Rights

FirstpublishedMonDec19,2005substantiverevisionWedSep9,2015
Rightsareentitlements(not)toperformcertainactions,or(not)tobeincertainstatesorentitlements
thatothers(not)performcertainactionsor(not)beincertainstates.
Rightsdominatemodernunderstandingsofwhatactionsarepermissibleandwhichinstitutionsare
just.Rightsstructuretheformofgovernments,thecontentoflaws,andtheshapeofmoralityasitis
currentlyperceived.Toacceptasetofrightsistoapproveadistributionoffreedomandauthority,and
sotoendorseacertainviewofwhatmay,must,andmustnotbedone.
Thisentrybeginsbydescribingthenatureofrights:theirclassification,theircomposition,andtheir
function.Itthenreviewsthehistoryofthelanguageofrights,andvariousrelationshipsbetweenrights
andreasons.Themajorcontemporaryphilosophicalapproachestothejustificationofrightsare
compared,andtheentryconcludesbysurveyingcriticismsofrightsandrightstalk.Thefocus
throughoutisongeneraltheoreticalissuesinsteadofontheanalysisorjustificationofspecificrights
ortypesofrights.ThoselookingforfullerintroductionstorightsmayconsiderJones(1994),Harel
(2005),Campbell(2006),Ivison(2007)andEdmundson(2012).
1.CategoriesofRights
2.TheAnalysisofRights
2.1TheFormofRights:TheHohfeldianAnalyticalSystem
2.2TheFunctionofRights:TheWillTheoryandtheInterestTheory
3.TheHistoryoftheLanguageofRights
4.RightsandFreedom
5.RightsandReasons
5.1RightsasTrumps
5.2ConflictsofRights?
5.3SupportamongRights
5.4RightstoDoWrong
5.5RightstoBelieve,Feel,andWant
6.ThreeApproachestotheJustificationofRights
6.1StatusBasedRights
6.2InstrumentalRights
6.3ContractualandJustificatoryRights
7.CritiquesofRights
7.1CritiquesofRightsDoctrine

7.2CritiquesoftheLanguageofRights
Bibliography
AcademicTools
OtherInternetResources
RelatedEntries

1.CategoriesofRights
Arighttolife,arighttochoosearighttovote,towork,tostrikearighttoonephonecall,to
dissolveparliament,tooperateaforklift,toasylum,toequaltreatmentbeforethelaw,tofeel
proudofwhatonehasdonearighttoexist,tosentenceanoffendertodeath,tolaunchanuclear
firststrike,tocastlekingside,toadistinctgeneticidentityarighttobelieveone'seyes,to
pronouncethecouplehusbandandwife,tobeleftalone,togotohellinone'sownway.
Weencounterassertionsofrightsasweencountersounds:persistentlyandingreatvariety.Making
senseofthisprofusionofassertionsrequiresthatweclassrightstogetherbycommonattributes.
Rightsassertionscanbecategorized,forexample,accordingto:
Whoisallegedtohavetheright:Children'srights,animalrights,workers'rights,states'rights,
therightsofpeoples.
Whatactionsorstatesorobjectstheassertedrightpertainsto:Rightsoffreeexpression,topass
judgmentrightsofprivacy,toremainsilentpropertyrights,bodilyrights.
Whytherightholder(allegedly)hastheright:Moralrightsaregroundedinmoralreasons,legal
rightsderivefromthelawsofthesociety,customaryrightsexistbylocalconvention.
Howtheassertedrightcanbeaffectedbytherightholder'sactions:Theinalienablerighttolife,
theforfeitablerighttoliberty,andthewaivablerightthatapromisebekept.
Manyofthesecategorieshavesubcategories.Forinstance,naturalrightsarethesubclassofmoral
rightsthathumanshavebecauseoftheirnature.Oragain,therightsofpoliticalspeechareasubclass
oftherightsoffreeexpression.
Thestudyofparticularrightsisprimarilyaninvestigationintohowsuchcategoriesandsub
categoriesoverlap.Therehasbeenmuchdiscussion,forexample,ofwhetherhumanrightsarenatural
rights,whethertherighttoprivacyisalegalright,andwhetherthelegalrighttolifeisaforfeitable
right.(Forthecentraljurisprudentialdebateovertherelationbetweenlegalandmoralrights,seelegal
positivism,naturallawtheories,andthenatureoflaw.)Sometimestheoristswillalsofocuswithin
somesubcategory:forexample,Steiner(2013)questionswhetherinalienableorunwaivablerightsare
logicallypossible,andAndersson(2013)discusseswhomoralrightholdersare.

2.TheAnalysisofRights
Categorizationsortstheprofusionofrightsassertions.Tounderstandtheexactmeaningofany
assertionofaright,weneedtounderstandmorepreciselyhowrightsareconstructedandwhatthey
do.
Ananalysisofrightshastwoparts:adescriptionoftheinternalstructureofrights(theirform),anda
descriptionofwhatrightsdoforthosewhoholdthem(theirfunction).TheHohfeldiansystemfor
describingtheformofrightsiswidelyaccepted,althoughtherearescholarlyquarrelsaboutitsdetails.
Whichtheorygivesthebestaccountofthefunctionofrightshasbeenmuchmorecontentiouswe
turntothatdebateinsection3.

2.1TheFormofRights:TheHohfeldianAnalyticalSystem
Analysisrevealsthatmostfamiliarrights,suchastherighttofreeexpressionortherightofprivate
property,haveacomplexinternalstructure.Suchrightsareorderedarrangementsofbasic
components,muchinthesamewaythatmostmoleculesareorderedarrangementsofchemical
elements.ThefourbasiccomponentsofrightsareknownastheHohfeldianincidentsafterWesley
Hohfeld(18791918),theAmericanlegaltheoristwhodiscoveredthem.Thesefourbasicelements
aretheprivilege,theclaim,thepower,andtheimmunity.EachoftheseHohfeldianincidentshasa
distinctivelogicalform,andtheincidentsfittogetherincharacteristicwaystocreatecomplex
molecularrights.

2.1.1Privileges(orLiberties)
Youhavearighttopickupashellthatyoufindonthebeach.Thisrightisaprivilege:
AhasaprivilegetoifandonlyifAhasnodutynotto.
Tosaythatyouhavearighttopickuptheshellistosaythatyouhavenodutynottopickitup.You
willnotbeviolatinganydutynottopickuptheshellshouldyoudecidetodoso.Similarlyyourright
tositinanemptyseatinthecinema,andyourrighttopaintyourbedroomred,arealsoprivileges.
Privilegerightsmarkoutwhattheirbearerhasnodutynottodo.WhenUSPresidentsinvoke
executiveprivilege,theydenyanassertionthattheyhaveadutynottoconcealevidence:theyassert
aHohfeldianprivilege.Similarly,alicense(todrive,toperformsurgery,tokill)endowsitsholder
withaprivilegetoengageinthelicensedactivity.
(Somewritersonrightshavepreferredtospeakoflibertiesinsteadofprivileges(e.g.,Steiner
1994,5960).Othershavegiventhesetwotermsdifferentdefinitions(e.g.,Thomson1990,5355).
Toavoidconfusion,thisentrywillalwaysuseprivilegeandneverlibertytorefertotheincident
definedabove.)

2.1.2Claims
Acontractbetweenemployerandemployeeconfersontheemployeearighttobepaidherwages.

Thisrightisaclaim:
AhasaclaimthatBifandonlyifBhasadutytoAto.
Theemployeehasaclaimthattheemployerpaysherherwages,whichmeansthattheemployerhasa
dutytotheemployeetopaythosewages.Asseeninthedefinitionandtheexample,everyclaimright
correlatestoadutyin(atleast)onedutybearer.Whatisdistinctiveabouttheclaimrightisthata
dutybearer'sdutyisdirectedatorowedtotherightholder.
Someclaimrightsexistindependentlyofvoluntaryactionslikesigningacontractandsomeclaim
rightscorrespondtodutiesinmorethanoneagent.Forexample,achild'sclaimrightagainstabuse
existsindependentlyofanyone'sactions,andthechild'sclaimrightcorrelatestoadutyineveryother
personnottoabusehim(i.e.,theclaimrightisinrem).Thisexampleofthechild'srightalso
illustrateshowaclaimrightcanrequiredutybearerstorefrainfromperformingsomeaction(i.e.,
thatphicanbeanegativeverbsuchasnotabuseher).Bodilyandpropertyrightsare
paradigmaticrightswithclaimrightsattheircore.

2.1.3Powers
PrivilegesandclaimsdefinewhatHartcalledprimaryrules:rulesrequiringthatpeopleperformor
refrainfromperformingparticularactions(Hart1961).Indeedtheprimaryrulesforallphysical
actionsareproperlyanalyzedasprivilegesandclaims.Werewetoknowallprivilegesandclaims
concerningphysicalactions,wewouldknowforeverypossiblephysicalactionwhetherthataction
waspermitted,requiredorforbidden.
TwofurtherHohfeldianincidentsdefinewhatHartcalledsecondaryrules:rulesthatspecifyhow
agentscanintroduceandchangeprimaryrules.
TheHohfeldianpoweristheincidentthatenablesagentstoalterprimaryrules:
AhasapowerifandonlyifAhastheabilitytoalterherownoranother'sHohfeldianincidents.
Aship'scaptainhasthepowerrighttoorderamidshipmantoscrubthedeck.Thecaptain'sexercise
ofthispowerchangesthesailor'snormativesituation:itimposesanewdutyuponthesailorandso
annulsoneofhisHohfeldianprivileges(nottoscrubthedeck).Similarly,apromisorexercisesa
powerrighttocreateinthepromiseeaclaimthatthepromisorwillperformacertainaction.The
promisor'sexerciseofherpowerrighttopromisecreatesinthepromiseeaclaimthatthepromisordo
whatshepromisedtodo.Oragain,aneighborwaiveshisclaimthatyounotenterhispropertyby
invitingyouintohishome,thusendowingyouwithacorrespondingprivilege.Ordering,promising,
waiving,sentencing,consenting,selling,andabandoningareallexamplesofactsbywhicha
rightholderexercisesapowertochangehisownHohfeldianincidentsorthoseofanother.
Powerscanalternotonlyfirstorderprivilegesandclaims,butsecondorderincidentsaswell
(Sumner1987,31).Anadmiral,forexample,hasthepowerrighttorelieveacaptainofherpower
righttocommandaship.Powerrightstoaltertheauthorityofothersare,aswewillsee,definitiveof
alldevelopedlegalandpoliticalsystems.

2.1.4Immunities

ThefourthandfinalHohfeldianincidentistheimmunity.WhenAhastheabilitytoalterB's
Hohfeldianincidents,thenAhasapower.WhenAlackstheabilitytoalterB'sHohfeldianincidents,
thenBhasanimmunity:
BhasanimmunityifandonlyifAlackstheabilitytoalterB'sHohfeldianincidents.
TheUnitedStatesCongresslackstheabilitywithintheConstitutiontoimposeuponAmerican
citizensadutytokneeldailybeforeacross.SincetheCongresslacksapower,thecitizenshavean
immunity.ThisimmunityisacoreelementofanAmericancitizen'srighttoreligiousfreedom.
Similarly,witnessesincourthavearightnottobeorderedtoincriminatethemselves,andcivil
servantshavearightnottobedismissedwhenanewgovernmentcomestopower.Alloftheserights
areimmunities,correspondingtoanabsenceofapowerinsomeotherpartytoaltertherightholder's
normativesituationinsomeway.

2.1.5OppositesandCorrelatives
Hohfeldarrangedthefourincidentsintablesofoppositesandcorrelativessoastodisplaythe
logicalstructureofhissystem.Inordertofilloutthetablesheaddedsomefurtherterminology.For
instance,ifapersonAhasaclaim,thenAlacksanoclaim(anoclaimistheoppositeofaclaim).
AndifapersonAhasapower,thensomepersonBhasaliability(aliabilityisthecorrelativeofa
power).
Opposites
IfAhas aClaim,
thenAlacks aNoclaim.
aPrivilege,

aDuty.
aPower,

aDisability.
anImmunity,

aLiability.
Correlatives
IfAhas aClaim,
thensomepersonBhas aDuty.
aPrivilege,

aNoclaim.
aPower,

aLiability.
anImmunity,

aDisability.

2.1.6MolecularRights
Eachoftheatomicincidentstheprivilege,claim,power,andimmunitycanbearightwhenit
occursinisolation.Andasmentionedabovetheseatomicincidentsalsobondtogetherin
characteristicwaystoformcomplexrights.Following,forexample,ispartofthemolecular
structureofthepropertyrightthatyouhaveoveryourcomputer:

PartoftheMolecularStructureofaPropertyRight

Inthefigure,thefirstorderrightsareyourlegalrightsdirectlyoveryourpropertyinthiscase,
yourcomputer.Theprivilegeonthisfirstlevelentitlesyoutouseyourcomputer.Theclaimcorrelates
toadutyineveryotherpersonnottouseyourcomputer.
Thesecondorderrightsareyourlegalrightsconcerningthealterationofthesefirstorderrights.
Youhaveseveralpowerswithrespecttoyourclaimyoumaywaivetheclaim(grantingothers
permissiontotouchthecomputer),annultheclaim(abandoningthecomputerasyourproperty),or
transfertheclaim(makingthecomputerintosomeoneelse'sproperty).Alsoonthesecondorder,your
immunitypreventsothersfromalteringyourfirstorderclaimoveryourcomputer.Yourimmunity,
thatis,preventsothersfromwaiving,annulling,ortransferringyourclaimoveryourcomputer.The
fourincidentstogetherconstituteasignificantportionofyourpropertyright.
Ofcoursealloftheseincidentsarequalified:youhavenoprivilegetouseyourcomputerasaweapon,
ortouseyourcomputertohackintosomeoneelse'smachineandyourimmunitymaynotentirely
blockoutthestate'spowerofexpropriation(ifforexamplethecomputerbecomesevidenceina
criminalcase).Thesequalificationstotheincidentscarvethecontoursofyourpropertyright,butthey
donotaffectitsbasicshape.
Theremayalsobemoreincidentsassociatedwithownershipthanshowninthefigureabove.
Wellman(1985,1995)describeseachrightashavingadefiningcoresurroundedbyassociated
elementswhichmaybepresentorabsentinaparticularcase.Yourpropertyright,forinstance,may
alsobeprotectedbyaqualifiedthirdorderimmunityagainstthegovernmentalteringyoursecond
orderrightsoveryourproperty(forexample,undertheTakingsClauseoftheFifthAmendmentto
theUSConstitutionthegovernmentcannotsimplyannulyourrighttosellaparcelofyourland).

2.1.7ActiveandPassiveRights

Thedistinctionbetweenactiveandpassiverights(Lyons1970)mapsneatlyontotheHohfeldian
incidents.Theprivilegeandthepowerareactiverightsthatconcerntheirholders'ownactions.The
claimandtheimmunityarepassiverightsthatregulatetheactionsofothers.Activerightsare
signaledbystatementsoftheformAhasarighttowhilepassiverightsaresignaledby
statementsoftheformAhasarightthatB(inbothoftheseformulas,isanactiveverb).
Anavalcaptainhasanactiveprivilegerighttowalkthedecksandanactivepowerrighttoorderthat
theshipsetsail.Aplayerinachesstournamenthasapassiveclaimrightthathisopponentnot
distracthim,andaprofessorhasapassiveimmunityrightthatheruniversitynotfireherfor
publishingunpopularviews.

2.1.8NegativeandPositiveRights
Adistinctionbetweennegativeandpositiverightsispopularamongsomenormativetheorists,
especiallythosewithabenttowardlibertarianism.Theholderofanegativerightisentitledtonon
interference,whiletheholderofapositiverightisentitledtoprovisionofsomegoodorservice.A
rightagainstassaultisaclassicexampleofanegativeright,whilearighttowelfareassistanceisa
prototypicalpositiveright(Narveson2001).
Sincebothnegativeandpositiverightsarepassiverights,somerightsareneithernegativenor
positive.Privilegesandpowerscannotbenegativerightsandprivileges,powers,andimmunities
cannotbepositiverights.The(privilege)righttoenterabuilding,andthe(power)righttoenterinto
abindingagreement,areneithernegativenorpositive.
Itissometimessaidthatnegativerightsareeasiertosatisfythanpositiverights.Negativerightscan
berespectedsimplybyeachpersonrefrainingfrominterferingwitheachother,whileitmaybe
difficultorevenimpossibletofulfilleveryone'spositiverightsifthesumofpeople'sclaimsoutstrips
theresourcesavailable.
However,whenitcomestotheenforcementofrights,thisdifferencedisappears.Fundingalegal
systemthatenforcescitizens'negativerightsagainstassaultmayrequiremoreresourcesthanfunding
awelfaresystemthatrealizescitizens'positiverightstoassistance.AsHolmesandSunstein(1999,
43)putit,inthecontextofcitizens'rightstostateenforcement,allrightsarepositive.Moreover,the
pointisoftenmadethatthemoralurgencyofsecuringpositiverightsmaybejustasgreatasthemoral
urgencyofsecuringnegativerights(Shue1996).Whateveristhejustificatorybasisforascribing
rightsautonomy,need,orsomethingelsetheremightbejustasstrongamoralcaseforfulfillinga
person'srighttoadequatenutritionasthereisforprotectingthatperson'srightnottobeassaulted.

2.2TheFunctionofRights:TheWillTheoryandtheInterest
Theory
2.2.1ConceptualAnalysisversusDefinitionalStipulation
AllrightscanberepresentedbyHohfeldiandiagramslikethediagramofthepartofthepropertyright
moleculeabove.However,somediagramsofHohfeldianincidentsthatwecouldconstructdonot
correspondtoanyright.RightsareonlythosecollectionsofHohfeldianincidentsthathaveacertain
function(orperhapscertainfunctions).Totakeananalogy:allengagementringsarerings,butonly

ringswithacertainfunctionareengagementrings.
Thequestionofthefunctionofrightsisthequestionofwhatrightsdoforthosewhoholdthem.
Beforediscussingthetwomajorpositionsonthisissue,wecansurveysomestatementsthattheorists
havemadethatmayappeartobedescribingwhichHohfeldianincidentsarerights:
Tohavearightistohaveavalidclaim.(Feinberg1970,257)
Inthestrictestsenseallrightsareclaims.(Hohfeld1919,36)
Aright,inthemostimportantsense,istheconjunctionofa[privilege]andaclaimright.
(Mackie1979,169)
Rightsarepermissionsratherthanrequirements.Rightstelluswhatthebearerisatlibertyto
do.(Louden1983,95)
Nooneeverhasarighttodosomethingheonlyhasarightthatsomeoneelseshalldo(or
refrainfromdoing)something.(Williams1968,125)
ApersonwhosaystoanotherIhavearighttodoitisnotsayingthatitisnotwrongtodo
it.Heisclaimingthattheotherhasadutynottointerfere.(Raz1994,275)
Arightisanestablishedwayofacting.(Martin1993,1)
Itishardtothinkofrightsexceptascapableofexercise.(Hart1982,185)
Arightisapowerwhichacreatureoughttopossess.(Plamenatz1938,82)
Allrightsareessentiallypropertyrights.(Steiner1994,93)
Rightsarethemselvesproperty,thingsweown.(Feinberg1973,75)
Atfirstthissurveymightremindonetheproverboftheblindmenandtheelephant.However,we
shoulddistinguishbetweentwodifferentaimsthatatheoristmighthavewhenhemakeastatementof
theformAllrightsarex.Atheoristmaybeattemptingtoanalyzethemeaningofourordinary
conceptofrights,orhemaybestipulatingadefinitionofrightswithinherownethical,politicalor
legaltheory.
Consider,forexample,Mill'sfamousassertioninUtilitarianism:
Whenwecallanythingaperson'sright,wemeanthathehasavalidclaimonsocietytoprotect
himinthepossessionofit,eitherbytheforceoflaw,orbythatofeducationandopinionTo
havearight,then,is,Iconceive,tohavesomethingwhichsocietyoughttodefendmeinthe
possessionof.(Mill1861,54)
Asananalysisoftheeverydayconceptofaright,Mill'sassertionwouldbeweak.Throughhistory
manyhaveasserted,forexample,thatGodhastherighttocommandmanyetpresumablynoone
assertingsucharightwouldmaintainthatsocietyoughttodefendGodinthepossessionofanything.
Indeedthereseemsnothingincoherentinthethoughtthatindividualshavearightnottobeprotected
bysocietyyetthisthoughtcouldnotmakesenseonMill'scharacterizationofwhatrightsare.(On
MillseealsoHart1982,10004.)
Mill'sstatementisbetterseenasastipulativedefinitionofthetermright.Millstipulatesthis

particulardefinitionbecausetheconceptofthosepossessiverelationsthatarevaluableenoughthatit
isworthwhileforsocietytoinstitutesanctionstoprotectthemisaconceptthatworkswellwithinhis
largerutilitariantheory.SowhereMill'sstatementdepartsfromthecommonunderstandingofrights,
weshouldcharitablyreadMillasprescribing,insteadofdescribing,usage.Manyauthors'
pronouncementsaboutrightsarecharitablyinterpretedasthesekindsofexercisesinstipulation,
ratherthanasattemptstoanalyzetheordinaryconceptofrights.
Totakeanexamplefromthescholarlyliterature,itisnotuncommontoencounterageneralstatement
thatallrightsare,oratleastinclude,claimrights(see,e.g.,Raz1986,166,17375Steiner,1994,55
Kramer,SteinerandSimmonds1999,914).Againtheseallrightsareclaimsstatementsarebetter
interpretedasstipulative,ratherthanasanalysesofcommonusage.Allrightsareclaimspositions
cannotrecognize,forexample,therightsintheHobbesianstateofnature,inwhicheachpersonhas
unlimitedprivilegerightsofselfdefenseyetnoclaimrightsagainstattack.Neithercouldanall
rightsareclaimstheoryrecognizethattheUSConstitutiongivesCongressthesolepowerrightto
declarewar.Thestatementthatrightsareclaimsisprescriptivefor,notdescriptiveof,usage.
Occasionallyatheoristwillsaythatsheispresentingneitherananalysisoftheordinaryconceptofa
right,normerelystipulatinganewmeaningforthetermright,butisratherofferingsomethirdtype
ofcharacterization.Forinstance,Wellman(1995,136)saysthathisnarrowspecificationofaright
isneededtoprovideaclearerandmorerevealingmapofthelaw.Raz(1986,166)framesa
contrastingphilosophicaldefinitionthat,hesays,illuminatesatraditionofpoliticalandmoral
discourseinwhichdifferenttheoriesofferincompatibleviewsofwhatrightsthereareandwhy.
Whetherthereisroomforsuchathirdcategoryofphilosophicaldefinition,whichgoesbeyondboth
ordinaryanalysisandstipulation,iscontested(Wenar2008).

2.2.2TheWillTheoryandtheInterestTheory
Therearetwomaintheoriesofthefunctionofrights:thewilltheoryandtheinteresttheory.Each
theorypresentsitselfascapturinganordinaryunderstandingofwhatrightsdoforthosewhohold
them.Whichtheoryoffersthebetteraccountofthefunctionsofrightshasbeenthesubjectofspirited
dispute,literallyforages.
Willtheoristsmaintainthatarightmakestherightholderasmallscalesovereign(Hart1982,183).
Morespecifically,awilltheoristassertsthatthefunctionofarightistogiveitsholdercontrolover
another'sduty.Yourpropertyrightdiagrammedinthefigureaboveisaright,saysthewilltheorist,
becauseitcontainsapowertowaive(orannul,ortransfer)others'duties.Youarethesovereignof
yourcomputer,inthatyoumaypermitotherstotouchitornotatyourdiscretion.Similarlya
promiseeissovereignovertheactionofthepromisor:shehasarightbecauseshehasthepowerto
waive(orannul)thepromisor'sdutytokeepthepromise.InHohfeldianterms,willtheoristsassert
thateveryrightincludesaHohfeldianpoweroveraclaim.Incolloquialterms,willtheoristsbelieve
thatallrightsconfercontroloverothers'dutiestoactinparticularways.
Interesttheoristsdisagree.Interesttheoristsmaintainthatthefunctionofarightistofurthertheright
holder'sinterests.Anownerhasaright,accordingtotheinteresttheorist,notbecauseownershave
choices,butbecausetheownershipmakesownersbetteroff.Apromiseehasarightbecause
promiseeshavesomeinterestintheperformanceofthepromise,or(alternatively)someinterestin

beingabletoformvoluntarybondswithothers.Yourrights,theinteresttheoristsays,arethe
Hohfeldianincidentsyouhavethataregoodforyou.
Thecontestbetweenwillbasedandinterestbasedtheoriesofthefunctionofrightshasbeenwaged
forhundredsofyears.InfluentialwilltheoristsincludeKant,Savigny,Hart,Kelsen,Wellman,and
Steiner.ImportantinteresttheoristsincludeBentham,Ihering,Austin,Lyons,MacCormick,Raz,and
Kramer.Eachtheoryhasstrongerandweakerpointsasanaccountofwhatrightsdoforrightholders.
Thewilltheorycapturesthepowerfullinkbetweenrightsandnormativecontrol.Tohavearightisto
havetheabilitytodeterminewhatothersmayandmaynotdo,andsotoexerciseauthorityovera
certaindomainofaffairs.Theresonantconnectionbetweenrightsandauthority(theauthorityto
controlwhatothersmaydo)isforwilltheoristsamatterofdefinition.
However,thewilltheory'saccountofthefunctionofrightsisunabletoexplainmanyrightsthatmost
thinkthereare.Withinthewilltheorytherecanbenosuchthingasanunwaivableright:arightover
whichitsholderhasnopower.Yetintuitivelyitwouldappearthatunwaivablerightsaresomeofthe
mostimportantrightsthatwehave:consider,forexample,theunwaivablerightnottobeenslaved
(MacCormick1977,197).Moreover,sincethewilltheoristholdsthatallrightsconfersovereignty,
shecannotacknowledgeanyrightsinbeingsincapableofexercisingsovereignty.Withinthewill
theoryitisimpossibleforincompetentslikeinfants,animals,andcomatoseadultstohaverights.Yet
weordinarilywouldnotdoubtthattheseincompetentscanhaverights,forexampletherightnottobe
tortured(MacCormick1982,15466).Willtheoriesalsohavedifficultiesexplainingbareprivilege
rights(suchasintheHobbesianstateofnature),whicharenotrightsofauthorityoverothers.
Theinteresttheoryismorecapaciousthanthewilltheory.Itcanacceptasrightsbothunwaivable
rights(thepossessionofwhichmaybegoodfortheirholders)andtherightsofincompetents(who
haveintereststhatrightscanprotect).Theinteresttheoryalsotapsintothedeeplyplausible
connectionbetweenholdingrightsandbeingbetteroff.
However,theinteresttheoryisalsomisalignedwithanyordinaryunderstandingofrights.We
commonlyacceptthatpeoplecanhaveinterestsinxwithouthavingarighttoxandcontrariwisethat
peoplecanhavearighttoxwithouthavinginterestssufficienttoexplainthis.Inthefirstcategoryare
thirdpartybeneficiaries(Lyons1994,3646).Youmayhaveapowerfulinterestinthelottery
payingoutforyourspouse'swinningticket,butyouhavenorightthatthelotterypaysouttoyour
spouse.Inthesecondcategoryaremanyoftherightsofofficeholdersandrolebearers(Jones1994,
3132Wenar2013b).Whateverinterestajudgemayhaveinexercisingherlegalrighttosentencea
convicttolifeinprison,thejudge'sinterestscannotpossiblyjustifyascribingtoherthepowerto
makesuchadramaticchangeintheconvict'snormativesituation.
ThedifficultiesoftheinteresttheoryhaveoftenbeennotedinRaz'sversion,whichisperhapsthe
mostprominent.InRaz'saccount,XhasarightifXcanhaverights,and,otherthingsbeingequal,
anaspectofX'swellbeing(hisinterest)isasufficientreasonforholdingsomeotherperson(s)tobe
underaduty(Raz1986,166).
Yetthereappeartobemanyrightsforwhichtheinterestsoftheputativerightholderarenot
sufficienttoholdotherperson(s)tobeunderaduty.Forexample,Razhimselfallowsthattheinterest
ofajournalistinprotectinghissourcesisnotitselfsufficientreasontoholdotherstobeunderthe

correspondingduty(Raz1986,179,2478).Itisrathertheinterestsofthegeneralpublicinanactive
andindependentmediathatgroundsthejournalist'srighttoprotecthissources.YetasKamm
observes,Ifthesatisfactionoftheinterestsofothersisthereasonwhythejournalistgetsarightto
havehisinterestprotected,hisinterestisnotsufficienttogiverisetothedutyofnoninterferencewith
hisspeech(Kamm2002,485).
NordoesthisdifficultyonlyaffecttherightsofofficeholderslikejournalistsRazadmitsthat
weightyrightssuchastherightsoffreeexpressionandfreedomofcontractarenotjustifiedsolelyby
theinterestsoftheindividualcitizenswhoholdthem(Raz1996a,3043,131).Oragain,parentsmay
havetherighttoreceivechildbenefitpaymentsfromthestate,buthereonlytheinterestsofthe
children,andnottheinterestsoftheparents,couldbesufficienttoholdthestatetobeunderaduty.
Raz'sversionoftheinteresttheorycontinuestobethemostwidelycitedaccountofthefunctionof
rights,despitesuchconcernsthatarenowcommonplaceinthespecialistliterature.Kramer'sversion
oftheinteresttheory,whichspecifiesnecessaryconditionsforholdingalegalright,isthemajor
contemporaryalternative(Kramer2013,246n.4).
Willtheoristsandinteresttheoristshavedevelopedtheirpositionswithincreasingtechnical
sophistication.Theissuesthatdividethetwocampsareclearlydefined,andthedebatesbetweenthem
areoftenintense.(Kramer,Simmonds,andSteiner1998,VanDuffel2012a,Kramer2013)The
seeminglyinterminabledebatebetweenthesetwomajortheorieshasdrivensometoconcludethatthe
debateitselfrestsonthemistakenpremisethatthereisasingleconceptofarightforwhichthese
theoriesproviderivalanalyses(VanDuffel2012b,Hayward2013).Thedeadlockhasencouraged
othertheoriststodevelopalternativepositionsonthefunctionofrights.
Demandtheoriesfillouttheideathat,asFeinberg(1973,5859)putsit,Arightissomethinga
mancanstandon,somethingthatcanbedemandedorinsisteduponwithoutembarrassmentor
shame.ForDarwall(2006,18),tohaveaclaimright,includesasecondpersonalauthoritytoresist,
complain,remonstrate,andperhapsusecoercivemeasuresofotherkinds,including,perhaps,togain
compensationiftherightisviolated.OnSkorupski'saccount(2010,XII.6,XIV.23)rightsspecify
whattherightholdermaydemandofothers,wheredemandimpliesthepermissibilityof
compellingperformanceorexactingcompensationfornonperformance.Likethewilltheory,these
demandtheoriescenterontheagencyoftherightholder.Theydonotturnontherightholder'spower
overthedutyofanother,sotheydonotsharethewilltheory'sdifficultywithunwaivablerights.They
may,however,havemoredifficultiesinexplainingpowerrights.Demandtheoriesalsosharethewill
theory'schallengesinexplainingtherightsofincompetents,andinexplainingprivilegerights.
Otherrecentanalysesofwhatrightsdoforrightholdersarevaried.Scanlon(2003,2013)defendsthe
positionthatrightsareconstraintsonthediscretionofindividualsorinstitutionstoact.Sreenivasan
(2005,2010)putsforwardahybridanalysisoftheclaimrightthatgraftstheinteresttheoryontothe
willtheory:herethefunctionoftheclaimrightistoendowtherightholderwiththeamountof
controloveranother'sdutythatadvancesherinterests.Wenar(2005)abandonstheideathatallrights
haveanysinglefunction,andsetsoutaseveralfunctionsonwhichrightsperformsixdistinct
functions.Scanlon'sanalysisiscriticizedinGilbert(2004),Wenar(2013a)Sreenivasan'sandWenar's
analysesarecritiquedinKramerandSteiner2007,May2012.

Recently,theoristshaveattemptedtomakeprogressonthequestionoffunctionalitybyscrutinizing
theclaimrightinparticular,andbyshiftingattentionontothecorrespondingduty.Asabove,onthe
standardaccountwhatisdistinctiveabouttheclaimrightisthatadutybearer'sdutyisdirectedat
orowedtotherightholder.(Thepromisor,forexample,owesadutyofperformancetothe
promisee.)Yetwhatcouldaccountforthedirectionalityofsuchdirectedduties(May2015)?
Afterall,notalldutiesaredirectedtospecificothers:dutiesofcharityorbenevolencearenot.And
directeddutiesappeartohavespecialnormativesignificance.Theviolationofanydutymay
bewrong(itmaybewrongnottogivetocharity),buttheviolationofadirecteddutyisawrongingof
thebeingtowhomthedutyisowed:itwrongsthatbeing.Andunlikeamerewrong,thewrongingof
somebeingcalls,ceterisparibus,forapologyandcompensation.Cruft(2013)furtherarguesthatthe
violationofanydutyowedtoabeingisdisrespectfulofthatbeing.Thequestioniswhatcould
possiblyaccountfortheextrasignificanceofthedutiesthathavedirection.
Hedahl(2013)presentsahybridpriorityexplanationofdirectionality,inwhichadutyisdirectedto
someentityjustincasethatentity'sprioritizationcontrolsthenormativestrengthoftheduty.For
instance,inacaseofconflictingduties,bothdutiesaredirectedtoAiffA'sauthorizationor(failing
that)A'sinterestsdeterminewhichdutyshouldbeperformed.Wenar(2013b)setsoutakinddesire
theory,inwhichthedirectionsofdutiesareexplainedbywhatrolebearerslikejournalistsandparents
wantassuch,andmoregenerallybywhatbeings(likehumans)wantquathekindsofbeingsthatthey
are.

3.TheHistoryoftheLanguageofRights
Intellectualhistorianshavetangledovertheoriginsofrights.Thesedebatesaresometimesframedin
termsofwhentheconceptofarightemerged.Yetinsofarasitisreallytheemergenceof
theconceptofarightthatisatissue,theanswerliesbeyondthecompetenceoftheintellectual
historianandwithinthedomainoftheanthropologist.Eventhemostprimitivesocialordermust
includerulesspecifyingthatcertainindividualsorgroupshavespecialpermissiontoperformcertain
actions.Moreover,eventhemostrudimentaryhumancommunitiesmusthaverulesspecifyingthat
someareentitledtotellotherswhattheymustdo.Suchrulesascriberights.Thegenesisofthe
conceptofarightwassimultaneouswithreflectiveawarenessofsuchsocialnorms.
Themoreproductivecharacterizationofthedebatewithinintellectualhistoryconcernswhen
awordorphraseappearedthathasameaningclosetothemeaningofourmodernword.Thisdebate
turnsonwheninhistorythepremodernobjectivesenseofrightcamealsotobearourmodern,
subjectivesenseofaright.
Rightinitsolder,objectivesensemeanswhatisjustorwhatisfair(Finnis1980,206).
Aristotleusesdikaion,forexample,toindicatethatasocietyisrightlyordered:thatitdisplaysthe
correctstructureofhumanrelationshipsRightinthisobjectivesensecanalsobeattributedto
individuals.TheRomanjuristUlpian,forinstance,heldthatjusticemeansrenderingeachhisright
(ius).Inthissense,aperson'srightiswhatisduetohimgivenhisroleorstatus.Thisobjective
senseofrightisnotthesameasourmodernideaofaright.Forinstance,Ulpiannotedthat
theiusofaparricidewastobesewnintoasackofsnakesandtossedintotheTiber(Tierney1997,

16).
Thescholarlyinquiryintowhenourmodern,subjectivesenseofarightbecameestablishedasa
meaningofsomewordorphrasehasprovedlonganddivisive.Theancientauthorsoftenusedwords
imprecisely,andsmearedtheirmeaningsacrossandbeyondtheHohfeldiancategories.The
intellectualhistoriansthemselveshaveoccasionallycongestedthediscussionbytakingdifferent
featuresofrightsasdefinitiveofthemodernconcept.Moreover,thescholarlydebatehassometimes
acceptedoveroptimisticassumptionsaboutthesharpnessofconceptualboundaries.
Nevertheless,twobroadtrendsinthescholarlydiscussionsareclear.Thefirstistopushtheoriginsof
atermindicatingamodern,subjectivesenseofarightbackfurtherintohistory:fromLocketo
HobbestoGrotiusintheseventeenthcentury,thentoGersoninthefifteenthcentury,Ockhaminthe
fourteenth,perhapseventoGratianinthetwelfth(Brett1997,Tierney1997).Donohue(2010)now
arguesthatiusisusedinasubjectivesensethroughouttheworksoftheclassicalRomanjuristsinthe
firstcenturyBCEtothethirdcenturyCE.
Thesecondandrelatedtrendhasbeentoestablishthattermsreferringtoactiverights(whatwewould
callprivilegerightsandpowerrights)predatetermsreferringtopassiverights(whatwewouldcall
claimrightsandimmunityrights).Itappearsthattheearliestmedievaldebatesusingrecognizably
modernrightslanguage,forinstance,concernedtopicssuchaswhetherthepopehasa(power)right
toruleanearthlyempire,andwhetherthepoorhavea(privilege)righttotakewhattheyneedfrom
thesurplusoftherich.

4.RightsandFreedom
Mostrightsentitletheirholderstofreedominsomesenseindeedholdingarightcanentailthatoneis
freeinoneormoreofavarietyofsenses.Inthemostgeneralterms,theactiveincidentsthe
privilegeandthepowerentitletheirholderstofreedomtoactincertainways.Thepassiveincidents
theclaimandtheimmunityoftenentitletheirholderstofreedomfromundesirableactionsor
states.
Wecanbemorespecific.Aprivilegerightmakesitholderfreetointhesenseofnon
forbiddenness.Agovernmentemployeewithasecurityclearance,forinstance,hasaprivilegeright
thatmakeshimfreetoreadclassifieddocuments.Onecanbefreeinthisnonforbiddenwaywithout
havingthephysicalabilitytodowhatoneisfreetodo.Youmaybefreetojointhemarch,evenwhen
bothyourkneesaresprained.Theactionsyouarefreetodointhissensemayormaynotbepossible
foryou,butatleasttheyarenotdisallowed.
Someonewhohasapairofprivilegerightsnodutytoperformtheaction,nodutynottoperformthe
actionisfreeinanadditionalsenseofhavingdiscretionoverwhethertoperformtheactionornot.
Youyoumaybefreetojointhemarch,ornot,asyoulike.Thisdualnonforbiddennessagaindoes
notimplyphysicalability.Arightholdermaybepermittedtoperformornotperformsomeaction,but
thisstilldoesnotmeanthatsheiscapableofperformingtheactionthatsheisfreetoperform.
Incontrast,theholderofapowerrightdoeshaveanability.Thisisthenormativeabilitytoexercise
authorityinacertainway.(Sumner1987,28)Thisnormativeabilityconfersfreedominadifferent

sense.Ajudgeisfreetosentenceaconvictedcriminaltoprison.Thejudgeisnotmerelyallowedto
sentencetheprisoner:herpowerrightgiveshertheabilitythatis,theauthoritytodoso.Her
(power)rightmakesherfreetosentenceinawaythatnonjudgesarenotfreetosentence.
Asforthepassiverights,manyclaimrightsentitletheirholderstobefreefromthephysical
interferenceorsurveillanceofothers.Otherclaimrightsentitletheirholderstobefreefrom
undesirableconditionslikehungerorfear.Immunityrightsparallelclaimrightsonelevelup.
Immunityrightsmaketheirholdersfreefromtheauthorityofothers,andsoentitletheirholderstobe
freefromconditionsliketyrannyorexploitation.
Alegalsystemcanbeseenasadistributionofallofthesevarietiesoffreedom.Anylegalsystemwill
setoutrulesspecifyingwhoisfreetoactinwhichways,andwhoshouldbefreefromunwanted
actionsandconditions.Adevelopedlegalsystemwillalsodeterminewhohastheauthority(andso
whoisfree)tointerpretandenforcetheserules.
Moregenerally,anypoliticalconstitutioncanbeseenasamultileveledstructureofrightsthat
distributesauthorityoverrulesofconductinadistinctiveway.Ademocraticconstitution,for
example,maygivevotersthepowertoelectlegislators,whohavecertainpowerstoenactlaws,which
thejudiciaryhascertainpowerstointerpret,andthepolicehavecertainpowerstoenforce,leaving
certaincoursesofconductopenaslegalforcitizenstopursue.Thefactsaboutwhoshouldbefreeto
dowhatwithinanylegalorpoliticalsystem,aswellasthefactsaboutwhoshouldbefreefromwhich
actionsandconditions,canberepresentedasacomplex,layeredstructureofrightsexponentially
morecomplexthaninthediagramofthepropertyrightabove.

5.RightsandReasons
5.1RightsasTrumps
Thoughtherearedisputesoverthefunctionofrightsandthehistoryofrightslanguage,mostagree
thatrightshavespecialnormativeforce.Thereasonsthatrightsprovideareparticularlypowerfulor
weightyreasons,whichoverridereasonsofothersorts.Dworkin'smetaphorisofrightsastrumps
(Dworkin1984).Rightspermittheirholderstoactincertainways,orgivereasonstotreattheir
holdersincertainwaysorpermittheirholderstoactincertainways,evenifsomesocialaimwould
beservedbydoingotherwise.AsMillwroteofthetrumpingpoweroftherighttofreeexpression:If
allmankindminusonewereofoneopinion,mankindwouldbenomorejustifiedinsilencingthatone
personthanhe,ifhehadthepower,wouldbeinsilencingmankind(Mill1859,20).
Howrightsbecomeimbuedwiththisspecialnormativeforceisamatterofongoingscholarlyinquiry.
AsSreenivasan(2010)notes,aHohfeldianclaimrightinitselfonlyentailstheexistenceofaduty
withacertainstructure,andnotadutywithacertainforce.AhasaclaimagainstBifandonlyifBhas
adutytoA:inthisdefinitionitisthedirectionofB'sduty(thatitisowedtoA)whichcorrelatesB's
dutytoA'srightnothingissaidinthedefinitionabouttheduty'sstrength.Whydirecteddutiesas
above,thoseowedtoanentityhavegreaternormativepriorityremainsanopenquestion:theonly
broadconsensusisthattheydo.(SeeThompson2004onbipolarjudgments.)

Dworkin'smetaphorsuggeststhatrightstrumpnonrightobjectives,suchasincreasingnational
wealth.Whatofthepriorityofonerightwithrespecttoanother?Wecankeeptothetrumpsmetaphor
whilerecognizingthatsomerightshaveahigherprioritythanothers.Withinthetrumpsuit,ajack
stillbeatsasevenorathree.Yourrightofwayataflashingyellowlighthaspriorityovertherightof
wayofthedriverfacingaflashingredandtherightofwayofanambulancewithsirensontrumps
youboth.
Thismetaphoroftrumpsleadsnaturallytothequestionofwhetherthereisanyrightthathaspriority
toabsolutelyallothernormativeconsiderations:whetherthereisanaceofrights.Gewirth(1981)
assertsthatthereisatleastonesuchabsoluteright:therightofallpersonsnottobemadethevictim
ofahomicidalproject.Forsucharighttobeabsoluteitwouldhavetotrumpeveryother
considerationwhatsoever:otherrights,economicefficiency,savinglives,everything.Notallwould
agreewithGewirththateventhisverypowerfulrightoverrideseveryconceivablenormativeconcern.
Somewouldthinkitmightbejustifiabletoinfringeeventhisrightwerethissomehownecessary,for
example,topreventthedeathsofagreatmanypeople.Ifitispermissibletokilloneinordertosavea
billion,thennotevenGewirth'srightisabsolute.

5.2ConflictsofRights?
MosttheoristswouldagreethatA'sclaimrightgivesBwhatRaz(1975,3548)callsanexclusionary
reason:asecondorderreasonnottoactonsomefirstorderreason.Dworkin'strumpingmetaphor
makesittemptingtocharacterizethenormativeforceofrightsinthestrongerterms
ofconclusivereasons.WecouldindeedattempttodefinetheHohfeldianincidentsintheseterms.A's
havingaclaimrightthatBwouldimplythatBhasaconclusivereasonto,andA'shavinga
privilegerighttowouldimplythatAhasnoconclusivereasonnotto.Powersandimmunities
wouldthendeterminethewaysinwhichagentswereandwerenotabletoalterthepatternsof
conclusivereasonsintheworld.
Werewetogothisroute,wewouldneedtotempertheconclusivenessoftheconclusivereasons
impliedbyrightsassertionstoaccommodatethefactsthatsomerightshaveprioritytoothers,andthat
fewifanyrightsoutweighabsolutelyallnonrightconsiderationsinallcircumstances.Ifweassociate
rightswithconclusivereasons,thenforatleastmostrightsthesereasonscanonlybeconclusivewith
respecttosomebutnotallcompetingconsiderations.
Thislineofthoughtcanbedevelopedbysayingthatthereasonsassociatedwithrightsare
conclusivewithintheareacoveredbytheright,butarenotconclusiveoutsideofthatarea.Eachright
trumpscompetingconsiderationsinmostcircumstances,buttherearecertaincircumstancesinwhich
anotherrightwithhigherpriorityorapressingnonrightconsiderationdetermineswhatmayor
shouldbedone.Fromthisperspective,theconclusivereasonsimpliedbyrightsassertionsreallyare
conclusive,butonlywithincertaincircumstances.Everyrightisabsolute,withinapreciselydelimited
space.(ContrastthispositionwithGewirth'sdefenseofasingle,unqualifiedabsoluteright.)
Thetheoreticalpositionattheendofthislineofthoughtiscalledspecificationism(ShaferLandau
1995,Oberdiek2008).Thespecificationistholdsthateachrightisdefinedbyanelaboratesetof
qualificationsthatspecifywhenitdoesandwhenitdoesnotapply:asetofqualificationsthatdefine
theright'sspace.

Thetestofspecificationismishowconvincinglyitcanexplainwhatoccurswhenrightsappearto
conflict.Rightsdooftenappeartoconflict.(SinnottArmstrong1996Kamm2007,262301)For
example,onacertaindayitmayseemthatthepublic'srighttoprotestisconflictingwiththe
government'srighttokeeporderonpublicproperty.Whenconfrontedwithacaselikethisone,we
willjudgethatoneortheother(say,thepublic's)rightshouldprevail.However,wedonotbelieve
thatoneoftheserightsisalwaysstrongerthantheother.Givendifferentcircumstances,ourjudgment
mightfavortheother(inthiscase,thegovernment's)right.Whenrightsappeartoconflictlikethis,
theusefulnessoftheimageofrightsastrumpsbeginstodim.Bothoftheserightsaretrumpcards,yet
itdoesnotappearthatonerightalwaystrumpstheother.
Aspecificationistwillattempttodispelanyappearanceofconflictofrights.Forexample,a
specificationistwillsaythatwhatiscolloquiallyreferredtoasthepublic'srighttoprotestis
actually,oncloserexamination,thepublic'srighttoprotest,unlesstheprotestwouldcauseserious
risktolifeorproperty,orwouldleadtothespreadofadeadlydisease,orSimilarly,the
government'srightshouldreallybespecifiedmorefullyastheright:tocontrolwhathappenson
publicproperty,butnottotheextentofstoppingpeacefulprotest,unlesstheprotestwouldleadtothe
spreadofdeadlydisease,butnotOnthespecificationistview,rightsneverdoconflictinthesense
ofoverlappinginagivencase.Rather,rightsfittogetherlikepiecesinajigsawpuzzle,sothatineach
circumstancethereisonlyonerightwhichdetermineswhatispermitted,forbiddenorrequired.Every
rightisabsolutewithinitsownarea,buttheareainwhicheachrightprevailsiselaborately
gerrymandered.Rightsneverconflict:theyarealways,touseSteiner'sphrase,compossible(Steiner
1994).
Feinberg(1980,22151)andThomson(1990,82104)objecttothisspecificationistviewofrights.
First,fullyspecifiedrightswouldbeunknowable:noonecouldsetoutallofthequalificationsthat
defineeventhesimplestright.Second,rightssounderstoodlosetheirexplanatoryforce:forthe
specificationistrightscanonlybetheconclusions,notthepremises,ofargumentsconcerningwhich
sideinanydisputeshouldprevail.Third,specificationistscannotexplainthemoralresidueofa
defeatedright.Forinstance,consideracaseinwhichyourpropertyrightinthepiecoolingonyour
windowsillconflictswithJohn'srighttodowhathemustdotokeepfromstarving.John'srightmay
prevailinthiscase:Johnmayhavearighttoeatyourpie.Still,afterJohnrightfullyeatsyourpiehe
shouldapologizetoyou,andcompensateyouifhecan.Thomsonallegesthatspecificationistscannot
explaintherequirementsthatJohnapologizestoandcompensatesyou,sinceonthespecificationist
viewthereisnorightofyoursthathehasviolatedwhenheconsumesyourfood.Thomsonprefersthe
viewthattherereallyareconflictsofrights,andsuggeststhatweshouldspeakofadefeatedrightas
beingpermissiblyinfringed(insteadofviolated),leavingresidualobligationsontheinfringer.
Frederick(2014)chasesdownsomespecificationistrepliestotheseobjections,andconcludesthat
althoughmoralrightsarestrongmoralconsiderations,theyareonlyprotanto.

5.3SupportamongRights
Philosophershavediscussednotonlyhowrightscanconflict,buthowtheysometimessupportone
another.Forexample,HenryShuehasarguedthatbothrightsofsecurityandrightsofsubsistenceare
basicrightsbecausetheyareindispensableforthefullenjoymentofallotherrightswhileother
rightsarenonbasicbecausetheyarenotindispensablefortheenjoymentofthesetwo.Ifthe

enjoymentorrealizationofacontroversialrightisanimportantpreconditionfortheenjoymentofan
uncontroversialright,onecandefendthecontroversialrightbydocumentingitsstrongsupporting
role.SuchalinkageargumentisusedbyShuetodefendtherighttosubsistenceasabasicright,and
bySentodefendrightstodemocracyandfreedomofthepressassupportiveoftherighttoadequate
nutritionindevelopingcountries(Shue1996,Sen1999).Shue'sandSen'sassertionshavebeen
criticizedasexaggerated(Nickel2008,MyhvoldHanssen2003(intheOtherInternetResources)).
Nickel(2008,2010)developsatypologyofsupportingrelationsbetweenrights(seealsoGilabert
2010).Onerightstronglysupportsanotherwhenitislogicallyorpracticallyinconsistenttoendorse
theimplementationofsecondrightwithoutendorsingthesimultaneousimplementationofthefirst.
Forexample,therighttobodilysecuritystronglysupportstherighttofreedomofassembly.Oneright
weaklysupportsanotherwhenitisusefulbutnotessentialtoit.Therighttoeducation,forexample,
weaklysupportstherighttoafairtrial.Nickelarguesthatthestrengthofsupportingrelationsbetween
rightsvarieswithqualityofimplementation.Poorlyimplementedrightsprovidelittlesupporttoother
rights,whileonesthataremoreeffectivelyimplementedtendtoprovidegreatersupporttoother
rights.Therighttodueprocesssupportstherighttoequaltreatmentformembersofdifferentracial
andethnicgroupsbutthesupportwillbesoftiftherighttodueprocessisonlyweakly
implemented.
Rightsthatweaklysupporteachotherareinterdependent.Rightsthatstronglysupporteachotherare
indivisible.Beginningwiththe1968ProclamationofTeherantheUnitedNationshaspromotedthe
ideathatSincehumanrightsandfundamentalfreedomsareindivisible,thefullrealizationofcivil
andpoliticalrightswithouttheenjoymentofeconomic,socialandculturalrightsisimpossible(see
Whelan2010).Nickelholdsthatthisindivisibilitythesisexaggeratesthedensityandstrengthof
supportingrelationsamonghumanrights.Heallows,however,thatmanysupportingrelationsexist
betweenrightsparticularlyunderhighqualityimplementationandendorsestheuseoflinkage
argumentswhenindispensabilitycanbeshown.

5.4RightstoDoWrong
Arethererightstodowrong?Manyhavethoughtso.Waldron(1993,63)givestheexampleof
antiwarprotestersorganizingarowdydemonstrationnearaRemembranceDayserviceWellman
(1997,33)offerstheillustrationofedgingintoacheckoutlinewithafullcart,justaheadofatired
womancarryingtriplets.Thepuzzleishowthepositivenormativeforceofarightcanexistsoclose
toanopposednegativenormativepole,wrong.InHohfeldianterms,howcantherebearight(no
dutynot)todowhatitiswrong(dutynot)todo?(Similarquestionsariseabouttheabuseofrights
(Schauer1984).)
Therearetwomainreadingsofrightstodowrong.Thefirstreadingcharacterizesmostrightsas
furtheringtheholder'sautonomy.Rightsentitletheirholderstomakechoices,andasWaldron(1993)
saystheimportanceofaperson'shavingchoiceswouldbediminishedifshewereforcedtodothe
rightthing.Eventhoughthepersonhasno(privilege)righttoperformanactionthatiswrong,it
wouldneverthelessviolateanimportant(claim)rightofhersforotherstocompelhernottodothat
thing.Totakethespeechexample,werespecttheautonomyofspeakerswhenweallowthemtospeak
unmolestedevenwhentheydowrongbyexpressingthemselvesindisrespectfulways.(Fora

defenseofthisreadingagainstobjectionsfromGalstonandGeorge,seeHerstein2012.Onthe
existenceandvalueoflegalrightstodolegalwrongs,seeHerstein2013.)
Thesecondreadingofrightstodowrongseesthemasinvolvingamidsentenceshiftindomainsof
reasons.Thereisnomystery,afterall,inhavingalegalrighttodosomethingmorallywrong.The
potentialforalegalrighttodoamoralwrongarisesfromthefactthatthedomainsoflegalandmoral
reasonsarenotperfectlyoverlapped.Onehasalegalprivilegetoedgeinfrontofthetiredmotherin
thecheckoutline,butthisissomethingthatonehasamoraldutynottodo.Similarly,onemighthave
amoralprivilegetodowhatonehasnocustomaryprivilegetodo(amoralrighttodoacustomary
wrong),andsoon.Eachdomainofreasonsisdistinct,andhoweverconclusivearethereasonsthat
anyparticularrightsassertionimplies,theseareonlyreasonswithinasingledomainofreasons
(moral,orlegal,orcustomary).

5.5RightstoBelieve,Feel,andWant
Moralrights,legalrights,andcustomaryrightsalldefinedomainsofrightswithintherealmofrights
ofconduct:rightsconcerninghowagentsshouldact.Whenourreasonswithinthesethreedifferent
domainsconflict,wemayhavereasonsofdifferentkindstoactindifferentways.Yettherearealso
rightsentirelybeyondtherealmofconduct.Thesearerightstobelieve,tofeelandtowant.For
example,theprimeministerassertsthathehadarighttobelievewhathisadvisorstoldhim.Theartist
saysshehasarighttofeelangryathercritics.Thefrustratedsuburbanitecomplainshehasarightto
wantmoreoutoflife.
Therealmofrightsofrightstobelieve,tofeelandtowantaretherealmsofepistemic,ofaffective,
andofconativerights.Togetherwiththerealmofrightsofconduct,thesearethefourrealmsof
rights.Eachofthesefourrealmsofrightsdefinesaseparateconceptualspace:therearenoepistemic
rightstoact,andnoaffectiverightstobelieve.Whatisdistinctiveaboutthethreerealmsofrights
beyondtherightsofconductisthattheyseemonlytocontainonlyprivilegerights(Wenar2003).
Onemay,forexample,haveaprivilegerighttobelievewhatone'seyestellone,andaprivilegeright
tofeelproudofwhatonehasdone.Itisinterestingtoconsiderwhytheseepistemic,affective,and
conativerealmscontainnoclaims,powers,orimmunities.
Philosophershavelongbeeninterestedinepistemicrightsinparticular(thoughthereisalso
skepticismaboutthiscategory,asinGlick2010).WilliamJames,forinstance,callsTheWillto
Believe,anessayinjustificationoffaith,adefenseofourrighttoadoptabelievingattitudein
religiousmatters,inspiteofthefactthatourmerelylogicalintellectmaynothavebeencoerced.
James'sradicalconclusionintheessayisthatwehavetherighttobelieveatourownriskany
hypothesisthatisliveenoughtotemptourwill(James1897,2,29).Similarlythedeepestquestions
inKant'sphilosophyareframedintermsofrights.IntheCritiqueofPureReasontheTranscendental
DeductionoftheCategoriesaimstoprovethevalidityoftheemploymentoftheconceptsofpure
understanding.IntheCritiqueofPracticalReasontheDeductionofFreedomaimstodemonstrateour
entitlementtoregardourselvesasfree.InbothDeductionsthecentralquestionisaquaestioiuris:By
whatright?Kant'squestionsare:Bywhatrightdoweemploythecategoriesandbywhatrightdo
wethinkofourselvesasfree?

6.ThreeApproachestotheJustificationofRights
Therearetwoleadingphilosophicalapproachestoexplainingwhichfundamentalrightsofconduct
thereare,andwhytheserightsshouldberespected.Thesetwoapproachesarebroadlyidentifiableas
deontologicalandconsequentialist.Statustheoriesholdthathumanbeingshaveattributesthatmakeit
fittingtoascribecertainrightstothem,andmakerespectfortheserightsappropriate.Instrumental
theoriesholdthatrespectforparticularrightsisameansforbringingaboutsomeoptimaldistribution
ofadvantages.Eachapproachhascharacteristicstrengthsandweaknessesthelongrunningcontest
betweenthemisongoing.
Quinn(1993,170)sketchesamodernstatustheorythisway:
Apersonisconstitutedbyhisbodyandhismind.Theyarepartsoraspectsofhim.Forthatvery
reason,itisfittingthathehaveprimarysayoverwhatmaybedonetothemnotbecausesuch
anarrangementbestpromotesoverallhumanwelfare,butbecauseanyarrangementthatdenied
himthatsaywouldbeagraveindignity.Ingivinghimthisauthority,moralityrecognizeshis
existenceasanindividualwithendsofhisownanindependentbeing.Sincethatiswhatheis,
hedeservesthisrecognition.
Quinnclaimsthatthereissomeattributeofthepersonhere,beinganindividualwithendsofhis
ownthatmeritsrecognitionfromothers.Therecognitionthatisduetoeachindividualcanbe
accordedtothatindividualbyrespectinghisfundamentalrights.
Quinncontrastshisstatusapproachtorightswithonethatascribesrightsbecausesuchan
arrangementbestpromotesoverallhumanwelfare.Histargetisconsequentialisttheoriesofrights,
theparadigmofwhichareutilitariantheories.WemetsuchautilitariantheoryofrightsaboveinJohn
StuartMill'sconceptualizationofrightsassomethingwhichsocietyoughttodefendmeinthe
possessionof.Millbelievedthatsocietyoughttodefendtheindividualinpossessionofherrights
becausedoingsowouldbringaboutthegreatestutilitysummedacrossthemembersofthatsociety.
ForMill,asforotherinstrumentaltheorists,rightsareatoolforproducinganoptimaldistributionof
interestsacrosssomegroup.
Thetwoapproachesdiffersharplyovertheroleofconsequencesinthejustificationofascribing
rights.Statustheoristsholdthatrightsshouldberespectedbecauseitisfittingtodoso,andnot
becauseofthegoodconsequencesthatwillflowfromsodoing.Bycontrast,withinaninstrumental
theorygoodconsequencesarethejustificationforpromulgatingandenforcingrights.AsQuinn
(1993,173)saysaboutthestatusapproach:
Itisnotthatwethinkitfittingtoascriberightsbecausewethinkitisagoodthingthatrightsbe
respected.Ratherwethinkrespectforrightsagoodthingpreciselybecausewethinkpeople
actuallyhavethemandthattheyhavethembecauseitisfittingthattheyshould.
Withinastatusapproachrightsarenotmeansforthepromotionofgoodconsequences.Theyare

rather,inNozick'sphrase,sideconstraintsonthepursuitofgoodconsequences(Nozick1974,29).A
statusapproachfrownsonanyrightsviolation,evenforthesakeofmaximizingthenonviolationof
rightsoverall(asinautilitarianismofrights).Suchanapproachemphasizestheagentrelative
reasonsthateachpersonhastoavoidviolatingtherightsofothers.
Astatusbasedjustificationthusbeginswiththenatureoftherightholderandarrivesimmediatelyat
theright.Theinstrumentalapproachstartswiththedesiredconsequences(likemaximumutility)and
worksbackwardtoseewhichrightsascriptionswillproducethoseconsequences.

6.1StatusBasedRights
Statustheoriesbelongtothetraditionofnaturalrightstheories.Allnaturalrightstheoriesfixupon
featuresthathumanshavebytheirnature,andwhichmakerespectforcertainrightsappropriate.The
theoriesdifferoverpreciselywhichattributesofhumansgiverisetorights,althoughnonreligious
theoriestendtofixuponthesamesortsofattributesdescribedinmoreorlessmetaphysicalor
moralizedterms:freewill,rationality,autonomy,ortheabilitytoregulateone'slifeinaccordance
withone'schosenconceptionofthegoodlife.Naturalrightstheoristsagreethathumanreasoncan
graspthefactthatitisappropriatetotreatbeingswithsuchattributesincertainways,althoughthey
disagreeonwhethersuchfactsareselfevident.
Naturalrightstheoryreacheditshighpointintheearlymodernera,intheworkofGrotius,Hobbes,
Pufendorf,andespeciallyLocke.Lockearguedthatmenhaverightstolife,liberty,andestateina
prepoliticalstateofnature,andthatthesenaturalrightsputlimitsonthelegitimateauthorityofthe
state.Locke'sinfluencecanbeseenintherevolutionaryAmericanandFrenchpoliticaldocumentsof
theeighteenthcentury,andespeciallyinJefferson'sDeclarationofIndependence(1776):Wehold
thesetruthstobeselfevident,thatallmenarecreatedequal,thattheyareendowedbytheirCreator
withcertainunalienablerights,thatamongtheseareLife,Liberty,andthePursuitofHappiness.
TherevivalofstatustheorywithincontemporaryphilosophybeganwithNozick'sAnarchyStateand
Utopia(1974).WhileNozickdoesacknowledgeadebttoLocke'stheoryofproperty,hiswork
belongswithintheKantiantraditionofnaturalrightstheorizing.Nozickcentershisexplanationofthe
moralforceofindividualrightsontheKantianimperativeagainsttreatinghumanitymerelyasa
meanstoanend.Eachperson'srightsimposesideconstraintsonothers'pursuitoftheirgoals,Nozick
says,becauseeachpersonpossessesaninviolabilitythatallothersmustrespect.Individualshave
rights,hewrote,andtherearethingsnopersonorgroupmaydotothem(withoutviolatingtheir
rights)(Nozick1974,ix).
Manyfindthisapproachofgroundingofrightsinindividualdignityappealing.Thereisadirectness
andclaritytostatusexplanationsoffundamentalrights.Forexample,Kamm(2007,247)explainsthe
rightoffreeexpressionasfollows:
Therighttospeakmaysimplybetheonlyappropriatewaytotreatpeoplewithmindsoftheir
ownandthecapacitytousemeanstoexpressit...Notrecognizingaperson'soptionofspeaking
istofailtorespecthim...Tosaythatanygivenpersonisnotentitledtothestrongrighttofree
speechis...awayofsayingthatcertaincrucialfeaturesofhumannaturearenotsufficientto
generatetherightinanyone.Andthisseemstobeamistake.

Moreover,statusbasedrightsareattractivelyrobust.Whilethejustificationsofinstrumentalrightsare
alwayscontingentoncalculationsconcerningconsequences,statusbasedrightsareanchoredfirmly
inindividualdignity.Thismakesiteasytoexplainwhystatusbasedrightsarestrong,almost
unqualifiedrights,andthisisapositionwhichmanybelieveproperlyexpressesthegreatvalueof
eachperson.
However,thestrengthofstatusbasedrightscanalsobeseenasaweaknessofthetheory.Onedoes
notwishtobecarriedfromthegreatimportanceofeachindividualtotheimplausiblepositionthatall
fundamentalrightsareabsolute.AsNagel(2002,36)allowswhiledefendingastatusview,thereare
evilsgreatenoughsothatonewouldbejustifiedinmurderingortorturinganinnocentpersonto
preventthem.Consequences,ifbadenough,dojustifythequalificationofindividualrights,which
leavesthestatustheoristneedingtoexplainhowatheorywhichrejectsconsequencessoresolutelyat
theoutsetcanconcedetheirimportancelateron.
Moreover,thesimplicityofthestatusapproachtorightscanalsoappeartobealiability.Onclose
examination,thefundamentalrightsthatmostpeoplebelieveinareintricatelyshaped.Forexample,
considerthewidelyacceptedrighttofreeexpression.Thisrightincludestherighttomakedamning
personalattacksonothers.Yettherightismuchmorepermissiveaboutattackingpublicfiguresthan
itisaboutassailingprivatecitizens.Howcouldastatusapproachexplainthisdistinctionbetween
publicfiguresandprivatecitizens?Oragain:therighttofreespeechsometimescontainsarighttosay
whatthespeakerknowstobeuntrue.Yetwetendtobemoretolerantofdeceitfulspeechinpolitical
campaignsthanweareofdeceitfulspeechinadvertisingorinthecourtroom.Itisanopenquestion
whetherstatustheoryhastheconceptualresourcestoexplainwhyindividualrightsshouldbeshaped
inthesespecificways.
Statustheoryalsofacesthechallengeofvindicatingitsfoundationsanditsscope.Whyafterallisit
fittingtoascribeindividualsrights?TheKantianvalueofinviolabilitycanlookpuzzlingwhen
presentedindependentlyofametaphysicalgrounding.AsNagel(2002,34)admits,ithasproven
extremelydifficulttoaccountforsuchabasic,individualizedvaluesuchthatitbecomesmorally
intelligible.ThisisaquietechoofBentham'sprotestthatthedoctrineofnaturalrightsisfrom
beginningtoendsomuchflatassertion:itlaysdownasafundamentalandinviolableprinciple
whateverisindispute(Bentham1796,66).Cruft(2010,451)hasattemptedtodeepenthetheoryof
thenoninstrumentalvalueofbasicrights,byshowingthatsuchrightsareconstitutiveof
relationshipsthatbindallhumanstogetherinfellowshipasmembersofasharedprotocommunity.
Evenso,statustheoristsmustalsoresolveaninternaldebateoverexactlywhichrightsshouldbe
thoughttoexpressanindividual'sinviolability.Nozickholdsthatstatusbasedrightsincluderightsto
whateverpropertyonehasacquired,whileotherstatustheoristsrejecttherightlibertariantowhich
Nozick'spositionleads.Theresolutionofthisdebatehasbecomemoreurgent,asagroupofneo
KantianandneoLockeanleftlibertariantheoristshaveadvancedtheviewthatthestatusof
individualsrequiresthateachbeaccordedstrongrightstoselfownership,andalsoinitiallyequal
sharesofworldownership.(VallentyneandSteiner2000,Otsuka2003)

6.2InstrumentalRights
Instrumentaltheoriesdescriberightsasinstrumentsforachievinganoptimaldistributionof

advantages.Thearchetypalinstrumentaltheoryissomeformoftwolevelconsequentialism,suchas
ruleutilitarianism.Withinsuchatheoryrightsarepartsofrules,thegeneralobservanceofwhichwill
leadtoanoptimaldistributionofadvantages.Inruleutilitarianismtheoptimaldistributionistheone
thatcontainsthegreatestaggregateutility.
Themostcommonobjectiontogroundingrightsinsuchatheoryisthattheresultingrightswillbetoo
flimsy.Ifrightsarejustifiedonlyinsofarastheygenerategoodconsequences,itmayseemthatthe
theorywillneedtopruneitsrights,perhapsseverely,whenevermaximumutilitylieselsewhere.Why
shoulditnotbearuleinatwolevelsystem,forexample,thatoneshouldframeaninnocentmanif
thiswouldpreventamajorriot?Whyshoulditnotbearulethatoneshouldviolatetherightofan
innocentnottobekilledifthiswouldpreventthekillingsoftwoinnocentselsewhere?Whilestatus
basedrightscanappeartobetoostrong,instrumentalrightscanappeartobetooweak.(SeePettit
1988foracounterargument.)
Weakrightsareaproblemforutilitarianismbecauseitsfocusonmaximizationmakesitindifferentto
certainfactsabouthowutilityisdistributedacrossindividuals.However,utilitarianismisnottheonly
kindofinstrumentaltheory.
Forexample,apureegalitariantheorywillportrayrightsasinstrumentsforachievingamoreequal
distributionofadvantages.Aprioritariantheorywilldefineanoptimaldistributioninamanner
similartoegalitarianism,exceptthatitwillgiveextraweighttotheinterestsofthoseworseoff.Other
instrumentaltheoriescharacterizeoptimaldistributioninotherways.(Sumner1987,171)
Instrumentaltheoriesthatdonotdefineanoptimaldistributionintermsofmaximizationmayface
lesspressurethanutilitarianismdoesfromconcernsaboutweakrights.(Scanlon1977)
Instrumentaltheoriesdifferoverhowtheydefinewhatcountsasanoptimaldistribution
(maximization,equality,etc.).Theyalsodifferinhowtheymeasureindividualadvantage.For
instance,autilitarian'smetricisutility,Senworkswithametricofcapabilities,Dworkinwith
resources,andsoon.
Whatevermetrictheyuse,allinstrumentaltheoristswillhavetoaddresslongstandingquestionsabout
thecommensurabilityandinterpersonalcomparisonofinterests.Sinceinstrumentaltheoristswork
withoverallevaluationsofhowwelloffindividualswouldbewerecertainrightsascribed,theymust
explainhowdistinctcategoriesofinterests(e.g.,health,income,opportunitiesforselfexpression,
socialrecognition)tradeoffagainstoneanother.Theymustalsoexplainwhytheybelievethatthese
interestsaresimilarenoughacrosspersonsthatitmakessensetousethesamescalesofmeasurement
fordifferentpersons.(Griffin1989)
Statustheoriesaresubjecttotheobjectionthattheylacktheconceptualresourcestoexplainwhythe
rightswebelieveinareintricatelyshapedtoaccommodatetheparticularitiesofdifferentcontexts
anddifferentrightholders.Instrumentaltheoriesarevulnerabletothemirrorimageobjection.An
instrumentaltheoristcanappealtoanynumberofdistinctinterests,whichareatstakeforanynumber
ofdifferentlysituatedindividuals,toexplainwhyacertainrightshouldbeheldonlybycertain
personsoronlyincertaincircumstances.Thedangerforsuchatheorististhatthewealthofnormative
resourcesathercommandwillpermittheascriptionofwhateverrightsshefavors.Thetheoristbegins
withtherightsthatshewantstojustify,thengivesajustsostoryintermsofanoptimaldistribution

ofintereststhatleadstoexactlythoserights.(Tushnet1984,Frey1985)Moreoverallinstrumental
justificationsrelyonempiricalpredictionsconcerningwhichascriptionsofrightswouldproduce
whichconsequences,andtherewilltypicallybeenoughslackintheseempiricalpredictionsfor
instrumentaltheoriststofudgetheirderivationsinordertoreachthedesiredrights.
Bothstatustheoriesandinstrumentaltheoriesofrightshaveheldaperennialattraction.Becauseof
this,manyhavebeentemptedtosearchforahybridapproachthatwouldcombinewhatisplausiblein
each(e.g.,Sen,1982).

6.3ContractualandJustificatoryRights
Athirdapproachtothejustificationofrightsmightbecalledcontractual.Hererightsare
characterizedneitherasnaturallyfittingforindependentbeings,norastoolstopromotethebeststate
ofaffairs.Rather,rightsdefineprinciplesthatwouldbechosenbyproperlysituatedandmotivated
agentsagreeingtothebasictermsoftheirrelations(e.g.,principleschoseninRawls'soriginal
position,orprincipleswithinScanlon'scontractualismthatnoonecouldreasonablyreject).Thefact
thattheseprincipleswouldbeagreedtounderthespecifiedconditionsistheirjustification.
Therightsthatdefinefundamentalprincipleswithinthesetheoriesarephrasedintermsofwhatthe
theories'agentshavestrongreasontowant.So,forexample,Rawlsstatesthattheroleofacitizen's
rightofpersonalpropertyistoallowasufficientmaterialbasisforasenseofpersonalindependence
andselfrespect,bothofwhichareessentialforthedevelopmentandexerciseofthetwomoral
powers(Rawls1993,298).AndScanlonsaysthatreasonableindividualshavereasontoinsist...on
basicrights,whichgivethemimportantformsofprotectionandcontrolovertheirownlives
(Scanlon2003,4).
Forst(2012,2014)combinescriticalandcontractualisttheoryintoasophisticatedaccountofrights.
Beginningwithastatusbasedfundamentalrighttojustification,heshowshowsuitablyidealized
demandsforjustificationfromindividualssubordinatedwithinrealrelationsofpowercanground
specificrightstorelieffromandredressforactualinjustices.Forst'sframeworkshowstheenduring
theoreticalappealandpracticalpotentialoftheKantiantraditionofunderstandingrights.

7.CritiquesofRights
Critiquesofrightscomeintwoforms.Thefirstisanattackonthesubstanceofdoctrinesthatgive
rightsacentralplace.Thesecritiquesallegethatthecontentofsuchdoctrinesis,inonewayorother,
malformedorunjustified.Herewefind,forexample,thecriticismthatnaturalrightsdoctrinesareso
muchflatassertion,andthatutilitarianrightstendtobeimplausiblyweak.Thesecondformof
critiqueattacksthelanguageofrightsitself.Theobjectionhereisthatitisinappropriateor
counterproductivetoexpressatleastsomekindsofnormativeconcernsintermsofrights.Weshould,
accordingtothesecondformofcritique,reduceoravoidrightstalk.

7.1CritiquesofRightsDoctrine
MarxattackedthesubstanceoftherevolutionaryeighteenthcenturyAmericanandFrenchpolitical
documentsthatproclaimedthefundamentalrightsofman:liberty,equality,security,property,and

thefreeexerciseofreligion.Marxobjectedthattheseallegedrightsderivefromafalseconceptionof
thehumanindividualasunrelatedtoothers,ashavinginterestscanbedefinedwithoutreferenceto
others,andasalwayspotentiallyinconflictwithothers.Therightsbearingindividualisanisolated
monadwithdrawnbehindhisprivateinterestsandwhimsandseparatedfromthecommunity.
(Marx1844,146)
Therightofproperty,Marxasserted,exemplifiestheisolatingandantisocialcharacterofthese
allegedrightsofman.Ontheonehand,therightofpropertyistherighttokeepothersatadistance:
thelegalequivalentofabarbedwirefence.Ontheotherhand,therightofpropertyallowsanowner
totransferhisresourcesathisownpleasureandforhisowngain,withoutregardevenforthe
desperateneedforthoseresourceselsewhere.
Similarly,Marxheldthatthemuchcelebratedindividualrighttolibertyreinforcesselfishness.Those
whoareascribedtherighttodowhattheywishsolongastheydonothurtotherswillperpetuatea
cultureofegoisticobsession.Asforequality,theachievementofequalrightsinaliberalstatemerely
distractspeoplefromnoticingthattheirequalityispurelyformal:asocietywithformallyequalrights
willcontinuetobedividedbyhugeinequalitiesineconomicandpoliticalpower.Finally,theseso
callednaturalrightsareinfactnotnaturaltohumansatall.Theyaresimplythedefiningelements
oftherulesofthemodernmodeofproduction,perfectlysuitedtofiteachindividualintothecapitalist
machine.
Communitarians(Taylor,Walzer,MacIntyre,Sandel)soundseveralofthesamethemesintheir
criticismsofcontemporaryliberalandlibertariantheories.Thecommunitariansobjectthathumans
arenot,assuchtheoriesassume,antecedentlyindividuated.Nozick'sstateofnaturetheorizing,
forexample,errsinpresumingthatindividualsoutsideofastable,stategovernedsocialorderwill
developtheautonomouscapacitiesthatmakethemdeservingofrights.Norshouldweattempt,asin
Rawls'soriginalposition,tobaseanargumentforrightsonwhatindividualswouldchoosein
abstractionfromtheirparticularidentitiesandcommunityattachments.Thereisnowaytoestablisha
substantivepoliticaltheoryonwhatallrationalagentswantintheabstract.Rather,theoristsshould
lookattheparticularsocialcontextsinwhichrealpeoplelivetheirlives,andtothemeaningsthat
specificgoodscarrywithindifferentcultures.Thiscommunitariancritiquecontinuesbyaccusing
liberalandlibertariantheoriesofbeingfalselyuniversalistic,ininsistingthatallsocietiesshouldbend
themselvestofitwithinastandardsizedgridofrights.Insofarasweshouldadmitrightsintoour
understandingoftheworldatall,communitarianssay,weshouldseethemaspartofongoing
practicesofsocialselfinterpretationandnegotiationandsoasrulesthatcanvarysignificantly
betweencultures.
Thesekindsofcriticismshavebeendiscussedindetail(e.g.,Gutmann1985,Waldron1987b,Mulhall
andSwift1992).Theirvalidityturnsonweightyissuesinmoralandpoliticaltheory.Whatcanbesaid
hereisthatacommonthemeinmostofthesecriticismsthatprominentrightsdoctrinesareinsome
wayexcessivelyindividualisticoratomisticneednotcutagainstanytheorymerelybecauseit
usesthelanguageofrights.Ignatieff(2003,67)errs,forexample,whenhechargesthatrights
languagecannotbeparsedortranslatedintoanonindividualistic,communitarianframework.It
presumesmoralindividualismandisnonsensicaloutsidethatassumption.
Aswesawabove,thelanguageofrightsisabletoaccommodaterightholderswhoareindividualsas

such,butalsoindividualsconsideredasmembersofgroups,aswellasgroupsthemselves,states,
peoples,andsoon.Indeedthenonindividualisticpotentialofrightslanguageismorethanaformal
possibility.Thedoctrineofinternationalhumanrightsthemoderncousinofeighteenthcentury
naturalrightstheoryascribesseveralsignificantrightstogroups.TheinternationalConvention
againstGenocide,forexample,forbidsactionsintendingtodestroyanynational,ethnic,racialor
religiousgroupandbothofthehumanrightsCovenantsascribetopeoplestherighttoself
determination.Suchexamplesshowthatthelanguageofrightsisnotindividualisticinitsessence.

7.2CritiquesoftheLanguageofRights
Thelanguageofrightscanresistthechargethatitisnecessarilycomplicitwithindividualism.
However,criticshaveaccusedrightstalkofimpedingsocialprogress:
Ourrightstalk,initsabsolutenesspromotesunrealisticexpectations,heightenssocialconflict,
andinhibitsdialoguethatmightleadtowardconsensus,accommodation,oratleastthediscovery
ofcommonground.Initssilenceconcerningresponsibilities,itseemstocondoneacceptanceof
thebenefitsoflivinginademocraticsocialwelfarestate,withoutacceptingthecorresponding
personalandcivicobligations.Initsinsularity,itshutsoutpotentiallyimportantaidstothe
processofselfcorrectinglearning.Allofthesetraitspromotemereassertionoverreasongiving.
Glendon(1991,14)heredrawsoutsomeofthedetrimentalpracticalconsequencesofthepopular
connectionbetweenrightsandconclusivereasonsthatwesawabove.Sincerightsassertionssuggest
conclusivereasons,peoplecanbetemptedtoassertrightswhentheywanttoendadiscussioninstead
ofcontinuingit.Oneplaysarightasatrumpcardwhenonehasrunoutofarguments.Similarly,the
readyavailabilityofrightslanguagemayleadpartiesinitiallyatoddswitheachothertoward
confrontationinsteadofnegotiation,aseachsideescalatesanarmsraceofrightsassertionsthatcan
onlyberesolvedbyasuperiorauthoritylikeacourt.Onelineoffeministtheoryhaspickeduponthis
lineofcriticism,identifyingtheperemptoryandrigidifyingdiscourseofrightswiththe
confrontationalmasculinevoice.(Gilligan1993)
Itisnotinevitablethattheseunfortunatetendencieswillafflictthosewhomakeuseofthelanguageof
rights.Aswehaveseen,itmaybeplausibletoholdthateachrightisabsoluteonlywithinan
elaboratelygerrymanderedarea.Anditmaybepossibletoproducedeeptheoriestojustifywhyone
hastherightsthatoneasserts.However,itisplausiblethattheactualuseofrightstalkdoeshavethe
propensitiesthatGlendonsuggests.ItseemsnoaccidentthatAmerica,thelandofrights,isalsothe
landoflitigation.
AnotherdeleteriousconsequenceofrightstalkthatGlendonpicksoutisitstendencytomovethe
moralfocustowardpersonsasrightholders,insteadoftowardpersonsasbearersofresponsibilities.
ThiscritiqueisdevelopedbyO'Neill(1996,127532002,2734).Afocusonrightholderssteers
moralreasoningtowardtheperspectiveofrecipience,insteadoftowardthetraditionalactiveethical
questionsofwhatoneoughttodoandhowoneoughttolive.Rightstalkalsoleadsthosewhouseitto
neglectimportantvirtuessuchascourageandbeneficence,whicharedutiestowhichnorights
correspond.Finally,theuseofrightslanguageencouragespeopletomakeimpracticaldemands,since
onecanassertarightwithoutattendingtothedesirabilityoreventhepossibilityofburdeningothers

withthecorrespondingobligations.
CriticismssuchasO'Neill'sdonottargetthelanguageofrightsasawhole.Theyaimsquarelyatthe
passiverights,andespeciallyatclaimrights,insteadofattheactiveprivilegesandpowers.
Nevertheless,itisagainplausiblethatthespreadofrightstalkhasencouragedthetendenciesthat
thesecriticismssuggest.Themoderndiscourseofrightsischaracteristicallydeployedbythosewho
seethemselvesorothersaspotentialrecipients,entitledtoinsistoncertainbenefitsorprotections.
Describingfundamentalnormsintermsofrightshasbenefitsaswellasdangers.Thelanguageof
rightscangivepreciseexpressiontoelaboratestructuresoffreedomandauthority.Whenembodiedin
particulardoctrines,suchasintheinternationalhumanrightsdocuments,thelanguageofrightscan
expressinaccessibletermsthestandardsforminimallyacceptabletreatmentthatindividualscan
demandfromthosewithpoweroverthem.Rightsarealsoassociatedwithhistoricalmovementsfor
greaterlibertyandequality,soassertionsofrightsinpursuitofjusticecancarryaresonancethatother
appealslack.Whetherthesebenefitsofusingrightslanguageoverbalancethehazardsremainsalive
questioninmoral,politicalandlegaltheory.

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