JOVENAL OUANO, petitioner, vs.

PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

CORPORATION and HON. JUDGE RAMON G. CODILLA, JR.,respondents.

The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. CEB-21319.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

The complaint seeks to recover from private respondent the ownership and possession of
PGTT International Investment Corp. (PGTT), respondent, is a corporation duly organized the lots in question and the payment of damages. Since the action involves ownership and
possession of real property, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is
under existing laws, with address at YASCO Bldg., M. J. Cuenco Ave., Cebu City.
determined by the assessed value, not the market value, thereof, pursuant to Batas
On December 11, 1997, PGTT filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cebu Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691. Sec. 33 (par. 3) of the said law provides:
City, a verified complaint against Jovenal Ouano, petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No.
"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
CEB- 21319, entitled "PGTT INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Plaintiff,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
vs. JUVENAL OUANO, Defendant," for "Recovery of Ownership and Possession of Real
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
Property and Damages."1 In its complaint, PGTT alleged that it is the owner of Lot Nos. 1x x x.
10, Block 2 of the Sunnymeade Crescent Subdivision located at Pit-os, Talamban, Cebu
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
City. Sometime in October of 1996, PGTT found that Ouano uprooted the concrete
monuments of the said lots, plowed them and planted corn thereon. Despite PGTTs
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00 or, in civil actions in
demand that he vacate the lots and restore them to their original condition, Ouano refused,
claiming he is the owner and lawful possessor of the 380 square meters he occupied. Due
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed P50,000.00 exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and
to Ouanos wrongful act, PGTT was deprived of the use of its property and suffered
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 a year. Likewise, PGTT was constrained to file the
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value
of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
subject action and hired the services of his counsel for P100,000.00. PGTT prayed:
x x x." (Emphasis ours)
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that after due

notice and hearing, judgment be rendered ordering defendant (Jovenal Ouano) to Likewise, Section 19 (paragraph 2) of the same law reads:
vacate the premises and restore the lots to their original condition; pay plaintiff
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - The Regional Trial Court shall
(PGTT) P100,000.00 as damages per year, beginning October, 1996 until he shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
have vacated the premises and restored the lots to their original condition;
x x x.
pay P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; and pay P50,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
"Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs & remedies, just & equitable under the premises."
any interest therein,where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
On February 5, 1998, Ouano filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is
P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over it considering that
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful
the assessed value of the lots involved is only P2,910, as indicated in the latest tax
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
declaration,3 citing Section 19 (paragraph 2) and Section 33 (paragraph 3) of Batas
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
Pambansa Bilang 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by Republic
x x x." (Emphasis ours)
4
Act No. 7691.
It
is
undisputed
that the assessed value of the property involved, as shown by the
In its opposition to Ouanos motion, PGTT contends that the RTC has jurisdiction since
the market value of the lots is P49,760.00.5 Besides, the complaint is not only an action for corresponding tax declaration, is only P2,910.00. As such, the complaint is well within the
recovery of ownership and possession of real property, but also for damages MTCs P20,000.00 jurisdictional limit.
exceeding P100,000.00, over which claim the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction under The finding of respondent judge that the value of the lots is higher than that indicated in the
tax declaration and that, therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case is highly
Section 19 (paragraph 8) of the same law.
On March 6, 1998, the RTC, presided by Judge Ramon G. Codilla, Jr., issued an Order speculative. It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the
property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper
denying the motion to dismiss, holding that:
government agency.
"This court believes that this court has jurisdiction to try this case considering that the
real properties consist of ten parcels of land in a subdivision and the court takes note Respondent judge further held that since the complaint also seeks the recovery of damages
that there is a discrepancy somewhere by the Office of the City Assessor in the exceedingP100,000.00, then it is within the competence of the RTC pursuant to Section 19
Assessment of the parcels of land for only less thanP2,000.00 and that the (paragraph 8) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, which states:
"SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
government is very much at a loss by these unrealistic valuation."6
original jurisdiction:
Ouano filed a motion for reconsideration but was likewise denied by the RTC in its Order
xxx
dated May 27, 1998. The trial court ruled it has jurisdiction over the case because "(i)t is of
judicial knowledge that the real properties situated in Cebu City command a higher
valuation than those indicated in the tax declaration. The observation of plaintiffs (PGTTs)
counsel as to the issue on damages is likewise sustained considering that, being a
corporation, it may have incurred damages in the form of unrealized profits."7

"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the
property in controversy exceeds P100,000.00 or, in such other cases in Metro Manila,
where the demand, exclusive of the above mentioned items exceeds P200,000.00."

Hence the present petition for certiorari filed by Ouano under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Orders of respondent judge dated March 6,
1998 and May 27, 1998 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The above provision does not apply to the instant case. It is applicable only to "all other
cases" other than an action involving title to, or possession of real property in which
the assessed value is the controlling factor in determining the courts jurisdiction. Besides,
the same provision explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional amount
the demand for "interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, and costs". The exclusion of such damages is reiterated in Section 33,
paragraph 3 of the sameBatas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier. The said
damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for
recovery of ownership and possession of real property. In this connection, this Court issued
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. 7691.
Paragraph 2 states:

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper,
for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts.8 We need to reiterate, for the guidance of petitioner, that this Courts original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus,quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA), as
in the present case, and with the RTCs in proper cases within their respective
regions.9 However, this concurrence of jurisdiction does not grant a party seeking any of the
extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file his petition with the court of his choice. This
Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.10 The hierarchy of
courts determines the appropriate forum for such petitions. Thus, petitions for the issuance
of such extraordinary writs against the first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the
RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA.11 A direct invocation of this Courts original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is the
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon this
Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of its docket.12 Unfortunately, the instant
petition does not allege any special and compelling reason to justify a direct recourse to this
Court. However, we deem it more appropriate and practical to resolve the controversy in
order to avoid further delay, but only in this instance.

"2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of
the court." (Emphasis ours)
We thus find that in issuing the assailed orders denying petitioners motion to dismiss, thus
taking cognizance of the case, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders issued by
respondent RTC on March 6, 1998 and May 27, 1998 in Civil Case No. CEB-21319
are SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint is orderedDISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005

CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA
and PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ALLAN T. SALVADOR, Respondents.

After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with
counterclaim.9 Traversing the material allegations of the complaint, he contended that the
petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the
conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion
Mazo-Salvador.

parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon,
Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M.
Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which adjudication was known by the
plaintiffs[] fathers co-heirs;

Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador appealed

the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of
the RTC and dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as
follows:

10
HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention making
common
cause
with
the
private
respondent.
On
her
own
motion,
however,
Virginia
Salvador
VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM,respondents-intervenors.
was dropped as intervenor.11
DECISION
During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
in 1991 the property had an assessed value of P5,950.00.12
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as well as its dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said decision.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:
The Antecedents
Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed property; and
Hilario, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch
71, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows: Dismissing defendants counterclaim.
13
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a SO ORDERED.

3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case
the property of the plaintiffs father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refilling in the proper court.
predecessors-in-interest;
SO ORDERED.14
4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership
manifested that he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion and possession of real property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed
Mazo Salvador;
value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the

5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the action, conformably to Section 3315 of R.A. No. 7691.
Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate
hereto attached as ANNEX B;
court denied.16 Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the following assignment of errors:
6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the I
plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE, ACCION REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN
3
services of a lawyer.
THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.
thus:
II
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR
issued for the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied IN ORDERING THE REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE [PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF
property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:
DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS
a. actual damages, as follows:
ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE
17
a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.

amounting to P1,500.00 and for the subsequent attendance to the hearing of this case The Ruling of the Court
at P1,500.00 each schedule;
The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the
a.2. attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P500.00 for every court appearance;
petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC, against the private respondent, who was the defendant
b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court to therein.
determine; and

The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion
reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the
assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court.
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of Besides, according to the petitioners, in their opposition to respondents motion to dismiss,
jurisdiction over the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. they made mention of the increase in the assessed value of the land in question in the
129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691.5 He averred that
amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their action is also one for
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;
damages exceedingP20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction under R.A.
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to No. 7691.
as the subject-matter of this action;
The petition has no merit.
both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive
case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the
absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayed for which type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed,
can be picked-up for determining the Courts jurisdiction as provided by law.
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted
18
In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the therein. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor
lines, that the assessed value of the land in question cannot exceed P20,000.00 and, as does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of
such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and should have the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
been filed before said Court rather than before the RTC. 6
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the
The petitioners opposed the motion.7 They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that
action since the court can take judicial notice of the market value of the property in the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession
question, which was P200.00 per square meter and considering that the property was of the real property subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for
14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value thereof isP3,500,000.00. Besides, its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of
according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and "the proper time to ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion
publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to
interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the land is of such value."
as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the motion to dismiss, holding of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.19
that the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the
RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.4

The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of
ownership over the property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such,
entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the defendant,
constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and refused to vacate the
property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate
the property and restore possession thereof to them.

cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of
action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, which states:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was jurisdiction:
already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro

Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest The said provision is applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action involving title
therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro to, or possession of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) determining the courts jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property.26
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:
be dismissed.27
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
original jurisdiction:
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now
determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof.
The assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied
by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.20 The fair market value is the
price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought
by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation
stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint.21 The court cannot take
judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands.22 Absent any allegation in the
complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the
RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590A, showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners,
however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed
value of the property when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the
assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not
the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case involved title to or
possession of real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00.23
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691
discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces,
the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and the MTC, if the value
is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the
municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the
case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffsappellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5
million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the
light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that
should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this
is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is
located, and not the court a quo.24
It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys
the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.25
Unavailing also is the petitioners argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks
the recovery of damages exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over
their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes
from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for "interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs." This Court issued
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No.
7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main

G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005

CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA
and PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ALLAN T. SALVADOR, Respondents.

After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with
counterclaim.9 Traversing the material allegations of the complaint, he contended that the
petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the
conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion
Mazo-Salvador.

parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon,
Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary share of their father, Brigido M.
Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which adjudication was known by the
plaintiffs[] fathers co-heirs;

Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador appealed

the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003 reversing the ruling of
the RTC and dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as
follows:

10
HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention making
common
cause
with
the
private
respondent.
On
her
own
motion,
however,
Virginia
Salvador
VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM,respondents-intervenors.
was dropped as intervenor.11
DECISION
During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
in 1991 the property had an assessed value of P5,950.00.12
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as well as its dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said decision.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:
The Antecedents
Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all surnamed property; and
Hilario, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon, Romblon, Branch
71, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows: Dismissing defendants counterclaim.
13
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of a SO ORDERED.

3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case
the property of the plaintiffs father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or their DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refilling in the proper court.
predecessors-in-interest;
SO ORDERED.14
4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the latter The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of ownership
manifested that he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their grandmother, Concepcion and possession of real property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed
Mazo Salvador;
value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the

5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the action, conformably to Section 3315 of R.A. No. 7691.
Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the appellate
hereto attached as ANNEX B;
court denied.16 Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the following assignment of errors:
6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the I
plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE, ACCION REINVINDICATORIA, FALLS WITHIN
3
services of a lawyer.
THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON.
thus:
II
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR
issued for the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the occupied IN ORDERING THE REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE [PROPER] COURT, INSTEAD OF
property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:
DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED ON THE COMPLETE RECORDS
a. actual damages, as follows:
ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE
17
a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.

amounting to P1,500.00 and for the subsequent attendance to the hearing of this case The Ruling of the Court
at P1,500.00 each schedule;
The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the
a.2. attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P500.00 for every court appearance;
petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC, against the private respondent, who was the defendant
b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable Court to therein.
determine; and

The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion
reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the
assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court.
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of Besides, according to the petitioners, in their opposition to respondents motion to dismiss,
jurisdiction over the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. they made mention of the increase in the assessed value of the land in question in the
129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691.5 He averred that
amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their action is also one for
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;
damages exceedingP20,000.00, over which the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction under R.A.
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to No. 7691.
as the subject-matter of this action;
The petition has no merit.
both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive
case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the
absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayed for which type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed,
can be picked-up for determining the Courts jurisdiction as provided by law.
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted
18
In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between the therein. The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action. Nor
lines, that the assessed value of the land in question cannot exceed P20,000.00 and, as does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of the defendant or agreement of
such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and should have the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties.
been filed before said Court rather than before the RTC. 6
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the
The petitioners opposed the motion.7 They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so rule that
action since the court can take judicial notice of the market value of the property in the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession
question, which was P200.00 per square meter and considering that the property was of the real property subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has for
14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value thereof isP3,500,000.00. Besides, its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of
according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and "the proper time to ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion
publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to
interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the land is of such value."
as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order8 denying the motion to dismiss, holding of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.19
that the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore, cognizable by the
RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.4

The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of
ownership over the property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such,
entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the defendant,
constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and refused to vacate the
property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate
the property and restore possession thereof to them.

cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of
action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, which states:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was jurisdiction:
already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro

Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest The said provision is applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action involving title
therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro to, or possession of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling factor in
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) determining the courts jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property.26
costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the proceedings
property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:
be dismissed.27
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
original jurisdiction:
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now
determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof.
The assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the real property multiplied
by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.20 The fair market value is the
price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought
by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an allegation
stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint.21 The court cannot take
judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands.22 Absent any allegation in the
complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be determined whether the
RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners action.
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590A, showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was P5,950.00. The petitioners,
however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed
value of the property when they filed their complaint in 1996. Even assuming that the
assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not
the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners since the case involved title to or
possession of real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00.23
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691
discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the provinces,
the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and the MTC, if the value
is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the
municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the
case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and presented by the plaintiffsappellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5
million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the
light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that
should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this
is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is
located, and not the court a quo.24
It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys
the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency.25
Unavailing also is the petitioners argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks
the recovery of damages exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over
their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes
from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for "interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs." This Court issued
Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No.
7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main

SLU, INC. vs. EVANGELINE C. COBARRUBIAS | G.R. No. 187104 August 3, 2010
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner SLU, to challenge
the decision2 and the resolution3 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 101708.4
The Factual Background
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.
Respondent Evangeline C. Cobarrubias is an associate professor of the petitioners College
of Human Sciences. She is an active member of the Union of Faculty and Employees of
Saint Louis University (UFESLU).
The 2001-20065 and 2006-20116 Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) between SLU
and UFESLU contain the following common provision on forced leave:
Section 7.7. For teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation, the following
provisions shall apply:
(a) Teaching employees who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years
shall be on forced leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits due
them shall be suspended.7
SLU placed Cobarrubias on forced leave for the first semester of School Year (SY) 20072008 when she failed the evaluation for SY 2002-2003, SY 2005-2006, and SY 2006-2007,
with the rating of 85, 77, and 72.9 points, respectively, below the required rating of 87
points.
To reverse the imposed forced leave, Cobarrubias sought recourse from the CBAs
grievance machinery. Despite the conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their
dispute, prompting Cobarrubias to file a case for illegal forced leave or illegal suspension
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and
Employment, Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City. When circulation and mediation
again failed, the parties submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before
Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) Daniel T. Farias.
Cobarrubias argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case
between the parties, CA-G.R. SP No. 90596,8 ruling that the forced leave for teachers who
fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year period should be coterminous with
the CBA in force during the same five-year period.9
SLU, for its part, countered that the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90596 cannot be
considered in deciding the present case since it is presently on appeal w/ this Court (G.R.
No. 176717)10 &, thus, is not yet final. It argued that the forced leave provision applies
irrespective of w/c CBA is applicable, provided the employee fails her evaluation ) times in 5
years.11
The Voluntary Arbitrator Decision
On October 26, 2007, VA Daniel T. Farias dismissed the case. 12 He found that the CA
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 90596 is not yet final because of the pending appeal with this
Court. He noted that the CBA clearly authorized SLU to place its teaching employees on
forced leave when they fail in the evaluation for 3 yrs w/n a five-year period, without a
distinction on whether the three years fall within one or two CBA periods. Cobarrubias
received the VAs decision on Nov. 20, 2007.13
On December 5, 2007, Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court, but failed to pay the required filing fees and to attach to the petition
copies of the material portions of the record.14
Thus, on Jan. 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition outright for Cobarrubias procedural
lapses.15Cobarrubias received the CA resolution, dismissing her petition, on Jan. 31, 2008.
On February 15, 2008, Cobarrubias filed her motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
ground cited is technical. She, nonetheless, attached to her motion copies of the material
portions of the record and the postal money orders for P4,230.00. She maintained that the
ends of justice and fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits.17
On July 30, 2008, the CA reinstated the petition. It found that Cobarrubias substantially
complied with the rules by paying the appeal fee in full and attaching the proper documents
in her motion for reconsideration.18
SLU insisted that the VA decision had already attained finality for Cobarrubias failure to
pay the docket fees on time.
The CA Decision
The CA brushed aside SLUs insistence on the finality of the VA decision & annulled it,
declaring that the "3 cumulative yrs in 5 yrs" phrase in Sec. 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA
means w/n the 5-year effectivity of the CBA. Thus, the CA ordered SLU to pay all the
benefits due Cobarrubias for the 1st semester of SY 2007-2008, when she was placed on
forced leave.19
When the CA denied20 the motion for reconsideration that followed,21 SLU filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.22
The Petition
SLU argues that the CA should not have reinstated the appeal since Cobarrubias failed to
pay the docket fees within the prescribed period, and rendered the VA decision final and
executory. Even if Cobarrubias procedural lapse is disregarded, SLU submits that Section
7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA should apply irrespective of the 5-yr effectivity of each CBA.

The Case for Cobarrubias

Cobarrubias insists that the CA settled the appeal fee issue, in its July 30, 2008 resolution,
when it found that she had substantially complied with the rules by subsequently paying the
docket fees in full. She submits that the CAs interpretation of Section 7.7(a) of the 20062011 CBA is more in accord with law and jurisprudence.24
The Issues
The core issues boil down to whether the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias petition
despite her failure to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period, and in reversing the
VA decision. To state the obvious, the appeal fee is a threshold issue that renders all other
issues unnecessary if SLUs position on this issue is correct.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees
Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made
strictly in accordance w/ the provision set by law.25 Rule 43 of the ROC provides that
appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a petition for review
w/n 15 days from the receipt of the notice of judgment.26 Furthermore, upon the filing of the
petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and other lawful
fees;27 non-compliance w/ the procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the
petitions dismissal.28 Thus, payment in full of docket fees w/n the prescribed period is not
only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.29 It is an essential requirement, w/o w/n, the decision
appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed.30
As early as the 1932 case of Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres,31 we stressed that the
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of
an appeal. In Lee v. Republic,32 we decided that even though half of the appellate court
docket fee was deposited, no appeal was deemed perfected where the other half was
tendered after the period w/n w/c payment should have been made. In Aranas v. Endona,
we reiterated that the appeal is not perfected if only a part of the docket fee is deposited
w/n the reglementary period & the remainder is tendered after the expiration of the period.
The rulings in these cases have been consistently reiterated in subsequent cases:
Guevarra v. CA, Pedrosa v. Spouses Hill, Gegare v. CA, Lazaro v. CA, Sps. Manalili v. Sps.
de Leon, La Salette College v. Pilotin, SLU v. Spouses Cordero, M.A. Santander Const, Inc.
v. Villanueva, Far Corp. v. Magdaluyo, Meatmasters Intl. Corp. v. Lelis Integrated Devt.
Corp., Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr., Enriquez v. Enriquez, KLT Fruits, Inc. v. WSR Fruits,
Inc., Tan v. Link, Ilusorio v. Ilusorio-Yap, & most recently in Tabigue v. INTERCO, &
continues to be the controlling doctrine.
In the present case, Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on Dec. 5, 2007, 15 days from
receipt of the VA decision on Nov. 20, 2007, but paid her docket fees in full only after 72
days, when she filed her motion for reconsideration on Feb. 15, 2008 & attached the postal
money orders for P4,230.00. Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late, and w/o payment
of the full docket fees, Cobarrubias appeal was not perfected w/n the reglementary period.
Exceptions to the Rule on Payment of Appellate Court Docket Fees not applicable
Procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established
primarily to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our judicial system.50 While
procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly
applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary
to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.51
Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they
are required to be followed. However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict
observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from
an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3)
good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the
time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits
of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9)
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10) peculiar,
legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial
justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound
discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant circumstances.52 Thus, there should be
an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable or meritorious
explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.1avvphi1
In Cobarrubias' case, no such explanation has been advanced. Other than insisting
that the ends of justice and fair play are better served if the case is decided on its merits,
Cobarrubias offered no excuse for her failure to pay the docket fees in full when she filed
her petition for review. To us, Cobarrubias omission is fatal to her cause.
We, thus, find that the CA erred in reinstating Cobarrubias petition for review despite the
nonpayment of the requisite docket fees within the reglementary period. The VA decision
had lapsed to finality when the docket fees were paid; hence, the CA had no jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal except to order its dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101708 are hereby DECLARED VOID and are
consequently SET ASIDE. The decision of the voluntary arbitrator, that the voided CA
decision and resolution nullified, stands. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 166876

March 24, 2006

ARTEMIO INIEGO,1Petitioner,
vs.
The HONORABLE JUDGE GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, in his official capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, City of Manila, and FOKKER
C. SANTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For this Court to grant this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner has to persuade us on two engaging questions of law. First, he has to
convince us that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are capable of
pecuniary estimation, and therefore would fall under the jurisdiction of the municipal courts
if the claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount of P400,000.00 in Metro Manila.
Second, he has to convince us that the moral and exemplary damages claimed by the
private respondent should be excluded from the computation of the above-mentioned
jurisdictional amount because they arose from a cause of action other than the negligent
act of the defendant.

petitioners motion for reconsideration. Pertinent portions of the 21 January 2003 Order are
reproduced hereunder:
What this court referred to in its Order sought to be reconsidered as not capable of
pecuniary estimation is the CAUSE OF ACTION, which is quasi-delict and NOT the amount
of damage prayed for.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.4
Petitioner elevated the 21 October 2002 and 21 January 2003 Orders of the RTC to the
Court of Appeals on petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On 28
October 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and dismissed for lack of merit.5
On 22 November 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the
Court of Appeals on 26 January 2005. Hence, this present petition.

Petitioner claims that actions for damages based on quasi-delict are actions that are
capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the jurisdiction in such cases falls upon either the
Petitioner urges us to reverse the 28 October 2004 Decision and 26 January 2005 municipal courts (the Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Eighth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 76206 denying due Courts In Cities, And Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), or the Regional Trial Courts, depending
course to the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner under Rule 65, elevating the 21 on the value of the damages claimed.
October 2002 Omnibus Order and the 21 January 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court Petitioner argues further that should this Court find actions for damages capable of
(RTC), Branch 42, City of Manila. The dispositive portion of the 28 October 2004 Decision pecuniary estimation, then the total amount of damages claimed by the private respondent
must exceed P400,000.00 in order that it may fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
of the Court of Appeals reads:
Petitioner asserts, however, that the moral and exemplary damages claimed by private
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit.2
respondent be excluded from the computation of the total amount of damages for
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
jurisdictional purposes because the said moral and exemplary damages arose, not from the
On 1 March 2002, private respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and quasi-delict, but from the petitioners refusal to pay the actual damages.
damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck involved in a traffic accident, and I
against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The
complaint stemmed from a vehicular accident that happened on 11 December 1999, when Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the
a freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private respondents jitney which private recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the defendants alleged
tortious acts, and are therefore capable of pecuniary estimation.
respondent was driving at the time of the accident.
6
On 24 August 2002, private respondent filed a Motion to Declare defendant in Default In a recent case, we did affirm the jurisdiction of a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in actions
for
damages
based
on quasi-delict, although the ground used to challenge said jurisdiction
allegedly for failure of the latter to file his answer within the final extended period. On 28
August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on was an alleged forum shopping, and not the applicability of Section 19(1) of Batas
the ground, among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the cause of action of Pambansa Blg. 129.
the case.
On 21 October 2002, public respondent Judge Guillermo G. Purganan, acting as presiding
judge of the RTC, Branch 42, Manila, issued the assailed Omnibus Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss of the petitioner and the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default of the
private respondent. Pertinent portions of the Omnibus Order and the dispositive portion
thereof read:

According to respondent Judge, what he referred to in his assailed Order as not capable of
pecuniary estimation is the cause of action, which is a quasi-delict, and not the amount of
damage prayed for.7 From this, respondent Judge concluded that since fault or negligence
in quasi-delicts cannot be the subject of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction. The
Court of Appeals affirmed respondent Judge in this respect.8

Respondent Judges observation is erroneous. It is crystal clear from B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, that what must be determined to be capable or
incapable of pecuniary estimation is not the cause of action, but the subject matter of the
action.9 A cause of action is "the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the
defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff." 10 On the other hand, the "subject
matter of the action" is "the physical facts, the thing real or personal, the money, lands,
chattels, and the like, in relation to which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong
The explanation of defendant IEGO has merit. The order dated 12 August 2002 was sent committed by the defendant."11
to a wrong address, thus defendant IEGO did not receive it. Since it was not received, he
12
was not aware that the court would grant no further extension. The Motion to Admit Motion The case of Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc., et al., has guided this Court time and again in
determining
whether
the
subject
matter
of
the
action is capable of pecuniary estimation. In
to Dismiss has to be granted and the Motion to declare Defendant IEGO [in default] has to
Lapitan, the Court spoke through the eminent Mr. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes:
be DENIED.
In his opposition to the motion to declare him in default and his Motion to Admit defendant
IEGO alleged that he never received the Order dated 12 August 2002. But believing in
good faith, without being presumptuous, that his 3rd Motion for additional Time to file or any
appropriate [pleading] would be granted, he filed the aforesaid Motion received by the Court
on 23 August 2002.

xxxx
The plaintiff opines that this court has exclusive jurisdiction because the cause of action is
the claim for damages, which exceeds P400,000.00. The complaint prays for actual
damages in the amount of P40,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, and
exemplary damages in the amount of P150,000.00. Excluding attorneys fees in the amount
of P50,000.00, the total amount of damages being claimed is P490,000.00.
Proceeding on the assumption that the cause of action is the claim of (sic) for damages in
the total amount ofP490,000.00, this court has jurisdiction. But is the main cause of action
the claim for damages?

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts] would depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought like suits to have the defendant perform his part
of the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance [now Regional Trial Courts]. x x
x.13 (Emphasis supplied.)

This court is of the view that the main cause of action is not the claim for damages but
quasi-delict. Damages are being claimed only as a result of the alleged fault or negligence
of both defendants under Article 2176 of the Civil Code in the case of defendant Pinion and
under Article 2180 also of the Civil Code in the case of defendant Iniego. But since fault or Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the
negligence (quasi-delicts) could not be the subject of pecuniary estimation, this court has recovery of a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the defendants alleged
exclusive jurisdiction.
tortious acts. The damages claimed in such actions represent the monetary equivalent of
the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought to be recovered by
xxxx
the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought, and is not merely incidental
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion to declare defendant Iniego in default thereto or a consequence thereof. It bears to point out that the complaint filed by private
3
and the said defendants motion to dismiss are denied.
respondent before the RTC actually bears the caption "for DAMAGES."
On 7 November 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Omnibus Order of Fault or negligence, which the Court of Appeals claims is not capable of pecuniary
21 October 2002. On 21 January 2003, public respondent issued an Order denying estimation, is not actionable by itself. For such fault or negligence to be actionable, there
must be a resulting damage to a third person. The relief available to the offended party in

such cases is for the reparation, restitution, or payment of such damage, without which any
alleged offended party has no cause of action or relief. The fault or negligence of the
defendant, therefore, is inextricably intertwined with the claim for damages, and there can
be no action based on quasi-delict without a claim for damages.
We therefore rule that the subject matter of actions for damages based on quasi-delict is
capable of pecuniary estimation.
II
The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for
all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the
claims for damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.
Despite our concurrence in petitioners claim that actions for damages based on quasidelict are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation, we find that the total amount of
damages claimed by the private respondent nevertheless still exceeds the jurisdictional limit
of P400,000.00 and remains under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Petitioner argues that in actions for damages based on quasi-delict, claims for damages
arising from a different cause of action (i.e., other than the fault or negligence of the
defendant) should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional amount.
According to petitioner, the moral and exemplary damages claimed by the respondents in
the case at bar are not direct and proximate consequences of the alleged negligent act.
Petitioner points out that the complaint itself stated that such moral and exemplary
damages arose from the alleged refusal of defendants to honor the demand for damages,
and therefore there is no reasonable cause and effect between the fault or negligence of
the defendant and the claim for moral and exemplary damages.14 If the claims for moral and
exemplary damages are not included in the computation for purposes of determining
jurisdiction, only the claim for actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00 will be
considered, and the MeTC will have jurisdiction.
We cannot give credence to petitioners arguments. The distinction he made between
damages arising directly from injuries in a quasi-delict and those arising from a refusal to
admit liability for a quasi-delict is more apparent than real, as the damages sought by
respondent originate from the same cause of action: the quasi-delict. The fault or
negligence of the employee and the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his employer
in his selection and supervision are the seeds of the damages claimed, without distinction.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral and exemplary
damages arose from a cause of action other than the quasi-delict, their inclusion in the
computation of damages for jurisdictional purposes is still proper. All claims for damages
should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of whether they
arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the
Rules of Court allows a party to assert as many causes of action as he may have against
the opposing party. Subsection (d) of said section provides that where the claims in all such
joined causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.15
Hence, whether or not the different claims for damages are based on a single cause of
action or different causes of action, it is the total amount thereof which shall govern.
Jurisdiction in the case at bar remains with the RTC, considering that the total amount
claimed, inclusive of the moral and exemplary damages claimed, isP490,000.00.
In sum, actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that are capable of
pecuniary estimation. As such, they fall within the jurisdiction of either the RTC or the
municipal courts, depending on the amount of damages claimed. In this case, the amount
of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of
damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for
damages arise from the same or from different causes of action.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 28 October 2004 and 26 January
2005, respectively, are AFFIRMED insofar as they held that the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 140746

March 16, 2005

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN, Petitioner,

vs.
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE, Respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated July 23 1999
and Resolution2 dated November 4, 1999 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 38453, entitled
"Standard Insurance Company, Inc., and Martina Gicale vs. PANTRANCO North Express,
Inc., and Alexander Buncan."

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in a
Resolution dated November 4, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the following assignments of error:
"I: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT OF THE ACTION CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS RESPECTIVE
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS DID NOT ARISE OUT OF THE
SAME TRANSACTION NOR ARE THERE QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACTS
COMMON TO BOTH PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS.
II: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE TO RESPONDENTS
CONSIDERING THAT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND LAW
APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT SHOWN ANY
RIGHT TO THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR.

In the afternoon of October 28, 1984, Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney
owned by his mother Martina Gicale, respondent herein. It was then raining. While driving
north bound along the National Highway in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, a passenger bus, owned
by Pantranco North Express, Inc., petitioner, driven by Alexander Buncan, also a petitioner,
III: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS."
was trailing behind. When the two vehicles were negotiating a curve along the highway, the
passenger bus overtook the jeepney. In so doing, the passenger bus hit the left rear side of
For their part, respondents contend that their individual claims arose out of the same
the jeepney and sped away.
vehicular accident and involve a common question of fact and law. Hence, the RTC has
Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police Station and respondent Standard jurisdiction over the case.
Insurance Co., Inc. (Standard), insurer of the jeepney. The total cost of the repair
I
was P21,415.00, but respondent Standard paid only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale shouldered
the balance of P13,415.00.
Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the cause of
action of each respondent did not arise from the same transaction and that there are no
Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement from petitioners
common questions of law and fact common to both parties. Section 6, Rule 3 of the
Pantranco and its driver Alexander Buncan, but they refused. This prompted respondents to
Revised Rules of Court,5 provides:
file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Manila, a complaint for sum of money.
"Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any right
In their answer, both petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and
to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is
averred that it is the MTC, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.
alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as
otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
On June 5, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision3 in favor of respondents Standard and
Martina, thus:
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such
defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just
"WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, Standard Insurance Company and Martina Gicale,
connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest."
and against defendants Pantranco Bus Company and Alexander Buncan, ordering
the latter to pay as follows:
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same
(1) to pay plaintiff Standard Insurance the amount of P8,000.00 with interest due transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the
thereon from November 27, 1984 until fully paid;
plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of
(2) to pay plaintiff Martina Gicale the amount of P13,415.00 with interest due thereon the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.6
from October 22, 1984 until fully paid;
In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting the
(3) to pay the sum of P10,000.00 for attorneys fees;
rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether
petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents,
(4) to pay the expenses of litigation and the cost of suit.
consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners.
SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision4 dated July 23, 1999, affirmed the trial To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence
which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to
courts ruling, holding that:
authorize a recovery in the first.7 Here, had respondents filed separate suits against
"The appellants argue that appellee Gicales claim of P13,415.00 and appellee petitioners, the same evidence would have been presented to sustain the same cause of
insurance companys claim of P8,000.00 individually fell under the exclusive original action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the complaint with the court below is in order.
jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. This is not correct because under the Totality Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and
Rule provided for under Sec. 19, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, it is the sum of the two orderly administration of justice.
claims that determines the jurisdictional amount.
Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides:
In the case at bench, the total of the two claims is definitely more than P20,000.00 which
at the time of the incident in question was the jurisdictional amount of the RTC.
"Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an
Appellants contend that there was a misjoinder of parties. Assuming that there was,
opposing party, subject to the following conditions:
under the Rules of Court (Sec. 11, Rule 7) as well as under the Rules of Civil Procedure
(ditto), the same does not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor is it a ground to dismiss
xxx
the complaint.
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money
It does not need perspicacity in logic to see that appellees Gicales and insurance
the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction."
companys individual claims against appellees (sic) arose from the same vehicular
accident on October 28, 1984 involving appellant Pantrancos bus and appellee Gicales The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined
jeepney. That being the case, there was a question of fact common to all the parties: accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and that no
Whose fault or negligence caused the damage to the jeepney?
misjoinder of parties is involved.8 The issue of whether respondents claims shall be lumped
Appellants submit that they were denied their day in court because the case was together is determined by paragraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies
deemed submitted for decision "without even declaring defendants in default or to have the "totality rule" as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 9 which states, among
waived the presentation of evidence." This is incorrect. Of course, the court did not others, that "where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or
declare defendants in default because that is done only when the defendant fails to different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
tender an answer within the reglementary period. When the lower court ordered that the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
case is deemed submitted for decision that meant that the defendants were deemed to arose out of the same or different transactions."
have waived their right to present evidence. If they failed to adduce their evidence, they
As previously stated, respondents cause of action against petitioners arose out of the same
should blame nobody but themselves. They failed to be present during the scheduled
transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims.
hearing for the reception of their evidence despite notice and without any motion or
explanation. They did not even file any motion for reconsideration of the order Respondent Standards claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina Gicale
considering the case submitted for decision.
is P13,415.00, or a total ofP21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC
Finally, contrary to the assertion of the defendant-appellants, the evidence has "exclusive original jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of
preponderantly established their liability for quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00)." Clearly, it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant
Code."
case. It bears emphasis that when the complaint was filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the

jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts had not yet
taken effect. It became effective on April 15, 1994.
II
The finding of the trial court, affirmed by the Appellate Court, that petitioners are negligent
and thus liable to respondents, is a factual finding which is binding upon us, a rule wellestablished in our jurisprudence. It has been repeatedly held that the trial court's factual
findings, when affirmed by the Appellate Court, are conclusive and binding upon this Court,
if they are not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
significance and influence. Petitioners have not presented sufficient ground to warrant a
deviation from this rule.10
III
There is no merit in petitioners contention that they were denied due process. Records
show that during the hearing, petitioner Pantrancos counsel filed two motions for resetting
of trial which were granted by the trial court. Subsequently, said counsel filed a notice to
withdraw. After respondents had presented their evidence, the trial court, upon petitioners
motion, reset the hearing to another date. On this date, Pantranco failed to appear. Thus,
the trial court warned Pantranco that should it fail to appear during the next hearing, the
case will be submitted for resolution on the basis of the evidence presented. Subsequently,
Pantrancos new counsel manifested that his client is willing to settle the case amicably and
moved for another postponement. The trial court granted the motion. On the date of the
hearing, the new counsel manifested that Pantrancos employees are on strike and moved
for another postponement. On the next hearing, said counsel still failed to appear. Hence,
the trial court considered the case submitted for decision.
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.11
Petitioner Pantranco filed an answer and participated during the trial and presentation of
respondents evidence. It was apprised of the notices of hearing issued by the trial court.
Indeed, it was afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain its side of the
controversy. Clearly, it was not denied of its right to due process. What is frowned upon is
the absolute lack of notice and hearing which is not present here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 23 1999 and
Resolution dated November 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38453 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,

vs.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE
SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.

face that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict
by evidence other than their negative allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce
accounted by the second marriage and the compulsory heirs thereunder.

SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, Petitioner,

vs.
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE
SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Respondents.

The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true and just accounting of his
administration from his date of assumption up to the year ending December 31, 1996 per
Financial and Accounting Report dated June 2, 1997 which was approved by the Court.
The accounting report included the income earned and received for the period and the
expenses incurred in the administration, sustenance and allowance of the widow. In
accordance with said Financial and Accounting Report which was duly approved by this
Court in its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 the deceased JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real
properties consisting of the following:

DECISION

I LAND:

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 177192

Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located at #3030 Agtarap St., Pasay
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 38254 and 38255 and registered with the
Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of petitioners Sebastian G. Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro Manila, described as follows:
Agtarap (Sebastian)1and Eduardo G. Agtarap (Eduardo),2 assailing the Decision dated
November 21, 20063 and the Resolution dated March 27, 20074 of the Court of Appeals
TCT NO. LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M. ZONAL VALUE AMOUNT
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73916.
NACHURA, J.:

The antecedent facts and proceedings

On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114,
Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his deceased father
Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin). It was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 94-4055.

38254

745-B-1

1,335 sq. m.

P5,000.00

P6,675,000.00

38255

745-B-2

1,331 sq. m.

P5,000.00

P6,655,000.00

The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City
without any known debts or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two
TOTAL------------------------------------------------------------marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia),5 and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia
died on April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had three childrenJesus (died without issue),
Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria,6 Joseph, and Teresa7). II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:
Joaquin married Caridad on February 9, 1926. They also had three childrenEduardo,
Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time of his death,
BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1) -----------------------------Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of
BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2) ----------------------------Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the said realties and had been appropriating for
himselfP26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Building Improvements -------------------------------------Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint him as special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil fruits,
pending the appointment of a regular administrator. In addition, he prayed that an order be
issued (a) confirming and declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be
entitled to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the named heirs
their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and (c) entitling the distributees
the right to receive and enter into possession those parts of the estate individually awarded
to them.
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition for initial hearing and
directing Eduardo to cause its publication.

P13,330,000.00

P350,000.00
320,000.00
97,500.00

Restaurant ------------------------------------------------------

80,000.00

TOTAL ---------------------------------------------------------

P847,500.00

TOTAL NET WORTH -----------------------------------------

P14,177,500.00

On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally admitting the allegations in WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a total
value of P14,177,500.00, together with whatever interest from bank deposits and all other
the petition, and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special administrator.
incomes or increments thereof accruing after the Accounting Report of December 31, 1996,
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject after deducting therefrom the compensation of the administrator and other expenses
lots belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucias death allowed by the Court, are hereby ordered distributed as follows:
in April 1924, they became the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that
their residence was built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and the TOTAL ESTATE P14,177,500.00
expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the CARIDAD AGTARAP of the estate as her conjugal share P7,088,750.00, the other
restaurant (Manongs Restaurant) was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his half of P7,088,750.00 to be divided among the compulsory heirs as follows:
business partner. They opposed the appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the
following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots
1) JOSE (deceased) P1,181,548.30
is minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed that the best
interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as special or regular administrator.
2) MILAGROS (deceased) P1,181,548.30
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator of Joaquins estate. Consequently, it issued him letters of administration.
3) MERCEDES (deceased) P1,181,548.30
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in intervention, alleging that
Mercedes is survived not only by her daughter Cecile, but also by him as her husband. He
4) SEBASTIAN P1,181,548.30
also averred that there is a need to appoint a special administrator to the estate, but
claimed that Eduardo is not the person best qualified for the task.
After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit their respective
proposed projects of partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of
Partition,8 with the following disposition

5) EDUARDO -

P1,181,548.30

6) CARIDAD P1,181,548.30
In the light of the filing by the heirs of their respective proposed projects of partition and the
payment of inheritance taxes due the estate as early as 1965, and there being no claim in The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the amount of P1,181,548.30 and who
Court against the estate of the deceased, the estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now died in 1996 will go to Teresa Agtarap and Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and half
consequently ripe for distribution among the heirs minus the surviving spouse Caridad brothers Eduardo and Sebastian Agtarap in equal proportions.
Garcia who died on August 25, 1999.
TERESA AGTARAP P236,291.66
Considering that the bulk of the estate property were acquired during the existence of the
second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which showed on its

JOSEPH AGTARAP -

P236,291.66

P1,181,458.38

WALTER DE SANTOS -

P236,291.66

SEBASTIAN AGTARAP -

P236,291.66

2)
EDUARDO
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap)

EDUARDO AGTARAP -

P236,291.66

In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to inherit:

REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:

1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP

Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as follows:

SEBASTIAN

COMPULSORY HEIRS:

P4,135,104.10
P1,181,458.30
P 236,291.66

AGTARAP

share from Caridad Garcia

- as compulsory heir
- share from Milagros

1) GLORIA (deceased) represented by Walter de Santos

-

P295,364.57

2) JOSEPH AGTARAP -

P295,364.57

3) TERESA AGTARAP -

P295,364.57

4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP -

P295,364.57

P5,522,854.06
EDUARDO

P4,135,104.10
P1,181,458.30
P 236,291.66

share from Caridad Garcia

as compulsory heir
share from Milagros

P5,522,854.06
SO ORDERED.9

Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit P295,364.57.

Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their respective motions for
Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following heirs of the first marriage stand to reconsideration.
receive the total amount of:
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution10 denying the motions for reconsideration
HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:
of Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph and Teresa. It also declared that the
real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also
1avvphi1
directed the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct
sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo
1) JOSEPH AGTARAP P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap
and Sebastian both appealed to the CA.
P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
2) TERESA AGTARAP -

P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap

P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

3) WALTER DE SANTOS -

P236,291.66 share from Milagros Agtarap

P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:

a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999
P7,088,750.00

- as conjugal share

P1,181,458.30

- as compulsory heir

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The assailed Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED and pursuant thereto, the
subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT No. 38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2 [TCT No. 38255])
and the estate of the late Joaquin Agtarap are hereby partitioned as follows:
The two (2) properties, together with their improvements, embraced by TCT No. 38254 and
TCT No. 38255, respectively, are first to be distributed among the following:
Lucia Mendietta - of the property. But since she is deceased, her share shall be inherited
by Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros and Jose in equal shares.
Joaquin Agtarap - of the property and of the other half of the property which pertains to
Lucia Mendiettas share.
Jesus Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since he is already deceased (and died
without issue), his inheritance shall, in turn, be acquired by Joaquin Agtarap.
Milagros Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since she died in 1996 without issue,
5/8 of her inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de
Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in
representation of Milagros brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by
Mercedes (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile),
Sebastian Eduardo, all surnamed Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance
shall be acquired by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by her husband
Walter de Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa in equal
shares.

Total of

P8,270,208.30

b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP -

P1,181,458.38

as compulsory heir

Then, Joaquin Agtaraps estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) of the subject properties and
its improvements, shall be distributed as follows:

P 236,291.66

share from Milagros

P1,181,458.38

as compulsory heir

Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1999, her share shall be inherited
by her children namely Mercedes Agtarap (represented by her husband Abelardo Dagoro
and her daughter Cecilia), Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

P 236,291.66

share from Milagros

c) EDUARDO AGTARAP -

d) MERCEDES -

as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as the

surviving spouse of a compulsory heir

Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her
inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and
her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in representation of
Milagros brother Jose Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by Mercedes (represented
by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile), Sebastian and Eduardo, all
surnamed Agtarap.

Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in 1967, his inheritance shall be acquired conducted in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to
by his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria (represented by her husband Walter de Santos and Eduardo whatever share that she would receive from Joaquins estate. He states that this
her daughter Samantha), Joseph Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in equal shares.
violated the rule on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings.
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died in 1984, her inheritance shall be Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the CA gravely erred when it
acquired by her husband Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile in equal shares.
affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the first marriage of
Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title were registered in the name of
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia. According to him, the RTC,
acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was not vested with the power and
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
authority to determine questions of ownership, which properly belongs to another court with
SO ORDERED.11
general jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
The Courts Ruling
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both motions. Hence, these petitions As to Sebastians and Eduardos common issue on the ownership of the subject real
ascribing to the appellate court the following errors:
properties, we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the same.
G.R. No. 177192
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the aforementioned important court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of
the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
facts12 which alter its Decision;
ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is that such
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the necessity of hearing the issue of court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16 As held in several cases,17 a
legitimacy of respondents as heirs;
probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot
3. The Court of Appeals erred in allowing violation of the law and in not applying the adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are
claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
doctrines of collateral attack, estoppel, and res judicata.13
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
G.R. No. 177099
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT ACQUIRE in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP AND ERRED IN there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing
DISTRIBUTING HER INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF HER LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT IN a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE OF TESTATE PROCEEDINGS However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
convenience.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE DECISION APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE
ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER COURT HOLDING
THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.) 38255
OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF PASAY BELONG TO THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP MARRIED TO LUCIA GARCIA
MENDIETTA NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR EXISTING
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP,
CASADO CON CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE
PROBATE COURT HAS NO POWER TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH SHOULD BE
RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR A TORRENS TITLE
UNDER THE LAW IS ENDOWED WITH INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET
ASIDE IN THE MANNER INDICATED IN THE LAW ITSELF.14
As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian contends that Joseph and
Teresa failed to establish by competent evidence that they are the legitimate heirs of their
father Jose, and thus of their grandfather Joaquin. He draws attention to the certificate of
title (TCT No. 8026) they submitted, stating that the wife of their father Jose is Presentacion
Garcia, while they claim that their mother is Priscilla. He avers that the marriage contracts
proffered by Joseph and Teresa do not qualify as the best evidence of Joses marriage with
Priscilla, inasmuch as they were not authenticated and formally offered in evidence.
Sebastian also asseverates that he actually questioned the legitimacy of Joseph and
Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to their
opposition to the said motion. He further claims that the failure of Abelardo Dagoro and
Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to exclude them as heirs had the effect of admitting
the allegations therein. He points out that his motion was denied by the RTC without a
hearing.
With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that the certificates of title of
real estate properties subject of the controversy are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Caridad Garcia, and as such are conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and
thus, they are not subject to collateral attack, but should be threshed out in a separate
proceeding for that purpose. He likewise argues that estoppel applies against the children
of the first marriage, since none of them registered any objection to the issuance of the
TCTs in the name of Caridad and Joaquin only. He avers that the estate must have already
been settled in light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by Milagros, Joseph,
and Teresa, resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in Milagros name and of TCT No.
8026 in the names of Milagros and Jose. He also alleges that res judicata is applicable as
the court order directing the deletion of the name of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of
Caridad, in the TCTs had long become final and executory.

First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding
the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without
prejudice to the final determination of ownership in a separate action.18 Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
resolve issues on ownership.19Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.20
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties
are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of
the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties
are conjugal is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of
Joaquin.1auuphi1
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified petition for judicial settlement
of Joaquins estate, he alleged that the subject properties were owned by Joaquin and
Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to contracting
marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition,
Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos.
38254 and 38255 were derived from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in
the name of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero casado
con Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR
BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to Emilia Muscat, and the second
married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta).21 When TCT No. 5239 was divided between Francisco
Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 745 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368,
consisting of 8,872 square meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577
(32184)22 issued on April 23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia
Garcia Mendietta.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April 24, 1924, and
subsequently, on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is worthy to note that TCT
No. 5577 (32184) contained an annotation, which reads

Ap-4966 NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de titulo, tal como aparece,

tanchando las palabras "con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a" y poniendo en su lugar, entre lineas
y en tinta encarnada, las palabras "en segundas nupcias con Caridad Garcia", en
complimiento de un orden de fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la
Costa, juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente cadastal No. 23,
In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error, Eduardo alleges that the CA G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia de cual orden has sido presentada con el No. 4966
erroneously settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No. 32184.
Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in contravention of the principle of
settling only one estate in one proceeding. He particularly questions the distribution of the Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.23
estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was

Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa, presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out
and replaced by en segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring to the second marriage
of Joaquin to Caridad. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of
Caridads name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already left, as her estate, onehalf (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No. 32184. Lucias share in the property covered by the
said TCT was carried over to the properties covered by the certificates of title derivative of
TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as found by both the RTC and the
CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory heirs Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.

admitting his answer on October 18, 1995.31 The CA also noted that, during the hearing of
the motion to intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose any
objection when the intervention was submitted to the RTC for resolution.32

Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no compelling reason to hold that
both courts erred in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro
rightfully participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present
competent evidence to refute his and Eduardos admissions that Joseph and Teresa were
heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the participation of
Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do so.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the marriage is dissolved by Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had the right to participate in the
the death of the husband or the wife, the community property shall be inventoried, estate in representation of the Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate respectively.33
proceedings of the deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal
This Court also differs from Eduardos asseveration that the CA erred in settling, together
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Thus, the
with Joaquins estate, the respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria. A
RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had to liquidate
perusal of the November 21, 2006 CA Decision would readily show that the disposition of
the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and
the properties related only to the settlement of the estate of Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1,
Teresa institute a settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited above, the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction
be consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucias
to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well as their respective shares after the
24
spouse. Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the
payment of the obligations of the estate, as enumerated in the said provision. The inclusion
properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of this case, to her compulsory
of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria in the distribution of the shares was merely a
heirs.
necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquins estate, they being his legal heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the
However, we agree with Eduardos position that the CA erred in distributing Joaquins
claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show that
estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a
the owners of the properties covered therein were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the
separate proceeding was instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by
registration in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia,
Milagros before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City.34 While there has been no showing that
deserves scant consideration. This cannot be said to be a collateral attack on the said
the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share from Joaquins estate in favor of
TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily conclusive of a
Eduardo, has already been probated and approved, prudence dictates that this Court
25
holders true ownership of property. A certificate of title under the Torrens system aims to
refrain from distributing Milagros share in Joaquins estate.
protect dominion; it cannot be used as an instrument for the deprivation of
ownership.26 Thus, the fact that the properties were registered in the name of Joaquin It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010, per his Certificate of
Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the properties were acquired Death.35 He is survived by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita) and his children Joaquin
during the spouses coverture.27 The phrase "married to Caridad Garcia" in the TCTs is Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the registered owner, and does not
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006 Decision and the
necessarily prove that the realties are their conjugal properties.28
March 27, 2007 Resolution of the CA should be affirmed with modifications such that the
Neither can Sebastians claim that Joaquins estate could have already been settled in 1965 share of Milagros shall not yet be distributed until after the final determination of the probate
after the payment of the inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the inheritance tax, per se, of her purported will, and that Sebastian shall be represented by his compulsory heirs.
does not settle the estate of a deceased person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of merit, while the
Rules of Court
petition in G.R. No. 177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the Decision dated
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. -- When the debts, funeral November 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are
charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in favor of
any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the Milagros Agtarap shall not be distributed until the final determination of the probate of her
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after will, and that petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on January 15, 2010,
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the shall be represented by his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children Joaquin Julian B.
same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such Agtarap and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.
persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, for
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to further proceedings in the settlement of the estate of Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement
the distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall as to costs.
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
SO ORDERED.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has
been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the payment of the
debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax. The records of these cases do not show that these were complied with
in 1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa, suffice it
to say that both the RTC and the CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose. The
RTC found that Sebastian did not present clear and convincing evidence to support his
averments in his motion to exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative
allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and Teresa being the children of Jose
was never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the latter two even admitted this in
their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the August 21, 1995
hearing.29 Furthermore, the CA affirmed this finding of fact in its November 21, 2006
Decision.30
Also, Sebastians insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are not heirs to
the estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the
RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in
the proceedings below by her husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with
Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on
September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to intervene,
alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father of Cecilia
Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. The RTC later granted the motion, thereby

G.R. No. 99843 June 22, 1993

Sps. BRAULIO ABALOS and AQUILINA ABALOS & JUANITO ULANDAY, petitioners,
vs. CA, HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, ELCOCADIO SORIANO & LIBRADA SORIANO.
BIDIN, J.:
Petitioners seek a reversal of the decision of respondent court dated December 7, 1990
and its resolution dated May 6, 1991, dismissing their petition for certiorari and prohibition
to set aside the resolution dated August 8, 1989 of the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
Branch 37, which reconsidered and set aside its previous resolution dated May 25, 1989,
dismissing private respondents' re-amended complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On Aug. 16, 1979, spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos filed before the RTC of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 38, an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052 proindiviso of Lot No. 8459, situated in barangay Baay, Lingayen & under Cad-373-D of the
Lingayen Cadastre (docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-3405, Record No. N49833), w/ the remaining pro-indiviso portion thereof belonging to Roman Soriano.
On February 17, 1977, the trial court, sitting as a land registration court, issued an order of
general default against the whole world except the Director of Lands and Roman Soriano
who had filed their respective oppositions to the application. In his opposition, oppositor
Soriano alleged that the two lots mentioned in the application had in fact not yet been
divided and therefore, he is a co-owner to the extent of one-seventh (/ 7) pro-indiviso of the
combined areas of Lot Nos. 60052 and 8459 and not only one-fourth () of Lot No. 8459.
In the course of the hearing, it was established that the lots in question were originally
owned by Adriano Soriano who was in continuous, open and adverse possession in the
concept of an owner until his death in 1947. Thereafter, Adriano's heirs executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition stating that the property was inherited by seven of his nine children,
namely: Candido, Lourdes, the heirs of Dionesia, Roman, Francisca, Librada and Elocadio.
The two other children were given other properties.
The above-named heirs likewise decide to subdivide the property into the northern &
southern portions w/c were then separately declared for taxn purposes, ( tax dec. No. 5065
for the northern & tax dec No. 5066 for the southern portion). The northern portion went to
Candido, Lourdes & the heirs of Dionesia while the southern portion was declared in the
names of oppositor Roman, Francisca, Librada & Elcocadio or pro-indiviso shares each.
In 1971, Candido, Lourdes and the heirs of Dionesia sold their shares in the northern
portion to petitioner spouses Abalos. In the same year, Lourdes, Librada and Francisca
sold their shares of the southern portion also to petitioner spouses. Respondent Soriano
raised no objections in regard to the aforementioned sale of the properties.
Based on the above findings, the land registration court in its decision dated June 27, 1983
granted the application for registration of spouses Abalos. The court specifically held
therein that "(t)he deeds of conveyances executed by the former owners of the property in
question in favor of the herein applicants, bearing all the legal formalities under the
safeguard of a notarial certificate and there being no showing that the contracts of sale
entered into by the parties were fraudulent, fictitious and simulated, it is presumed that the
recitals thereof are true and correct and a high degree of proof is to overcome this legal
presumption" (Rollo, p. 75). The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Accordingly, pursuant to the Land Registration Law, known as Act 496, as amended, this
Court hereby confirms the title of the herein applicants over the parcel of land denominated
as Lot No. 60052 and over the three-fourth () pro-indiviso portion of the land mentioned
as Lot No. 8459, described and bounded in Plan AP-1-0028 marked as Exhibit A and series
and the technical description (Exhibits B and C), and therefore adjudicates the said
properties in the name of the herein applicants, Braulio R. Abalos and Aquilina Soriano, of
legal ages, Filipinos and residents of Barangay Baay, Lingayen, Pangasinan, Philippines,
as their conjugal property.
This Court also confirms the title of the herein private oppositor over the one-fourth () proindivisoportion of Lot No. 8459 described and bounded in Plan AP-1-00228 (Exhibit A and
series) and the technical description (Exh. B) and hereby adjudicates the said property in
the name of Roman Soriano II, of legal age, Filipino, married to Beatriz Castro, and a
resident of Barangay Baay, Lingayen, Pangasinan, Philippines, as his exclusive property.
The opposition of the Republic of the Philippines is hereby dismissed for lack of basis.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 76)
Roman Soriano appealed the above decision to the then Intermediate Court of Appeals
(docketed as AC-G.R. C.V. No. 02077).
In its decision dated January 31, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 78-88) the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court. On the issue of whether or not the lower court, sitting as a land
registration court, has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of deeds of sale, the appellate court
cited Franco v. Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank (7 SCRA 660 [1963]) which held that
the general rule that a land registration court has no power to decide matters which are
properly litigable in ordinary civil actions admits of exceptions as when the parties have
acquiesced in submitting said matters for determination in the land registration proceedings
and the parties are afforded full opportunity to present their respective sides and evidence.
It also cited Zuiga v. Court of Appeals (95 SCRA 740 [1980]), which held that a land
registration court may not be denied the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction
which shall make it effective and this includes the power to determine the validity of deeds
of conveyances. As the appellate court concluded: ". . . where the issue of the genuineness
of a document is presented in a land registration case, the CFI (now RTC) sitting as a land

registration court should not in any manner hesitate to determine the conflicting claims of
the parties; otherwise, that would practically reduce said court to impotence to determine
questions of facts, since claims on such a disputed land more often than not are based on
documents of title, and it is only natural that the issue of genuineness would be raised
against said document." (Rollo, pp. 86-87)
Brought before this Court on a petition for review on certiorari (docketed as G.R. No.
70842), Soriano's petition was likewise denied for lack of merit in a Resolution dated Nov.
11, 1985 and entry of judgment was entered on Dec. 16, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 90-91).
It appears that on July 15, 1983, or a day after the promulgation of the trial court's decision
granting the application of petitioners in the land registration case, oppositor Soriano,
together with Elcocadio and Librada Soriano filed a complaint against spouses Abalos for
the annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and damages (docketed as Civil
Case No. 15958) before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 37.
The spouses Abalos filed motion to dismiss the complaint (CC No. 15958) on the ground
of res judicata, pendency of another action, lack of cause of action, laches, misjoinder of
parties and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court (branch 37) denied the motion and instead
directed the spouses to file their Answer, which they did on January 30, 1984.
Upon the demise of oppositor Soriano, his counsel in Civil Case No. 15958 filed an
amended complaint to substitute his heirs as party-plaintiffs. On March 14, 1988, the heirs
of Roman Soriano filed another motion for leave to admit re-amended complaint which
sought to implead Juanito Ulanday, one of petitioners herein, as additional party-defendant
for having allegedly purchased part of the disputed property from the spouses Abalos.
Petitioner spouses opposed the admission of the re-amended complaint. Subsequently, the
heirs of Soriano filed another re-amended complaint dated October 21, 1988 in lieu of the
opposed re-amended complaint.
On motion of the spouses Abalos, the trial court issued a resolution dated May 25, 1989
granting the motion to dismiss the re-amended complaint on the ground that the reamended complaint altered the original cause of action.
Respondent heirs of Soriano moved for a reconsideration of the said resolution and on
August 8, 1989, the trial court issued another resolution setting aside its May 25, 1989
resolution and ordered the spouses Abalos to file their answer to the re-amended complaint
(Rollo, p. 142). Petitioner spouses' "Motion for, and Opposition to, Motion for
Reconsideration" having been filed late, the trial court resolved to deny the same or being
moot and academic (Rollo, p. 152).
Petitioners filed petition for certiorari and prohibition before the respondent court alleging
grave abuse of discretion having been committed by the trial court in not dismissing the reamended complaint. Petitioners contend that the refusal of the trial court to dismiss
respondent's re-amended complaint amounted to lack of jurisdiction because it ignored the
decisions of the land registration court, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Court of
Appeals and as well as that of this Court in the previous land registration case involving the
same parties, the same subject matter and the same issues.
Respondent court disagreed with the petitioners and dismissed the petition. It ruled that the
lower court, acting as a land registration court, exercises limited jurisdiction. Therefore, it
cannot pass upon questions regarding the validity of contracts affecting the disputed
property. Accordingly, a land registration court having limited jurisdiction may not resolve an
issue involving the validity of the deed of sale which is ordinarily cognizable by a court of
general jurisdiction. Concluding, respondent court held that the trial court committed no
error when it refused to adhere to the rule on res judicata which requires that the resolution
of the issue in the prior case should have been made by a court of competent jurisdiction.
We reverse.
Respondent court is in error to rule that the trial court, sitting as a land registration court, is
without authority to determine conflicting claims of ownership over the land sought to be
registered. True, a land registration court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. But this
is not without exception.
From an otherwise rigid rule outlining the jurisdiction of a land registration court being
limited in character, deviations have been sanctioned under the following circumstances
where: (1) the parties agreed or have acquiesced in submitting the aforesaid issues for
determination by the court in the registration proceedings; (2) the parties were accorded full
opportunity in presenting their respective arguments of the issues litigated and of the
evidence in support thereof; and (3) the court has already considered the evidence on
record and is convinced that the same is sufficient and adequate for rendering a decision
upon the issues controverted. (Manalo v. Mariano, 69 SCRA 80 [1976]; Zuiga v. CA, 95
SCRA 740 [1980], citing Aglipay v. De los Reyes, 107 Phil 331 [1960]; Florentino v.
Encarnacion, Jr., 79 SCRA 192 [1977]; Franco v. Monte de Piedad, 117 Phil. 672 [1963];
See also Republic v. Neri, et al., G.R. No. 57475, September 14, 1992)
Here, the issue of ownership was fully ventilated before the land registratn court w/ both of
the parties presenting oral & documentary evidence to sustain their respective claims. It
was a full-dress trial on the merits of the applicants' (herein petitioners) claim over the
parcels of land w/ the then oppositor, Roman Soriano, having been accorded every
opportunity to refute the same. As found by the land registration court: the Abalos spouses
obtained ownership over the land in controversy through the deeds of sale which were
evidenced by Exh. "N", executed on Sept. 28, 1971 by Elcocadio, Librada & Francisca
Soriano over their share on Lot No. 8459; Exh. "O", executed on April 9, 1971 by
Candido Soriano over his 1/3 share; Exh. "P", executed on Sept. 27, 1971 by the
Quinotoses over their 1/3 share; Exh. "Q", executed on Sept. 21, 1971 by Lourdes Soriano
over her 1/3 share.

Indeed, Soriano even offered to sell his shares in the property to petitioners spouses but
the latter found the conditions so onerous that the transaction failed to materialize.
In land registration proceedings, it is expected of the applicant to adduce evidence,
testimonial and documentary, and for the oppositor to adduce proof of equal, if not more,
evidentiary weight to defeat the claim of ownership. The purpose of the applicant is to prove
that he has absolute or registerable title over the property applied for. The oppositor, on the
other hand, claims a right totally adverse to the applicant. The land registration court must
decide as to who has a better right and determine the authenticity of the documents relied
upon by the party claimants.
Given the highly contentious nature of a land registration proceeding, in rem and binding on
the whole world, the claim as to whether or not the land applied for is registerable or not
necessarily entails a resolution on the question of the validity of the document upon which
the applicant anchors his claim of dominion or ownership. The question is not foreign, but is
material and germane, to the crux of the controversy, i.e., whether or not the applicant
possesses registerable title in the realty claimed. If a land registration court is not allowed to
rule on the question of controverted ownership when the parties themselves acquiesced in
the resolution thereof, how could said court be expected to render a decision on
applications for land registration? The claim of ownership in land registration case is more
often evidenced by documents. Otherwise, how could an applicant and/or oppositor prove
their respective claims of ownership?
In Manalo v. Mariano (supra), this Court had occasion to pass upon a similar issue
whether the trial court can entertain an action for annulment of a partition agreement on the
ground of fraud although its validity had already been upheld by Branch 7 of the same court
in a land registration case. In said case, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss based
on bar by prior judgment in the land registration case. Reversing the trial court, we held:
The lower court in its orders dated March 10 and July 17, 1971 denied the motion to
dismiss. It ruled that the decision in the land registration case did not constitute res
judicata as to the validity of the "Kasulatan" in question because Severino Manalo did not
testify in the land registration case regarding its execution and, moreover, the lower court,
as a land registration court with limited jurisdiction, allegedly could not resolve that issue.
On Aug. 5, 1971 Demetrio Manalo filed the instant petition for certiorari & prohibition. The
issue is whether the action for the annulment of the partition agreement is barred by res
judicata.
We hold that such action is barred by the prior judgment in the land registration case. The
decision in a land registration proceeding, which is proceeding in rem, is conclusive upon
the title to the land and is binding on the whole world (Sec. 49 [a], Rule 39, Rules of Court).
In the instant case, the decision in Land Registration Case No. N-6347 may also be
regarded as a judgment in personam against Severino Manalo. He was the oppositor in that
case. He presented evidence in support of his opposition particularly with reference to the
supposed nullity of the 1960 partition agreement. He asked that the contested lots be
registered in his name. The lower court ruled against his contentions and sustained the
application of Demetrio Manalo.
The lower court's decision is conclusive against Severino Manalo. It has all the elements
of res judicata vis-a-vis Civil Case No. 13708: (a) a final judgment, (b) a court with
jurisdiction over the resand the parties, (c) a judgment on the merits, and (d) identity of the
parties, subject-matter and cause of action.
Severino Manalo's contention that the lower court, as a land registration court, had no
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the 1960 partition agreement is not well-taken. The
Court of First Instance (now RTC) is a court of "general original jurisdiction" "invested with
power to take cognizance of all kinds of cases": civil cases, criminal cases, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty and insolvency cases
...
Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance (now RTC) in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate,
land registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural
question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived" (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil.
227, 232; Cf. Reyes v. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re jurisdiction over the issue).
Thus, although a probate court may not decide a question of title, yet if the parties submit
that question to the probate court and the interests of third parties are not impaired, the
probate court may have jurisdiction to decide that issue (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 56).
Generally, an issue properly litigable in an ordinary civil action under the general jurisdiction
of the CFI (or RTC) should not be resolved in a land registration proceeding. But since in
this jurisdiction the CFI (or RTC) also functions as a land registration court, if the parties
acquiesced in submitting that issue for determination in the land registration proceeding &
they were given full opportunity to present their respective sides and their evidence, the
land registration court would have jurisdiction to pass upon that issue (citing cases).
In this case Severino Manalo himself invoked the court's jurisdiction by praying that the
deed of partition be "declared null and void" and that the disputed lands be registered in his
name. He and Demetrio Manalo in effect agreed to submit the issue for adjudication by the
lower court, sitting as a land registration court. That was merely a matter of practice or
procedure. It did not mean that the parties asked the lower court to exercise a jurisdiction
which it did not possess.
In such a situation, the rule is that a party cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction (Dean v. Dean, 86 ALR 79; Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA
29 [1968]).

The circumstances obtaining in the above-cited case are on all fours with the instant
petition. As such, the pronouncement made therein finds full application in the case at bar.
Having disposed of the above issue, we now find petitioner's prayer to dismiss Civil Case
No. 15958 on the ground of res judicata impressed with merit.
The principle of res judicata embraces two concepts. Where as between the first case
where the judgment is rendered an second case where such judgment is invoked, there is
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action, the judgment on the merits in the
first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action not only as to every matter
which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but also as to any
other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and to all matters
that could have been adjudged in that case. This is what is called "bar by former judgment".
It is well-settled that for a prior judgments to constitute a bar to a subsequent action, (1)
there must be a final judgment or order, (2) the court rendering the same must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, (3) it must be a judgment on the
merits and (4) there must be between the two cases, identity of the parties, subject matter
and causes of action.
On the other hand, where the second action between the parties is upon a different claim or
demand, the judgment in the first case operates as an estoppel only with regard to those
issues directly controverted, upon the determination of which the judgment was rendered.
This is the rule on "conclusiveness of judgment" (Sec. 49 [c], Rule 39; Tiongson v. Court of
Appeals, 49 SCRA 429 [1973] and cases cited therein).
In the complaint filed by private respondents, it appears that respondents' cause of action is
predicated upon the annulment of the deeds of sale and/or redemption or ownership of the
disputed parcels of land. Whether it be for annulment or claim of ownership, the Court finds
that respondents' action instituted before the trial court falls within the ambit of res
judicata and should be dismissed.
Respondents' claim of nullity of the deeds of sale executed by Elcocadio, Francisca and
Librada in favor of petitioner spouses before the RTC, Branch 37 of Lingayen was already
raised and passed upon by the land registration court (RTC, Branch 38). In other words, it
was the same defense advanced by private respondents in their effort to defeat petitioner
spouses' claim of ownership in the land registration case which, unfortunately, was belied
by the records therein. The judgment on the merits in the land registration case as affirmed
by this Court in G.R. No. 70842, entitled Roman Soriano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
al., constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action not only as to every matter which
was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but also as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and to all matters that
could have been adjudged in that case.
Neither can respondents Elcocadio and Librada Soriano find solace in the fact that by being
not parties to the land registration case, they can now find legal personality to annul the
alleged deed of sale executed by them in favor of petitioner spouses. The fact is, Elcocadio
and Librada Soriano failed to oppose petitioner spouses' application for land registration. A
land registration proceeding is an action in rem; it is binding on the whole world such that
whoever failed to oppose an application, including the Republic, is bound by the order of
general default. As a matter of fact, Elcocadio and Librada Soriano even testified before the
land registration court assailing the validity of the aforesaid sale. This is more than enough
constructive notice and they cannot, by the mere variance of action predicated upon (CC
No. 15958), be allowed to again litigate what had already been adjudged.
Consequently, respondents are barred from assailing again the validity of the conveyances
in Civil Case No. 15958 filed before Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, for the simple reason
that the same has already been litigated and passed upon in the previous land registration
case and affirmed by us. The disputed property could not have been registered in the name
of petitioner spouses were it not found by the land registration court that petitioners were
the real and legitimate owners thereof.
A party may be at liberty to vary his form of actions by bringing in new issues or arguments;
but just the same, he cannot escape the application of the principle of res judicata nor can a
party avoid an estoppel of a former judgment by bringing forward in a second action new or
additional grounds in support of his case or arguments to sustain it, the facts remaining the
same, at least where such additional matter could have been pleaded in the prior action
(Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 207 SCRA 59 [1992]).
With regard to the issue of redemption raised by private respondents in its complaint below,
suffice it to state that it was established in LRC No. N-3405 that at the time of the sale of
Lot No. 60052 to petitioner spouses, said parcel of land has already been segregated from
Lot No. 8459. Records disclose that Lot No. 60052 had been partitioned among Candido,
Lourdes and the heirs of Dionesia who later declared their respective shares of one-third
(/) each under separate tax declarations. No longer held pro-indiviso at the time the
subject properties were sold to the petitioner spouses, the right of legal redemption
accorded under Article 1620 of the Civil Code can no longer be availed of for it applies only
if the co-ownership still exists. No legal redemption may be made where the subject
property has been partitioned or an identified share thereof has been sold (Mendoza I v.
Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 778 [1991], citing Umengan v. Butucan, 117 Phil. 325; Caro v.
Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the respondent court
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, is further ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 15958 with costs against plaintiffs
therein. Costs against private respondents in this instance.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 107751 June 1, 1995

LETICIA P. LIGON, petitioner,
vs.
CA, JUDGE CELIA LIPANA-REYES, Presiding Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Iglesia ni Kristo & the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 82, granting the motion of respondent of
Iglesia ni Kristo to direct petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate of the certificates of
title in her possession.
On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint 1 for specific performance with damages against the Islamic
Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) docketed as Civil Case No. Q90-6937. Respondent INK
alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale dated 20 April 1989 IDP
sold to it two (2) parcels of land located at Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat, Quezon City, both
of which IDP is the registered owner. The parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the IDP
shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the property within forty-five
(45) days from the execution of the contract.
IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial court order IDP to comply
with its obligation of clearing the subject lots of illegal occupants & to pay damages to INK.
IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK w/c violated the contract by delaying the payment
of the purchase price and prayed that the contract of sale be rescinded and revoked.
On 15 June 1991 INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground that there
was actually no genuine issue as to any material fact.
On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial judgment, and on 7 October 1991 an
amended partial judgment granting the reliefs prayed for by INK except the prayer for
damages which was to be resolved later.
On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that petitioner Leticia
Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of title over the properties as mortgagee of
IDP, be directed to surrender the certificates to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for
the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. INK alleged that the document
could not be registered because of the refusal and/or failure of petitioner to deliver the
certificates of title despite repeated requests.
On 31 January 1992 petitioner Ligon filed an opposition to the motion on the ground that
the IDP was not served copy of the motion, and the ownership of the INK over the property
was still in issue since rescission was sought by the IDP as a counterclaim. She prayed that
the motion be denied, but should it be granted, the Register of Deeds be directed after
registration to deliver the owner's duplicate copies of the new certificates of title to her.
On 15 February 1992 petitioner filed a Supplemental Opposition questioning the jurisdiction
of the trial court because the motion involved the registrability of the document of sale, and
she was not made a party to the main case.
On 2 March 1992 the trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered petitioner to
surrender to INK the owner's copy of RT-26521 (170567) and RT-26520 (176616) in open
court for the registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in the latter's name and the
annotation of the mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new transfer certificates of
title to be issued to INK. 2
On 6 April 1992, on motion of petitioner Ligon, the trial court reconsidered its order by
directing her to deliver the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. 3
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the annulment of
the two (2) orders. However, on 28 October 1992 the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and affirmed the orders of the trial court.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the trial court erred: (a) in ruling that it had
jurisdiction over petitioner; (b) in upholding the orders of the trial court even as they violated
the rule prohibiting splitting of a single cause of action and forum-shopping; (c) in holding
that INK is the owner of the property and entitled to registration of its ownership; and, (d) in
holding that INK has a superior right to the possession of the owner's copies of the
certificates of title.
Upon prior leave, the IDP intervened alleging that prior to the issuance by the trial court of
the order of 2 March 1992, its legal Board of Trustees filed a motion for intervention
informing said court that the sale of the properties was not executed by it but was made
possible by a fake Board of Trustees, hence, the sale is void. The trial court denied the
motion since jurisdiction over the incident properly belonged to the Securities & Exchange
Commission (SEC). Conformably therewith, IDP brought the matter before the SEC w/c
later declared that the sale of the properties was void. Thus, IDP banks on this favorable
decision in similarly seeking the nullification of the questioned orders of the trial court.
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register
of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate certificate is presented together with such
instrument, except in some cases or upon order of the court for cause shown. In case the
person in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to surrender the same to
the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may be registered and a new certificate
issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of P.D. No. 1529 clearly states:
Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate certificates. Where it is necessary to issue a
new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary instrument which divests the title of the
registered owner against his consent or where a voluntary instrument cannot be registered
by reason of the refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the owner's duplicate certificate

of title, the party in interest may file a petition in court to compel surrender of the same to
the Register of Deeds. The court, after hearing, may order the registered owner or any
person withholding the duplicate certificate to surrender the same and direct the entry of a
new certificate or memorandum upon such surrender. If the person withholding the
duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process of the court, or if for any reason the
outstanding owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered, the court may order the
annulment of the same as well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in lieu thereof.
Such new, certificate and all duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, the former law, Act No. 496 otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, and all
jurisprudence interpreting the former law had established that summary reliefs such as an
action to compel the surrender of owner's duplicate certificate of title to the Register of
Deeds could only be filed with and granted by the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land
registration court if there was unanimity among the parties or there was no adverse claim or
serious objection on the part of any party in interest, otherwise, if the case became
contentious and controversial it should be threshed out in an ordinary action or in the case
where the incident properly belonged. 4
Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First Instance (now RTCs)
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of titles to
lands, including improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions." The above provision has eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred
upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits the change has simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon
the regional trial courts the authority to act not only on applications for original registration
but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. 5
The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 before the trial court was for
specific performance with damages based on a document of sale. Such action was well
within the exclusive jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court. 6 When IDP, the defendant in
the trial court, did not question the genuineness and validity of said deed of sale and its
obligations thereunder, the summary judgment issued by the court granting the reliefs
sought by INK was also an exercise of its general jurisdiction.
Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the same court to compel
the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to surrender the same to the Register of
Deeds for the registration of the deed of sale subject of the principal action, the motion was
a necessary incident to the main case. When the sale of the property was upheld by the
court in its judgment and the defendant was directed to comply with its terms and
conditions, the right of INK to have the same registered with the Register of Deeds could
not be disregarded. To assert and enjoy its right, INK should be allowed to seek the aid of
the court to direct the surrender of the certificates of title. Since Regional Trial Courts are
courts of general jurisdiction, they may therefore take cognizance of this case pursuant to
such jurisdiction. 7 Even while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition which can be filed
by one who wants to compel another to surrender the certificates of title to the Register of
Deeds, this does not preclude a party to a pending case to include as incident therein the
relief stated under Sec. 107, especially if the subject certificates of title to be surrendered
are intimately connected with the subject matter of the principal action. 8 This principle is
based on expediency and in accordance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.
The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner appears in the
certificates of title Nos. 26520 & 26521. Hence, the order of the trial court directing the
surrender of the certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor
of INK can be registered, cannot in any way prejudice her rights and interests as a
mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated on the previous certificates of title which subsists
should be incorporated in or carried over to the new transfer certificates of title. This is true
even in the case of a real estate mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of the Civil Code
it directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the
possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. It
is inseparable from the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem a lien on the property
whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership; in short, the
personality of the owner is disregarded. Thus, all subsequent purchasers must respect the
mortgage whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for
such mortgage until discharged follows the property. 9 It is clear therefore that the surrender
by petitioner of the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial court
will not create any substantial injustice to her. To grant the petition and compel INK to file a
new action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the motion before the trial court is
to encourage litigations where no substantial rights are prejudiced. This end should be
avoided. Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the
proper administration of justice. The rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of
litigations because of the higher objective they seek, which is, to protect the parties'
substantive rights. 10
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 October 1992 is
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-88246 June 4, 1993

LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND CASCADE COMMERCIAL CORP., respondents.

alleged therein that the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant that he would be sued for
ejectment if he failed to pay the rentals. This Court, agreeing with the lower court, said that
there was no necessity to categorically use the word "vacate" in the lessor's demand.

The January 20, 1986 letter of La Campana to Cascade, however, is rather ambiguous. It
warned that upon failure of Cascade to pay the rentals and unpaid water bill, "we may
On February 15, 1982, petitioner La Campana Food Products, Inc. leased a building and lot forward this matter to our legal counsel for proper action thereof." We do not see in this
in Quezon City to private respondent Cascade Commercial Corporation for a period of 4 statement an unequivocal or even an implied demand on the defendant to vacate the
years beginning March 1, 1982. 1
leased premises. The doctrine covered in the Golden Gate case is therefore not applicable.
On January 22, 1986, cascade received a demand letter 2 from the lessor reading in part as Nevertheless, we will not sustain the finding of the respondent court that the Metropolitan
follows:
Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
CRUZ, J.:

In this connection, demands are hereby repeated again made to you for the full
payment of your above rentals in arrears and unpaid water bill in the total sum of
P73,902.00 within a period of 3 days from your receipt hereof, other wise upon your
failure, we may forward this matter to our legal counsel for proper action thereof.

The reason is that the lack of the averment that there was demand to vacate the premises
was never raised by the private respondent in the Metropolitan Trial court and the Regional
Trial Court, and not even in the Court of Appeals in G.R. Sp. No. 09550. The private
respondent had questioned the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court in its Motion to
On February 19, 1986, La Campana filed against Cascade a complaint for ejectment with Dismiss on the ground that the action was not for ejectment but for the collection of a sum
preliminary attachment in the MTC of Quezon City. The complaint alleged non-payment of of money. The answer it later filed did not raise the lack of the said allegation but in fact,
rentals since August 1985 despite repeated demands by the plaintiffs on the defendant. It recognizing the jurisdiction of the court, actually sought affirmative relief therefrom, thus:
prayed that a writ of preliminary attachment be issued for the amount of P73,820.60 to
WHEREFORE, after due hearing, defendant prays:
answer for the unpaid rentals. The defendant was also asked to vacate the premises and to
1. That the Complaint be dismissed;
pay the unpaid rentals in the sum of P73,820.60 plus the amount of P15,000 monthly
2. That the counterclaim be granted ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant:
starting from March 1986 as the reasonable value of the use of the premises. 3
On April 4, 1986, Cascade filed a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Discharge of
Attachment. 4 The motions alleged that, in view of the circumstances surrounding the case,
the complaint should be considered an action for a sum of money and not ejectment. Since
the amount claimed was over P20,000, the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction.
Cascade also alleged that it vacated the leased premises on March 3, 1986, and that when
copies of summons and complaint were tendered upon it on March 26, 1986, the court no
longer acquire jurisdiction over it and the subject of the action.

a. Actual expenses, the amount of which to be presented during the trial;

The trial court denied the defendant's motion on April 15, 1986, and reconsideration of such
denial on June 30, 1986. 5

Defendant further prays for such other reliefs and remedies as may be deemed just
and equitable under the premises.

b. Moral and exemplary damages in an amount left to the discretion of the

Honorable Court;
c. Attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to P5,000.00, plus P300.00 per
appearance;
d. Cost of suit.

Cascade then filed a petition for review on certiorari with prohibition in the CA, again In the case of Jakihaca v. Aquino, 14 this Court held on a similar question:
assailing the jurisdiction of the MTC. 6 The petition claimed that there was no allegation in
As a general rule, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be rejected to at
the complaint that Cascade was unlawfully withholding possession of the leased premises.
any stage of the proceeding even on appeal, but this is not without exception. In the
Instead, it was averred that Cascade was removing its properties from the leased premises,
case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 30, cited in Tejones v. Cironella, 159 SCRA
a clear admission that it had the intention to voluntarily vacate the premises upon the
104, We held:
expiration of the lease contract. The allegation that the petitioner had failed to pay the
It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court
monthly rental amounting to P73,820.60 as of February 1986, showed that the complaint
in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that
was for collection of unpaid rentals and not for ejectment.
same jurisdiction to escape penalty. Upon this same principle is what we said .
Meanwhile, on July 25, 1986, Cascade filed its answer w/ the counterclaim in the MTC
. . to the effect that we frown upon the undesirable practice of a party
praying for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment to its of actual expenses, moral
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment only if
and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, as well as the costs of the suit. 7
favorable and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction.
On July 28, 1986, the CA denied the petition filed by Cascade, holding that it was actually a
Nowhere in the Answer of respondents contain an allegation attacking the jurisdiction
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition that should have been filed in the RTC. 8
of the Municipal Trial Court based on the issue on demand. Again in PNB v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, SCRA 305, We held:
Thereafter, in a decision dated April 6, 1987. Judge Pacifico L. Punzalan of the Metropolitan
Trial Court found that the defendant had indeed vacated the leased premises on March 3,
While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising by
1986. It also ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,237.70 as unpaid
jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead
rentals (after deducting the rental deposit and withholding tax), P50,000 as attorney's fees,
invoke the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative
9
and the costs of the suit. All the counterclaims were dismissed.
relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the case by crossexamining respondent Planas. Upon that premise, petitioners cannot now be
Cascade appealed to the Regional Trial Court, where it reiterated the arguments raised in
allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction
the Court of Appeals questioning the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court.
of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily.
On August 24, 1987, Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. affirmed the appealed decision and on
September 29, 1987, denied reconsideration. 10
In its subsequent petition for review before the Court of Appeals, Cascade again challenged
the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but this time on different ground. It pointed
out that in the complaint for ejectment, La Campana failed to allege that prior demands had
been made upon the defendant to vacate the premises. This was an indispensable
averment and its omission was fatal. The demands alleged in the complaint were merely for
payment of unpaid rentals. 11

It is settled that where a party voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court and
thereafter loses on the merits, he may not thereafter be heard to say that the court had no
jurisdiction after all. The party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or
order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication but because such a practice
cannot be tolerated for reasons of public policy. 15

In Sibonghanoy, we held that the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered
the questioned ruling was barred by estoppel or laches, which we defined as "failure or
On February 8, 1989, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed the challenged neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert
decision 12 and dismissed the complaint, holding as follows:
a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert it
Indeed, to constitute unlawful detainer, it is not enough for the complainant to allege has abandoned it or declined to assert it." 16
that petitioner did not pay the rentals due, because failure to pay rent does not make
unlawful petitioner's withholding of the leased premises. It is the owner's demand for We cannot close this opinion expressing our disapproval of the action taken by Judge
the tenant to vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on Tomas V. Tadeo in filing his own motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
time, and tenant's refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful the withholding of respondent court. He should be admonished for his disregard of a well-known doctrine
possession. The demand to vacate is indispensable and jurisdictional, and if none is imposing upon the judge the duty of detachment in cases where his decision is elevated to
be a higher court for its review. The judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding
made, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
and must leave it to the parties themselves to argue their respective positions and for the
La Campana and, surprisingly, even the trial judge filed a separate motions for appellate court to rule on the matter without his participation. The mere circumspect policy
reconsideration. On May 11, 1989, the respondent Court of Appeals denied both motions.
is to recognize one's role in the scheme of things, remembering always that the task of a
The petitioner invokes the case of Golden Gate Realty v. IAC, 13 where a motion to dismiss judge is to decide and not to litigate.
was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for failure WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
to allege in the complaint that the plaintiff had made prior demands on the defendant to ASIDE, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming the decision of the MTC is
vacate the premises. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the complaint had REINSTATED, with costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.