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Agenda
1.
2.
Merger waves
3.
4.
Most mergers
2.
A.
B.
Alternatives
Proxy fight
Get enough votes from shareholders to replace the current board and management, with people
favorable to the bid being made
Merger waves
$500.00
Very cyclical
1. Hot markets
2. Cold markets
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$50.00
2. Economies of scope
Shared marketing campaigns
Shared distribution channels
Etc.
Less competition!
Risk:
Less competition
Regulatory concerns: Antitrust
1. U.S. DOJ (Department of Justice)
More power over
2. FTC (Federal Trade Commission)
customers and suppliers
3. EC (European Commission)
Can charge more for
its products
Can get its input
cheaper
Famous examples
1. AT&T and T-Mobile
2. GE and Honeywell
1. Horizontal mergers
2. Vertical mergers
Combination between
A. Upstream firm (supplier)
B. Downstream firm (distributors)
Benefits:
1.
2.
B.
Tax Inversion
Firm may have tax shields but not the profits to take advantage of them
Recall:
You cannot use tax carryforwards with a change of ownership so you cannot be acquired
for that reason.
What M&A activity could still be done?
Example: Penn Central
After its restructuring, it had billions of unused tax-loss carry forwards
Bought several mature taxpaying companies so that these shields could be used
More stable and greater cash flow generation for combined firm
Firm can now issue relatively more debt
Greater tax shield benefit of debt
Lower cost of capital
Additional problems:
In-fighting for the money within the conglomerate
Poor allocation of resources across the divisions
3. CEO compensation
Often tied to size of firm
2. Dubious reasons
i. Eliminate inefficiencies in the target
ii. Use excess cash
3. Bad reasons
i. Diversification
ii. Managerial self-interest
Anti-takeover defenses
Firms can defend themselves in many ways
1. Poison pill (only in US):
If potential acquirer goes above a threshold of ownership (for example
20%), it triggers a massive dilution whereby existing shareholders can
buy new shares at massively discounted price, except the shareholder
who has more than the threshold ownership!
Ultimate deterrent!
2. Staggered boards
Staggered reelection process of board members
Takes a few years to replace entire board
3. Scorched-earth strategy
Threaten to sell prized assets (crown jewels), load up on debt, etc.
Premium paid
Bidders (acquirers) almost always pay a premium to
acquire the target firms
1. Why do they have to pay a premium?
2. How much premium should they pay?
3. Are all the profits going to target shareholders?
Massive premium
Rationale?
TI stock up 1% at announcement
Valuation
Recall:
M&A = Biggest CAPEX project you can have!
Valuation tools
DCF approach
Step 1: Compute target firm DCF as a stand-alone
Step 2: Compute target firm DCF assuming all the
benefits of the merger
For instance:
i. Lower WACC (due to increased debt capacity)
ii. Higher sales (due to better distribution network)
iii. Lower SG&A (due to reduction in overhead costs)
iv. Lower COGS (due to shared facilities)
v. Etc
Empirical evidence:
1. Stock return at announcement for target firm
Average: 20% to 40% depending on the study
Reflects premium paid
2.
Overall:
On average, bidding firms do not make mistakes (see next slide however)
On average, most of the gains do end up with target shareholders!
2.
3.
4.
5.
Combined returns
Overall gains:
On average: 2% to 7% depending on the study
Efficient markets
Assets are priced fairly
So what should the combined returns correspond to?
Complexity
Tight coupling
Cognitive biases
Conclusion
There are good and not so good reasons for M&A!
On average, M&A earns returns at or slightly
above cost of capital
Reflects synergies
But: Most benefits accrue to target firm