the authority is
confided, are satisfied that the office is in a
proper state to be left, and the officer discharged.
Public officers are not legally required to finish
their term and may resign anytime, as long as
they are qualified to do so and there are
adequate safeguards for the protection of the
public and of creditors.
Resignation as indication of quilt; effect on pending case
79
Resignation should not and cannot be used to

evade administrative sanction. It does not cause
the dismissal of administrative or criminal
proceedings against a public officer.
Immediate resignation after discovery of an
anomalous transaction is indicative of guilt, as is
flight in criminal cases (Pagano v. Nazario, Jr.).
RA 3019, Sec. 12
Section 12. Termination of office. No public officer shall
be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution
against him, for any offense under this Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
Form of resignation
If a law requires a certain form of resignation,
that form must substantially complied with, e.g.,
resignation must be written if there is a law
requiring written resignation.
If the form of resignation is not prescribed, any
method indicative of the intent to resign may be
used
Written resignation must be signed by the party
tendering it.
Elements of resignation
1. Intent to resign
2. Act of resignation
o Application for retirement benefits or
submission of unsigned resignation
letter are prima facie acts of resignation
o Filing of illegal dismissal case is difficult
to reconcile with voluntary resignation
3. Acceptance by proper authority (see RP v.
Singun)
o Proper authority is the one designated
by statute. In the absence of designation,
it must be tendered to the appointing
authority or the body authorized to call
an election to fill the office (for elective
local officials, see LGC 82).
o SC cannot accept the resignation of a
judge because this is a prerogative of
President.
o Resignation tendered to the improper
authority is a nullity.
o Acceptance may be manifested by
formal declaration or by appointment of
a successor
o Tenure of the resigned officer ends upon
acceptance, NOT upon appointment of
the successor.
Withdrawal of resignation
Must be made prior to acceptance, or prior to its
effectivity date
A withdrawal of an application for optional

retirement which is in effect an application for
reappointment to the former position must be
approved by the appointing official since such
reappointment may no longer be possible when
the vacancy has been filled up (Merino v. CSC).
A prospective resignation may be a mere notice
or proposition to resign, i.e., prima facie
evidence of intent to resign since possession of
the office is still retained and the officer may still
withdraw his resignation.
Mechem: Resignation can be withdrawn after
acceptance by the authority, provided that the
accepting authority consents to the withdrawal
and no new rights have intervened.
Repudiation of resignation
1. Resignation is not effective even if a successor
has already been appointed - if transmitted
without the officers consent
2. Resignation procured by fraud or duress is
voidable and may be repudiated
3. Resignation made as an alternative to the filing
of charges may be repudiated, since such
cannot be accepted as having been given
voluntarily.
Resignation under duress or fraud
If an officer resigns after it has been determined
by the proper disciplining authority that he
should be terminated, the resignation is not
under duress, since it is not duress to threaten to
do what one has the legal right or justification to
do.
Resignations are presumed to be voluntary.
Ortiz v. COMELEC (1988)
SUMMARY: Ortiz became COMELEC Commissioner for
a term of 1985-1992. EDSA I came and Pres. Cory
called on all appointive officials to submit courtesy
resignations.
Ortiz
and
2
other
COMELEC
Commissioners wrote the President manifesting that
they were placing their positions in her hands. Cory
accepted Ortiz resignation. When Ortiz applied for
retirement benefits with the COMELEC, he was denied,
on the ground that he was not able to complete the 20year government service requirement under RA 1586
because he tendered courtesy resignation. SC reversed,
holding that courtesy resignations must be strictly
construed, and here, Ortiz purported resignation did not
show a clear intent to relinquish his position. In the legal
sense, a resignation is an act manifesting a clear intent
to relinquish the position. Here Ortiz did not have such
intent but merely placed his continued stay in office at
the Presidents discretion, so SC held that he was similar
to a primarily confidential officer, whose term expires at
80
the loss appointing powers confidence. SC concluded

that, based on equity and justice, Ortiz should be
deemed to have completed his term for purposes of the
20-year requirement; thus he is entitled to benefits under
RA 1586.
DOCTRINE: Resignation is the act of giving up or the
act of an officer by which he declines his office and
renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a
complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or
employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or
surrender his position accompanied by the act of
relinquishment.
A courtesy resignation cannot properly be interpreted as
a resignation in the legal sense because it is not
necessarily a reflection of the public officers intent to
surrender her position. A courtesy resignation is a
manifestation of the submission to the will of the political
authority and the appointing power. Therefore, courtesy
resignations must be given a stringent interpretation,
particularly in cases involving constitutional officials who
are removable by impeachment.
Estrada v. Arroyo (2001)
SUMMARY: Estrada and his family left Malacaang. He
issued a press statement, declaring his departure for the
sake of peace. He also signed a letter, saying that,
invoking Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, he
finds himself unable to exercise the powers and duties of
his office, and leaves the Vice-President as Acting
President.
DOCTRINE: The elements of resignation are as such:
(a) there must be intent to resign; and (b) the intent must
be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement
as to form. Estrada did not write any formal letter of
resignation, so in this case, the issue has to be
determined by the totality of prior, contemporaneous,
and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing
a material relevance on the issue. Using this test,
Estrada had, as a matter of fact, resigned.
Class Notes: The use of external evidence to assess an
officers intent to resign, as was done in this case, goes
against the concept of resignation as an act coupled with
an internal intent. Case should not be extended to
members of the civil service as it would have dire
implications for security of tenure, i.e., resignatory intent
can be attributed to an officer with no such intent, in
order to oust her from office.
Republic v. Singun (2008)
SUMMARY: Singun was a Chief Trade and Industry
Development Specialist at DTI Region II office. He
wanted to take a leave, but it was disapproved. He again
filed an application for leave with resignation. It was
allegedly accepted by Director Hipolito. Singun contends
that his resignation was invalid because it was made

under duress and he was not notified of its acceptance.
CSC and CA ruled in favor of Singun. SC also ruled in
favor of Singun, and held that 3 requisites must be
fulfilled for the resignation to be valid: 1) intention 2) act
and 3) acceptance. As held by CSC and CA, the third
was clearly not present in the case.
DOCTRINE: Acceptance is necessary for resignation of
a public officer to be operative and effective. Without
acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer
remains in office.
Without acceptance, a resignation is not
complete and is revocable unless otherwise
provided.
Thus, a resignation may still be withdrawn prior
to acceptance, but NOT after acceptance.
E. Acceptance of Incompatible Office
Performance of inconsistent and incompatible

duties is inconsistent with the policy of the law;
thus, one who accepts an incompatible office
while occupying another office absolutely
vacates the first office.
Rule applies even if the second office is inferior
to the first office, or when the election to the
second office was void, and even more so when
another person has been appointed to the first
office.
Statutory or constitutional ban on multiple
officeholding is not a case of incompatibility but
of a prohibition (Zandueta v. dela Costa). If the
appointment to the latter office is void because
of disqualification or ineligibility, the appointee
does not forfeit his original office.
When are offices incompatible? Look into the
character of the offices
o There is conflict in such duties and
functions, as amounts to interference
o One office is subordinate to the other
o Law or Constitution declares the offices
incompatible even if there is no conflict
or inconsistency
Exceptions to the rule
o When the officer cannot vacate the
office by his own act, e.g., when law
requires the approval of another
authority before the officer can resign
o Where the two offices are held under
and conferred by different governments
o Officer is expressly authorized by law to
accept another office
o Second office is temporary
Public Interest Center v. Elma, supra
81
DOCTRINE: The general rule contained in Article IX-B of

the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to
hold more than one office only if "allowed by law or by
the primary functions of his position."
There is no legal objection to a government official
occupying two government offices and performing the
functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility.
TEST
IN
DETERMINING
WHETHER
INCOMPATIBILITY EXISTS BET. 2 OFFICES: Whether
one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that
one office has the right to interfere with the other.
Incompatibility between two offices, is an
inconsistency in the functions of the two;
NO INCOMPATIBILITY: Where one office is not
subordinate to the other, nor the relations of the
one to the other such as are inconsistent and
repugnant, there is not that incompatibility from
which the law declares that the acceptance of
the one is the vacation of the other.
From the nature and relations to each other, of the two
places, they ought not to be held by the same person,
from the contrariety and antagonism which would result
in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the
other. The offices must subordinate, one [over] the other,
and they must, per se, have the right to interfere, one
with the other, before they are incompatible at common
law. CAB: An incompatibility exists between the
positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC.
F. Abandonment of Office
Statute may declare that a mere filing of

certificate of candidacy for a second office
operates as abandonment (see Election Law)
Once abandoned, former incumbent cannot
legally repossess the office.
Intention to abandon is the first and paramount
object of inquiry. No abandonment without intent
to abandon.
When is there abandonment of office
1. Clear intention to abandon office
2. Acceptance of another office
3. Concurrence of overt acts and intention
4. Failure to discharge duties or failure to
claim or resume the office
5. Acquiescence by the officer in wrongful
or illegal removal
Resignation
is
not
abandonment;
but
abandonment can be considered a species of
resignation.
Both are voluntary acts of
relinquishment of office. Resignation is formal
relinquishment, while abandonment is a
relinquishment through non-use. Both have the
same effect, i.e., the former holder can no longer

legally repossess the office.
Abandonment = intent + act (non-use).
Canonizado v. Aguirre (2001)
FACTS: During the pendency of the 2000 Canonizado
case, Canonizado was appointed by Pres. Estrada as
Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of
the PNP on 30 June 1998.
He accepted such
appointment and took his oath before the DILG
Secretary and the President. Respondents insist that this
fact should be taken judicial notice of. By accepting such
position, respondents contend that Canonizado is
deemed to have abandoned his claim for reinstatement
to the NAPOLCOM since the offices of NAPOLCOM
Commissioner and Inspector General of the IAS are
incompatible. Petitioners assert that Canonizado should
not be faulted for seeking gainful employment during the
pendency of this case. Furthermore, petitioners point out
that from the time Canonizado assumed office as
Inspector General he never received the salary
pertaining to such position.
RULING: WoN Canonizado abandoned his claim for
reinstatement. NO. Abandonment of an office is the
voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder,
with the intention of terminating his possession and
control thereof. A person holding a public office may
abandon such office by nonuser or acquiescence.
Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or
to exercise an office. However, nonperformance of the
duties of an office does not constitute abandonment
where such nonperformance results from temporary
disability or from involuntary failure to perform.
Abandonment may also result from an acquiescence by
the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge, for
instance, after a summary removal, an unreasonable
delay by an officer illegally removed in taking steps to
vindicate his rights may constitute an abandonment of
the office.
It is a well settled rule that he who, while occupying one
office, accepts another incompatible with the first, ipso
facto vacates the first office and his title is thereby
terminated without any other act or proceeding. The
incompatibility contemplated is not the mere physical
impossibility of one person's performing the duties of the
two offices due to a lack of time or the inability to be in
two places at the same moment, but that which
proceeds from the nature and relations of the two
positions to each other as to give rise to contrariety and
antagonism should one person attempt to faithfully and
impartially discharge the duties of one toward the
incumbent of the other.
However, the rule on incompatibility of duties will not
apply to the case at bar because at no point did
82
Canonizado discharge the functions of the two offices

simultaneously, but before Canonizado can re-assume
his post as Commissioner, he should first resign as
Inspector General of the IAS-PNP.
G. Prescription of Right to Office
Pertains to an officer who is entitled to an office

but is not in possession/occupation thereof
Rules of Court, Rule 66, Sec. 11
Section 11. Limitations. Nothing contained in this Rule
shall be construed to authorize an action against a public
officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause
of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such
office or position, arose, nor to authorize an action for
damages in accordance with the provisions of the next
preceding section unless the same be commenced
within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment
establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question.
(16a)
see discussion on Quo Warranto
Lapse of the period for bringing quo warranto
means that the de jure officer loses the right to
take the office, i.e., his right to it prescribes.
Nachura:
Reason for the rule Title to public office should
not be subjected to continued uncertainty; it
must be determined as speedily as possible.
Resort to administrative remedy does not
suspend the period; but the period runs even
during the pendency of a MR.
GR: Period will be strictly observed.
EX:
Strong,
compelling,
exceptional
circumstances, as in Cristobal v. Melchor (with
which Maam disagrees).
H. Removal
Concept and Extent
Removal is the ouster of an incumbent before
the expiration of his term. The office exists after
the ouster. It is synonymous to dismissal.
Constructive removal is removal induced by
making continued employment impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely.
Certain personnel actions (e.g. transfer,
demotion, reassignment), if done in bad faith,
without just cause, or in violation of security of
tenure, amount to removal.
o Transfer or reassignment with no
definite period or duration and resulting
in a reduction in rank, status, or salary,
is a constructive removal.
The power to remove and the power to appoint

are usually lodged in the same authority.
Power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint. According to Mechem, this rule is
applicable where the term of the office is not
fixed by law and no other provision is made for
the removal of the officer.
If the term is fixed, appointee enjoys security of
tenure for the duration of term, i.e., may only be
removed for cause.
Permanent appointees under the Civil Service
may only be removed for cause and with notice
and hearing.
Power to remove may be absolute or conditional.
o Absolute when the authority has
unlimited discretion exercisable at such
time and for such reasons as the
authority may deem sufficient.
o Conditional when the time, manner, or
reason for removal is beyond the mere
discretion of the authority.
In Whom Vested
Statutes creating public offices usually also
provide for the power of removal. Where an
office is created by statute, it is wholly within the
power of Congress and this extends to
regulation of removals.
If the Constitution exclusively prescribes the
means and causes for removal, Congress has
no power to prescribe rules for removal.
The Constitution may vest in Congress general
authority over the subject of removal of public
officers, except impeachable officers.
Presidential Power of Removal
Not expressly vested, but implied from
constitutional provisions:
o Presidents power to appoint (supra),
thus even career officers appointed by
the President are under the direct
disciplining authority of the President
(Larin v. Executive Secretary)
o Executive power (Art. VII, Sec. 1)
o The faithful execution clause (Art. VII,
Secs. 1 & 5)
o Presidential control of the departments,
bureaus, and offices (Art. VII, Sec. 17)
o Art. IX-B, Sec. 2(3)
Presidential power of removal WRT certain
classes of officers
Executive officers with no With or without cause, not
fixed term, e.g., Cabinet subject to Congressional
secretaries
regulation
Quasi-judicial/quasiOnly on grounds provided
83
legislative officers
Constitutional officers and
judges
Members of the Civil
Service
Temporary, provisional, or
acting appointees
Office-holders
at
the
pleasure of the President
Offices created by law and
law authorizes President to
remove at pleasure
Non-career members of
the Civil Service
by law
Cannot be removed
Only for cause as provided
by law
At
the
Presidents
pleasure, with or without
cause
Term
expires
upon
displeasure, not really
removed
Only for cause (see delos
Santos v. Mallare)
Co-terminous
with
appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure
Local elective officials
President may remove,
subject to LGC and
implementing rules
Grounds for Removal/Sanction
Members of Congress
Constitution, Art. VI, Section 16(3). Each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
President,
Vice-President,
SC
Justices,
Constitutional Commissioners and Ombudsman
Constitution, Art. XI, Section 2. The President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Members of the Judiciary
Constitution, Art. VIII, Section 11. The Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold
office during good behavior until they reach the age of
seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall
have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
o As regards lower court judges, SC
determination
of
deviation
from
behavioral norms is conclusive since it
alone has the power to order their

dismissal.
Under the Local Government Code
LGC, Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An
elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or
removed from office on any of the following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross
negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude
or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive
working days, except in the case of members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or
residence or the status of an immigrant of another
country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code
and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on
the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper
court.
Under the Civil Service Law
Civil Service Law, Section 46. Discipline: General
Provisions.
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
(1) Dishonesty;
(2) Oppression;
(3) Neglect of duty;
(4) Misconduct;
(5) Disgraceful and immoral conduct;
(6) Being notoriously undesirable;
(7) Discourtesy in the course of official duties;
(8) Inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of
official duties;
(9) Receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other
valuable thing in the course of official duties or in
connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other
valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or
expectation of receiving favor or better treatment than
that accorded other persons, or committing
acts punishable under the anti-graft laws;
(10) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(11) Improper or unauthorized solicitation of
contributions from subordinate employees and by
teachers or school officials from school children;
(12) Violation of existing Civil Service Law and rules or
reasonable office regulations;
(13) Falsification of official document;
(14) Frequent unauthorized absences or tardiness in
84
reporting for duty, loafing or frequently

unauthorized absence from duty during regular office
hours;
(15) Habitual drunkenness;
(16) Gambling prohibited by law;
(17) Refusal to perform official duty or render overtime
service;
(18) Disgraceful, immoral or dishonest conduct prior to
entering the service;
(19) Physical or mental incapacity or disability due to
immoral or vicious habits;
(20) Borrowing money by superior officers from
subordinates or lending by subordinates to superior
officers;
(21) Lending money at usurious rates or interest;
(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay
taxes due to the government;
(23) Contracting loans of money or other property from
persons with whom the office of the employee
concerned has business relations;
(24) Pursuit of private business, vocation or profession
without the permission required by Civil
Service rules and regulations;
(25) Insubordination;
(26) Engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political
activities by one holding a non-political office;
(27) Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service;
(28) Lobbying for personal interest or gain in legislative
halls and offices without authority;
(29) Promoting the sale of tickets in behalf of private
enterprises that are not intended for charitable
or public welfare purposes and even in the latter cases if
there is no prior authority;
(30) Nepotism as defined in Section 60 of this Title.
Violations of RA 3019 are also grounds for
removal or disciplinary action.
Aquino v. CSC, supra
SUMMARY: Aquino who was then holding the position of
Clerk II, Division of City Schools of San Pablo City, was
designated as OIC of the Division Supply Office in view
of the retirement of the Supply Officer I by the DECS
Reg. Director. Later on, Dela Paz was extended a
promotional appointment to the same position by the
Division Superintendent of City Schools of San Pablo
City. Prior to her appointment, she was holding the
position of Clerk II, Division of City Schools and was
designated as Assistant to the Supply Officer. CSC
Regional Office approved her appointment provided that
there is no pending administrative case against her, no
pending protest against the appointment; nor any
decision by competent authority that will adversely affect
the approval of her appointment. Aquino filed a protest
with the DECS Secretary and was thus appointed to the

position on the ground that Aquino has advantage over
Dela Paz in terms of education, experience and training
and that the latter has no relevant in-service training
course attended and completed. Dela Paz appealed to
the MSPB who upheld the appointment of Dela Paz.
However, the CSC, reversed and found such appeal
meritorious. The Court held that the CSC did not err in
revoking Aquinos appointment since Dela Paz already
acquired the right to security of tenure. The Luego
doctrine does not apply in this case.
Fabella v. CA (1997)
SUMMARY: Mandaluyong High teachers were
administratively charged for going on strike. A committee
was formed to investigate. The teachers sued to enjoin
the committee from investigating them because: its
guidelines were unclear; the burden of proof was shifted
to the teachers and teachers groups were not
represented in the committee. Later, they changed their
suit to certiorari to assail the findings of the committee
after it recommended their dismissal. RTC dismissed the
case but SC reversed. After trial, RTC ruled for the
teachers and ordered their reinstatement. CA affirmed
the RTC. DECS appealed to the SC, which held that the
RTC and the CA were correct in holding that the
investigating committee was improperly constituted.
Without the teachers organization representative, the
teachers were denied administrative due process and
the proceedings were void. The power of the DECS
Secretary and Regional Directors to investigate and
discipline teachers must be exercised through the
committees created under the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers.
DOCTRINE:
RA
4670
governs
administrative
proceedings against public school teachers. Under that
law, representation of teachers organizations in
disciplinary committees is indispensable to ensure an
impartial tribunal. It is this requirement that gives
substance and meaning to the right to be heard, which is
the essence of procedural due process; as embodied in
the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to
be heard. The choice of representative must come from
the teachers organizations themselves, who, under the
law, have the right to choose their representatives for the
disciplinary committee.
Aguinaldo v. Santos (1992)
SUMMARY: Governor Aguinaldos removal from office
was ordered after the Secretary of Local Government
found him guilty of acts of disloyalty to the Republic in
relation to the failed December 1989 coup dtat. This
did not stop him from filing his COC for the position of
Governor in the upcoming 1992 elections, however. He
eventually won the election. This petition was filed
85
before Aguinaldo was proclaimed Governor, and against

the decision of the Secretary dismissing him as
Governor of Cagayan. SC declared the petition moot
and academic because of Aguinaldos win in the 1992
elections. Should the SC remove the duly elected public
officer from office due to acts prior to his/her present
term, this would be tantamount to depriving the people of
their right to elect their officers. The people are assumed
to have known of the officials life and character, and that
they have disregarded or forgiven his fault or
misconduct.
DOCTRINE: A public official cannot be removed for
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term,
since his re-election to office operates as a condonation
of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
UPDATE: In Carpio Morales v. CA (11/10/2015), SC
abandoned the condonation doctrine. It also struck down
Sec. 14 of the Ombudsman Law providing for the noninjunctibility of the Ombudsmans investigations.
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. (1996)
SUMMARY: Tiwi Mayor Coral filed an admin complaint
against Albay Governor Salalima and other provincial
officials for various violations of the LGC (pars c and d of
S 60). The Office of the President (OP) issued an AO
creating an Ad Hoc Investigating Committee, which
found Salalima et al. guilty of violating the LGC. SC
affirmed the OP, stating that the suspension of Mayor
Coral was tainted with arbitrariness and constitutes
abuse of authority, but Salalima cannot be held liable
administratively for certain acts done during the previous
term (Court applied the Aguinaldo doctrine).
DOCTRINE: LGC 66(b) sets the limits to the penalty of
suspension, viz., it should not exceed six months or the
unexpired portion of the term of office of the respondent
for every administrative offense. An administrative
offense means every act or conduct or omission which
amounts to, or constitutes, every of the grounds or
disciplinary action. The offenses for which suspension
may be imposed are enumerated in Section 60 of the
Code.
Gloria v. CA (1999)
SUMMARY: Strikes and walk-outs were staged by
public school teachers on different dates in September
and October 1990. The illegality of the strikes was
declared in Manila Public School Teachers Association v.
Laguio. At issue in this case is the right to back salaries
of teachers who were either dismissed or suspended
because they did not report for work but who were
eventually ordered reinstated because they had not
been shown to have taken part in the strike, although
reprimanded for being absent without leave.
DOCTRINE: Employees are entitled to compensation for

the period of their suspension pending appeal if
eventually they are found innocent. Preventive
suspension pending investigation is not a penalty but
only means of enabling the disciplining authority to
conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other
hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually
punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered
illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative
decision finding him guilty is reversed.
SECS v. CA (2000)
SUMMARY: Petitioners are public school teachers from
various schools in the NCR who incurred unauthorized
absences in connection with their then on-going mass
action. DECS Sec. Carino issued a Memorandum
ordering them to return to work under the pain of
dismissal. Said Memorandum was ignored, prompting
the Secretary to lodge administrative complaints
against them for grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, violation of the Civil Service law and rules and
reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official
duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the
public interest, and absence without leave.
DOCTRINE: When the teachers have given cause for
their suspension - i.e., the unjustified abandonment of
classes to the prejudice of their students-they were not
fully innocent of the charges against them although they
were eventually found guilty only of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service and not grave
misconduct or other offenses warranting their dismissal
from service; 'being found liable for a lesser offense in
not equivalent to exoneration.
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole (1995)
SUMMARY: A criminal and an administrative complaint
were filed with the office of Deputy Ombudsman Hagad,
against Mandaue Mayor Ouano and other officials for
violation of RA 3019, RPC, and RA 6713. Ouano et al
moved to dismiss the administrative complaint, on the
ground that the Ombudsman was bereft of jurisdiction
since, under Section 63 of the LGC, the power to
investigate and impose administrative sanctions, as well
as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been
vested with OP. Hagad denied this MTD and
preventively suspended Ouano et al. SC HELD that: 1)
There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has
repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act; 2) The 60-month
and
60-day
preventive
suspension
under
Ombudsman Act and LGC respectively, govern
differently; 3) There is no need for hearing before
preventive suspension; and 4) Ouano et al should have
filed a petition for certiorari with SC, not prohibition with
RTC.
86
DOCTRINE: In order to justify the preventive suspension

of a public official under Section 24 of RA 6770, the
evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge
against the officer or employee should involve
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty; (b) the charges should
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's
continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed
against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month
preventive suspension to all public officials, whether
elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon
the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty
(60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the
Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local
official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would
be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe
that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,
(c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the records and other evidence.
Sangguniang Barangay v. Martinez (2008)
SUMMARY: The kagawads of Bgy. Don Mariano
Marcos charged P/B Martinez before the Sangguniang
Bayan of Bayombong with misconduct, dishonesty, and
graft for pocketing money from junkets and garbage
recycling projects. SBayan found him guilty and ordered
his removal. The mayor admitted that SBayan cannot
order Martinez removal but did nothing about it, so
Martinez went to court. RTC invalidated the SBayan
order. The kagawads appealed to the SC, to no avail.
HELD: LGC 60 and jurisprudence evince the intent to
place in the courts the exclusive jurisdiction to decree
the removal of elective local officials, to ensure that they
would not be removed by a body as highly politicized
and capricious as the Sanggunians. This does not
violate the separation of powers, since the courts have a
constitutional duty to ascertain if the other branches
committed grave abuse of discretion. The direct resort to
the court was proper, because exceptions to the rule of
exhaustion of administrative remedies obtain in the case
at bar.
DOCTRINE: LGC 61 provides for the procedure for the
filing of an administrative case against an erring elective
barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the
removal of an erring elective barangay official from office,
as the courts are exclusively vested with this power
under LGC 60. If the acts allegedly committed by the
barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found
guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the
case should be filed with the RTC. Once the court

assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case
even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial
that a penalty less than removal from office is
appropriate. The most extreme penalty that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may
impose on the erring elective barangay official is
suspension if it deems that the removal of the official
from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the
proper charges be filed in court.
I. Impeachment
Constitution, Art. XI, Secs. 2-3
Section 2 . The President, the Vice-President, the

Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may
be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes,
or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment.
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of
all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from such referral, together
with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period
87
of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation.
When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but
shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but
the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according
to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.
Blacks: The act (by a legislature) of calling for
the removal from office of a public official,
accomplished by presenting a written charge of
the official's alleged misconduct.
Mechem: Impeachment is an extraordinary
proceeding.
The essence of impeachment is a national
inquest upon the conduct of public men
(Federalist No. 65 by Alexander Hamilton)
Intended primarily for the protection of the state,
not for the punishment of the offender (Sinco)
2 views on the grounds for impeachment
o First view: Grounds must constitute
grave offenses under the RPC, or must
be criminally punishable at the least
o Second view: Grounds need not amount
to a criminal offense to constitute
sufficient grounds for impeachment
(more plausible view).
Blacks: The grounds upon
which an official can be
removed do not have to be
criminal in nature. They usually
involve some type of abuse of
power or breach of the public
trust.
An impeachable officer cannot be subjected to
disbarment proceedings during his incumbency
(In re Gonzales).
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives (2003)
SUMMARY: Two impeachment complaints were brought
against Chief Justice Davide, the second of which is
being assailed as violating the constitutional bar against

the filing of more than one impeachment complaint
against the same official within one ear. The argument of
the House of Representatives is that the term initiate
does not mean to file, which could only be done in the
three ways stated in Sec. 3(2) of Art. XI. Hence, the
resolution of these petitions hinges on the interpretation
of if word initiate.
The term should be understood as ordinary understand
it: to begin, to commence, or set going, to perform the
first action. The framers of our Constitution also intended
that the term starts with the filing of the complaint.
ConComs Regalado and Maambong, and also Father
Bernas, are in agreement with this interpretation.
DOCTRINE: When Section 3(5), Article XI says, "No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one
year," it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. The framers intended "initiation" to start with the
filing of the complaint. An impeachment proceeding is
not a single act. It is a complexus of acts consisting of a
beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the
transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
The middle consists of those deliberative moments
leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment.
The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the
complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
J. Abolition of Office
Power to abolish lies with the authority which

created the office (Constitutional or statutory);
but Congress may delegate the power to the
President.
Congress has power to abolish office without
infringing on the rights of the affected officer.
In the absence of a Constitutional prohibition
(e.g., Art. VIII, Sec. 2), an office created by
Congress may be abolished by Congress during
the term of the incumbent.
Essence of abolition: Intent to do away with the
office wholly and permanently
o NLTDRA v. CSC: The question of
whether or not a law abolishes an office
is one of legislative intent about which
there can be no controversy whatsoever
if there is an explicit declaration in the
law itself.
In removal, the office subsists after the officer is
ousted. In abolition, the office is done away with
and the officer is removed as a consequence.
The right protected by security of tenure is thus
also abolished, since the office itself has been
88
done away with. As to effect, however, there is

really no difference.
Abolition in bad faith is invalid, as when it is used
to discharge the incumbent in violation of the
civil service law.
Dario v. Mison: There is an invalid "abolition" as
where there is merely a change of nomenclature
of positions, or where claims of economy are
belied by the existence of ample funds.
Requisites of valid abolition
Good faith
Not personally or politically motivated; or
intended to circumvent security of tenure
Not implemented in violation of law
Reorganization
Constitution, Art. XVIII, Sec. 16
Section 16. Career civil service employees separated
from the service not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other
benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In lieu
thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be
considered for employment in the Government or in any
of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to
career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with
the existing policy, had been accepted.
see Dario v. Mison and allied cases, p. 2
onwards.
SOTC v. Mabalot: Sec. 17, Article VII of the
Constitution mandates that The President shall
have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed... The Administrative
Code of 1987 also provides legal basis for the
Chief Executives authority to reorganize the
National Government.
Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is
pursued in good faith. As a general rule,
reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is
for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient.
There is no vested property right to be
reemployed in a reorganized office (MelencioHerrera, dissenting in Dario v. Mison).
Removal must be distinguished from separations
arising from abolition of office (not by virtue of
the Constitution) as a result of reorganization
carried out by reason of economy or to remove
redundancy of functions. In the latter case the

Government is obliged to prove good faith.
In case of removals undertaken to comply with
clear and explicit, constitutional mandates, the
Government is not hard put to prove anything,
plainly and simply because the Constitution
allows it (automatic vacancies).
The 1987 Constitution does not provide for
"automatic" vacancies. Removals made in the
course of reorganization must also pass the test
of good faith.
Automatic vacancy: Transition periods are
characterized by provisions for "automatic"
vacancies. They are dictated by the need to
hasten the passage from the old to the new
Constitution free from the "fetters" of due
process and security of tenure.
Canonizado v. Aguirre (2000)
SUMMARY:
Canonizado et al. were former
Commissioners of NAPOLCOM. Upon the passing of RA
8551, they were removed from office. They filed the
instant Petition questioning the constitutionality of RA
8551. The SC held that they was no abolition nor
reorganization of their office; thus, their removal from
office was unconstitutional for being violative of the right
to security of tenure. Canonizado, et al. are entitled to
reinstatement and backwages.
DOCTRINE: Where one office is abolished and replaced
with another office vested with similar functions, the
abolition is a legal nullity.
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of
the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them.
Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a
collegial body within the DILG whereas under RA 8551 it
is made "an agency attached to the [DILG] for policy and
program coordination.
K. Conviction of Crime
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is

a ground for disciplinary action.
RPC 30-31
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary
absolute disqualification. The penalties of perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall
produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments
which the offender may have held even if conferred by
popular election. X X X
3. The disqualification for the offices or public
employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
89
mentioned.
In
case
of
temporary
disqualification,
such
disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of
this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other
pension for any office formerly held.
Art. 31. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary
special disqualification. The penalties of perpetual or
temporal special disqualification for public office,
profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession
or calling affected;
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or
employments either perpetually or during the term of the
sentence according to the extent of such disqualification.
Perpetual/temporary absolute disqualification or
special disqualification serves to terminate
official relations, since it operates as a
deprivation of public office held by the offender,
regardless of how it was conferred. Conversely,
an acquitted officer must be reinstated.
Conviction to be a mode of termination must
emanate from a court. It contemplates a court
finding of guilt and a judgment upholding and
implementing such finding. Plea of guilty and
judgment in accordance with such plea also
amounts to conviction.
Effect of pardon
see Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, supra
RPC 36
Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. A pardon shall not work the
restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.
Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted
felon to the office forfeited by reason of the
conviction.
Pardon restores the convicts eligibility for
appointment or election. It removes the
disqualification and nothing more.
Garcia v. Commission on Audit (1993)
SUMMARY: Garcia was a Supervising Lineman in the
Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications
in Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, Garcia was summarily
dismissed from the service. He was administratively
charged and found guilty of dishonesty for the loss of
several telegraph poles. He did not appeal from the
decision. Based on the same facts in the administrative
case, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against
him with the CFI of Quezon. He was acquitted. In view of

his acquittal, Garcia sought reinstatement to his former
position. Garcia was granted executive clemency was
granted pursuant to OP Resolution 1800
DOCTRINE: General Rule - Since pardon does not
generally result in automatic reinstatement because the
offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not
entitled to back wages.
Exception - If the pardon is based on the innocence of
the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a
new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found
guilty of the offense charged.
When a person is given pardon because he did not truly
commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from
all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby
restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and
unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
L. Recall
LGC 69-75, as amended
Section 69. By Whom Exercised. - The power of recall
for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit to which the
local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process.
(a) The Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal
or barangay official shall be commenced by a petition of
a registered voter in the local government unit
concerned and supported by the registered voters in the
local government unit concerned during the election in
which the local official sought to be recalled was elected
subject to the following percentage requirements:
(1) At least twenty-five percent (25%) in the case of
local government units with a voting population of not
more than twenty thousand (20,000);
(2) At least twenty percent (20%) in the case of local
government units with a voting population of at least
twenty thousand (20,000) but not more than seventyfive thousand (75,000): Provided, That in no case shall
the required petitioners be less than five thousand
(5,000);
(3) At least fifteen percent (15%) in the case of local
government units with a voting population of at least
seventy-five thousand (75,000) but not more than
three hundred thousand (300,000): Provided, however,
That in no case shall the required number of
petitioners be less than fifteen thousand (15,000); and
(4) At least ten percent (10%) in the case of local
government units with a voting population of over three
hundred thousand (300,000): Provided, however, That
in no case shall the required petitioners be less than
forty-five thousand (45,000)
90
(b) The process of recall shall be effected in accordance

with the following procedure:
(1) A written petition for recall duly signed by the
representatives of the petitioners before the election
registrar or his representative, shall be filed with the
Comelec through its office in the local government unit
concerned.
(2) The petition to recall shall contain the following:
(a) The names and addresses of the petitioners
written in legible form and their signatures;
(b) The barangay, city or municipality, local
legislative district and the province to which the
petitioners belong;
(c) The name of the official sought to be recalled;
and
(d) A brief narration of the reasons and justifications
therefor.
(3) The Comelec shall, within fifteen (15) days from the
filing of the petition, certify to the sufficiency of the
required number of signatures. Failure to obtain the
required number of signatures automatically nullifies
the petition;
(4) If the petition is found to be sufficient in form, the
Comelec or its duly authorized representative shall,
within three (3) days from the issuance of the
certification, provide the official sought to be recalled a
copy of the petition, cause its publication in a national
newspaper of general circulation and a newspaper of
general circulation in the locality, once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of the
petitioners and at the same time post copies thereof in
public and conspicuous places for a period of not less
than ten (10) days nor more than twenty (20) days, for
the purpose of allowing interested parties to examine
and verify the validity of the petition and the
authenticity of the signatures contained therein.
(5) The Comelec or its duly authorized representatives
shall, upon issuance of certification, proceed
independently with the verification and authentication
of the signatures of the petitioners and registered
voters contained therein. Representatives of the
petitioners and the official sought to be recalled shall
be duly notified and shall have the right to participate
therein as mere observers. The filing of any challenge
or protest shall be allowed within the period provided
in the immediately preceding paragraph and shall be
ruled upon with finality within fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing of such protest or challenge;
(6) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the
Comelec or its duly authorized representative shall
announce the acceptance of candidates to the position
and thereafter prepare the list of candidates which
shall include the name of the official sought to be
recalled.
Sec. 71. Election on Recall. Upon the filing of a valid
petition for recall with the appropriate local office of the
Comelec, the Comelec or its duly authorized
representative shall set the date of the election or recall,
which shall not be later than thirty (30) days upon the
completion of the procedure outlined in the preceding
article, in the case of the barangay, city or municipal
officials, and forty-five (45) days in the case of provincial
officials. The officials sought to be recalled shall
automatically be considered as duly registered candidate
or candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other
candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
Section 72. Effectivity of Recall. - The recall of an
elective local official shall be effective only upon the
election and proclamation of a successor in the person
of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes
cast during the election on recall. Should the official
sought to be recalled receive the highest number of
votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and he shall
continue in office.
Section 73. Prohibition from Resignation. - The elective
local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to
resign while the recall process is in progress.
Section 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a
recall election only once during his term of office for loss
of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the
date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
Section 75. Expenses Incident to Recall Elections. - All
expenses incident to recall elections shall be borne by
the COMELEC. For this purpose, there shall be included
in the annual General Appropriations Act a contingency
fund at the disposal of the COMELEC for the conduct of
recall elections.
Speedy remedy for the removal of an elective
official, to be exercised by the electorate.
Political in nature. An exercise of the power of
removal by the people themselves.
There is only one ground for recall: loss of
confidence. There is no need for the people to
bring up any charge of abuse or corruption
against the local elective officals who are the
subject of any recall petition (Pimentel).
Garcia v. COMELEC (1993)
91
SUMMARY: Various local officials of Bataan convened a

Peoples Recall Assembly to initiate a recall election
against Governor Garcia. Garcia filed a petition before
the SC assailing the constitutionality of LGC 70 which
provided for a PRA. The SC held that the law is not
unconstitutional. The Constitution did not limit the modes
of initiating recall. The officials who were part of the PRA
were likewise acting in behalf of the people.
DOCTRINE: The provision is constitutional. Recall is a
mode of removal of a public officer by the people before
the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative to
remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign
power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the
power is implied in all governmental operations. The
legislative records reveal that there were two principal
reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall
process thru an assembly was adopted: (a) to diminish
the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the
people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses. There is
nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that
the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide
on whether to initiate a recall proceeding."
(NB: RA 9244 later eliminated the PRA as a mode of
initiating recall.)
Angobung v. COMELEC (1997)
SUMMARY: Angobung won as Mayor of Tumauini,
Isabela in the 1995 local elections. De Alban, his
opponent, filed a petition for recall. COMELEC granted
her petition even though it was just filed and signed by 1
registered voter (De Alban) and also set a date for
further signing by the rest of the registered voters.
HELD: The COMELEC erred in granting the petition
because the LGC clearly states that the recall must be
initiated via a petition of at least 25% of the total number
of voters, so such requirement was not met with just one
signature. Such is the intent of the legislature in
providing a remedy for the people, and not for the loser
of an election. Also, the contention that the election is
barred because a barangay election is scheduled within
1 year does not hold water. There can be no application
of the 1-year bar when the same is being invoked by a
mayor in view of the approaching barangay elections.
DOCTRINE: LGC 69(d) expressly provides that "recall of
any electivemunicipalofficial may also be validly
initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number
of registered voters in the local government unit
concerned during the election in which the local official
sought to be recalled was elected". Only a petition of at
least 25% of the total number of registered voters, may
validly initiate recall proceedings. Taking note of the
phrase "petition of at least 25%", the law does not state
that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the
registered voters; rather, the petition must be "of" or by,
at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition

must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least
25% of the total number of registered voters.
NOTE: This ruling came before LGC 70 was amended;
thus its no longer good law. 70(b)(2)(a) as it stands
says and their signatures (Gatmaytan).
M. Disciplinary Cases
Governing Law
Administrative proceedings against public
officers are generally governed by the Civil
Service Law and its Implementing Rules, subject
to the provisions of other laws applicable to
specific classes of public officers.
Officers not under the coverage of the
disciplinary provisions of the Civil Service Law
include local elective officials (governed by LGC
and DILG-AO 23, see Joson v. Torres), police
officers (the Civil Service Law applies only
insofar as it is consistent with RA 6975, the
Police Professionalization Law)
Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition
of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or
fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion
in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. A complaint may be filed directly with demotion in
rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. A complaint may be filed directly with the
Commission by a private citizen against a government
official or employee in which case it may hear and
decide the case or it may deputize any department or
agency or official or group of officials to conduct the
investigation. The results of the investigation shall be
submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to
the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities
shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall
be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for
not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days', salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the
department and finally to the Commission and pending
appeal, the same shall be executory except when the
penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the Secretary
92
concerned.
(3) An investigation may be entrusted to regional director
or similar officials who shall make the necessary report
and recommendation to the chief of bureau or office or
department within the period specified in Paragraph (4)
of the following Section.
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or
removal, the respondent shall be considered as having
been under preventive suspension during the pendency
of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
Similar to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and the COA over their respective
spheres, the CSC is the single arbiter of all
controversies pertaining to civil service positions
in the government service, whether career or
non-career.
It has the authority to hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases directly or on
appeal, and to enforce its decisions, resolutions,
or orders.
In its investigations, the CSC is not bound by
technical rules of procedure and evidence
applicable in judicial proceedings.
Remedy to enforce a final and executory
decision of the CSC = Mandamus
CSC has no authority to force UP to dismiss a
faculty member, since institutions of higher
learning such as UP enjoy academic freedom
under the Constitution (UP v. CSC).
Procedure in administrative cases
Civil Service Law, Section 48. Procedure in
Administrative
Cases
Against
Non-Presidential
Appointees. (1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced
against a subordinate officer or employee by the
Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of
local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional
directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other
person.
(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons,
the complainant shall submit sworn statements covering
his testimony and those of his witnesses together with
his documentary evidence. If on the basis of such
papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the
disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima
facie case exists, he shall notify the respondent in
writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall
be attached copies of the complaint, sworn statements
and other documents submitted, and the respondent
shall be allowed not less than seventy-two hours after
receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing
under oath, together with supporting sworn statements
and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or not

he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not
considered satisfactory. If the answer is found
satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the
case.
(3) Although a respondent does not request a formal
investigation, one shall nevertheless be conducted when
from the allegations of the complaint and the answer of
the respondent, including the supporting documents, the
merits of the case cannot be decided judiciously without
conducting such an investigation.
(4) The investigation shall be held not earlier than five
days nor later than ten days from the date of receipt of
respondent's answer by the disciplining authority, and
shall be finished within thirty days from the filing of the
charges, unless the period is extended by the
Commission in meritorious cases. The decision shall be
rendered by the disciplining authority within thirty days
from the termination of the investigation or submission of
the report of the investigator, which report shall be
submitted within fifteen days from the conclusion of the
investigation.
(5) The direct evidence for the complainant and the
respondent shall consist of the sworn statement and
documents submitted in support of the complaint or
answer, as the case may be, without prejudice to the
presentation of additional evidence deemed necessary
but was unavailable at the time of the filing of the
complaint or answer, upon which the cross-examination,
by respondent and the complainant, respectively, shall
be based. Following cross-examination, there may be
redirect and re-cross-examination.
(6) Either party may avail himself of the services of
counsel and may require the attendance of witnesses
and the production of documentary evidence in his favor
through the compulsory process of subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum.
(7) The investigation shall be conducted only for the
purpose of ascertaining the truth and without necessarily
adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial
proceedings. It shall be conducted by the disciplining
authority concerned or his authorized representative.
The phrase "any other party" shall be understood to be a
complainant other than those referred to in subsection
(a) hereof.
Section 49. Appeals. (1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party
adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days
from receipt of the decision unless a petition for
reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall
be decided within fifteen days. Notice of the appeal shall
be filed with the disciplining office, which shall forward
93
the records of the case, together with the notice of

appeal, to the appellate authority within fifteen days from
filing of the notice of appeal, with its comment, if any.
The notice of appeal shall specifically state the date of
the decision appealed from and the date of receipt
thereof. It shall also specifically set forth clearly the
grounds relied upon for excepting from the decision.
(2) A petition for reconsideration shall be based only on
any of the following grounds: (a) new evidence has been
discovered which materially affects the decision
rendered; (b) the decision is not supported by the
evidence on record; or (c) error of law or irregularities
have been committed which are prejudicial to the
interest of the respondent: Provided, That only one
petition for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Section 50. Summary Proceedings. - No formal
investigation is necessary and the respondent may be
immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following
circumstances is present:
(1) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt
is strong;
(2) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been
repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to
believe that he is guilty of the present charge; and
(3) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.
Resort to summary proceedings by the disciplining
authority shall be done with utmost objectivity and
impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed:
Provided, That removal or dismissal except those by the
President, himself or upon his order, may be appealed to
the Commission.
Section 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper
disciplining authority may preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if the charge against such
officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty,
or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is
guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from
the service.
Section 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending
Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative
case against the officer or employee under preventive
suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining
authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the
date of suspension of the respondent who is not a
presidential appointee, the respondent shall be
automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That
when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to
the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the
period of delay shall not be counted in computing the

period of suspension herein provided.
Section 53. Removal of Administrative Penalties or
Disabilities. - In meritorious cases and upon
recommendation of the Commission, the President may
commute or remove administrative penalties or
disabilities imposed upon officers or employees in
disciplinary cases, subject to such terms and conditions
as he may impose in the interest of the service.
CSC can appeal a decision adverse to it, since it
is adversely affected by such decision which
seriously prejudiced the civil service system; as
an aggrieved party, it may appeal adverse CA
decisions to the SC (CSC v. Dacoycoy).
There is no private interest in administrative
proceedings. Complainant is really a mere
witness, thus he has no personality to appeal,
unless the respondent fails to question such lack
of personality; and his death or desistance does
not warrant the dismissal or non-continuance of
the proceedings (Tudtud v. Coliflores).
Merit System Protection Board
Civil Service Law, Section 16. Offices in the
Commission. - The Commission shall have the following
offices:
xxx
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a
Chairman and two (2) members shall have the following
functions:
(a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases
involving officials and employees of the Civil Service. Its
decision shall be final except those involving dismissal or
separation from the service which may be appealed to
the Commission;
(b) Hear and decide cases brought before it on appeal
by officials and employees who feel aggrieved by the
determination of appointing authorities involving
personnel actions and violations of the merit system.
The decision of the Board shall be final except those
involving division chiefs or officials of higher ranks which
may be appealed to the Commission;
(c) Directly take cognizance of complaints affecting
functions of the Commission, those which are unacted
upon by the agencies, and such other complaints which
require direct action of the Board in the interest of
justice;
(d) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum, take testimony in any investigation or
inquiry, punish for contempt in accordance with the
same procedures and penalties prescribed in the Rules
of Court; and
(e) Promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
94
functions of the Board subject to the approval of the

Commission.
xxx
Under the old Civil Service Decree (PD 807), it
was held that CSC cannot take original
cognizance of cases except those specified in
Sec. 9(j) of the Decree (GSIS v. CSC, 1991);
and that the CSC had no jurisdiction over
appeals from MSPB decisions exonerating
officers from administrative charges, since no
appeal from such decisions is provided for
(Navarro v. CSC, del Castillo v. CSC).
The Ombudsman
RA 6770
SECTION 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority;
Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except
over officials who may be removed only by impeachment
or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
SECTION 22. Investigatory Power. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any
serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by
officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of
filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or
employee of the government and a private person, the
Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to
include such private person in the investigation and
proceed against such private person as the evidence
may warrant. The officer or employee and the private
person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the
same penalties and liabilities.
SECTION 23. Formal
Investigation.
(1)
Administrative investigations conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of
procedure and consistent with due process.
(2)
At its option, the Office of the Ombudsman may
refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary
authority for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings against erring public officers or employees,
which shall be determined within the period prescribed in
the civil service law. Any delay without just cause in
acting on any referral made by the Office of the
Ombudsman shall be a ground for administrative action
against the officers or employees to whom such referrals
are addressed and shall constitute a graft offense
punishable by a fine of not exceeding Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00).
(3)
In any investigation under this Act the
Ombudsman may: (a) enter and inspect the premises of
any office, agency, commission or tribunal; (b) examine
and have access to any book, record, file, document or
paper; and (c) hold private hearings with both the
complaining individual and the official concerned.
SECTION 24. Preventive
Suspension.
The
Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend
any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case
is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not
more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the
delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of
the respondent, in which case the period of such delay
shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
Preventive Suspension
RA 3019
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits.Any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or
under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for
any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment he
snail lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any
law, bur if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have
already been separated from the service, has already
received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the
same to the Government
The suspension under this law is mandatory
after the validity of the information is determined
(Socrates v. Sandiganbayan).
Suspension under this law is distinct from the
Congressional power to suspend its own
95
members. Members of Congress are

excluded from the coverage of RA 3019.
LGC 63
Section 63. Preventive Suspension.
(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective
official of a province, a highly urbanized or an
independent component city;
(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective
official of a component city or municipality; or
(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official
of the barangay.
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time
after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is
strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is
great probability that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence: Provided, That, any single preventive
suspension of local elective officials shall not extend
beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the
event that several administrative cases are filed against
an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended
for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the
same ground or grounds existing and known at the time
of the first suspension.
(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the
suspended elective official shall be deemed reinstated in
office without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings against him, which shall be terminated
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time he
was formally notified of the case against him.
However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is
due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the
appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of termination of the case.
(d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive
suspension shall be penalized as abuse of authority.
2 kinds: pending investigation and pending
appeal
Suspension under the Ombudsman Law, and
under the LGC are also distinct. See Hagad v.
Gozo-Dadole. The length of suspension under
the Ombudsman Law is discretionary upon the
Ombudsman.
Preventive suspension pending investigation
o See Civil Service Law, Sec. 51
o May be imposed even before charges
are heard and before the respondent is
given a chance to answer
o Preliminary in nature and usually
immediately effective and executory.
Prior notice and hearing are not required
not
Purpose of suspension pendente lite is

to prevent the respondent from using his
position to intimidate or influence the
case. Mere possibility of such influence
is sufficient.
o Preventive suspension is not a penalty.
Thus, it can be imposed immediately
after charges are brought, even before
these are heard.
o Period of preventive suspension is not
considered part of the actual penalty of
suspension. Period of preventive
suspension is not credited to the final
penalty.
o If the investigation is not finished within
the period of the preventive suspension,
the suspension must be lifted and the
respondent should be reinstated.
o No compensation is due for the period of
suspension pending investigation.
Preventive suspension pending appeal
o Preventive suspension pending appeal
is actually punitive although it is
considered illegal if respondent is
exonerated and the adverse decision is
reversed.
o If the decision is affirmed, the period of
suspension pending appeal becomes
part of the final penalty of suspension or
dismissal.
o Backwages for preventive suspension
pending appeal may be collected if the
respondent is exonerated. Being found
liable for a lesser offense is not
exoneration.
Preventive suspension imposed for an
unreasonable length of time may be used to
shorten an officers term. In such a case, this is
tantamount to a removal without just cause.
Lacson v. Roque, supra
o Whether decreed as a punishment in
itself, or as auxiliary in the proceedings
for removal so as to tie the defendant's
hand
pending
his
investigation,
suspension ought to be based on the
same ground upon which removal may
be effected or is sought.
o When exercised as a mere incident to
the power to remove, the power to
suspend cannot be broader than the
power to which it is ancillary. A stream
cannot rise higher than its source.
96
In their effects, the difference between

the power to remove and the power to
suspend is only one of degree.
o Suspension is a qualified expulsion, and
whether termed suspension or expulsion,
it constitutes either temporary or
permanent disfranchisement. It is an ad
interim stoppage or arrest of an official
power and pay.
o When the "suspension is to continue
until the final disposition" of a criminal
prosecution, it might become a virtual
removal.
Ombudsman v. CA (2007)
SUMMARY: Bacolod City Treasury Operations Assistant
Magbanua was audited and held to account for
P265,450. Before the Ombudsman, Magbanua blamed
Cash Clerk Baja for making fictitious vouchers. Both
were found guilty - Magbanua for neglect (6 months
suspension) and Baja for dishonesty (dismissal). On
review, Magbanua was also dismissed. On certiorari to
CA, penalty was rescinded on the ground that
Ombudsman had no authority to impose penalties. On
certiorari by the Ombudsman, SC reversed the CA
because it relied on an obiter. The Constitution and the
Ombudsman Law clearly empower the Ombudsman to
directly impose the penalty of dismissal on employees
subject to its jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE: Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman is not
authority for saying that the Ombudsman has no power
to impose penalties on public officers. It has been
reversed. RA 6770 reveals the manifest intent of the
lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman
full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions
cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication
which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive
complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in
accordance with its rules of procedure, summon
witnesses and require the production of documents,
place under preventive suspension public officers and
employees pending an investigation, determine the
appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or
employees as warranted by the evidence, and
necessarily, impose the said penalty.
Class Notes: Magbanua was an accountable officer as
defined in EO 292 (supra).
Marohomsalic v. Cole (2008)
SUMMARY: Marohomsalic was ordered dismissed due
to the Ombudsman finding that he requested and
received money from Cole in connection with a
transaction in which he was involved in his official
capacity as Special Land Investigator I of PENRODENR. Marohomsalic asked for money to secure the
reversal of the PENRO decision against Cole.

Marohomsalic challenged the Ombudsmans jurisdiction
in dismissing him. Citing Sec. 12, Art. XI of the
Constitution, the SC declared that the Ombudsman did
have such power, as a corollary to its disciplinary
authority in relation to government employees.
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over
disciplinary cases against government employees is
vested by no less than Sec. 12, Article XI of the
Constitution. Part of such disciplinary authority in
administrative cases is the power to investigate and
prosecute, in accordance with the requirements laid
down by law. One such requirement is that substantial
evidence must always support any finding.
Joson v. Torres (1998)
SUMMARY: Tinio, V-Gov. of Nueva Ecija, and several
members of the SP filed a complaint with the OP against
Joson, the governor. They alleged that he had acted
threateningly towards them due to their opposition to a
legislative measure which would allow Nueva Ecija to
contract a P150M loan. The President endorsed the
matter to the DILG Sec, who directed Joson to file his
answer. Joson failed to file an answer after several
extensions, and was declared in default. Upon filing a
MR of the order of default, he was again given an
extension. Instead of filing his answer, he filed a MTD
alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the DILG. This
was denied. He filed his answer, which was admitted.
The DILG directed the parties to submit position papers,
but none did, as Joson at that time had filed a motion for
formal investigation instead while Tinio et al. had
submitted the case for decision based on the pleadings.
The DILG found Joson guilty, and the OP adopted the
DILGs findings and meted out the penalty of 6 mos.
suspension.
DOCTRINE: The SC held that the DILG had jurisdiction
and authority over the case, as the disciplining authority
was different from the investigating authority. There was
no undue delegation as only the power of investigation
was delegated, not the power to discipline. Moreover,
the power of the DILG to investigate administrative
complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the
doctrine of qualified political agency. However, Joson
was denied due process, which invalidated the decision
of the Exec Sec. Joson had the right to have a formal
investigation conducted, as provided for in the LGC and
AO 23.
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan (1996)
SUMMARY: During the time Rodriguez was OIC
Governor of Palawan, he and the Provincial Board filed
before the Office of the Tanodbayan two complaints
against Socrates for violations of RA 3019, Secs. 3(b),
97
(a), and (g). The prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend

Accused Pendente Lite pursuant to Sec. 13 of RA 3019.
DOCTRINE: The preventive suspension may issue
pending the resolution of the validity of the informations.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty. In fact, if
acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he
failed to receive during suspension. Thus, the accused
elective public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by
the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in
the event that the information is subsequently declared
null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as
against him. Public policy dictates that the protection of
the public interest prevail over the private interest of the
accused.
Layus v. Sandiganbayan (1999)
SUMMARY: Claveria, Cagayan Mayor Layus was
charged with estafa through falsification of public
documents.
The
prosecution
filed
with
the
Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente
Lite. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. She
argues that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction as
she only receives a salary which is classified at SG 25.
DOCTRINE: The fact that Layus is getting an amount
less than that prescribed for SG 27 is entirely irrelevant
for purposes of determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. That Layus is receiving a rate within SG
25 should not, however, be construed to mean that she
falls within the classification of SG 25. The suspension
pendente lite is in accordance to Sec. 13 of RA 3019.
This provision makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer who has
been validly charged with a violation of RA 3019, as
amended, or Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code,
or any offense involving fraud upon government or public
funds or property. The imposition of the suspension is
not automatic or self-operative. There must first be a
valid information, determined at a pre-suspension
hearing, where the court is furnished with the basis to
suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the
merits of the case, or refuse suspension of the latter and
dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings
which impairs its validity.
Castro v. Gloria (2001)
SUMMARY: Gutang filed a complaint for disgraceful and
immoral conduct with the DECS against Castro for
allegedly having an illicit affair with his wife. The DECS
Reg. Office declared Castro guilty and dismissed him
from service. He asked reconsideration and filed several
incidents and a motion for review to the DECS Sec. but
he was always denied; hence, he filed a petition for
mandamus with RTC to reduce his penalty from
dismissal to 1 yr suspension. HELD: Mandamus is
granted. While he was guilty of the administrative

charge, the penalty of dismissal for such act is not
proper. Specifically under Sec. 23, Rule XIV of the Rules
Implementing Book V of E.O. 292, the proper penalty for
st
the 1 offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is only
suspension for 6 months and 1 day to 1 year and not
dismissal.
Caniete v. SECS (2000)
SUMMARY: QC Public school teachers Caniete and
Rosario were dismissed from the service after DECS
Secretary Carino found them guilty of participating in the
strike held on Sept. 20-21, 1990. On appeal, the Merit
System Protection Board set aside their dismissal. They
were found guilty of gross violation of Civil Service rules.
The penalty was modified to 3 months suspension
without pay. Aug. 30, 1994 - On appeal, the CSC found
them guilty of going on absence without approved leave.
They were reprimanded and reinstated WITHOUT back
salaries. MR denied; CA denied; hence this petition.
DOCTRINE: Although employees who are preventively
suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the
payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, we
do not agree x x x that they are not entitled to
compensation for the period of suspension pending
appeal if eventually they are found innocent.
2 kinds of preventive suspension: PS pending
investigation under 51 and PS pending appeal if the
penalty imposed is suspension or dismissal and, after
review, respondent is exonerated (47[4]).
The employee who is placed under preventive
suspension pending investigation is not entitled to
compensation because such suspension is not a penalty
only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to
conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other
hand, there is right to compensation for preventive
suspension pending appeal if the respondent is
exonerated, because this kind of preventive suspension
is punitive although it is in effect subsequently
considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed.
Nalupta, Jr. v. Tapec (1993)
SUMMARY: Honesto Tapec was charged with
immorality for cohabiting with his paramour, with whom
he had 2 children, and for discharging the duties of
Barangay Captain despite holding the position of Deputy
Sheriff. The executive judge handling the case sent his
branch clerk of court to verify the birth certificates of the
2 children, and later found Tapec guilty as charged,
recommending imposition of the appropriate penalty. SC
found that the Judges report was supported by
evidence, leading it to concluded that Tapec was indeed
guilty of immoral conduct, which subjected Tapec to
disciplinary action under the Civil Service Decree.
98
DOCTRINE: The act of having illicit relations is

considered disgraceful and immoral conduct within the
purview of Section 36 (b)(5) of PD 807 (Civil Service
Decree), for which respondent may be subjected to
disciplinary action.
OCA v. Librado (1996)
SUMMARY: Vicente Librado, deputy sheriff, was
convicted for selling and possessing illegal drugs. The
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed an admin
complaint against him, and he was suspended from
office. Librado admits he was convicted but claims he is
on probation. Exec Judge of RTC Iligan recommended
that in view of the probation, a penalty short of dismissal
should be meted out against Librado for his
rehabilitation. SC ruled that Librado must be dismissed.
DOCTRINE: The image of the judiciary is tarnished by
conduct, which involves moral turpitude. While indeed
the purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable
human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike
pardon probation has been convicted. The reform and
rehabilitation of the probationer cannot justify his
retention in the government service. He may seek to reenter government service, but only after he has shown
that he is fit to serve once again. It cannot be repeated
too often that a public office is a public trust, which
demands of those in its service the highest degree of
morality.
OCA v. Hon. Veneracion (2000)
SUMMARY: Santos filed with the Court Administrator, a
complaint against Rogelio A. Tria, "Acting Sheriff IV,
Branch 47, RTC, Manila," assailing his acts in the
implementation of a writ of execution in a civil case for
support. "Sheriff" Tria was not an employee of the
judiciary at the time he acted as "sheriff" in Civil Case No.
97-84356. He was actually first a process server before
being transferred to the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Department of Finance, as
an Intelligence Officer. Judge Veneracion assigned
Deputy Sheriff IV Antonio Velasco to the Office of the
Clerk of Court in order that Rogelio A. Tria, who was not
an employee of the judiciary, could be designated to
perform the functions of "Acting Deputy Sheriff IV"
considering the position vacant and authorized to carry
out the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 97-84356.
DOCTRINE: Judge Veneracion failed to observe
Constitutional and regulatory prescriptions. He had no
power to assign on temporary detail his duly appointed
sheriff to the office of the clerk of court. The authority to
detail employees of his branch to the office of the clerk
of court is vested in the executive judge. His actions
constitute usurpation of the appointing authority of the
Supreme Court amounting to grave misconduct in office.
RTC-Makati Movement Against Graft and Corruption v.

Dumlao (1995)
SUMMARY: Clerk of Court withheld employees salaries
to force them to take usurious loans from him. His
defense: the Usury Law has been suspended; and that
he was on a secret mission from OCA to expose
corruption. He was also accused of collecting
unauthorized fees from a litigant seeking to calendar his
case. In defense, he said that he did not know the
Manual for Clerks of Court. SC dismissed the secret
agent/usurer/clerk of court.
DOCTRINE: Public service requires utmost integrity and
strictest discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all
times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The
administration of justice is a sacred task. The Office of
Clerk of Court is the hub of activities, both adjudicative
and administrative and who occupy a position of great
importance and responsibility in the framework of judicial
administration. Branch clerks of court must realize that
their administrative functions are just as vital to the
prompt and proper administration of justice.
Nieva v. Alvarez-Edad (2005)
SUMMARY: Nieva filed an administrative complaint
against Alvarez-Edad, Branch Clerk of Court of MeTC
Br. 32, QC, for allegedly demanding or receiving
commissioners fee for reception of evidence ex-parte,
among others. HELD: She is administratively liable. To
be entitled to reasonable compensation, a commissioner
must not be an employee of the court. Edad overstepped
her powers and responsibilities. She demanded and
received a commissioners fee from a litigant in an exparte proceeding. Such act violates Section B, Chapter
II of the Manual for Clerks of Court which expressly
prohibits a Branch Clerk of Court from receiving
commissioners fee.
CSC v. Dacoycoy, supra
DOCTRINE: Nepotism under the Civil Service Law
covers four situations. In the last two mentioned
situations, it is immaterial who the appointing or
recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of
the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended or
issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or
office, or the person exercising immediate supervision
over the appointee.
Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service
and the efficiency of its personnel. The basic purpose or
objective of the prohibition against nepotism also
strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be
a comprehensive one. The Court was unwilling to restrict
and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually
very broad and comprehensive.
99
If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that

must be nipped in the bud or bated whenever or
wherever it raises its ugly head.
Santos v. Macaraig (1992)
SUMMARY: Philippine Ambassador to UN-Geneva
Santos was going to New York for a vacation. She was
able to get a big discount on a package deal for plane
tickets. However, before her scheduled vacation, she
was asked to join the Philippine delegation for a
UNCTAD conference in Havana. Since the trip involved
a New York connecting flight, she decided to use her
discounted tickets, which included fare for her baby
daughter. After the trip Santos was reimbursed for the
cost of her discounted tickets, but the DFA asked her to
return the amount corresponding to her kids fare. Under
the impression (which the SC upheld) that the tickets
were packaged together, Santos returned the whole
amount reimbursed to her and then asked for the
reimbursement of the actual amount of an economy
roundtrip ticket, to which she was entitled under the
Foreign Service junketing rules (an amount much higher
than what she got her tickets for). DFA people took this
as bitchiness on her part so administrative charges were
filed against her. DFA internal committees found her
guilty of misconduct. She was reprimanded and recalled
to Manila. On appeal to the OP, she was found guilty of
dishonesty for not telling the DFA that the tickets she
used included fare for her kid, which the government
reimbursed. SC reversed the finding of dishonesty,
holding that Santos was acting in good faith and without
intent to defraud the government. Mere inadvertence on
her part to ask DFA permission before using her
discounted tickets cannot be taken as dishonesty. It was
unreasonable for the Government to only shoulder
Santos fare when in fact the tickets she used were
packaged together and inseparable; even more so
considering that Santos was able to get tickets for 2
persons for a much lower price than what is standard for
a ticket for 1 person only, thus saving the government
money. Her recall to Manila was upheld, on the basis of
the presidential power over foreign relations and the fact
that Santos occupied a primarily confidential position
which was terminable at the Presidents desire.
DOCTRINE: The presidential prerogative to determine
the assignments of the countrys diplomatic personnel is
unquestionable. Considering that the conduct of foreign
relations is primarily an executive prerogative, courts
may not inquire into the wisdom or unwisdom in the
exercise thereof. The power to conduct foreign policy
and its necessary element of assigning the countrys
representatives abroad is best addressed to the wisdom
of the executive branch and not to be unduly interfered
with by the judiciary.
Doctrine on tenure of primarily confidential appointees

reiterated quotable quote: It is the fact of loss of
confidence, not the reason for it, that is important and
controlling.
Garciano v. Oyao (1981)
SUMMARY: 12 years after incurring his debt, Clerk of
Court Oyao has still not been able to pay it, causing his
creditor Garciano to file a suit against him. The SC found
Oyaos explanations insufficient, and proceeded to
admonish him to pay his debt. The Court points out that
caution should be taken to prevent the development of
suspicious circumstances that might impair the image of
public office. Situations that might arouse suspicion that
a public officer is utilizing his/her position for personal
gain or advantage should be avoided.
DOCTRINE: The conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation
of justice, like the courts below, from the presiding judge
to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times,
must not only be characterized with propriety and
decorum but above all else must be above suspicion
- END References
Agpalo, Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, and
Election Law (2005)
Civil Service Commission, Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws (2007)
de Leon, The Law on Public Officers and Election Law
(2011)
Gatmaytan, Local Government Law and Jurisprudence
(2014)
Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and
Officers (1890)
Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law (2006)
Santos, Karichi PubOff Notes (2011)
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Law 156 [The Law on Public Officers]

AY 2015-16, 1st Semester

D2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes

2) Purpose and Nature

and attainable goals that should be match with actual

Powers and functions are defined by

4) Creation of Public Office

contractors profit to write off certain deductives. He was

of Personnel Inspection and Audit (OPIA) while De Lima

comply with clear and explicit, constitutional mandates,

4. Officer appointed/elected pursuant to an

is estopped from taking advantage of his own

salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved

SUMMARY: F. Martinez, provincial treasurer, as

One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the

DOCTRINE: Monserate was denied due process.

A. Eligibility and Qualifications

state or quality of being legally fitted or qualified

determining training needs, and as aid in the inspection

subsequent acquisition of qualifications by an

endowment or accomplishment that fits one for

EO 292, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A will hereinafter be referred to as the Civil

D2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes

2. Nature of Right to Hold Public Office

3. Power of Congress to prescribe qualifications

In congressionally created offices: Congress can impose

4. Restrictions and Construction

5. General and Particular Qualifications

usually imposed with respect to offices

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall

SUMMARY: Frivaldo and Lee have been gunning it out

Commonwealth Act No. 63. Cruz was naturalized as US

citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No.

remanded the case to the COMELEC. Rodriguez alleges

In general, individuals who lack the qualifications

D2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes

Judgment of ouster may not preclude offender

by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)

D2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes

SUMMARY: 2 petitions filed by Civil Liberties Union and

appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of

relations to each other, of the two places, they ought not

of office, without mental reservation or purpose of

prohibition is directed against "moonlighting," which

report of such appointment shall be made to the

d) person exercising immediate supervision over the

Denotes cases not in the outline but mentioned in class/assigned by Maam.

that the pardoning power of the President is plenary. It is

C. Acquisition of Right or Title to Office

D2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes

However, appointments by the other branches

Right of appointee to the office depends

EX: Officer is removable at will of the appointing

rule is that the power of appointment must remain

classification for provisional employees under the

Solicitor General concedes that the office of POEA

asked in the mid-terms. Yun lang naalala ko hahaha

D2016 | Public Officers | Prof. G. Dizon-Reyes

is obvious. The petitioner is a career official of MSU for

SUMMARY: The PAFCA Board issued Resolution No.

Congress without the Commission on Appointments

Petitioner could not therefore demand from respondent

a temporary appointment may be with or without cause

revocation of Monserate's appointment by demoting her.