ARAULLO v.

AQUINO III
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to
stimulate the economy through accelerated spending. In
the context of the DAPs adoption and implementation
being a function pertaining to the Executive as the main
actor during the Budget Execution Stage under its
constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws,
including the GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to
adopt or to implement the DAP. Congress could
appropriate but would have nothing more to do during the
Budget Execution Stage. Indeed, appropriation was the
act by which Congress "designates a particular fund, or
sets apart a specified portion of the public revenue or of
the money in the public treasury, to be applied to some
general object of governmental expenditure, or to some
individual purchase or expense."124 As pointed out in
Gonzales v. Raquiza:125 "In a strict sense, appropriation
has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money
may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation
made by law refers to the act of the legislature setting
apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be
used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to its
creditors."126
On the other hand, the President, in keeping with his duty
to faithfully execute the laws, had sufficient discretion
during the execution of the budget to adapt the budget to
changes in the countrys economic situation.127 He could
adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool
the savings and identify the PAPs to be funded under the
DAP. The pooling of savings pursuant to the DAP, and the
identification of the PAPs to be funded under the DAP did
not involve appropriation in the strict sense because the
money had been already set apart from the public
treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions,
the Executive did not usurp the power vested in Congress
under Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the
President in allocating funds pursuant to the GAAs,
particularly when the funds are grouped to form lump sum
accounts. It is assumed that the agencies of the
Government enjoy more flexibility when the GAAs provide
broader appropriation items. This flexibility comes in the
form of policies that the Executive may adopt during the
budget execution phase. The DAP as a strategy to
improve the countrys economic position was one policy
that the President decided to carry out in order to fulfill his
mandate under the GAAs.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner
the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize
the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the
Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of
powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional
system is based.

In the case of the President, the power to transfer funds

from one item to another within the Executive has not
been the mere offshoot of established usage, but has
emanated from law itself. It has existed since the time of
the American Governors-General.134 Act No. 1902 (An Act
authorizing the Governor-General to direct any
unexpended balances of appropriations be returned to the
general fund of the Insular Treasury and to transfer from
the general fund moneys which have been returned
thereto), passed on May 18, 1909 by the First Philippine
Legislature,135 was the first enabling law that granted
statutory authority to the President to transfer funds. The
authority was without any limitation, for the Act explicitly
empowered the Governor-General to transfer any
unexpended balance of appropriations for any bureau or
office to another, and to spend such balance as if it had
originally been appropriated for that bureau or office.

RODRIGUEZ v. GMA
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the
petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is not an action
to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or even administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The totality
of evidence as a standard for the grant of the writ was
correctly applied by this Court, as first laid down in Razon
v. Tagitis:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the
pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our
usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce
our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the
relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.
Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it
satisfies this basic minimum test.
The writs curative role is an acknowledgment that the
violation of the right to life, liberty, and security may be
caused not only by a public officials act, but also by his
omission. Accountability may attach to respondents who
are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden
of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance. The duty to investigate must be
undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere
formality preordained to be ineffective.
The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG Verzosa,
LT. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera, and Lt. Col.
Mina conducted a perfunctory investigation which relied
solely on the accounts of the military. Thus, the CA
correctly held that the investigation was superficial, onesided, and depended entirely on the report prepared by
1st Lt. Johnny Calub. No efforts were undertaken to solicit
petitioners version of the incident, and no witnesses were

questioned regarding it. The CA also took into account the

palpable lack of effort from respondent Versoza, as the
chief of the Philippine National Police.

LOZADA v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
The writ of amparo is an independent and summary
remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to protect the
peoples right to life, liberty and security. Having been
originally intended as a response to the alarming cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the
country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to
address the said human rights violations. It is preventive
in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the
commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by
inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.
As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to
threats thereof. Considering that this remedy is aimed at
addressing these serious violations of or threats to the
right to life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on
amorphous and uncertain grounds, or in cases where the
alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or
continuing.[66] Instead, it must be granted judiciously so
as not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character
of the writ, thus:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically
to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to
the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought
by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the
indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less
than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys
immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office or
actual incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege
of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president
even for acts committed during his or her tenure.
In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present
action, as well as the filing of the original Petition and the
issuance of the CA Decision, occurred during the
incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it
was proper for the court a quo to have dropped her as a
respondent on account of her presidential immunity from
suit.

It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of

office has already ended, former President Arroyo can no
longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity as a
defense to evade judicial determination of her
responsibility or accountability for the alleged violation or
threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and
security of Lozada.
Nonetheless, examining the merits of the case still results
in the denial of the Petition on the issue of former
President Arroyos alleged responsibility or accountability.
A thorough examination of the allegations postulated and
the evidence adduced by petitioners reveals their failure
to sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on
her part that violated, or threatened with violation, the
right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except for the
bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain
Ma[a]m, whom Lozada speculated to have referred to her,
and (b) Sec. Defensor told Lozada that the President was
hurting from all the media frenzy, there is nothing in the
records that would sufficiently establish the link of former
President Arroyo to the events that transpired on 5-6
February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that
Lozada and his family purportedly received.

SAEZ v. GMA
In the present case, the Court notes that the petition for
the issuance of the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data is sufficient as to its contents. The petitioner
made specific allegations relative to his personal
circumstances and those of the respondents. The
petitioner likewise indicated particular acts, which are
allegedly violative of his rights and the participation of
some of the respondents in their commission. As to the
prerequisite conduct and result of an investigation prior to
the filing of the petition, it was explained that the
petitioner expected no relief from the military, which he
perceived as his oppressors, hence, his request for
assistance from a human rights organization, then a direct
resort to the court.
Anent the documents sought to be the subject of the writ
of habeas data prayed for, the Court finds the
requirement of specificity to have been satisfied. The
documents subject of the petition include the order of
battle, those linking the petitioner to the CPP and those he
signed involuntarily, and military intelligence reports
making references to him. Although the exact locations
and the custodians of the documents were not identified,
this does not render the petition insufficient. Section 6(d)
of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the
requirement of specificity arises only when the exact
locations and identities of the custodians are known. The
Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make
it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights.
Thus, despite the lack of certain contents, which the Rules
on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally
require, for as long as their absence under exceptional
circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition
should not be susceptible to outright dismissal.

From the foregoing, the Court holds that the allegations

stated in the petition for the privilege of the writs of
amparo and habeas data filed conform to the rules.
However, they are mere allegations, which the Court
cannot accept hook, line and sinker, so to speak, and
whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the
granting of the petition is a different matter altogether
The Court has ruled that in view of the recognition of the
evidentiary difficulties attendant to the filing of a petition
for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data,
not only direct evidence, but circumstantial evidence,
indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as
they lead to conclusions consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced.
With the foregoing in mind, the Court still finds that the
CA did not commit a reversible error in declaring that no
substantial evidence exist to compel the grant of the
reliefs prayed for by the petitioner. The Court took a
second look on the evidence on record and finds no
reason to reconsider the denial of the issuance of the
writs prayed for.
Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data is explicit that questions of fact and law can
be raised before the Court in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then, the Court is not
bound by the factual findings made by the appellate court
which rendered the judgment in a petition for the
issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data. Be that
as it may, in the instant case, the Court agrees with the
CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of
proof imposed upon him by the rules to establish his
claims. It cannot be overemphasized that Section 1 of
both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data
expressly include in their coverage even threatened
violations against a persons right to life, liberty or
security. Further, threat and intimidation that vitiate the

free will although not involving invasion of bodily

integrity nevertheless constitute a violation of the right
to security in the sense of freedom from threat.
It must be stressed, however, that such threat must find
rational basis on the surrounding circumstances of the
case. In this case, the petition was mainly anchored on
the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by
reason of his inclusion in the militarys order of battle, the
surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and
the intimidation exerted upon him to compel him to be a
military asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats fall
within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo and
habeas data, in the petitioners case, the restraints and
threats allegedly made allegations lack corroborations,
are not supported by independent and credible evidence,
and thus stand on nebulous grounds.
Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the
President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be
held liable for affront against the petitioners rights to life,
liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist
to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or
can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had
failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in
conducting the necessary investigations required under
the rules. The Court also stresses that rule that the
presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence
with the presidents incumbency.
Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot
be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts
committed during his or her tenure.Courts look with
disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity,
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs
the vindication of a right.