The International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol.

3, 2009, 4968,
doi: 10.1093/ijtj/ijn043
Advance Access publication: 31 January 2009

Reshaping Civil Society through a Truth

Commission: Human Rights in
Moroccos Process of Political Reform
Luke Wilcox

Observers of Moroccan politics have debated extensively the significance of the countrys
top-down liberalization. At this point, there is no definitive verdict on palace-guided reforms, such as the recent Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER). Rather, these reforms have left an ambiguous legacy. This article uses the IER a truth commission established in 2004 to examine past human rights abuses, compensate victims and ensure
nonrepetition as an analytical tool to understand how transitional justice carried out as
a strategic measure of top-down liberalization can reshape the relationship between civil
society and the state. While the monarchys reform efforts in Morocco have not (as of yet)
led to a civil society capable of supporting a stable democratic transition, the article argues
that these efforts have increased civil societys expectations of gaining capacity and space
to implement ethical goals and demands. Greater expectations, in turn, have altered how
the monarchy must calculate its survival strategy.

Introduction
The Moroccan monarchy has long known and exploited the fact that Morocco,
like many developing countries, has a number of entrenched social divisions. Ideological differences between secularist and Islamist,2 and a system of patronage
and corruption that encourages inequality between social classes continue to be
useful strategically for the monarchy. King Mohamed VI has also realized, however,

Graduate Program in International Relations and Religion, Boston University, USA. Email:
lukewilcox10@gmail.com
This article is based on interviews and research conducted in preparation for and during a
trip to Rabat, Morocco, made possible by the Department of International Relations at Boston
University. The author thanks Wilfrid Rollman for his extensive support; Abdelhay Moudden
and the Center for Cross-Cultural Learning in Rabat for enabling the interviews; and all those
who were interviewed, in particular Abdelhay Moudden, Mohamed Soual, Mohamed Berdouzi,
Abderrazzak Rouwane and Aboubakr Jamai. The author also thanks Charles Dunbar and Augustus
Richard Norton for reviewing an earlier draft. Finally, the author thanks the anonymous reviewers
and the editors of the International Journal of Transitional Justice for their helpful comments and
patience.
The term Islamist will be used broadly, describing someone who combines political activism with
a desire to make the state and society more in tune with a particular interpretation of Islam. The
author will generally distinguish between Islamists who have shown a commitment to nonviolence
and those who use violence by designating violent Islamists as extremist or radical. Because Islam
is so closely tied with traditional political power in Morocco the king is officially Commander
of the Faithful and a descendant of the Prophet and there is widespread popular support for the
state to remain Islamic, few political actors can seriously embrace secularism.


C The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

For Permissions, please email journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org.

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

Abstract1

50 L. Wilcox

that these lines separate social groups not only from each other but also from him
and his vision for Morocco.3 In his first national address as Moroccos king, he
emphasized the need
to achieve reconciliation and co-operation by overcoming the negative aspects of the
present and looking forward to the future, on the basis of our rich common history,
our civilization and culture and our true religion.4

4
5
6

See, for example, John P. Entelis, The Democratic Imperative vs. the Authoritarian Impulse: The
Maghrib State between Transition and Terrorism, Middle East Journal 59(4) (2005): 537558.
Entelis writes that the Maghrib state lacks ideological hegemony [in a Gramscian sense] that
would enable it to forge a historic social bloc that accepts the legitimacy of the ruling stratum
(p. 541).
Excerpts from King Mohammed VIs Address, BBC Monitoring, 31 July 1999, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/408513.stm.
Shana Cohen and Larabi Jaidi, Morocco: Globalization and Its Consequences (New York: Routledge,
2006).
Thomas Omestad, The Casbah Connection: Why Morocco Is Producing Some of the Worlds Most
Feared Terrorists, U.S. News and World Report, 1 May 2005, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/
articles/050509/9morocco.htm (accessed 9 January 2009).
Although the IER revealed and documented a significant number of human rights abuses committed by the government, many observers have criticized its results as partial and incomplete, and
have questioned whether it in fact meets the definition of a truth commission. These criticisms
are examined below.
Legitimacy here is understood simply as the popular acceptance of a government and its right to
rule.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

Such reconciliation, it turns out, has been hard to come by.

In May 2003, four years after Mohamed VI ascended the throne, 12 Moroccan
suicide bombers asserted an extreme rejection of the monarchys vision for the
country, killing themselves and 33 others in Casablanca. The attacks shocked and
angered most, but they also demonstrated that Morocco is not exempt from the
contradictions of liberalization and modernization;5 that is, increased radicalism
occurring alongside more freedom of expression and openness. For the suicide
bombers, most of whom came from neglected slums outside of Casablanca, a
modernity so visible and yet unattainable breeds frustration . . . The attitude is,
If modernity is rejecting me, Ill reject it.6 For Mohamed VI, the projects of
liberalization and modernization that have largely defined his nine-year rule have
neither created a consensus on the appropriate direction of national development
nor achieved the reconciliation he desired.
This article asserts, however, that these projects have had mixed, rather than
unsuccessful, results. Reforms such as the Equity and Reconciliation Commission
(lInstance Equite et Reconciliation, or IER) a truth commission7 established in
2004 that was designed (officially) to examine past human rights abuses, compensate victims and ensure nonrepetition of such abuses have left an ambiguous
legacy. The IER represented a real, albeit incomplete and contested, step toward
greater respect for basic human rights. As such, the Commission increased the
monarchys legitimacy in some social and political sectors at home and abroad,8

Reshaping Civil Society through a Truth Commission

51

A Framework for Analyzing Transitional Justice

in Morocco
Civil Society and Human Rights
Although the term civil society has a long history and has been defined in many
ways,13 recently it has come to be identified with democracy and democratization.
Many practitioners and academics, including in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA), see it as key to processes of political reform and development.14 In a
typical modern definition, civil society is where a melange of associations, clubs,

9
10
11

12

13
14

Personal interview, Abdelhay Moudden, Rabat, Morocco, 30 May 2007.

By ethical goals and demands the author means the individual and group purposes or ideal ends
that various actors seek to realize in public space in Morocco.
The author understands public space to be any place beyond the private sphere of individual and
primordial ties where members of the larger society interact with each other and with the state.
For a discussion of civil society, public space and political transition in Morocco, see, James N.
Sater, Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco (London: Routledge, 2007).
The author conducted 10 interviews in Rabat, Morocco, from 2030 May 2007 with IER members,
government employees, human rights activists and journalists. Because the IER was a top-down
measure established by the monarchy, the author chose to interview professionals engaged and
interacting with the government.
For an overview of the history and development of the idea of civil society, see, Adam B. Seligman,
The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Free Press, 1992).
See, for example, Augustus Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, vol. 1 (Leiden,
NY: E.J. Brill, 1995).

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

and began to chip away at Moroccans deeply entrenched distrust of the state.9
Using the IER, a transitional justice institution, as an analytical tool, this article
examines how top-down liberalization has reshaped the relationship between
civil society and the state in Morocco.
In particular, the article argues that although the IER (and top-down liberalization in general) has not led to explicit and deep political reform in Morocco, it
has created greater expectations among some social actors for increased political
power to implement ethical goals and demands.10 Greater expectations for power
and a growing desire within civil society to exercise control over public space,11 in
turn, have altered how the monarchy must calculate its survival strategy and has
expanded possibilities for future reform (and future instability). To support this
argument, the article first develops a framework of transitional justice, including
the two major dynamics involved in the IER: a civil society that holds diverse and
changing concepts of human rights, and top-down liberalization as a strategic
transition guided by those in power to open public space to greater contestation.
A detailed analysis of the IERs operations follows, drawing on texts published
by the IER, personal interviews12 and available academic and media sources. The
conclusion sums up the argument, probes the likelihood that a more directly
political sequel an IER, part two will occur and reflects on the IERs larger
implications.

52 L. Wilcox

15
16

17
18

19
20

Ibid., 7.
This distinction is taken from Abdou Filali-Ansary, State, Society and Creed: Reflections on the
Maghreb, in Civil Society in the Muslim World: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Amyn B. Sajoo
(London: Islamic Publications, 2002). The term civil society as used in this article refers to
descriptive civil society unless otherwise stated.
Norton, supra n 14 at 12.
While these ideas of civility, citizenship and democracy may seem western, they are contestable
and flexible enough to fit with cultures that are themselves plural. The challenge for those wishing
to see real reform is getting those who already argue for the use of these ideas to be accepted within
their societies. For an argument for their use in the Arab world, see, United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World
(2005). For a recent overview of Moroccos civil society, see, Driss Khrouz, A Dynamic Civil
Society, Journal of Democracy 19(1) (2008): 4249.
Augustus Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East, vol. 2 (Leiden, NY: E.J. Brill, 1996),
56.
Susan Waltz, Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995), 225. See also, Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in
Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties and groups come together to provide
a buffer between state and citizen.15 This melange operates in a public space that,
while theoretically neutral, is always governed by rules of association, such as the
necessity of tolerating diverse and opposing ideologies.
It is helpful here to distinguish between descriptive and normative definitions
of civil society.16 A descriptive definition includes the whole melange, regardless
of the ideologies of individual organizations. Normative definitions, meanwhile,
delineate certain criteria that organizations must meet to qualify as members of
civil society. One criterion is often said to be the concept of civility, or a tolerance for
dissenting viewpoints and recognition of the profoundly important idea that there
is no right answer.17 Another criterion often said to be a normative component
of civil society is citizenship, which generally includes the contestable rights and
responsibilities that define a contract between state and society.
The normative idea of a melange of groups operating in a public space governed
by the rules of civility and citizenship and representing the interests of society to the
state underpins the concept and possibility of democracy. In trying to understand
the effects of top-down liberalization (and transitional justice as a clear component
of this liberalization) on Moroccos civil society, this article seeks to understand
how the more open associative life resulting from liberalization has or has not
moved toward the normative underpinnings that support democracy.18
For many, democracy and a normative civil society must be accompanied by
human rights. While the role of the state as referee, law-giver, and policer of
civil society is important, human rights assure that the state also does not have
a license for reckless, arbitrary or gratuitously harmful behavior.19 Essentially,
the boundary between state and society and the rules governing this boundary are defined by the legal and popular concept of human rights. Without human rights, or without guarantees of civil and political rights, citizen has little
meaning.20

Reshaping Civil Society through a Truth Commission

53

Top-Down Liberalization as a Strategy of Security

Top-down liberalization is defined here as an instrumental political strategy of
those in power to initiate and control real but partial (and mostly social) reforms
in order to buttress the legitimacy and stability of the current power structure. In
Morocco, reforms in the areas of human rights, womens rights and press freedom
have had real social impact, but final political power still resides in the monarchy,
which is untrammeled by constitutional provisions and institutional checks and
balances.26 Top-down liberalization has opened new public space, with altered
rules governing both ethical and political contestation,27 but the borders around
21
22
23

24
25
26
27

See, for example, Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, ed. Amy Gutmann
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
John R. Wallach, Human Rights as an Ethics of Power, in Human Rights in the War on Terror,
ed. Richard Ashby Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 108.
For example, Islamist and liberal womens rights movements in Morocco both describe their goals
as based on the essential qualities of humankind but differ on what these qualities are and what
they mean in practice. Cohen and Jaidi, supra n 5 at 6.
Wallach, supra n 22 at 132.
Ibid., 129.
Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, Morocco: From Top-Down Reform to Democratic Transition? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Article No. 71 (September 2006), 7.
By ethical contestation the author means the competition in public space to assert individual and
group purposes; that is, to realize various ideal ends. Political contestation refers to a more general
question of who gets to govern the distribution of resources and why, which is related to the ethical
contest.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

While human rights can limit the states action, a political perspective emphasizes
that human rights are often used to support political power.21 For John Wallach,
human rights are an ethics of power, both a sign of immutable morality and a
practical tool of particular political actors.22 In other words, various actors use
the language of human rights to justify political action, claiming to base particular
political goals on universal human rights.23 Because of this cooption of human
rights, it is important to clarify the political role of human rights within the above
normative definition of civil society. Wallach identifies this role as an ethics of
the governed that devolves power to individuals and to local elements of society
to control social and historical change and to realize particular ethical goals. An
ethics of the governed highlights democratic agency as the primary vehicle of
contemporary justice.24
Transference of political power to the governed, of course, would entail a loss
of power for the monarchy. According to many observers of Moroccan politics, the
king has pursued top-down liberalization and withdrawn, to some extent, from
public space precisely to avoid having to relinquish real political power. Under this
strategy, the monarchys definition of human rights can perhaps be described as an
ethics of security25 that posits security and stability (rather than political empowerment) as the basic rights of Moroccan society. In the tradition of Thomas Hobbes,
this ethics justifies a strong state and a stable political order as necessary to protect
the right of individual security from others with dangerous and competing goals.

54 L. Wilcox

28

29

30

31

32

33

On the relationship between top-down liberalization and democratization in the Middle East, see,
Daniel Brumberg, Liberalization versus Democracy, in Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy
in the Middle East, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2005); Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, eds.,
Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, vol. 1 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
1995).
At the American-Moroccan Youth Dialogue on Democracy and Security in Rabat, Morocco, on 25 May 2007, Lahcen Haddad of the Mouvement Populaire party asserted that
the king has initiated top-down reforms in response to the agendas of various civil society
organizations.
See, Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, Waiting for Godot: Regime Change without
Democratization in the Middle East, International Political Science Review 25(4) (2004): 371392;
Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1977).
According to Haddad, a major obstacle to democratization in Morocco is the absence of a wide array
of groups that see themselves as stakeholders in democracy. Haddad, supra n 29. See also, Marina
Ottaway, The Missing Constituency for Democratic Reform, in Uncharted Journey: Promoting
Democracy in the Middle East, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, 2005).
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recently reported, In what may be a
telling sign of their political inclinations, members of the business community have declined to
advertise in news articles and magazines that demand quicker reforms. CSIS, The U.S., the EU
and Middle East Reform: What Can We Learn from Morocco? (March 2006), 7.
Michael McFaul and Tamara Cofman Wittes, The Limits of Limited Reform, Journal of Democracy
19(1) (2008): 1933.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

this space securely cordon off the institution of the monarchy and its core political
power.28
The monarchys retention of ultimate political power means that, to some extent, it can stall and reverse the process of liberalization at will. Nevertheless,
both a rulers initial decision to liberalize and later decision to continue or reverse the process respond to the rulers relationship with civil society.29 Although
compliance can be obtained from civil society through various practices of coercion and co-option, rulers know that, in the long run, a base of legitimacy
provides significantly greater stability and security.30 Thus, rulers will respond to
civil society to obtain what legitimacy they can, but will do everything possible
to keep civil society from becoming both united and strongly pro-reform. This
is why top-down reform has rarely succeeded in inducing those in power to respond to demands for deep political reform. Those elements of civil society that
make these demands do not represent a large or powerful enough constituency
to present a threat that cannot be cowed with intimidation or coopted with
patronage.31
In Morocco civil society remains divided, with many elements, such as business
associations, supporting the status quo while others push for reform.32 The question that stalled liberalization begs one that has been asked by many observers
of Moroccan politics,33 yet remains without a definitive answer is whether limited, top-down openings have created or will ever create decisive momentum for
bottom-up reform pressure.

Reshaping Civil Society through a Truth Commission

55

Defining Transitional Justice in Morocco

34
35

36

37

Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

See, for example, the definition given by Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, who follow the
bulk of the literature in focusing on transitions to liberal democracy. Eric A. Posner and
Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, Harvard Law Review 117(3) (2004):
768.
For example, Driss Ksikes, the former editor of the Moroccan journals Tel Quel and Nichane, was
recently sentenced to a suspended three-year jail term for publishing an article about popular
Moroccan jokes that was deemed offensive to Islam. Personal interview, Mchanna Abdellah,
Maghreb Arabe Presse, Rabat, Morocco, 28 May 2007.
For a discussion of the ambiguous foundations of formal political authority in Morocco, see,
Abdeslam Maghraoui, Political Authority in Crisis: Mohammed VIs Morocco, Middle East Report
218 (2001), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer218/218 maghraoui.html.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

Transitional justice generally refers to the variety of tools (such as truth commissions) used by societies to address widespread past human rights abuses within a
context of political transformation. By transition, the literature means, minimally,
political transformation spanning two regimes.34 Most definitions go further, referring to a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule or from intense
conflict to (relative) peace.35 In Morocco, however, the IER did not occur alongside regime change or institutional political reform. Rather, it occurred as a central
component of a regimes larger strategy of top-down liberalization. Ideas of justice
in Moroccos transition respond to and address past human rights abuses, but the
transition (guided by a king who retains ultimate political power) severely limits
how these ideas can be implemented. As a number of would-be reformers have
discovered, social ideas (such as press freedom)36 can become formal law only if
the king wills them to be so.
A more precise description of transitional justice in Moroccos context could be
conceptualized as the redefining of dominant (civil) society ideas of human rights
and justice in public space, outside of the formal political sphere but still politically
important and transformative. In other words, the IER process was a negotiation
between civil society and the monarch sometimes cooperative, sometimes adversarial over the shifting social ground on which Moroccos political structures
are founded.37 At a basic level, the IER was a struggle over the meaning of human
rights in Morocco.
On a larger level, Moroccos experience of transitional justice can perhaps offer
insights into important questions about future applications of transitional justice
around the world. For example, can transitional justice that occurs primarily in
public space on ethical and social levels lead to institutional political change?
Should transitional justice mechanisms be used in other contexts where, as in
Morocco, the power imbalance has led to only instrumental, gradual reform rather
than deep political transition? The conclusion of this article explores answers to
these questions, but, first, the article examines the IERs operation as an example
of transitional justice carried out within top-down liberalization.

56 L. Wilcox

The IER as Top-Down Liberalization: Creating

Possibilities for Civil Society or Simply Burnishing the
Monarchys Image
Creation of the IER

38
39

40

41
42
43
44

For an account of the social and political legacy left by Hassan II, see, Abdeslam Maghraoui,
Monarchy and Political Reform in Morocco, Journal of Democracy 12(1) (2001): 7386.
Exacerbating this distrust were Hassan IIs repeated denials of widespread past human rights
abuses. See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Moroccos Truth Commission: Honoring
Past Victims during an Uncertain Present (November 2005), 8.
For example, the widely read Notre Ami le Roi was published in 1990, containing details about
Hassan IIs human rights abuses. Gilles Perrault, Notre Ami le Roi (Paris: Gallimard, 1990). Also
in 1990, Amnesty International published a report titled Morocco: Disappearances of People of
Western Saharan Origin, which detailed abuses that had occurred in the infamous Tazmamart
prison.
Veerle Opgenhaffen and Mark Freeman, Transitional Justice in Morocco: A Progress Report (New
York: International Center for Transitional Justice, November 2005), 8.
See, John Entelis, Morocco: Democracy Denied, Le Monde Diplomatique (October 2002).
Personal interview, Mohamed Soual, vice-president of the Ethics and Good Governance Committee of the General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises, Rabat, Morocco, 23 May 2007.
On the alternance government and Hassan IIs strategy of cooption, see, Catherine Sweet, Democratization without Democracy: Political Openings and Closures in Modern Morocco, Middle
East Report 218 (2001): 2225.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

The roots of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission can be traced to former
King Hassan IIs initiation of liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s.38 The
creation of the Consultative Council of Human Rights (CCDH) in 1990 represented
one of the first official acknowledgments by the monarchy that its history of human
rights abuses had created a problematic distrust of the state among Moroccans.39 In
addition, the new council was a response to increasing domestic and international
awareness and criticism of the monarchys human rights violations.40
Following the establishment of the CCDH, a number of events laid the ground
for the creation of the IER. One such event was the release of 330 disappeared
persons in 1991, which helped to break the silence around claims of abuse, and
provided a rare glimpse into the world of Moroccos secret detention centers.41
In 1997, the alternance [sic] government,42 headed by the formerly exiled Abderrahmane al-Youssoufi, marked the first time the opposition led the national
government. According to Mohamed Soual, one of the alternation governments
goals was to reach reconciliation and build a common future.43 As a sign of political will at the highest level to allow the opposition (i.e., the leftists) some political
power, the alternation government marked a significant benchmark in the reform
process. As a stratagem to bring the opposition into the national government
without allowing these groups access to the palaces inner chambers of power, the
alternation government was typical of the monarchys instrumental liberalization
strategy, which sought (and seeks) to gain legitimacy and stave off the need for real
reform.44

Reshaping Civil Society through a Truth Commission

57

a deal of historic importance to the monarchy: They would collaborate with the
regime and even support an amnesty of their former torturers and their superiors on
the condition that the throne would strongly pursue democratization. They saw the
TRC [IER] as a tool to give new impetus to democratization by publicly denouncing past
systemic violations of human rights and recommending broad institutional reforms.
They believed the domestic system could be reformed from within.49

Mohamed VI approved the CCDH proposal, giving the IER four mandates: unveiling the truth; redressing damages and restoring dignity; offering recommendations and guarantees for the prevention and nonrecurrence of violations; and

45
46
47
48
49

HRW, supra n 39 at 10.

Ibid., 11.
Waltz, supra n 20 at 33.
HRW, supra n 39 at 11.
Pierre Hazan, Morocco: Betting on a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace, July 2006), 3.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

In 1999, Hassan II signed a CCDH recommendation that he establish a panel

to compensate victims of past government abuses. He died two weeks later, and
his son, Mohamed VI, initiated the Independent Arbitration Panel. The panel was
charged with receiving applications for compensation from victims of disappearances (or their survivors) and of arbitrary detention, and determining the
amount of compensation the state should pay them.45 Although it compensated
nearly 3,700 victims, the panel was heavily criticized by human rights groups and
victims of abuses. Among the most common criticisms were the panels limitation
of compensating only victims of certain categories of abuse; its restriction to financial compensation and inability to uncover the truth of abuses or the identity
of perpetrators of abuses; and its requirement that applicants for compensation
agree before the process to accept the panels decisions as final.46 Despite these
criticisms, the panel helped create potential for further human rights and reform
measures by setting a precedent for state recognition of past human rights abuses.
For pro-reform civil society actors, the kings commitment to at least some reform
presented a strategic dilemma. Had the monarchy shown enough good will to merit
trust and belief in the possibility of producing real reform via cooperative action?
Or would the monarchy never be willing to relinquish real power, making any end
goal of democratic transition just another illusion created by palace magicians?
According to Susan Waltz, some degree of the success of human rights groups in
North Africa can be attributed to their professional membership base and ability
to secure hearings for their concerns behind the closed doors of government.47
A number of human rights activists and former political prisoners in Morocco
apparently agree with Waltzs assessment. These activists worked with the CCDH
to present the king with a proposal in 2003 to establish the IER to address the
issues of disappearances and arbitrary detention.48 The activists, including the
late Driss Benzekri, chairman of the IER, offered

58 L. Wilcox

reconciliation.50 These mandates, the activities they entailed and the degree of
their success are examined below.

Unveiling the Truth and Transforming Public Memory and Space?

50
51

52
53

54
55
56
57

Presentation by Mr. Driss Benzekri: The Commissions Activities in the Period between January
7, 2004, and April 12, 2004, IER (23 April 2004), http://ier.ma/article.php3?id article=1307.
See, for example, Dahir Approving Statutes of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission, IER
(10 April 2004), http://ier.ma/article.php3?id article=1395; The Speech of His Majesty the King
Mohamed VI, IER, http://ier.ma/article.php3?id article=1297.
Mandates and Tasks, IER, http://ier.ma/article.php3?id article=1305.
According to the Commission, Turning the page on the past and building a modern and democratic
state and society in which rights and duties are respected is first and foremost a social issue that
engages all Moroccans. IER, Summary of the Final Report (Casablanca: Imprimerie Najah al-Jadida,
2006), 32.
Ibid., 11.
Ibid., 12.
Ahmed El Amraoui, Morocco to Address Past Abuses, AlJazeera.net, 17 December 2005,
http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2005/12/20084101519970283.html.
Teitel, supra n 34 at 8.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

Mohamed VI mentioned in several speeches and proclamations that he considers

the IER a truth commission.51 Officially, the mandate to unveil the truth meant
uncovering and recording past human rights violations and determining government responsibility for those violations.52 For Mohamed VI, uncovering abuses
under the rule of his father and grandfather was perhaps an opportunity to restore
some trust in the monarchy and dissociate himself from the political negatives of
his fathers rule. For the Commission and those elements of civil society that supported the IER process, uncovering the truth was an important service for victims
and their families, a start toward reconciliation (understood here as building a
normative civil society)53 and the best available opportunity to hold the monarchy
accountable for its past deeds.
The IERs investigations revealed systematic government use of forced disappearances and arbitrary detention. Of 742 disappeared persons, the Commission determined that 325 had been killed as a result of the excessive use of force
by security forces during riots and that another 173 had died in illegal detention
centers.54 In 66 unresolved cases, the Commission asserted the States responsibility to pursue the investigations to the end of uncovering these victims fate.55 In
cases of arbitrary detention, torture was often perpetrated on victims as a method
of punishment or to obtain a confession. All in all, the IER determined that 9,779
cases of rights abuses had occurred, including deaths and injuries in detention,
extra-judicial killings, forced disappearances, forced exiles and sexual abuse.56
While this presentation of the truth to Moroccan society represented a significant concession by the monarchy and some democratization of Moroccos truth
regime,57 it was also flawed and heavily criticized. One of the most common
criticisms was the inability of victims to name, much less prosecute, those who

Reshaping Civil Society through a Truth Commission

59

committed torture or other crimes against them.58 As Mohamed al-Bukili of the

Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) asked:
What good will it do to just let people speak and then turn the page? Responsibility
should be converted into justice. It is not a question of vengeance; it is nothing personal,
but people who may have committed crimes against humanity should be judged publicly
and fairly.59

58
59
60
61

62

63
64

65

Robin Wright, Dreams and Shadows: The Future of the Middle East (New York: Penguin, 2008).
Ahmed El Amraoui, Morocco Tries to Reconcile Painful Past, AlJazeera.net, 26 April 2005,
http://english.aljazeera.net/archive/2005/04/200849135616342866.html.
See, Dahir Approving Statutes, supra n 51; Hazan, supra n 49.
The Commission stated that cooperation by the security apparatus was erratic; the testimony of
those responsible was sometimes vague, and others refused to cooperate at all. Quoted in Hazan,
supra n 49 at 11.
This criticism has been leveled more generally at national human rights institutions in the Arab
world. See, Moataz el Fegiery, The Effectiveness of Human Rights Commissions, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Arab Reform Bulletin (June 2008).
Opgenhaffen and Freeman, supra n 41.
Mohamed Ahmed Bennis, The Equity and Reconciliation Committee and the Transition Process in Morocco, Arab Reform Initiative (15 January 2007), http://www.arabreform.net/spip.php?article398 (accessed 3 December 2008).
Hazan, supra n 49 at 11.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

This argument sees a Pyrrhic victory in the IERs uncovering of truth similar to
that of civil society in the process of top-down liberalization; that is, although
the monarchy allows increased criticism of the perpetrators of injustice, it ensures
continued immunity for these perpetrators rather than accountability.
A similar criticism was the inability of the Commission to compel state institutions to relinquish requested information and records necessary for the truthgathering process. Although the IERs mandate officially called on state institutions
to support and comply with its requests, no legal mechanism was created to punish state actors who did not comply.60 Predictably, the Commission found that
compliance was often hard to come by.61 Reflecting his dependence on the military
and security organs, the king was unable or unwilling to issue a clear threat of
consequences for noncompliance.
A third criticism of the IER involved the Commissions supposed lack of independence from the regime.62 Created by and reporting to the monarchy, the IER
seemed closely affiliated with the governmental CCDH. The president and half of
the Commissioners, in fact, retained their positions with the CCDH during the
IER process.63 For critics, this close collaboration with the monarchy led to serious
holes in the IERs picture of uncovered truth. As was most evident in politically
sensitive cases such as that of former socialist leader Mehdi Ben Barka, there was
a political, standard symbolic red line that the Committee was not expected to
cross.64 In the case of Ben Barka, the Commission failed to shed any new light
on [his] fate . . . although it is public knowledge that the Moroccan secret services
played a major role in his disappearance in 1965.65

60 L. Wilcox

Reparations
The Commissions second mandate was to offer financial compensation and social
reintegration to those who the truth-seeking process determined to be victims
of state abuses.68 Ahmed Harzani, successor to Benzekri as head of the CCDH,
announced in August 2007 that 11,706 of the victims had received financial
compensation . . . twelve thousand families received medical insurance, while 814
individuals were socially reintegrated and 502 saw the settlement of their administrative files.69 These numbers are significant because reparations help redefine
human rights: Transitional reparatory remedies advance entitlements that seek
to correct violations of rights in the past precisely in order to embed them simultaneously in the future.70
66

67

68
69

70

More obvious evidence of this limitation is that many perpetrators of past human rights abuses
remain in government posts despite the release of their names by AMDH and others. HRW, supra
n 39.
The expression iron curtains is taken from Driss Ksikes, who believes that since 2003 we have
been closing down the window [of press freedom] bit by bit [and] putting up an iron curtain.
Quoted in Joel Campagna and Kamel Labidi, The Moroccan Facade: Politicized court cases, media
laws, harassment undermine a nations press gains, Committee to Protect Journalists (3 July 2007),
http://cpj.org/reports/2007/07/moroccoweb.php.
Presentation by Mr. Driss Benzekri, supra n 50.
Nabil Darwish, Morocco: Retributions for the Past, Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, 11 August 2007,
http://www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=3&id=9856. Moudden also said that more
than 90 percent of victims had received compensation. Personal interview, Abdelhay Moudden,
Rabat, Morocco, 30 May 2007.
Teitel, supra n 34 at 218.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

The most politically sensitive case, of course, involved Hassan II himself. Because
the monarchy is sacred (according to the constitution), truth about its history
cannot be subject to the same democratization as other historical facts. Thus,
the Commission could not directly accuse Hassan II, leaving many unsatisfied
with its analysis of past repression. On the institutional and constitutional levels,
this restriction of truth to the periphery meant that changing conceptions of
justice in Moroccan society lost any direct connection to fundamental political
transformation.66 The lack of any overt institutional reform or accountability
is perhaps the central reason many human rights activists in Morocco (such as
al-Bukili) opposed the IERs strategy.
Ideally, unveiling the truth would represent the first step toward building a
normative civil society capable eventually of institutional reform. However, the
flaws related to impunity in the Commissions mandate throw into question the
extent and nature of any social transformation the IER may have initiated or
aided. The key signs that would indicate the start of such a transformation include
greater participation in national politics, increased civil society cooperation across
ideological lines in order to push more effectively for further political reform and
a decrease in Moroccans sympathy for extremist measures. If these developments
were to occur, it is possible that the monarchy would feel compelled to unveil the
truth behind the iron curtains.67

Reshaping Civil Society through a Truth Commission

61

The process of restoring trust cannot be limited to providing material compensation

or social services, but also has to guarantee the victims, as citizens, their full rights,
including the right to participate in the reform process to advance a state of law and
institutions.75

Even if this definition of reparations as political rights did not develop immediately,
the increased space created by the IER to argue for its redefinition at least signifies
greater possibility for the future.
At present, the socioeconomic situation of many Moroccans remains poor,76
and the monarchy has yet to relinquish any core political power. To the extent that
the monarchy denies or is unable to fulfill the perceived rights of groups seeking
either more equitable socioeconomic development or real power to implement
ethical visions for Moroccan society,77 the partial and limited opening (a window
with iron curtains)78 represented by reparations may increase the susceptibility
of the marginalized to the message of extremists rather than of reformers. In this
event, reparations would make the monarchy less rather than more responsive to
71
72
73
74

75
76

77

78

Personal interview, Mohamed Soual, Rabat, Morocco, 23 May 2007.

IER, supra n 53 at 2728.
Personal interview, Abdellatif Moustaghfir, Rabat, Morocco, 27 May 2007.
On the issue of trust and civil society, see, Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988); Adam B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
IER, supra n 53 at 19.
For example, Morocco ranked just 126th in the 20072008 Human Development Index. United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2007/2008 Report: Morocco HDI Rank 126,
http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data sheets/cty ds MAR.html.
This includes groups such as al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Charity) and the Party of Justice and
Development, two large, nonviolent Islamist groups in Morocco. See, for example, Marvine Howe,
Morocco: The Islamist Awakening and Other Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Ksikes in Campagna and Labidi, supra n 67.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

In the view of the Commission, this logic of reparations was especially relevant
at the level of communities and groups hardest hit by past repression and political
violence.71 Specifically, the Commission recommended the adoption and support
of socio-economic or cultural development plans tailored to a number of cities
(such as Casablanca), and to specific groups (namely women), and regions.72
By seeking socioeconomic empowerment for these communities and groups, the
IER aimed to change fundamentally their position in public space and national
development. This is critical because progress toward a normative civil society
depends on the social relations among groups, communities and classes (i.e.,
reconciliation).73 Reparations sought to encourage popular buy-in for national
development and the state and to reestablish trust between social groups and
between the state and society.74
Similarly, the IER viewed reparations as critical to the long-term project of advancing the political rights of Moroccan citizens. Because reparations, like human
rights, is a contested concept, agreeing to the principle of reparations creates room
for the argument that, in practice, reparations should include more than financial
and social compensation. According to the IER,

62 L. Wilcox

the demands of pro-reform civil society. This possibility, reflecting the ambiguity
of partially unveiled truth, ultimately makes the Commissions decision to work
with the monarchy more of a calculated risk than any kind of guaranteed deal.

Recommendations to Ensure Human Rights Abuses Do Not Recur

the habilitation, clarification and publication of the regulations and laws related to
the prerogatives, the organization, and the decision-making process in the sectors of
security . . . [and] any other party having the power to resort to public force.80

It would be no small feat to tear down the corrupt and ambiguous order of
government that creates impunity for those with the power to resort to public
force. This mode of government, which leaves those in power accountable only
to their superiors, and ultimately to the king, reinforces the kings position. John
Waterbury wrote in 1970 that the monarchy is the major distributor of spoils and
patronage in Morocco, and it considers the entire elite as its clientele group.81 This
dynamic remains largely intact today.
Thus, although reforming the security apparatuses by building a culture of
human rights82 has potential if carried out to guard against future human
rights abuses, the Commissions constitutional reform recommendations represent
the real crux of genuine reform and the best assurance that state human rights
abuses will not recur.83 These recommendations call for reinforcing the principle

79
80
81
82

83

IER, supra n 53 at 3537.

Ibid., 36.
John Waterbury, The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite: A Study of Segmented
Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), 143.
One recommendation that the monarchy reportedly has begun to implement creates human rights
education programs among specific categories of people, such as police and students. Personal
interview, Abderrazzak Rouwane, Rabat, Morocco, 29 May 2007.
For Aboubakr Jamai, these recommendations were the real price paid by the monarchy for greater
legitimacy. Personal interview, Aboubakr Jamai, Boston, USA, 14 May 2007. Jamai is a frequent
critic of the monarchy and former editor of the Moroccan newspapers Le Journal Hebdomadaire
and Assahifa al-Ousbouiya. He was forced to resign in 2007 when the Moroccan courts fined Le
Journal Hebdomadaire an unpayable amount. Campagna and Labidi, supra n 67.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

Ensuring that state human rights violations do not continue is central to societal
reconciliation as well as the Commissions overall strategy. The Commission made
several recommendations to the monarchy intended to safeguard against any return
to the black years (19561999). These recommendations fall under four broad
categories: consolidating constitutional guarantees of human rights; adopting
and implementing an integrated national strategy to struggle against impunity;
reforms in the sectors of security, justice, law, and penal policy; and the more
technical follow-up mechanisms.79
In general, recommendations for both combating impunity and reforming national institutions seek to make the states operation more transparent and accountable to the rule of law. A recommendation to reform the security apparatuses, for
example, would require

Reshaping Civil Society through a Truth Commission

63

of separation of powers, and prohibiting constitutionally any interference by the

executive power in the functioning of the judiciary power.84 As of now, the king has
endorsed the IER and its final report, given reparation money and health insurance
to victims of past abuse and reportedly begun to build a culture of human rights.
However, he has also stated repeatedly that the constitution does not need further
reform.85
For critics, the Commissions inability to compel such reform coincided with the
most obvious flaw in its mandate, ensuring nonrepetition. Violations did recur,
even as the IER was still operating. According to Human Rights Watch,

Abdelhay Moudden, a political science professor and member of the IER, reported
in 2005, People ask us, how can you investigate the past while the human rights
abuses still go on, even if they dont compare with the past? How can these abuses
continue. . .?87 While the government has not returned to the systematic violations
carried out under Hassan II, its continued abuses (primarily against Islamists)
suggest that any substantive changes enacted by the IER remain subordinate to the
security interests of the monarchy.
Although defending its citizens is obviously a responsibility of the state, the
predominance of an ethics of security means that the state determines the (human)
rights of society. Given this power, the state is willing all too often to compromise
these rights for the perceived greater good. If Morocco remains divided and the
monarchy retains its basic ethic of security, messages of takfir assertions that the
king and the makhzen88 are illegitimate apostates and that violence is necessary to
institute a true Islamic society will likely become increasingly appealing to those
frustrated with denied possibility and power. In this event, the monarchy would
continue to gain some legitimacy as the provider of order and stability, but at the
expense of alienating those who want real change. Such a cycle implies increasing
political stagnation, social polarization and potential for violence, not reform and
reconciliation.

Reconciliation
The final mandate of the IER was to promote reconciliation in order to support
the democratic transition of the country, to build the rule of law, and to spread
the values and culture of citizenship and human rights.89 For the Commission,
84
85
86
87
88
89

IER, supra n 53 at 35.

Ottaway and Riley, supra n 26 at 10.
HRW, supra n 39 at 43.
Hazan, supra n 49 at 10.
Makhzen generally means all of the institutions controlled by the king.
Mandates and Tasks, supra n 52.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

Many [suspects arrested after the 2003 Casablanca bombings] were subjected to torture
or mistreatment while under interrogation . . . Some 900 of the suspects were sentenced
to prison terms, many in hasty proceedings that did not provide defendants their basic
due process rights.86

64 L. Wilcox

a bid to restore the victims dignity and moral rehabilitation, preserve a common
memory, and share the pains and sufferings of the victims . . . These sessions further
fulfilled an educational role towards the parties responsible, the public at large and
future generations.92

By breaking taboos on public discussion of past collective suffering and bringing

the intellectual debate on human rights to an emotional level, the sessions sought
to foster a national dialogue on past suffering and build a consensus for the need
to guard against future violations.93 Because Moroccos illiteracy rate is extremely
high94 and the total circulation of its daily press is only between 300,000 and
400,000,95 television and radio broadcasts of the sessions were critical to reaching
the general public.96 Whether the message conveyed was well received is a separate
question (one that correlates with the larger outcome of the IER), but the simple
fact that victims could tell their stories to the public was important.
Similarly, the public discussions and debate in Moroccos mass media, generated
in large part by the hearing sessions, were important for the Commissions effort
to promote equitable dialogue and national vigilance against recurrence of human
rights violations. Essentially, the medias publicizing of the despotic potential of
governmental institutions encourages members of (civil) society to believe that

90
91
92
93

94

95
96

IER, supra n 53 at 21.

Ibid., 3134.
Ibid., 31.
Mohamed Berdouzi, one of 16 IER members, said that the sessions served as a kind of collective catharsis. Personal interview, Mohamed Berdouzi, Rabat, Morocco, 30 May 2007. Similarly,
Moudden asserted that these sessions, full of emotion, had created widespread sympathy for the
victims and a consensus to recognize their suffering. Personal interview, Abdelhay Moudden,
Rabat, Morocco, 30 May 2007.
In 2005, the illiteracy rate for women was 62 percent in urban areas and 82 percent in rural areas.
For men, it was 41 percent in urban areas and 50 percent in rural areas. US Department of State
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Morocco: Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices 2005 (8 March 2006), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61695.htm.
Hazan, supra n 49.
According to Abdellatif Moustaghfir of AMDH, the number of Moroccans who watched the hearing
sessions is likely in the millions. Personal interview, Abdellatif Moustaghfir, Rabat, Morocco, 27
May 2007.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

fulfilling this mandate meant fostering a genuine and equitable democratic

debate90 that would contribute to the building of normative civil society. To
support this interpretation, the Commission identified three broad bases for
reconciliation: public acknowledgment of what happened with public hearing
sessions; national dialogue on reform and reconciliation; and preservation of
memory and of the archives.91
At the level of the general public, the public hearing sessions were likely the most
successful of the approaches in reaching Moroccans, gaining trust and fostering
some democratic debate. These sessions were the first time victims were allowed
officially (and endorsed implicitly) to speak out about their experiences in public.
For the Commission, their testimonies were

Reshaping Civil Society through a Truth Commission

65

fear should not rule, indeed that government by fear [is] illegitimate.97 Victims
imprisoned in the infamous Tazmamart detention center spoke of numerous
grievances, including:
unfair trials and imprisonment, stifling heat and Siberian winters in a stinking jail
that was dark, dirty, and infested with scorpions and mosquitoes, isolation, disease,
inadequate food rations and sadistic prison guards.98

97
98
99
100
101

102

John Keane, Fear and Democracy, in Violence and Politics: Globalizations Paradox, ed. Kenton
Worcester, Sally Avery Bermanzohn and Mark Ungar (New York: Routledge, 2002), 230.
Amraoui, supra n 59 at 21.
Ibid.
Hazan, supra n 49.
Ibid., 10. Moudden also emphasized to the author that the IER is only a part of the larger picture
of reform, which must include economic development, changes in social services, constitutional
reform, the separation of government powers, creating a culture of citizenship and so on. Personal
interview, Abdelhay Moudden, Rabat, Morocco, 30 May 2007.
For example, Salah al Wadi, a Moroccan poet who was imprisoned for years at Kenitra Central
Prison and who heads the IER, recently declared, My appointment came at the hands of a humane
king, an activist for the sake of democracy. Quoted in Darwish, supra n 69.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

These broadcasts, then, helped shape public expectations and assumptions about
the ethical use of power that, in turn, created altered standards to which the regime
could be held.
While the public hearing sessions were well received by many, they were, of
course, criticized by others. For al-Bukili, the sessions were little more than a kind
of therapy to soothe a patient.99 This sentiment reflects unhappiness with the
flaws in the IER process mentioned above under the first three mandates. While
the sessions garnered significant public attention and stimulated a more equitable
debate, victims could not publicly name perpetrators, and abuses occurring under
the present regime were excluded. A planned hearing session in the disputed
Western Sahara, one of the areas hardest hit by repression, was postponed and
finally cancelled as a result of strong opposition from the security sector and the
Sahrawi independence movement.100
In the view of critics, such discretionary measures left the sessions, like the larger
IER process, too apolitical. For the Commission, this was the critical point of
contention. Moudden asserts that the IER had been thought of, conceived, and
defined as a means to achieve a political objective, that of democratization. To
transform the amnesty into cultural forgiveness would give it some local color
but would depoliticize it and damage its potential to foster social mobilization.101
Whether the Commission was successful in fostering social mobilization capable
of inducing real political reform is the key question in determining its ultimate
success.
Two perspectives can help answer this question. From the first perspective,
the monarchy improved its image and garnered greater legitimacy among both
international actors and some elements of Moroccan civil society.102 While most
Moroccans and civil society groups do not accept wholesale the kings projected
image (at least not in private), many do accept that the king is at least somewhat

66 L. Wilcox

103
104
105
106
107

108

Personal interview, Abdelhay Moudden, Rabat, Morocco, 30 May 2007.

Cohen and Jaidi, supra n 5 at 112.
Bronwyn Leebaw, The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice, Human Rights Quarterly 30(1)
(2008): 95118.
Teitel, supra n 34 at 228.
See, for example, Moroccos Poor Show: The Lowest Electoral Turnout in Its History, Economist
Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, 11 September 2007. See also articles about the elections by Michael
McFaul and Tamara Cofman Wittes, Mohamed Tozy, Driss Khrouz and Abdou Filali-Ansary in
the Journal of Democracy 19(1) (2008).
According to Jamai, the beginning of Mohamed VIs rule has been a missed opportunity for the
monarchy a constitutional moment in which it could have embarked on a relatively stable
transition to real democracy. Personal interview, Aboubakr Jamai, Boston, USA, 14 May 2007.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

committed to the cause of their human rights. For the king, although this legitimacy
came at the expense of some real reforms, these have been limited in nature. For
now at least, the king remains safely behind lines that he continues to determine
and control.
From the second perspective, however, the legitimacy granted by many individuals and civil society groups in Morocco is contingent on continued reform.
Although civil society is divided over strategies and goals, the monarchy may recognize a changed mood103 and a consensus on claiming further public space and
building a future free of political violence. As Shana Cohen and Larabi Jaidi assert,
many groups hold divergent visions for Moroccan society but share a language
of reclamation and a similar foundation of uncompromising activism that . . .
may represent enough to bind the movements into stable, nonviolent action that
forces a political response.104 Precisely because the goals of the various actors
involved in transitional justice in Morocco the monarchy, the Commission and
other (civil) society elements were in tension, or perhaps were to some extent
irreconcilable,105 they preserved a critical space106 or gap between expectations
and reality that creates some support for democratic transition and allows for future possibilities. To some extent, then, the IER was successful in its goal of starting a
social transformation in which human rights granted by a security-conscious state
could be redefined as political rights for citizens (a political ethics of the governed).
This is no guaranteed transformation, but it at least creates possibilities.
However, the record voter apathy in the September 2007 national elections (voter
turnout was 37 percent) provides evidence of a generalized alienation from the
state rather than reconciliation.107 Essentially, those who voted with their feet
saw iron curtains rather than an open window of opportunity. If Moroccans
continue to lose faith in the possibility of reform within the current national
political system, increased empathy with extremists is likely. In the short term,
this apathy and potential for extremism make it unlikely that the king will embark
on real democratization. In the long term, however, there are greater (although
uncertain) possibilities. If the monarchy seeks a peaceful transition out of the cycle
of top-down liberalization into a political system in which it still plays the leading
role (although perhaps without a monopoly on power),108 it will have to do more

Reshaping Civil Society through a Truth Commission

67

to engage Moroccans in an equitable and genuine debate about the future of their
country and about the meaning of reconciliation.

Conclusion

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

Will there be a part two to the IER a more directly political sequel to its current,
mostly social impact or was the Commissions historic deal for less perceptible,
social transformation leading to possible political transformation little more than
a successful stratagem by the monarchy to coopt the opposition? In other words,
is the IER an ongoing process or a finished product? There is little doubt, at
this point, that the IERs ultimate legacy has yet to be determined. Any social
transformation effected by the IER has yet to produce reconciliation defined as
normative civil society capable of exerting the right combination of pressure on
and trust with the monarchy to convince it that continued political reform is its
best survival option. While greater public space to contest the dominant definition
of human rights has raised expectations and perceptions of possibility among some
(civil) society elements, many of these elements have been alienated by continued
inequality. Nevertheless, although Moroccan (civil) society remains divided, the
IER has at least tied the monarchy more securely to its projects of liberalization
and modernization, thereby increasing the power of social actors to influence (or
scare) a ruler whose primary concern seems to be security and political survival.
Just as the IER built upon past, flawed measures of liberalization, the king may
decide that further, more significant efforts to achieve reconciliation are necessary.
On a deeper level, the monarchy so far has been unable to find the political
will necessary to overcome irreconcilable tensions in the face of polarization and
mistrust. This lack of will reflects both the practical tensions between security
and human rights in the global war on terror and the larger contradictions
of liberalization and modernization. Opening up as a strategy of security is only
plausible with a minimal level of trust and convergence of ethical visions. In
processes of liberalization and modernization, groups with competing visions of
ideal social orders are likely to see each other as ethically threatening. They are
likely to see the world as starkly divided (between the status quo and a radical
alternative) with high stakes, rather than as a safe space where compromise and
engagement in democratic debate are possible. In modernizing and liberalizing
contexts, then, building normative civil society where human rights are defined as
an ethics of the governed requires defusing ethical tensions through the creation
of a safe space for constructive dialogue.
While the monarchy appears to be trying to create a safe space, it seems to
intend this space for stable change guided by one side only (the monarchy) rather
than for constructive dialogue. Instead of entering the political fray, the king has
remained in his role as final arbiter of the truth and the meaning of human
rights. Thus, although the monarchys idea of human rights seems to promote the
basic right of security in Morocco, this right remains subordinate to the security
of the monarchy. Presumably, the monarchy sought reconciliation with alienated

68 L. Wilcox

109

Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 89.

International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, 2009, 4968

Downloaded from http://ijtj.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Connecticut on April 12, 2015

Moroccans in order to bring them back into national development and formal
politics. It missed the fundamental point, however, that its definition of human
rights as an ethics of security is a key factor keeping them out.
On a larger level, these observations about Moroccos experience of transitional
justice suggest that in a world defined by some as an age of terrorism led by
states primarily concerned with security, transitional justice research and practice
should focus on the social mobilization and mobility of local and marginalized
groups rather than on national discourses of human rights, which are frequently
coopted by security-conscious states. In what Ruti Teitel calls the current phase of
transitional justice, related to increasing global interdependence and the expansion
and normalization of transitional justice,109 contexts in which liberalization and
modernization are occurring are likely to experience problems of competing ethical
visions and lack of trust similar to what has happened in Morocco. If transitional
justice institutions operating within, rather than after, top-down reform are to
navigate and overcome these problems, they must devise strategies that both
defuse tensions and convince the powerful that the idea of human rights as an
ethics of security leads, at its logical conclusion, to human rights as an ethics of
the governed. The ambiguous legacy of the IER demonstrates the difficulty of this
project, but also that it is a robust area of inquiry.
In contexts in MENA and throughout the world with parallels to Morocco, where
the power relations allow realistically for only gradual reform, transitional justice
institutions similar to the IER could reinforce flawed systems of legitimacy and
trends of instability. Yet, for reformers seeking available methods to create greater
possibilities for future reform, such institutions could significantly reshape the
statesociety relationship. In Morocco, transitional justice has raised the stakes of
top-down liberalization. The IER has helped establish a foundation for moving the
country beyond the apparently endless cycle of instrumental opening and closing,
reform and repression. Whether Morocco will move more fully into political reform
or repression is unclear. What is clear, however, is that if Mohamed VI remains
unwilling to genuinely redefine human rights as an ethics of the governed, to open
(gradually but surely) the iron curtains around the palaces inner chambers of
power, the hope of reconciliation he has pursued since becoming king will fade
farther and farther into the past.