MEMORANDUM

THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECEMBER 8TH, 2012
TO: Gayle Smith, Senior Director for Global Development, Stabilization and Humanitarian Assistance
FROM: Robert Swope, Staff Assistant, Stabilization Desk
SUBJECT: Capacity Building Considerations for Post-Conflict Countries
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This memo discusses considerations for building capacity in fragile states during post-conflict
interventions. The U.S. government (USG) currently, and in the recent past, has taken part in such statebuilding missions and will likely continue to do so in the future, albeit on a much more limited basis. It
is in the interest of the USG that capacity-building be taken into account in all interventions so the
assisted countries are able to function successfully on their own and the U.S. may exit sooner rather than
later.
The memo begins with a short explanation of what capacity means, breaking it down into its
subsidiary components, and highlighting why it is a necessary line of operation in post-conflict contexts.
Discussion and analysis then ensues as to the special considerations related to capacity-building in a
country transitioning out of conflict, both in terms of the operating environment in which capacitybuilding is done, and the various tradeoffs and challenges faced by field staff. Finally, recommendations
are made for steps to be taken that may strengthen U.S. government preparedness for and execution of
capacity-building interventions in future post-conflict transition scenarios.
THE NATURE OF CAPACITY
Though the term capacity often means various things to different people, the operative definition for the
purposes of this memo is that of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developments
Development Assistance Committee, or OECD/DAC, which according to its 2006 guidelines, refers to
capacity as the ability of people, organizations, and society as a whole to manage their affairs
successfully.i Neither the USG nor USAID has an official definition of capacity. However, the U.S. is
a longstanding member of the OECD/DAC and this definition has the virtue of perhaps being the most
widely accepted and succinct.
When international development professionals and capacity-building experts break down what capacity
means, they refer to five core capabilities that institutions, organizations and individuals must possess if
they are to achieve their intended purposes.ii Taken from a seminal 2008 European Centre for
Development Policy Management (ECDPM) Study Report, which is considered to be a standard text for
understanding capacity development issues, they are the capabilities to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Commit and engage;

Carry out technical, service delivery and logistical tasks;
Relate and to attract resources and support;
Adapt and self-renew;
Balance diversity and coherence.iii

More specifically, these five capabilities allow for individuals, organizations, and institutions to
self-organize and take action; complete tasks and generate results; establish supportive relationships and
accrue resources from others as needed; evolve based on changing conditions and develop resiliencies to

withstand shocks so as to allow the potential for self-renewal; and develop both short and long-term
strategies while simultaneously coping with the complexity and fragmentation (i.e. diversity) found
internal to themselves without losing the ability to remain functional and whole. iv
These capabilities are much needed in post-conflict countries since such places are often
characterized by extreme capacity deficits, particularly those related to the capabilities of states to provide
safety and security for their people (an environment free from violence and crime); basic public goods
and services (such as health, education, infrastructure); and government legitimacy (a political system
based on democracy or communally agreed on principles). v Though the sources of intrastate violence and
instability are often complex and multifaceted, their root causes may more often than not be tied to one or
more of these three shortfalls. What is more is that studies have shown that countries which have recently
emerged from conflict face a 40% chance of lapsing back into violence within five years. vi This makes
sufficiently building a countrys capacity during the window of opportunity available in post-conflict
transitions to be of the utmost importance.
CAPACITY-BUILDING CONSIDERATIONS IN POST-CONFLICT SCENARIOS
Many issues present themselves when discussing capacity-building interventions in the context of
existing or recently quelled conflict that make them unlike similar efforts in stable but underdeveloped
nations. These may include (but are not limited to):
1. Humanitarian requirements related to providing life-saving assistances such as water, food,
emergency medical care and shelter;
2. Residual security challenges brought on by spoilers and criminal groups;
3. Greater pressure to restore essential government services;
4. An extremely politically sensitive and media-scrutinized context;
5. Psycho-social traumas and low levels of societal trust or resilience;
6. Shorter operational timeframes (i.e. the need for quick results);
7. Lack of information as to key stakeholders and existing capacity levels; and finally
8. The need to create new capacity, as opposed to building upon what already exists. vii
The above factors constitute the enabling environment for those working in such communities
and must be considered when designing a capacity-building intervention. These issues do not even
consider the challenges interveners themselves face in staffing and resourcing such missions, which
require personnel who are willing, ready and able to work under such trying conditions. In addition to
those who will be carrying out the capacity-building intervention, there is a need for sufficient support
staff to manage the extra logistical and security issues that are likely to prevent themselves, and which are
usually not present under a traditional scenario. The problems may become even more acute based on
local geography, infrastructure, and stability levels. For example, those seeking to build capacity may
find themselves under-resourced and spending a greater than normal percentage of their funds and time
on life support and security issues if they are operating in a landlocked country that is far from a seaport,
has vast ungoverned spaces where banditry may occur, lacks adequate transportation networks, and is
surrounded by less than accommodating neighbors who may make passing through their borders more
difficult and expensive (or who for their own reasons exacerbate the conflict). Unfortunately, such places
are often where conflict is likely to occur and where capacity-building is needed most.
Nor do above characteristics of the enabling environment encompass the harmonization problems
that will develop once a deluge of aid workers arrive as the firing begins to stop. Competition over hiring
local staff, finding accommodations, and securing transportation will likely distort the local economy, in
addition to negatively impacting capacity-building efforts. This may be because individuals who would
otherwise be government or civil society leaders decide to take on higher paid yet less important jobs for
interveners, (such as a government economist or statistics expert working as a driver for an NGO),

resulting in less competent bureaucrats for the host nation. A large capital inflow brought in by the flood
of aid workers and the buying up of local goods may also lead to prices for scarce commodities
increasing, thereby shrinking the purchasing power of local government and non-government
organizations as they seek to accrue resources, not to mention the poorest members of the local
community who lack the financial cushion needed to absorb the extra costs brought on by inflation. The
plethora of new aid actors and money may also change political dynamics and incentives as well as over
burden many already capacity deficient local organizations (both government and non-government alike).
Local organizations may also lack the ability to properly manage all the new support or programming and
reporting requirements, leading to waste. Competition and incentives for corruption may also increase
among stakeholders who focus more on accumulating power and money than on strengthening their
organizations or national goals, perhaps resulting in a further declination of capacity, the opposite of what
is originally intended. This competition may also reignite violent conflict among actors if the stakes are
high enough. Such challenges can set up an inauspicious foundation and have long-term detrimental
consequences. They must be dealt with to avoid duplication of effort among external interveners and
suboptimal use of limited resources, not to mention the delegitimization of the international assistance
effort and continued instability.
In order for capacity-building efforts to be most effective and sustainable, they must be endogenous in
nature, or in other words, an emergent property that arises from within the individual, organization, or
institution undergoing the capacity development process. This brings up a design challenge of ensuring
that intervention activities and goals are internally chosen by the host nation and are demand-driven, a
concern present not just in post-conflict scenarios, but in all capacity-building efforts. Too often, the
goals and activities of international capacity-building assistance interventions are externally imposed
from the funding source, which may think it knows what is best or is engaging in tasks more related to its
own narrow interests as opposed to those of the beneficiary. If capacity-building goals or activities are
not entirely self-generated, then interveners need to at the very least ensure that beneficiaries have agreed
to and bought into the program, displaying a certain amount of ownership for it. This could take the
form of cost-shares, official legal reforms, or other displays of buy-in. In the absence of sufficient
ownership, the intervention should probably not be carried out.
This problem understanding the enabling environment and designing appropriate capacitybuilding programs in conjunction with local partners may be made more difficult by the isolation
representatives of the funding source often experience in unstable environments. It is not unusual for
such actors to be sequestered behind heavily guarded and difficult to access walled compounds, or to
require burdensome security details. These aspects of the intervention limit the movement of interveners
and the time they may spend in the headquarters or administrative offices of beneficiary organizations or
the wider community. Such seclusion may often be justified for security reasons, yet it harms the ability
of interveners to properly gauge what is happening on the ground in their area of responsibility and to
interact with their local counterparts. Capacity-building practitioners must be aware of this challenges
and commit to overcoming it as best they can.
In addition to these concerns related to the enabling environment, resourcing, the distortionary
effects of aid, and designing appropriate interventions, a variety of trade-offs also present themselves
once external interveners begin to plan and carry out capacity development activities. As noted by Derick
Brinkerhoff in a theme paper on capacity development in fragile states, which was used as an input into
the above discussed ECDPM report, some of these include choices that must be made regarding:
1. The provision of state vs. non-state services;
2. Service delivery of essential government functions immediately vs. later in order to strengthen
existing state institutions;
3. Focusing on limited resources on security vs. other non-security matters (like good governance)
which may be related, and perhaps more important, to maintaining stability over time;
4. Addressing technical issues vs. political dynamics which may create disincentives for even the
most capable individual or organization to perform;

5. Weighing insider (local resident) vs. outsider (indigenous expat) advice; and
6. Providing support to local groups with less capacity vs. external groups who have proven track
records plus more capacity to complete task, and who may be better able to relate to the USG. viii
These dilemmas require skill in navigating and constitute many of the pitfalls encountered by
practitioners working in an already challenging setting. To overcome them, interveners need a
sophisticated understanding of both the operating environment and the capacity development process, in
addition to a clear understanding their own organizations goals and priorities. Much can be done in
advance to prepare for this, for example, a determination (to the greatest extent possible) of national
interests, end states, and strategy constraints at the policy decision-making level, followed by their
articulation to field staff. This should allow those on the ground to more appropriately balance these
concerns with the need to support endogenous capacity development.
Those likely to be deployed to post-conflict countries can also monitor the situations in areas of
concern and develop resource book detailing important information, such as basic country facts, current
capacity levels, actors, the political situation, cultural aspects, and so on. While any country study will
have to be adjusted once practitioners arrive on the ground and get a firsthand look at the situation, the
exercise may provide a strong foundation upon which to determine entry points and design intervention
strategies, along with preventing offensive and entirely avoidable cultural missteps. The study can also
be vetted by expats and other country experts to ensure it is valid. And the information may prove useful
to senior level policy makers as they develop their own strategic level goals and priorities. Additionally,
the effort may result in the development of more information needs that may be able to further refine
strategy and improve outcomes. At the very least, it will serve as a basis for discussion and the
development of a shared understanding of the situation among practitioners.
Up to this point, we have discussed the nature of capacity, some considerations related to how it
develops, the characteristics of post-conflict environments, and the challenges faced by practitioners.
There is however, a key consideration that must be dealt with when operating in contexts characterized by
conflict that is present but much more easy to overcome in traditional scenarios. This is the problem of
sorting out whether an issue is not being addressed, or a task done, because the individual, organization,
or institution being assisted actually lacks capacity or because, for whatever reason (sometimes justified)
the beneficiary lacks the will to do so. Many times, the true, underlying cause for a why an organization
appears to not being getting something done has less to do with a lack of knowledge or resources of
personnel, and instead has more to do with the incentives influencing the decisions made by those
responsible for carrying out tasks.
In post-conflict contexts, where competition over resources and power may be deadly and where
there are often times an insufficient security system or justice sector, many individuals, organization, and
institutions fail to perform tasks for which they are capable. Would-be capacity-builders must ask
themselves before deciding on a particular activity or approach whether or not a true capacity deficit
exists, or whether or not capacity is there but is being suboptimally utilized as a result of certain
environmental factors. To attempt to develop capacity when the context or enabling environment does
not exist for that capacity to be employed is a waste of limited resources and interveners would be better
off directing their efforts to influencing those aspects of the enabling environment that are preventing
existing capacity from being used to its fullest potential. Examples may include the troublesome security
environment, but may also be the lack of enabling legislation, or certain powerful individuals who create
disincentives for action and whose influence must be negated.
RECOMMENDATIONS
There are two different categories of recommendations that must be looked at when it comes to improving
the USGs capabilities to support capacity-building in post-conflict countries. One involves actions that

may be taken prior to field staff deploying to such areas. The other involves ways they may be assisted in
implementing capacity development programs and achieving goals once on the ground.
Pre-deployment Recommendations
The first step to improve USG capacity-building efforts is for relevant departments and agencies to
recognize the importance of capacity development and then commit to improving their existing
organizational capabilities. This is where you as the NSCs Senior Director for Global Development,
Stabilization and Humanitarian Assistance can be of great use. With the ear of the President and as the
lead Executive-branch interagency coordinating body on national security issues (which includes USG
post-conflict assistance), the NSC may influence the design and implementation of presidential directives
that shifts the focus and resources of the USG as they relate to interventions in post-conflict countries.
What is more is that the NSC can leverage its convening authority to better align policies and procedures
among the various departments and agencies that work in such places. Following in the spirit of former
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who noted that building the capacity of partner nations will likely be
the applied approach to future security challenges, (though it also applies to humanitarian assistance and
international development), and that building the capabilities other nations to deal with such challenges is
arguably more important than the actions the U.S. takes, it would behoove USG international
development and post-conflict stabilization communities to internalize the importance of capacity
development by reorienting existing programs toward meeting the challenge. ix
To this end, the NSC should push for the approval and publication of a Presidential Policy
Directive (PPD) that speaks to the issue of capacity development and formalizes USG international
assistance (both in stable and unstable countries) as one of helping to build capacity so that the U.S. does
not need to be involved any longer than is necessary. Similar PPDs have been used in the past to issue the
United States Global Development Policy and make post-conflict stabilization and state-building
activities a core mission of the Department of Defense. A PPD has the full force and effect of law
and the NSC can craft one for the President that seeks to mainstream capacity-building throughout the
USGs international assistance community (primarily the Departments of Defense and State, along with
USAID). With a PPD in place, various departments and agencies will be mandated and better
incentivized to develop strategies, infrastructure, staff, and other resources to address the capacity
development challenges found in post-conflict scenarios and the USGs own capacity-building deficits. A
PPD would also be a useful tool since capacity-building is often given lip service, as many agencies to do
not engage in it appropriately because of the long time frames required for achieving results, and because
capacity-building does not easily lend itself to quick wins. Nonetheless, capacity-building must be a
core goal if any long-term strategic objectives of the United States are to be accomplished in a postconflict country in which the USG has a presence. This is especially true if U.S. wishes to leave with a
legitimate government successfully positioned to maintain stability and provide appropriate public goods
for its citizenry. If requisite capacity is not built, there is a high likelihood that USG personnel will have
to remain there putting out fires or return again at some future date, perhaps requiring an even greater
expenditure of lives and financial resources than that which would have been necessary had sufficient
capacity been built the first time around.
Building off the PPD, relevant USG departments and agencies with roles in post-conflict capacity
development can begin better aligning their individual organizations systems, policies, procedures, and
resources to better incorporate the capacity-building efforts in their overseas missions. The NSC could
aid in this by convening an interagency working group that produces guidance on what capacity is and
best practices for how it is arrived at so that a shared understanding of the nature of capacity and the
capacity development process exists at the policy level. A framework should also be developed through
which subsidiary departments and agencies can identify and assess their own existing capabilities for
addressing the question of capacity-building. An example might be guidance as to the desired qualities
and competencies of individuals chosen to be on post-conflict capacity-building teams, such as personnel
who are able to function successfully in dangerous, high-pressure, and austere environments that are
complex, constantly changing, and are closely scrutinized. With such knowledge, department and

agencies may then direct staff changes, craft job statements and specific organizational subunit
responsibilities, and provide resources such as additional training to ensure there is a bench of
knowledgeable practitioners ready to go to such areas when needed.
In addition to providing the impetus and framework by which departments and agencies can go
about the task of building their capacity to engage in capacity-building, the NSC must set some standards
in this regard as to minimal capabilities required and put in place a monitoring and evaluation plan to
ensure that compliance with the PPD is occurring. What gets done is that which gets checked and
surveillance and enforcement mechanisms will serve as aids toward implementation.
Field Recommendations
When it comes to the assisting field staff, good preparation prior to deployment is of high importance.
Often times efforts of all types will succeed or fail before implementation even begins, based upon how
well prepared the implementers were and how much thought and planning was put into the intervention
process. This is where the NSC can be of great benefit since the actual implementation of capacitybuilding efforts devolves to the various Executive-branch organizations. The NSC can assist by
monitoring whether or not departments and agencies have trained personnel that are ready, willing and
able to deploy on quick notice and remain on the ground for long time periods. Such knowledge can
inform the Presidents decision making when it comes to determining whether or not to move forward
with an intervention, and to what degree. In field contexts, the NSC can also assist by making sure clear
guidance is issued from the White House as to the goals of the mission and priorities, which is necessary
for those on the ground to develop appropriate strategies. The NSC can also monitor capacity-building
efforts as they occur, providing an additional set of eyes that may provide valuable and perhaps a more
independent assessment of events on the ground. This would supplement reports coming through the
information reporting chain from the institutions carrying out capacity-building tasks and which are
naturally incentivized to make their own organizations look good. The NSC may also leverage its role as
the Presidents national security staff to help influence the Commander in Chief and senior-level decision
makers in allocating resources in ways that may better support those in the field.
This last issue is of particular importance since as mentioned earlier, post-conflict countries
possess certain security and logistical challenges not present in traditional capacity-building scenarios.
The NSC should help ensure that capacity-building practitioners have sufficient support staff in place so
they do not have to worry about logistical or security issues and can focus solely on building capacity.
The NSC may help achieve this by monitoring the situation on the ground and providing input to the
President as necessary so he may direct the various line Secretaries to better resource the mission. If
more resources are needed the President may also use the information the NSC provides to request that
Congress authorize more personnel and funding as appropriate. The President can also task various
Secretaries to redirect and share resources and to ensure their personnel on the ground do the same. For
the NSC to fulfill this role it needs to foster strong relationships with the various departments and
agencies involved in capacity-building and develop a way to collect the necessary data so it can make
informed recommendations.
The NSC may also help by serving in an independent mediation role between organizations (such
as the Departments of Defense and State) as they seek to achieve unity of effort in the field. Often times
institutional cultures, authorities, systems, do not line up easily when it comes to implementation, leading
to friction both at the headquarters level and in the field since personal operate under different incentives
and mindsets. By assisting in Executive-branch departments and agencies in managing relationships, in
addition to the allocation and use of resources, the NSC can better support those trying to build capacity
on the ground, especially since the staff enjoys the ear of the President as well as the mandate of being the
countrys interagency policy making body on national security issues.
.

CONCLUSION
This memo has discussed capacity-building in post-conflict contexts as it relates to the U.S. government.
It began with a definition, noting that capacity essentially entails individuals, organizations, or institutions
being able to successfully manage their own affairs. Capacity was further described as consisting of five
subsidiary components which together allow for value creation. These are the abilities to self-organize
and act; achieve results; build relationships and attract resources; adapt as needed and develop resiliencies
to self-renew; and balance the diversity found in a complex organization. The preferred development
process was described as an endogenous and demand-driven, with capacity seen as arising internally from
within, especially if what is built is to be sustainable.
The unique characteristics of capacity development in post-conflict transitions were reviewed with an eye
towards the difficulty, complexity, and pressures found in such environments. These included
humanitarian challenges, security concerns, resourcing issues, and intense media scrutiny, along with the
possible requirement to not just build off existing capacity, but to create new capacity as well. Some
dilemmas practitioners will likely face were also considered, among them, the tradeoffs that need to be
made, such as whether or not to deliver assistance immediately via non-state institutions at the expense of
building state institutions to deliver services over the long-term; whether to focus on security vs. nonsecurity issues, and whether to address capacity deficits with technical support (like training) and
resources, or address the political dynamics that may be the underlying causes of the problem.
Understanding that capacity-building strategy must be based on context, the memo acknowledges that
those tradeoffs will likely be determined upon an analysis of the situation once practitioners arrive on the
ground. Further discussion also occurred as to diagnosing whether or not a capacity deficit was the result
of a lack of capacity or insufficient political will.
The memo ends with a series of recommendations the NSC can take to embed capacity
development within the U.S. international development and national security communities. Primary
among them was the need to recognize the importance of capacity-building and commit to it. In order to
achieve this, the memo recommended the NSC draft a Presidential Policy Directive for the President to
sign that speaks to the issue of capacity development, formalizing it as a core goal of U.S. national
security and international development strategy. The creation of a framework so Executive-branch
departments and agencies may analyze their existing capabilities to build capacity was also
recommended, as was the development of a set of minimum standards for internal capabilities which the
NSC could then monitor to ensure compliance with the PPD. To support those in the field, it was advised
that the NSC help the President to develop clear guidance regarding mission and priorities to better enable
those on the ground to craft appropriate capacity-building strategies. Also recommended was an effort to
ensure sufficient life support personnel to manage the additional logistical and security requirements
present in post-conflict countries so that capacity-building experts could focus directly on the tasks at
hand. Finally, it was recommended that the NSC leverage its mandate as the Presidents interagency
coordinating body to provide an independent mediation role between relevant departments and agencies
so as to better achieve unity of effort in the field.
In closing, the NSC can play a valuable role in creating awareness for the importance of capacitybuilding among the various departments and agencies involved in post-conflict transitions where the USG
determines there are key national security interests. It can also support in capacity-building efforts abroad
by helping craft a presidential mandate directing Executive-branch organizations to assess their existing
capacity-building capabilities and develop a road map toward eliminating any capacity deficits they may
have. In doing so, practitioners in the field will be better positioned to carry out their roles, with the end
goal of enabling partner nations to manage their own affairs successfully and on a sustainable basis.

Endnotes

i Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee.

Capacity development: Key to development results. [Website]. Accessed December 12, 2012.
Available
at:http://www.oecd.org/dac/governanceanddevelopment/capacitydevelopmentkeytodevelopmentre
sults.htm

ii ECDPM has its own definition of capacity, which is that emergent combination of individual
competencies, collective capabilities, assets and relationships that enables a human system to
create value.

iii Baser, Heather and Peter Morgan. Capacity, Change and Performance. European Centre for
Development Policy Management Study Report. April, 2008. Pps. 28-34.

iv These explanations borrow from both the EDCPM study and an earlier theme paper prepared
for the EDCPM report.

v Brinkerhoff, Derick. Capacity Development in Fragile States. European Centre for

Development Policy Management Discussion paper No. 58D. May, 2007. Pg. 5.

vi Collier, Paul, with L. Elliott, H. Hegre, A. Hoeffler, A. Reynol-Querol, and N. Sambanis. Breaking
the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. New York: Oxford University Press.

vii These considerations come, in part, from the Brinkerhoff discussion paper, but are also
informed by the authors own experiences in post-conflict settings.

viii See the above Brinkerhoff discussion paper on capacity development in fragile settings,
particularly pages 20-25.

ix Gates, Robert. A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming The Pentagon For A New Age. Foreign
Affairs. January 2009. The full quote is as follows: The United States is unlikely to repeat
another Iraq or Afghanistanthat is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire
anytime soon. But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales.
Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approachesprimarily through building the
capacity of partner governments and their security forcesto prevent festering problems
from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this
kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States allies and partners may be as
important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not
more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.