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-TABLE OF CONTENTS-..........................................................................................1
-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES-.....................................................................................2
-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION-........................................................................4
-STATEMENT OF FACTS-........................................................................................5
-STATEMENT OF ISSUES-.......................................................................................7
-SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS-.................................................................................8
-WRITTEN PLEADINGS-.......................................................................................10
1. THE PIL IS NOT MAINTAINABLE BEFORE FEDERAL COURT OF INDUS
LAND...........................................................................................................................10
1.1.The Petitioners Does Not Satisfy The Pre-Requisite Of The Principal Of Locus
Standi..........................................................................................................................10
1.2.There Is No Legal Dispute Concerned Because The Facts Do Not Disclose a
Prima Facie Case For Arbitrariness or Capricious Act.................................11
2. THE GOVERNOR HAS NOT DISCHARGED HIS RESPONSIBILITY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME.................................16
2.1 Purview Of The Article 163 And The Relation With The Executive Functions....16
2.2 There Do Exist A Differnce In Tenure Of Elected And Nominated Official.........19
3. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN REMOVING THE GOVERNOR HAS NOT
EXERCISED ITS POWER ARBITRARILY AND THEREFORE DID NOT
VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW.................................................................21
3.1 Constitutional Texts Interpretations Regarding The Term Of The Governor........21
3.2 Debate Regarding Nature Of The Post Of The Governor......................................23
3.3 There Aint Any Evidence That Would Reduce The Decisions Of The President To
Be Whimsical And Arbitrary........................................................................................25
4. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAS NOT LOWERED THE HONOUR AND
DIGNITY OF THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR..................................................28
4.1 Government Should Be Based Upon Sound Principles.........................................29
-PRAYER-...................................................................................................................30
-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES-
BOOKS
A.V. Dicey, The Law Of The Constitution 422, Universal Law 13
Publishing, 10th Ed. 2012
Albert E. Bowen, Prophets, Principles and National Survival, Pg. 29
21-22.
B. Shiva Rao, The Framing Of The Constitution 243, Universal 13
Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., Vol. 6, 2006.
Constituent Assembly Debates, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Govt. of 23
India, 20055, Vol. VIII, Pg. 2166.
Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Print, Lok Sabha 17
Secretariat, Govt. of India, 20055, Vol. VIII, 2nd June, 1949.
Charles Henry Alexandrowicz, Constitutional Development of 22
India, Oxford University Press, 1957,
D.D. Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, 8th Ed., 23
2009, Pg. 6106.
HA GANI, Governor in the Indian Constitution: Certain 27
Controversies and the Sarkaria Commission, June 1983, Ajanta
Publications, Delhi (2008).
Granville Austin, Working A Democratic Constitution: A History 15
Of The Indian Experience 577 (OUP 2004)
H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law Of India, Universal Publishing 15
Co., 4th ed. Vol. II, 2008.
H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, Volume II, 1976 22
Edition.
Kagzi, M.C. Jain, The Constitutional of India, Vol. 1 , India Law 22
House, New Delhi, 2001.
CASES
Arun Kumar v. Union of India and Ors, AIR 1982 Raj 67
18
10,20
12
23
18
11
10
23
13
14
DICTIONARIES
Black's Law Dictionary, 435, 9th Ed., 2009
21,23
Merriam-Webster Online
Referred
DYNAMIC LINKS
1. www.westlawindia.com
2. www.manupatra.com
3. www.indiankanoon.org
4. http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/parl.htm
LEGAL WEB
1. Constitution of India, 1950
-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION-
The Union of Indus Land has the honour to submit this Memorial before the Federal
Court of the Indus Land in the matter arose due to the removal of the Governor of the
State of East Land, Mr. TARAK SINGH, and the Subsequent Interpretation of the
Article 156(1) along with the Scope of Doctrine of Pleasure. The Honble Federal
Court of Indus Land has the inherent jurisdiction to try, entertain and dispose of the
present case by virtue of Article 32.
-STATEMENT OF FACTS-
The Conservative Party of Indus Land (CPI) and the Freedom Party of Indus
Land (FPI) are the two major national parties of the country of Indus Land.
State of East Land is the Biggest and the most developed State of the Union of
Indus Land. Mr. Tarak Singh is the Governor and Mr. Vinay Chandra is the
Chief Minister of the State.
Before Elections 2012, FPI is in Power and CPI is in Opposition. CPI is the
ruling party of the State of East Land since last 10 Years.
Chief Minister on consistent media perusal and in public interest directed the
State Crime Investigation Department (CAD) to investigate the matter.
Even though the Evidences collected by the CAD were not enough to prove
the involvement of the State Ministers, Governor gave the false sanction to
prosecute them.
Mr. Tarak Singh ordered the State Government to allocate Rs. 200 Crores for
the development of the backward revenue divisions of the State without
consulting the Council of Ministers.
-THE CASE-
Mr. Tarak Singh was removed from his post of the Governor of the State of
East Land by the order of the Central Government according to the prescribed
rules and guidelines.
There was a political uproar in the country regarding the removal of Mr. Tarak
Singh as the Governor of the State of East land. Many legal experts and
organizations decided to challenge this decision of the Central Government.
-STATEMENT OF ISSUES-
-SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS1. THE PIL IS NOT MAINTAINABLE BEFORE FEDERAL COURT OF INDUS
LAND
It is humbly contended that the PIL has been filed against valid actions of the Central
Government that have not harmed the fundamental rights of any person. The PIL
7
stands non-maintainable for two prime reasons. First, that the petitioner, Organisation
for Public Welfare, does not satisfy the condition for the validation of principle of
locus standi as none of the aggrieved persons has approached the honourable court for
relief and mere disappointment shown by the Governor does not account into an
action for relief. Moreover, previous precedents call for rejection of similar natured
PILs. Secondly, the facts dont disclose a prima facie case for arbitrariness or
capricious act and hence there arises no legal dispute. The petitioner has neither
framed a very strong case nor provided the Court with any just statements that could
prove that the Government has acted unwontedly. The PIL has no legal or
authoritative backing and is hence, unfit to stand.
The discretionary powers assigned to the Governor are not absolute. Article 163(1) of
the Indian Constitution clearly signifies that the Governor can exercise his
discretionary powers only if there is a compelling necessity to do so. The functions of
Governor are essentially political and though he is not bound by the aid and advice of
the Council of Ministers, he ought to consult them in major policies and decisions
instead of acting in utter discretion. Article 371(2) of the Constitution gives Special
Responsibility for Development to the Governors. It means the same as in his
discretion but he is obligated to consult the Council of Ministers or else Article
163(1) would be rendered ineffective. Moreover, the nominated members cannot
claim equality to the elected members on all grounds. The Governors decisions are
misdirected. By not complying with the Government that the public has laid its faith
in, the Governor has clearly acted beyond constitutionary provisions and principals.
Alterum Partum does not apply in the present case. The Doctrine of
Pleasure cannot be disregarded. While the President himself can be
impeached, an irremovable Governor would be an anomaly. The Governor
could endanger executive efficiency, Union-State relations and might be
the focal point of separatist tendencies. The decision of removal of Mr.
Taarak Singh is not whimsical or arbitrary but under the prescribed rules
and guidelines of the Indian Constitution. Neither Article 156 nor Art 160
compels the President to give reasons. And there is no fact or evidence in
the Moot Proposition that suggests mala fide use of power by the President
as he has nothing against the Governor. The Governor has been removed
because he acted beyond constitutional provisions and in doing so, the
Central Government has not violated the due process of law.
The Central Government in its actions to remove the Governor has merely fulfilled its
responsibility within the framework of the Constitution and the rule of law and has
not acted whimsically. The leaders of the Central Government are persons of intellect
in whom the public has laid down its faith. The needs for development of an area are
best known to the representatives of the people of that area in the Government. As
mentioned in proposition, the people of the State of East Land have been electing the
same government from the past 10 years which suggests that the steps taken by the
Government have always been aimed at the benefit of the public. The misdirected
decisions taken by Mr. Tarak Singh, without even consulting the Ministers, merely
caused legislative chaos. In dismissing the Governor fairly, the Central Government
has only acted in the welfare of the public and this is no way, an attempt to tarnish the
honour and dignity of the office of the Governor.
-WRITTEN PLEADINGS-
In the context of the present case between Organisation for Welfare of People (Herein
after OPW) and Union of Indus Land, the PIL is filed under Article 32 of
Constitution, which guarantees the protection of the Fundamental Rights, enshrined in
the Part III of the Constitution. However, this PIL is filed against the valid actions of
In S.P. Gupta v. President of India1, Supreme Court submitted that a writ petition by
way of PIL, to secure relief for the Governors who have been removed from office, is
not maintainable as none of the aggrieved persons had approached the court for relief
and the writ petitioner has no locus to maintain a petition seeking relief on their
behalf. It is pointed out that Governors do not belong to a helpless section of society
which by reason of poverty, ignorance, disability or other disadvantages, is not
capable of seeking relief.2 Reliance is placed on the following observations of this
Court in the Supra Case3:
..cases may arise where there is undoubtedly public injury by the actor omission
of the State or a public authority but such act or omission also causes a specific legal
injury to an individual or to a specific class or group of individuals. In such cases, a
member of the public having sufficient interest can certainly maintain an action
challenging the legality of such act or omission, but if the person on specific class or
group of persons who are primarily injured as a result of such act or omission, do not
wish to claim any relief and accept such act or omission willingly and without protect,
the member of the public who complains of a secondary public injury cannot
maintain the action, for the effect of entertaining the action at the instance of such
member of the public would be to foist relief on the person or specific class or group
of persons primarily injured, which they do not want.
1 S.P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, 1981, Supp (1) SCC 87, 1982 2 SCR
365.
2 B.P. Singhal v. Union of India & Anr, (2010) 6 SCC 33, 11.
3 Supra, Note 1.
10
Similar Public Interest Litigation came up before a Constitution Bench of this Court
in Ranji Thomas v. Union of India4, seeking intervention of this court to restrain the
President of India from forcibly extracting resignations from various Governors and
Lt. Governors. The Court observed in the case: The petitioner has no locus to
maintain the petition in regard to the prayers claiming relief for the benefit of the
individual Governors. At all events, such prayers no longer survive on account of
passage of time.
In the present case, it is very clear from the proposition that the governor has not
recorded any statement that shows that he does not respect the decision of the central
Government. However, the counsel on behalf of the respondent puts forward a
demarcation that that there is a difference between being disappointed from a decision
and taking any action to reverse it. Mere disappointment of the Governor, Mr. Tarak
Singh, towards the decision of the Central Government does not make the decision
Invalid or Illegal. Hence, an establishment is laid down which clearly shows that the
present filed petition does not have a legal and authoritative backing and therefore
should be dismissed.
1.2.
THERE IS NO LEGAL DISPUTE CONCERNED BECAUSE THE FACTS DO NOT
DISCLOSE A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR ARBITRARINESS OR CAPRICIOUS ACT.
The Supreme Court ruling5 is being selectively quoted and in fact, misquoted. The
Supreme Court is clear in the operative part of the Judgement in the year 2010 that
the union government or the president has powers to remove any governor.
The Constitution is very clear that a Governor only holds office during the pleasure of
the president.
And the apex court said that courts will presume the bona fide of the president's
action in removing a Governor.6
The second thing the Supreme Court said is that a Governor who is removed has no
Right to demand that the grounds of his removal be conveyed to him. It states that
4 Ranji Thomas v. Union of India, 2000 (2) SCC 8.
5 Supra, Note 2.
6 Supra, Note 2.
11
there must be a reason for removing a governor on file. But if the governor feels that
the grounds for his removal are mala fide, then he has to make "a very strong case"
before the court proving his removal is capricious and arbitrary. The onus of making
such a case is on the governor who has been removed and not on the government, and
only in such "very strong cases" can the court intervene. There is very limited scope
for judicial review in this matter.
There is nothing on record or even a semblance of suggestion that on any account
whatever the Government at the Centre, its functionaries or the President bore an illwill against Mr Tarak Singh. Simply because no reason has been mentioned in the
impugned order, it cannot be said that the order is arbitrary, capricious or malicious.
Mr Tarak Singh hadnt expressed any grievance or was not sore about his termination
and the petitioner cannot be allowed to make any grievance about it.
In B.P Singhal v. Union of India7, it was stated by the Court:
If the aggrieved person is able to demonstrate prima facie that his removal was either
arbitrary, malafide, capricious or whimsical, the court will call upon the Union
Government to disclose to the court, the material upon which the President had taken
the decision to withdraw the pleasure. If the Union Government does not disclose any
reason, or if the reasons disclosed are found to be irrelevant, arbitrary, whimsical, or
malafide, the court will interfere. However, the court will not interfere merely on the
ground that a different view is possible or that the material or reasons are
insufficient.8
The Supreme Court observed in K.L. Trading Co. Ltd. v. State of Meghalaya9, that to
attract Judicial Review of administration action, the applicant must show that the
administrative action suffers from vice of arbitrariness, unreasonableness and
unfairness. Merely because the Court may feel that the administrative action is not
justified on merit, can be no ground for interference. The Court can only interfere
when the process of making such decision is wrong or suffers from the vice of
arbitrariness, unfairness and unreasonableness.
7 Supra, Note 2.
8 Supra, Note 2, 50.
9 K.L. Trading Co. Ltd. v. State of Meghalaya, AIR 1996 Gau 17.
12
In the present case, it is clearly evident that the President, on the advice of the Central
Government didnt act whimsically and arbitrarily in his decision to remove the
governor, Mr. Tarak Singh. It cant also be clearly made out from the present case that
the President or the Central Government has something against the Governor, Mr.
Tarak Singh. The petitioners has neither framed a strong case nor provided the court
with any Just reason that could prove that the Central Government has acted
unreasonably. Pointing out Random Flaws in the Policies and Decisions based on the
Principals of the Constitutionalism, along with its skilfully framed Articles would do
no help to the Petitioners unless they produce some strong case or evidence in the
Court, which till date, they have failed to.
Supreme Court also observed in a ruling10 that:
But this Court will not sit in appeal over the judgment of the President, nor will the,
Courts determine the weight which should be attached to the evidence. Appreciation
of evidence is entirely left to the President and it is not for the Courts to hold that on
the evidence placed before the President on which the conclusion is founded, if they
were called upon to decide the case they would have reached some other conclusion.11
One may also agree with the reasoning, that removal of the Governor should be for
compelling reasons. Further, there should not be any whimsical or capricious grounds
for removal. However, one may take deviation from the same, where court stated 12
that opportunity of being heard will not be given to Governor while removing him. It
is agreed, that the Doctrine of Fair Hearing is not in itself absolute in nature and is
indeed, subject to some reasonable restrictions.13 The judiciary is the interpreter of the
Constitution and to the judiciary is assigned the delicate task of determining what is
the power conferred on each branch of Government, whether it is limited and if so,
what the limits are and whether any action of that branch transgresses such limits. It is
10 Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter, 1971 AIR 1093.
11 Id. 30.
12<https://www.academia.edu/8233260/B.P._Singhal_V._Union_Of_India_&_Anr_2010_A_
Critical_Analysis.>, accessed on 20th December,2014.
13 A.V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 422, Universal Law Publishing, 10th Ed. 2012; See
also, B. SHIVA RAO, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 243, Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.,
Vol. 6, 2006.
13
for the judiciary to uphold the constitutional values and to enforce the constitutional
limitations.
The extent and depth of Judicial Review will depend upon and vary with reference to
the matter under review. For example, judicial review is permissible in regard to
administrative action, legislations and constitutional amendments. But the extent or
scope of judicial review for one will be different from the scope of judicial review for
the other. Mala fides may be a ground for judicial review of administrative action but
is not a ground for judicial review of legislations or constitutional amendments. For
withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a Minister or an Attorney general, loss of
confidence may be a relevant ground. The Ideology of the Minister or Attorney
General being out of sync with the policies of or ideologies of the Government may
also be a ground. On the other hand, for withdrawal of pleasure in the case of a
Governor, loss of confidence will not be a ground for withdrawal of the pleasure. The
reasons for withdrawal are wider in the case of Ministers and Attorney General, when
compared to Governors. As a result, the judicial review of withdrawal of pleasure, is
limited in the case of a Governor whereas virtually nil in the case of a Minister or an
Attorney General".14
The situation will be clearer once we apply these above arguments into the practical
realm of the case where the Governor of the State of East Land, Mr. Tarak Singh,
asked the President of the nation for hearing his side of the case, which was not
considered by the President. By doing this, the President and the Central Government
did not try to curb his Right to Natural Justice but acted in an Official Manner in
which any Government would have, in their place. No Right is Absolute15 is well
known to every person in this nation especially when that Right is indeed, against the
very mind-set of the framers of the Constitution of the Country. The Central
Government is the ruling party of the nation who are brought into the position with
immense trust and faith by the citizens of the country. So it is the very requirement of
the Central Government that they should act in a manner, so that citizens of the
Country be benefitted out of that. We also need to remember that, nothing is above the
14Against The Judgment in Wp(C) v. Byadvs. Sri. P. Ravindran (Sr.), WA. No. 1832 of 2013,
in WP(C) 28829/2012, 23; Gopalakrishnan v. Chancellor, University of Kerala, 1990 (1)
KLT 681.
15 Id, Note 14.
14
16 Nissan Motors India Private Limited (NMIPL) v. The Competition Commission of India (CCI),
(2014) 5 MLJ 267; Justice P.D. Dinakaran v. Hon'ble Judges Inquiry Committee and Ors., AIR 2011
SC 3711, 113(2012) CLT 215 (SC); See also, GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY OF THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE, 577, OUP 2004; H.M. SEERVAI,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, Universal Publishing Co., 4th Ed., Vol. II, Pg. 5936.
15
Our Constitution is the product of thorough study, deep and mature considerations as
well as extensive Debate and Discussion. It is result of analytic and deliberate
considerations as well as judicious draftsmanship on the part of the framers of the
Constitution. The framers of the Indian Constitution were not writing on a clean slate.
They had before them the working of the Governments under the Government of
India Acts of 1919 and 1935. While framing the Constitution they were also
influenced by geographical considerations, historical necessities as well as cultural
and social diversities. The very fact that, it is not a product of a political revolution,
but of the research and political deliberations of a body of eminent Representatives of
the people who sought to improve upon the existing system of administration of the
country.
2.1 PURVIEW OF THE ARTICLE 163 AND THE RELATION WITH THE EXECUTIVE
FUNCTIONS.
The present circumstances arising between the Governor and the State Government,
forcing the State Governments in demanding the abolition of the office of the
Governor. It stressed however, the point needs to be reemphasized is that the
Governor should act in his discretion in rare and exceptional circumstances. It
becomes his moral and legal duty to uphold the supremacy of the Constitution. Since
the Centre has given the appointments, it tries the office to protect its interest.
Shri Jawaharlal Nehru and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar expressed in the Constituent Assembly
that:
Shri Nehru said:
But on the whole it probably would be desirable to have people from outside
eminent people, sometimes people who have not taken too great a part in politics
he would nevertheless represent before the public someone slightly above the party
and thereby, in fact, help that government more than if he was considered as part of
the party machine.
16
If the Constitution remains in principle the same as we intend that it should be, that
the Governor should be a purely constitutional Governor, with no power of
interference in the administration of the province.
Thus on a close reading of the Constituent Assembly Debates17, one would find the
following disclosures:
(I) The intention of the founding fathers was clearly to adopt the route of Doctrine of
Pleasure, instead of impeachment or enquiry, with regard to removal of Governors.
(II) It was assumed that withdrawal of pleasure resulting in removal of the Governor
will be on valid grounds but there was no need to enumerate them in the Article.
The functions of the Governor are essentially political and governed by certain
conventions of a parliamentary system of government. Although he is not bound by
the aid and advice of the Council of the Ministers of the State, in certain matters, but
that does not necessarily means that he can, at large, act on his own discretion and
decide on the policies of the State which has maximum tendencies of affecting the
nearby states too. He is at least required to consult and take advices from the State
Ministers, so concerned, so that the policies can be implemented upto a satisfactory
level and in the interest of the citizens of the state.
In other words, the person concerned is liable to be dismissed without notice and there
is no right of action for wrongful dismissal. This well known rule of English law has
been incorporated in Article 156(1) of the Constitution. The Governor's appointment
and also by necessary implication his removal is during pleasure of the President.
Neither the Presidential order can be challenged in any Court, nor can it be refuted in
any House of State legislature.
Legally the President's order is conclusive. The pleasure condition of a Governor's
term makes any proceeding or procedure or rules of Natural Justice for his removal
unnecessary. The founding fathers in their wisdom provided in Article 61 of the
Constitution for the removal of the President from office by impeachment, but as the
Governor holds office during pleasure of the President, it was not felt necessary to
make separate provision for the removal of the Governor. President enjoys
17 Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Print, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Govt. of India,
20055, Vol. VIII, 2nd June, 1949.
17
The Counsel on behalf of Respondent humbly submits that actually the appellant has
no legal or fundamental right to espouse. In this connection, one can draw his
attention to the judgement of the case of Om Narain Agarwal and others v. Nagar
Palika, Shahjahanpur and others22. Therein the Apex Court was dealing with a case
where persons who were nominated to the Municipal Board and who were to hold the
office during the pleasure of the State Government but not beyond the term of the
Board, challenged the constitutionality of the provision containing the pleasure
doctrine on the ground that it is in violation of Article 14 and 15 of the Constitution.
In the course of the judgment, the Apex Court, inter alia held as follows:
"We are not impressed with the reasoning given by the High Court that the fourth
proviso of Section 9 of the Act23 in any manner deprived the fundamental right of
equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. It is well established that the
right of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution applies to equals and
not to unequals. The nominated members of the Board fall in a different class and
cannot claim equality with the elected members. We are also not impressed with the
argument that there would be a constant fear of removal at the will of the State
Government and is bound to demoralise the nominated members in the discharge of
their duties as a member in the Board. We do not find any justification for drawing
such an inference, inasmuch as, and such contingency usually arises only with the
change of ruling party in the Government. Even in the case of functionary in the
Government like the Governors, the Ministers, the Attorney General and the Advocate
General discharge their duties efficiently, though removable at the pleasure of the
competent authority under the law, and it cannot be said that they are bound to
demoralise or remain under a constant fear of removal and as such do not discharge
their functions in a proper manner during the period they remain in the office."
One would, therefore, contend that the nominated members cannot be treated as
employees who may be entitled to continue for a definite term. The condition of the
22 Om Narain Agarwal and others v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur and others, 1993 2 SCC
242.
23 United Provinces Municipalities Act, 1916.
19
The Governor can be dismissed by the President without assigning any reason. 31
Hence, since Article 156 of the Constitution is not couched with the similar qualifying
words of immunity granted to Government servants under Article 310 of the
Constitution, therefore, "withdrawal of the pleasure" comes in to operation no sooner
it is withdrawn resulting in dismissal, removal or transfer of the office of Governor
without observing the principle of "Audi Alteram Partem" as this maxim has no
application. On the other hand, the maxim "Salus-Populi-Supreme-Lex" applies,
which means welfare of the people is supreme is also applicable.32
Under clause (3) of Article 156, it is apparent that five year term is subject to exercise
of pleasure by president and the president is the best judge to decide as to when and in
what circumstances the term of a sitting governor should be reduced or he may be
asked to vacate his office. No reason need be given for exercising the pleasure and he
need not be heard.33
If the foregoing term of a Governor were fixed term, the condition of his holding
office during Presidential pleasure would, be a redundancy. The essence of his term is
the Presidential pleasure, and not the duration of limit of five years. This is amply
borne out by a reference to the Constituent Assembly Debates.34 The idea of a fixed
mandatory term and for that matter the idea of an irremovable Governor was not
approved or accepted by the Constitution. The mode of an elected and consequently,
an irremovable Governor was not deliberately adopted by the framers. It was thought
that an appointed or nominated Governor holding office during Presidential pleasure
would remove a source of possible separatist tendencies.
3.2 DEBATE REGARDING NATURE OF THE POST OF THE GOVERNOR
cases of high functionaries including President, Chief Justice and Judges of the
Supreme Court and those of the High Courts, but no such provision exists in case of
those functionaries who hold office during pleasure of President. If a Governor should
be irremovable during his five years term, while President, can be removed following
his impeachment in Parliament an irremovable Governor of a State holding office
during pleasure of the president would be an anomaly. He would endanger executive
efficiency, Union-State relations and might be possibly the focal point of separatist
tendencies. Even the learned counsel for the Petitioner would not want so. He readily
concedes that there can be a situation in which removal or dismissal of a Governor
might become justified in the national interest.
It would be wrong to construe the Art.156 by saying that Cl. (3) controls Cl. (1) of the
Article. The correct construction is just the opposite. It is expressly stated that Cl. (3)
is subject to Cl. (1). This means that five years term is subject to the exercise of
pleasure by the President. He may in exercise of pleasure cut short the term. The
Presidential pleasure is contemplated the Article is unjusticiable. It may be pointed
that where any regulatory restriction for the exercise at pleasure is contemplated, such
a provision could have been made in express words, as is the case with Art.311 in
relation to pleasure under Art.310. In the absence of any like regulatory provision and
its unqualified character, no restriction can be placed upon it.
The interpretation suggested by the learned counsel that the term of the office of
Governor cannot be reduced, if accepted, will have the effect of making Cl. (1) of
Art.156 otiose. It is also likely to create insurmountable difficulties for the country.
As for instance, in Assam, which stands surrounded by foreign countries like China,
Burma etc. and a narrow 30 miles corridor connect it with the rest of the country. If
the party in power of the State and the Governor decide to secede and integrate with
China, the President of India cannot be asked by a Court of Law to wait for five years
in not terminating the terms of the Governor or recall him earlier. Articles of the
Constitution are required to be given harmonious interpretation. A look at the debates
in the Constituent Assembly will show that one of the reasons, which weighed with
our founding fathers, was not to have the elected Governors, as this method would
encourage separatist tendency. The stability and the unity of the Government
24
The third limb of the same argument is that it is the requirement of law that every
executive action must be accompanied by reasons and should be free from
arbitrariness. The decision of the Central Government in removing the Governor of
the State of East Land is not arbitrary because this was taken and executed under the
prescribed rules and guidelines of the Constitution.
Neither Art.156 nor Art.160 enjoins on the President duty to give explicit reasons
while issuing orders under them. The President of India is the best Judge to decide as
to when and in what circumstances the term of sitting Governor of a State should be
reduced or he may be asked to vacate the office or may be transferred from one place
to another. It is not the requirement of Art.156 that a person who holds the office at
the pleasure of the President shall be removed by a speaking order. In a humble
opinion, it is tried to establish that the reasons are not required to be disclosed.
The point is undisputed that the Governor is not an employee either of the President
or of the Union Government. He is a Constitutional functionary. Obviously the
Governor is also the medium through whom Union keeps itself informed as to
whether the State is complying with the directives issued by the Union from time to
time. However, after promulgation of a proclamation on the failure of the
constitutional machinery in the State, the Governor acts as agent of the President. As
regards those functions of the State Government, which have been assumed by the
President under the proclamation Art.356(1)(a), it is obvious that in matters on which
the Governor is empowered to act in his discretion or on his special responsibility, the
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Governor will be under the complete control of the President. Art.371 (2) provides
that President may direct that the Governor of Maharashtra or Gujarat shall have a
special responsibility for taking steps for the development of certain areas in the State
such as Vidharb, Saurashtra etc. Similarly, the Governor of Nagaland under Art.371
(1) (B) has similar responsibilities with respect to law and order in the State. Special
responsibilities have also been imposed upon the Governors of Manipur and Sikkim.
In discharge of such responsibilities, the Governor has to act according to the
directions issued by the President from time to time and if anyone of the above noted
Governors flout the directions of the President aided by the Council of Ministers, it
cannot be said that the intention of the Constitution is that the President should feel
helpless and should not remove the Governor of that State prior to the expiry of the
term of five years.
Long discussion was carried on in the Constituent Assembly regarding the term of
appointment of the Governor and his removability. Ultimately Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
observed that this power of removal was given to the President in general terms. This
was so; although Prof. Shah wanted that certain grounds should be stated in the
Constitution itself for the removal of the Governor. Therefore, it seems obvious to Dr.
Ambedkar that when the President is given the general power, he is also given power
to remove a Governor for corruption, for bribery, for violation of Constitution or for
any other reason which the President, no doubt, feels is legitimate ground, for the
removal of the Governor. It seems, therefore, quite unnecessary to burden the
Constitution with all these details in express terms. When it is perfectly possible for
the President to act upon any one or more ground under the formula, I should think
that it is unnecessary to categorise the conditions under which the President may
undertake the task of removing the Governor. The President in the present case has
acted in this general power and completely acted within the purview of his
constitutional powers. Merely not notifying the Governor about the removal, when the
Doctrine of pleasure is absolute in the country, is not a proof of ill-will or arbitrariness
on the part of the President or the central government.
The power of removal has been left in the hand of the highest Constitutional
functionary of the Union of India: and a presumption under S. 114 of the Evidence Act
does arise that an official act must have been done in the manner it ought to have
been done. No fact or data has been mentioned in the Proposition or placed before this
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Court on the basis of whom it can be said that the President while passing the
impugned order, acted capriciously, arbitrarily or maliciously. Mere averment of the
word 'capricious' or 'malicious' in the argument is not sufficient. Necessary details are
required to be mentioned. Thus, there is nothing on record or even a semblance of
suggestion that on any account whatever the Government at the Centre, its
functionaries or the President bore an ill-will against Mr. Tarak Singh. Simply because
no reason has been mentioned in the impugned order, it cannot be said that the order
is arbitrary, capricious or malicious. Nowhere in the proposition, has it been
mentioned that Shri Tarak Singh had expressed any grievance or was sore about his
termination and therefore, the petitioner cannot be allowed to make any grievance
about it. The Court also considered the recommendation of the Sarkaria
Commission35 and the Consultation Paper on Institution of Governor under the
Constitution36 published by the National Commission to Review the Working of the
Constitution, both of which have made a strong case for reading in detailed guidelines
into Article 156. However, while noting these recommendations, the Court, in a
refreshing act of judicial economy, observed:
These recommendations howsoever logical, or deserving consideration and
acceptance, remain recommendations. They cannot override the express provisions of
the Constitution as they stand. Nor can they assist in interpreting Article 156. The
very fact that such recommendations are made, shows that the position under the
existing Constitutional provisions is otherwise. They are suggestions to be considered
by those who can amend the Constitution. They do not assist in interpreting the
existing provisions of the Constitution.
Therefore, it is humbly submitted that, if there is no disclosure of the reason, there is
no purpose of the need of the reason and therefore, the principal of Doctrine of
Pleasure stands unfettered and undisputed and the Central Government in removing
the Governor has not exercised its power arbitrarily and therefore did not violate the
Due Process of Law.
37 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, 1999; Laundy, Philip, Parliaments in the Modern
World, Dartmouth 1989; Sorensen, A., Election without Democracy: Process and prospects in
a Changing World, 3rd Ed., West View Press 2002; UNDP/IPU, Global Parliamentary Report:
the Changing Nature of Parliamentary Representation, Denmark, 2012.
38 6, Moot proposition.
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Such an approach (as taken by the Governor, in the present context) towards vital
political questions of the day can only lead to Public Confusion and Legislative
Chaos. Decisions of this nature should be based upon and measured against certain
basic principles regarding the proper role of government. If principles are correct,
then they can be applied to any specific proposal with confidence.
Are there not, in reality, underlying, universal principles with reference to which all
issues must be resolved, whether the society be simple or complex in its mechanical
organization? It seems to the counsel on behalf the respondent that we could relieve
ourselves of most of the bewilderment which so unsettles and distracts us by
subjecting each situation to the simple test of right and wrong. Right and wrong as
moral principles do not change. They are applicable and reliable determinants
whether the situations with which we deal are simple or complicated. There is always
a right and wrong to every question which requires our solution.41
Unlike the political opportunist, the true statesman values principle above
popularity, and works to create popularity for those political principles
which are wise and just.
Hence, it is pleaded and humbly submitted that the Central government
has acted reasonably within the framework of the Constitutional Policies
and therefore did not compromised on the dignity of the Governor Office
and acted in the interest and benefits of the citizens of the State of East
Land.
-PRAYER-
39 7, Moot Proposition.
40 6, Moot Proposition.
41 Albert E. Bowen, Prophets, Principles and National Survival, Pg. 21-22.
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In Light of the Issues raised, arguments advanced and Authorities cited. It is most
humbly and respectfully submitted that this Honourable Court may adjudge and
declare that:
1) The PIL is not maintainable before the Federal Court of Indus Land.
2) The Governor has not discharged his responsibility in accordance with the
Constitutional Scheme.
3) The Central Government in removing the Governor has not exercised its power
arbitrarily and therefore did not violate the due process of law.
4) The Central Government has not lowered the honour and dignity of the office of
the Governor.
Also, the Counsel on Behalf of Respondent prays before the Honourable Federal
Court for dismissing the Plea for the Restoration of the Governor.
The Court may also be pleased to pass any other order, which this Honourable Court
may deem fit in light of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
All of which is respectfully affirmed and submitted.
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