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U.S.-Japan alliance is strong now

Schoff 15
(James L. Schoff, Senior Associate Asia Program, 7-16-2015, "Strengthening U.S.
Alliances in Northeast Asia," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances are in good shape today, thanks in part to
consistent bipartisan support from the U.S. government over the years and careful
attention paid most recently by both the Bush and Obama administrations. Polls show broad support on
each side of these two alliances, and political change (back and forth) in all three countries
over the last two decades has not disrupted their relationships .1 In fact, the alliances are
arguably as strong as they have ever been . Quick and robust U.S. support for Japan
in the aftermath of its 2011 tsunami and nuclear crisis was the right thing to do not
only from a humanitarian perspective, but also from a U.S. strategic standpoint and
as a close friend. Although current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe often remarks that his
partys return to power in late 2012 helped repair U.S.-Japan relations, the fact is that
alliance cooperation was solid during the last two years the Democratic Party of
Japan was in power, and this emerging bipartisan support for the relationship in
Japan should be celebrated. It is a long-term asset for the alliance.

Engagement strategies over climate change specifically trigger

Japanese abandonment fears
Funabashi 6/10
(Yoichi Funabashi has a Ph.D. and is the Former Editor-in-Chief for the Asahi Shimbun, The
gap in 'China policies', Japan Times, 10 June 2016)
Pentagon and the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) are pushing for a stronger
and clearer response to Chinas aggressive actions in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, the
White House would like to stabilize relations with China across all areas, including cybersecurity
and the global environment. Many in the U.S. government have come to believe that deepening
cooperation with China on global issues such as climate change will directly benefit their
management of other regional geopolitical challenges. Apparently Secretary of State John Kerry still
belongs to this school of thought. Japan, however, believes that even if these sets of issues could be
linked, it is doubtful that it would encourage China to exercise restraint in the geopolitical
sphere. Indeed, Japan acutely feels nakedly exposed to Chinas assertiveness and is concerned
that this unease is not sufficiently shared by the Obama administration. The Abe
administrations approach to China is similar to that of the Pentagon and PACOM , while the
White House feels hemmed in by the Pentagon-Japan alliance. The fact that the U.S. National Security Council
(NSC) and Japans National Security Secretariat (NSS) are not working well together at present is
a reflection of this state of affairs
2. Within the U.S. government, there are two schools of thought on the proper approach to China. On one hand,

Wavering commitments to Japan and weakness towards

China cause Japanese proliferation
Apikyan and Diamond 15
(Apikyan, Samuel, and David J. Diamond, eds. Nuclear Threats and Security
Challenges. Dordrecht: Springer, 2015. Print.)
A major security concern for Japan is a rising China, both in its military strength and
economic policies. The Japanese worry that their economic edge of the 1980s has been in decline due to competition with
China, and as a result, China is becoming competitive vis-a-vis regional economic dominance. The Center for Strategic and
International Studies hosted a Third US-Japan Strategic Dialogue forum in which they note, Japan

is seriously
studying the American strategic posture in this region. Will the US choose Japan or
China as a strategic partner? Will it choose neither? Unless the US chooses to promote the
Japan-US relationship to a level like that of the Anglo-American special relatio nship,
Japan may withdraw from the alliance and the US may find itself an isolated power
in the Pacific.58 This relationship needs to be carefully considered when thinking
about Japans potential nuclear. Similarly, Japan watches how the United States deals with North Korea. Japanese
officials want to know how the United States will stem the tide of proliferation in the region. The United States has a long history of
assurances when it comes to Japanese anxieties over nuclear posture. A more recent development is that Japan has asked to be
more involved in the process of nuclear posture planning. The Japan Times noted that Two days after the latest nuclear test by the
North, U.S. President Barack Obama told Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in a telephone meeting that there would be no change
whatsoever in Americas commitment to defend Japan, including nuclear deterrence through its nuclear umbrella over Japan.59

The United States needs to continually express its intent to provide Japan with
security in both words and deeds. It is important that the United States continually involves Japan in discussions
concerning the nuclear umbrella. Japan finds itself on the same tightrope the United States finds itself on, specifically how to
applaud/pursue reductions of and emphasis on nuclear weapons while simultaneously maintaining a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent. Japan was apparently sufficiently satisfied with the final draft of the 2010 NPR and their consultations beforehand.
However, Japan was insistent on further discussions addressing more willing to talk of their specific concerns, holding high-level
meetings to discuss the details and implications of the 2010 NPR. There were, however, still a few points of contention. One of the
largest issues between Japan and the United States on the NPR is the different threat priorities. While Japan is not impervious or
ignorant towards terrorism, they see state actors as their main threats, whereas the NPR identified nuclear terrorism as the highest
priority, specifically preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.60 Japan, on the other hand, sees China and North
Korea as its biggest threats, not terrorism. In the Pacific Forum dialogue at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,

participants have warned of a potential problem should the United States

not pay sufficient attention to traditional state-based nuclear security threats .61
Another point of contention was how the 2010 NPR dealt with China. The NPR stated, The United States and China are increasingly
interdependent and their shared responsibilities for addressing global security threats, such as WMD proliferation and terrorism, are
growing. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in supporting international
rules, norms, and institutions.62 This is in stark contrast to the stance as articulated in from Japans White Papers (vide supra).

This less-than-confrontational language in the 2010 NPR further increases Japans

anxieties about the U.S.-Sino relationship. While the fear of abandonment may not
be analytically founded, the fear remains that perhaps the United States will look for
different allies in the region. Should Japan believe that the United States and China
were becoming closer, would they be inclined to either look for security guarantees
elsewhere, or move toward an independent deterrent? While these sources of tension exist, Japan is
nevertheless very proud of its partnership with the United States, and vice-a-versa. The aforementioned 2013 White Paper
highlighted the US-Japan partnership. It explained the peace and security of Japan is ensured through developing seamless defense
measures by coupling Japans own defense capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.63 Japan, like South Korea, has
never actually pursued a nuclear weapons program. They have, however, like South Korea had major security threats and tensions.

Japan is surrounded by two nuclear weapons states,

each of which has continually provoked Japan, and yet, while some of these threats
are quite provocative, Japan has yet to respond with direct proliferation activities.
Japan does, however, closely monitor its relationship with the United States, and
when regional threats are coupled with a perceived wavering of U.S. support and
commitment, Japan is more likely to hint at an independent deterrent.
The security model does not hold true in this case.

Asian prolif causes nuclear war safeguards fail

Cimbala 15
(Stephen J. Cimbala professor of Political Science, Penn State Brandywine. Nuclear
Weapons and Anticipatory Attacks: Implications for Russia and the United States,
16 March 2015,
The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia (including those parts of the Middle East with geostrategic
proximity or reach into Asia) presents a complicated mosaic of possibilities in this regard.
States with nuclear forces of variable force structure, operational experience, and
command-control systems will be thrown into a matrix of complex political, social, and cultural
cross-currents contributory to the possibility of war. In addition to the existing nuclear
powers in Asia, others may seek nuclear weapons if they feel threatened by regional
rivals or hostile alliances. Containment of nuclear proliferation in Asia is a desirable political objective for all of
the obvious reasons. Nevertheless, the present century is unlikely to see the nuclear hesitancy or
risk aversion that marked the Cold War, in part because the military and political
discipline imposed by the Cold War superpowers no longer exists but also because states
in Asia have new aspirations for regional or global respect.6 The spread of ballistic
missiles and other nuclear-capable delivery systems in Asia, or in the Middle East with reach
into Asia, is especially dangerous because plausible adversaries live close together and
are already engaged in ongoing disputes about territory or other issues. The Cold War Americans and
Soviets required missiles and airborne delivery systems of intercontinental range to strike at one anothers vitals,
but short-range ballistic missiles or fighter-bombers suffice for India and Pakistan to launch attacks at one another
with potentially strategic effects. China shares borders with Russia, North Korea, India, and Pakistan; Russia, with

The short
flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that
very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender.
Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first
use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional
ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential
victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first-strike vulnerable forces and
command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly
mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom
about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policy makers and
academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass
destruction from a European center of gravity (in the 20th century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of
gravity (in the present century).7 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the
effect that wars of mass destruction are now pass , on account of the emergence of the
Revolution in Military Affairs and its encouragement of information-based warfare.8 Together with this, there
has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of
states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and
potentially obsolete.9 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia
could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization
of major interstate warfare. For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might
China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on.

be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less
sustainable than hitherto.10

Theorists optimistic about the ability of the international order

to accommodate the proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in the

present century have made several plausible arguments based on international
systems and deterrence theory. First, nuclear weapons may make states more risk averse as opposed to
risk acceptant, with regard to brandishing military power in support of foreign policy objectives. Second, if states
nuclear forces are second-strike survivable, they contribute to reduced fears of surprise attack. Third, the motives
of states with respect to the existing international order are crucial. Revisionists will seek to use nuclear weapons to
overturn the existing balance of power; status quo-oriented states will use nuclear forces to support the existing
distribution of power, and therefore slow and peaceful change, as opposed to sudden and radical power transitions.

These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history
of nuclear policy in the first nuclear age roughly corresponding to the Cold War .11
Pessimists who predicted that some 30 or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were

However, the Cold War is a dubious precedent for the control of

nuclear weapons spread outside of Europe. The military and security agenda of the
Cold War was dominated by the United States and the Soviet Unionespecially with
regard to nuclear weapons. Ideas about mutual deterrence based on second-strike
capability and the deterrence rationality according to American or allied Western
concepts might be inaccurate guides to the avoidance of war elsewhere .12 In addition,
proved wrong.

powers favoring nuclear containment in general may fall short of disagreement in specific political cases. As Patrick
M. Morgan has noted, there is insufficient agreement among states on how serious it (nuclear proliferation) is and
on what to do about it.13

Text: The United States federal government should enter into
trilateral cooperation with the Peoples Republic of China and
Japan for the purpose of promoting clean energy, including an
offer for the United States and the Peoples Republic of China
to mutually eliminate import tariffs and non-tariff trade
barriers on solar cells and panels produced in their respective
The CP best solves for clean energy Japan, the U.S. and China
have complementary markets and strengths
Duan et al. 15
(Fengjun Duan, Takahisa Yokoyama and, Tetsuo Yuhara, The U.S.- Japan- China
Trilateral Cooperation toward a New Climate Regime, Advances in Economics and
Business, 2015)
Through the proposed trilateral cooperation, large scale effects in combating global
warming can be expected both internal (within the three countries) and external (global contribution
through aiding developing countries). For the internal benefit, firstly the high level technology input to
the cooperation by Japan can accelerate the innovation process in both United
States and China, thereby decrease the CO2 reduction costs . Case study in China [23]
suggested that rapid technology improvement could mitigate approximately half of the minus economic influences
to achieve a deep reduction target. Hausker et al. [24] also indicated that the most parts of the national target of

the deployment of
these technologies can activate the industry and keep the competitiveness in Japan.
Secondly, the abundant energy resources in United States can contribute to the energy
security in Japan and China, which are the top two energy importers in the world. And the high level
energy producing technology of the United States such as shale technology can also
contribute to low carbon energy supply in the other two countries. Finally, the cheap products
United States can be realized through deployment of existing technology. At the meanwhile,

from China can significantly contribute to the decease of CO2 reduction costs in
United States and Japan. And the high production capacity provides the possibility of
deploy the low carbon infrastructure to other developing countries to maintain the industry
As to the external effects, three levels of contribution can be
expected. On the strategic level, the trilateral cooperation could significantly reduce the
energy demand in the three countries by which can release the tension of energy supply
market. Therefore, the developing countries in Pacific regions could get cheaper energy to support their economic
growth. On the policy level, the most advanced technologies usually couldnt be utilized
directly in developing countries due to the limitation of infrastructure and capacity . The
trilateral cooperation can generate the more suitable technology and system through
competitiveness of the three countries.

R&D in Japan, industrialization in United States, and commercialization in China just

on the practical level, the capital investments for low
carbon infrastructures tend to be larger than traditional ones, thereby limit the deployment
in developing countries, even though they can be beneficial during the life cycle . The projection
like some practices recently [25]. Finally

results in this study also illustrated the same problem. The southeastern Asian countries could achieve a benefit of
1.36% of GDP through fuel saving during 2010-50 compared with the number of 0.1-0.3% in industrialized countries

during the same period. However, the initial additional investment of 0.3% of GDP compared with the number of

trilateral cooperation scheme can be expected to solve the problem through a combination
of technology and investment. 6. Conclusions United States, Japan and China cover near half of
the current global emissions, developed more than half of the global climate
0.05-0.15% in industrialized countries prevent them to utilize the same technology in the same period [2].

technologies, produced most of the global green equipments, thereby are essential
player on combating climate change. The three countries have a mutually dependent
and mutually complementary relationship. Cooperation between the three nations will not only
contribute to overcoming the current environment danger but also contribute to energy security and
maintaining industrial competitiveness and make international contributions. Cooperation
between the three nations will contribute to achieving energy mixes in harmony with
national resource conditions and low carbon growth methods that can be disseminated to
developing nations should be established. Cooperation schemes should be established that
go beyond the limits of existing bilateral cooperation with regard to strategy, implementation and
deployment. Based on intergovernmental agreements, infrastructure for the full process flow of technology
development, demonstration, industrialization as the basis for cooperation.

The CP solves the Japan DA by enabling Japanese influence in

the plan thats key to the alliance
Santoro & Warden 15
(David Santoro is a Senior Fellow at the CSIS Pacific Forum and John Warden is a
Fellow at the CSIS Pacific Forum. Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second
Nuclear Age The Washington Quarterly, Vol 38 N. 1. 2015)
The United States has a variety of military and political tools at its disposal to assure
Japan and South Korea. Because the requirements of assurance and extended deterrence
overlap, actions designed to strengthen extended deterrence, such as modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and public declarations
of will, also strengthen assurance as long as their effects are relayed to allies. Yet, these steps will not be sufficient. Assurance
has to be tailored to the needs of each ally and include dialogue, consultations,
joint planning, and improved relations beyond the military area. The Obama
administration has reassured Japan and South Korea by committing to strengthen
extended deterrence including extended nuclear deterrence. In nuclear policy, President Barack Obama is perhaps best
known for his commitment to the long - term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, which resulted in him receiving the Nobel
Peace Prize in 2009 and set the tone for a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010. Yet, just as important is the work that his
administration has done to strengthen extended deterrence and assurance. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Ballistic
Missile Defense Review (BMDR), and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Washington reiterated that the United States must deploy strong
and credible military forces tailored to regional needs. 12 Washington continues to ascribe an important role to nuclear weapons in
extended deterrence. The Obama administration stated that U.S. nuclear weapons continue to deter non - nuclear attacks against
the United States and its allies, rejecting the notion that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear use. In its revised
nuclear employment strategy, it reiterated that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure,
and effective arsenal that guarantees the defense of the United States and our allies and partners. 13 The administration confirmed
the U.S. reliance on central strategic forces to deter threats in Northeast Asia; committed to modernizing its triad of intercontinental
ballistic missiles, submarine - launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear - capable bombers; and decided to maintain a capability to
forward deploy nuclear - capable fighter - bombers. Bombers and fighter - bombers give the United States the ability to visibly show
resolve to an adversary and assure an ally, as was the case in March 2013 when U.S. bombers flew through South Korean air space
following North Korean belligerence. 14 At the same time, the NPR committed to reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons, in part

Because allies face a broad

range of threats, many below the level of full - scale war, the threat of U.S. nuclear
retaliation may not always be credible. Conventional strike capabilities, by contrast, are generally perceived
by emphasizing the important and growing role of non - nuclear capabilities. 15

as more usable. The administration also highlighted the important role that missile defense plays in extended deterrence by
complicating an adversarys strategic calculus. While generally supportive of the Obama administrations dual commitment to move
toward a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist, some in

fears through frequent consultations

Tokyo and Seoul were concerned that the United States might move away from the nuclear option too soon or too fast. 16



was able to allay


which shaped allied perceptions before new policies were finalized.

17 Without the prior consultations, the United States likely would have faced an
assurance crisis. Consultations provided the United States an opportunity to demonstrate to allies
that nuclear weapons would continue to remain an important part of extended deterrence. Washington explained how its
nuclear forces would contribute to allied defense and avoided policy changes that would have
unnecessarily increased allied anxiety. The United States, for example, talked
through the decision to retire the nuclear variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile and convinced
its alliesJapan in particularthat the combination of U.S. strategic nuclear forces and the ability
to forward deploy fighter - bombers in the future was sufficient for extended deterrence. 18 The United
during the NPR process,

States also avoided further narrowing its nuclear declaratory policyopting to retain calculated ambiguity rather than adopting a
sole purpose formulationin part because of the concerns of allies. 19 The NPR concluded that regular extended deterrence

The United States has long held formal discussions

with its European allies under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), but there had been no such process in Northeast Asia. Rather,
consultations took place in an ad hoc manner, leaving allies mostly on the
receiving end of U.S. decisions. Therefore, the Obama administration worked with Tokyo to establish the
U.S. Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) in 2010 and co - founded with Seoul the U.S.South Korea Extended
dialogues with Japan and South Korea were needed.
about nuclear policy

Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) that same year. These forums, which build on years of unofficial discussions among experts
and officials from the respective countries, 20 have institutionalized high - Level focus on ways to strengthen deterrence in

enhanced assurance by helping Tokyo and Seoul better understand

U.S. policies and capabilities, and giving them a greater sense of enfranchisement
in matters involving their security. Finally, the Obama administration recognized that
effective assurance goes beyond capabilities and deterrence - focused discussions.
At root, assurance is a function of the nature of the relationship between the
United States and its ally. Analyst Michael Wheeler explains that, Security relationships are
first and foremost political relationships...if the basic political relationship is
strong, security relationships can better weather short - term challenges . 21 For this
reason, the Obama administration has worked to deepen political engagement with Japan and
South Korea. Beginning in 2011, it announced that the United States would rebalance the
focus of its foreign policy to the AsiaPacific, increasing diplomatic, economic, and military
engagement in the region. 22 As part of the rebalance, the United States concluded the U.S.ROK free - trade
Northeast Asia. This has

agreement (known as KORUS), rejuvenated efforts to negotiate and implement the Trans - Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would
include Japan, and emphasized the important contributions that its allies make to regional security. Together,


initiatives served to solidify the U.S. political relationship with Japan and South Korea
respectively, assuring them that the United States has an enduring interest in
their partnerships.

The CP competes the plan is a bilateral, unconditional policy

compared to the multilateral, conditional CP which makes this
a key test of the aff

The affirmatives excessive impact scenarios contribute to a
culture of fear within debate and excludes those with mental
Calm Clinic 09
(Calm Clinic is an informational blog designed to educate the public on anxiety and
assist those with anxiety, Common Anxiety Triggers for Anxiety and Panic, Calm
Clinic http://www.calmclinic.com/anxiety/causes/triggers)
The media really has changed the culture of anxiety. They report often
on young deaths, dangers, and lawsuits that can all create a feeling of discomfort
and fear that may trigger an increase in anxiety levels . A great example was an article about
Health and News

the dangers of MRSA - a deadly infection that is immune to most medications - where doctors wrote the biggest

Media can create fears

and stress where they weren't before, and this may lead to persistent anxiety . Loss of
danger of MRSA wasn't the disease itself, but rather public fear over the disease.

Coping Anxiety may also be triggered by a loss of coping ability, often due to replacement coping. This is an
incredibly common problem with those that abuse drugs or alcohol, but may affect those that party or do reckless
behaviors in order to cure stress. These behaviors are coping replacements, and unfortunately natural stress coping
is a "use it or lose it" type of ability. If you replace your coping ability with these types of negative behaviors, you
risk losing you mental ability to cope with stress and anxiety may be the result. Anxious Thoughts Certain

anxious thoughts may also trigger greater amounts of anxiety . Anxiety causes anxious
thoughts in general, so often this affects those that have already been struggling with mild anxiety. But in some

if the thought was particularly distressing, it may trigger an incredible increase

in anxiety that cascades out of control.

Ableism marginalizes and devalues people with disabilities,

creating a culture of disregard accessibility is a key point of
Zelinger 15
(Julie Zeilinger is a freelance author from Barnard College, 6 Forms of Ableism We
Need to Retire Immediately, Mic.com, 7 July 2015,
Nearly 1 in 5 people in the United States has a disability , according to a 2012 Census Bureau
report. Yet many forms of discrimination against the disability community not only
persist, but are actually largely normalized and even integrated into our culture's
very understanding (or, more accurately, disregard) of disabled people's
experiences. Ableism refers to "discrimination in favor of able-bodied people," according to the Oxford English
Dictionary. But the reality of ableism extends beyond literal discriminatory acts (intentional
or not) to the way our culture views disabled people as a concept . Ableism is also
the belief that people with disabilities "need to be fixed or cannot function as full
members of society" and that having a disability is "a defect rather than a
dimension of difference," according to the authors of one 2008 Journal of Counseling & Development article
on the topic, as reported by Feminists with Disabilities. This interpretation of difference as

defect is the true root of ableist acts that cause far too many to feel marginalized,
discriminated against and ultimately devalued in this society . Here are just six
forms of this behavior that, though largely normalized, need to be retired immediately. 1. Failing to provide
accessibility beyond wheelchair ramps Source: Getty Perhaps the most obvious form of discrimination people with
disabilities face is the inability to access places and services open to their able-bodied counterparts even with

people think
"just [putting] wheelchair ramps everywhere" is sufficient, true accessibility
accommodates all types of disabilities not just physical disabilities that specifically bind people to
laws in place to prevent such inequality. As Tumblr user The (Chronically) Illest noted, while most

wheelchairs. Accommodations can also include "braille, seeing-eye dogs/assistant dogs, ergonomic workspaces,
easy to grip tools, closed captions ... class note-takers, recording devices for lectures" and other services and

accessibility is certainly a matter of convenience and equity, a lack of

accessible resources can impact the very wellbeing of people with disabilities .
Individuals with disabilities have reported not being able to receive health care
because their providers' facilities weren't accessible, and one study found that
women with disabilities particularly face increased difficulty accessing reproductive
health care, just to name two examples. 2. Using ableist language Source: Getty Ableism has
alterations. Though

become undeniably naturalized in the English language. Many people not only use words like "crazy," "insane" or
"retarded" without a second thought, but many adamantly defend their use of these terms, decrying anybody who
questions their right to do so as too "politically correct" or "sensitive." But this personal defense fails to recognize
that ableist language is not about the words themselves so much as what their usage suggests the speaker feels
about the individuals they represent. "When a critique of language that makes reference to disability is not
welcome, it is nearly inevitable that, as a disabled person, I am not welcome either," Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg
wrote in a 2013 Disability and Representation article. But beyond individual feelings, ableist language can
contribute to a foundation of more systemic oppression of people with disabilities as a group. "If a culture's
language is full of pejorative metaphors about a group of people," Cohen-Rottenberg continued, that culture is more
likely to view those individuals as less entitled to rights like "housing, employment, medical care, education, access,
and inclusion as people in a more favored group." 3. Able-bodied people failing to check their privilege Source:

able-bodied individuals fail to

recognize the privilege of having access to every and any space
accessible. As Erin Tatum points out at Everyday Feminism, plenty of people may not directly
discriminate against people with disabilities but effectively do so by using
resources allocated for them. For example, many able-bodied people use handicapped bathroom
Getty It may not seem like a big deal in the moment, but

stalls or take up space in crowded elevators, rather than taking the stairs and leave room for people with disabilities

While these actions may not be the

product of ill will, they are evidence of the way able-bodied privilege manifests in
our society. There's a general cultural notion that "disability is something inherently
negative," Allie Cannington, a board member of the American Association of People with Disabilities, told Mic.
"There's a level of silencing that happens, and erasing of the disabled
experience as an important experience because able-bodied experiences
are the privileged experiences in our society."
who don't have other options, without a second thought.

The alternative is to reject the 1AC Recognizing and

challenging privilege in the education system is the only way
to render ableism unacceptable

Hehir 07
(Thomas Hehir is Professor of Practice and Director of the School Leadership
Program at Harvard Graduate School of Education, Confronting Ableism,
Educational Leadership, February 2007,

The U.S. education system has made major strides in improving education opportunities for students with

More of these students are finishing high school than ever, and record
numbers are moving on to employment and higher education (Wagner & Cameto, 2004).
Much of this improvement has taken place because of the work of school leaders
throughout the United States. To continue and expand this progress , however, educators
must recognize and challenge the ableist assumptions that still permeate the
culture and guide much special education practice. Students with disabilities need
carefully constructed, individual instructional programs that recognize the effects of their
disability while creating opportunities for them to learn and fully participate in school

and society.


Solar industry is rapidly growing in the SQ
SEIA 3/9
(US Solar Market Set to Grow 119% in 2016, Installations to Reach 16 GW, SEIA, 9
March 2016)
The U.S. solar market is set to grow a staggering 119 percent this year says GTM Research
in its latest U.S. Solar Market Insight Report 2015 Year in Review, published in conjunction with the Solar Energy Industries

Led by the utility-scale segment, GTM Research forecasts 16 gigawatts

(GW) of solar will be installed in the U.S. in 2016, more than doubling the recordbreaking 7.3 GW installed in 2015. While utility-scale installations will represent 74 percent of the installations
for the year, the residential and commercial markets will also experience strong growth in 2016. In fact, the U.S. is on the
verge of the 1 millionth solar installation milestone. This is a new energy paradigm
and the solar industry officially has a seat at the table with the largest energy
producers, said SEIA president and CEO Rhone Resch. Because of the strong demand for solar
energy nationwide, and smart public policies like the ITC and NEM, hundreds of
thousands of well-paying solar jobs will be added in the next few years benefiting
both Americas economy and the environment.
Association (SEIA).

Tariffs are key to preventing China from flooding the solar

market net better for long-term innovation and price
Yin 2012
(Clifton Yin is a Clean Energy Policy Analyst at the Information Technology and
Innovation Foundation, Tariffs Well-Justified in Fighting Green Mercantilism,
Innovation Files, 10 August 2012)
But the situation is far more nuanced than CASE might indicate. Competition

is a good thing, Claudia

it has to be fair, which is not
how things are right now. In fact, ITIF has covered the issue of Chinas green mercantilist policies
extensively, noting in a previous blog post that the country employs nearly all types of mercantilist
policies to artificially drive down the price of clean energy technologies and devoting
Kemfert of the German Institute for Economic Research observes, but

entire reports, Green Mercantilism: Threat to the Clean Energy Economyand Enough is Enough: Confronting Chinese
Innovation Mercantilism to the subject. It was also recently noted on the blog that a Chinese city has taken the

Tariffs can thus

not only level the playing field so U.S. and European clean energy companies can
compete fairly, but also discourage countries from employing poor trade practices
in the first place. More importantly, they can increase the incentive for emerging
[clean energy] technologies, new ideas, and more innovative firms to remain or
enter the market, a previous ITIF blog post states, which is essential if clean energy is to
become cost competitive with fossil fuels. The previous blog post summarizes the challenge well in
troubling, unprecedented step of helping pay off the debt of a local solar wafer manufacturer.

regard to the solar market, but the argument is applicable to clean energy in general and bears repeating here:

We need solar to be cheaper than fossil fuels so it can be globally deployed to reduce
carbon emissions to near-zero by mid-century. How far can government subsidies Chinese or otherwise
of first-generation solar PV take us to that goal? It simply cant. If we allow Chinese green

mercantilism to decimate the U.S. solar manufacturing industry, we would be left

with a few firms producing potentially subpar technology when what in fact need are second,
third, and fourth generation designs to meet our climate goals. Chinas ability to rapidly take a
technology to scale is still important and could be helpful to accelerate new technology market
deployment, but only if it doesnt stifle global clean energy innovation. The choice is
twofold: we can allow China to play by different rules to benefit from artificially
lower priced solar PV in the short-term, but less innovation over time or we can level
the playing field and allow technological progress and innovation to lower costs and
grow the industry. Choosing the former may be great in the short-term, but puts the
industry at a disadvantage in the long-term . Instead, if were serious about addressing climate
change and growing a robust industry that continues innovating and producing jobsthe latter choice is the right

The plan allows China to maintain tariffs on U.S. solar products

thats a bigger i/l to U.S. solar adoption
Hamlin and Han 11/17
(Kevin Hamlin and Miao Han, When the U.S. Moves on Trade, China Hits Back Fast,
Bloomberg News, 17 November 2016)
In July, the U.S. raised anti-dumping duties on photovoltaic products from China.

months later, China imposed anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties on distillers dried grain, a byproduct of ethanol and animal feed,

In 2014, China hiked tariffs to 57 percent for U.S. exports of polysilicon

used in solar cells. That rippled through to small manufacturers like REC Silicon ASA
in Moses Lake, Washington, and Hemlock Semiconductor Corp. in Hemlock,
Michigan. The dispute with China, the biggest market for materials used in solar
panels, pressured U.S. producers to cut output and prices.
from the U.S.

100% solar is a pipe dream its seriously not happening any

time soon
Hinderaker 15
(John Hinderaker, Could the U.S. Meet Its Electricity Needs With Solar Energy?
Powerline, 4 September 2015)
The basic green project is to replace our current fossil fuel and nuclear power
plants with a combination of solar and wind energy. The cost consequences of making this transition
to less efficient forms of energy are almost inconceivable, but putting cost to one side, is it even possible? At Watts Up With That?,

Tom Tamarkin and Barrie Lawson have authored one of the more entertaining
scientific articles I have read in a long time. They actually undertake to do the math: what would it require to
replace existing fossil fuel and nuclear power plants with solar energy as current
plants are phased out over the next several decades? There are many variables, of course. For
example, if electric vehicles ever gain a significant market share, the need for electric power will be vastly greater. Here, as

They write: This paper explores the

system requirements to replace this generation capacity with a photovoltaic only
generation scheme. Topics include the definition of peak power demand, time of use issues, reserve power requirements,
elsewhere, the authors calculations make optimistic assumptions.

storage to provide power when there is no sunlight, and the various engineering challenges associated with managing a large area
synchronous AC power grid. This analysis considers the factors involved in dimensioning solar power generating plants. To illustrate
the issues involved the example considers the case for supplying the entire electric power needs of the USA from solar energy
without the use of fossil fuel, nuclear or other back up. To simplify the calculations, the example considers a single very large
hypothetical solar power installation providing all the countrys power although in practice, generation would be dispersed in a
network of smaller installations throughout the country, each one closer to the point of need. Extensive calculations follow. You can

if located in the
Northeast, where power demands are highest, the necessary solar panels would
[cover] an area of 44,000 square kilometers or a square with sides of 210 km.
Bigger than Denmark, the Netherlands or Switzerland . If located in the Southwest,
you could get away with a solar installation the size of Belgium, or 50% larger than
Israel. Just for fun, I created this graphic that shows a 210-km square superimposed on the Northeastern United States. Click to
enlarge. Heck, we didnt need Ohio anyway! This actually understates the amount of
land that would be needed for a functioning solar power system: The total area
covered by the solar array will be significantly larger than the area of the panels to
allow for installation, maintenance access and periodic cleaning. The space required
for the batteries is in addition to this. Of course, the area consumed by the solar farm is only one aspect of the
problem: Note that If 1 square metre PV panels were manufactured at the rate of 1 per
second, it would take 930 years to manufacture 29.3 billion panels. And how about those
batteries, which would be needed so you can turn lights on at night ? The article includes a lengthy
discussion of issues surrounding lithium batteries. It turns out that adequate battery
capacity would be expensive: To store 4,400 gWh would need 4.4 million of these 40
foot containers costing $3,300,000,000,000 or $3.3 trillion. The batteries would take up a lot of space too.
Thats another thing about green energy, it is environmentally awful: For 4.4 million containers, the
containers would cover an area of 130.8 million m2 = 130.8 km2 or a square with
sides 11.44 km long; but adequate access space must also be provided, adding
substantially to the total. The standard container exterior dimensions are 12.193 m X 2.438 m giving an area of
29.727 m2. Then theres this: Note that if these 44 million containerized batteries were
manufactured in China, it would take 587 round trips of twenty days each way on
the largest container ships to deliver them to the USA. One could tinker with assumptions forever,
but the bottom line is blindingly obvious: for the United States to actually try to transition to solar
power as its sole or principal source of electricity is in practice impossible. Moreover, the
work through the calculations and critique them if so inclined, but I will cut to the conclusion:

attempt, if made, would be an economic and environmental catastrophe. It isnt going to happen. While not everyone understands
the relevant mathematics and electrical engineering, even Barack Obama is smart enough to know that his hectoring the rest of us
to do away with fossil fuels is total BS, intended only to enrich Democratic Party cronies who, in turn, subsidize Obama and his fellow
left-wing office-seekers.

Grid attacks are functionally impossible

Perera 14
(David Perera is a cybersecurity reporter for POLITICO Pro, U.S. grid safe from
large-scale attack, experts say, Politico, 10 September 2014)
the half-dozen security experts interviewed for this article agreed its virtually
impossible for an online-only attack to cause a widespread or prolonged outage of the
North American power grid. Even laying the groundwork for such a cyber operation
could qualify as an act of war against the U.S. a line that few nation-state-backed hacker crews
would wish to cross. None denied that determined hackers could penetrate the networks of bulk power providers. But theres a huge gap
between that and causing a civilization-ending sustained outage of the grid. Electrical-grid hacking scenarios mostly overlook
the engineering expertise necessary to intentionally cause harm to the grid, say
experts knowledgeable about the power generators and high voltage transmission entities that constitute the backbone of the grid whats called
the bulk power system. Theres also the enormity of the grid and diversity of its equipment to
consider. The grid is designed to lose utilities all the time, said Patrick Miller, founder and
director of the Energy Sector Security Consortium. Im not trying to trivialize the situation, but youre not really able to cause
this nationwide cascading failure for any extended duration of time , he added. Its just
But in fact,

not possible.

ICS security in a nutshell Controlling the boilers, fans, valves and switches and other mechanical devices that turn raw
inputs and high-voltage transmission into flip-of-a-switch electricity is a class of computers known as industrial control systems. Supervisory Control and

ICSs arent general purpose computers like desktops. At

the level of direct control over electromechanical processes via a device often classified as a Programmable Logic Controller programming
is mainly done in specialized languages on obscure operating systems. Even just
accessing a PLC requires particular software . Hiding malware in field devices is
difficult to impossible. Many of the devices arent running multi-thread, multi-tasking operations like our laptops, noted Chris Blask,
chair of the Industrial Control System Information Sharing and Analysis Center. And penetration is just a starting point.
Just hacking into the system, and even taking complete control of a computer or
crashing a bunch of computers, wont necessarily bring down the bulk electric
system, said Dale Peterson, founder of Digital Bond, an industrial control system cybersecurity consultancy. For example, hackers could
cause a SCADA system to crash, causing grid operators to lose system visibility decidedly not a good thing. But the
grid doesnt need the SCADA system to continue operating . There has to be an understanding that
Data Acquisition Systems, or SCADA, is a type of ICS.

simply taking out the cyber assets doesnt cause a blackout, Peterson said.

Economic decline doesnt cause war empirics

Barnett 09
(Thomas Barnett is the senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC,
contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire, The New Rules: Security Remains
Stable Amid Financial Crisis, Aprodex, Asset Protection Index, 8/25/09,
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with
all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of
the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news
brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's
interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly
worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security
landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by
GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new
entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic
crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 lowintensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly,

Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the
opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed
by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in a n almost two-decade long struggle
between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a
most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed
terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential stateon-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear
weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the
United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-intoPakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up
to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America,
the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere
else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the

Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to
anything beyond advising and training local forces.

Economic decline doesnt cause lash out their studies are

based on flawed models
Bennett and Nordstrom 2k
(D. Scott, Timothy, Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University,
Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring
Rivalries, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 1, Feb., pp. 33-61, JSTOR)
S/O to RVI
Most scholarly works that examine the effects of domestic economic woes on
international behavior have focused on the theoretical possibility that leaders undertake
adventurous foreign policies under conditions of worsening economic, social, and

political problems (Levy 1989). Commonly known as either externalization or diversion, the main thrust of the
argument is that political elites can solidify their relationship with their domestic constituents by transferring the
public's attention from economic issues to the foreign enemy. Underlying the process is the assumption that the
military action will cause the citizens to "rally 'round the flag" (Mueller 1973) and thereby the patriotic mass will see
political elites in a more positive light. Early studies attributed to his rallying effect to a suspected in-group/outgroup relationship. Simmel (1955) argued that an altercation with an out-group (the target of the externalization
efforts) helps promote cohesion within the in-group (the troubled leader's citizenry) because it is natural for
individuals to pull together with those they know when confronted by outsiders. Transferring the argument to
action, it may be that if political elites realize that this in-group/out-group dynamic exists, then they will make
advantageous use of externalization tactics. Auxiliary arguments might suggest that leaders will prefer short,
manageable conflicts to boost their support without risking the long term costs of war. An additional implication of
the theory when applied strategically to pairs of conflictual states is that while states with problems are likely to be
conflict initiators, states without such problems are more likely to be the targets of diversion. If diversionary logic
holds and states want to initiate a cheap and manageable incident to divert attention without imposing major costs,
then leaders would prefer to initiate against states in a good economic or domestic situation. If the target is in bad
shape domestically, then leaders in that target may have their own incentives to escalate the conflict to divert
public attention. Initiators thinking strategically may try to avoid conflict against such an opponent. While
diversionary conflict theory has been the subject of much scholarly attention, the evidence supporting the
argument has been mixed. On one hand, studies that take the historical case study approach tend to support the
notion that leaders do externalize when faced with domestic problems (Levy 1988, 667); in a related body of work,
some case studies of deterrence failures have shown that these cases are often characterized by an attacker who is

studies of externalization have not provided consistent support . Across studies of
motivated by internal problems (e.g., Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985). On the other hand,

externalization in general (e.g., Leeds and Davis 1997) or in the context of specific states' foreign policies (Fordham
1998; Gowa 1998; Meernik 1994; Meernik and Waterman 1996; Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992;
Mintz and Russett 1992), findings about whether quantitative data support the theory have been mixed. The nature
of the results has led some to question the validity of the theories. For example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1985)
posits that the logical flaw in externalization theory lies in the psychological nature of the original scapegoat
hypothesis on which externalization theory is based. While the international relations version of this theory is

"the logical foundation for

the leap from individual psychology to national action remains non-existent " (1985,
indeed written in psychological terms (in-group/out-group), it may be that

130). Similarly, Levy (1989, 266) puts forth four problems with the original causal process as described by Simmel
(1955), Coser (1956), and other early writers on externalization(:1 ) little attention is paid to the direction of the
relationship between internal problems and external conflict, (2) attempts to develop or test alternative theoretical
relationships are rare,( 3) precise specifications of when externalization should occur theoretically are rare, and (4)
the conditions under which externalization conditions should hold are unexplored. The conclusion that Levy draws

the empirical studies suffer from problems of

misspecified models (1989, 267). An additional possible source of discrepancies in findings about
from these theoretical issues is that many of

diversionary conflict may be attributable to differences in research design and variable measurement. Studies have
used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized
disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different
states. Even the central concept of externalization, namely, domestic trouble, is unclear. Most studies to date have

used presidential popularity, overall presidential success, the election calendar, or a misery index composed of
inflation and unemployment as indicators of presidential problems. Cross-national studies have most frequently
examined what James (1988, 103) categorizes as manifest conflict, a category which includes protest demon
strations, political strikes, armed attacks, and deaths from domestic violence. This category can be opposed to
latent conflict, which exists when sources of trouble are present but have not yet led to the physical manifestations
of dissatisfaction. Diversionary conflict theory as presented is typically so general in its discussion of internal
problems that it opens a Pandora's box of possible indicators of domestic conflict, and all of the types of measures
discussed above fit with the theory. The vague nature of the theory may be contributing to this possible problem of
model misspecification, but there are few arguments that suggest one indicator is superior to the others. Alternative
relationships between domestic economic performance and international conflict also have been proposed, perhaps
most importantly by Blainey (1973, 74). Blainey offers the alternative hypothesis about economics and war that
economically challenged countries are more likely to be the target of aggressive military acts than their initiator
(1973, 86). Faced with a poor target in a bad economic situation, who is faced with an unhappy populace and
possibly limited resources, potential conflict initiators are likely to see opportunity. The argument also parallels the
historical notion that leaders would only go to war when their coffers were full-in bad times, leaders may simply not
be able to afford to go to conflict. Blainey's argument appears to pose a challenge to diversionary conflict theory in
its emphasis on what is the most likely direction of conflict. Note, however, that its prediction (weak states become
targets) differs from a strategic application of diversionary conflict theory. By coming at externalization from the
substitutability perspective, we hope to deal with some of the theoretical problems raised by critics of diversionary
conflict theory. Substitutability can be seen as a particular problem of model specification where the dependent
variable has not been fully developed. We believe that one of the theoretical problems with studies of
externalization has been a lack of attention to alternative choices; Bueno de Mesquita actually hints toward this

it is shortsighted to conclude
that a leader will uniformly externalize in response to domestic problems at the
expense of other possible policy choices (1985, 130). We hope to improve on the study of
(and the importance of foreign policy substitution) when he argues that

externalization and behavior within rivalries by considering multiple outcomes in response to domestic conditions.5

faced with domestic economic troubles. Rather than diverting the attention of the
public or relevant elites through military action, leaders may actually work to solve
their internal problems internally. Tying internal solutions to the external environment, we focus on
In particular, we will focus on the alternative option that instead of externalizing, leaders may internalize

the possibility that leaders may work to disengage their country from hostile relationships in the international arena
to deal with domestic issues. Domestic problems often emerge from the challenges of spreading finite resources
across many different issue areas in a manner that satisfies the public and solves real problems. Turning

inward for some time may free up resources required to jump-start the domestic
economy or may simply provide leaders the time to solve internal distributional
issues. In our study, we will focus on the condition of the domestic economy (gross domestic product [GDP] per
capita growth) as a source of pressure on leaders to externalize. We do this for a number of reasons. First, when
studying rivalries, we need an indicator of potential domestic trouble that is applicable beyond just the United
States or just advanced industrialized democracies. In many non-Western states, variables such as election cycles
and presidential popularity are irrelevant. Economics are important to all countries at all times. At a purely practical
level, GDP data is also more widely available (cross-nationally and historically) than is data on inflation or
unemployment. 6 Second, we believe that fundamental economic conditions are a source of potential political
problems to which leaders must pay attention. Slowing growth or worsening economic conditions may lead to mass
dissatisfaction and protests down the road; economic problems may best be dealt with at an early stage before they
turn into outward, potentially violent, conflict. This leads us to a third argument, which is that we in fact believe that
it may be more appropriate in general to use indicators of latent conflict rather than manifest conflict as indicators
of the potential to divert. Once the citizens of a country are so distressed that they resort to manifest conflict
(rioting or engaging in open protest), it may be too late for a leader to satisfy them by engaging in distracting
foreign policy actions. If indeed leaders do attempt to distract people's attention, then if protest reaches a high
level, that attempt has actually failed and we are looking for correlations between failed externalization attempts
and further diversion.

Tnnesson sides neg they assume trade imbalances rather

than global economic decline and conclude the tensions in
East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war.

The CP solves warming better enables trilateral market
development to spur innovation and price reduction on a
variety of clean tech theres only a risk the aff locks in
ineffective solutions
Hsu 11
(Shi-Ling Hsu, Larson Professor Florida State University College of Law, The case
for a carbon tax: Getting past our hang-up to effective climate policy, p 43-; kdf)
that by supporting specific renewable energy technologies now,
we run the risk of effectively locking them in for decades, and perhaps missing the
chance to find renewable technologies with even smaller carbon or environmental
footprints. Wind turbines have an expected lifespan of twenty to twenty-five years, 38 solar
photovoltaic panels about the same . 39 Although these seem like environmentally
and economically sensible renewable energy technologies, what will be learned in
the next twenty or thirty years? Already, concentrated solar power has emerged as
a possibly cheaper and simpler alternative to the previously dominant solar
technology, photovoltaic solar energy . 40 Environmental organizations, oriented by their
missions to get things done, have again fallen into the trap of wedding themselves to
certain technologies. Todays environmental savior may be tomorrows
environmental pariah, and the problem with mandating an expensive environmental technology is the
The overlooked danger is

economic irreversibility of capital expenditures. A recent technological mandate sought by some environmental
groups was Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle technology, a technology that gasifies coal so as to be able to
separate out the carbon for later capture and sequestration underground. The Natural Resource Defense Council
and other organizations sued the EPA to force it to require IGCC as part of any new coal-fired power plant as part of
its New Source Review program. 41 Failing to learn the past lessons of the New Source Review program, the NRDC
seemed to have overlooked the possibility that if coal-fired power plants with IGCC were actually built, carbon
dioxide emissions might be abated but better and environmentally cleaner opportunities to reduce emissions would
be lost for generations

Trade war offense is empirically denied 1AC Stemler indicates

that the U.S. and China are in a solar trade war now and yet we
dont see war (nuclear or otherwise) Drezner assumes a
decline in overall trade relations, not just one industry
Massive alt causes to WTO legitimacy if not following one
ruling means WTO collapse then the WTO would have collapsed
day one. And the only WTO good warrant here is that it
promotes trade relations C/A Bennett and Nordstrom and
Barnett here, declining trade doesnt cause war even if it did
Hamann assumes overall WTO decline and isnt reverse causal
WTO decline key to development of regionalism which is a
better check on protectionism and war
Brkic 13

(Snjeana Brkic is an Economics Prof at U of Sarajevo, 3/25/13, Regional Trading

Arrangements Stumbling Blocks or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade
Liberalization?, papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239275)
Besides those advocating the optimistic or pessimistic view on regionalism effect on global trade liberalization, some economists,
such as Frankel and Wei, hold a neutral position, in a way. Frankel and Wei believe that forms and achievements of international

regionalism can be depending on

circumstances linked to greater or smaller global trade liberalization . In the years-long
economic integrations can vary and that, for this reason,

period of regional integration development, four periods have been identified during which the integration processes were becoming
particularly intensive and which have therefore been named "waves of regionalism". The first wave was taking place during the
capitalism development in the second half of the 19th century, in the course of British sovereign domination over the world market.
Economic integrations of the time primarily had the form of bilateral customs unions; however, owing to the comparative openness
of international trading system based on the golden standard automatism, this period is called the "era of progressive bilateralism".
The next two waves of regionalism occurred in the years following the world wars . Since the disintegration
processes caused by the wars usually spawned economic nationalisms and autarchic tendencies, it is not surprising that post-war

were marked by discriminatory international economic integrations,

primarily at the level of so-called negative integration, with expressedly beggar-thyneighbor policies that resulted in considerable trade deviations . This particularly refers to the

regionalism momentum after the First World War, which was additionally burdened by the consequences of Big Economic Crisis.

The current wave of regionalism started in late 1980s and spread around the world
to a far greater extent than any previous one did: it has covered almost all the continents and almost all
the countries, even those which have mis to join all earlier regional initiatives, such as the USA, Canada, Japan and China.

Integration processes, however, do not show any signs of flagging. Up till now, over 200
RTAs have been registered with GATT/WTO, more than 150 of them being still in force, and most of these
valid arrangement have been made in the past ten years. Specific in many ways, this wave was dubbed "new
regionalism". The most specific characteristics of new regionalism include : geographic spread
RTAs in terms of encompassing entire continents; greater speed; integration forms success;
deepening of integration processes; and, the most important for this theoretical discussion,


generally non-negative impact on outsiders , world economy as a whole, and the multilateral liberalization
process. Some theorists (Gilpin) actually distinguish between the "benign" and "malign" regionalism. On the one hand, regionalism
can advance the international economic stability, multilateral liberalization and world peace. On the other, it can have mercantilist

Analyses of
trends within the contemporary integration processes show that they mainly have
features of "benign" regionalism. Reasons for this are numerous. Forces driving the
features leading to economic well-being degradation and increasing international tensions and conflicts.

contemporary regionalism development differ from those that used to drive earlier
regionalism periods in the 20th century. The present regionalism emerged in the period
characterized by the increasing economic inter-dependence between different world
economy subjects, countries attempts to resolve trade disputes and multilateral framework of trade relations. As
opposed to the 1930s episode, contemporary regional initiatives represent
attempts to make the members' participation in the world economy easier, rather
than make them more distant from it. As opposed to 1950s and 1960s episode, new initiatives are

less frequently motivated exclusively by political interests, and are less frequently
being used for mercantilist purposes. After the Second World War, more powerful
countries kept using the economic integration as a means to strengthen their
political influence on their weaker partners and outsiders . The examples include CMEA and
European Community arrangements with its members' former colonies. As opposed to this practice, the new
regionalism, mostly driven by common economic interests, yielded less trade
diversion than previous one, and has also contributed to the prevention of military
conflicts of greater proportions. Various analyses have shown that many regional integrations in

earlier periods resulted in trade deviations, particularly those formed between less developed countries and
between socialist countries. In recent years, however, the newly formed or revised regional integrations
primarily seem to lead to trade creation. Contrary to the beggar thy- neighbor model of

former international economic integrations, the integrations now offer certain

advantages to outsiders as well, by stimulating growth and spurring the role of market
forces. The analyses of contemporary trends in world economy also speak in favor of
the "optimistic" proposition. The structural analysis shows that the world trade is growing and that this
growth results both from the increase in intra-regional and from the increase in extra-regional
trade value (Anderson i Snape 1994.)28. Actually, the intraregional trade has been growing faster,
both by total value and by its share in world GDP . The extra-regional trade share in GDP was increasing
in some regions in North America, Asia-Pacific and Asian developing countries. However, the question arises as to whether the
extra-regional trade would be greater without regional integrations or not? The answer would primarily depend both on the estimate
of degree of some countries' trade policy restrictedness in such circumstances, and on factors such as geographic distance,

One should also take into account certain

contemporary integration features the primarily economic, rather than strategic
motivation, and continuous expansion, which mostly includes countries that are
significant economic partners. With respect to NAFTA , many believe that the negative
effects on outsiders will be negligible, since the USA and Canada have actually been
highly integrated economies for a long time already , while the Mexican economy is relatively small.
The same view was pointed out by the EU, with respect to its expansion. It
particularly refers to the inclusion of the remaining EFTA countries, because this will
actually only complete, in institutional terms, the EU strong economic ties with
these countries. Most EFTA countries have been part of the European economic area
(EEA), i.e. the original EC-EFTA agreement, for a few years already , and conduct some 70% of their total international
exchange with the Union countries. EU countries are also the most significant foreign-trade
partners of Central and East Europe countries, and the recent joining the Union of
several of them is not expected to cause a significant trade diversion . Besides, according to
some earlier studies, during the previous wave of regionalism, in the 1967-70 period, the creation of trade in EEC was
far greater than trade diversion: trade creation ranged from 13 to 23% of total
imports, while trade diversion ranged from 1 to 6%. In Latin America, the new
regionalism resulted in the faster growth of intra-regional trade, while the extraregional exports and imports also continued to grow . Since early 1990s, the value of intra-regional
transport communications, political relations among states.

imports registered the average annual growth of 18%. In the same time, the extra-regional exports were also growing, although at a
lower rate of 9% average a year; its share in the total Latin America exports at the end of decade amounted to 18% as compared to
12% in 1990. In the 1990-1996 period, the intraregional imports grew by some 18% a year. The extra-regional imports were also
growing very fast, reaching the 14% rate. These data reflect a great unbalance in the trade with extra-regional markets, since the

Since the described trends point to

the continued growth of extra-regional imports and exports, they also show that
regional integration in Latin America has had the open regionalism character .
Besides, the pending establishment of FTAA Free Trade Area of Americas will gather, in the
same group, the so-called "natural" trade partners countries that have had an extremely extensive mutual
exchange for years already, and the outsiders are therefore unlikely to be affected by
strengthening of regionalism in this part of the world. Contemporary research shows that
intra-regional trade is growing, however, same as interdependence between North
America and East Asia and between the EU and East Asia . It can also be seen that the
biggest and the most powerful countries, i.e. blocs, are extremely dependent on the
rest of the world in terms of trade. For the EU, besides the intra-European trade , which
is ranked first, foreign trade has the vital importance since it accounts for 10% of
European GDP. In early 1990s, EU exchanged 40% of its foreign trade with non-members, 16% out of which with North
America and East Asia together. EU therefore must keep in mind the rest of the world as well . The
imports from countries outside the region grew much faster the exports.30

growing EU interest in outsiders is confirmed by establishing "The Euro-Med Partnership", which proclaimed a new form of
cooperation between the EU and the countries at its South periphery32. Besides,

the past few years witnessed a

series of inter-regional agreements between the EU on the one hand, and certain
groups from other regions on the other (MERCOSUR, CARICOM, ASEAN and GCC). In case of North America the
Any attempt to move
towards significantly closed blocs ("fortresses") would require overcoming the
significant inter-dependence between major trading blocs. Besides the analysis of
contemporary trends in extra- and intra-regional trade , other research was conducted that was
supposed to point to the reasons why the new regionalism has mainly a non-negative
impact on outsiders and global liberalization. The distinctive features of new
ratio between intra-regional and inter-regional trade is 40:60, and in East Asia, it is 45:55.

regionalism were also affected to characteristics of international economic and

political environment it sprouted in. In the 1980s, economic nationalisms were not
so expressed as in the interventionism years following the Second World War; however,
the neo-liberalism represented by GATT activities did not find the "fertile ground in all parts of the world. Regionalism
growth in the circumstances of multilateral system existence is, among other things, the
consequence of distrust in multilateralism. The revival of the forces of regionalism
stemmed from frustration with the slow pace of multilateral trade liberalization... If the
world trade regime could not be moved ahead, then perhaps it was time for deeper
liberalization within more limited groups of like-minded nations ... Such efforts would at least
liberalize some trade... and might even prod the other nations to go along with multilateral liberalization.33 Kennedy's round and
Tokyo round of trade negotiations under GATT auspices brought a certain progress in the global trade liberalization. However,


1980s witnessed significant changes in the world economy that the GATT trade
system was not up to. Besides. GATT had not yet managed to cover the entire trade in goods, since there were still
exceptions in the trade in agricultural and textile products that particularly affected the USA and developing countries. GATT system

In this vacuum
from the point when GATT inadequacy
became obvious until the start of the Uruguay round and the establishment of World Trade Organization, the wave
of regionalism started spreading across the world again. Prodded by the Single European Act and the
success of European integration, many countries turned to an alternative solution
establishment of new or expansion and deepening of the existing economic
integrations. Even the USA, the multilateralism bastion until then, made a radical turn in their foreign-trade policy and started
of conflict resolutions, and its organizational and administrative mechanism in general also required revision.
that was created in promoting trade and investment multilateralism

working on designing a North American integration.

Trump rolls back the aff he has essentially unlimited control
over tariffs
Gillespie 11/14
(Patrick Gillespie, 3 ways Trump can slap tariffs on China and Mexico, CNNMoney,
14 November 2016)
President-elect Donald Trump has threatened to slap big tariffs on China and Mexico to
help bring jobs back to America. At first glance, it may seem hard to do without backing from Congress. But
actually, Trump doesn't even need Congress to approve it. True, the Constitution gives Congress the
right to impose tariffs on other nations. However, several complicated laws have been passed in the last 100 years that delegate
that power from Congress to the president. Trump has several options -- each open to interpretation
-- but here are three key ways he can go after China and Mexico. 1. Trump's biggest weapon: Unlimited tariffs 'during time of war'

Trump could invoke the "Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917" to hit Mexico and China
with tariffs as high as he wants. Under the law, the president can restrict all types of
trade "during time of war." That definition is very loose though. America doesn't
have to be at war with China or Mexico -- it just has to be "at war" somewhere in the
world in order to apply tariffs against China or Mexico. Experts believe U.S. special forces in
Syria and Libya would suffice to meet that requirement for Trump to hit China and Mexico with tariffs.
In 1971, President Richard Nixon used this act to impose a 10% import tariff (not directed at
any particular nation) citing the Korean War, which had ended nearly two decades prior. Technically, America was still in
a state of emergency which had not lifted. All to say: the excuse of war has very loose meaning for the President to raise tariffs of
any kind. 2. Trump's next best weapon: unlimited tariffs during 'national emergency' Think that law is too outdated for Trump to use?

the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977. It gives the

president authority to use tariffs on another country during a "national emergency."
Again, defining an emergency is vague. Losing manufacturing jobs to Mexico and
China would suffice as one and courts have never rejected a president's reasoning.
There's another --

"You say 'it's an emergency, we've lost a lot of jobs and now I've got to act. I declare an emergency.' I think it's really that simple,"
says Doug Irwin, a trade expert at Dartmouth. "If he wants to threaten China or Mexico, he has a lot of leverage." The big difference
between this Act and the one from 1917 is that Trump can't seize assets using this one, but that's not his aim anyway. This law has
been invoked against Nicaragua, Panama, Sierra Leone and Somalia, according to the Peterson Institute of International Economics.
It was used "in circumstances that few observers would characterize as an 'unusual or extraordinary threat," says Gary Hufbauer, an

Trump can also impose

tariffs on everything under another law -- the Trade Act of 1974, Section 122. It
gives him authority to impose across-the-board tariffs. Trump just needs to find "an
adverse impact on national security from imports." Lost jobs could be an adverse impact. The caveat:
economist at PIIE. 3. Trump's limited options: hit specific industries or low tariffs on everyone

The tariff can only be up to 15% on all goods and it's only good for 150 days. Then Congress needs to approve it. So, it's a blunt rule

Trump can
also use the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Ronald Reagan used this one. It allows Trump to slap
targeted tariffs on certain industries , like steel. It's not as broad, but Trump can
raise tariffs as high as he wants on specific things.
that could have a severe short term impact but it expires after five months, unless it is extended by Congress.

Politics is an amalgamation of constantly changing parts

theres no chance their plan solves the impacts because the
plan is only one cause among millions and their impacts are
only a snapshot of the way the system used to be vote neg on
Ramalingam et al 2008
(Ben, Senior Research Associate at the Overseas Development Institute, and Harry
jones at ODI, "Exploring the science of complexity"
Concept 4: Nonlinearity5 ... the darkest corner of science [is] the realm of non-linear problems (Strogatz, 2003). Outline of the concept Traditional scientific approaches are based on the idea that linear relationships can be
identified through data gathering and analysis, and can be used as the basis of laws of behaviour (Byrne, 1998). Such approaches in the physical sciences have informed the development of social, economic and political science,
using broad theories of behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest (Homer-Dixon, 1995). However, complexity science suggests that

not work in a simple linear fashion

human systems do

. Feedback processes between interconnected elements and dimensions lead to relationships that see change that is dynamic, nonlinear

clear causal relations

cannot be traced because of multiple influences. The distinction between linear and
nonlinearity is far from trivial
and unpredictable (Stacey, 1996). Nonlinearity is a direct result of the mutual interdependence between dimensions found in complex systems. In such systems,

. If dynamic nonlinear feedbacks in response to rising greenhouse gases are included in the model used in the Stern Review of Climate Change (cited in

Concept 2), for example, the total average cost of climate change rises from 5% to at least 20% of global per capita consumption (HM Treasury, 2006).6 Detailed explanation Vast numbers of naturally occurring systems exhibit
nonlinearity. As one thinker has dryly suggested (Stanislaw Ulam, in the 1950s), calling a situation nonlinear is like going to the zoo and talking about all the interesting non-elephant animals you can see there (Campbell et al., 1985):

problems can be broken down into pieces, with each piece
analysed separately
all the separate answers can be recombined to give the right
answer to the original problem
the whole
equivalent to the sum of the
linearity is often an approximation of a more complicated reality
When a system starts to behave in a nonlinear fashion, all
bets are off (Strogatz, 2003). This is not to suggest that nonlinearity is necessarily a
dangerous or unwanted aspect of systems
there are as many nonlinear situations as there are non-elephant animals.

describes the proportionality

d in idealised situations where responses are proportional to forces and causes are

proportional to effects (Strogatz, 2003). Linear

; finally,

. In a linear system,

is exactly

. However,

most systems only behave

linearly if they are close to equilibrium and are not pushed too hard.

. The biology of life itself is dependent on nonlinearity, as are the laws of ecology. Combination therapy for HIV/AIDS

using a cocktail of three drugs works precisely because the immune response and viral dynamics are nonlinear the three drugs taken in combination are much more effective than the sum of the three taken separately. The
nonlinearity concept means that linear assumptions of how social phenomena play out should be questioned. It is important to note that such thinking has only relatively recently been incorporated into the hard science paradigms

have to be examined all at once, as a coherent entity.
, the need to develop
such ways of thinking cannot be overstated as one thinker puts it: ... every major
unresolved problem in science from consciousness to cancer to the
collective craziness of the economy, is nonlinear
and, moreover, is still only starting to shape thinking in the social, economic and political realms.

ity poses challenges to analysis precisely because such

apart they

cannot be taken


(Capra, 1996). 5 It is important to distinguish nonlinearity as used here, which relates to

relationships and proportionality, and nonlinearity in terms of sequences of events one thing following another. 6 Note that the previously cited increase from 5 to 14.4% was due to natural, known feedbacks and does not include
non-linear feedbacks 25 Although nonlinearity is a mathematical formulation, it is useful to take the suggestion that what is required is a qualitative understanding of [the] quantitative when attempting to investigate
them systematically (Byrne, 1998). Such a qualitative understanding has been furthered by the work of Robert Jervis (1997) on the role of complexity in international relations. Starting with the notion that understanding of social
systems has tacitly incorporated linear approaches from Newtonian sciences, Jervis goes on to highlight three common assumptions that need to be challenged in order to take better account of nonlinearity. These assumptions
provide a solid basis for investigating nonlinearity. First, it is very common to test ideas and propositions by making comparisons between two situations which are identical except for one variable referred to as the independent
variable. This kind of analysis is usually prefaced with the statement holding all other things constant. However, in a system of interconnected and interrelated parts, with feedback loops, adaptive agents and emergent properties,
this is almost impossible, as everything else cannot be held constant and there is no independent variable. Jervis argues that, in such systems, it is impossible to look at just one thing, or to make only one change, hence to look at a
situation involving just one change is unrealistic. Secondly, it is often assumed that changes in system output are proportional to changes in input. For example, if it has been assumed that a little foreign aid slightly increases
economic growth, then more aid should produce more growth. However, as recent work by ODI and others argues, absorption capacity needs to be taken account more aid does not necessarily equate to better aid. In
complex systems, then, the output is not proportional to the input. Feedback loops and adaptive behaviours and emergent dynamics within the system may mean that the relationship between input and output is a nonlinear
one: Sometimes even a small amount of the variable can do a great deal of work and then the law of diminishing returns sets in [a negative feedback process] in other cases very little impact is felt until a critical mass is
assembled (Jervis, 1997). The third and final commonly made assumption of linearity is that the system output that follows from the sum of two different inputs is equal to the sum of the outputs arising from the individual inputs. In
other words, the assumption is that if Action A leads to Consequence X and Action B has Consequence Y then Action A plus Action B will have Consequences X plus Y. This frequently does not hold, because the consequences of Action
A may depend on the presence or absence of many other factors which may well be affected by B or Bs Consequence (Y). In addition, the sequence in which actions are undertaken may affect the outcome. Example: The growth
dynamics model as an alternative to linear regression models Studies of economic growth face methodological problems, the foremost of which is dealing with real world complexity. The standard way of understanding growth
assumes, implicitly, that the same model of growth is true for all countries, and that linear relationships of growth are true for all countries. However, linear relationships might not apply in many cases. An example would be a
country where moderate trade protection would increase economic growth but closing off the economy completely to international trade would spell economic disaster. Linear growth models imply that the effect of increasing the
value of the independent variable would be the same for all countries, regardless of the initial value of that variable or other variables. Therefore, an increase of the tariff rate from 0% to 10% is presumed to generate the same
change in the growth rate as a change from 90% to 100%. Furthermore, the change from 0% to 10% is assumed to have the same effect in a poor country as in a rich country, in a primary resource exporter as in a manufacturing
exporter, and in a country with well developed institutions as in a country with underdeveloped institutions. Despite some efforts to address these issues by relaxing the linear framework and introducing mechanisms to
capture nonlinearities and interactions among some variables, this is still a poor way of addressing real world nonlinearity. Econometric research has identified that linear models cannot generally be expected to 26 provide a good
approximation of an unknown nonlinear function, and in some cases can lead to serious misestimates (Rodrguez, 2007). Research at Harvard University has focused on the problem of designing a growth strategy in a context of
radical uncertainty about any generalised growth models. They call their method growth diagnostics, in part because it is very similar to the approach taken by medical specialists in identifying the causes of ailments. In such a
context, assuming that every country has the same problem is unlikely to be very helpful. The principal idea is to look for clues in the countrys concrete environment about the specific binding constraints on growth. The growth
diagnostics exercise asks a set of basic questions that can sequentially rule out possible explanations of the problem. The answers are inherently country-specific and time-specific. The essential method is to identify the key problem
to be addressed as the signals that the economy would provide if a particular constraint were the cause of that problem. Implication: Challenge linearity in underlying assumptions Within complex systems, the degree of nonlinearity

and theories
a local situation
hoped-for changes.

and relationships between various factors, and the lack of proportionality between inputs and outputs, means that the

entirely appropriate
, if there are

, aggregations

when applied

the dynamics of

understanding of what should be done, and is furthermore unlikely to lead to the

of change

are highly context-specific.

is unlikely to lead

about the relations among different aspects of a specific situation, and these are


, then this perspective

to a deep

Nonlinearity implies that, as well as understanding the limitations of a particular model or

perspective, it is important to build and improve new models that can provide the sort of information required for the particular task at hand. No kind of explanatory representation can suit all kinds of phenomena ... any one
diagnosis of [a] problem and its solution is necessarily partial (Holland, 2000). From this perspective, it is important to tailor to the particular situation ones perspective on the dynamics of some phenomena. In a complex system,
one must examine the complex web of interrelationships and interdependencies among its parts or elements (Flynn Research, 2003).

It is important from the outset to

causes another

the association and

interaction among variables, rather than assuming that one

to change, and to look at how variables interact and feed back into each other over time (Haynes, 2003). Homer-Dixon, cited above, suggests that political scientists use methods that are

modelled on the physical sciences, developing broad theories of political behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest. These ideas resonate strongly with a recent assessment undertaken for
Sida on the use of the log frame (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005), highlighting some of the advantages and disadvantages in a way which is particularly pertinent for this paper. In the international aid world, much of programme
planning and development is undertaken using a set of methods and tools called the logical framework. For most of the study respondents, the advantage of logical frameworks was that they force people to think carefully through
what they are planning to do, and to consider in a systematic fashion how proposed activities might contribute to the desired goal through delivering outputs and outcomes. As a result, many see the log frame as a useful way of
encouraging clear thinking. However, these positive aspects were offset by the almost universal complaint that the log frame rests on a very

linear logic


This linear idea of cause and effect is profoundly ill-at-ease with the implications


B will result, leading to


C and Impact D.

, which

suggests if


A is

of complexity science and, indeed, the experiences of many development practitioners. The authors of the study sum up the problems of the log frame in a way that is key to our discussion of complexity: Unfortunately (for the
logical framework approach at least) we are not working with such a selfcontained system and there are so many factors involved which lie beyond the scope of the 27 planned initiative that will change the way things work.
Although the LFA makes some attempt to capture these through the consideration of the risks and assumptions, these are limited by the imagination and experience of those involved. As a result the LFA tends to be onedimensional and fails to reflect the messy realities facing development actors (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005). Nonlinearity also has clear implications for the increased interest in randomised control trials (RCTs). While the implications
of nonlinearity for techniques and tools such as the log frame and RCTs are increasingly well understood by many actors within the aid system, the answer to the deeper question as to whether incorporation of nonlinearity will be

The distinction between linearity and

re-frame the
debate. If the goals of
learning are about
mindsets, the degree to which
balance can be struck without exploring these
open to question.
feasible, given the pressure on donors to justify aid budgets while having to deal with a reducing headcount, is less clear.

can be seen in as providing a theoretical underpinning of the frequently cited tension between upward accountability and learning. It also provides a means to

accountability and




mindsets and the

on which they are based

Concept 5: Sensitivity to initial conditions Outline of the concept The behaviours of complex systems are sensitive to their initial conditions. Simply, this means that two complex

systems that are initially very close together in terms of their various elements and dimensions can end up in distinctly different places. This comes from nonlinearity of relationships where changes are not proportional, small
changes in any one of the elements can result in large changes regarding the phenomenon of interest. Detailed explanation Imagine a small ball dropped onto the edge of a razor blade, as shown in the first image in Figure 4 below.
The ball can strike the blade in such a way that it can go off to the left (centre image) or to the right (right-hand image). The condition that will determine whether the ball goes to the left or right is minute. If the ball were initially
held centred over the blade (as in the first image), a prediction of which direction the ball would bounce would be impossible to make with certainty. A very slight change in the initial conditions of the ball can result in falling to the
right or left of the blade. Figure 4: Sensitivity to initial conditions ball striking razor blade Source: http://www.schuelers.com/ChaosPsyche/part_1_14.htm. The concept of phase space (Concept 6) allows a more precise understanding
of initial conditions. Phase space allows for the analysis of the evolution of systems by considering the evolution process as a sequence of states in time (Rosen, 1991). A state is the position of the system in its phase space at
a given time. At any time, the systems state can be seen as the initial conditions for whatever processes follow. The sensitive dependence on initial conditions, in phase space terms, means that the position of a system in its phase
space at a particular moment will have an influence on its future evolution. The interactions that are taking place at any moment in time have evolved from a previous moment in time, that is, all interactions are contingent on an
historical process. Put simply, history matters in complex systems. 28 The infamous butterfly effect was a metaphor developed to illustrate this idea in the context of the weather. Edward Lorenz (1972), a meteorologist, used the
metaphor of a flapping wing of a butterfly to explain how a minute difference in the initial condition of a weather system leads to a chain of events producing large-scale differences in weather patterns, such as the occurrence of a
tornado where there was none before. As more recent thinkers have put it, in relation to complex systems in general, an initial uncertainty in measurement of the state of a system: however small, inevitably grow[s] so large that
long-range prediction becomes impossible even the most gentle, unaccounted-for perturbation can produce, in short order, abject failure of prediction (Peak and Frame, 1998). A large proportion of complex systems are prone to
exhibiting the butterfly effect, so much so that some have defined complex behaviour as occurring where the butterfly effect is present (ibid). As no two situations will be exactly alike, the phenomenon will inevitably occur in many
settings. As with nonlinearity, many have not used formal models to demonstrate the butterfly effect, but instead have tried to develop a qualitative understanding of the likely quantitative nature of real life situations. Sensitivity to
initial conditions also means that the generalisation of good practice [between contexts] begins to look fragile (Haynes, 2003) because initial conditions are never exactly the same, and because the complexity and nonlinearity of
behaviour make it extremely difficult to separate the contributions to overall behaviour that individual factors have. Any notion of good practice requires a detailed local knowledge to understand why the practice in question was
good. This concept highlights the importance of understanding what can be forecast in complex systems to what level of certainty, as well as what is comparable across complex systems. It reinforces the point that both of these
areas are necessarily restricted by the perspective of the observer. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions suggests that no single perspective can capture all there is to know about a system, that it may be wise to look in detail
at how appropriate our solution to a problem is, and that it may be better to work with inevitable uncertainty rather than plan based on flimsy or hopeful predictions. This may mean, to take the example of predictability, that the
success of a nation may be best explained not by its populations virtues, its natural resources and its governments skills, but rather simply by the position it took in the past, with small historical advantages leading to much
bigger advantages later. Another example is how socioeconomic policy can result in a separation of neighbourhoods, driving a large gap between the rich and the poor so that, in short order, a gulf in wealth can result between two
families who once had similar wealth (Byrne and Rogers, 1996). This is closely related to the notion of path dependence, which is the idea that many alternatives are possible at some stages of a systems development, but once
one of these alternatives gains the upper hand, it becomes locked in and it is not possible to go to any of the previous available alternatives. For example, many cities developed where and how they did not because of the
natural advantages we are so quick to detect after the fact, but because their establishment set off self-reinforcing expectations and behaviours (Cronon, cited in Jervis, 1997). In economic development, the term path
dependence is used to describe how standards which are first-to-market can become entrenched lock ins - such as the QWERTY layout in typewriters still used in computer keyboards (David, 2000). In certain situations, positive
feedbacks leading from a small change can lead to such irreversible path dependence (Urry, 2003). Urry gives the example of irreversibility across an entire industry or sector, whereby through sensitive dependence on
initial conditions, feedback can set in motion institutional patterns that are hard or impossible to reverse. He cites the example of the domination of steel and petroleum-based fuel models, developed in the late 29 19th century,
which have come to dominate over other fuel alternatives, especially steam and electric, which were at the time preferable. The concept of path dependence has received some criticism from exponents of complexity
science, because it has imported into economics the view that minor initial perturbations are important while grafting this onto an underlying theory that still assumes that there are a finite number of stable and alternative endstates, one of which will arise based on the particular initial conditions. As will be explained in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos, this is not always the case in complex systems (Margolis and Liebowitz, 1998). Example: Sensitive
dependence on initial conditions and economic growth Economists have generally identified sensitive dependence on initial conditions as one of the important features of the growth process that is, what eventually happens to an
economy depends greatly on the point of departure. There is mounting evidence that large qualitative differences in outcomes can arise from small (and perhaps accidental) differences in initial conditions or events (Hurwicz, 1995).
In other words, the scope for and the direction and magnitude of change that a society can undertake depend critically on its prevailing objective conditions and the constellation of sociopolitical and institutional factors that have
shaped these conditions. For specific economies, the initial conditions affecting economic growth include levels of per capita income; the development of human capital; the natural resource base; the levels and structure
of production; the degree of the economys openness and its form of integration into the world system; the development of physical infrastructure; and institutional variables such as governance, land tenure and property rights. One
might add here the nature of colonial rule and the institutional arrangements it bequeathed the former colonies, the decolonisation process, and the economic interests and policies of the erstwhile colonial masters. Wrongly
specifying these initial conditions can undermine policy initiatives. Government polices are not simply a matter of choice made without historical or socioeconomic preconditions. Further, a sensitive appreciation of the differences
and similarities in the initial conditions is important if one is to avoid some of the invidious comparisons one runs into today and the naive voluntarism that policymakers exhibit when they declare that their particular country is about
to become the new tiger of Africa. Such comparisons and self-description actually make the process of learning from others more costly because they start the planning process off on a wrong foot (Mkandawire and
Soludo, 1999). Implication: Rethink the scope of learning and the purpose of planning in an uncertain world Sensitivity to initial conditions suggests that there are inevitably degrees of non-comparability across, and unpredictability
within, complex systems. Some have argued that this implies that: the map to the future cannot be drawn in advance. We cannot know enough to set forth a meaningful vision or plan productively (Tetenbaum, 1998). The general
implications for development theory and practice have been highlighted by a previous ODI working paper on participatory approaches, which suggests that this implies the notion of development as planned change is paradoxical. To
quote directly, perfect planning would imply perfect knowledge of the future, which in turn would imply a totally deterministic universe in which planning would not make a difference (Geyer, cited in Sellamna, 1999). Sellamna
goes on: For this reason, development planning should abandon prescriptive, goal-oriented decision making and prediction about future states and focus instead on understanding the dynamics of 30 change and promoting a
collective learning framework through which concerned stakeholders can constantly, through dialogue, express their respective interests and reach consensus. With regards to learning, this poses profound issues for the
transferability of best practice, a concept that has taken on increasing meaning within the development sector since the rise of knowledge management and organisational learning strategies (Ramalingam, 2005). While it is
possible that, for example, an understanding of the interplay of factors driving urban change in the Philippines may be relevant for analysis of urban change in Guatemala, this is not necessarily the case. The sensitivity to initial
conditions gives us a strong reason to suppose that, even if we have a generally useful perspective on urban environments, this may entirely fail to capture the key features of the next situation we look at. This means that the search
for best practices may need to be replaced by the search for good principles. Some have suggested that the most appropriate way to bring the principles of effective approaches from one context to another is for development
workers to become facilitators enabling representatives of other communities to see first hand what in the successful project they would wish to replicate (Breslin, 2004). Moving onto planning, to say that prediction of any kind

Complexity does suggest that, in certain

cannot be forecasted
in other systems future s can be foreseen
is impossible may be overstating the case.

kinds of

systems, future events

to a useful level of probability and that, from certain perspectives, it is not possible to offer any firm prediction of the way the future will pan out on certain timescales.



in a helpful manner. For example, Geyer (2006) suggests that, with political dynamics, it is fairly safe

to predict the short-term dynamics of basic power resources and political structures and that, therefore, there is decent scope for forecasting voting and decision outcomes of policy. On the other hand, examining party and
institutional dynamics becomes more difficult, and grasping the potential shifts in contested political and social debates is even harder, while the longterm development of political dynamics is effectively characterised by disorder, as

is important to
and not treat uncertainty as
embarrassing Rather than rejecting planning outright, there is a need to
inherent levels of uncertainty

far as our ability to predict is concerned. It is important to clarify that certain levels of uncertainty are unavoidable when looking into the future. Complexity science suggests that it


and analyse these levels of

some way unscientific or

as part of the nature of the systems with which we work,

the purpose and principles of planning. This has two key strands. First, it is necessary to incorporate an



ance of the

into planning. The

requirement for a certain level of detail in understanding future events should be balanced with the understanding that both simple and intricate processes carry uncertainty of prediction. While improving ones models of change and
analyses of facets of a situation may be worthwhile, it is just as important and often more practical to work with a realistic understanding of this uncertainty and build a level of flexibility and adaptability into projects, allowing for
greater resilience. It has been argued that development projects have fallen under the enchantment of [delivering] clear, specific, measurable outcomes (Westley et al., 2006). In many cases, this could be unrealistic, ineffective or
even counterproductive; it is uncertain whether valuable social outcomes could be planned in terms of a specific series of outputs, and it is unclear why it is more productive to be able to hold agencies strictly accountable to
promises at the expense of their promises delivering real results. This resonates with critiques of the log frame approach cited earlier, which argue that the adoption of the log frame as a central tool in effect and impact evaluations
assumes higher powers of foresight than in fact is the case (Gasper, 2000). What is needed is higher levels of flexibility in the funding of international aid work, involving less stringent targets and requirements from donors. The role
of M&E would be shifted to value learning from unexpected outcomes. This is at the heart of the participatory approach to M&E developed by IDRC called outcome mapping. 31 Second, the way organisations look into the future
should be adjusted by taking a more systematic and realistic view of what the future can hold: A single vision to serve as an intended organisational future is a thoroughly bad idea not that the long term is dismissed as an
effective irrelevance, [instead we need a] refocusing: rather than establish a future target and work back to what we do now to achieve it, the sequence is reversed. We should concentrate on the significant issues which need to be
handled in the short term, and ensure that the debate about their long-term consequences is lively and engaged (Rosenhead, 2001). What is needed is a pragmatic balance between present concerns and future potentialities (ibid);
this means that ongoing systematic thinking about the future is an important task for any organisation working in development or humanitarian aid. Foresight is the ability to create and maintain viable forward views and to use
these in organisationally useful ways (Slaughter, 2003), and futures techniques, such as driver analysis or scenario planning, are suitable for this task. Scenario planning constructs a number of possible futures, in order to produce
decisions and policies that are robust under a variety of feasible circumstances. This encourages a move away from looking for optimal policies or strategies: any strategy can only be optimum under certain conditions and when
those conditions change, the strategy may no longer be optimal (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003), so it may be preferable to produce strategies that are robust and insensitive to future variability rather than optimal for one possible future
scenario. Path dependence and lock ins are also important to consider in the context of the practices of international aid agencies. The widespread use of the logical framework approach, despite the often serious critiques, is a clear
example of path dependence at play. In fact, it could be argued that linearity has a lock in when it comes to the thought processes and approaches of international agencies. How lock ins may be addressed in specific agency
contexts is touched upon in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos Concept 6: Phase space and attractors Outline of the concept The dimensions of any system can be mapped using a concept called phase space, also described as the
space of the possible (Cohen and Stewart, 1995).7 For any system, the space of the possible is developed by identifying all the dimensions that are relevant to understanding the system, then determining the possible values that
these dimensions can take (Romenska, 2006). This space of the possible is then represented in either graphical or tabular form. In natural sciences, the prevalence of time-series data means that the phase space can be
represented as a graphical map of all of the relevant dimensions and their values. In social scientific thinking, tables of data can be used to apply the same principles. The phase space of a system is literally the set of all the possible
states or phases that the system can occupy. Phase space is particularly useful as a way to describe complex systems because it does not seek to establish known relationships between selected variables, but instead attempts to
shed light on the overall shape of the system by looking at the patterns apparent when looking across all of the key dimensions. This resonates with a key point raised in Concept 1 more may be learned about complex systems by
trying to understand the important patterns of interaction and association across different elements and dimensions of such systems (Haynes, 2003). Phase space can be used to enable this kind of learning. By creating such a map
of a system, it is possible to characterise how that system changes over time and the constraints that exist to change in the system (Musters et al., 1998). 7 Phase space is often used interchangeably with the phrase state

space. 32 Detailed explanation The dimensions of a complex system mutually influence each other, leading to an intricate intertwining (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003) of these relationships and system behaviours to degrees of nonlinearity
and unpredictability. Because of the challenges involved in analysing such systems, scientists studying complex systems have made use of a mathematical tool called phase space, which allows data relating to the dimensions of a
system to be mapped rather than solved (Capra, 1996). Put simply, phase space is a visual way of representing information about the dimensions of a system. Rather than a graph, which attempts to show the relationships between

gives the example of a city as a complex system
the cities are complex
a range of variables are interacting simultaneously in
interconnected ways.
specific chosen dimensions, phase space maps the possible values of each dimension of the system (akin to drawing the axes of a graph). This is the space within which a complex system displays its behaviour.
(Byrne, 2006). He describes how

in that they present situations where


He cites the specific example of Leicester, a city in the UK that grew from a small market town of 2,000 people in the 11th century to a city of 280,000 in 2001. Using the

Census data from 2001, he shows that Leicester could be seen as a complex urban system made up of the following variables: