Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its
officers and members, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAAGAS II, as Liquidator of
Pacific Banking Corporation, respondents.
G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Liquidator of
the Pacific Banking Corporation , petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON
ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by
their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is the same: whether
a petition for liquidation under 29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is
a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action. The Fifth and the Fourteenth Divisions of the Court
of Appeals reached opposite results on this question and consequently applied different periods for
appealing.
The facts are as follows:
I.
Proceedings in the CB and the RTC
On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the
Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months
later, it was placed under liquidation 1 and a Liquidator was appointed. 2

On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 31, a petition
entitled "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was
approved, after which creditors filed their claims with the court.
On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Naagas, 4 President of the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by the Central Bank.
On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for short),
petitioner in G.R. No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th
month pay differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick
Leave Benefit due its members as employees of PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the
trial court ordered payment of the principal claims of the Union. 5
The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16, 1991, he filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the
judge modified his September 13, 1991 6 but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration.
This order was received by the Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991,
he filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December
23, 1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Naagas.
In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on
the ground that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared
his September 13, 1991 order and subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied
reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he granted the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of
Execution.
Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991, likewise filed claims for
the payment of investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to
US$2,531,632.18. The shares of stocks, consisting of 154,462 common shares, constituted 11% of
the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC. They alleged that their claim constituted foreign
exchange capital investment entitled to preference in payment under the Foreign Investments Law.
In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the Liquidator to pay
private respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred creditors. 7
The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992 he moved for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He received the order
denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 5, 1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice
of Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union,
however, the judge ordered the Notice of Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had
been filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days. In his order of October 28,
1992, the judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992 order granting the Stockholders/
Investors' claim.
II.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court of
Appeals to set aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal from the orders granting the
claims of Union and of the Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to
which the cases were separately raffled, rendered conflicting rulings.
In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373) the Fifth
Division 8 held in the case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding
and, therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. Since
the notice of appeal of the Liquidator was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the
Union's claims, the appeal was brought on time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the
lower court and directed the latter to give due course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record
on Appeal he had filed for hearing.
On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division 9 ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 29351
(now G.R. No. 112991) in the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an
ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 15
days and that since the Liquidator's appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order
appealed from, deducting the period during which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice
of appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition.
III.
Present Proceedings
The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.
In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:
1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the suit.
2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition
for certiorari filed by Naagas who was without any legal authority to file it.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special proceeding
governed by Rules 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of Court.
4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal filed
by Naagas was filed on time.
5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of appeal
filed on December 23, 1991 by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:

1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation s
a Special Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case
the period of appeal is 30 days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment
appealed from.
2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders whose
right to receive payment as such would accrue only after all the creditors of the
insolvent bank have been paid.
3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is not in the
nature of foreign investment as it is understood in law.
4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly established and proved.
5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC was made with
grave abuse of discretion.
The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.
First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a petition for
liquidation under 29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the
period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with
the trial court a record on appeal in order to perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding
is an ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order
appealed from.
BP Blg. 129 provides:
39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed
from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpuscases the period for appeal shall be
forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire
record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively,
together with an index of the contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court.
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:
19. Period of Appeals.

(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases
referred to in paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award appealed
from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of
the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are
allowed, the period of appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a record on
appeal being required.
The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an ordinary action similar
to an action for interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth Division stated:
The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court where
there are conflicting claimants or several claims upon the same subject matter, a
person who claims no interest thereon may file an action for interpleader to compel
the claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several claims among themselves.
(Section I Rule 63).
An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62 which, like an
ordinary action, may be appealed only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or order appealed from. Under Rule 62, the preceding rules covering
ordinary civil actions which are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the
provisions of the rule relating to such civil actions are applicable to special civil
actions. This embraces Rule 41 covering appeals from the regional trial court to the
Court of Appeals.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as "an
ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong." On the
other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule states that "every other remedy including one
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact shall be by special
proceeding."
To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a special proceeding,
the petition for assistance of the court in the liquidation of an asset of a bank is not
"one to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact." Contrary to the
submission of the petitioner, the petition is not intended to establish the fact of
insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank had already been previously
determined by the Central Bank in accordance with Section 9 of the CB Act before
the petition was filed. All that needs to be done is to liquidate the assets of the bank
and thus the assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.

It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the cases categorized as
a special proceeding under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor among the
special proceedings that may be appealed under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.
We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:
1. Action defined. Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the
party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. Every other remedy, including one to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special
proceeding.
Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice
Moran states:" 11
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special
proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or
a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special proceeding in that the
former is a formal demand of a right by one against another, while the latter is but a
petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to
recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his purpose is to
seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding
to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified
a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or
protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for
affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action
that can be enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its
creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations.
Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations.
Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and
the concomitant right of creditors and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the
corporation's assets.
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions
for interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a
person who has no interest therein. 12 This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the
Liquidator, as representative of the corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of
the creditors. 13 He is thus charged with insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful
claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.

Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased
persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the
determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent
corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged with the
assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the liability of the corporation and the
estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and the
determination of their order of payment.
Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for
liquidation of an insolvent corporation. As the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, quoting the
Liquidator, correctly noted:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases
properly classified as "claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first
phase is concerned with the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval
of the petition seeking the assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a close
entity, all money claims against the bank are required to be filed with the liquidation
court. This phase may end with the declaration by the liquidation court that the claim
is not proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also end with the liquidation
court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified whether it is
ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the
party aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan
prepared by the duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the
total amount available for distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier allowed.
The Order finally disposes of the issue of how much property is available for
disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the liquidation proceeding
payment of all allowed claims in accordance with the order of legal priority and the
approved distribution plan.
Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or disallowance of a
particular claim cannot be overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes a
liquidation proceeding a "case where multiple appeals are allowed by law." The
issuance of an Order which, by its nature, affects only the particular claims involved,
and which may assume finality if no appeal is made therefrom,ipso facto creates a
situation where multiple appeals are allowed.
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the
Solicitor General with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g., Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against
the insolvent are required to be filed with the liquidation court. Although the claims
are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is individual. Each claim is heard
separately. And the Order issued relative to a particular claim applies only to said
claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered separate and

distinct from the others. Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving
the others to proceed with their ordinary course. In such case, the original records of
the proceeding are not elevated to the appellate court. They remain with the
liquidation court. In lieu of the original record, a record of appeal is instead required
to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court.
Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings. Consequently, a
record on appeal is necessary in each and every appeal made. Hence, the period to
appeal therefrom should be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.
(Record pp. 162-164).
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was
filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the result that he
failed to perfect his appeal. As already stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules
and Guidelines in special proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The
reason for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order with
respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the
trial court where other claims may still be pending.
Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing
the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a
different reason.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the Fifth Division
correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already
noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to file a record on appeal on
December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his receipt of the order granting the Union's claim.
Without waiting for the resolution of his motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within
the extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on
appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on appeal.
The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition andMandamus and its decision should, therefore, be affirmed.
Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under 29 of Rep. Act No. 265, the court
merely assists in adjudicating the claims of creditors, preserves the assets of the institution,
and implements the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board and that, therefore, as
representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator cannot question the order of the court or appeal
from it. It contends that since the Monetary Board had previously admitted PaBC's liability to the
laborers by in fact setting aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of their claims, there
was nothing else for the Liquidator to do except to comply with the order of the court.

The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court is not
limited to assisting in the implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same
section (29) of the law invoked by the Union, the court has authority to set aside the decision of the
Monetary Board "if there is a convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad
faith." 14 As this Court held in Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15
There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this regard may be
subject to judicial review. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere with
the Central Bank's exercise of discretion in determining whether or not a distressed
bank shall be supported or liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been
held to include arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith (Ramos v. Central Bank of
the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).
In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of the insolvent
bank. Under 28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank "personally or through
counsel as he may retain, in all actions or proceedings or against the corporation" and he has
authority "to do whatever may be necessary for these purposes." This authority includes the power
to appeal from the decisions or final orders of the court which he believes to be contrary to the
interest of the bank.
Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the
record on appeal filed in behalf of the Central Bank was not filed by the office of the Solicitor General
as counsel for the Central Bank. This contention has no merit. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant
Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta informed the trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had
previously authorized lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and sign pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably
thereto the Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to submit Record on Appeal filed were
jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by lawyers of the PDIC. 17
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed from are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192828

November 28, 2011

RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA
SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
December 14, 2009 Decision2 and July 8, 2010 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 99856. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by
us DENYING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed Orders dated March 15,
2007 and May 16, 2007 issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
6, in Manila in Civil Case No. 02-105251.4
The assailed Resolution denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
Sometime between November 25, 2002 and December 3, 2002,5 the respondents filed a
Complaint6 against the petitioners and Stronghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc.
(formerly PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc., Registers of Deeds
of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon) and his
successors-in-interest.
The Complaint, captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and
Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title
with Prayer for [the] Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary
Injunction," was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-105251 and raffled to Branch 8 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (RTC).
In the Complaint, the respondents alleged the following as causes of action:

First Cause of Action. They are the heirs of Lim San, also known as Antonio Ching / Tiong
Cheng / Ching Cheng Suy (Antonio). Respondents Joseph Cheng (Joseph) and Jaime
Cheng (Jaime) are allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law wife, respondent
Mercedes Igne (Mercedes). Respondent Lucina Santos (Lucina) claimed that she was also a
common-law wife of Antonio. The respondents averred that Ramon misrepresented himself
as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth
certificate was merely simulated. On July 18, 1996, Antonio died of a stab wound. Police
investigators identified Ramon as the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused
in a criminal case for murder filed against him. Warrants of arrest issued against him have
remained unserved as he is at large. From the foregoing circumstances and upon the
authority of Article 9197 of the New Civil Code (NCC), the respondents concluded that
Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence, prohibited from receiving any share from the
estate of Antonio.
Second Cause of Action. On August 26, 1996, prior to the conclusion of the police
investigations tagging Ramon as the prime suspect in the murder of Antonio, the former
made an inventory of the latter's estate. Ramon misrepresented that there were only six real
estate properties left by Antonio. The respondents alleged that Ramon had illegally
transferred to his name the titles to the said properties. Further, there are two other parcels
of land, cash and jewelries, plus properties in Hongkong, which were in Ramon's
possession.
Third Cause of Action. Mercedes, being of low educational attainment, was sweet-talked by
Ramon into surrendering to him a Global Business Bank, Inc. (Global Bank) Certificate of
Time Deposit ofP4,000,000.00 in the name of Antonio, and the certificates of title covering
two condominium units in Binondo which were purchased by Antonio using his own money
but which were registered in Ramon's name. Ramon also fraudulently misrepresented to
Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes that they will promptly receive their complete shares, exclusive
of the stocks in Po Wing Properties, Inc. (Po Wing), from the estate of Antonio. Exerting
undue influence, Ramon had convinced them to execute an Agreement8 and a Waiver9 on
August 20, 1996. The terms and conditions stipulated in the Agreement and Waiver,
specifically, on the payment by Ramon to Joseph, Jaime and Mercedes of the amount
of P22,000,000.00, were not complied with. Further, Lucina was not informed of the
execution of the said instruments and had not received any amount from Ramon. Hence, the
instruments are null and void.
Fourth Cause of Action. Antonio's 40,000 shares in Po Wing, which constitute 60% of the
latter's total capital stock, were illegally transferred by Ramon to his own name through a
forged document of sale executed after Antonio died. Po Wing owns a ten-storey building in
Binondo. Ramon's claim that he bought the stocks from Antonio before the latter died is
baseless. Further, Lucina's shares in Po Wing had also banished into thin air through
Ramon's machinations.
Fifth Cause of Action. On October 29, 1996, Ramon executed an Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate10 adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's entire estate to the prejudice of
the respondents. By virtue of the said instrument, new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs)

covering eight real properties owned by Antonio were issued in Ramon's name. Relative to
the Po Wing shares, the Register of Deeds of Manila had required Ramon to post a Surety
Bond conditioned to answer for whatever claims which may eventually surface in connection
with the said stocks. Co-defendant Stronghold Insurance Company issued the bond in
Ramon's behalf.
Sixth Cause of Action. Ramon sold Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to codefendant Asia Atlantic Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of
Antonio's estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an unreasonably
low price. By reason of Ramon's lack of authority to dispose of any part of Antonio's estate,
the conveyances are null and void ab initio.
Since Ramon is at large, his wife, Belen Dy Tan Ching, now manages Antonio's estate. She has no
intent to convey to the respondents their shares in the estate of Antonio.
The respondents thus prayed for the following in their Complaint:
1. x x x a temporary restraining order be issued restraining the defendant RAMON CHING and/or his
attorney-in-fact Belen Dy Tan Ching from disposing, selling or alienating any property that belongs to
the estate of the deceased ANTONIO CHING;
xxx
4. x x x
a.) Declaring that the defendant RAMON CHING who murdered his father ANTONIO CHING
disqualified as heir and from inheriting to (sic) the estate of his father;
b.) Declaring the nullity of the defendant RAMON CHING transfer (sic) of the six [6] parcels
of land from the name of his father ANTONIO CHING to his name covered by TCT No. x x x;
c.) Declaring the nullity of the AGREEMENT and WAIVER executed by plaintiffs x x x in favor
of x x x RAMON CHING for being patently immoral, invalid, illegal, simulated and (sic) sham;
d.) Declaring the nullity of the transfer of the shares of stocks at (sic) PO WING from the
names of ANTONIO CHING and LUCINA SANTOS to the defendant ANTONIO CHING's
name for having been illegally procured through the falsification of their signatures in the
document purporting the transfer thereof;
e.) Declaring the nullity and to have no force and effect the AFFIDAVIT OF SETTLEMENT
OF ESTATE executed by x x x RAMON CHING for being contrary to law and existing
jurisprudence;
f.) Declaring the nullity of the DEED OF SALES (sic) executed by x x x RAMON CHING (i)
over two (2) parcels of land x x x to defendant ASIA ATLANTIC BUSINESS VENTURES,

Inc.; and (ii) one (1) parcel of land x x x sold to x x x ELENA TIU DEL PILAR for having
illegally procured the ownership and titles of the above properties;
x x x.11
The petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Dismiss12 alleging forum shopping, litis pendentia, res
judicata and the respondents as not being the real parties in interest.
On July 30, 2004, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order 13 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
The respondents filed an Amended Complaint14 dated April 7, 2005 impleading Metrobank as the
successor-in-interest of co-defendant Global Bank. The Amended Complaint also added a seventh
cause of action relative to the existence of a Certificate of Premium Plus Acquisition (CPPA) in the
amount of P4,000,000.00 originally issued by PhilBank to Antonio. The respondents prayed that they
be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA and that it be immediately released to them.
Alternatively, the respondents prayed for the issuance of a hold order relative to the CPPA to
preserve it during the pendency of the case.
On April 22, 2005, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim. 15
On October 28, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 16 admitting the respondents' Amended Complaint.
The RTC stressed that Metrobank had already filed Manifestations admitting that as successor-ininterest of Global Bank, it now possesses custody of Antonio's deposits. Metrobank expressed
willingness to abide by any court order as regards the disposition of Antonio's deposits. The
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed to assail the aforecited Order was denied by the RTC on
May 3, 2006.
On May 29, 2006, the petitioners filed their Consolidated Answer with Counterclaim to the
respondents' Amended Complaint.
On August 11, 2006, the RTC issued a pre-trial order.17
On January 18, 2007, the petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss 18 the respondents' Amended
Complaint on the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
Complaint. The petitioners argued that since the Amended Complaint sought the release of the
CPPA to the respondents, the latter's declaration as heirs of Antonio, and the propriety of Ramon's
disinheritance, the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for
declaration of nullity. Hence, jurisdiction pertains to a probate or intestate court and not to the RTC
acting as an ordinary court.
On March 15, 2007, the RTC issued an Order19 denying the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss on
grounds:
In the case at bar, an examination of the Complaint would disclose that the action delves mainly on
the question of ownership of the properties described in the Complaint which can be properly settled
in an ordinary civil action. And as pointed out by the defendants, the action seeks to declare the

nullity of the Agreement, Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale,
Transfer Certificates of Title, which were all allegedly executed by defendant Ramon Ching to
defraud the plaintiffs. The relief of establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have
translated this action into a special proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended
Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of the
CPPA and that the same be immediately released to them, in itself poses an issue of
ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial evidence. And as emphasized by
the plaintiffs, the Amended Complaint was intended to implead Metrobank as a co-defendant.
As regards the issue of disinheritance, the court notes that during the Pre-trial of this case, one of
the issues raised by the defendants Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties is: Whether or not there
can be disinheritance in intestate succession? Whether or not defendant Ramon Ching can be
legally disinherited from the estate of his father? To the mind of the Court, the issue of
disinheritance, which is one of the causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial
on the merits. And at this stage, it has not been sufficiently established whether or not there is a
will.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above Order, and a subsequent Order dated May 16, 2007 denying the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration, became the subjects of a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. The petition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99856, raised the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss despite the fact that the Amended
Complaint sought to establish the status or rights of the respondents which subjects are within the
ambit of a special proceeding.
On December 14, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed Decision 21 denying the petition
for certiorari on grounds:
Our in-depth assessment of the condensed allegations supporting the causes of action of the
amended complaint induced us to infer that nothing in the said complaint shows that the action
of the private respondents should be threshed out in a special proceeding, it appearing that
their allegations were substantially for the enforcement of their rights against the alleged
fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching. The private respondents also
instituted the said amended complaint in order to protect them from the consequence of the
fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching by seeking to disqualify Ramon Ching from inheriting from
Antonio Ching as well as to enjoin him from disposing or alienating the subject properties,
including the P4 Million deposit with Metrobank. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction
to adjudicate such issues, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a regional trial court. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court that the probate court
could not take cognizance of the prayer to disinherit Ramon Ching, given the undisputed fact that
there was no will to be contested in a probate court.
The petition at bench apparently cavils the subject amended complaint and complicates the issue of
jurisdiction by reiterating the grounds or defenses set up in the petitioners' earlier pleadings.
Notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations
of the complaint without regard to whether or not the private respondents (plaintiffs) are entitled to
recover upon all or some of the causes of action asserted therein. In this regard, the jurisdiction of

the court does not depend upon the defenses pleaded in the answer or in the motion to dismiss, lest
the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the petitioners (defendants). 22 Hence,
we focus our resolution on the issue of jurisdiction on the allegations in the amended complaint and
not on the defenses pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in the subsequent pleadings of the
petitioners.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject the action of the petitioners in a special proceeding since the nullification of the
subject documents could be achieved in the civil case, the lower court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon upon the issues that it defined
during the pre-trial in Civil Case No. 02-105251. 23 (emphasis supplied)
The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA through a Resolution 24 issued on
July 8, 2010.
The Issue
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari25 is anchored on the issue of:
Whether or not the RTC should have granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by the PETITIONERS on
the alleged ground of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the Amended
Complaint, to wit, (a) filiations with Antonio of Ramon, Jaime and Joseph; (b) rights of common-law
wives, Lucina and Mercedes, to be considered as heirs of Antonio; (c) determination of the extent of
Antonio's estate; and (d) other matters which can only be resolved in a special proceeding and not in
an ordinary civil action.
The petitioners argue that only a probate court has the authority to determine (a) who are the heirs
of a decedent; (b) the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights; (c) the status of each heir; and (d)
whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or the exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.26 Further, the extent of Antonio's estate, the status of the contending parties and the
respondents' alleged entitlement as heirs to receive the proceeds of Antonio's CPPA now in
Metrobank's custody are matters which are more appropriately the subjects of a special proceeding
and not of an ordinary civil action.
The respondents opposed27 the instant petition claiming that the petitioners are engaged in forum
shopping. Specifically, G.R. Nos. 17550728 and 183840,29 both involving the contending parties in the
instant petition were filed by the petitioners and are currently pending before this Court. Further,
in Mendoza v. Hon. Teh,30 the SC declared that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction, is not a jurisdictional
issue but a mere question of procedure. Besides, the petitioners, having validly submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC and having actively participated in the trial of the case, are
already estopped from challenging the RTC's jurisdiction over the respondents' Complaint and
Amended Complaint.31
The Court's Ruling

We resolve to deny the instant petition.

The petitioners failed to comply with a lawful order of this Court directing them to file their reply to the
respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant Petition. While the prescribed period to comply
expired on March 15, 2011, the petitioners filed their Manifestation that they will no longer file a reply
only on October 10, 2011 or after the lapse of almost seven months.
Further, no reversible errors were committed by the RTC and the CA when they both ruled that the
denial of the petitioners' second motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-105251 was proper.
Even without delving into the procedural allegations of the respondents that the petitioners engaged
in forum shopping and are already estopped from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction after having
validly submitted to it when the latter participated in the proceedings, the denial of the instant Petition
is still in order. Although the respondents' Complaint and Amended Complaint sought, among others,
the disinheritance of Ramon and the release in favor of the respondents of the CPPA now under
Metrobank's custody, Civil Case No. 02-105251 remains to be an ordinary civil action, and not a
special proceeding pertaining to a settlement court.
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by
the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.32 A special proceeding is a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 33 It is distinguished from an
ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.34 To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint
should be filed.
Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal
cause therefor shall be specified. This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the
respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon, no will
or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever
mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, Civil Case No. 02-105251 does
not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of
its limited jurisdiction.
The petitioners also argue that the prayers in the Amended Complaint, seeking the release in favor
of the respondents of the CPPA under Metrobank's custody and the nullification of the instruments
subject of the complaint, necessarily require the determination of the respondents' status as
Antonio's heirs.
It bears stressing that what the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as the rightful
owners of the CPPA which was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and
Waiver. The respondents also prayed for the alternative relief of securing the issuance by the RTC of
a hold order relative to the CPPA to preserve Antonio's deposits with Metrobank during the pendency
of the case. It can thus be said that the respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on
Mercedes' prior possession of and their alleged collective ownership of the same, and not on the

declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs. Further, it also has to be emphasized that the
respondents were parties to the execution of the Agreement35 and Waiver36 prayed to be nullified.
Hence, even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the
standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments in the light of their claims that there was no
consideration for their execution, and that Ramon exercised undue influence and committed fraud
against them. Consequently, the respondents then claimed that the Affidavit of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Antonios estate executed by Ramon, and the TCTs issued upon the authority of the
said affidavit, are null and void as well. Ramon's averment that a resolution of the issues raised shall
first require a declaration of the respondents' status as heirs is a mere defense which is not
determinative of which court shall properly exercise jurisdiction.
In Marjorie Cadimas v. Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo,37 the Court declared:
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon
the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.
1wphi1

In sum, this Court agrees with the CA that the nullification of the documents subject of Civil Case No.
02-105251 could be achieved in an ordinary civil action, which in this specific case was instituted to
protect the respondents from the supposedly fraudulent acts of Ramon. In the event that the RTC
will find grounds to grant the reliefs prayed for by the respondents, the only consequence will be the
reversion of the properties subject of the dispute to the estate of Antonio. Civil Case No. 02-105251
was not instituted to conclusively resolve the issues relating to the administration, liquidation and
distribution of Antonio's estate, hence, not the proper subject of a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person under Rules 73-91 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents' resort to an ordinary civil action before the RTC may not be strategically sound,
because a settlement proceeding should thereafter still follow, if their intent is to recover from Ramon
the properties alleged to have been illegally transferred in his name. Be that as it may, the RTC, in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot be restrained from taking cognizance of respondents'
Complaint and Amended Complaint as the issues raised and the prayers indicated therein are
matters which need not be threshed out in a special proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The petitioners' (a) Opposition to the respondents'
Motion to Admit Substitution of Party;38 and (b) Manifestation39 through counsel that they will no
longer file a reply to the respondents' Comment/Opposition to the instant petition are NOTED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168913

March 14, 2007

ROLANDO TING, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO,
ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L.
ALCOVER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983, then Judge Alfredo
Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted the application filed by the
Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu
Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787.
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge Marigomen
thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982 directing the Land Registration Commission to
issue the corresponding decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu an
application for registration of title to the same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N. 1
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, Aurora L.
Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle L. Alcover, who were
afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioners application by Branch 21 of the Cebu
RTC, filed their Answer2 calling attention to the December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which
had become final and executory on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of
petitioners application on the ground of res judicata.
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of
respondents, dismissed petitioners application on the ground of res judicata. 3
1vvphi1.nt

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of whether the
decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N.
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and executory on
January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA);4 it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as basis of
respondents motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N;5and as no action for revival of the said decision
was filed by respondents after the lapse of the ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in
the dormant judgment pass[d] into extinction."6
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res judicata.7

The petition fails.

Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. The judgment
rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days8 to be
counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the
judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an
order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the
decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged
entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition,
the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and
ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world.9 It
becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of
confirmation and registration.10
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration courts approval in LRC No. N983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienzas application for registration of the lot settled its
ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had become
"extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not issued the decree of registration, a certain Engr.
Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section, Land Management Services, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey
of the Cebu Cadastral Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension
must first be approved by the Land Management Services of
the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court; and that the spouses
Lirio did not comply with the said requirement for they instead submitted to the court a mere special
work order.11
There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer Belleza and that it
reported such claim to the land registration court for appropriate action or reconsideration of the
decision which was its duty.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is
purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the
decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and
they have no discretion in the matter.However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to
the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court.
They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their

act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in
ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."12 (Emphasis supplied)
As for petitioners claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order
may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such
time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The
revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their
predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison detre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land
registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS
LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT
YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in
so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it
may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce
the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect
that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by
an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a
party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided
in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special
proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed
by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except
when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party
desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding
the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in
possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the
expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-18799

March 31, 1964

HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental,
ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent.
Jose Gutierrez David, A. Aveto, A. Mirasol and P. C. Ramos for petitioners.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No.
27200-R) wherein, over their objection, raising the question of jurisdiction petition, the appellate
court took cognizance of the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio Maravilla and, in
consequence thereof, set aside the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as a special coadministrator of the estate of the deceased Digna Maravilla. The pertinent antecedent facts are as
follows:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with he Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased wife Digna
Maravilla who died on August 12 of that same year. In the will the surviving spouse was named as
the universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the
deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter alia, that
the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and
of one another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro, Asuncion,
and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him special administrator of the estate of
the deceased, for the reason that:
... all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner and his late
wife, Digna Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal property is done, the Court
cannot pinpoint which of the property subject of the Will belongs to Digna Maravilla,
exclusively, that shall be administered by the special administrator. Hence, although it is true
that the petitioner Herminio Maravilla has an adverse interest in the property subject of the
Will, the Court finds it impossible for the present time to appoint any person other than the
petitioner as special administrator of the property until after the partition is ordered, for the
reason that the properties mentioned in the Will are in the name of the petitioner who is the
surviving spouse of the deceased.
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was not duly
signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses and of one another.

On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for
appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-administrator to protect their
interests, on the ground that the will, having been denied probate, they are the legal heirs of the
decedent. Said petition was heard on February 20, at which hearing, respondent's counsel orally
moved for postponement, because respondent's principal counsel (Salonga) had not been notified
and was not present. The court ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the testimonies
of Eliezar Lopez, and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record
on appeal, from the decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees under the will, likewise,
appealed from said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition for the
removal of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an inventory within 3 months from
his appointment and qualification as special administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of
the Rules of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision
of the Rules of Court does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already been
submitted by him, before said petition for his removal was filed.
1wph1.t

On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the court a
petition for appointment of Conchita as special co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo, likewise,
filed a similar petition February 29.
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing the (1) petition to appoint Eliezar Lopez as special
administrator, (2) approval of respondent's record appeal and appeal bond, (3) petition to remove
respondent as special administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita Kohlhaas as special coadministratrix, and (5) petition to appoint Adelina Sajo as special co-administrator. At said hearing,
respondent objected to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on grounds
that (a) the law allows only one special co-administrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959 estops the
court from appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator (c) such appointment is unfair to
respondent, because owns at least 3/4 of the whole property, conjugal nature, which would be
subjected to the administrate of a stranger, and (d) a deadlock between two special administrators
would ruin the management of the property, including those of respondent. On cross-examination of
Eliezar Lopez, respondent's counsel elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was employed full time in the
PCAPE, with office in Manila. and could not discharge the functions of a co-administrator, and (2)
there was merely intention on Lopez part to resign from office.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator in an order
dictated open court, to protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion and Regina Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul the order appointing
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, and to prohibit the probate court from further proceeding
with the petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator. The Court of Appeals issued
a writ of preliminary injunction on March 9, 1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it
more specific.

On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to
certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this
case exceeds P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To
this petition, respondent filed an opposition. on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less
than P200,000.00 and the decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal
before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to or possession of real estate
exceeding in value P200,000.00.1
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and
prohibition) prayed for by respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez
as special co-administrator.
Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioners. The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, assumed jurisdiction
over the present case on the theory that "the amount in controversy relative to the appointment of
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator to protect the interests of respondents (herein petitioners)
is only P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the conjugal property" (of respondent and the
deceased Digna Maravilla) which, is per inventory submitted by respondent as special administrator
is valued at P362,424.90. This theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings had on the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator are merely incidental to the probate or
testate proceedings of the deceased Digna Maravilla presently on appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) where petitioners' motion to elevate the same to the Supreme
Court, on the ground that the amount herein involved is within the latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still
pending, resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over said testate
proceedings cannot be doubted, considering that the properties therein involved are valued at
P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be administered and liquidated in
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is, not only that part of the conjugal estate
pertaining to the deceased spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This Court has already held that
even if the deceased had left no debts, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211,
December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al., L-10663,
October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an order of a probate court
disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved or in controversy
therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v.
Vda. de Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over
the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R), considering that the amount involved therein is

more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the writs
of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which are merely incidental
thereto.
In the United States, the rule is that "proceedings in probate are appealable where the amount or
value involved is reducible to a pecuniary standard, the amount involved being either the appellant's
interest or the value of the entire estate according as the issues on appeal involve only the
appellant's rights or the entire administration of the estate. ... In a contest for administration of an
estate the amount or value of the assets of the estate is the amount in controversy for purposes of
appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it is to be observed that respondent's interest as
appellant in the probate proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) is, according to his theory, the whole
estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at least more than 3/4 thereof, or approximately P270,000.00.
Such interest, reduced to a pecuniary standard on the basis of the inventory, is the amount or value
of the matter in controversy, and such amount being more than P200,000.00, it follows that the
appeal taken in said proceedings falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the appointment of
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to restrain the probate court from removing
respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the administration of the estate and,
consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the whole estate is the value in controversy (4
C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the
Court of Appeals clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed from, arrived at the amount of "P90,000.00 more or
less", as the amount involved in the case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v. Archbishop (73 Phil.
20). But this case is inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question of administration of the estate,
nor to an order denying probate of a will, but only to the recovery of a particular legacy consisting of
the rentals of a fishpond belonging to the estate. In an analogous case involving the administration
of a trust fund, the United States Supreme Court held:
Where the trust fund administered and ordered to be distributed by the circuit court, in a suit
to compel the stockholders of a corporation to pay their subscriptions to stock to realize the
fund, amounts to more than $5,000.00, this court has jurisdiction of the appeal, which is not
affected by the fact that the amounts decreed to some of the creditors are less than that sum
(Handly et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
Respondent also contends that appeals in special proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil
cases, are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, since they are not
enumerated in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special
proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that a special proceeding is not a "civil
case" (Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842). On the other hand, it has been held that the
term "civil case" includes special proceedings (Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178).
Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions
are applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with, or when they may serve
to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings. Consequently, the procedure of appeal

is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings. (See Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, Vol. II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)
The cases cited by respondent where this Court ruled that the separate total claim of the parties and
not the combined claims against each other determine the appellate jurisdictional amount, are not
applicable to, the instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the Rules of Court is explicit that the
amount or value involved or in controversy in probate proceedings is that of the entire estate.
Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the cases cited by respondent is here applicable, it should be
noted that respondent claims the whole estate of at least more than 3/4 thereof. Said claim, reduced
to a pecuniary standard, on the basis of the inventory, would amount to more than P200,000.00 and,
consequently, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115, May 10, 1954) cited by respondent in his brief, is also
inapplicable, because unlike the instant case, it did not involve a contest in the administration of the
estate.
While it is true that questions of fact have been raised in the probate proceedings (Spec. Proc. No.
4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which was appealed by respondent to the Court of Appeals, it
becomes immaterial, in view of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which
the value in controversy exceeds two hundred thousand pesos, exclusive of interests and costs",
and that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court, or to the Court of
Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same as if it had originally been
brought before it".
On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, we agree
with respondent that there was no need for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on
special co-administrator, the reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is
merely temporary and subsists only until a regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus,
it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical, if for the temporary duration of the need for a
special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the husband, in this case, upon whom the
duty to liquidate the community property devolves merely to protect the interests of petitioners who,
in the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate, would even have no right to participate in the
proceedings at all. (Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)
In view of the conclusion herein reached, in connection with the amount involved in the controversy,
it is suggested that appropriate steps be taken on the appeal pending in the Court of Appeals
involving the probate of the will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the provisions of the Judiciary
Act on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set aside and another one
entered also setting aside the order of the trial court of March 5, 1960, appointing Eliezar Lopez as
special co-administrator. Without costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and
Regala, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES
CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO
REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R,
promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila.
He was survived by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr.
and Jesus Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco,
Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and
Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator) 1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed
a Petition for Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R),
alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he
was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and
Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April
1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and interested persons, and ordering the requisite
publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of Cebu.
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one
released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead
of Branch I of the said Cebu court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March
1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court, giving as reasons the following:
It will be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired
jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not
yet having been complied with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been

served on all of the heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of
administration. 2
In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition)
herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal
(Quezon City) for the probate of the deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance
of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said last will and
testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed
in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an
Opposition to Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964,
the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss
"until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall have acted on the petition for probate of
that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco." 3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the probateproceedings in the Quezon City court
was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor
did they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10
April 1964,opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to
entertain petitioner's petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in
view of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No.
2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal
reason the "precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further
found in said order that theresidence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y
Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order follows:
On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and
motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco was a resident of the City of Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid
petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the
proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73 of the
New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to
understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident
of Cebu City when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail
over the probate proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate
of the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings should be filed
in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last proposition is the desire of the
oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be entertained as proper
because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don
Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at 69
Pi y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the

petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed
his Last Will clearly stated that he is a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and
the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two residences, the one
will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or considers to
be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus
filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the
decedent and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to
the exclusion of all others. 5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11
April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu
court was denied on 27 April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was
likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will
of the decedent was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification
none of the oppositors appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing
in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that
respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the
following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted
by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the
time he affixed his signature thereto. 6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had
been duly complied with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after
receiving the testimony of the three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty.
Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty.
Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the documentary evidence (such as the
decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all
indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by
him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the
late senator's last will and testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator"
and "with all formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without
bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as probated.

Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and
naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R.
No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No. Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners
therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp.
Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been filed ahead, it is that court whose
jurisdiction was first invoked and which first attached. It is that court which can
properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left
or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident of
Cebu at the time of his death.
Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI
(Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the petition for probate was filed by the
respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said
respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the
Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge
Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition
for appointment of special administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of
the Court today. It would be premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet
regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in this
connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's jurisdiction
over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is
filed, but only to theexercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings.
At all events, jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on
the pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the
respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the
respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain perpetually from proceeding and
taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent
court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said respondent
court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled.
The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals,
dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in
issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from
proceeding with the testateproceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in compliance with the testator's express wish in
his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the
Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance
and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the
Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate
over intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate
of the document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by
prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed without any
impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to dismiss the
probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, toproceed with the hearing of
the petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution and
authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling
and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's
last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to
the deceased testator's express wish, for the following considerations:
1. The Judiciary Act 7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all
matter of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules
of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent
conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the
Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence,
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73) 8

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the
late Chief Justice Moran inSy Oa vs. Co Ho 9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place
of residence of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter. But we decline to follow this view because of its mischievous
consequences. For instance, a probate case has been submitted in good faith to the
Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the
parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a claim
of a creditor who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse
decision raises for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial
court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we consider such
question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole proceedings including all
decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to
be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced
anew before another court of the same rank in another province. That this is
ofmischievous effect in the prompt administration of justice is too obvious to require
comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31,
1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided,
could not have been intended as defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the
subject-matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing
merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one
thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-General vs. Manila
Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No.
5 confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many
courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section
600, fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place
of residence of the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter
but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of Court the
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is properly called
"venue".
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estateof a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of
all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has
been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and
resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of
the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false,
may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and
instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's
alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss
Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion
and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that
court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the
Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition
which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to
the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu
court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the
decedent's residence at the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal
domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it
would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon
City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the
residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to
the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu
court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to
exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said
rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal and
coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court
should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court
their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due
notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without
jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts
analogous to the present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate
proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the
estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate
succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for
the settlement of his estate. It is equally true, however, that in accordance with
settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had
left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that state an administrator had already been appointed, the
latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is understood to
be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved,
the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City
court) although opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that
[therein respondent] should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case,
the Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose
filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition,
albeit we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural
defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of
the opinion, and so hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection
or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection
that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since
December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed
in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the
existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the
petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan
Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All
these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila
Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to
intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up
to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with
the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier,

or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his
negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in
some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the
objection against said proceedings is raised too late. 16
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding
that Quezon City was the firstchoice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and
domicile therein with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court could not be
contested except by appeal from said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule
expressly provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could
probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City
court not appeared in the record, or had the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken
cognizance of the petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate
court while recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan 17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is
considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First
Instance of Cebu as held by this Court. Parenthetically, we note that the question of
the residence of the deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal
resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course of
procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased was
better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives
Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires
airing in the proper court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja
vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first
filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect
asked the Quezon City court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a
last will and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu
or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus determined in effect for both courts at the
behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court thatQuezon City was the actual

residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue, the Borja ruling would
seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu
court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to
determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so
determined Quezon City as the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have
not seriously questioned this factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court
should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary finding reversed on
appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and inaction to institute the
corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into
consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a)
the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court
in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in
the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left
his estate in such province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a
proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a
constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State.The probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction
thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted
regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue
notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to
probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action
should not be set aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's
appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in
dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to
probate and distributing the estate in accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be
remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings
repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa, supra,
"the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as
affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again
the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to
require comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives
gets first to file a petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence
of the Court that Rule 73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts
which may properly assumejurisdiction from doing so and creating conflicts between them to the
detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As
between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to
who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is
still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a
last will and testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire

consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public
policy and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules
of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed
an intestate petition in the Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the
Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's
death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and petitioned for letters
testamentary and is admittedly entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's
estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit
anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate
proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding when under the Rules, the proper venue for
the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is
Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the
decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under
the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and
effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of the
estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since
petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and
conjugal estate have to beadministered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper
venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance
and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of the Cebu court, such
proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would have to continually leave her
residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and
conjugal estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without
jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition
and instead deferring to thetestate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving
widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's
opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsityof the allegation in the intestate petition that the
decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never challenged by certiorari or
prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings
before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of
deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction
nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing
petitioner as executrix in accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled
doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964
admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court
concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since become final
and can not be overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over
all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly
assumed by and transferredto the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance
of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the
decedent (with the due deference and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last
will and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the
decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be
approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and
duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon City court
should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the
strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of
the decedent.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally
filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No
costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.

G.R. No. 124715

January 24, 2000

RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC.,
ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY,
INC. respondents.
BUENA, J.:
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the
estate of a deceased person?
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, the decision1 of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set
aside the orders dated 04 July 19952, 12 September 19953 and 15 September 19954 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court.

Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of
probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor
Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner".
1wphi1.nt

Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing,
Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and existing
under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system.
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly
represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a joint petition 5 for the
administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of
Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion6 for the lifting of lis pendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain
properties from the estate of the decedent.
In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a
probate court, granted the private respondents' twin motions, in this wise:
Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift, expunge or delete
the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718,
116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further ordered that the properties covered by the same
titles as well as those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123,
236236 and 263236 are excluded from these proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition9 which contained the following
averments:
3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following business entities,
to wit:
Business
Entity
xxx
Alliance
Marketing, Inc.
xxx
Speed
Distributing
Inc.
xxx
Auto Truck
TBA Corp.
xxx

Address:
xxx

xxx

Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF

Homes, Paraaque, Metro
Manila.
xxx

xxx

910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo

Highway, Bacoor, Cavite.
xxx

xxx

2251 Roosevelt Avenue,

Quezon City.
xxx

xxx

Active
Distributors,
Inc.

Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF

Homes, Paraaque, Metro
Manila.

xxx
Action
Company

xxx

xxx

100 20th Avenue Murphy,

Quezon City or 92-D McArthur Highway Valenzuela
Bulacan.

3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business with the
public as corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however, personally
owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and officers
appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the above business entities
were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes
of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the following banks: (a)
Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b)
First Intestate Bank (formerly Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and
in other banks whose identities are yet to be determined.
5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of the above entities,
were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with petitioner, to wit:
Corporation

Title
xxx

xxx

Location
xxx

k. Auto Truck

TCT No. 617726

Sto. Domingo TBA

Corporation Cainta, Rizal

q. Alliance Marketing

TCT No. 27896

Prance, Metro Manila

Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax Declarations are
hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".
xxx

xxx

xxx

7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor Y. Lim, are all
conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him during the existence of his marriage with
petitioner.
8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim which petitioner
could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit to this Honorable Court the identities
thereof and the necessary documents covering the same as soon as possible.
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion issued an order 10, thus:
Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens in case said

annotation had already been deleted and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717,
116718, 116719 and 51282.
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123, 236256 and
236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant petition.
SO ORDERED.
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator 11 and
Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after
which letters of administration were accordingly issued.
In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private respondents' motion
for exclusion, in this wise:
The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the corporations are the
mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves
the piercing of the corporate veil, a matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court and not the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case
of Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the regular court
was whether the corporation involved therein was the mere extension of the decedent. After
finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the assets of the corporation are also assets of
the estate.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the SEC's exclusive
(sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is simply a suit to settle the intestate estate
of a deceased person who, during his lifetime, acquired several properties and put up
corporations as his instrumentalities.
SO ORDERED.
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by petitioner, issued an
order13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under enumerated are
hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to produce and submit to the special
administrators, through this Honorable Court within (5) five days from receipt of this order
their respective records of the savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits in
the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-mentioned, showing all the transactions
made or done concerning savings/current accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of
this court order.
xxx

xxx

xxx

SO ORDERED.
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14, with an urgent prayer for a restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the
Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court.

On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents, rendered the
assailed decision15, the decretal portion of which declares:
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is hereby
granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent court on July 4, 1995 and September
12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The impugned order issued by respondent on
September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as petitioner corporations" bank accounts and
records are concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina Luy Lim now
comes before us with a lone assignment of
error16:
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower court which
merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private respondents as part of
the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals
arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit
provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the
petitioner, from performing her duty as special administrator of the estate as expressly
provided in the said Rules.
Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued by the probate
court which were subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction over probate
proceedings is indeed in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 769117, which introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
are pertinent:
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate
and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which must be specifically
alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's, litigation
expenses and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees, Provided
further, that where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same
or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends
upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a
probate court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory.
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its probing arms in
the determination of the question of title in probate proceedings.
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held:
. . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS19:
. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the
competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may
be instituted by the parties.
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE21, We made an
exposition on the probate court's limited jurisdiction:
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate
or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the

estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there
is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22, We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr. Justice Andres
Narvasa23:
Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a
probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of
and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the
decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property
consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the
exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by
the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special
court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of
procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived. . . .
. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title is not in
the decedent's name but in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion
to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours)
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens system and
registered in the name of private respondent corporations should be included in the inventory of the
estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of
whether these properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not
conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of
adjudging once and for all the issue of title.
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in the name of
private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID 24 is of great
essence and finds applicability, thus:
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her
claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which
under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner
indicated in the law itself, which of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a
mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. . .
.
. . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered
by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar,
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. . . .
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by
petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the

properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree", proscribes
collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law.
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property subject of the
controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system, We categorically stated:
. . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of
third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name
of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of
the property. . . .
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are
in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under
the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of
any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in
favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' motion for exclusion.
While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and exercising
limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of
certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally
the question of title over properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and
reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the
peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name
of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the
probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the
impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the
presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents. Certainly, the probate court
through such brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence
on this matter.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent corporations are
properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private respondent corporations themselves. To
rivet such flimsy contention, petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized
and wholly-owned the five corporations, which are the private respondents in the instant
case.25 Petitioner thus attached as Annexes "F"26 and "G"27 of the petition for review affidavits
executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained averments that the
incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual and participation in the
organization and incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added that the persons whose
names appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as incorporators

thereof, are mere dummies since they have not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock
of the corporation and have been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective
signatures thereon.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the
persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may
not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected
with it.28
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate
from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is
an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons
comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL
BANK vs.COURT OF APPEALS29, We enunciated:
. . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a
vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the
achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime,
the veil with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the members or
stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an
aggregation of individuals. . . .
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which
exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one
corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction. 30
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just
but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public
convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the
notion of legal entity should come to naught.31
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction
is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not
only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own;
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the
violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of
plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the
injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the
corporate veil".32
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital
stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities.33
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-doing must be
clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed. 34

Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a limited
capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would
have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner
on the affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the
aforementioned documents possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule.
Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as
the affiants were not at all presented during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it
differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from Our
duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.
Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS35 finds pertinence:
Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the
affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements, which
may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse
party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits
are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon.
As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals correctly
observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The
probate court had no authority to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the private
respondent corporations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set aside the orders issued
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12
September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate
of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special
administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba,
presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2,
1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that
the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon
all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the
proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado
G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and,
Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore,
prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule,
and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B.
Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8,
1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she
has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by
Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May
17, 24, and 31, 1973, in theBayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of
Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the
original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna
and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of
Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation
that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving
spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to
the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be
appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was
opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer
jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at
the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest
of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to
take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well
as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation
made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an
inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B.
Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the
order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the

court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she
is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia
G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before
before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of
Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the
special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons
which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate;
and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G.
Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss,
Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in
Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the
court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and
that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973
to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the
decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon
Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered
to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words
like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar
ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the
supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of
administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge
Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had
waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of
the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or
reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the
authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and
also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa
B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second,
holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit
an inventory of the assets of the estate.

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of
November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the
issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e)
delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar
issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special
administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well
as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B.
Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate;
and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or
"married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his
residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his
residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in
Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for
certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the
questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental
petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19,
1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule,
and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings
before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith
elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as

Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10,
1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as
special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed
the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the
pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975.
She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision
of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of
Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court
until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the
Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and
Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3,
1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had
already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an
order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations"
in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt
on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari
with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to
restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A restraining order was
issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The

court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition
therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last
residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this
is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor,
or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within
the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at
the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court
to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate,"
is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and
was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or
changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be
fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably
with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or
that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it
has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just
a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction
over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of
the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court,
however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A
fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised
Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall
be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to
the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the
doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as

distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and
rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition
for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G.
Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba,
Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court."
Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence
of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he
also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa
B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule
herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia
was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended
petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence
was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was
at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death
certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it
is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule
herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate
for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney
dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated
January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to
Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in
bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the
conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver.
Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in

a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason
to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia
did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert
her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper
venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix

is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as
surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and
charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator
was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules,
however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there
is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree
among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in
the probate court. 15That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his
personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the
same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not
be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the
judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in
appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this
respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law,
the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as
such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin.
The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked
ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late
Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no
relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the
latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia
is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in
the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in
the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to
be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the
parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B.
Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to
Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name
of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract

of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late
Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree
that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it
is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise
of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the
appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the
Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be
required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the
continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar
Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the
sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-41171

July 23, 1987

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO BORROMEOHERRERA, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-55000

July 23, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO, DECEASED, PILAR N. BORROMEO,

MARIA B. PUTONG, FEDERICO V. BORROMEO, JOSE BORROMEO, CONSUELO B.
MORALES, AND CANUTO V. BORROMEO, JR., heirs-appellants,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO, claimant-appellee.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-62895

July 23, 1987

JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, As presiding Judge of
the (now) Regional Trial Court, Branch XV, Region VII, RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator
of the Estate of Vito Borromeo in Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO and
DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-63818

July 23, 1987

DOMINGO ANTIGUA AND RICARDO V. REYES, as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of

VITO BORROMEO, Sp. Proceedings No. 916-R, Regional Trial Court of Cebu, joined by HON.
JUDGE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, as Presiding Judge of Branch XV of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu, as a formal party, and ATTYS. FRANCIS M. ZOSA, GAUDIOSO RUIZ and NUMERIANO
ESTENZO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE CUENCO BORROMEO, and PETRA
O. BORROMEO, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
No. L-65995

July 23, 1987

PETRA BORROMEO, VITALIANA BORROMEO, AMELINDA BORROMEO, and JOSE CUENCO

BORROMEO,petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Regional Trial Court of
Cebu; RICARDO V. REYES, Administrator of the Estate of VITO BORROMEO in Sp. Proc. No.
916-R; and DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These cases before us all stem from SP. PROC. NO. 916-R of the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu.
G.R. No. 41171
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13, 1952, in
Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the
province of Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the
probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased, devising all
his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided
shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 916-R. The document, drafted in Spanish, was allegedly signed and thumbmarked
by the deceased in the presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna, and Felixberto Leonardo
who acted as witnesses.
Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On May 28, 1960, after due trial, the probate court
held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was a forgery.
On appeal to this Court, the decision of the probate court disallowing the probate of the will was
affirmed inTestate Estate of Vito Borromeo, Jose H. Junquera et al. v. Crispin Borromeo et al. (19
SCRA 656).
The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings. Several parties came before
the court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate estate of Vito
Borromeo.
The following petitions or claims were filed:
1. On August 29, 1967, the heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed a petition
for declaration of heirs and determination of heirship. There was no opposition filed against
said petition.
2. On November 26, 1967, Vitaliana Borromeo also filed a petition for declaration as heir.
The heirs of Jose Ma. Borromeo and Cosme Borromeo filed an opposition to this petition.

3. On December 13, 1967, Jose Barcenilla, Jr., Anecita Ocampo de Castro, Ramon Ocampo,
Lourdes Ocampo, Elena Ocampo, Isagani Morre, Rosario Morre, Aurora Morre, Lila Morre,
Lamberto Morre, and Patricia Morre, filed a petition for declaration of heirs and determination
of shares. The petition was opposed by the heirs of Jose and Cosme Borromeo.
4. On December 2, 1968, Maria Borromeo Atega, Luz Borromeo, Hermenegilda Borromeo
Nonnenkamp, Rosario Borromeo, and Fe Borromeo Queroz filed a claim. Jose Cuenco
Borromeo, Crispin Borromeo, Vitaliana Borromeo and the heirs of Carlos Borromeo
represented by Jose Talam filed oppositions to this claim.
When the aforementioned petitions and claims were heard jointly, the following facts were
established:
1. Maximo Borromeo and Hermenegilda Galan, husband and wife (the latter having predeceased the
former), were survived by their eight (8) children, namely,
Jose Ma. Borromeo
Cosme Borromeo
Pantaleon Borromeo
Vito Borromeo
Paulo Borromeo
Anecita Borromeo
Quirino Borromeo and
Julian Borromeo
2. Vito Borromeo died a widower on March 13, 1952, without any issue, and all his brothers and
sisters predeceased him.
3. Vito's brother Pantaleon Borromeo died leaving the following children:
a. Ismaela Borromeo,who died on Oct. 16, 1939
b. Teofilo Borromeo, who died on Aug. 1, 1955, or 3 years after the death of Vito Borromeo.
He was married to Remedios Cuenco Borromeo, who died on March 28, 1968. He had an
only son-Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo one of the petitioners herein.
c. Crispin Borromeo, who is still alive.

4. Anecita Borromeo, sister of Vito Borromeo, died ahead of him and left an only daughter, Aurora B.
Ocampo, who died on Jan. 30, 1950 leaving the following children:
a. Anecita Ocampo Castro
b. Ramon Ocampo
c. Lourdes Ocampo
d. Elena Ocampo, all living, and
e. Antonieta Ocampo Barcenilla (deceased), survived by claimant Jose Barcenilla, Jr.
5. Cosme Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and left the following
children:
a. Marcial Borromeo
b. Carlos Borromeo,who died on Jan. 18, 1965,survived by his wife, Remedios Alfonso, and
his only daughter, Amelinda Borromeo Talam
c. Asuncion Borromeo
d. Florentina Borromeo, who died in 1948.
e. Amilio Borromeo, who died in 1944.
f. Carmen Borromeo, who died in 1925.
The last three died leaving no issue.
6. Jose Ma. Borromeo, another brother of Vito Borromeo, died before the war and left the following
children:
a. Exequiel Borromeo,who died on December 29, 1949
b. Canuto Borromeo, who died on Dec. 31, 1959, leaving the following children:
aa. Federico Borromeo
bb. Marisol Borromeo (Maria B. Putong, Rec. p. 85)
cc. Canuto Borromeo, Jr.
dd. Jose Borromeo

ee. Consuelo Borromeo

ff. Pilar Borromeo
gg. Salud Borromeo
hh. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
c. Maximo Borromeo, who died in July, 1948
d. Matilde Borromeo, who died on Aug. 6, 1946
e. Andres Borromeo, who died on Jan. 3, 1923, but survived by his children:
aa. Maria Borromeo Atega
bb. Luz Borromeo
cc. Hermenegilda Borromeo Nonnenkamp
dd. Rosario Borromeo
ee. Fe Borromeo Queroz
On April 10, 1969, the trial court, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued an order declaring the
following, to the exclusion of all others, as the intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo:
1. Jose Cuenco Borromeo
2. Judge Crispin Borromeo
3. Vitaliana Borromeo
4. Patrocinio Borromeo Herrera
5. Salud Borromeo
6. Asuncion Borromeo
7. Marcial Borromeo
8. Amelinda Borromeo de Talam, and
9. The heirs of Canuto Borromeo

The court also ordered that the assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into
4/9 and 5/9 groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 abovenamed declared
intestate heirs.
On April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an
agreement of partition of the properties of the deceased Vito Borromeo which was approved by the
trial court, in its order of August 15, 1969. In this same order, the trial court ordered the administrator,
Atty Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of the deceased in the way and manner they are
divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market
value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be segregated. All attorney's fees shall be taken and paid
from this segregated portion.
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the
forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the heirs of the
deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the
declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a
forced heir entitled to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate
child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitime of
an acknowledged natural child.
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of the court dated
April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal heirs of the deceased Vito
Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on June 25, 1973.
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he submitted to support
his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate.
He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed
by Pilar N. Borromeo, Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo,
Patrocinio Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo,
Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of the nine heirs
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground
that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that
respondent Fortunato Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver
agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same is void having
been executed before the distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and
that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter.
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five declared heirs who
signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to Fortunato Borromeo had lost the
same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo.
A motion for reconsideration of this order was denied on July 7, 1975.
In the present petition, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the trial court's order dated
December 24, 1974, declaring respondent Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito
Borromeo and the July 7, 1975 order, denying the motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of
respondent Fortunato Borromeo because it is not a money claim against the decedent but a claim
for properties, real and personal, which constitute all of the shares of the heirs in the decedent's
estate, heirs who allegedly waived their rights in his favor. The claim of the private respondent under
the waiver agreement, according to the petitioner, may be likened to that of a creditor of the heirs
which is improper. He alleges that the claim of the private respondent under the waiver agreement
was filed beyond the time allowed for filing of claims as it was filed only sometime in 1973, after
there had been a declaration of heirs (April 10, 1969), an agreement of partition (April 30, 1969), the
approval of the agreement of partition and an order directing the administrator to partition the estate
(August 15, 1969), when in a mere memorandum, the existence of the waiver agreement was
brought out.
It is further argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary Rights"
executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by
Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo, is without force and effect because
there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the
inheritance the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make
acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one
from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs
were not certain of their right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were,
therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the
same Code which directs heirs, devicees, and legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation
within thirty days after the court has issued an order for the distribution of the estate.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article 1043 of the Civil
Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an
inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the death of the person from whom he
is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of
the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver document were
certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in
the waiver document itself.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court to pass upon the validity of the waiver of
hereditary rights, respondent Borromeo asserts that since the waiver or renunciation of hereditary
rights took place after the court assumed jurisdiction over the properties of the estate it partakes of
the nature of a partition of the properties of the estate needing approval of the court because it was
executed in the course of the proceedings. lie further maintains that the probate court loses
jurisdiction of the estate only after the payment of all the debts of the estate and the remaining estate
is distributed to those entitled to the same.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties included in an
existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons with respect to the heirs,
who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the
character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the
death of the deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the Civil
Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less,

time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession
of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in
accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the
adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion." (Osorio v. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship
Co., 41 Phil., 531). The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order
to partition the estate was issued only in 1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be
effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the
knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador,
(CA) 53 O.G. No. 22, p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown
clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act
should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the
particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible (67 C.J.,
311). (Fernandez v. Sebido, et al., 70 Phil., 151, 159).
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the
clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1) On October 27, 1967. Fortunato,
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a
proposal for the amicable settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to
all the eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including all cash
and sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October 31, 1967, not contested
or claimed by them in any action then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the
heirs would waive and concede to them all the 14 contested lots. In this document, the respondent
recognizes and concedes that the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an
heir of the deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver of
Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to be. Had the intent
been otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to
mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the
estate of the deceased; (2) On April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an
Agreement on how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was
approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner, among others,
signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to transfer and assign in favor of the
respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and
participation as an intestate heir in the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated
consideration for said assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the
respondent Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of assignment) in
turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named in the same deed of
assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A Cancellation of Deed of Assignment
and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15,
1968, while Fortunato Borromeo signed this document on March 24, 1969.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of the waiver agreement. It must be noted that in Special Proceedings No. 916-R the lower
court disallowed the probate of the will and declared it as fake. Upon appeal, this Court affirmed the
decision of the lower court on March 30, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18498. Subsequently, several parties

came before the lower court filing claims or petitions alleging themselves as heirs of the intestate
estate of Vito Borromeo. We see no impediment to the trial court in exercising jurisdiction and trying
the said claims or petitions. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the trial court extends to matters incidental
and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate.
In view of the foregoing, the questioned order of the trial court dated December 24, 1974, is hereby
SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 55000
This case was originally an appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, dated December 24, 1974, declaring the waiver document earlier
discussed in G.R. No. 41171 valid. The appellate court certified this case to this Court as the
questions raised are all of law.
The appellants not only assail the validity of the waiver agreement but they also question the
jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and decide the action filed by claimant Fortunato Borromeo.
The appellants argue that when the waiver of hereditary right was executed on July 31, 1967, Pilar
Borromeo and her children did not yet possess or own any hereditary right in the intestate estate of
the deceased Vito Borromeo because said hereditary right was only acquired and owned by them on
April 10, 1969, when the estate was ordered distributed.
They further argue that in contemplation of law, there is no such contract of waiver of hereditary right
in the present case because there was no object, which is hereditary right, that could be the subject
matter of said waiver, and, therefore, said waiver of hereditary right was not only null and void ab
initio but was inexistent.
With respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the appellants contend that without any formal pleading filed
by the lawyers of Fortunato Borromeo for the approval of the waiver agreement and without notice to
the parties concerned, two things which are necessary so that the lower court would be vested with
authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide the validity of said waiver agreement, nevertheless, the
lower court set the hearing on September 25, 1973 and without asking for the requisite pleading.
This resulted in the issuance of the appealed order of December 24, 1974, which approved the
validity of the waiver agreement. The appellants contend that this constitutes an error in the exercise
of jurisdiction.
The appellee on the other hand, maintains that by waiving their hereditary rights in favor of Fortunato
Borromeo, the signatories to the waiver document tacitly and irrevocably accepted the inheritance
and by virtue of the same act, they lost their rights because the rights from that moment on became
vested in Fortunato Borromeo.
It is also argued by the appellee that under Article 1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a
person to be declared as heir first before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required
is that he is certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and of his right to the
inheritance. At the time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the

waiver document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead and they were also certain of
their right to the inheritance as shown by the waiver document itself.
On the allegation of the appellants that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the claim
because of the alleged lack of a pleading invoking its jurisdiction to decide the claim, the appellee
asserts that on August 23, 1973, the lower court issued an order specifically calling on all oppositors
to the waiver document to submit their comments within ten days from notice and setting the same
for hearing on September 25, 1973. The appellee also avers that the claim as to a 5/9 share in the
inheritance involves no question of title to property and, therefore, the probate court can decide the
question.
The issues in this case are similar to the issues raised in G.R. No. 41171. The appellants in this
case, who are all declared heirs of the late Vito Borromeo are contesting the validity of the trial
court's order dated December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo entitled to 5/9 of the estate of
Vito Borromeo under the waiver agreement.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, the supposed waiver of hereditary rights can not be validated. The
essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear and convincing intention to relinquish hereditary
rights, are not found in this case.
The October 27, 1967 proposal for an amicable settlement conceding to all the eight (8) intestate
heirs various properties in consideration for the heirs giving to the respondent and to Tomas, and
Amelia Borromeo the fourteen (14) contested lots was filed inspite of the fact that on July 31, 1967,
some of the heirs had allegedly already waived or sold their hereditary rights to the respondent.
The agreement on how the estate is to be distributed, the June 29, 1968 deed of assignment, the
deed of reconveyance, and the subsequent cancellation of the deed of assignment and deed of
reconveyance all argue against the purported waiver of hereditary rights.
Concerning the issue of jurisdiction, we have already stated in G.R. No. 41171 that the trial court
acquired jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the waiver agreement because the trial court's
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate.
The questioned order is, therefore, SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 62895
A motion dated April 28, 1972, was filed by Atty. Raul M. Sesbreno, representative of some of the
heirs-distributees, praying for the immediate closure of Special Proceeding No. 916-R. A similar
motion dated May 29, 1979 was filed by Atty. Jose Amadora. Both motions were grounded on the
fact that there was nothing more to be done after the payment of all the obligations of the estate
since the order of partition and distribution had long become final.

Alleging that respondent Judge Francisco P. Burgos failed or refused to resolve the aforesaid
motions, petitioner Jose Cuenco Borromeo-filed a petition for mandamus before the Court of
Appeals to compel the respondent judge to terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R.
Finding that the inaction of the respondent judge was due to pending motions to compel the
petitioner, as co-administrator, to submit an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an
accounting of the cash in his hands, pending claims for attorney's fees, and that mandamus will not
lie to compel the performance of a discretionary function, the appellate court denied the petition on
May 14, 1982. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner's stand is that the inaction of the respondent judge on the motion filed on April 28,
1972 for the closure of the administration proceeding cannot be justified by the filing of the motion for
inventory and accounting because the latter motion was filed only on March 2, 1979. He claimed that
under the then Constitution, it is the duty of the respondent judge to decide or resolve a case or
matter within three months from the date of its submission.
The respondents contend that the motion to close the administration had already been resolved
when the respondent judge cancelled all settings of all incidents previously set in his court in an
order dated June 4, 1979, pursuant to the resolution and restraining order issued by the Court of
Appeals enjoining him to maintain status quo on the case.
As stated in G.R. No. 41171, on April 21 and 30, 1969, the declared heirs, with the exception of
Patrocinio B. Herrera, signed an agreement of partition of the properties of the deceased Vito
Borromeo which was approved by the trial court, in its order dated August 15, 1969. In this same
order, the trial court ordered the administrator, Atty. Jesus Gaboya, Jr., to partition the properties of
the deceased in the way and manner they are divided and partitioned in the said Agreement of
Partition and further ordered that 40% of the market value of the 4/9 and 5/9 of the estate shall be
segregated and reserved for attorney's fees.
According to the manifestation of Judge Francisco Burgos dated July 5, 1982, (p. 197, Rollo, G. R.
No. 41171) his court has not finally distributed to the nine (9) declared heirs the properties due to the
following circumstances:
1. The court's determination of the market value of the estate in order to segregate the 40%
reserved for attorney's fees;
2. The order of December 24, 1974, declaring Fortunato Borromeo as beneficiary of the 5/9
of the estate because of the waiver agreement signed by the heirs representing the 5/9
group which is still pending resolution by this Court (G.R. No. 4117 1);
3. The refusal of administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to render his accounting; and
4. The claim of Marcela Villegas for 1/2 of the estate causing annotations of notices of lis
pendens on the different titles of the properties of the estate.

Since there are still real properties of the estate that were not vet distributed to some of the declared
heirs, particularly the 5/9 group of heirs due to the pending resolution of the waiver agreement, this
Court in its resolution of June 15, 1983, required the judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch 11, to expedite the determination of Special Proceedings No. 916-R and ordered the coadministrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo to submit an inventory of real properties of the estate and to
render an accounting of cash and bank deposits realized from rents of several properties.
The matter of attorney's fees shall be discussed in G.R. No. 65995.
Considering the pronouncements stated in:
1. G.R. No. 41171 & G.R. No. 55000, setting aside the Order of the trial court dated
December 24, 1974;
2. G.R. No. 63818, denying the petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos
from further hearing the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and ordering the remand of the
case to the Executive,Judge of the Regional trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling; and
3. G.R. No. 65995, granting the petition to restrain the respondents from further acting on
any and all incidents in Special proceedings No. 916-11 because of the affirmation of the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818.
the trial court may now terminate and close Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the
submission of an inventory of the real properties of the estate and an accounting of the call and bank
deposits of the petitioner, as co-administrator of the estate, if he has not vet done so, as required by
this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983. This must be effected with all deliberate speed.
G.R. No. 63818
On June 9, 1979, respondents Jose Cuenco Borromeo and Petra 0. Borromeo filed a motion for
inhibition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 11, presided over by Judge Francisco P.
Burgos to inhibit the judge from further acting in Special Proceedings No. 916-R. 'The movants
alleged, among others, the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

6. To keep the agitation to sell moving, Atty. Antigua filed a motion for the production of the
certificates of title and to deposit the same with the Branch Clerk of Court, presumably for the
ready inspection of interested buyers. Said motion was granted by the Hon. Court in its order
of October 2, 1978 which, however, became the subject of various motions for
reconsideration from heirs-distributees who contended that as owners they cannot be
deprived of their titles for the flimsy reasons advanced by Atty, Antigua. In view of the
motions for reconsideration, Atty Antigua ultimately withdraw his motions for production of
titles.

7. The incident concerning the production of titles triggered another incident involving Atty.
Raul H. Sesbreno who was then the counsel of herein movants Petra O. Borromeo and
Amelinda B. Talam In connection with said incident, Atty. Sesbreno filed a pleading which the
tion. presiding, Judge Considered direct contempt because among others, Atty. Sesbreno
insinuated that the Hon. Presiding Judge stands to receive "fat commission" from the sale of
the entire property. Indeed, Atty. Sesbreno was seriously in danger of being declared in
contempt of court with the dim prospect of suspension from the practice of his profession.
But obviously to extricate himself from the prospect of contempt and suspension. Atty.
Sesbreno chose rapproachment and ultimately joined forces with Atty. Antigua, et al., who,
together, continued to harass administrator
xxx

xxx

xxx

9. The herein movants are informed and so they allege, that a brother of the Hon. Presiding
Judge is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.
10. There is now a clear tug of war bet ween Atty. Antigua, et al. who are agitating for the
sale of the entire estate or to buy out the individual heirs, on the one hand, and the herein
movants, on the other, who are not willing to sell their distributive shares under the terms and
conditions presently proposed. In this tug of war, a pattern of harassment has become
apparent against the herein movants, especially Jose Cuenco Borromeo. Among the
harassments employed by Atty Antigua et al. are the pending motions for the removal of
administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo, the subpoena duces tecum issued to the bank which
seeks to invade into the privacy of the personal account of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, and the
other matters mentioned in paragraph 8 hereof. More harassment motions are expected until
the herein movants shall finally yield to the proposed sale. In such a situation, the herein
movants beg for an entirely independent and impartial judge to pass upon the merits of said
incidents.
11. Should the Hon. Presiding Judge continue to sit and take cognizance of this proceeding,
including the incidents above-mentioned, he is liable to be misunderstood as being biased in
favor of Atty Antigua, et al. and prejudiced against the herein movants. Incidents which may
create this impression need not be enumerated herein. (pp. 39-41, Rollo)
The motion for inhibition was denied by Judge Francisco P. Burgos. Their motion for reconsideration
having been denied, the private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with
preliminary injunction before the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In the appellate court, the private respondents alleged, among others, the following:
xxx

xxx

xxx

16. With all due respect, petitioners regret the necessity of having to state herein that
respondent Hon. Francisco P. Burgos has shown undue interest in pursing the sale initiated
by Atty. Domingo L. Antigua, et al. Significantly, a brother of respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos is married to a sister of Atty. Domingo L. Antigua.

17. Evidence the proposed sale of the entire properties of the estate cannot be legally done
without the conformity of the heirs-distributees because the certificates of title are already
registered in their names Hence, in pursuit of the agitation to sell, respondent Hon. Francisco
P. Burgos urged the heirs-distributees to sell the entire property based on the rationale that
proceeds thereof deposited in the bank will earn interest more than the present income of
the so called estate. Most of the heirs-distributees, however. have been petitioner timid to
say their piece. Only the 4/9 group of heirs led by Jose Cuenco Borromeo have had the
courage to stand up and refuse the proposal to sell clearly favored by respondent Hon.
Francisco P. Burgos.
xxx

xxx

xxx

20. Petitioners will refrain from discussing herein the merits of the shotgun motion of Atty.
Domingo L. Antigua as well as other incidents now pending in the court below which smack
of harassment against the herein petitioners. For, regardless of the merits of said incidents,
petitioners respectfully contend that it is highly improper for respondent Hon. Francisco P.
Burgos to continue to preside over Sp. Proc. No. 916-R by reason of the following
circumstances:
(a) He has shown undue interest in the sale of the properties as initiated by Atty.
Domingo L. Antigua whose sister is married to a brother of respondent.
(b) The proposed sale cannot be legally done without the conformity of the heirsdistributees, and petitioners have openly refused the sale, to the great
disappointment of respondent.
(c) The shot gun motion of Atty. Antigua and similar incidents are clearly intended to
harass and embarrass administrator Jose Cuenco Borromeo in order to pressure him
into acceding to the proposed sale.
(d) Respondent has shown bias and prejudice against petitioners by failing to resolve
the claim for attorney's fees filed by Jose Cuenco Borromeo and the late Crispin
Borromeo. Similar claims by the other lawyers were resolved by respondent after
petitioners refused the proposed sale. (pp. 41-43, Rollo)
On March 1, 1983, the appellate court rendered its decision granting the petition for certiorari and/or
prohibition and disqualifying Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special
Proceedings No. 916-R. The court also ordered the transmission of the records of the case to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling.
A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the appellate court on April 11, 1983.
Hence, the present petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the case
of Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo and orders the remand of the case to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu for re-raffling.

The principal issue in this case has become moot and academic because Judge Francisco P.
Burgos decided to retire from the Regional Trial Court of Cebu sometime before the latest
reorganization of the judiciary. However, we decide the petition on its merits for the guidance of the
judge to whom this case will be reassigned and others concerned.
The petitioners deny that respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo has been harassed. They contend that
Judge Burgos has benn shown unusual interest in the proposed sale of the entire estate for
P6,700,000.00 in favor of the buyers of Atty. Antigua. They claim that this disinterest is shown by the
judge's order of March 2, 1979 assessing the property of the estate at P15,000,000.00. They add
that he only ordered the administrator to sell so much of the properties of the estate to pay the
attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants. To them, the inhibition of Judge Burgos would have been
unreasonable because his orders against the failure of Jose Cuenco Borromeo, as administrator, to
give an accounting and inventory of the estate were all affirmed by the appellate court. They claim
that the respondent court, should also have taken judicial notice of the resolution of this Court
directing the said judge to "expedite the settlement and adjudication of the case" in G.R. No. 54232.
And finally, they state that the disqualification of judge Burgos would delay further the closing of the
administration proceeding as he is the only judge who is conversant with the 47 volumes of the
records of the case.
Respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo, to show that he had been harassed. countered that Judge
Burgos appointed Ricardo V. Reyes as co-administrator of the estate on October 11, 1972, yet
Borromeo was singled out to make an accounting of what t he was supposed to have received as
rentals for the land upon which the Juliana Trade Center is erected, from January, 1977 to February
1982, inclusive, without mentioning the withholding tax for the Bureau of Internal Revenue. In order
to bolster the agitation to sell as proposed by Domingo L. Antigua, Judge Burgos invited Antonio
Barredo, Jr., to a series of conferences from February 26 to 28, 1979. During the conferences, Atty.
Antonio Barredo, Jr., offered to buy the shares of the heirs-distributees presumably to cover up the
projected sale initiated by Atty. Antigua.
On March 2, 1979, or two days after the conferences, a motion was filed by petitioner Domingo L.
Antigua praying that Jose Cuenco Borromeo be required to file an inventory when he has already
filed one to account for cash, a report on which the administrators had already rendered: and to
appear and be examined under oath in a proceeding conducted by Judge Burgos lt was also prayed
that subpoena duces tecum be issued for the appearance of the Manager of the Consolidated Bank
and Trust Co., bringing all the bank records in the name of Jose Cuenco Borromeo jointly with his
wife as well as the appearance of heirs-distributees Amelinda Borromeo Talam and another heir
distributee Vitaliana Borromeo. Simultaneously with the filing of the motion of Domingo Antigua, Atty.
Raul H. Sesbreno filed a request for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum to the Manager of
Consolidated Bank and 'Trust Co., Inc.; Register of Deeds of Cebu City; Register of Deeds for the
Province of Cebu and another subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Jose Cuenco Borromeo.
On the same date, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Managert of the
bank, the Register of deeds for the City of Cebu, the Register of Deeds for the Province, of Cebu.
and to Jose Cuenco Borromeo.

On the following day, March 3, 1979, Atty Gaudioso v. Villagonzalo in behalf of the heirs of Marcial
Borromeo who had a common cause with Atty Barredo, Jr., joined petitioner Domingo L. Antigua by
filing a motion for relief of the administrator.
On March 5, 1979, Atty. Villagonzalo filed a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to
private respondent Jose Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce all the owners" copies of the titles
in the court presided order by Judge Burgos.
Consequently. the Branch Clerk of Court issued a subpoena duces tecum commanding Atty. Jose
Cuenco Borromeo to bring and produce the titles in court.
All the above-incidents were set for hearing on June 7, 1979 but on June 14, 1979, before the date
of the hearing, Judge Burgos issued an order denying the private respondents' motion for
reconsideration and the motion to quash the subpoena.
1avvphi1

It was further argued by the private respondents that if ,judge Francisco P. Burgos is not inhibited or
disqualified from trying Sp. Proc. No. 916-R, there would be a miscarriage of justice Because for the
past twelve years, he had not done anything towards the closure of the estate proceedings except to
sell the properties of the heirs-distributees as initiated by petitioner Domingo L. Antigua at 6.7 million
pesos while the Intestate Court had already evaluated it at 15 million pesos.
The allegations of the private respondents in their motion for inhibition, more specifically, the
insistence of the trial judge to sell the entire estate at P6,700,000.00, where 4/9 group of heirs
objected, cannot easily be ignored. Suspicion of partiality on the part of a trial judge must be avoided
at all costs. In the case of Bautista v. Rebeuno(81 SCRA 535), this Court stated:
... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties litigants. He must
hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith and trust to
his actions, whether well grounded or not, the Judge has no other alternative but inhibit
himself from the case. A judge may not be legally Prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but
when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in
favor or of either partly or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts
of Justice is not impaired, "The better course for the Judge under such circumstances is to
disqualify himself "That way he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and
objectivity is preserve ed. what is more important, the Ideal of impartial administration of
justice is lived up to.
In this case, the fervent distrust of the private respondents is based on sound reasons. As Earlier
stated, however, the petition for review seeking to modify the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court insofar as it disqualifies and inhibits Judge Francisco P. Burgos from further hearing the
Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo case and ordering the remand of the case to the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court for re-raffling should be DENIED for the decision is not only valid but the
issue itself has become moot and academic.
G.R. No. 65995

The petitioners seek to restrain the respondents from further acting on any and all incidents in
Special Proceedings No. 916-R during the pendency of this petition and No. 63818. They also pray
that all acts of the respondents related to the said special proceedings after March 1, 1983 when the
respondent Judge was disqualified by the appellate court be declared null and void and without force
and effect whatsoever.
The petitioners state that the respondent Judge has set for hearing all incidents in Special
Proceedings No. 916-R, including the reversion from the heirs-distributees to the estate, of the
distributed properties already titled in their names as early as 1970, notwithstanding the pending
inhibition case elevated before this Court which is docketed as G.R. No. 63818.
The petitioners further argue that the present status of Special Proceeding No. 916-R requires only
the appraisal of the attorney's fees of the lawyers-claimants who were individually hired by their
respective heirs-clients, so their attorney's fees should be legally charged against their respective
clients and not against the estate.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that the petition is a dilatory one and barred by res
judicata because this Court on July 8, 1981, in G.R. No. 54232 directed the respondent Judge to
expedite the settlement and liquidation of the decedent's estate. They claim that this resolution,
which was already final and executory, was in effect reversed and nullified by the Intermediate
Appellate Court in its case-AC G.R.-No. SP - 11145 when it granted the petition for certiorari and
or prohibition and disqualified Judge Francisco P. Burgos from taking further cognizance of Special
Proceedings No. 916R as well as ordering the transmission of the records of the case to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Region VII for re-raffling on March 1, 1983, which was
appealed to this Court by means of a Petition for Review (G.R. No. 63818).
We agree with the petitioners' contention that attorney's fees are not the obligation of the estate but
of the individual heirs who individually hired their respective lawyers. The portion, therefore, of the
Order of August 15, 1969, segregating the exhorbitantly excessive amount of 40% of the market
value of the estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be deleted.
Due to our affirmance of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in G.R. No. 63818, we
grant the petition.
WHEREFORE,
(1) In G.R. No. 41171, the order of the respondent judge dated December 24, 1974,
declaring the respondent entitled to 5/9 of the estate of the late Vito Borromeo and the order
dated July 7, 1975, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned
order are hereby SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID;
(2) In G.R. No. 55000, the order of the trial court declaring the waiver document valid is
hereby SET ASIDE;
(3) In G.R. No. 63818, the petition is hereby DENIED. The issue in the decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court disqualifying and ordering the inhibition of Judge Francisco P.

Burgos from further hearing Special Proceedings No. 916-R is declared moot and academic.
The judge who has taken over the sala of retired Judge Francisco P. Burgos shall
immediately conduct hearings with a view to terminating the proceedings. In the event that
the successor-judge is likewise disqualified, the order of the Intermediate Appellate Court
directing the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to re-raffle the case shall
be implemented:
(4) In G.R. No. 65995, the petition is hereby GRANTED. 'The issue seeking to restrain Judge
Francisco P. Burgos from further acting in G.R. No. 63818 is MOOT and ACADEMIC:
(5) In G.R, No, 62895, the trial court is hereby ordered to speedily terminate the close
Special Proceedings No. 916-R, subject to the submission of an inventory of the real
properties of the estate and an accounting of the cash and bank deposits by the petitioneradministrator of the estate as required by this Court in its Resolution dated June 15, 1983;
and
(6) The portion of the Order of August 15, 1969, segregating 40% of the market value of the
estate from which attorney's fees shall be taken and paid should be, as it is hereby
DELETED. The lawyers should collect from the heirs-distributees who individually hired
them, attorney's fees according to the nature of the services rendered but in amounts which
should not exceed more than 20% of the market value of the property the latter acquired
from the estate as beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95574 August 16, 1991

HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA and BASSER MUSA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, Fifth
Shari'a District, Cotabato City and HADJI JAHARA ABDURAHIM, respondents.
Randolph C. Parcasio for petitioners.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p
Questions of jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, and of venue, in an intestate proceeding are
herein raised.
Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, who passed away on 31 December
1987. He had six (6) wives, three (3) of whom he later divorced, and twenty three (23) children. He
had extensive real and personal properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao, Davao del Sur
and Davao Oriental. Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA Musa, are among those he
divorced, while private respondent Hadji Jalai a ABDURAHIM is one of the three (3) surviving
widows, RIZAL Musa and BASSER Musa are two (2) of his sons.
On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for the Administration and
Settlement of the Inestate Estate of the Late Jamiri Musa and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership,"
before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Sharia's District, with station at Cotabato City (SDC Spec.
Proceedings No. 89-19) (the Intestate Case). That Court embraces the province of Maguindanao
within its jurisdiction but not the provinces of Davao del Sur and Oriental.
The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, left
various properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao (184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61
hectares), and Davao Oriental (207 hectares). Aside from the settlement of the vast estate, also
prayed for was the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets of the decedent and ABDURAHIM
and the segregation and turn-over to the latter of her one-half (1/2) share.
Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA, the divorced wives, who also claim
to be widows of the deceased: RIZAL, Putih Musa, and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the
decedent; and BASSER, another son. They alleged that venues was improperly said and that the
properties of the decedent located outside Aguinaldo were beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a
District. Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Respondent Judge issued the Order
of Publication on 1 July 1989 and initially set the case for hearing on 18 September 1989.
All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing on said date where petitioners,
through counsel, manifested their desire to have the case amicably settled, Respondent Judo "in the

interest of peace and harmony among the heirs of the deceased Jamiri Musa," appointed the
following as Special Administrators: ABDURAHIM, for all properties situated in Maguindanao; RIZAL.
for all properties situated in Davao Oriental; and BASSER. for all properties situated in Davao del
Sul.
However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation and Motion to Cite for Contempt,"
accused BASSER, among others, of having allegedly fired upon the house of her son in-law in
Maguindanao on 21 September 1989.
Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an "Opposition to Petition for Administration and Liquidation of
Conjugal Partnership" was filed by Petitioners, alleging that ABDURAHIM was never legally married
to the decedent and, as such, there was "nothing to support her claim" of having had a conjugal
partnership with the latter; and that venue was improperly laid. Petitioners also asked that RIZAL be
issued Letters of Administration instead.
In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that, her marriage to the decedent was
admitted by the latter in various Deeds of Sale he had signed, which were presented as
documentary evidence. Since there was no amicable settlement reached, hearings on the Joint
Petition were conducted, commencing on 27 December 1989.
On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing ABDURAHIM as Regular
Administratrix upon the finding that she was legally married to the decedent. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration.
In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June 1990, incorporating the
testimonies of the two (2) other witnesses presented by Petitioners, which were omitted in the Order,
dated 16 May 1990. Otherwise, the appointment of ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix was
maintained.
On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Motion to Dismiss," raising
once again, mainly the questions of venue and of jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the real
properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental.
Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court's jurisdiction in his Order, dated 22
August 1990. Hence, the elevation of the instant Petition for Prohibition before this Court seeking to
enjoin respondent Judge Corocoy D. Moson, presiding over the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a
District, from further taking action on the "Joint Petition ."
Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have dismissed the Intestate Case for
lack of jurisdiction and for improper venue. Private respondent maintains the contrary.
We rule against Petitioners.
Pres. Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,
explicitly provides that exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims, belong to Shari'a District Courts. Thus:

Art. 143. Original Jurisdiction.The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive
original jurisdictionover:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate
value of the property. (Chapter 1, Title I, Book IV, par. (b), (Emphasis supplied).
Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim is, in fact,
involved herein, the Joint Petition was correctly filed before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a
District.
In invoking improper venue, however, petitioners call attention to the Rules of Court mandating that:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.If the decedent is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73). (Emphasis supplied).
It is then claimed that since the residence of the decedent at the time of his death was actually in
Davao City, not Maguindanao, as averred by ABDUHARIM, the proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, and that venue is more properly laid in Davao City
before the Regional Trial Court since there are no Shari'a District Courts therein.
At this juncture, it should be recalled that the residence of the deceased in an estate proceeding is
not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. The law of jurisdiction
confers upon Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased (In the matter of the intestate estate of Kaw
Singco, 74 Phil. 239 [1943]).
To all appearances, the decedent was a resident of both Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, and Davao City.
In fact, in various Deeds of Sale presented as evidence by the parties, the decedent alternately
stated his place of residence as either Linao, Upi,Maguindanao which is the residence of
ABDURAHIM, or Davao City, where Petitioners reside. As this Court held in Uytengsu v. Republic,
95 Phil. 890 (1954), "a man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time,
but he may have numerous places of residence." Venue, therefore, ordinarily could be at either place
of the decedent's residence, i.e., Maguindanao or Davao City, but for the provisions of the Muslim

Code vesting exclusive original jurisdiction, in matters of disposition and settlement of estates of
deceased Muslims, in Shari'a District Courts (supra).
But petitioners also contend that the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, presided over by
respondent Judge, has no territorial jurisdiction over properties of the decedent situated in the
provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental, citing as statutory authority therefor the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws, which provides:
Art. 138. Shari'a judicial districts.Five special judicial districts, each to have one
Shari'a District Court presided over by one judge, are constituted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The Fifth Shari'a District, the Provinces of Maguindanao, North Cotabato and
Sultan Kudarat, and the City of Cotabato.
Indeed, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental are not comprised within the Fifth Shari'a District. In fact,
those provinces are outside the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao created by Republic Act
No. 6734, its Organic Act. But as stated in that law, "the Shari'a District Court and the Shari'a Circuit
Courts created under existing laws shall continue to function as provided therein." (Art. IX, Sec. 13).
Additionally, the same Organic Act explicitly provides;
(4) Except in cases of successional rights, the regular courts shall acquire jurisdiction
over controversies involving real property outside the area of autonomy. (Art. IX,
Section 17[4]). (Emphasis supplied)
Since the subject intestate proceeding concerns successional rights, coupled with the fact that the
decedent was also a resident of Linao, Upi, Maguindanao, owning real estate property located in
that province, venue has been properly laid with the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District,
winch is vested with territorial jurisdiction over Maguindanao, notwithstanding the location in different
provinces of the other real proper- ties of the decedent.
A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits, to the detriment of the expeditious
settlement of estate proceedings (See Ngo Bun Tiong v. Sayo, 30 June 1988,163 SCRA 237 [1988]).
Besides, the judgment that may be rendered by the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, may
be executed in other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated.
When an action covers various parcels of land situated in different provinces, venue
may be laid in the Court of First Instance of any of said provinces, and the judgment
rendered therein may be executed in other provinces where the rest of the real
estate is situated (National Bank v. Barreto, 52 Phil. 818 [1929]; Monte Piedad v.
Rodrigo, 56 Phil. 310 [1931]; El Hogar Filipino v. Seva ,57 Phil. 573 [L-1932]; Bank of
P.I. v. Green, 57 Phil. 712 [1932]).

The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts(Rule 73, sec. 1).
There should be no impediment to the application of said Rules as they apply suppletorily to the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, there being nothing inconsistent with the provisions of the latter
statute (Article 187 of said Code).
And while Rule 73 provides that "the jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record," we have taken cognizance of this Petition for Prohibition considering that the
jurisdiction of a Shari'a District Court, a relatively new Court in our judicial system, has been
challenged.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Prohibition is DENIED, and the case hereby REMANDED to the
Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, for continuation of the intestate proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991

MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL, ERLINDA REYES-VALERIO,
ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and EVELYN, all
surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, MARIA VDA. DE REYES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and ROSARIO
MARTILLANOrespondents.
De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.
Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934, promulgated on 20 October
1989, 1 reversing the decision of 1 October 1986 of Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite) of the Regional Trial Court
of the Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 entitled Maria vda. de Reyes, et
al. vs. Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, and Spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emelita
Gardiola, 2 and the resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts have been
preponderantly established:
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or
less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the
operation of the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the
title having been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was
the administrator of his property.
In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the
subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It
appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. I A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael
Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured
tax declarations for their respective shares.
In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the
whole property OCT No. 255 was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of
Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters,
more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this
parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however,

did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property
and started paying the land taxes therein.
In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. As reconstituted,
the new title isOCT (0-4358) RO-255 (Exhs. "4" to "4-A").
On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate (Exh. "D") based on the aforestated subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot that was intended
for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son and heir,
Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein). Private respondent Rosario
Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of
Gavino Reyes.
As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, several
transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were issued in the names of the respective
adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering Lot No. 1-A14. The Transfer Certificates of Title were, however, kept by one Candido Hebron. On 10 January
1969, some of the heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a case of Annulment of Partition and Recovery of
Possession before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City, which was docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 1267. One of the defendants in said case is herein private respondent Rosario Martillano.
The case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but Candido Hebron was ordered by the trial court
to deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of title in his possession. 3
After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron, pursuant to the
aforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners herein, as successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes,
Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the Regional Trial Court the above-mentioned Civil Case No. RTCBCV-83-17 against private respondents (defendants therein) for recovery of possession or, in the
alternative, for indemnification, accounting and damages. They allege therein that after "having
definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners of the property," (Lot No. 1-A-14), they,
"including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands to (sic) defendants to
surrender the possession of and vacate the parcel of land belonging to the former, but defendants
refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the said land to herein plaintiffs;" the last of the
demands was allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further allege that they have been deprived
by said defendants of the rightful possession and enjoyment of the property since September 1969
which coincides with the date of the order in Civil Case No. 1267. 4
In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint and assert that
they are the owners of the lot in question, having bought the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the
issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void, for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that they
have been in possession of the property and have been paying the land taxes thereon; and that
petitioners are barred by prescription and/or laches. 5
Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as additional defendants the
spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emerita Gardiola, on the basis of the following claims:
xxx xxx xxx

9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spouses Dalmacio Gardiola

and Rosario Martillano's evidence the former testified that they mortgaged the
subject land to the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc. For their failure to redeem the
mortgage the same was foreclosed by the bank.
10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such foreclosure the questioned
land was redeemed by the original defendants' son in the person of Ricardo M.
Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of the pendency of the above captioned
case. The corresponding redemption was effected through a deed of
conveyance, . . . . 6
The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for indemnification for the
reasonable value of the property "in the event restitution of the property is no longer possible." 7
In its decision of 1 October 1986, 8 the trial court concluded that petitioners' "title over the subject
property is valid and regular and thus they are entitled to its possession and enjoyment," and accordingly
decided thus:
WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalf are hereby
ordered to relinguish possession or vacate the property in question which is covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 in favor of the plaintiffs.
All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative to this case are dismissed
for lack of proper substantiation.
The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no evidence that the heirs of
Gavino Reyes entered into any written agreement of partition in 1936 based on the subdivision plan;
(b) there is no identity between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to private respondents by Rafael
Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the description of the latter as indicated in the deed of sale (Exh. "5")
does not tally with the description of the former; and (c) moreover:
Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the defendants
covered the land in question Lot No. 1-A-14 and that Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-27257 was obtained by means of fraud, the claim of the defendants over the
said property is already barred. Action for reconveyance prescribes in four (4) years
from the discovery thereof. If there was fraud, the defendant could have discovered
the same in 1967 when the partition was made in as much as defendant Rosario
Martillano was a party to that partition. Let us grant further that the issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 to Rafael Reyes, Jr. created a constructive or
implied trust in favor of the defendants, again, the claim of the defendants is also
barred. From 1967 to the filing of their answer (let us consider this as an action for
reconveyance) to this case sometime in July, 1983, a period of about sixteen (16)
years had already elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust is ten (10) years.

The trial court further held that the continued possession by private respondents, which it found to
have started in 1943, did not ripen into ownership because at that time, the property was already
registered, hence it cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 9
Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal
as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In its decision of 20 October 1989, the respondent Court of Appeals
formulated the issues before it as follows:
I
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property of the late Gavino
Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was partitioned only in 1967 by his grandchildren
after discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that no actual partition was
made in 1936 by the decedent's children.
II
Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel of land sold by the
appellees' predecessor-in-interest, the late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio
Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation. 10
and resolved such issues, thus:
On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed a reversible error when
it declared that the landed estate of the late Gavino Reyes was partitioned only in
1967 by the latter's grandchildren; and that no actual partition was made in 1936 by
the decedents' (sic) children. The evidence on record bears out the existence of a
subdivision plan (Exh. 6) which was not controverted nor denied by the appellees. In
like manner, the lower court itself recognized the fact that the property of the late
Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed and subdivided in 1936 as
evidenced by the said subdivision plan (Exh. 6). With the existence of a subdivision
plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony of appellants' witness, We can only infer
that at least an oral partition, which under the law is valid and binding, was entered
into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes regarding his properties in 1936. As held in a long
line of decisions, extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and the same would be
valid if freely entered into (Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March 1953). The reason for
this is because a partition is not exactly a conveyance for the reason that it does not
involve transfer of property from one to the other but rather a confirmation by them of
their ownership of the property. It must also be remembered that when Gavino Reyes
died on March 7, 1921, his property was admittedly not yet covered by a torrens title,
as it was only in 1941 when said properties were brought into the application of the
torrens system. With this factual milieu, it can also be concluded that his heirs have
indeed settled, subdivided and partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed estate without
formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when a parcel of land is
covered by a torrens title. As told earlier, the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) undisputedly
showed on its face that the 70 hectares of land belonging to the late Gavino Reyes

was subdivided and partitioned by his children in 1936. On this score, the partition of
the said property even without the formal requirements under the rule is valid as held
in the case of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed by Rafael
Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold therein was
described as "na aking minana sa aking ama." This alone would confirm the
contention of the appellants that there was already an actual partition (at least an oral
partition) of the property of Gavino Reyes in 1936. As aforestated, the presence of
the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) is an (sic) evidence of such partition which appellees
failed to controvert not to mention the fact that the lower court itself recognized the
existence of said plan, in the same manner that it concluded that the property was
already surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936 (page 3, pars. 3 and 4, Decision).
From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate (Exh. D) executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino
Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject of the partition
in the deed was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes. It is for
this reason that the lots supposedly inherited by the grandchildren named in the deed
of 1967 were the same lots inherited and given to their respective fathers or mothers
in 1936 while the land was not yet covered by the torrens system. Hence, in the case
of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by him was two (2) parcels of land known as
Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14 described in the Subdivision plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which
were the same parcels of land allegedly inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino
Reyes in representation of his father, pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate for which TCT No. 27257 was issued.
Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when it concluded that
the parcel of land sold by appellee's predecessor-in-interest to appellant Dalmacio
Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation. It must be pointed out that
the identity of the parcel of land which the appellees sought to recover from the
appellants was never an issue in the lower court, because the litigants had already
conceded that the parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was the
same parcel of land identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and 1235 described in Tax
Declaration No. 4766. Despite this admission, however, the lower court declared that
"as described in the deed of sale (Exh. 5), the land's description does not tally with
the description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land in litigation." As correctly pointed out by
the appellants however, the discrepancy in the description was due to the fact that
the description of the land sold in the Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's
language whereas the description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was done in
technical terms. This was so because, when Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the property in
dispute to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola on December 3, 1943, the only evidence of
title to the land then available in so far as Rafael Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax
Declaration No. 4766, because at that time, neither he nor appellant Dalmacio

Gardiola was aware of the existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was
issued only in 1967. Consequently, the land subject of the Deed of Sale was
described by the vendor in the manner as described in Tax Declaration No. 4766.
However, the description of the land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was
exactly the same land identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) of
1936. Accordingly, the assumption of the lower court that "if the land sold by Rafael
Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he could have easily indicated Lot No. 1-A14" is bereft of merit under the foregoing circumstances. Interestingly enough, the
appellees never denied the identity of the subject lot during the hearing at the lower
court. What they were denying only was the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to
appellant Dalmacio Gardiola which does not hold true because of the document
denominated as Deed of Sale (Exh. 5). 11
It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private respondents or anyone acting in
their behalf to relinquish the possession or vacate the property in question. It thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
a new one is rendered declaring appellants to be the lawful owners of the lot
identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. No
costs. 12
Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution of 1 March 1990, 13 petitioners filed the instant petition on 6 April 1990 after having obtained
an extension of time within which to file it.
The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola.
As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners allege that
said court has decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with law or applicable
jurisprudence when it held that "the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh. "D") executed by
the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the property
subject of the partition was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes." In support
thereof, they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land; the lot described in paragraph
1 thereof is owned by petitioners and that ownership was confirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 79882,
hence, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the decision of the trial court; (b) private
respondent Rosario Martillano was a party to the extrajudicial settlement of estate which was duly
registered in the Registry of Deeds in 1967; said registration is the operative act that gives validity to
the transfer or creates a lien upon the land and also constituted constructive notice to the whole
world. The court cannot disregard the binding effect thereof Finally, the pronouncement of the Court
of Appeals that private respondents are the lawful owners of the lot in question "militates against the
indefeasible and incontrovertible character of the torrens title," 14 and allows reconveyance which is not
tenable since the action therefor had already prescribed, as stated in the decision of the trial court.
In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on the petition. But even
before it could do so, petitioner, without obtaining prior leave of the Court, filed on 29 May 1990 a socalled Supplemental Arguments in Support of The Petition For Review On certiorari 15 wherein they

assert, among others, that: (a) the findings of facts of respondent Court are contrary to those of the trial
court and appear to be contradicted by the evidence on record thus calling for the review by this
Court; 16 (b) it also committed misapprehension of the facts in this case and its findings are based on
speculation, conjecture and surmises; (c) private respondents' attack on petitioners' title is a collateral
attack which is not allowed; even if it is allowed, the same had already prescribed and is now barred.

It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their Comment. 17 We required petitioners
to reply thereto, which they complied with on 8 August 1990. 18 A rejoinder was filed by private
respondents on 29 August 1990.
We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the parties to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda which they complied with.
Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was filed on 10 December 1990,
is the Resolution of this Court (Third Division) of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811 entitled Spouses
Artemio Durumpili and Angustia Reyes vs. The Court of Appeals and Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola
and Rosario Martillano, which also involves the property of Gavino Reyes, the partition thereof
among his children in 1936, and the extrajudicial settlement in 1967.
In said resolution, this Court held:
. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The requirement in Article
1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property
must appear in a public instrument is only for convenience and not for validity or
enforceability as between the parties themselves. [Thunga Hui vs. Que Bentec, 2
Phil. 561 (1903)] The subsequent execution by the heirs of the Extrajudicial Partition
in 1967 did not alter the oral partition as in fact the share pertaining to Angustia
Reyes corresponded to that previously assigned to her father. Considering that Angel
Reyes sold this property to Basilio de Ocampo who, in turn, sold the same to
respondents, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the latter lawfully acquired the
property and are entitled to ownership and possession thereof.
In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately failed to cite this
resolution, the latter, in their reply-memorandum dated 15 March 1991 and filed three days
thereafter, allege:
Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before this Honorable Court is
not deliberate nor with malice aforethought. The reason is that to date, we have not
yet received any resolution to our Motion For Leave of Court To Refer Case To The
Honorable Supreme Court En Banc. Moreover, we honestly feel that the resolution
that will be issued therein will not be applicable to the case before this Honorable
Court's Second Division. It should be mentioned that in the Durumpili case before the
Third Division, the Court of Appeals relied on the alleged confirmation of the sale
executed by Angustia Reyes, while in the Reyes case before this Second Division,
there was no sale that was executed by the petitioners Reyes' predecessor-ininterest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.

The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811, which reveals the following: (a)
On 18 September 1990, petitioners therein, represented by De Lara, De Lunas and Rosales, who
are the lawyers of petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
resolution of 20 August 1990. 19 b) This motion was denied in the resolution of 1 October 1990. 20 c) On
17 November 1990, petitioners therein, through the same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of Court To
Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc And/Or Motion For Reconsideration 21 wherein
they specifically admit that said case and the instant petition have "identity and/or similarity of the parties,
the facts, the issues raised," even going to the extent of "graphically" illustrating where such similarities
lie. 22d) This motion was denied in the resolution of 28 November 1990. Copy thereof was furnished the
attorneys for petitioners.23 e) Entry of judgment had already been made therein and a copy thereof was
sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of Transmittal of the Deputy Court and Chief of the Judicial Records
Office dated 20 December 1990.
What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple issue: whether or not
respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial
court.
We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and unavoidable because the
legal and factual conclusions made by the trial court are unfounded and clearly erroneous. The
Court of Appeals was not bound to agree to such conclusions. The trial court erred in holding that:
(a) there was no partition among the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936 since there is no written
evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that there was a survey and subdivision of the property
and the adjudication of specific subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino; (b) the land sold by
Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondents is not identical to Lot No. 1-A-14, the lot specified for and
adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition agreement; and (c) if the land sold by Rafael Reyes,
Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 and that TCT No. T-27257 was
obtained through fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was an action for reconveyance, which
should have been brought within four (4) years from the discovery thereof in 1967 when the
Extrajudicial Settlement was executed since private respondent Rosario Martillano, wife of Dalmacio,
was a party thereto.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936,
although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in
writing to be valid. 24 InHernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has
for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then
that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play
when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved,
it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon
a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred
that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral
partition is valid.
Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why
it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by
some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve

transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.
Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court in
the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811. 25
But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid for
some reason or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino
Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. 26 The estate of the
decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of
his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually
allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
In Ramirez vs. Bautista, 27 this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share in
the community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal
rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the
partition of the property.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his
share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was
eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirspetitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. is identical to Lot No. 114-A, the trial court based its conclusion that it is not, on his observation that the description of the
former does not tally with that of the latter, moreover, if Rafael did intend to sell Lot No. 1-14-A, he
should have specifically stated it in the deed since at that time, the property had already been
partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to him. In addition to the contrary findings and conclusion of
the respondent Court on this issue to which We fully agree, it is to be stressed that Rafael had this
property declared for taxation purposes and the tax declaration issued was made the basis for the
description of the property in the deed of sale. Upon the execution of the deed of sale, vendee
herein private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola immediately took possession of the property. This is
the very same property which is the subject matter of this case and which petitioners seek to recover
from the private respondents. The main evidence adduced for their claim of ownership and
possession over it is TCT No. T-27257, the certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They therefore
admit and concede that the property claimed by private respondent, which was acquired by sale
from Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none other than Lot No. 1-14-A.
The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial Settlement did not place
private respondents in estoppel to question the issuance of TCT No. T-27257. As correctly

maintained by private respondents, she signed it in representation of her deceased mother, Marta
Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf of her husband,
Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.
The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of
Gavino. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr.,
can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never
became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT
No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly
erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a light in
favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case, 28 it is but a confirmation or ratification of
title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution
of the settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create
any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The
latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.
There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-ininterest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time his
father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private
respondents the ownership and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As
categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or
about September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that
they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question. And yet, despite full
knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the property, it was only
about thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of
possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983.
There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the burden on private respondents to
bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of the
transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The instant petition then is without merit.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198680

July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO

YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC),
through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure
question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the
RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation
of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso
Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246. 5 In
their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June
28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno,
Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos.
T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his
certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his
passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of
action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not
prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been
judicially declared as Magdalenos lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs
therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the
issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedents compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he
is Magdalenos son and hence, his compulsory heir through the documentary evidence he

submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia
Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport. 13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31,
2011 due to the counsels failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246, 15 sought direct
recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTCs dismissal
of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 It is
well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained,
the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that
they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title
issued in the latters favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a
decedents lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding 20 precludes the
RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the
case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding
for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this
case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
1wphi1

prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be
made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in
Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that
matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in
a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case
of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir
to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was
for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of
heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, 23 or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be reopened.24
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence,
there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the
parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a
cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the
questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of
heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the
RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should
therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late
Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177066

September 11, 2009

JOSELITO MUSNI PUNO (as heir of the late Carlos Puno), Petitioner,
vs.
PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by JESUSA PUNO, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the rights and privileges of a stockholder. This,
we declare in this petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated
October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86137.
The facts of the case follow:
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises,
Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno,
initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the
son of the deceased with the latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed
entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint
thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all
the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or
income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno. 2
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal personality
to sue because his birth certificate names him as "Joselito Musni Muno." Apropos, there was yet a
need for a judicial declaration that "Joselito Musni Puno" and "Joselito Musni Muno" were one and
the same.
The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that petitioners certificate
of live birth was no proof of his paternity and relation to Carlos L. Puno.
Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name "Joselito M. Puno," certified by the
Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, and the Certificate of Finality thereof. To hasten the disposition
of the case, the court conditionally admitted the corrected birth certificate as genuine and authentic
and ordered respondent to file its answer within fifteen days from the order and set the case for
pretrial.3
On October 11, 2005, the court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad Fermin to allow
the plaintiff to inspect the corporate books and records of the company from 1962 up to the present
including the financial statements of the corporation.

The costs of copying shall be shouldered by the plaintiff. Any expenses to be incurred by the
defendant to be able to comply with this order shall be the subject of a bill of costs.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated October 11, 2006.
According to the CA, petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L.
Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the participatory
acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had no right
to demand that he be allowed to examine respondents books. Moreover, petitioner was not a
stockholder of the corporation but was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an
incorporator of the corporation. His action for specific performance therefore appeared to be
premature; the proper action to be taken was to prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L.
Puno in a petition for the settlement of the estate of the latter.5
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution 6 dated March 6, 2007.
In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE JOSELITO PUNO
IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEFS DEMANDED HE BEING THE HEIR OF THE LATE CARLOS
PUNO, ONE OF THE INCORPORATORS [OF] RESPONDENT CORPORATION.
II. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT FILIATION OF JOSELITO
PUNO, THE PETITIONER[,] IS NOT DULY PROVEN OR ESTABLISHED.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT JOSELITO MUNO AND JOSELITO
PUNO REFERS TO THE ONE AND THE SAME PERSON.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT
RESPONDENT MERELY DISPUTES IS THE SURNAME OF THE PETITIONER WHICH WAS
MISSPELLED AND THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION E.G. RIGHTS OF PETITIONER AS HEIR OF
CARLOS PUNO ARE DEEMED ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY IN THE RESPONDENT[S]
MOTION TO DISMISS.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THEREFORE ERRED I[N] DECREEING THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO INSPECT THE CORPORATE BOOKS OF DEFENDANT
CORPORATION.7
The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect respondent
corporations books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by Carlos L. Puno.
Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. However, we agree
with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased
stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter.

Incessantly, we have declared that factual findings of the CA supported by substantial evidence, are
conclusive and binding.8 In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may not review the factual findings of
the CA. It is not the Courts function under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to review, examine, and
evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. 9
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on
the information of a third person.10 As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioners mother supplied
the data in the birth certificate and signed the same. There was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno
acknowledged petitioner as his son.
As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not of the veracity of the entries with
respect to the childs paternity.11
In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons who are entitled to
the inspection of corporate books, thus
Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. x x x.
The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting shall be
open to the inspection of any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at
reasonable hours on business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said
records or minutes, at his expense.
xxxx
Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. Within ten (10) days from receipt of a written request of
any stockholder or member, the corporation shall furnish to him its most recent financial statement,
which shall include a balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable year and a profit or loss of
statement for said taxable year, showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result
of its operations.12
The stockholders right of inspection of the corporations books and records is based upon his
ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity for self-protection. After all, a shareholder
has the right to be intelligently informed about corporate affairs.13 Such right rests upon the
stockholders underlying ownership of the corporations assets and property.14
Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the corporation, a
right inherent in the ownership of the shares.15
1avvphi1

Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation.
The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks
must be recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that

no transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of
the corporation.16 During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks,
the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the
stock.17 Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held
by the administrator or executor.18 Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor
who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder.
Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of
Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondents books and be entitled to
receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares
owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been
recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Corollary to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights
over the estate of a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special
proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The status of an
illegitimate child who claims to be an heir to a decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action, as in a case for the recovery of property.19 The doctrine applies to the instant
case, which is one for specific performance to direct respondent corporation to allow petitioner to
exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his representatives.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133743

February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029

February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and
January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc.
No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was
the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to
Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the
two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the
Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on
the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It
also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and
did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos
legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment
of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view sweeping

statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic
policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The
foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute
the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration
Court of Appeals.

34

which were denied by the

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it
was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at
the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such

nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place
and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5,
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49 stating
that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa
was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule
in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a

proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee,

is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,
after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.

1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of
the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains
a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."
xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and
the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we
find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may
be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144
of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband
and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Coownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of coownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property
is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponents defense. x x x81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to

dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127969 June 25, 1999

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE M. ESTRADA and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE, respondents.

VITUG, J.:
The instant petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 39816
which has affirmed the judgment and orders of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") or Cavite (Branch
20) in LRC Case No. 1077-95, entitled. In Re: "Petition for Reconstitution of Los/Burned Original
Copy of Transfer Certificates of Title No. 11203 and No. 11204.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, gave a brief factual and case settings of the controversy.
On March 28, 1995, Jose M. Estrada, the private respondent in this case and
petitioner in LRC Case No. 1077-95 filed with the Regional Trial Court Branch 20,
Imus, Cavite the reconstitution of lost/burned original copies of certificate of titles
nos. T-11203 and T-11204 and for the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of
the same certificates. These were allegedly lost or destroyed when the capitol
building was burned.
On April 29, 1995, RTC Branch 20 of Imus Cavite set the hearing of the petition on
June 19, 1995 at 9:00 A.M. requiring all interested parties to appear and show cause,
if any, why the petition be not granted. The order required its publication in the
Official Gazette for two successive issues with the further directive that copies be
furnished the adjoining owners, Office of the Solicitor General, Land Registration
authority, and the Register of Deeds. It was likewise required that the petitioner post
copies of the order at the Bulletin Board of the Court, at the main entrance of the
Provincial Capitol Building, Trece Martirez City and at the Municipal Building of
Dasmarias, Cavite, as well as where the properties is located.
There being no opposition to the petition, petitioner was allowed to adduce his
evidence in the presence of the public prosecutor who had been deputized by the
Solicitor General to represent him for the Republic of the Philippines.
Florinda Estrada, a 41-year old daughter of the petitioner who was duly authorized to
represent her sickly father, introduced oral and testimonial evidence. The lost/burned
certificate of titles were presented in court as well as the tax declarations in the name
of petitioner. The official receipts of tax payments were likewise introduced. A copy of
the Deed of Sale dated July 30, 1957 in favor of petitioner was submitted by him to
the court. After Florinda Estrada's testimonial evidence on the possession of her

father of the land and its not being mortgaged or encumbered, Francisco Cuenca,
owner of all the adjoining lots offered no objection to the petition. The public
prosecutor Zenaida de Castro cross-examined the petitioner's witnesses. 1
On 20 June 1995, the trial court granted the petition for reconstitution; thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing the
Register of Deeds of Cavite to cause the reconstitution of the lost/burned original of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 11203 and 11204 in the name of Jose Estrada upon
payment of proper fees.
Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Register of Deeds, the Solicitor General, the
Land Registration Authority and to petitioner. 2
On 24 July 1995, private respondent filed a motion to cite the Registrar of Deeds of Cavite for
contempt alleging, among other things
3. That in spite of the finality of the judgment, and over the pleas of petitioner's
[private respondent's] representative, the Register of Deeds of Cavite has refused
and continues to refuse to effect the reconstitution, thereby depriving the petitioner
[private respondent] of the use of his Transfer Certificate of Title.
4. That the Register of Deeds of Cavite insists on referring the matter first to the Land
Registration Authority, which is uncalled for, without factual and legal basis, an
exercise in futility, considering that the LRA was very much aware of the proceedings
and did not oppose the petition, and is aware of the judgment and did not appeal
either.
5. That the refusal of the Register of Deeds of Cavite to effect the reconstitution is
punishable contempt under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court.
6. That under Section 7 of the same Rule, the Register of Deeds of Cavite may be
imprisoned until he effect the reconstitution. 3
Atty. Alejandro Villanueva, the then incumbent Registrar of Deeds of Cavite, proffered his
explanation asseverating
That the Register of Deeds did not give due course to the registration of the above
decision for reconstitution in view of the doubt entertained by the Register of Deeds
as to the authenticity and genuiness of the alleged owner's duplicate copy of TCT
Nos T-11203 and T-11204 which serve as basis for reconstitution of the original copy
thereof when presented and suggested that the same be subjected to government
agencies like the NBI to determine their genuiness.
That the tax declarations presented to the court to support the petition for
reconstitution and marked Exhibits K and K-1 were not genuine as per Certification

dated July 27,1995 issued by the Assistant Provincial Assessor which is hereto
attached as Annex "A";
That the alleged certification issued by the Register of Deeds that TCT Nos. T-11203
and T-11204 were among those burned and marked as Exhibit J is also not genuine.
That Lot 5766 as allegedly covered by TCT Nos. T-11203 and T-11204, is already
covered by a certificate of title issued on November; 6 1967 namely TCT No. T26877 in the name of PILAR DEVELOPMENT CO. INC., Xerox copy hereto attached
as Annex "B";
That as held by the Supreme Court in RP vs. C.T. of APP. et al 1-46626 Dec. 27,
1979, (Pea, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds 1982 Ed. P-09) THUS, where
a certificate of title covering a parcel of land was reconstituted judicially, and it was
found later that there existed earlier a certificate of title covering the same property in
the name of another person, it was held that the existence of such prior title ipso
facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in said
proceeding as to the alleged ownership under the reconstituted title cannot be given
any credence. That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud
FOISTED on the courts of justice.
That this explanation is being submitted for the appraisal of the Honorable Court with
a prayer that the Register of Deeds be not cited for contempt of Court.
In an Order, dated 03 August 1995, Atty. Villanueva was ordered as incarcerated until such times he
would have complied with the judgment of the RTC. A warrant for his arrest was issued, and a bond
of P100,000.00 for his provisional liberty was fixed which he posted.
Shortly after the complete records of LRC No. 1077-95, in connection with the contempt charge
against him, were elevated to the appellate court for review, Atty. Villanueva assailants was slain by
unidentified assailants in his residence in Las Pias, Metro Manila.
On 27 December 1995, the Acting Registrar of Deeds of Cavite caused the reconstitution of the
Originals of TCT No. 11203 and No. 11204 Pursuant to the 22nd December 1995 order of the RTC.
On 20 February 1996, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the judgment of the trial court. The
petition for annulment was anchored on the following grounds; to wit:
(a) That the two (2) reconstituted titles are patent nullity as they were
reconstituted pursuant to a void decision and secured thru fraud and
misrepresentation;
(b) that the amended order dated 29 April 1995 was not published;

(c) that the Solicitor General was not notified about the hearing on the
case; and
(d) that the Land Registration Authority was not furnished a copy of
the decision,
The appellate court, in its now assailed decision of 27 January 1997, dismissed the petition for
annulment and affirmed the judgment and orders of the trial court. Unsatisfied with this outcome, the
Republic of the Philippines filed the instant petition for review, contending that
I.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
RECONSTITUTION CASE.
II
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE VOID
DECISION. 5
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines would here insist that the RTC erroneously proceeded to take
cognizance of petition notwithstanding the existence of several jurisdictional defects, among which
included the following shortcomings, namely, that
1. The amended order advancing the initial hearing of the case from 24 July 1995 to
19 June 1995 was not published.
2. No notice to actual occupants and other interested persons were sent.
3. The owner's duplicate of TCT No. 11203 and No. 11204 presented by private
respondent to the RTC were fake and of doubtful origin because
a. The said owner's duplicates are not in the official form.
b. Lot No. 5766 is declared for taxation purposes in the name of Luis
Pujalte from 1940 to 1994.
c. The signature of the Registrar of Deeds Escorastico Cuevas on
both titles are fake.
d. The technical descriptions on subject titles when plotted did not
coincide/conform, with the technical description of Lot 5766.
e. The Alleged registered owner and his Attorney-in-fact are not the
occupants of the parcels of land.

f. The tax declarations in the name of Jose Estrada are fake and
spurious.
4. The existence Of other titles the same property barred the reconstitution
proceedings before the Regional Trial Court.
5. The void judgment reconstitution case was not served on the petitioner.
This Court, in its resolution of 16 April 1997, required respondents to comment on the petition and
forthwith issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining private respondent Jose Estrada from
conveying, encumbering or otherwise dealing with the property, as well as public respondent
Registrar of Deeds of Cavite Province from registering any transaction involving Transfer Certificates
of Title No. 11203 and No. 11204, subject matter of the reconstitution proceedings in LRC Case No.
1077-95. In accordance with the resolution, private respondent Jose Estrada submitted his
comment. Following the reply filed by petitioner, the Court gave due course to the petition. 6
The Court sees merit in the petition.
Reconstitution of a certificate of title, in the context of Republic Act No. 26, denotes the restoration in
the original form and condition 7 of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece
of land. The purpose of the reconstitution is to have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the
title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred. Among the
conditions explicitly required by the law is publication of the petition twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and its posting at the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal
building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. 8 This directive is mandatory; indeed, its compliance has been held to be jurisdictional.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 9 the Court has said:
Anent the publication requirement, R.A. No. 26 obligates the petitioner to prove to the
trial court two things, namely that: (1) its order giving due course to the petition for
reconstitution and setting it for hearing was published twice, in two consecutive
issues of the Official Gazette; and (2) such publication was made at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. 10
So also did the Court hold in Allama vs. Republic,

11

where the Court, again, has stated:

The non-compliance with these requirements provided for under Section 13 of

Republic Act No. 26 as regards the notice of hearing is fatal and the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the petition. 12
Private respondent admits that the amended Order has not been published but seeks to justify this
failure by stating that the amended order is simply a verbatim reproduction of the first Order,
published in the Official Gazette on 29 May 1995 and 09 June 1995, and that, therefore, the
omission is just a minor lapse. The Court sees it differently. The flaw is fatal. The legally mandated
publication must be complied with in the manner the law has ordained. The date of the actual
hearing is obviously a matter of accurately be stated in the notice. It is not here substance that must
accurately be stated in the notice. It is not here denied that the volume of the Official Gazette, where

the Order of Initial Hearing (for the 24 July 1995 setting) can be found, has officially been released
by the National Printing Office only on 14 June 1995 or merely actual five days from the date of the
actual hearing on 19 June 1995. The clear directive of the law is for the notice to be made "at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing." The Court of Appeals indeed must have failed to take note
that the Exhibits "B," "C," "D" and "D-1" of the alleged jurisdictional requirements presented before
the trial court all pertain to the original order setting the initial hearing on 24 July 1995 and not to the
amended order advancing the hearing to 19 June 1995. Concededly, the amended order has not
been published at all.
One other compelling reason that militates against respondent is the evident failure of due
compliance with the requirement of notice to actual occupants, the (although one of the adjoining
owners, Mr. Francisco Cuenca, would appear to have been duly notified of the hearing of 19 June
1995) and all other persons who may have an interest in the property. Sections 12 and 13 of
Republic Act No. 26, provide:
Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d),
2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of
First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest
in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following:
(a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b)
that no co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, a any
had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and
boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names
and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and
addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners
of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the
property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property;
and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have
been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not
been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be
introduced in evidence in support to the petition for reconstitution shall be attached
thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be
made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the
petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the
property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, [now
Commission of Land Registration] or with a certified copy of the description taken
from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding
section, to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues
of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial
building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is
situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise
cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense
of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least

thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things,
the number of the lost or destroyed Certificate of Title, if known, the name of the
registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the
location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons
having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the
petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting
and service of the notice as directed by the court.
The existence of several other titles, including
1. TCTs No. T-96019 (Lot 5766-B) and T-96011 (Lot 5766-A) both in name of Susan
D. Degollacion.
2. TCT No. T-148177 (Lot No. 5766-B) in the names of spouses Jose del Rosario
and Juliet dela Cruz.
3. TCT No. T-26877 (Lot No. 7524, a portion of Lot 5766) in the name of Pilar
Development Company, Inc. 13
mentioned in the records apparently have not been properly disclosed in the petition for
reconstitution nor in the corresponding notice caused to be given by the court, which notice
the law requires to be sent to all interested parties at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. The registered owners named in these incompatible titles, as so aptly pointed out by
the Solicitor General, are interested persons within the meaning of the law entitled to notice
of the date of initial hearing on 19 June 1995, the absence of which notice constitutes a
jurisdictional defect. This Court has repeatedly stated that the requirement of actual notice to
the occupants and the owners of the adjoining property under sections 12 and 13 of
Republic Act No. 26 is itself mandatory to vest jurisdiction upon the court in a petition for
reconstitution of title and to take the case on its merits. The non-observance of the
requirement invalidates the whole reconstitution proceedings in the trial court. 14
The Court, given the foregoing circumstances, is constrained to accordingly hold that the decision,
dated 20 June 1995, in LRC Case No. 1077-95 decreeing the reconstitution of TCT No. 11203 and
No. 11204 is null and void. In contemplation of law, the decision is non-existent; in MWSS vs.
Sison, 15 the Court had said:
. . . (A) void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to valid judgment, but
may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is
sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid
adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any
place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is,
ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All Proceedings founded on
the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words a void
judgment is regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there

were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position
they were in before the trial. 16
For want of jurisdiction, the trial court must be held to have been without authority to take
cognizance of the litigation and all its aspects. 17
Finally, it may not be amiss for the Court to reiterate its admonition in Ortigas and Company Ltd.
Partnership vs. Velasco 18 that courts must exercise the greatest caution in entertaining petitions for
reconstitution of destroyed or lost certificates of title in order to help avoid litigations and controversies, as
well as discordant supervening events, that may be spawned by a hasty grant of reconstitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 27
January 1997, is set aside. The Temporary restraining order issued by this Court in 16 April 1997 is
made permanent and the decision and the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite in the
reconstitution case (LRC Case No. 1077-95) are declared null and void for want of jurisdiction. No
costs.
1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER

QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las
Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo),
filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The petition was
opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia
was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma.
Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is
the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To
prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was
alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties
worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its
value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death
Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 the petition for settlement of

decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In addition to
their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for
Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to
Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was
properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or
incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent
Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of
the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived
together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution 11 dated 7 August
2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on
the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON
WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIAQUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING
MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS
NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of
his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. 14 Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. 18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las
Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his
estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos
Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled.
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the
time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband
and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in
1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. 20 That Eliseo
went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable
petitioners position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It

disproves rather than supports petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose from an
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed
by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court. 21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias
marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place,
thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms,
allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to
therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally
without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after
the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the
validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a
cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to
determine whether or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between
Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by
the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in
Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the
certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage exists does
not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first
marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can
no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote.
Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time

Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage
is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to
the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must
be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the

phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in
the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse
the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the
estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the
law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. 29Having a vested right in
the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as
an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 128314

May 29, 2002

RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao,
who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of
stock and other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1 Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that
he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually
dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real
properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased
parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. 2 He argued that the
deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their
deaths. The decedents actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother
used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they
stayed in Rodolfos residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of
obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence
previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voters affidavits, statements
of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all
indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.
1wphi1.nt

In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfos house
in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their
death certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon
City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother,
Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents residence on
the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as
reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same
way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to Pericos residence at Legaspi
Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive
evidence of the decedents residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise. 5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position. 6 Both failed to
comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived. 7

Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived. 8 After the parties submitted
the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as
special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989,
respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of the
decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were
supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant,
therefore, cannot disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position other than
his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit
movants motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.10
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo having
been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the
respondent Judge is affirmedin toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution
dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE
DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY
INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.
III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE

AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS RESIDENCE RATHER
THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS
TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN
SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES
OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE
CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS
AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga,
where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed
before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to

the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration
granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that
the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent
residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the
following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom
of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein
permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to be physically present in
Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their
permanent residence.
1wphi1.nt

The contention lacks merit.

The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres
Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in
Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to
purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a
house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that
Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be
said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in
Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioners
Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondents assertion that their elderly
parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were both residents of
Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late
mothers death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner
recognized his deceased mothers residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to
contest the entry in Ignacios death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly
considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate courts
observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and
respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at
the time of their parents death.

The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at the time of
death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the
documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required by
the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of
Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and
"residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary.17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been living with
petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be
substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that,
contrary to petitioners assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents physical
presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents stay therein was more
than temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts factual findings
stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2, 18 on
ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings.
He argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the
purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in
Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to
permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept
and where most of the decedents properties are located.
Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in the place where he
permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a persons properties can be found mostly in
the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different

from that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business
interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep
records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individuals choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary
civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court
of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one
and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that
venue for the settlement of the decedents intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City
court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149926

February 23, 2005

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which
seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
48831 affirming the dismissal2 of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez
entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the
payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In
view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the
principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations ofP43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and
every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, 4 this time in the
amount ofP123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of
Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard
Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the
said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing
Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.6 Subsequently in March 1981,
testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent.7 During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement8 dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for
Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding
to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities 9 was executed by and
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint11 for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil
Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not
served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of
his return to the Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence
S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer 13 and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement
signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void;
hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch
63.14Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit. 15
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court
before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money
being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the
Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in
effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering
that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until after
the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was
the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and
liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of
assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly
refer to the decedents account. Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and
void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola
must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA),
assigning the following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A)
SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION
AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED
HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.16

The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his
legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the
joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A" estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot
deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their
personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the same before the probate court for
approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in the
holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to relitigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the petitioner
should have been presented before the probate court.17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should
have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid
partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph
(e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the
deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active participation of respondent
Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT
SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION
AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN
PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED
HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
IV.

RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE
PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT
UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND
DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE
FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK.19
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided
in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint
agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the
obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without
any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also
points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors
subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation
and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioners
claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and
to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of
the tractors under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves
to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to
consider the fact that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan
documents, all establishing thevinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez
and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated
May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibaez, together with his
heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are
concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the continuing
guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must
be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its
money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are
being sued in their respective personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying to
recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been
filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement
there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. However, to
avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted
to require them to execute the said agreement.
1a\^/phi1.net

According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the agreement
was null and void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her

brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice
the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even stated
in her answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the
petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty
agreement, nor was there any document presented as evidence to show that she had caused
herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement
executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the
deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased.
1awphi1.nt

At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered.20 The said court is primarily concerned with the
administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.21
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. 22
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced
in the will.23In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will 24 which
contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he
was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three
(3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not
valid. The joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among
themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.

It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without
the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any
other transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an
extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just
divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of
the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. 28 In the instant case, there is
no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it
was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to
determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola
to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other
possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the
decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs
as parties thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the
above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel
taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp."29 The assumption of
liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession
and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were
each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive
any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor
of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
l^vvphi1.net

Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due,
not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action
that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased
in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim
had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due,
or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory.30 As we
held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31

 This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the
rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition
of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola
accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented,
particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed
only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money
claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent
under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses
Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the
successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its
assets and liabilities.33 The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation
and Union Bank of the Philippines"34 However, the documentary evidence35 clearly reflects that the
parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can
the petitioners participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial
evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact,
petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not
present evidence to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the
Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised
by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative." (Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it
failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and
the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals
Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 45904

September 30, 1938

Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G. UTULO, applicant-appellee,

vs.
LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
Feliciano B. Gardiner for appellant.
Gerardo S. Limlingan for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the order of the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial administrator of the property left by the deceased Luz
Garcia.
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac for the administration of his property (special proceedings No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de
Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The
said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia
who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G.
Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said deceased, she died in
the province without any legitimate descendants, her only forced heirs being her mother and her
husband. The latter commenced in the same court the judicial administration of the property of his
deceased wife (special proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs were he
himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only property left by the deceased
consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that
he be named administrator of the property of said deceased. The oppositor objected to the petition,
opposing the judicial administration of the property of her daughter and the appointment of the
applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness,
there was no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she stated that should the court grant
the administration of the property, she should be appointed the administratrix thereof inasmuch as
she had a better right than the applicant. After the required publications, trial was had and the court,
on August 28, 1936, finally issued the appealed order to which the oppositor excepted and thereafter
filed the record on appeal which was certified and approved.
The oppositor-appellant assigns five errors allegedly committed by the trial court, but these assigned
errors raise only two questions for resolution, namely: whether upon the admitted facts the judicial
administration of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia lies, with the consequent appointment
of an administrator, and whether the appellant has a better right to the said office than the appellee.
1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing in part that
"if no executor is named in the will, or if a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted" etc.
This provision enunciates the general rule that when a person dies living property in the Philippine
Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the deceased left no will, or in
case he had left one should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule, however, is subject to the

exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the same Code, as finally amended. According to
the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may
agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for
the appointment of an administrator. According to the second, if the property left does not exceed six
thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the competent court, after the required publications, to
proceed with the summary partition and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the
property constituting the inheritance among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a person dies without
leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs.Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil.,
434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemorvs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fule vs. Fule, 46
Phil., 317).
In enunciating the aforesaid doctrine, this court relied on the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661
of the Civil Code under which the heirs succeed to all the property left by the deceased from the time
of his death. In the case of Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra, it was said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded
immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs
at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed
and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing
against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property
immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it
among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The
Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for
partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts
existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an
administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs
are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be
burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging
absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator
has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs.
They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division
of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs
requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever
in the present actions. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their
participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.
In the cases of Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra, Bondad vs. Bondad, supra, and Baldemor vs.
Malangyaon, supra, the same doctrine was reiterated. And in the case of Fule vs. Fule, supra, this
court amplified and ratified the same doctrine in the following language:

Upon the second question Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint an
administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule? it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all
of the parties to the present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against his
estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil
Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is
transmitted immediately to his heirs. (To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546;
Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Marin vs.Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238;
Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil., 73; Bondadvs. Bondad,
34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes immediately to his heirs, as
owners, and there are no debts, what reason can there be for the appointment of a judicial
administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately entitled? In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad (34
Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, discussing this question, said: Under the
provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are
transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to
all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment
of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the
estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they
desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves
and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure
in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they
cannot mutually agree in the division. (Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate
should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The administrator has
no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs
when they are adults and when there are no debts against the estate. (Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, supra; Bondad vs. Bondad, supra; Baldemor vs.Malangyaon, supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the property left by their
ancestor is the same as that of any other coowners or owners in common, and they may
recover their individual rights, the same as any other coowners of undivided property.
(Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann., 502; Mcintyre vs.Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et
ux. vs. Ford, 29 Miss., 57.)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exist in the divisions of
personal as well as the real property. If they cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for
partition of such personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is maintenable

where the estate is not in debts, the heirs are all of age, and there is no administration upon
the estate and no necessity thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. Rep., 559.)
It is difficult to conceive of any class or item of property susceptible of being held in common
which may not be divided by the coowners. It may be of personal property as well as of real
estate; of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of
adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands of the coowners as well as of the whole.
(Pickering vs. Moore, 67 N. H., 533; 31 L. R. A., 698; Pipes vs.Buckner, 51 Miss., 848;
Tewksbury vs. Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)
We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine so uniformly
applied. We are convinced that if the courts had followed it in all cases to which it has application,
their files would not have been replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as they are
now. There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the effect that his appointment
as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of
the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right of the
representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary
forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and
necessary party if she were living . In order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the
distribution of the property it is not necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased
wife be instituted an administration which will take up time and occasion inconvenience and
unnecessary expenses.
2. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine which of the parties has preferential right to
the office of administrator.
The appealed order should be reversed, with the costs of this instance to the applicant-appellee. So
ordered.

G.R. No. 21859

September 30, 1924

Intestate estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased. CIRIACO FULE, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
ANASTASIO FULE, ET AL., opponents-appellees.
Palma, Leuterio & Yamzon for appellant.
Ramon Diokno for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
The record in this case presents two questions:
First. Was the appeal from the decision of the lower court perfected within the time required by law?
And,
Second. Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint and administrator for the estate of
Saturnino Fule, deceased?
FACTS
Saturnino Fule died on the 4th day of April, 1923, intestate. On the 2d day of July, 1923, Ciriaco
Fule, one of the heirs, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna
for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased, and prayed
specially for the appointment of Cornelio Alcantara as such administrator. The petitioner further
prayed that during the pendency of the petition for the appointment of an administrator, the said
Cornelio Alcantara be then and there appointed as special administrator for said estate. The
petitioner alleged that at the time of the death of Saturnino Fule, he was the owner of real and
personal property located in the municipality of San Pablo, Province of Laguna, of the value of
P50,000 with a rental value of about P8,000 and that, in addition to said real and personal property,
he also left about P30,000 in cash. The lower court on the day of the presentation of the petition
appointed Cornelio Alcantara as special administrator and required him to give a bond of P8,000. On
the 26th day of July, 1923, the special administrator presented in court an inventory of the alleged
property of the deceased.
On the 31st day of July, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney Mr. Ramon Diokno, appeared
and presented a motion alleging that they were children of Saturnino Fule and that they were all of
age; that they opposed the appointment of an administrator upon the ground that the deceased had
left no debts and that his property had already been partitioned among his children during his lifetime
in conformity with article 1056 of the Civil Code; that the special administrator had taken possession
of property of large value belonging to them, and had thereby deprived them of their means of
livelihood, and prayed that they order appointing a special administrator be denied. To said property,
personal and real, which the special administrator had taken possession of, belonging to the
oppositors.
On the 4th day of August, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney, presented a further opposition
to the appointment of an administrator for said estate, alleging again that the heirs of Saturnino Fule
were all of age; that the deceased had left no debts; that the property had been divided among his
heirs during his lifetime; that the special administrator had been appointed without any notification
whatever, neither personal not by publication, to the heirs of the deceased, and that there was no

necessity for the appointment of a special administrator during the pendency of the question, nor for
the appointment of an administrator.
On the 14th day of August, 1923, the petitioner answered the motion of the oppositors and opposed
their petition for the revocation of the appointment of a special administrator. He alleged that the
oppositors had been requested to make a partition of the property of the deceased; that no partition
of the property of the deceased had been made during the lifetime of the deceased; that the property
described in Exhibit A attached to the motion of the oppositors was the exclusive and absolute
property of the petitioner, who had for more than forty years been in the quiet, public, and exclusive
possession of the same, as owner; and prayed that the motion of the oppositors is denied.
Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Isidro Paredes, judge, on the 15th day of August,
1923, revoked the appointment of the special administrator and ordered him to render an account.
On the same day (August 15, 1923) Judge Paredes denied the appointment of an administrator, and
suggested to the petitioner that within thirty days from that date he should amend his petition and
present an ordinary action for the partition of the property of the estate of the deceased, and in case
he should fail to do so it would be understood that the petition for the appointment of an
administrator is denied.
On the 5th day of September, 1923, the petitioner excepted to the orders of the court of the 15th day
of August, 1923, and on the same day presented a motion for reconsideration, or new trial, and
prayed that the court declare without effect the orders of the 15th day of August and proceed to the
appointment of an ordinary administrator who should present to the court a project of partition of the
property involved, for approval. On the 11th day of September, 1923, the oppositors, through their
attorney, opposed the motion for reconsideration or new trial upon the ground that the judgment of
the court of the 15th day of August had become final and non-appealable.
On the 17th day of September, 1923, the court a quo, considering said motion for reconsideration or
new trial and the opposition thereto, annulled and set aside that part of the order of the court of the
15th day of August, which granted to the petitioner the right to amend his petition, and fixed the 4th
day of October, 1923, for a continuation of the proof upon the question of the appointment of an
administrator. On the 26th day of October, 1923, and after hearing the respective parties, the
Honorable Isidro Paredes, denied the petition for the appointment of an administrator upon the
principal ground that all of the property of Saturnino Fule had been in the possession of his heirs for
many years before his death; and that at the time of his death there were no debts and no property
to be administered. From that judgment the petitioner appealed.
In this court the oppositors renewed their motion to dismiss the appeal for the reason that it had not
been presented within the period of twenty days as provided in section 783 of Act No. 190. Said
section provides that: "Any person legally interested in any other order, decree, or judgment (other
than those mentioned in sections 781 and 782) of a court of first instance in the exercise of its
jurisdiction in special proceedings in the settlement of the estates of deceased persons or the
administration of guardians and trustees, may appeal to the Supreme Court from such order, decree,
or judgment, when such order, decree, or judgment constitutes a final determination of the rights of
the parties so appealing, and the appeal shall be effected in the manner provided in the two
preceding sections: . . ." (within twenty days).
The appellees argue that the appeal was not perfected within twenty days from the 15th day of
August, 1923. They evidently overlooked the fact that the decree was not a final decree for the
reason that it gave the petitioner thirty days within which to decide whether he would amend his
petition present an ordinary action. Inasmuch, therefore, as the petitioner had thirty days within
which to decide just what course he would pursue, said decision could not become until after the

expiration of thirty days or until the petitioner had decide just what course he desired to take. That
order of the court conceding him thirty days to decide the option therein given, continued in force
until the 17th day of September, when the court decided the motion for reconsideration and granted
to the petitioner a part of his prayer. From that date the cause proceeded to a final hearing and
judgment on the 26th day of October, 1923, and the appeal from the final judgment of that date was
perfected within the time provided for in the above-mentioned provision of Act No. 190.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the judgment of the 15th day of August, 1923, was not final; that
the final judgment rendered in the cause was on the 26th day of October, 1923; that the appeal from
the final judgment was perfected within time, and therefore, the motion to dismiss the appeal for
failure to perfect the same within the statutory period is hereby denied.
Upon the second question Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint an
administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule? it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the
parties to the present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against his estate and (b)
that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of
the property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately
to his heirs. (To Guioc-Covs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321;
Marin vs. Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable Jose vs. Uson, 17
Phil., 73; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes immediately to his heirs, as owners,
and there are no debts, what reason can there be for the appointment of a judicial administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are
immediately entitled? In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano
Arellano, discussing this question, said: " 'Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to
661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other
words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property
belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had
executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts
existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property
immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among
themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case
they cannot mutually agree in the division.' " (Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should
be burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to
intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs when they are adults
and when there are no debts against the estate. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra;
Bondad vs. Bondad, supra; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon,supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the property left by their
ancestor is the same as that of any other coowners in common, and they may recover their
individual rights, the same as any other coowners of undivided property. (Succession of Story, 3 La.
Ann., 502; McIntyre vs. Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux., vs. Ford, 29 Miss., 57.)
And even when there are debts against the estate, the heirs, all being of age, may pay the debts and
divide the property among themselves according to their respective rights, as heirs or as legatees in
case of a will, without probating the same, and the effect of such division is to invest each party with

a complete equitable title to their particular share of the estate. (Carter vs. Owens, 41 Ala., 217.) The
right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exists in the division of personal as
well as the real property. If they cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of such
personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is maintainable where the estate is not in
debt, the heirs are all of age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity
thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex., Civ. App. Rep., 559.)
It is difficult to conceived of any one class or item of property susceptible of being held in common
which may not be divided by the coowners. It may be of personal property as well as of real estate;
of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts;
or of part only of the lands of the co-owners as well as of the whole. (Pickering vs. Moore, 67 N. H.,
553; 31 L. R. A., 698; Pipes vs. Buckner, 51 Miss., 848; Tewsbury vs. Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)
Therefore, and for all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed,
without any findings as to costs, and without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to commence a
new action for a partition of any property left by Saturnino Fule which had not already been
partitioned among his heirs. So ordered.
Avancea Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Street, J., did not sign.

Separate Opinions
MALCOLM and OSTRAND, JJ., dissenting:
There are cases where the insignificance of the estate and the disproportionate expenses of the
administration proceedings, together with the fact that the parties are of age and that there appear to
be no debts, may justify the denial of a petition for an administration, but such is not the present
case. Here the estate is allege to be worth P80,000. The inventory shows a very large quantity of
personal property, thirty-one parcels of land, and outstanding credits to the amount of P13,454. It is
asserted that the deceased left no debts, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that a person with
such large property interest may have had dealings with others from which claims against the estate
may arise, the existence of which cannot be definitely ascertained until the publication of notice to
claimants and creditors has been made, pursuant to the provisions of section 687 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. In these circumstances it would seem to be to the interest of all parties concerned to
have the estate definitely settled and that can only be done properly through administration
proceedings.
That the distribution of the property which is alleged to have been made by the deceased by means
of informal donations a few years before his death can be of no legal effect, will not be disputed and
it clearly appears from the record that there is no probability of an amicable distribution of the estate
and that it will be necessary to have recourse to the courts for a settlement of the dispute.
Considering the character of the property, partition proceedings are likely to be more complicated
and expensive than administration proceedings and will settle nothing definitely. Claims against the
estate may be presented at any time within the Statute of Limitations and may lead to litigation and
possibly to the subsequent throwing of the estate into administration when a redistribution of the
property may have to be made. In the meantime some of the distributees may have become
insolvent or the property received by them otherwise dissipated, thus rendering an equitable
settlement of the estate difficult if not impossible.

An examination of the cases cited in the decision of the court reveals that only three of them have
any bearing on the question here discussed. These cases are Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa (17 Phil.,
321); Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232) and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon (34 Phil., 367).
The case of McIntyre vs. Chappell (4 Tex., 187), which, at first sight, appears to be in point, is based
on a statute which requires the appointment of an administrator only in case one or more of the
creditors of the estate demands it. We have been unable to find any decision of a court in the United
States where, under a statute similar to ours, the existence of known debts has been regarded as a
necessary prerequisite for the appointment of an administrator in cases where the heirs are of age.
It may further be observed that in none of the cases in this jurisdiction in which the appointment of
an administrator has been held unnecessary, as the court gone as far as it has in the present case.
In the case ofIlustre vs. Alaras Frondosa the heirs were of age and had made an amicable partition
for the appointment of the administrator was presented nearly six years after the death of the
deceased. In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad, supra, there had also been an amicable partition of
the property and the administrator was appointed nine years after the death of the deceased; and in
the case of Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra, it also appears that there had been a partition by
agreement that there were no debts and considering the long period which had elapsed since the
death of the deceased, there could be but little probability of any new claimants appearing. Under
such circumstances the court might well be justified in holding that the appointment of an
administrator was unnecessary. In the present case we are confronted with an entirely different
situation. Here there has been no partition or distribution by agreement among the heirs, the petition
for administration was presented within three months after the death of the deceased, and the estate
is large and its settlement may give rise to unexpected complications.
The Code of Civil Procedure devotes one hundred sixty-nine sections to proceedings for the
settlement of the estates of deceased persons. The remedies there provided are founded on
experience and are undoubtedly the most practicable for a definite settlement of all estates of any
importance. It seems to us that the court is going to judicial legislation, makes the remedies
prescribed by the Code unavailable to persons interested in such estates. Instead of discouraging
definite and final settlements the courts should encourage them.
The order appealed from should be reversed and the petition for the appointment of an administrator
granted.

G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.
Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving
any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix
of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main questions which
need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3,
1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the
herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private
respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration
in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified
petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only
surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased;
that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the
PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA)
and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at
Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had
been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate
of the deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private
respondent 2alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and
praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said
estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita
Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond
posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real
and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after
receipt of the order. 3

Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in its
decision dated December 15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1) Whether
or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of
administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are
no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as administratrix of
the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita
Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and
the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she
submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said
death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB
and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by several receipts; and,
finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the petitioner
and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties
form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that this
function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the
deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch
as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or nonexclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. 5
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration
proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant
contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the
rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a
certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's
determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action which may be instituted by the parties. 7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes
of administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by private
respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should
he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule

74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate,
they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying
for the appointment of an administrator.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not
desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs
to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for
partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the
estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for
partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be
paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator
by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings . 12
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased
when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of
each case.
In one case, 13 We said:
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to
the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at
loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents
succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what
property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be
ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands
of one heir.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to
avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment
of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and
the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find
so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his
deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in
the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a
forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter. 15
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a
wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the

deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The
only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to
obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these
properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We
are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration
of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not
appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to
an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of
being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to
the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the
creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending
was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the
estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration
proceeding.
With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the
surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to
be appointed as administratrix.
WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita
Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to
the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property left by Andres
de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31979 August 6, 1980

FILOMENA G. PIZARRO, MISAEL G. PIZARRO, AURELIO PIZARRO, JR., LUZMINDA G.
PIZARRO, DELIA-THELMA G. PIZARRO, ROGELIO G. PIZARRO, VIRGILIO G. PIZARRO,
ROSALINDA G. PIZARRO, JOSE ELVIN G. PIZARRO and MARIA EVELYN G.
PIZARRO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES, JUDGE OF
BRANCH III OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, HONORABLE VICENTE P.
BULLECER, JUDGE OF BRANCH IV OF THE COURT OF INSTANCE OF DAVAO, ALFONSO L.
ANGLIONGTO JR., FELICITAS YAP ANGLIONGTO, GAUDENCIO A. CORIAS, REGALADO C.
SALAVADOR, ALICIA P. LADISLA and LYDIA P. GUDANI, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 42507-R, entitled Filomena Pizarro,
et al. vs. Hon. Manases G. Reyes, et al., dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus with
Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction which sought to nullify the Order of the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch III, dated April 10, 1968, dismissing Civil Case No. 5762.
The controversy stemmed from the following facts:
Petitioner Filomena G. Pizarro, is the surviving spouse of the late Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., while the other
petitioners, Misael, Aurelio, Jr., Luzminda, Delia-Thelma, Rogelio, Virgilio, Rosalinda, Jose Elvin and
Maria Evelyn, all surnamed Pizarro, as well as respondents Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, are
their children. Upon the death of Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., Special Proceedings No. 1421 entitled "In the
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Aurelio Pizarro, Sr.," was instituted by petitioners through Atty.
Regalado C. Salvador on September 21, 1965 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I,
presided by Judge Vicente P. Bullecer. Listed among the properties of the estate were parcels of
land situated in Agdao, J. Palma Gill, and Claro M. Recto Streets, Davao City. On December 23,
1965, the Court, upon agreement of the parties, appointed Gaudencio A. Corias, Clerk of Court of
said Court, as Administrator of the estate.
On January 11, 1967, the Administrator, through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, filed a Motion for
Authority to Sell the properties located at Agdao and Jose Palma Gil Streets, Davao City, to settle
the debts of the estate initially estimated at P257,361.23, including inheritance and estate taxes. The
heirs, Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, opposed the Motion stating that the claims against the
estate had not yet been properly determined and that the sale of the Agdao lot with an area of
13,014 sq. ms. would be more than sufficient to cover the supposed obligations of the estate, which
they claimed were exaggerated.
The Court, in its Order dated February 7, 1967, authorized the sale "in the interest of the parties"
and since majority of the heirs were in favor of the sale "to avoid unnecessary additional burden of
about P2,000.00 every month. 1 On February 8, 1967, the Administrator moved for the approval of the

conditional sale of the Agdao property to Alfonso L. Angliongto for a total consideration of P146,820.00
payable in six installments including the down payment. 2 The document of sale stipulated that the vendor
was to cause the ejectment of all occupants in the property on or before July 31, 1967, otherwise, the
vendee was to have the right to rescind the sale and demand reimbursement of the price already paid.
The heirs filed a Motion, also dated February 8, 1967, to set aside or hold in abeyance the Order
authorizing the sale on the ground that they were negotiating for the sale of said lot to Mr. Benjamin
Gonzales, whose theatre was being constructed on a 1,187 square meter portion thereof. 3

The Court, in its Order dated February 9, 1967, denied the "Motion to Set Aside" stating that the
grounds relied upon by the heirs were "nothing but speculations and had no legal basis." 4 The heirs
moved for reconsideration alleging that they were being deprived of the right to a more beneficial
sale. 5 On February 11, 1967, a hearing was held on the Motion for approval of the sale of the Agdao lot to
Alfonso Angliongto. 6 The heirs maintained their objection on the grounds that 1) the sale would be
improvident and greatly prejudicial; 2) there has been no determination of the debts or obligations of the
estate as yet; and 3) the terms of the sale were very prejudicial to them. The Court denied reconsideration
on February 20, 1967, 7 and approved the sale on the same date stating that "the sale sought to be
approved was more beneficial."
On February 22, 1967, the Administrator presented another Motion for Authority to Sell the Claro M.
Recto lot stating that the proceeds from the sale of the Agdao lot were not sufficient to settle the
obligations of the estate and that the sale of the property on J. Palma Gil Street was unanimously
opposed by the heirs. Authority was granted by the Court o March 6, 1967. 8
Prior to this, the heirs, in a Motion dated February 27, 1967 prayed that Administrator Gaudencio A.
Corias be asked to resign or be removed for having abused his powers and duties is such and that,
Letters of Administration be granted instead to Filomena Pizarro. 9 They also terminated the services
of Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, who had acted likewise as counsel for the Administrator.
On March 11, 1967, the Administrator moved that he be allowed to resign.
On June 22, 1967, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, filed a "Motion for
Cancellation or Rescission of Conditional Contract of Sale" of the Agdao lot in favor of Alfonso L.
Angliongto reiterating that it was unnecessary and prejudicial to their interests, that the sale of the lot
in Claro M. Recto Street for P370.000.00 was more than sufficient to settle the obligations of the
estate, that it was impossible to eject all nineteen tenants, not later than July 31, 1967, and that the
vendee had failed to pay the last four installments due despite repeated demands. 10 Angliongto's
counsel countered that the condition of the sale requiring the prior ejectment of squatters had not been
complied with so that the vendee would hold in abeyance payment of the balance of the purchase price
until all the squatters were ejected. 11 The Court denied rescission of the sale in its Order, dated July 3,
1967, stating that the relief prayed for is not within its power to grant, and that the heirs "should file the
necessary action before a competent Court not before this Court, and much less by mere motion." 12 The
heirs moved to reconsider the said Order. In the meantime, Judge Bullecer was transferred to the Court of
First Instance at Mati, Davao Oriental.
On July 6, 1967, the Administrator presented a "Motion to Approve Final Sale" of the Agdao lot to
spouses Angliongtos stating that the latter had paid the full balance of P58,728.00. On the same

date, the Court approved the same. 13 It appears that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19342 was
issued in favor of Alfonso Angliongto on July 10, 1967. 14
On July 13, 1967, Gaudencio Corias ceased to be Administrator. 15
Without waiting for the resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying rescission
of the sale, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, filed on October 5, 1967, a
verified Complaint for "Cancellation of Authority to Sell and Rescission and Annulment of Deed of
Sale and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" (Civil Case No. 5762, hereinafter called the
Rescission Case) in the Court of First Instance of Davao (raffled to Branch III), against the
Angliongto spouses, Administrator Gaudencio A. Corias, Judge Vicente P. Bullecer, Atty. Regalado
C. Salvador, Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, 16 the latter two having refused to join as plaintiffs.
Petitioners contended inter alia that despite all their efforts to block the sale "the Administrator taking
advantage of the name and influence of the presiding Judge" succeeded in inducing Angliongto to
purchase the lot at a price allegedly much higher than the reported P12.00 per square meter; that the sale
contained an impossible condition which was the ejectment of the tenants before a certain date; that there
was connivance between the Administrator and the vendee with the knowledge of the Judge and Atty.
Regalado Salvador; and that they had suffered actual and moral damages by reason of the sale. They
also prayed that since the vendees had entered the lot and destroyed improvements thereon, that they be
enjoined from doing so. Attached to the Complaint was a letter 17 addressed to the surviving spouse,
Filomena G. Pizarro, from Atty. Raul Tolentino to the effect that the sum of P58,728.00 issued by Alfonso
Angliongto in favor of the estate and which was deposited by virtue of a Court Order had been dishonored
by the Bank because of a stop-payment order of Angliongto.
All the defendants except Judge Bullecer and Atty. Corias who filed a Motion to Dismiss, presented
their respective Answers. Eventually, however, they all adopted the same Motion predicated mainly
on plaintiffs' lack of legal capacity to sue and lack of cause of action. 18 In addition, the Angliongtos
pleaded res judicata, the sale having been approved by the Court as far back as February 20, 1967 and
the final deed on July 6, 1967, and the corresponding title issued in the name of Alfonso Angliongto on
July 10, 1967. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition 19 as well as a supplemental Opposition. 20
On October 17, 1967, Judge Alfredo I. Gonzales, as Executive Judge, issued an Order enjoining the
Angliongtos, their agents, laborers, representatives, from further cutting and destroying coconuts,
other fruits and improvements on the property pending the final termination of the action or until a
contrary order is issued by the Court, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P25,000.00. 21
On April 10, 1968, the trial Court (respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes presiding) dismissed the
Rescission Case (Civil Case No. 5762) on the ground that it could not review the actuations of a
coordinate Branch of the Court besides the fact that a Motion for Reconsideration was still pending
resolution before the Probate Court. 22Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal Order was
denied on October 10, 1968.
While the Rescission Case was pending, the Angliongtos filed Civil Case No. 5849 for Damages (the
Angliongtos Case) against the heirs.
On November 25, 1968, petitioners elevated their cause to the Court of Appeals on "Certiorari and
mandamus with Prohibition and Injunction," charging that respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes

gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the Rescission Case and prayed that he be required to
take cognizance thereof and that the Angliongtos be enjoined from exercising rights of ownership
over the property.
On February 11, 1970, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition opining that the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch IV, did not abuse its discretion in approving the sale in the Intestate Case
(Sp. Proc. No. 1421), and even granting that it did, the proper remedy was appeal not Certiorari; that
the Court of First Instance, Branch III, neither abused its discretion in dismissing the Rescission
Case (Civil Case No. 5762) as that case sought to review the actuations of a coordinate Branch
which is beyond its judicial competence; and that since said dismissal was final, the proper remedy
was appeal. It also observed that copies of the Orders sought to be reviewed were not certified true
copies and, therefore, violative of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The present Petition before us seeks a reversal of the aforestated findings of the Appellate Court
anchored on the principal contentions that the sale of the Agdao property should be rescinded for
failure of the vendees to pay the purchase price, and that actually no review of the actuations of a
co-equal Branch of the Court is being sought. We gave due course to the Petition on June 8, 1970.
In a Manifestation filed by petitioners on March 29, 1976, 23 they disclosed that the Angliongtos had
mortgaged the Agdao property to the Development Bank of the Philippines in Davao City, in violation of
the injunctive Order of the lower Court, and after redeeming the same caused the property to be
subdivided into three lots and titled in their names. Subsequently, they allegedly sold the biggest portion
containing 11,500 sq. ms. to Yu Cho Khai and Cristina Sy Yu for P250,000.00 on October 25, 1975. Title
to said portion has been allegedly transferred in favor of said vendees.
The primary point, tendered for resolution is the correctness of the ruling of the Court of Appeals
upholding the opinion of the trial Court that the latter was devoid of authority to review the actuations
of a coordinate Branch of the Court. Secondarily, the propriety of the extra-ordinary remedy of
certiorari despite the existence of the remedy of appeal is also in issue.
Certiorari should lie.
While an Order of dismissal is, indeed, final and appealable as it puts an end to litigation and leaves
nothing more to be done on the merits in the lower Court, 24 so that certiorari is ordinarily unavailable,
that general rule allows of exceptions, namely, when appeal is inadequate and ineffectual or when the
broader interest of justice so requires. 25 In this case, appeal would not have afforded the heirs an
effective and speedy recourse. It would have entailed a protracted litigation and in the interim, the heirs
stood to suffer as a consequence of the approval of the sale. The prompt stoppage of that sale was vital
to them. Thusly, appeal not being speedy enough to bring about the desired objective and to be of any
utility to the heirs, their availment of certiorari must be held to have been proper.
We come now to the question of correctness of the Order of dismissal of the trial Court which the
Appellate Tribunal had upheld. As a strict legal proposition, no actuation of the Probate Court had to
be reviewed. There is no judicial interference to speak of by one Court in the actuations of another
co-equal Court. The Order authorizing the sale was issued on February 20, 1967, and on July 6,
1967, the Court gave its stamp of approval to the final sale. Title was issued in favor of the vendees

on July 10, 1967. To all intents and purposes, therefore, that sale had been consummated; the Order
approving the sale, final.
But, what petitioners sought to achieve in filing the Rescission Case was to rescind the sale mainly
for failure of the vendees to pay the full consideration thereof, 26 which is a valid ground for
rescission. That cause of action was within the judicial competence and authority of the trial Court
(Branch III) as a Court of First Instance with exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It was beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the
Probate Court (Branch IV) whose main province was the settlement of the estate. As a matter of fact,
the Rescission Case was instituted after the Probate Court itself had stated that petitioners' cause of
action was not within its authority to resolve but should be filed with the competent Court. The cause
of action in one is different from that obtaining in the other. It behooved the trial Court, therefore, to
have taken cognizance of and to have heard the Rescission Case on the merits and it was reversible
error for the Court of Appeals to have upheld its dismissal.
In so far as the non-presentation of a certified true copy of the Order of April 10, 1968, sought to be
reviewed, its concerned, there seems to have been substantial compliance with section 1, Rule 65,
of the Rules of Court since the copy of the Order submitted is a duplicate copy of the original and
bears the seal of the Trial Court. Lawyers should bear in mind, however, that a faithful compliance
with the Rules is still the better practice.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the incumbent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, is hereby ordered to take cognizance of and hear and
decide Civil Case No. 5762 as expeditiously as possible.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161220

July 30, 2008

SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO substituted by their

heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and
SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents,
vs.
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,
Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud
Cuyos, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioners seeking to annul the Decision1 dated July 18, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its
Resolution2 dated November 13, 2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration issued in CAG.R. SP No. 65630.3
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children, namely:
Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August
28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered
by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the
name of Agatona Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty.
Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition4 for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special
Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos, Gloria
Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The petition was opposed by Glorias brother, Francisco, who was
represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels
appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case.
The trial court on even date issued an Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the
undivided half accruing to his spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor
of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after posting a nominal bond
of P1,000.00.6
Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate
hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother, oppositor Francisco, together
with their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Franciscos counsel, manifested that the
parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels suggested that the

Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect
the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the approval of the court. In
the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a
project of partition within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae
supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976
in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to
arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos
failed to attend; that per return of the service, these three heirs could not be located in their
respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided outside the province of
Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:
1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time that Francisco
Cuyos, one of the heirs, was administering the properties of the estate (without appointment
from the Court) as having been properly and duly accounted for.
2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the administration of
Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the Court) also one of the heirs as having been
properly and duly accounted for.
3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting from
Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as having been withdrawn.
4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the
sum ofP40,000.00 subject to the condition that should any of the heirs would be in a position
to buy the properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive only Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) each.
5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from their respective
share ofP4,000.00.9
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all
those present in the conference of her desire to buy the properties of the estate, to which everybody
present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in the submission
of the Report was due to the request of respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to make
some consultations on what was already agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it was only on
July 11, 1976 that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the information that
respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed upon, provided she be given the sum
of P5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her
in order to defray their father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioners Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order 10 dated December 16, 1976,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same
being not contrary to law, said compromise agreement as embodied in the report of the
commissioner is hereby approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the deed of
sale covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the payment
to her of the sum of P36,000.00. The said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all
the claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder
shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs. 11
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of P5,570.00, as the same had
been allegedly disregarded by the heirs present during the conference.
In an Order12 dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new
administrator of the estate, purportedly on the basis of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it
appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental to the
early termination of the proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 13 over the six parcels of
land constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a
consideration of the sum ofP36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia
Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud
Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730,
000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were
canceled and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132,
2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in Columbas name; and that later on, Original Certificates of
Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Columba; that some of these
parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and
Rosie M. Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for
which transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently discovered the
existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.14
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was
unsuccessful.15
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation 16 of the other heirs of Evaristo
Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,17 and Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was
null and void and of no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was
patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming

their share of their father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an affidavit, as well as
the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever took place for the purpose of
discussing how to dispose of the estate of their parents and that they never received any payment
from the supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the report was done in close
confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by the Commissioner's
recommendation, should the same be approved by the probate court; that since the report was a
falsity, any order proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in
favor of respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity, since the CFI which issued the assailed
order did not appear to have been furnished a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was
not incustodia legis of the consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide the
remainder of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the administration expenses
and estate taxes; that the intestate case had not yet been terminated as the last order found relative
to the case was the appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria; that they never received their
corresponding share in the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance with
administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their right to the property without due process of law,
thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order dated
December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was preposterous, as respondents were represented by
counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this
was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for annulment within the statutory
period of four (4) years; that they have been in possession of the six parcels of land since May 25,
1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the intestate proceedings;
that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed order; that Numeriano executed an
affidavit in which he attested to having received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that
respondents were estopped from assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already
attained the status of finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as well as
the Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the subsequent transfer
of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be
continued.18
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the veracity and
truthfulness of the Commissioners Report, which was used by the trial court as its basis for issuing
the assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all the
concerned parties to be present in the conference; however, such was not the scenario since in their
separate sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent attested to the fact that no
meeting or conference ever happened among them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on
the Rules of Evidence, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of an official duty, the
same may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence to prove the contrary.

The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held accordingly,
to wit: (1) the Commissioners Report never mentioned the names of the heirs who were present in
the alleged conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the names of those who
were present were equally essential, if not even more important, than the names of those who were
absent; (2) the Report also failed to include any proof of conformity to the agreement from the
attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent as regards the agreed
mechanisms for the estates settlement; (3) there was lack or absence of physical evidence attached
to the report indicating that the respondents were indeed properly notified about the scheduled
conference. The CA then concluded that due to the absence of the respondents' consent, the legal
existence of the compromise agreement did not stand on a firm ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was given to Atty. Lepiten
and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be taken as
notice to the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyers authority to compromise cannot be simply
presumed, since what was required was the special authority to compromise on behalf of his client;
that a compromise agreement entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the principal
is void and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;19 that being a void compromise agreement,
the assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were procured
fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise agreement
which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of P36,000.00 to the
administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting
that he received his share of the proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that he received;
that even so, such alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial courts
order for the administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all properties of the estate in favor of
Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to the administratrix of the sum of P36,000.00; that said
sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses
and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be
divided equally among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court nor
was said money placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that the Certification dated December
9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet been terminated
and that the last Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new
administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which included the execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new Tax
Declarations and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with fraud.
Consequently, the CA concluded that the compromise agreement, the certificates of title and the
transfers made by petitioners through fraud cannot be made a legal basis of their ownership over the
properties, since to do so would result in enriching them at the expense of the respondents; and that
it was also evident that the fraud attendant in this case was one of extrinsic fraud, since respondents

were denied the opportunity to fully litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by petitioners
to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper remedy where
the aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies, such as new trial, appeal, or petition for relief,
which they failed to take through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old
Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an official act which enjoys a strong presumption of
regularity - based merely on belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of said official
act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed
which is a sufficient ground to annul the lower court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 20
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in possession
of affidavits of waiver and desistance executed by the heirs of Lope Cuyos 21 and respondent
Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares22 on February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004, respectively. In both
affidavits, the affiants stated that they had no more interest in prosecuting/defending the case
involving the settlement of the estate, since the subject estate properties had been bought by their
late sister Columba, and they had already received their share of the purchase price. Another heir,
respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier executed an Affidavit23 dated December 13, 2001,
stating that the subject estate was sold to Columba and that she had already received her share of
the purchase price on May 18, 1988. In addition, Numeriano had issued a certification 24 dated May
18, 1988, which was not refuted by any of the parties, that he had already received P4,000.00 in
payment of his share, which could be the reason why he refused to sign the Special Power of
Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order
dated December 16, 1976, which approved the Commissioners Report embodying the alleged
compromise agreement entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character25 and will not so easily and
readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47
impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments
or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.

Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or
order of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,"
jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor.26
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character.27 Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the
prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from
presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party.28 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting
his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself
but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged
is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in
court. 29
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it
should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold
Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for
lack of due process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and
to prepare the project of partition for submission and approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent
upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his Commissioners
Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos and
Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the place, where the subject properties were located for settlement, by
sending them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the conference scheduled
on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the nine heirs, only six attended the
conference; however, as the CA aptly found, the Commissioner did not state the names of those
present, but only those heirs who failed to attend the conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud
and Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based on the return of service, could not be located in
their respective given addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged subpoenae,
supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled conference were indeed sent to
the heirs. In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably
present in the conference, as she was not mentioned as among those absent, had executed an
affidavit30 dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a meeting nor was
there any telegram or notice of any meeting received by her. While Patrocenia had executed on
December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance31 regarding this case, it was only for the
reason that the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and that she
had already received her corresponding share of the purchase price, but there was nothing in the

affidavit that retracted her previous statement that she was not called to a meeting. Respondent
Gloria also made an unnotarized statement32 that there was no meeting held. Thus, the veracity of
Atty. Taneos holding of a conference with the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving
at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were not even required to sign anything
to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which
embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to
show their consent and conformity thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise
agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that all the heirs must be
present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests.
Considering that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs embodying
their alleged agreement, it was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a
conference among the heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in
the Report.
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a disinterested party and
that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty
has been regularly performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection
with the performance of an official act in the line of his duty was legally done, such presumption may
be overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as
absence of the names of the persons present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the
heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing that respondents were
notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference was not held
accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification33 dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC),
Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to show that copies of the Commissioners Report
were sent to all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as
enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with the accompanying registry
receipts.34
In Cua v. Vargas,35 in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of and
bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to
participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly
states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial
settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all

interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and
not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case
with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the
present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having
discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74,
these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their
knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned 36 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed
notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was not established, and not
whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement
afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to
validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the
signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the
statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively
depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation
of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of
law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void
Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners contentions that all the parties in the intestate estate
proceedings in the trial court were duly represented by respective counsels, namely, Atty. Lepiten for
petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to settle the case
amicably, they manifested such intention through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January
30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate of a deceased person need not hire his own
lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented by the judicial administrator who retains the
services of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal representative not only of the estate
but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose interest he represents; that when the trial court
issued the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's Report, the
parties lawyers were duly served said copies of the Order on December 21, 1976 as shown by the
Certification37 dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that notices to lawyers should be
considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by counsel, service of notices of
orders and pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of such order by counsels,
any one of the respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy such as a motion for
reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time, but
they failed to do so without giving any cogent reason for such failure.
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioners Report was received by Attys. Yray and
Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the other

heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was Glorias
counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of administration, while Atty. Yray was Franciscos
lawyer when he filed his opposition to the petition for letters of administration and his Motion to Order
administrarix Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the estate. Thus, the other heirs
who were not represented by counsel were not given any notice of the judgment approving the
compromise. It was only sometime in February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax
declarations covering the parcels of land, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona
Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax Declarations were issued in Columbas name, and Original
Certificates of Titles were subsequently issued in favor of Columba. Thus, they could not have taken
an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or of any obligation. 38
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,39 we stated the consequences of a void judgment, thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar
failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it
cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that void decision is
deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In
Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be
entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.
It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or
efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to
enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded
on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It,
accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation.
All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can
never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to be a lawless
thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head."40 (Emphasis supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by
resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless
barred by laches.41Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it must be
declared null and void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the judgment after
the lapse of 24 years from its finality on ground of laches and estoppel.

Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 42
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances.43 The question of laches is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the
better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute
of limitations or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result. 44
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998 and filed the
petition for annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process
is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing that an action to
declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. 45
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or
efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed
of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant
to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error was thus
committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated
November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI,
Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No. 24BN for the settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168692

December 13, 2010

FRANCISCO TAYCO, substituted by LUCRESIA TAYCO and NOEL TAYCO, Petitioners,

vs.
Heirs Of Concepcion Tayco-Flores, namely: LUCELI F. DIAZ, RONELE F. BESA, MONELE
FLORES, PERLA FLORES, RUPERTO FLORES, WENCESLAO FLORES, PURISIMA FLORES,
and FELIPE FLORES,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals' Decision 2 dated November 17, 2004 and the
reinstatement of the Regional Trial Court's Decision3 dated October 2, 2001.
The records contain the following facts:
Upon the death of the spouses Fortunato Tayco and Diega Regalado, their children, petitioner
Francisco Tayco, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and Consolacion Tayco inherited the following parcels of
land:
1. A parcel of land (Lot 1902pt.), situated at Buswang New, Kalibo, Aklan with the area of
9,938 square meters, bounded on the NE by Lots 1848 & 1905; on the SE by Lots 1903 &
1904; on the NW by Lots 1895, 1887, 1890 and 1808, covered by OCT No. (24360) RO1569 under ARP/TD No. 01025 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed value
of P15,210.00;
2. A parcel of land (Lot 1896), situated at Buswang New, Kalibo, Aklan, with the area of 2,123
square meters, bounded on the NE by Lot 1898-C; on the SE by Lot 1897; on the SW by
New Provincial Road; and on the NW by Lot 1893, covered by OCT No. (24101) RO-1570,
under ARP/TD No. 01087 & 01088 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed value
of P6,910.00; and
3. A parcel of land (Lot 2960), situated at Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan, with the area of 4,012
square meters, bounded on the NE by Lot 2957-J; on the SE by Lot 2961-H; on the SW by
Lot 2660; and on the NW by Lot 2656, covered by OCT No. (23813) RO-1563, under
ARP/TD No. 01782 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed value of P4,820.00.4
Sometime in September of 1972, petitioner Francisco Tayco and his sister Consolacion Tayco
executed a document called Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega
Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares,5 transferring their shares on the abovementioned
properties to their sister Concepcion Tayco-Flores. The said document was notarized and, on March
16, 1991, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and Consolacion Tayco executed the Confirmation of Quitclaim
of Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land.6

Consolacion Tayco died on December 25, 1996 and Concepcion Tayco-Flores died on January 14,
1997. Thereafter, petitioner Francisco Tayco filed a case for nullity of documents and partition with
damages with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan claiming that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares and the Confirmation of
Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land are null and void; thus, he is still entitled to his
original shares in the parcels of land. According to him, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was
executed at that time, because Concepcion Tayco-Flores was in need of money and wanted the
properties to be mortgaged in a bank. He claimed that the mortgage did not push through and that
he requested his sister to cancel the said Deed, to which the latter ensured that the same document
had no effect. However, he further claimed that without his knowledge and consent, her sisters
Concepcion and Consolacion executed another document entitled Confirmation of Quitclaim of
Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land in order to have the tax declarations and certificates of title
covering those three parcels of land transferred in the name of Concepcion. He also alleged that he
came to know of the said facts only when he had the property surveyed for the purpose of partition
and some of the heirs of Concepcion objected to the said survey.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Francisco Tayco, the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the preponderance of evidence tilts in favor of the plaintiff and
judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Declaring the document entitled, Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased
Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares (Annex A, Complaint), and the
document entitled Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land (Annex
B, Complaint), as null and void;
b) Declaring the three (3) parcels of land subject of the above documents to be co-owned by
the plaintiff ( share) and defendants ( share);
c) Ordering the parties to submit to the court a Project of Partition indicating the specific
portion allotted to them within 30 days from receipt of this decision; in case of disagreement,
the Court shall order the sale of all the three (3) parcels with the proceeds to be divided
equally between plaintiff on the one hand and the defendants on the other;
d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 representing litigation
expenses, andP5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus cost.
e) The claim for moral and exemplary damages are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.7
In ruling that the assailed documents were null and void, the RTC ratiocinated that the extrajudicial
settlement is a simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores was the owner
of the properties, so that it would be easy for her to use the same as a collateral for a prospective
loan and as evidence disclosed that the intended loan with any financial institution did not
materialize, hence, the document had no more effect. Consequently, according to the trial court,

since the first document was simulated and had no force and effect, the second document had no
more purpose and basis.
The respondent-heirs appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals, and on November
17, 2004, the latter reversed the former's ruling, disposing it in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us REVERSING
the assailed decision of the lower court and a new one entered declaring defendants-appellants
absolute owners of Lot Nos. 1902, 1896 and 2620. The complaint of plaintiff-appellee is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.8
In reversing the trial court's findings, the CA reasoned out that the genuineness and due execution of
the Extrajudicial Settlement was not disputed and was duly signed by the parties and notarized. It
added that the recital of the provisions of the said document is clear that it is an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of deceased Diega Regalado and that petitioner and his sister Consolacion
confirmed the sale of their shares to Concepcion.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but was denied10 by the same court. Thus, the present
petition.
The petitioner raised this lone issue:
CAN THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
DIEGA REGALADO WITH CONFIRMATION OF SALE OF SHARES DIVEST CO-HEIR AND COOWNER FRANCISCO TAYCO OF HIS SHARES IN THE THREE (3) PARCELS OF LAND IN
QUESTION?11
Under question is the validity of the document that contains the extrajudicial settlement of the estate
of the deceased, Diega Regalado. The trial court ruled that it is null and void based on its
assessment of the facts, while the CA adjudged it valid based on its examination of the said
document. Under Section 1, Rule 45, providing for appeals by certiorari before the Supreme Court, it
is clearly enunciated that only questions of law may be set forth. 12 Questions of fact may not be
raised unless the case falls under any of the following exceptions: 13
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.

This case clearly falls under one of the exceptions and after a careful review of the facts of the case,
this Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do
so in an ordinary action for partition. x x x.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.
xxxx
Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of making it a public
document14 that can bind third parties. However, this formal requirement appears to be superseded
by the substantive provision of the Civil Code that states:
ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-ownership, he
expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs." Partition among co-owners
may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property
regardless of the form it takes. x x x15
The trial court, after a keen determination of the facts involved in the case, clearly articulated its
findings as to the inconclusiveness of the required publication and the notarization of the document
purportedly containing the extrajudicial settlement in question, thus:
At the outset, the document, Exhibit A, was executed at Lezo, Aklan which is about ten kilometers
from Kalibo where all the parties are residents. Defendant had to hire a tricycle from Kalibo to bring
the parties to Lezo. Assuming that a certain Engr. Reynaldo Lopez was helping the defendants at
that time in this transaction, he is also a resident of Kalibo, Aklan which is the center of Aklan where
almost all the lawyers have their offices. Engr. Lopez has also his office here. Why would he still
recommend the execution of this document particularly in Lezo and before that particular alleged
Notary Public? This sounds incredible.
Defendants alleged that the document was published in a newspaper of general circulation of Aklan
but no affidavit of such publication was presented. Only an alleged receipt from Engr. Lopez was
presented (Exh. 2) but does not prove its purpose.16

The above findings of fact of the trial court must be accorded respect. It is a hornbook doctrine that
the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be
disturbed except for strong and valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. It is not a function of this Court to analyze
and weigh evidence by the parties all over again. 17
Anent the true intent of the signatories of the questioned document appearing to be an extrajudicial
settlement of an estate, the trial court found the following facts:
Plaintiff alleged that Exhibit A was executed just to accommodate his sister Concepcion Tayco to be
able to offer as collateral the property in order to raise money for the marriage of her son Ruperto
Flores. But the property was never encumbered because it was then Martial Law (TSN, 10/14/98,
pp. 3-4; 5/6/99, pp. 5-6). This testimony of the plaintiff was never rebutted or denied by the
defendant, Ruperto Flores, who himself testified for the defendants. In fact, he even admitted that he
got married after the execution of Exhibit A (TSN, 2/16/01, pp. 15-16). This allegation by the plaintiff,
therefore, must stand.
Defendants argue that if their intention was to mortgage the property in raising money, there was no
need for the execution of Exhibit A but only a Special Power of Attorney would suffice. This would be
the quickest way if the bank would be amenable, but the latter would be more protected if the title of
the property are already transferred in the name of the mortgagor. For them, it has only to rely on the
certificate of tile if it decides to deal with it.18
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law does not
relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise
investment.19 However, in the construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the
parties is primordial and is to be pursued.20 If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. 21 If the
contract appears to be contrary to the evident intentions of the parties, the latter shall prevail over
the former.22 The denomination given by the parties in their contract is not conclusive of the nature of
the contents.23 In this particular case, the trial court, based on its appreciation of the pieces of
evidence presented, rightfully concluded that the intent of the signatories was contrary to the
questioned document's content and denomination.
1avvphi1

Furthermore, the trial court, before stating its final conclusion as to the nullity of the document in
question, correctly discussed the lack of consideration in so far as that part of the document which
embodies the confirmation of the sale of shares of siblings Francisco and Consolacion to
Concepcion. Thus:
The consideration of P50.00 for a 1/3 share of about 16,000 sq. meters real property in Kalibo, Aklan
even way back in 1972 is definitely way below the market value. Even if we take into consideration
the filial love between siblings (Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 233), still, the difference between the
market value then and the purchase price is very great. Even for a market value of P1,000.00, a
consideration of P50.00 only plus filial love would still be greatly disproportionate. Certainly, the 1/3
share of plaintiff exceeds P1,000.00. The filial love between siblings may affect the discrepancy

only if the difference between the market value over the selling price is slight. (ibid.). It would
appear, therefore, that Exhibit A is merely a simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion
Tayco-Flores is the owner of the properties so that it will be easy for her to use the same as
collateral for a prospective loan. Should the encumbrance not materialize or if it did after the
obligation thereunder has been paid, the document shall become null and void and without effect. As
the evidence disclosed that the intended loan with any financial institution did not materialize, hence,
immediately thereafter, the document had no more effect. 24
As to the other questioned document or the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three Parcels of
Land, the nullity of the first document renders it void because its effectivity is anchored on the validity
of the first document. The Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three Parcels of Land came into
fruition merely to confirm the existence of the first document. It was executed on March 16, 1991,
when petitioner Francisco Tayco was still alive. Nevertheless, the said document was signed only by
Consolacion and Concepcion, which prompted the trial court to make the following observations:
As to Exhibit B, it is surprising why only the two sisters participated in its execution while the plaintiff
who is still very much alive and also a resident of New Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan was excluded. This
document is a confirmation of the execution of Exhibit A where the plaintiff is a party. The plaintiff
would have also been made a party to this document so that he could have confirmed the sale of his
share had it been so. Could it be, therefore, that defendants did not want the plaintiff to know this
document so that they can obtain the transfer of the titles and the tax declarations in their names
without his knowledge? Unfortunately, however, plaintiff accidentally discovered the transfer when he
tried to survey the property for ultimate partition.25
To reiterate, in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, this Court is not a trier of facts,
and unless there are excepting circumstances, it does not routinely undertake the re-examination of
the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case. 26 The CA, therefore,
erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court without providing any substantial evidence
to support its own findings.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals' Decision dated November 17, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9, dated October 2, 2001,
is UPHELD and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171717

December 15, 2010

RAMON B. BRITO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO D. DIANALA, VIOLETA DIANALA SALES, JOVITA DIANALA DEQUINTO, ROSITA
DIANALA, CONCHITA DIANALA and JOEL DEQUINTO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision1 dated January 12, 2005 and Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70009. The assailed Decision set aside the Joint Orders 3 dated June 29,
2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 60, Cadiz City, while the
questioned Resolution denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Subject of the present petition is a parcel of land located at Barrio Sicaba, Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental. The said tract of land is a portion of Lot No. 1536-B, formerly known as Lot No. 591-B,
originally owned by a certain Esteban Dichimo and his wife, Eufemia Dianala, both of whom are
already deceased.
On September 27, 1976, Margarita Dichimo, assisted by her husband, Ramon Brito, Sr., together
with Bienvenido Dichimo, Francisco Dichimo, Edito Dichimo, Maria Dichimo, Herminia Dichimo,
assisted by her husband, Angelino Mission, Leonora Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Igmedio
Mission, Felicito, and Merlinda Dechimo, assisted by her husband, Fausto Dolleno, filed a Complaint
for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Negros Occidental, against a certain Jose Maria Golez. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 12887.
Petitioner's wife, Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco, alleged that they are the heirs
of a certain Vicente Dichimo, while Edito, Maria, Herminia, Leonora, Felicito and Merlinda claimed to
be the heirs of one Eusebio Dichimo; that Vicente and Eusebio are the only heirs of Esteban and
Eufemia; that Esteban and Eufemia died intestate and upon their death Vicente and Eusebio, as
compulsory heirs, inherited Lot No. 1536-B; that, in turn, Vicente and Eusebio, and their respective
spouses, also died intestate leaving their pro indiviso shares of Lot No. 1536-B as part of the
inheritance of the complainants in Civil Case No. 12887.
On July 29, 1983, herein respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention claiming that prior to his
marriage to Eufemia, Esteban was married to a certain Francisca Dumalagan; that Esteban and
Francisca bore five children, all of whom are already deceased; that herein respondents are the
heirs of Esteban and Francisca's children; that they are in open, actual, public and uninterrupted
possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more than 30 years; that their legal interests over the

subject lot prevails over those of petitioner and his co-heirs; that, in fact, petitioner and his co-heirs
have already disposed of their shares in the said property a long time ago.
On November 26, 1986, the trial court issued an Order dismissing without prejudice respondents'
Answer-in-Intervention for their failure to secure the services of a counsel despite ample opportunity
given them.
Civil Case No. 12887 then went to trial.
Subsequently, the parties in Civil Case No. 12887 agreed to enter into a Compromise Agreement
wherein Lot No. 1536-B was divided between Jose Maria Golez, on one hand, and the heirs of
Vicente, namely: Margarita, Bienvenido, and Francisco, on the other. It was stated in the said
agreement that the heirs of Eusebio had sold their share in the said lot to the mother of Golez. Thus,
on September 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 45 rendered a
decision approving the said Compromise Agreement.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-12561 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City in the name of
Margarita, Bienvenido and Francisco.
On January 18, 1999, herein petitioner and his co-heirs filed another Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages, this time against herein respondents. The case, filed with the RTC of
Cadiz City, Branch 60, was docketed as Civil Case No. 548-C. Herein respondents, on the other
hand, filed with the same court, on August 18, 1999, a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages
against petitioner and his co-heirs. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 588-C.
The parties filed their respective Motions to Dismiss. Thereafter, the cases were consolidated.
On June 29, 2000, the RTC issued Joint Orders, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders the following:
1. The Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 548-C is hereby GRANTED and Civil Case No.
548[-C] is hereby ordered DISMISSED for violation of the rule on forum shopping;
2. The Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 588-C is likewise hereby GRANTED and the
Complaint dated August 13, 1999 is hereby DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
3. All counterclaims in both cases, Civil Case No. 548-C and 588-C are likewise ordered
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4
The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but both were denied by the RTC in an
Order dated October 5, 2000.

Herein respondents then appealed the case to the CA praying that the portion of the RTC Joint
Orders dismissing Civil Case No. 588-C be declared null and void and that the case be decided on
the merits.
On January 12, 2005, the CA rendered judgment disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by
us GRANTING the appeal filed in this case and SETTING ASIDE, as we hereby set aside, the Joint
Order[s] dated June 29, 2000 of the RTC of Cadiz City, Branch 60, dismissing Civil Case No. 588-C.
Further, let the entire records of this case be remanded to the court a quo for the trial and hearing on
the merits of Civil Case No. 588-C.
SO ORDERED.5
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution dated February 13,
2006.
Hence, the instant petition with the following assigned errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LOWER
COURT HAS THE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE RECONVEYANCE CASE OF THE
HEREIN PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 60, CADIZ CITY.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AMENDMENT
OF THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 12887 IS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO ANNULMENT
OF THE SAID DECISION. THE HONORABLE COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO
TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THIS CASE.6
In his first assigned error, petitioner claims that the CA erred in holding that respondents are not
parties in Civil Case No. 12887 contending that, since their Answer-in-Intervention was admitted,
respondents should be considered parties in the said case. Petitioner also avers that, being parties
in Civil Case No. 12887, respondents are bound by the judgment rendered therein.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional
time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 7 In the
present case, when respondents filed their Answer-in-Intervention they submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the court, in turn, acquired jurisdiction over their persons. Respondents,
thus, became parties to the action. Subsequently, however, respondents' Answer-in-Intervention was
dismissed without prejudice. From then on, they ceased to be parties in the case so much so that
they did not have the opportunity to present evidence to support their claims, much less participate
in the compromise agreement entered into by and between herein petitioner and his co-heirs on one
hand and the defendant in Civil Case No. 12887 on the other. Stated differently, when their Answer-

in-Intervention was dismissed, herein respondents lost their standing in court and, consequently,
became strangers to Civil Case No. 12887. It is basic that no man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered
by the court.8 Thus, being strangers to Civil Case No. 12887, respondents are not bound by the
judgment rendered therein.
Neither does the Court concur with petitioner's argument that respondents are barred by prescription
for having filed their complaint for reconveyance only after more than eight years from the discovery
of the fraud allegedly committed by petitioner and his co-heirs, arguing that under the law an action
for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in four years, which period is
reckoned from the discovery of the fraud.
In their complaint for reconveyance and damages, respondents alleged that petitioner and his coheirs acquired the subject property by means of fraud.
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by
operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An
action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point of
which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.9 Thus, in Caro v. Court of Appeals,10 this Court held as follows:
x x x The case of Liwalug Amerol, et al. v. Molok Bagumbaran, G.R. No. L-33261, September 30,
1987,154 SCRA 396, illuminated what used to be a gray area on the prescriptive period for an action
to reconvey the title to real property and, corollarily, its point of reference:
x x x It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the new Civil
Code, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided:
SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited.- Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property
can only be brought within the following periods after the right of action accrues:
xxx

xxx

xxx

3. Within four years: xxx An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the right of action in such
case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud;
xxx

xxx

xxx

In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an
offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the
property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription,
Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx

xxx

x x x (Italics supplied.)

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten
years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that,
illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive
period for a reconveyance action is four years. However, this variance can be explained by the
erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25,
1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code not coming into effect
until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that article 1144 and
article 1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code
of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period
for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, which provides:
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent
holder of the decree of registration on the original petition or application, x x x.
This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, x x x
xxxx
The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and
Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for
the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of
the issuance of the certificate of title. x x x11
In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was obtained by petitioner and his co-heirs on September 28,
1990, while respondents filed their complaint for reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear
that the ten-year prescriptive period has not yet expired.
The Court, likewise, does not agree with petitioner's contention that respondents are guilty of laches
and are already estopped from questioning the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 12887 on the
ground that they slept on their rights and allowed the said decision to become final.

In the first place, respondents cannot be faulted for not appealing the decision of the RTC in Civil
Case No. 12887 simply because they are no longer parties to the case and, as such, have no
personality to assail the said judgment.
Secondly, respondents' act of filing their action for reconveyance within the ten-year prescriptive
period does not constitute an unreasonable delay in asserting their right. The Court has ruled that,
unless reasons of inequitable proportions are adduced, a delay within the prescriptive period is
sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay that would bar relief. 12 Laches is recourse in
equity.13 Equity, however, is applied only in the absence, never in contravention, of statutory law.14
Moreover, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as
when the plaintiff is not in possession thereof.15 Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in possession of the
property, prescription does not commence to run against him.16 Thus, when an action for
reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action
that is imprescriptible.17 The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land
claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right, the rationale for the rule being, that his undisturbed
possession provides him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right
can be claimed only by the one who is in possession. 18
In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the subject property as
evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a separate action against respondents for
recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to respondents' possession of the disputed property, it
follows that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact, imprescriptible. As such, with more reason
should respondents not be held guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is one in equity, cannot
be set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right.
In his second assignment of error, petitioner argues that the objective of respondents in filing Civil
Case No. 588-C with the RTC of Cadiz City was to have the decision of the RTC of Bacolod City in
Civil Case No. 12887 amended, which is tantamount to having the same annulled. Petitioner avers
that the RTC of Cadiz City has no jurisdiction to act on Civil Case No. 588-C, because it cannot
annul the decision of the RTC of Bacolod City which is a co-equal court.
The Court does not agree.
The action filed by respondents with the RTC of Cadiz City is for reconveyance and damages. They
are not seeking the amendment nor the annulment of the Decision of the RTC of Bacolod City in
Civil Case No. 12887. They are simply after the recovery of what they claim as their rightful share in
the subject lot as heirs of Esteban Dichimo.
1awphi1

As earlier discussed, respondents' Answer-in-Intervention was dismissed by the RTC of Bacolod City
without prejudice. This leaves them with no other option but to institute a separate action for the
protection and enforcement of their rights and interests. It will be the height of inequity to declare
herein petitioner and his co-heirs as exclusive owners of the disputed lot without giving respondents
the opportunity to prove their claims that they have legal interest over the subject parcel of land, that

it forms part of the estate of their deceased predecessor and that they are in open, and uninterrupted
possession of the same for more than 30 years. Much more, it would be tantamount to a violation of
the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of
law.19
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated January 12, 2005 and
Resolution dated February 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70009 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.