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DEMOCRATIZING CIVIL SOCIETY

IN LATIN AMERICA
Alison Brysk

Alison Brysk, associate professor of political science and chair of

international studies at the University of California, Irvine, is the
author of The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina (1994) and From
Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International
Relations in Latin America (2000).

If the twentieth century was dominated by the rise and reach of the
state, its close has been marked by the ascendance of civil society. Yet
this long-overdue recognition of the importance of civil society has too
often evolved into a simplistic equation of democracy with a strong civil
society. A strong civil society, however, may not necessarily be a
democratic one. For example, popular social forces have recently sought
to undermine democracy in Ecuador and Venezuela, and democratic
voters have returned former authoritarian leaders to power in Guatemala
and Bolivia. Even a democratic civil society does not ensure a democratic
state, but the latter is unlikely to be sustainable without the former.
Democratic deficits within civil society jeopardize its ability to perform
its proper social functionsand its legitimacy at home and abroad.
Democracy requires not just more civil society, but better civil society.
The debate on democratizing civil society has important consequences
for public policy and international relations. Both external actors
(governmental and nongovernmental) and the governments of
democratizing countries must take into account the relative legitimacy
and representativeness of civil-society organizations when making policy
decisions. In Colombia, for example, government officials, peace
commissioners, international organizations, and foreign funders struggle
to assess the autonomy and accountability of thousands of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) seeking human rights in Latin
Americas oldest and most threatened democracy. Since such evaluations
determine the level of resources, protection, and representation these
organizations receive in a country where more than a thousand people
Journal of Democracy Volume 11, Number 3 July 2000

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are killed each year in political violence, civic status may be a matter of
life and death.
Although most civic actors in Latin America are struggling to deepen
democracy under challenging conditions, nongovernmental social mobilization may also be subject to distortion and abuse. Which characteristics
of civil society influence its capacity for democratization? The answer
cannot be found in the conventional wisdom, which suggests that civil
society must be made more social or more civil. While history and
culture do create a legacy of social capital, arguments based on cultural
characteristics alone cannot explain why a Europeanized country like
Chile, steeped in a democratic heritage, has witnessed greater human
rights violations than Bolivia, its poorer, ethnically divided, and unstable
neighbor. Civil society must be analyzed as a set of social institutions
whose democratic functions parallel those of the state. To be democratic,
a civil society must be representative, accountable, and pluralistic, and
it must respect human rights.
How much democracy can we legitimately and realistically expect
from civil society? Organizations in the private sphere (such as churches
or universities) may legitimately be ascriptive, exclusive, or hierarchical.
Nevertheless, we can require all public actors to be transparent,
accountable, and ethical. And while we cannot require private individuals
or all associations to be nondiscriminatory, participatory, and representative, these characteristics can be required when such actors receive
public funds or perform public functions. These goals are interdependent;
both transparency and participation, for example, are linked to accountability. We can further distinguish between democratic goals that apply
to individual organizations and social sectors and those that can apply
only to civil society as a whole. For an organization to be democratic, it
must accountably represent its members; for civil society as a whole to
be democratic, it must be pluralistic. Thus the representativeness of
civil society is not impaired if a particular church discriminates in its
membership as long as the societys range of religious institutions does
not systematically exclude some social sector.
Although many supporters of democratization are reluctant to criticize
emerging civil societies for fear of undermining them, it is important to
recognize that civil society can also undermine itself through its own
democratic deficits and that the role of civic actors shifts during different
phases of democratic transition and consolidation. Under authoritarian
and transitional regimes, state domination and the exigencies of crisis
often mask the antidemocratic tendencies of certain civic groups. During
democratic transitions and their aftermath, groups lacking internal
democracy (such as Mexicos left-wing opposition party, the Partido
Revolucionario Democrtico, whose own internal primary elections in
1999 were discredited) can still play a critical role in supporting democracy on a systemwide level by checking state power, representing the

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153

voiceless, or providing services that empower citizens. As normal politics replaces crisis, however, civic groups that are unrepresentative or
unaccountable will often lose legitimacy, split into factions, or simply
fail to adapt to changing political circumstancesas occurred with one
segment of Argentinas human rights movement.1 At the system level,
studies of consolidation suggest that institutionalizing civil society is
a key condition for stabilizing democratic regimes.2 Thus promoting
democracy means not only empowering civil society but also democratizing it.

Defining Our Terms

Civil society. To proceed further, we must clearly define both civil
society and democratization. A typical policy makers definition is that
civil society comprises human activity outside the market and the state
. . . non-governmental organizations, peoples organizations, trade unions,
cooperatives, consumer and human rights groups, womens associations,
youth clubs, the media, neighborhood or community-based coalitions,
religious groups, academic and research institutions, grassroots
movements and organizations of indigenous peoples. 3 Yet can this
motley assortment of groupsfrom mosques to bowling leagues, food
co-ops to chambers of commerceplay a coherent political role? How
can purely private groups play a democratizing role? On the other hand,
if civil society is not separate from the government, how can governmental and partisan activity be disentangled from the civic realm? Where
is the fine line between a political party, a social movement, a lobby,
and an NGO?4
Some of these issues can be resolved if we define civil society in
terms of its civic role rather than its social identity: Civil society is public
and political association outside the state, not a residual category or a
list of types of actors.5 Its political role is not just to aggregate, represent,
and articulate interests, but also to create citizens, to shape consciousness,
and to help define what is public and political. Civic actors build social
capital, serve as intermediaries between the state and private citizens,
and sometimes exercise delegated authority in specific issue areas (such
as education, development, and resource management). In Latin America,
for example, the Catholic Church plays a wide range of social roles,
from conflict mediation to education to human rights monitoring to
lobbying for its own institutional or theological interests.
Civil-society actors are nonprofit and nongovernmental. Their civic
impact depends on the extent of their autonomy from state and market,
as measured by resource flows, decision-making structures, and organizational goals.6 Chilean and Peruvian shantytowns, for example, have
been heavily populated by food co-ops and soup kitchenssponsored
by the Catholic Church and various political partiesthat foster

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opposition to the state and play a more important role in civil society
than they do in the market.
Within these bounds, civil society is often analyzed by its sociological
form (for example, union, NGO, or sect) rather than its political function:
mobilization, contention, or institutionalization. These functions, in turn,
play different roles in democratization: developing citizenship, shaping the
public agenda, or changing institutions through collective action. In general,
traditional social sectors such as tribes and churches shape and represent
identitiesdeveloping citizenship and sometimes shaping the public agenda.
Social movements are less institutionalized, but more contentious and
disposed to collective action. NGOs and service providers tend to be less
mobilized, but may play a greater role in building democratic institutions.
Political parties, trade unions, and lobbies are generally the most mobilized,
contentious, institutionalized, and oriented toward state action.7
Shifting our focus to function also gives us a clearer picture of the
democratizing impact of civil society in practice. Labor rights are clearly
an important dimension of democratization, and labor unions are a natural
and structurally well-suited vehicle for the pursuit of these rights. In
Mexico, however, unions have not been effective in securing these rights,
largely due to their being corrupted by the state or ruling party. In order
to assess workers identities, mobilization, and representation in that
country, we must look beyond the largely coopted unions to find civic
organizations that shape the public agenda and collective action. The
types of organizations that have stepped in to mobilize disenfranchised
workers have more voluntary membership and contentious mobilization
than the corporatist unions, and often draw on a more encompassing
identity base. Such organizations include binational ethnic associations
for Indian migrant laborers, social movements of female garment
workers, and independent teachers unions campaigning for electoral
reform.
Democratization. If civil society is more than association,
democratization is more than participation. The same local communities
that are charged by shrinking states with taking on more responsibility
for development and local governance are lynching suspected criminals
in Latin America (and burning alleged witches in southern Africa). Supporters of social movements that unquestionably contribute new issues
and voices to the wider arena (such as ethnic-rights organizations) seldom
query these movements relationships to their own constituencies.8
Moreover, many proponents of policy initiatives centered in civil
society (such as microenterprise programs) conflate other desirable goals
(like improvements in social welfare) with democratic empowerment,
confusing the general development of civil society with that of democracy. Nonstate and private actors may serve other useful or desired goals
besides deepening democracy, such as articulating identities or delivering

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resources. The performance of these roles must be distinguished from

democratization, and tradeoffs between democracy and other goals should
be recognized. Development programs may easily reinforce unaccountable local elites; the Protestant aid organization World Vision was forced
to redesign its Andean programs after aid administered through local
churches catalyzed religious conflict in villages.
Neither does democratization necessarily mean limiting state power.
Especially in less-developed postauthoritarian settings, democratization
may involve civil society demanding more state attention to, and
accountability for, an overlooked constituency, like shantytown dwellers,
or an issue previously deemed private, like domestic violence. In
Ecuador, womens groups seeking assistance for the estimated silent
majority of women subject to domestic violence in that country adopted
the slogan, Democracy in the household [as in] the country.
If democracy is more than participation or limited government, and
distinct from the general growth of civil society, what does democracy
mean for civil society? A democratic state is representative of and
accountable to its society; a democratic civil society is representative of
and accountable to its members. In terms of state policy, deepening
democratization means a transition from the right to the reality of
association. 9 While the term deepening is usually associated with
consolidated liberal democracies, the democratization of civil society
also has a variety of roles to play in promoting democratic consolidation.
To use Andreas Schedlers terminology, Argentine protesters surrounding military mutineers prevent democratic breakdown, civic election
monitors in Mexico prevent democratic erosion, human rights movements help complete the transition from electoral to liberal democracy,
indigenous movements seeking cultural rights deepen democracy, and
panLatin American good-government movements like Conciencia help
to organize democracy.10

Democratic Deficits Within Civil Society

Which features of civil society impede democratization? Systematic
problems of representation and accountability are present in even the most
the most idealistic and widely supported social movements. As the stories
of Rigoberta Mench and Winnie Mandela suggest, these shortcomings
are, in part, the result of the fragility of charismatic leadership and of
opposition movements forged under repressive regimes. In broader terms,
civic democratic deficits include unclear representation, unaccountable
leadership, lack of autonomy (from the state, political parties, or international forces), and lack of respect for universal human rights. While
these problems should not be used as an excuse for failing to provide
support for civil society, they should be taken into account when designing
and implementing public policy in this area.

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Representation. Whom and what do civic organizations represent? It

would be unreasonable to expect an NGO to include within its membership
the entire constituency that it represents. Yet there is no standardized
mechanism for selecting civic leaders such as elections with universal
suffrage provide for states. Civil societys constituents depend on political
entrepreneurs, social leaders, or outside allies to represent them. States,
firms, and international organizations sometimes develop protocols to
determine whether certain civic organizations are representative, such as
certifying union elections. The UNs procedure for granting official
recognition to NGOs examines the autonomybut not the representativenessof civic groups. More often, however, recognition is based on the
policy makers political goals rather than on a systematic evaluation of
how well a given organization represents its constituency.
Since civic groups have no designated sphere of authority,
geographically or functionally overlapping organizations may claim to
represent the same populations. In one Indian region of the Ecuadoran
highlands, there have been as many as 26 NGOs per community.
Recently, there have been conflicts between transnational and local social
movements over which of them truly represents their constituents. Exiles
and locals battle for leadership of transnational campaigns for human
rights in countries like Chile. Latin American environmental movements
have been particularly plagued by tensions between international
ecologists with global conservationist agendas and local residents with
urgent development needs. Even transnational networks established to
contest development projects such as World Bank dams often founder
on North-South representation issues.
Furthermore, the way civil society is constructed has an influence on
which social issues and identities are seen as public and political. Many
civil societies privatize womens lives, in effect denying democratic
representation to half the population. The deep agenda-setting power of
civil society in this regard is manifest when even external democratizers
led to ask why there are so few women in trade unions instead of asking
why there are no public associations for women whose labor is
privatized, such as maids or prostitutes.11 Outside assistance may also
have the effect of making civil society less representative by creating a
gap between groups that receive assistance and those that do not. As a
result of these disparities, there are differences in levels of organization,
mobilization, and even identity among entire social sectors. Even among
indigenous peoples movements, for instance, small, poor rainforest
populations heavily penetrated by anthropologists, missionaries, and aid
workers are often more politically mobilized and visible than larger
highland Indian groups categorized by states and outsiders as peasants.
Accountability. If the representativeness of civil society is sometimes
open to question, the accountability of its leaders is also problematic.

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Social movements, NGOs, and religious and ethnic groups are especially
prone to personalistic leadership. This is more than just the result of the
iron law of oligarchyit also reflects the small size of these
organizations, the power of charismatic leadership, and the limited
leadership pool. The requisites of mobilization tend to concentrate
leadership quickly, especially in less developed democratizing countries,
where skills and availability are scarce.12 Civic leaders who emerge in
the struggle against authoritarian rule are often less than democratic in
the way they act within their own organizations; the moral certainty,
persistence, resolve, and discretion necessary for survival as dissidents
are not conducive to open, pragmatic, and fluid consensus-building.
Worse still, personalism makes civic groups more vulnerable to state
attack (by discrediting their leaders) and more susceptible to corruption,
cooptation, and partisanship. Brazils Amazonian indigenous movement
and its alliance with Northern environmentalists were damaged by the
fall of the colorful tribal leader Payakan. Even though Payakanwho
had been featured on the cover of Parade magazine as well as in
numerous fund-raising appealswas eventually acquitted of rape
charges, the revelation of his improper behavior revealed the movements
vulnerability and unfairly diminished international support for its
legitimate concerns.
Corruption can also be a problem in civil societies. During my own
work in the Andes, a key indigenous leader who had effectively
represented his constituency was not available to be interviewed because
he was in jail for misuse of funds. It is useful to distinguish among
various (and often coexisting) forms of maladministration that are
particularly prevalent in less-developed and non-Western societies, in
order to assess their impact on the democratic character of civil society.
Personal venality is probably the least common form of corruption, but
it is the most inimical to an organizations representativeness; when
organizational resources are diverted to the leadership, legitimacy is
sacrificed and civic goals may be distorted.
Far more common is unauthorized social spendingleaders
distributing resources according to extended family ties or traditional
social norms rather than policy or public commitments (sponsoring a
feast with money earmarked for a food co-op, for example). Although
such spending undercuts accountability to the wider society, outside
funders, and program goals (which may include democratization), it may
be compatible with representation of the organizations civic
constituency. On the other hand, it may also be used to build ethnic,
tribal, or religious political machines that exclude dissident members of
the constituency. In southern Mexico, it has led to intracommunity
violence between (government-allied) Catholic and dissident Protestant
sectors of indigenous villages.
Another problem is institutional hypertrophythe spending of

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Journal of Democracy

resources that should be used to support an organizations goals on the

organization itself. (The beach resorts constructed for union members
by Argentinas Peronist movement illustrate this phenomenon.) Although
frustrating to outside funders and ideological supporters, hypertrophy
produces a lower and variable level of democratic distortion. Its impact
on representation depends largely on how privately the organization is
managed and the degree to which its social role flows from mobilization
rather than institutionalization and member services.
Finally, a certain proportion of ostensible corruption involves mismanagement without malfeasance. For example, a group may not be able
to produce its newsletter because it spent the photocopying grant on fixing
the jeep, bribing the electric company to keep the power on, or paying a
staffers hospital bill. While such mismanagement poses little threat to
democracy, it hinders the democratizing work of civic groups.
Autonomy. Civic organizations can also be coopted by their targets,
thereby curtailing their capacity for contestation, interest articulation,
or even mobilization. Cooptation is most commonly pursued by the state;
for some regimes (like Mexicos), it is the characteristic response to
challenges from civil society. In a number of states, the creation of
government-sponsored NGOs confuses representationin Ecuador, the
government responded to ethnic mobilization by establishing shadow
Indian-rights federations in several provinces. Cooptation is also
practiced by corporate targets of labor, environmental, or human rights
mobilization. For example, one Amazonian Indian rights group is now
funded by the oil company against whose incursions it was originally
formed to protest. Civic groups that lack internal democracy are the
most vulnerable to cooptation, since capture is most likely when
leadership is personalistic and unaccountable. As with organizational
hypertrophy, cooptation hinders representation most when the groups
goals include contestation, and least when they center on the provision
of services.
Dependency. A related concern is dependence on international
support, a point recently emphasized by Mexicos restrictions on
international funding and visits to civic organizations in the Chiapas
conflict zone. Similarly, at one point El Salvador prohibited registered
NGOs from asking for foreign support. Yet while states may cite the
potential threat to sovereignty from civil societys international ties,
this objection is valid only if states themselves eschew foreign assistance,
and only insofar as foreign support threatens the states monopoly of
coercion. More often, global civic links merely affect the states monopoly of information, development resources, or representation. This
diversification of access to information, resources, and organization is
a crucial component of democratization.

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Furthermore, international support may be necessary for democratization under two sets of circumstances. First, when domestic groups
do not have the resources to mobilize effectively to articulate citizen
interests, international resources may be needed to level the playing
field between citizens and the state. Without the support of foreign
funders such as Global Exchange, the Honduran peasant movement
would not have the resources needed for transportation to regional
organizing meetings, government offices, or squatter sites. In this kind
of situation, foreign support would lead to dependency only if it distorted
an organizations goals or exerted an undue influence over its decision
making.
Second, civic groups and their goals are increasingly transnational.
It is natural and proper for a border-spanning ethnic group or an environmental NGO addressing global issues to mobilize transnationallythere
are both environmental and Indian rights groups that appropriately span
the Amazon basin. More generally, the resources, goals, and decision
making of civic groups may be intertwined with those of foreign
supporters through transnational networks and global memberships.13
This will produce interdependence rather than dependence: The transnational network may include peer groups (like the panLatin American
good government group Conciencia), and the Southern partners in NorthSouth alliances may provide some resources and exercise some control
(as in Oxfam partnerships).
Partisanship. Party affiliation poses another dilemma for civic
organizations, since it enhances effectiveness while diminishing public
legitimacy. Although there is nothing inherently illegitimate about party
affiliation, there is always the danger that partisan ideology will subsume
civic goals or representationespecially when party connections are
unacknowledged. To some extent, these fears flow from Cold War
histories of covert civic sponsorship on both sides. When civic groups
are tied to ruling parties, the issue of partisanship is akin to that of
cooptation. Support from foreign or transnational political parties raises
the specter of dependency. Even NGO support for (or from) domestic
opposition parties can be tainted by these parties role as contenders for
state power. Yet civic goals may naturally lead to or flow from a larger
critical consciousness associated with a universal ideology. Human rights
activists, for example, may adopt a leftist analysis linking repression to
underlying structural inequalities. And social movements that found their
own partieslike the European Greens, the Brazilian Workers Party,
or the Bolivian Indian rights movement (the Katarista party)are
generally applauded.
Human rights. Failure to respect universal human rights mars the
democratic character of civil society. Some civic groups may be

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representative of constituencies whose goals are in some way antidemocratic: discriminatory, exclusionary, hegemonic, or even violent.
What about a military officers club that lobbies against human rights
reform? A coca growers union that blockades police? A radical student
group that promotes political change by any means necessary? An
exile group that monitors human rights at home but funds violence
abroad? Should civil society be held accountable to the same human
rights norms as states? What if deviations from universal norms reflect
cultural differences and the heritage of the group represented (as is often
claimed by indigenous activists)?
Democracy rests on pluralism, and respect for universal human rights
enhances both the experience and the pursuit of pluralism. For this and
other reasons, a growing international consensus subjects all political
actors to universal human rights standards. International human rights
monitors now include the behavior of rebel movements in their
assessments. Even citizens engaged in wholly private behavior must
respect human rights, though the state bears ultimate responsibility for
regulating their behavior (as a legitimating condition of its monopoly
of coercion). Thus self-determination for citizens, as for states, is always
limited by human rights standards. These standards, however, apply to
behavior, not to political opinion or identity.
Finally, it is important to recognize that there are frequent, and perhaps
inherent, contradictions among the various democratizing roles of civil
society. Larry Diamond lists a spectrum of desirable roles that includes
scrutinizing the state, educating citizens, increasing participation,
promoting tolerance, representing interests, training leaders, monitoring
elections, and generating democratic constituencies for market
reforms.14 As we have seen, however, representing interests may not
promote tolerance, and training leaders may be at odds with increasing
participation. As market reforms generate increasing resistance and IMF
riots among impoverished majorities throughout Latin America, broad
representation and popular accountability may often conflict with
economic liberalization. Pluralist optimists can envision a healthy
division of labor in which different civic groups promote distinct
democratizing goals, but civic stalemate and polarization are equally
likely outcomes. In the era of democratic consolidation, the old image
of relatively unified societies coming together to challenge the state must
be modified to incorporate these civic contradictions.

Deepening Democracy in Civil Society

Despite its shortcomings, civil society is a key site for democratization, and civic actors are growing in importance. International agencies,
national governments, foreign funders, and transnational NGOs are
already involved in shaping civil society through funding, regulating,

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training, and subcontracting with civic organizations. How can these

supporters of civil society help to democratize it? They can do so by
strengthening the same qualities in civil society that build democracy at
the state level: transparency, accountability, checks and balances,
periodic consultation with constituencies, pluralistic goals, and respect
for human dignity.15 To be truly democratic, such measures should also
incorporate the greatest possible level of participation from Latin American organizations in standard-setting, monitoring, popular education,
and implementation.
Transparency. The first requirement for deepening democracy within
civil society is to secure better information about civic organizations
and local cultures. In many cases, a simple mapping of organizations,
their membership, and their claims to be representative is a necessary
prerequisite. In Latin America, Ecuador is one of the few countries that
has a national directory of NGOs, prepared by the Fundacin Alternativa.
Internal decision-making structures must be more transparent, and this
information may be made a requirement of NGO registration with
democratic states (except in cases of civil conflict, where NGO leaders
might be targeted). For funders, statements of NGO goals and lists of
accomplishments should be supplemented by analyses that emphasize
the quality of participation, mobilization, or services. Above all, civic
groups budgets and funding sources must be public, clear, and widely
accessible to all parties. This may include outside audits of civil groups
(perhaps by transnational organizations like Transparency International).
Funders may combine such scrutiny with incentive plans that recognize
the challenges of civic mobilization in diverse environments. To this
end, supportive states, funders, and transnational networks should make
it a priority to improve civic groups capacities to receive, gather, and
transmit information, both internally and externally. In this respect,
freedom of the press and the alternative media play a crucial role in
deepening democracy.
Accountability. Democracy also requires clear and consistent
standards of accountability. The articulation of such standards must
eventually be linked to consequences for organizational funding or
recognition, but even initial standard-setting provides a useful benchmark
as well as a starting point for dialogue between outsiders and civic
organizations. The democratic character of civic groups, like that of
other political organizations, can be assessed by their autonomy, breadth
of representation, accountability to constituents, and institutionalization.
Assessment of these characteristics may be useful when civic groups
contend for outside recognition by intergovernmental organizations,
funders, or foreign counterparts. Nongovernmental international
networks could provide universal norms and peer monitoring for internal

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leadership-selection processes (a civic version of election monitoring

or union certification). This would merely systematize and publicize a
process that already occurs among international NGO networks, which
informally rely on local gatekeepers such as the Catholic Church,
transnational groups like Cultural Survival, and Northern academics to
assess the effectiveness and democratic character of Latin American
civic organizations. Another useful measure would be to supplement
leadership training with membership training, in order to develop an
internal constituency for civic accountability.
Checks and balances. Introducing civic checks and balances requires
diversifying social forces without splintering them. To minimize
clientelism, funders, state agencies delegating tasks, and advocacy
networks seeking local partners should strive to emphasize issues rather
than relationships. This will mean greater and more transparent
competition, especially in urban and more developed sectors. The least
developed countries and weakest social sectors, however, may be barely
capable of generating a single association to address any given issue.
Moreover, frequent changes or even frequent reassessment of
relationships may jeopardize program goals in environments with low
social capital.
Pluralism. A more constructive policy for funders may be the direct
promotion of civic pluralism, focusing on areas where greater diversity
of associations or approaches will contribute the most to democratization.
For example, outsiders may help to level the playing field within civil
society by providing preferential support to new vehicles for historically
underrepresented sectors, as the Inter-American Foundation did in its
cultural-promotion programs. Democratizers can also provide grassrootsoriented leadership training to diversify the pool of civic organizers and
broaden the base of existing organizations.
Consultation. Outsiders should encourage NGOs to engage in periodic
consultation with their constituencies on such matters as leadership,
goals, strategies, and representative status. This will help moderate the
tendency toward personalistic leadership and generally improve
accountability and legitimacy. Funders may even require such
consultation as a condition of support, as long as such conditionality is
universal and designed in partnership with civic organizations. Yet only
a few Latin American states seem likely to enforce such a requirement
in a credible, nondiscriminatory, and nonrepressive fashion, so it is not
yet appropriate to incorporate civic consultation in the criteria for state
recognition. One of the most thorough efforts at civic grassroots
consultation ever conducted was made by a guerrilla group: the series
of referenda by Mexicos Zapatista rebels in 199596, which involved

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millions of constituents and generated the groups decision to form a

parallel social movement. Where possible, such consultationlike the
Zapatistasshould be externally monitored and incorporate constituencies beyond the direct membership.
Human Rights. Finally, it is important to require that all civic actors
demonstrate respect for universal human rights. State and foreign democratizers can work to restrain nonviolent but exclusionary or antidemocratic civic groups by denying them public resources and publicizing
their less attractive democratic deficits, but these measures are less
effective when such groups have access to private resources or covert
state support. An inherent dilemma for democratization arises when the
sole legitimate organization representing some group of citizens violates
human rights standards in its goals or behavior, creating a conflict
between democratic representation and democratic norms. One possible
resolution of this dilemma is for states and international supporters to
grant such civic groups conditional, graduated recognition while working
to foster alternatives and strengthen local human rights monitoring. For
example, antidemocratic groups might be invited to public debates but
denied funding. Although total exclusion of antidemocratic groups is
morally attractive, it is perilous in practice, and likely to encourage an
even less democratic stance among their membership. Conversely,
limited recognition and the lure of prospective rewards may inspire
moderating currents in such groups, as has occurred among several rightwing political parties and left-wing guerrilla organizations in Latin
America. Nevertheless, behavior that violates human rights must be
condemned by all states and foreign democratizers, who must use any
sanctions at their disposal to curb it.

Building Civic Democracy

In this era of widespread regime transformation, democratic consolidation, uneven globalization, and institutional malaise, civil society
matters more than ever. Yet democracy depends not just on more civil
society, but on a more democratic civil society. While history, culture,
and resources constrain the construction of civic democracy, there is no
fixed legacy or preconstituted stock of civic culture or social capital.
Fostering civic democratization is an active process of institutionbuilding that can be improved through clear analysis and consistent
policy.
Building a more representative and accountable civil society can facilitate more conventional approaches to democratization in two ways. First,
democratizing the institutions and procedures of civil society can spur
the slow process of value change. Practices of pluralism and tolerance,
even if they are not adopted for principled motives, may nevertheless

Journal of Democracy

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help to create new habits of the heart. Second, civic democratization

empowers a new set of stakeholders who benefit from openness and
accountability. In this way, societal democracy can create another arena
of citizen pressure that may trickle up to political structures, building
state institutions that have the potential to support further democratization
of civil society.16
The observations presented above have been drawn mainly from Latin
America, but the definitions of civil society, democracy, and the
democratic deficits within civil society are formulated in general terms.
Comparative analyses of other cases and regions may help determine
the feasibility of the policy suggestions offered here, and perhaps add
others. In some areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa, incomplete democratic
transitions, structural impediments, and resource shortages may severely
constrain the potential for civic democratization. Yet even limited civic
democratization efforts may lay the groundwork for future transitions,
and increasing transnational diffusion may allow some societies to
overcome objective constraints.
Whatever set of standards and mechanisms is chosen, it is time to
develop collective understandings about democratic civil society. These
understandings should ultimately reflect a democratic dialogue among
global civil society, including international organizations, transnational
networks, and grassroots organizations. Developing the representativeness and accountability of civic organizations can enhance their
credibility, broaden their constituencies, and encourage cooperation. A
democratic civil society can improve citizens daily lives and well-being,
and also help to build and sustain a democratic state. Democracy is too
important to be left solely to governments.
NOTES
1. See Alison Brysk, The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change,
and Democratization (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994).
2. See Emma Craswell, The Role of Civil Society in Transitions to Democracy:
Some Conceptual Confusions, paper presented at the Western Political Science
Association, Los Angeles, Calif., March 1998. On regime consolidation, see Juan J.
Linz and Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, Journal of Democracy 7
(April 1996): 1433.
3. This is the definition used by the United Nations Development Programme. It
can be found online at www.undp.org/csopp/CSO/NewFiles/faqs.htm.
4. For a similar consideration of definitions and mechanisms of civil society, see
Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, The Paradox of Civil Society, Journal of
Democracy 7 (July 1996): 3852.
5. This definition builds on Larry Diamonds definition of civil society as the realm
of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting,
autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is
distinct from society in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a

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public sphere. Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation, Journal

of Democracy 5 (July 1994): 5. My reading differs from his on several key points. First,
some of the activities he labels as private (notably religious groups) may play a critical
role in shaping political culture and citizen efficacy. Second, civil society does not
necessarily involve market activity; indeed, civic-opposition movements often arise
through nonmarket alternative associations (such as soup kitchens) and antimarket
protests (like Mexicos debtors movement El Barzon).
6. This parallels Diamonds treatment of democracy as a spectrum. Larry Diamond,
Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation,
in Tom Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the
Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 53. On degrees of
democracy, see Kenneth M. Roberts, Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and
Social Movements in Chile and Peru (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998).
7. See Mark Warren, Democracy and Associations: An Approach to the
Contributions of Associations to Democracy, paper delivered at the Western Political
Science Association, Los Angeles, Calif., March 1998.
8. For a review of such Latin American social movements, see Judith Adler Hellman,
Anniversary Essay on Social Movements: Revolution, Reform, and Reaction, NACLA
Report on the Americas 30 (MayJune 1997): 1318.
9. See Jonathan Fox, The Difficult Transition From Clientelism to Citizenship:
Lessons from Mexico, World Politics 46 (January 1994): 15184.
10. Andreas Schedler, What is Democratic Consolidation? Journal of Democracy
9 (April 1998): 91107.
11. Public associations for prostitutes already exist in the Philippines, Uruguay, and
Brazil. Such groups address political issues such as police harassment, domestic violence,
access to health care, and womens employment alternatives.
12. Jonathan Fox and Luis Hernandez, Offsetting the Iron Law of Oligarchy: The
Ebb and Flow of Leadership Accountability in a Regional Peasant Organization,
Grassroots Development 13:2 (1989): 815.
13. See Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy
Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).
14. Larry Diamond, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments,
Issues and Imperatives, report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict, December 1995, 48.
15. The following recommendations apply only to democratic regimes that offer a
minimal level of protection for civic organizations, although they may be useful goals
in various respects in less consolidated circumstances.
16. For a limited example of the success of feminist NGOs in democratizing health
policy in Nicaragua, see Christina Ewig, The Strength and Limits of the NGO Womens
Movement Model: Shaping Nicaraguas Democratic Institutions, Latin American
Research Review 34:3 (1999): 75102.