Actual case or controversy: Ripeness for

adjudication: Locus Standi

A. Lozano v. Nograles, G.R. No. 187883, 16 June 2009, 589 SCRA 356.

State Immunity From Suit

Constitution Article XVI, Section 16
A. United States v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 (1985).
B. Unites States v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 (1990).
C. Republic v. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124 (1993).
D. Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Commission,
227 SCRA 693 (1193).
E. World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972).
F. Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 (1988).
G. Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713 (1990).
H. C.M.H. Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357.
I. Minucher v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 242 (1993).
J. Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 241 SCRA 580 (1195).
K. Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, 405 SCRA 126 (2003).

Citizenship
Read and understand all the provisions of Article VI
and Republic Act No. 9225
A. Aznar v. Commission on Elections, 185 SCRA 703.
B. Co. v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692
(1991).
C. Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630.
D. Valles V. Commission on Elections, 337 SCRA 543 (2000).
E. Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA
545 (2001).
F. Nicolas- Lewis v. Commission on Elections, 497 SCRA 649 (2006).
G. Poe- Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221697,
221698-700, 08 March 2016.

For August 16, 2016

Suffrage
Read and understand Article V
A. Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954).

B. Romualdez v. Regional Trial Court, 226 SCRA 408 (1993).

C. Akbayan- Youth v. Commission on Elections, 335 SCRA 318 (2008).

Amendments or Revisions to the Constitution

Read and understand Article XVII, Section 1-4

A. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, G.R. 28196, 9 November 1967,

21 SCRA 774.
B. Lombino V. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 174153, 25 October
2006, 505 SCRA 160.

Legislative Department
Read and understand Article VI, Sections 1-7;
Sections 21-22
A. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, 21 April 2009,
586 SCRA 210.
B. Romualdez- Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976,
248 SCRA 300.
C. Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, 18 September
1995, 248 SCRA 400.
D. Senate of the Philippines V. Ermita, G.R.. No. 169777, April 20, 2006,
488 SCRA 1.
E. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 014
September 2008, 564 SCRA 152.

For August 23, 2016

To improve your foundation in constitutional principles, read the
assigned provisions and commentaries thoroughly. Jurisprudence will
be assigned at the proper time.

Legislative Department
Please read and understand Article VI, Sections 8-20, 23-32, and
Bernas (2009 Edition), page 721 to 819. We shall revisit Sections 21-22
for greater clarity on the distinction of the two constitutional
provisions.

Executive Department
Please read and understand Article VII, Section 1-23, especially the
powers of the President, and Bernas, pages 820-945.

 Judicial Department
Please read and understand Article VIII, Sections 1-16, and Bernas,
pages 946-1034. Internalize the Constitutional safeguards to ensure
the independence of Constitutional Commissions.

United States Supreme Court

SIERRA CLUB v. MORTON, (1972)
No. 70-34
Argued: November 17, 1971
Decided: April 19, 1972
Petitioner, a membership corporation with "a special interest in the
conservation and sound maintenance of the national parks, game
refuges, and forests of the country," brought this suit for a declaratory
judgment and an injunction to restrain federal officials from approving
an extensive skiing development in the Mineral King Valley in the
Sequoia National Forest. Petitioner relies on 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, which accords judicial review to a "person suffering
legal wrong because of agency action, or [who is] adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute."
On the theory that this was a "public" action involving questions as to
the use of natural resources, petitioner did not allege that the
challenged development would affect the club or its members in their
activities or that they used Mineral King, but maintained that the
project would adversely change the area's aesthetics and ecology. The
District Court granted a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the club lacked standing, and had not shown
irreparable injury. Held: A person has standing to seek judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act only if he can show that he
himself has suffered or will suffer injury, whether economic or
otherwise. In this case, where petitioner asserted no individualized
harm to itself or its members, it lacked standing to maintain the action.
Pp. 731-741.
433 F.2d 24, affirmed.
STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and WHITE and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., post, p. 741,
BRENNAN, J., post, p. 755, and BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 755, filed
dissenting opinions. POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.

Leland R. Selna, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
briefs was Matthew P. Mitchell. [405 U.S. 727, 728]
Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for respondents. With him
on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Kashiwa, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Kiechel, William Terry Bray, Edmund B. Clark, and
Jacques B. Gelin.
Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Anthony A. Lapham
and Edward Lee Rogers for the Environmental Defense Fund; by
George J. Alexander and Marcel B. Poche for the National
Environmental Law Society; and by Bruce J. Terris and James W.
Moorman for the Wilderness Society et al.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by E. Lewis Reid and
Calvin E. Baldwin for the County of Tulare; by Robert C. Keck for the
American National Cattlemen's Assn. et al.; and by Donald R. Allen for
the Far West Ski Assn. et al.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
I
The Mineral King Valley is an area of great natural beauty nestled in
the Sierra Nevada Mountains in Tulare County, California, adjacent to
Sequoia National Park. It has been part of the Sequoia National Forest
since 1926, and is designated as a national game refuge by special Act
of Congress. 1 Though once the site of extensive mining activity,
Mineral King is now used almost exclusively for recreational purposes.
Its relative inaccessibility and lack of development have limited the
number of visitors each year, and at the same time have preserved the
valley's quality as a quasiwilderness area largely uncluttered by the
products of civilization. [405 U.S. 727, 729]
The United States Forest Service, which is entrusted with the
maintenance and administration of national forests, began in the late
1940's to give consideration to Mineral King as a potential site for
recreational development. Prodded by a rapidly increasing demand for
skiing facilities, the Forest Service published a prospectus in 1965,
inviting bids from private developers for the construction and operation
of a ski resort that would also serve as a summer recreation area. The
proposal of Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc., was chosen from those of six
bidders, and Disney received a three-year permit to conduct surveys
and explorations in the valley in connection with its preparation of a
complete master plan for the resort.

The final Disney plan, approved by the Forest Service in January 1969,
outlines a $35 million complex of motels, restaurants, swimming pools,
parking lots, and other structures designed to accommodate 14,000
visitors daily. This complex is to be constructed on 80 acres of the
valley floor under a 30-year use permit from the Forest Service. Other
facilities, including ski lifts, ski trails, a cog-assisted railway, and utility
installations, are to be constructed on the mountain slopes and in other
parts of the valley under a revocable special-use permit. To provide
access to the resort, the State of California proposes to construct a
highway 20 miles in length. A section of this road would traverse
Sequoia National Park, as would a proposed high-voltage power line
needed to provide electricity for the resort. Both the highway and the
power line require the approval of the Department of the Interior,
which is entrusted with the preservation and maintenance of the
national parks.
Representatives of the Sierra Club, who favor maintaining Mineral King
largely in its present state, followed the progress of recreational
planning for the valley [405 U.S. 727, 730] with close attention and
increasing dismay. They unsuccessfully sought a public hearing on the
proposed development in 1965, and in subsequent correspondence
with officials of the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior,
they expressed the Club's objections to Disney's plan as a whole and to
particular features included in it. In June 1969 the Club filed the
present suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California, seeking a declaratory judgment that various aspects of
the proposed development contravene federal laws and regulations
governing the preservation of national parks, forests, and game
refuges, 2 and also seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions
restraining the federal officials involved from granting their approval or
issuing permits in connection with the Mineral King project. The
petitioner Sierra Club sued as a membership corporation with "a
special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the
national parks, game refuges and forests of the country," and invoked
the judicial-review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. 701 et seq. [405 U.S. 727, 731]
After two days of hearings, the District Court granted the requested
preliminary injunction. It rejected the respondents' challenge to the
Sierra Club's standing to sue, and determined that the hearing had
raised questions "concerning possible excess of statutory authority,
sufficiently substantial and serious to justify a preliminary
injunction . . . ." The respondents appealed, and the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 433 F.2d 24. With respect to the
petitioner's standing, the court noted that there was "no allegation in
the complaint that members of the Sierra Club would be affected by

the actions of [the respondents] other than the fact that the actions are
personally displeasing or distasteful to them," id., at 33, and
concluded:
"We do not believe such club concern without a showing of more
direct interest can constitute standing in the legal sense sufficient to
challenge the exercise of responsibilities on behalf of all the citizens by
two cabinet level officials of the government acting under
Congressional and Constitutional authority." Id., at 30.
Alternatively, the Court of Appeals held that the Sierra Club had not
made an adequate showing of irreparable injury and likelihood of
success on the merits to justify issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The court thus vacated the injunction. The Sierra Club filed a petition
for a writ of certiorari which we granted, 401 U.S. 907 , to review the
questions of federal law presented.
II
The first question presented is whether the Sierra Club has alleged
facts that entitle it to obtain judicial review of the challenged action.
Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is what
[405 U.S. 727, 732] has traditionally been referred to as the question
of standing to sue. Where the party does not rely on any specific
statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of
standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a "personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 , as to ensure that "the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 . Where,
however, Congress has authorized public officials to perform certain
functions according to law, and has provided by statute for judicial
review of those actions under certain circumstances, the inquiry as to
standing must begin with a determination of whether the statute in
question authorizes review at the behest of the plaintiff. 3
The Sierra Club relies upon 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. 702, which provides:
"A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency [405 U.S. 727, 733] action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof."
Early decisions under this statute interpreted the language as adopting

the various formulations of "legal interest" and "legal wrong" then

prevailing as constitutional requirements of standing. 4 But, in Data
Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 , and Barlow v. Collins, 397
U.S. 159 , decided the same day, we held more broadly that persons
had standing to obtain judicial review of federal agency action under
10 of the APA where they had alleged that the challenged action had
caused them "injury in fact," and where the alleged injury was to an
interest "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated" by the statutes that the agencies were claimed to have
violated. 5
In Data Processing, the injury claimed by the petitioners consisted of
harm to their competitive position in the computer-servicing market
through a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency that national banks
might perform data-processing services for their customers. In Barlow,
the petitioners were tenant farmers who claimed that certain
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture adversely affected their
economic position vis-a-vis their landlords. These palpable economic
injuries have long been recognized as sufficient to lay the basis for
standing, with or without a specific statutory [405 U.S. 727, 734]
provision for judicial review. 6 Thus, neither Data Processing nor Barlow
addressed itself to the question, which has arisen with increasing
frequency in federal courts in recent years, as to what must be alleged
by persons who claim injury of a noneconomic nature to interests that
are widely shared. 7 That question is presented in this case.
III
The injury alleged by the Sierra Club will be incurred entirely by reason
of the change in the uses to which Mineral King will be put, and the
attendant change in the aesthetics and ecology of the area. Thus, in
referring to the road to be built through Sequoia National Park, the
complaint alleged that the development "would destroy or otherwise
adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of
the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park for future
generations." We do not question that this type of harm may amount to
an "injury in fact" sufficient to lay the basis for standing under 10 of
the APA. Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic wellbeing, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and
the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many
rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal
protection through the judicial process. But the "injury in fact" test
requires more than an injury to a cognizable [405 U.S. 727, 735]
interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the
injured.

The impact of the proposed changes in the environment of Mineral

King will not fall indiscriminately upon every citizen. The alleged injury
will be felt directly only by those who use Mineral King and Sequoia
National Park, and for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of
the area will be lessened by the highway and ski resort. The Sierra Club
failed to allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their
activities or pastimes by the Disney development. Nowhere in the
pleadings or affidavits did the Club state that its members use Mineral
King for any purpose, much less that they use it in any way that would
be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the respondents. 8
[405 U.S. 727, 736]
The Club apparently regarded any allegations of individualized injury
as superfluous, on the theory that this was a "public" action involving
questions as to the use of natural resources, and that the Club's
longstanding concern with and expertise in such matters were
sufficient to give it standing as a "representative of the public". 9 This
theory reflects a misunderstanding of our cases involving so-called
"public actions" in the area of administrative law.
The origin of the theory advanced by the Sierra Club may be traced to
a dictum in Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 , in which the
licensee of a radio station in Cincinnati, Ohio, sought a stay of an order
of the FCC allowing another radio station in a nearby city to change its
frequency and increase its range. In discussing its power to grant a
stay, the Court noted that "these private litigants have standing only
as representatives of the public interest." Id., at 14. But that
observation did not describe the basis upon which the appellant was
allowed to obtain judicial review as a "person aggrieved" within the
meaning of the statute involved in that case, 10 since Scripps-Howard
[405 U.S. 727, 737] was clearly "aggrieved" by reason of the
economic injury that it would suffer as a result of the Commission's
action. 11 The Court's statement was, rather, directed to the theory
upon which Congress had authorized judicial review of the
Commission's actions. That theory had been described earlier in FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 , as follows:
"Congress had some purpose in enacting 402 (b) (2). It may have
been of opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the issue of a
license would be the only person having a sufficient interest to bring to
the attention of the appellate court errors of law in the action of the
Commission in granting the license. It is within the power of Congress
to confer such standing to prosecute an appeal."
Taken together, Sanders and Scripps-Howard thus established a dual
proposition: the fact of economic injury is what gives a person standing

to seek judicial review under the statute, but once review is properly
invoked, that person may argue the public interest in support of his
claim that the agency has failed to comply with its statutory mandate.
12 It was in the latter sense that the "standing" of the appellant in
Scripps-Howard existed only as a "representative of the public
interest." It is in a similar sense that we have used the phrase "private
attorney general" to [405 U.S. 727, 738] describe the function
performed by persons upon whom Congress has conferred the right to
seek judicial review of agency action. See Data Processing, supra, at
154.
The trend of cases arising under the APA and other statutes authorizing
judicial review of federal agency action has been toward recognizing
that injuries other than economic harm are sufficient to bring a person
within the meaning of the statutory language, and toward discarding
the notion that an injury that is widely shared is ipso facto not an injury
sufficient to provide the basis for judicial review. 13 We noted this
development with approval in Data Processing, 397 U.S., at 154 , in
saying that the interest alleged to have been injured "may reflect
`aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as economic
values." But broadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in
support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the
requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered
an injury.
Some courts have indicated a willingness to take this latter step by
conferring standing upon organizations [405 U.S. 727, 739] that have
demonstrated "an organizational interest in the problem" of
environmental or consumer protection. Environmental Defense Fund v.
Hardin, 138 U.S. App. D.C. 391, 395, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097. 14 It is clear
that an organization whose members are injured may represent those
members in a proceeding for judicial review. See, e. g., NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 . But a mere "interest in a problem," no
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the
organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to
render the organization "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" within the
meaning of the APA. The Sierra Club is a large and long-established
organization, with a historic commitment to the cause of protecting our
Nation's natural heritage from man's depredations. But if a "special
interest" in this subject were enough to entitle the Sierra Club to
commence this litigation, there would appear to be no objective basis
upon which to disallow a suit by any other bona fide "special interest"
organization, however small or short-lived. And if any group with a
bona fide "special interest" could initiate such litigation, it is difficult to
perceive why any individual citizen with the [405 U.S. 727, 740] same
bona fide special interest would not also be entitled to do so.

The requirement that a party seeking review must allege facts showing
that he is himself adversely affected does not insulate executive action
from judicial review, nor does it prevent any public interests from being
protected through the judicial process. 15 It does serve as at least a
rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will be sought
in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome. That
goal would be undermined were we to construe the APA to authorize
judicial review at the behest of organizations or individuals who seek to
do no more than vindicate their own value preferences through the
judicial process. 16 The principle that the Sierra Club would have us
establish in this case would do just that. [405 U.S. 727, 741]
As we conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct in its holding that
the Sierra Club lacked standing to maintain this action, we do not reach
any other questions presented in the petition, and we intimate no view
on the merits of the complaint.
The judgment is Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case

ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY: RIPENESS FOR

ADJUDICATION: LOCUS STANDI
Lozano v. Nograles
G.R. No. 187883
16 June 2009
589 SCRA 356
Facts:
Petitioners hoped for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109
entitled A Resolution Calling upon the members of Congress to
convene for the purpose of considering proposal to amend or revise
the Constitution, upon a 3/4 vote of all members of Congress. The
petition seeks to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a
definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article 17, which
provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution.
The duty of the judiciary is to say what the law is. The determination of
the nature, scope and extent of the powers of government is the
exclusive province of the judiciary. This Courts power to review is
limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having
adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of
arguments by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. The case-orcontroversy requirement bans this court from deciding abstract,
hypothetical or contingent questions.
An aspect of the case -or-controversy requirement is the requisite
of ripeness.
Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of
ripeness:
1)The fitness of the issues for judicial decision
2)The hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court
consideration.

In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms

of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners case has met the requirements for a
judicial review.

Ruling:
The fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review is
grossly lacking.
1) The petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse
injury or hardship from the act complained of.
2) House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of
Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of
proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No
convention has yet transpired, no rules of procedure have yet been
adopted, and no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no
usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken
place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a typical example of an
uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated
or may not occur at all.
There is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight since the proposed
amendments is still unacted. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to
submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted.
Locus standi or standing to sue: Generally, a party will be allowed
to litigate only when he can demonstrate that
1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy of sought.
The petitioners have not shown the elemental injury that would
grant them with the standing to sue. They failed to show that they
have sustained or will sustain direct injury in the promulgation of the
act. Moreover, the claim of the petitioners that they are instituting the
cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens do not grant them
with locus standi.
It is because a taxpayers suit requires that the act complained of
directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from

taxation. The possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is

yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under
the transcendental importance doctrine.
The petitions are dismissed.

Transcendal Importance
- Being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus
standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion.
Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners
have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to sue under
the principle of transcendal importance. [David v. Arroyo G.R. No.
171396 (2006)]

When an issue considered of Transcendal Importance:

An issue is of transcendal importance because of the following:
1. The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case;
2. The presence of a clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by an instrumentality of the government; and
3. The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the question. [Francisco v. House of Representatives,
415 SCRA 44; Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777 (2006)]

US v. Ruiz
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E.
GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER,
petitioners, vs. HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of
Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO
DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos

Facts:

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a

naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and
Repair typhoon damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded
to the invitation, submitted bids and complied with the requests
based on the letters received from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co
indicating that the company did not qualify to receive an award
for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the
boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs.
James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all
members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The
complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to
perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific
performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to
pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering
into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose

only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject
matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the
subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the
individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of
America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to
this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the
complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The
defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court.

Issue/s:

WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise

governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity

Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the
respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs
against the private respondent.

Ratio:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from

being sued in the courts of another State without its consent or
waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish thembetween sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The
result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure
imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when
the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly

given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business

contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are
an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order;
they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business
purposes.

correct test for the application of State immunity is not the

conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act

Republic vs. Sandoval (Consti1)

(Two petitions consolidated.)
En Banc
Campos, Jr., March 19, 1993
Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State Beyond the Scope of Authority
Facts:
The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola
massacre (background: Wiki), together with those injured (Caylao
group), instituted the petition, seeking the reversal and setting aside of
the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8, 1988) in
"Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al." which
dismissed the case against the Republic of the Philippines
May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being
charged in their personal and official capacity, holding them liable, if at
all, would not result in financial responsibility of the government
Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for
reconsideration
In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their
demands for what they called "genuine agrarian reform"
The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo,
presented their problems and demands such as:
giving lands for free to farmers
zero retention of lands by landlords

stop amortizations of land payments

Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform
(MAR) began on January 15, 1987
On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez
Alvarez was only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter
to the attention of then President Cory Aquino during the January 21
Cabinet meeting
Tension mounted the next day
The farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR
premises and prevented the employees from going inside their offices
On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez
and Tadeo, Tadeo's group decided to march to Malacanang to air their
demands
On their march to Malacanang, they were joined by Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino
Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod
(KPML)
Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was
heavily infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection was
impending
Government anti-riot forces assembled at Mendiola
The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at around 4:30 pm
From CM Recto, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue
took place; "pandemonium broke loose"
After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13
according to Tadeo)
39 were wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all
belonging to the group of marchers
Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20
suffered minor physical injuries
The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the
incident on February 27, 1987 as follows
The march did not have any permit
The police and military were armed with handguns prohibited by
law
The security men assigned to protect the government units were
in civilian attire (prohibited by law)
There was unnecessary firing by the police and military
The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law
It is not clear who started the firing
The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to
disperse the crowd; the water cannons and fire trucks were not put into
operation because:
there was no order to use them
they were incorrectly prepositioned

they were out of range of the marchers

The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four
unidentified, uniformed individuals shown either on tape or in pictures,
firing at the direction of the marchers
The Commission also recommended that all the commissioned
officers of both the Western Police District (WPD) and Integrated
National Police (INP) who were armed be prosecuted for violation of
par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985
Prosecution of the marchers was also recommended
It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding
the rally without permit and for inciting sedition
Administrative sanctions were recommended for the following
officers for their failure to make effective use of their skill and
experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola:
Gen. Ramon E. Montao
Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim
Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres
Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz
Col. Cezar Nazareno
Maj. Filemon Gasmin
Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and
wounded victims to be compensated by the government
It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their
claim for damages from the government
No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims
On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages
against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military
officers, and personnel involved in the Mendiola incident
Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
State cannot be sued without its consent
Petitioners said that the State has waived its immunity from suit
Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that there was no
such waiver
Motion for Reconsideration was also denied

Issues:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e.
Whether or not this is a suit against the State with its consent)
Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the
Commission for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims,
and by public addresses made by President Aquino, the State has
consented to be sued
Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State

Holding:
No.
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.

Ratio:
Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued
without its consent
The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way
mean that liability automatically attaches to the State
The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall
serve only as cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State
immediately
President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State;
they are not tantamount to a waiver by the State
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:
When the Republic is sued by name;
When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency
When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the
case is such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but
to the government
Although the military officers and personnel were discharging
their official functions during the incident, their functions ceased to be
official the moment they exceeded their authority
There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use
of firearms.
Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order,
but they fired at the crowd instead
No reversible error by the respondent Judge found. Petitions dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon.

Edilberto G. Sandoval, RTC of Manila, Branch 9, Caylao
et.al G. R. No. 84607, March 19, 2003
FACTS:
The doctrines of immunity of the government from suit is expressly
provided in the Constitution under Article XVI, Section 3. It is provided
that the State may not be sued without its consent. Some instances
when a suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the Republic is
sued by name;
(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the suit is, on its face, against a government officer but the
case is such that ultimate liablity will belong not to the officer but to
the government.With respect to the incident that happened in
Mendiola on January 22, 1987 that befell twelve rallyists, the the case
filed against the military officers was dismissed by the lower court. The
defendants were held liable but it would not result in financial
responsibility to the government. The petitioner (Caylao Group) filed a

suit against the State that for them the State has waived its immunity
when the Mendiola Commission recommended the government to
indemnify the victims of the Mendiola incident and the acts and
utterances of President Aquino which is sympathetic to the cause is
indicative of State's waiver of immunity and therefore, the government
should also be liable and should be compensated by the government .
The case has been dismissed that State has not waived its immunity.
On the other hand, the Military Officer filed a petition for certiorari to
review the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit and
therefore should the State be liable for the incident?

HELD:
No. The recommendation made by the Mendiola Commission
regarding the indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the
victims of the incident does not in any way mean liability automatically
attaches to the State. The purpose of which is to investigate of the
disorders that took place and there commendation it makes cannot in
any way bind the State. The acts and utterances of President Aquino
does not mean admission of the State of its liability. Moreover, the case
does not qualify as suit against the State.While the Republic in this
case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the
government.The military officials are held liable for the damages for
their official functions ceased the moment they have exceeded to their
authority. They were deployed to ensure that the rally would be
peaceful and orderly and should guarantee the safety of the people.
The court has made it quite clear that even a high position in the
government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another. The court rules that there is no reversible error and no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Judge in issuing the
questioned orders.

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of

Representative
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
En Banc
Doctrine: citizenship
Date: July 30, 1991
Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.
Facts:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district
of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in
the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners,
Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of
the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent
premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the
private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held:
Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established
his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he
bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of
residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in
China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community
of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was
baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a
natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who
was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to
put up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life
in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result,
a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong
Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of
where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong
Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of
Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final
and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old,
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other
Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace
were concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent,
in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his
secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed
the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were
better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in

the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he

worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the
1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen
was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived
citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and
solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural
born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending
the article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1.
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not
only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987
but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date. The provision in question was enacted to
correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and
an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born
citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would
still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not,
under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and

unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a

natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and
1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a
sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right
of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a
naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of
citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping
respondents father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a
persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run against
the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest

Shauf v. CA
Loida Q. Shauf & Jacob Shauf, petitioners v. Hon. CA, Don E. Detwiler & Anthony Persi,
respondents

Second Division
Doctrine: official v. personal capacity
Keywords: void for overbreadth
Date: November 27, 1990
Ponente: Justice Regalado

Facts:
Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a
member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of
Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air
Base, for which she is eminently qualified.
By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages
and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private
respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and
Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by
reason of her nationality and sex.
Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant
Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if
a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the
vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be
released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if shes
available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary
Abalateos was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateos
appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to
said position. She claims that the Abalateos stay was extended
indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the

complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation.
He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in
accordance of with the applicable regulation.
Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as
the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine
Regional Trial Court, etc.
RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay $39,662.49
as actual damages + 20% of such amount as attorneys fees +
P100k as moral & exemplary damages.
Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of
the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the
other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune
from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance
of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military
Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does
not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the
exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim
that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus
case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According
to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.
Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private
capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government which
would require consent.
Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further
claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers &
employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in
the Philippines & is not part of international law.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of
the US Armed
Forces

Held:
No they are not immune.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 17932 are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ORDERED, jointly and
severally, to pay petitioners the sum of P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.

Ratio:
They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and
may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his
private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak
of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government
is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity.
This situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.
It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable
in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have
caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications vs. Aligaen
Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts
of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the
rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has
been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State
officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the
personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which
he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without
its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record which suggests any
arbitrary, irregular or abusive conduct or motive on the part of
the trial judge in ruling that private respondents committed acts
of discrimination for which they should be held personally liable.

There is ample evidence to sustain plaintiffs' complaint that

plaintiff Loida Q. Shauf was refused appointment as
Guidance Counselor by the defendants on account of her
sex, color and origin.
She received a Master of Arts Degree from the University of
Santo Tomas, Manila, in 1971 and has completed 34
semester hours in psychology?guidance and 25 quarter
hours in human behavioral science. She has also
completed all course work in human behavior and
counselling psychology for a doctoral degree. She is a civil
service eligible. More important, she had functioned as a
Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at the GS-1710-9
level for approximately four years at the time she applied
for the same position in 1976.
In filling the vacant position of Guidance Counselor, defendant
Persi did not even consider the application of plaintiff Loida
Q. Shauf, but referred the vacancy to CORRO which
appointed Edward B. Isakson who was not eligible to the
position.
Article XIII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all. This is a carry-over
from Article II, Section 9, of the 1973 Constitution ensuring equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed..
There is no doubt that private respondents Persi and Detwiler, in
committing the acts complained of have, in effect, violated the basic
constitutional right of petitioner Loida Q. Shauf to earn a living which is
very much an integral aspect of the right to life. For this, they should
be held accountable

Respondents alleged that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail

herself of her remedy under the United States federal legislation
on equality of opportunity for civilian employees, which is
allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let
alone remedies before a foreign court and under a foreign law
such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
SC: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is
entitled as a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that

remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and

protect her interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from
seeking redress in Philippine courts which should not be ousted
of jurisdiction on the dubious and inconclusive representations of
private respondents on that score.