GOLDCREST REALTY CORPORATION, vs.

CYPRESS GARDENS CONDOMINIUM

CORPORATION.
FACTS:
Petitioner Goldcrest (developer of Cypress Gardens, a ten-storey building in Makati
City) executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions, which constituted
Cypress Gardens into a condominium project and incorporated respondent Cypress
Gardens Condominium Corporation (Cypress) to manage the condominium project and
to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the land on which the condominium stands
was transferred to Cypress under TCT. But Goldcrest retained ownership of the twolevel penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth floors of the condominium registered under
(CCT) of the Register of Deeds of Makati City. Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and
assigns likewise controlled the management and administration of the Condominium
until 1995.
After the turnover, it was discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress
were being occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a
complaint with damages against Goldcrest before the (HLURB), seeking to compel the
latter to vacate the common areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove the
structures it built thereon. Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest
along the stairway between the 8th and 9th floors, as well as the door built in front of the
9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal of the cyclone wire fence on the roof deck.
Cypress likewise prayed that Goldcrest pay damages for its occupation of the said
areas and for its refusal to remove the questioned structures.
For its part, Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive use of the roof decks
limited common area by Section 4(c)4 of the condominiums Master Deed. It likewise
argued that it constructed the contested doors for privacy and security purposes, and
that, nonetheless, the common areas occupied by it are unusable and inaccessible to
other condominium unit owners.
Arbiter San Vicente ruled in favor of Cypress. He required Goldcrest to: (1) remove the
questioned structures, including all other structures which inhibit the free ingress to and
egress from the condominiums limited and unlimited common areas; (2) vacate the roof
decks common areas and to pay actual damages for occupying the same; and (3) pay
an administrative fine for constructing a second penthouse and for making an
unauthorized alteration of the condominium plan.
The HLURB Special Division modified the decision of Arbiter San Vicente. It deleted the
award for actual damages after finding that the encroached areas were not actually
measured and that there was no evidentiary basis for the rate of compensation fixed by
Arbiter San Vicente. It likewise held that Cypress has no cause of action regarding the

use of the roof decks limited common area because only Goldcrest has the right to use
the same.
Aggrieved, Cypress appealed to the Office of the President, which then, dismissed the
appeal holding that the assailed decision did not favor the building of structures on
either the condominiums limited or unlimited common areas. Further, it stressed that
the decision did not only order Goldcrest to remove the structures impeding the use of
the unlimited common areas, but also fined it for making unauthorized alteration and
construction of structures on the condominiums roof deck. 9
The CA noted that the right of Goldcrest under Section 4(c) of the Master Deed for the
exclusive use of the easement covering the portion of the roof deck appurtenant to the
penthouse did not include the unrestricted right to build structures thereon or to lease
such area to third persons. Thus, CA ordered the removal of the permanent structures
constructed on the limited common area of the roof deck. Hence this petition
ISSUE:
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
GOLDCREST BUILT AN OFFICE STRUCTURE ON A SUPPOSED ENCROACHED
AREA IN THE OPEN SPACE OF THE ROOF DECK.
[WHETHER OR NOT] THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER IMPAIRED THE EASEMENT ON THE PORTION OF THE ROOF DECK
DESIGNATED AS A LIMITED COMMON AREA.12
We rule in favor of Cypress. At this stage of the proceedings, the failure to measure the
supposed encroached areas is no longer relevant because the award for actual
damages is no longer in issue. Moreover, a perusal of the records shows that the finding
of the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest built an office structure on the roof decks limited
common area is supported by substantial evidence and established facts. As aptly
pointed out by Cypress, the limited common area of the roof deck is specifically
identified by Section 4(c) of the Master Deed.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the similar finding of the HLURB, the Office of the
President and the CA that Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure on the
limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not only
did Goldcrests act impair the easement, it also illegally altered the condominium plan,
in violation of Sec. 2218 of PD 957.19
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed
restrictions on its rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights
necessary for the use of the easement;20 (2) it cannot use the easement except for the
benefit of the immovable originally contemplated; 21 (3) it cannot exercise the easement

in any other manner than that previously established; 22 (4) it cannot construct anything
on it which is not necessary for the use and preservation of the easement; 23 (5) it cannot
alter or make the easement more burdensome; 24 (6) it must notify the servient estate
owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; 25 and (7) it should
choose the most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the
least convenience to the owner of the servient estate. 26 Any violation of the above
constitutes impairment of the easement.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrests acts shows that it breached a number of
restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the office structure
were neither necessary for the use or preservation of the roof decks limited area.
Second, the weight of the office structure increased the strain on the condominiums
foundation and on the roof decks common limited area, making the easement more
burdensome and adding unnecessary safety risk to all the condominium unit owners.
Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went beyond the intendment of
the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium project plan and
violated Section 427 of the condominiums Declaration of Restrictions.28

G.R. No. L-52361 April 27, 1981

SUNSET
VIEW
CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH
XXX, PASAY CITY and AGUILAR-BERNARES REALTY, respondents.
In G.R. NO. 52361, private respondent Aguilar-Bernares Realty (ABR), a sole
proprietorship owned and operated by the spouses Aguilar, is the assignee of "Solana"
unit in the Sunset View Condominium Project with La Perla Commercial, Inc. (LPCI), as
assignor. LPCI bought the "Solana" unit on installment from the Tower Builders,
Inc. 4The petitioner, Sunset View, filed a complaint for the collection of assessments
levied on the unit against ABR, before the CFI. The ABR filed a Motion to Dismiss,
which was granted by the respondent Judge who opined that the private respondent is,
pursuant to Sec. 2 of RA 4726, a "holder of a separate interest" and consequently, a
shareholder of the plaintiff condominium corporation; and that "the case should be
properly filed with the SEC.
In G.R. NO. 52524, petitioner filed its amended complaint before the City Court of
Pasay City for the collection of overdue accounts on assessments and insurance
premiums and the interest amounting to P6,168 06 against the private respondent Lim
Siu Leng to whom was assigned the "Alegria" unit of the Sunset View Condo Project by
Alfonso Uy who had entered into a "Contract to Buy and Sell" with Tower Builders, Inc.
over the said unit on installment basis.
Lim filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the amount sought to be collected is an
assessment; that she has automatically become, as a purchaser of the condominium
unit, a stockholder of Sunset pursuant to Sec. 2, RA 4726; that the dispute is intracorporate and hence under SEC as provided in Sec. 5, PD 902-A. Sunset then alleged
that Lim who had not fully paid for the unit was not the owner thereof, thus was not the
holder of a separate interest which would make her a stockholder, and that hence the
case was not an intra-corporate dispute. 9
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents in both cases are correct in arguing that every
purchaser of a condo unit, regardless of whether or not they fully paid the purchase
price, is a "holder of a separate interest" mentioned in Sec. 2, RA 4726, and is
automatically a shareholder of the condo corp.
HELD:
Sec. 5, RA4726 provides that the shareholding in the Condominium Corporation will be
conveyed only in a proper case. Clearly, not every purchaser of a condo unit is a
shareholder of the condo corp.

Pursuant to the Sec. 10 of PD957, ownership of a unit is a condition sine qua non to
being a shareholder in the condo corp. It follows that a purchaser of a unit who is not yet
the owner thereof for not having fully paid the full purchase price, is not a
shareholderHence, the "separate interest" in a condo, which entitles the holder to
become automatically a share holder in the condo corp., as provided in Sec. 2 of
RA4726, can be no other than ownership of a unit. This is so because nobody can be a
shareholder unless he is the owner of a unit and when he ceases to be the owner, he
also ceases automatically to be a shareholder.
The private respondents, thus, who have not fully paid the purchase price of the units,
for their payment is on installment basis under the Contract to Buy and Sell, and are
consequently not owners of their units, are not members or shareholders of the
petitioner condominium corporation.

LILIAN CAPITLE, vs.JULIETA VDA. DE GABAN

FACTS:
Fabian Correjado (Fabian) inherited from his father Santos Correjado 2 parcels of
land. Fabian died intestate in 1919 and was survived by his 4 children. Fabians son
Julian occupied and cultivated the 2 lands until his death in 1950. He was survived by 3
children, herein respondents. Julians brother Francisco died in 1960. He was survived
by herein 5 petitioners. Julians brother Zacarias died in 1984. He was survived by the
other 8 petitioners herein.
Later on, petitioners filed a complaint for partition of the property before the (RTC)
against respondents, alleging that Fabian contracted two marriages, the first with
Brigida Salenda who was the mother of Julian, and the subsequent one with Maria
Catahay (Maria) who was the mother of Zacarias, Manuel and Francisco; that the
property remained undivided even after the death of Julian in 1950, his children-herein
respondents having arrogated unto themselves the use and enjoyment of the property,
to the exclusion of petitioners; and that respondents refused to deliver petitioners share
in the property despite demands therefor and for partition.
Respondents countered that in the proceedings in the intestate estate of their great
grandfather Santos Correjado, petitioners were not adjudicated any share in the
property, for Maria was just a mistress of Fabian, hence, Francisco and Zacarias (as
well as Manuel) were illegitimate who were not entitled to inherit under the old Civil
Code.
RTC dismissed the complaint upon the grounds of prescription and laches. CA
affirmed RTC, finding that respondents failed to prove that Francisco and Zacarias were
illegitimate. But it too found that petitioners also failed to prove that Zacarias and
Francisco were legitimate. Futher it held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of
a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as
beneficial to all of them so much so that each co-owner may demand at anytime the
partition of the common property and that this implies that an action to demand partition
is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. While the right of action to demand
partition does not prescribe, acquisitive prescription may set in where one of the coowners openly and adversely occupies
the property without recognizing the coownership.
The elements constituting adverse possession by a co-owner against another coowner or cestui que trust are: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owners; (ii) that such positive
acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other coowners; and (iii) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of CA decision based on ART. 19 NCC.

The CA, by Resolution denied the Motion for Reconsideration, hence, the present
petition.
ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT RELIANCE ON ART. 19 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS

MISPLACED.

WHETHER IN RESOLVING CASES, THE ISSUE OF MORALITY OF THE ACT

DOES NOT COME INTO PLAY.

WHETHER OR NOT LACHES IS APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.[11]

HELD:
From the moment co-owner Julian occupied in 1919 and claimed to be the absolute
and exclusive owner of the property and denied his brothers any share therein until his
death, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership in which case
imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked. The adverse
possession by Julian and his successors-in-interest herein respondents as exclusive
owner of the property having entailed a period of about 67 years at the time of the filing
of the case at bar in 1986, ownership by prescription had vested in them. [12]
Suffice it to state that while laches may not be strictly applied between near
relatives, especially the uncontroverted claim of respondents that their father Julian, and
the documented claim of respondent Julieta, had paid realty taxes on the property as
exclusive owner, as well as the admission of petitioner Rogelia that she and her copetitioners never benefited or were deprived of any benefits from the property for a
period of 67 years, despite demands therefor, even an extremely liberal application of
laches would bar the filing of the case.

MARILLA MAYANG CAVILE, vs/ HEIRS OF CLARITA CAVILE

FACTS:
This case has its roots in the complaint filed by the respondents against the petitioners
for partition of the 6 parcels of land left by their common ascendant, Bernardo Cavili.
Bernardo Cavili contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Ines Dumat-ol
with whom he had one child, Simplicia. The second was with Orfia Colalho with whom
he had two children: Fortunato and Vevencia. And the third was with Tranquilina Galon
with whom he had three children: Castor, Susana and Benedicta.
The descendants of Bernardos first and second marriage (herein respondents) filed a
complaint for partition against the descendants of his third marriage (herein petitioners),
alleging that parties were co-owners of the properties, having inherited the same from
Bernardo Cavili. Upon Bernardos death, Castor Cavili, took possession of the
properties as administrator for and in behalf of his co-owners. However, when he died,
his children took possession of the properties but no longer as administrators. They
claimed the properties as well as their fruits as their own and repeatedly refused
respondents demand for partition.
The trial court ordered the partition of the properties. However, upon motion of Primitivo
and Quirino Cavili who were not properly served with summons, the trial court held a
new trial and allowed said parties to present evidence. They proferred a Deed of
Partition which appeared to have been executed by the heirs of Bernardo Cavili. Thus,
the trial court dismissed the complaint for partition. 3
The CA reversed the decision of the trial court. It held that said Deed cannot be
considered as an ancient document whose authenticity and due execution need not be
proved as the respondents have presented evidence that cast doubt on its authenticity
and due execution.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners pose the following issues for resolution by the Court:
1. Whether or not the CA acted in accordance with law in ruling that the notarized
Deed of Partition, a public document, could not be validly admitted in evidence
because its genuineness and due execution was not proved by the petitioners.
2. Whether or not the CA acted in accordance with law and prevailing
jurisprudence in not ruling that prescription had set in since the petitioners have
been in open and adverse occupation of the subject properties for more than (45)
years without recognizing the alleged co-ownership with the respondents.
HELD:

The Court that the lawful heirs of Bernardo Cavili have already divided the properties
among themselves, as evidenced by the Deed of Partition.
The document was acknowledged before Notary Public Iluminado Golez and recorded
in his notarial book. Such public document is admissible in evidence without necessity
of preliminary proof as to their authenticity and due execution. They enjoy the
presumption of regularity. To overcome the presumption, there must be evidence that is
clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
The Court ruled that respondents in this case failed to overcome the presumption of
regularity. The CA based its conclusion on the testimonies of Tacang and Pareja who
both testified that Simplicia Cavili resided in Mindanao from 1934 until 1947. Their
testimonies are insufficient to overturn the presumption. Furthermore, the Deed of
Partition shows that what respondents claim to be mere inkblot is actually a thumbmark.
Hence, we uphold the ruling of the trial court finding that the properties left by Bernardo
Cavili have already been partitioned among his heirs.

SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT and ALEXANDER

V. MIAT, vs. ROMEO V. MIAT.
The evidence shows that the spouses Miat bought (2) parcels of land. They had two (2)
children: Romeo and Alexander. While at Dubai, Moises agreed that the Paraaque and
Paco properties would be given to his sons. Whn he returned, he renegotiated the
agreement with his sons. He wanted the Paraaque property for himself but would
leave the Paco property to his sons and they agreed.
Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property on installment basis. However, it was
only after 7 years that Moises was able to pay its balance. He secured the title over the
property in his name as a widower. According to Romeo, Moises violated the
agreement that their names would be registered in the title once the balance was
paid. Upon demand, Moises gave the owners duplicate of the Paco property title to
Romeo.
Romeo and Alexander lived on the Paco property. They paid its realty taxes and fire
insurance premiums.12 In early August 1985, Alexander and his first wife left the house
for personal reasons. In April 1988, Alexander agreed to sell to Romeo his share in the
Paco property for P42,750.00.13 He received a partial payment of P6,000.00 from
Romeo.14 Nonetheless, he never executed a deed of assignment in favor of Romeo.
Later on, Romeo learned from Mrs. Rosalina Castro, mother of petitioner Virgilio Castro,
that she had given Moises P30,000.00 as downpayment for the sale by Moises of the
Paco property to her son Virgilio.
On December 1, 1988, Romeo was brought by petitioner Virgilio Castro to the
chambers of Judge Anunciacion of the MeTC. Romeo was informed that the Paco
property had been sold to Castro by Moises by virtue of a deed of sale for (P95,000.00).
Romeo filed an action to nullify the sale between Moises and the Castro spouses; to
compel Moises and Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the
Paco property to him upon payment of the balance of its agreed price.
RTC ordered Alexander V. Miat to execute a deed of sale of his share in the property
upon payment by plaintiff Romeo of the balance of the purchase price of P36,750.00;
Miat to recognize as valid the sale of defendant Moises share in the house and lot in
Paco; the dismissal of defendants counter-claim.
Both parties appealed to CA, which modified the Decision nullifying the sale between
Moises and sps. Casto, ordering the reconveyance of the Paco property in favor of
Romeo upon payment of the balance of the purchase price.
The issues can be simplified thus:

1. Whether the Paco property is conjugal or capital;

2. Whether there was a valid oral partition covering the said property; and
3. Whether the spouses Castro were buyers in good faith.
HELD:
Moises and Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage. They executed a
Deed of Sale with Mortgage. The contract is one of sale the title passed to them
upon delivery of the Paco property.54 In fine, title was gained during the conjugal
partnership.
When Moises returned to Manila for good, the agreement was affirmed in front of the
extended Miat family members. Initially, Romeo and Alexander orally divided the Paco
property between them. Later, Alexander sold his share to Romeo. The consideration
for the grant to Romeo and Alexander of the Paco property was best expressed by
Moises himself in his letter to Romeo.
We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and Alexander is not covered by the
Statute of Frauds. It is enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted
(P6,000.00) given by Romeo as downpayment for the purchase of his share in the Paco
property. Secondly, Romeo and his witnesses, Ceferino Miat and Pedro Miranda, who
testified regarding the sale of Alexanders share to Romeo, were intensely questioned
by petitioners counsel.
The CA correctly held that the spouses Castro were not buyers in good faith. Virgilio
admitted in his testimony that Romeo told him that Moises had given the Paco property
to them. In fact, they consulted Judge Anunciacion on who had the right to the property
Moises or Romeo. Virgilio Castro is further aware that plaintiff is in possession of the
property, they being neighbors. A purchaser who was fully aware of another persons
possession of the lot he purchased cannot successfully pretend to be an innocent
purchaser for value. Thus, they have no right to the property.