FACTS:

In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A.

Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of lawyers oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges
against him, respondent filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking this
Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges
more definite. In a resolution the Court granted respondents motion and
required complainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant submitted
an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed
the following acts:
1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro
Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to
as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a
contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in
litigation.
xxx
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract
with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential
subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by
TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest
thereof as attorneys fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well
that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30,
1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the
Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
xxx
Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above, reads:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you
[respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including
court fees.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a
champertous contract.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months.
RATIO:
The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the
Fortunados contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or
bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional
Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the
expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The
agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not
provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by

him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of

proceedings to enforce the clients rights is champertous [citation omitted].
Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this
case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in
consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [citation
omitted]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary
relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must
incur administrative sanctions.

Brion, Jr. vs. Brillantes, Jr.

A.C. No. 5305
March 17, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Marciano P. Brion, Jr., in this petition for
disbarment, avers that respondent violated the courts
decree of perpetual disqualification imposed upon
respondent Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. (in A.M. No. MTJ-92706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F.
Brillantes, Jr.) from assuming any post in government
service, including any posts in government-owned and
controlled corporations, when he accepted a legal
consultancy post at the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said
consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as 6th
member of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta
(Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal
consultancy agreement, this was subsequently renewed
as a Special Consultancy Agreement.
Respondent admits the existence of the Legal
Consultancy Contract as well as the Special Consultancy
Contract. However, he raises the affirmative defense
that under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum
Circular No. 27, Series of 1993, services rendered
pursuant to a consultancy contract shall not be
considered government services, and therefore, are not
covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent has transgressed the letter
and spirit of the courts decree in the Atienza case.
Held:
By performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain
to a contractual employee, albeit in the guise of an
advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both
letter and spirit of the Courts decree in Atienza.
The Court finds that for all intents and purposes,
respondent performed duties and functions of a nonadvisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee
of LWUA. As stated by petitioner in his reply, there is a
difference between a consultant hired on a contractual
basis (which is governed by CSC M.C. No. 27, s. 1993)
and a contractual employee (whose appointment is
governed, among others, by the CSC Omnibus Rules on
Appointment and other Personnel Actions). The lawyers
primary duty as enunciated in the Attorneys Oath is to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for law and legal processes. That duty
in its irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal
orders of the courts. Respondents disobedience to this
Courts order prohibiting his reappointment to any
branch, instrumentality, or agency of government,
including
government
owned
and
controlled
corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal
consultancy or a special consultancy contract.
Hence, Atty. Brillantes was suspended and ordered to
pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00).

Magdalena T. Arciga vs. Segundino D. Maniwang

AC No. 1608, 106 SCRA 651, August 14, 1981
Facts:
[if !supportLists]

[endif]Magdalena

and Segundino got acquainted

sometime in October 1970 in Cebu City. Magdalena was a medical
technology student while Segundino was a law student.
[if !supportLists]
[endif]On March 1971, Magdalena and
Segundino had sexual congress. Thereafter, they had repeated acts
of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he
and Magdalena were secretly married.
[if !supportLists]
[endif]In 1972 Segundino transferred his
residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his studies to
Dava City.
[if !supportLists]
[endif]Magdalena discovered in January 1973
that she was pregnant. The two went to her hometown, Ivisan,
Capiz to apprise Magdalenas parents that they were married
although they were not. The respondent convinced Magdalenas
father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had
passed the bar examinations where he secured his birth certificate
preparatory to applying for a marriage license.
[if !supportLists]
[endif]Segundino reassured Magdalena that he
would marry once he passed the bar examinations. The latter gave
birth to their child on September 4, 1973.
[if !supportLists]
[endif]Segundino passed the bar examinations
that was released April 25, 1975. After the oathtaking, Segundino
stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Magdalena went to Davao
to contat Segundino. Segundino told her that they could not get
married for lack of money.
[if !supportLists]
[endif]In December 1975 Magdalena followed
Segundino in Bukidnon only to find out that their marriage could

not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang.

[if !supportLists]
[endif]Segundino followed Magdalena in Davao
and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a
confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang.
[if !supportLists]
[endif]Magdalena Arciga then filed a disbarment
case on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused
to fulfill his promise of marriage to her.
Issue:
[if !supportLists]

[endif]Whether

or not Segundino Maniwang

should be disbarred on the ground of grossly immoral conduct.
Ruling:
[if !supportLists]

[endif]No,

Segundino Maniwang shouldnt be

disbarred. The Supreme Court found that respondents refusal to
marry the complainant was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to
warrant disbarment. The complaint for disbarment against the
respondent is hereby dismissed.

ENGR.GILBERT
TUMBOKONvs.ATTY.
MARIANOR.
PEFIANCOA.C.No.

6116,1August2012

.entryheader
Facts:
Accordingtocomplainant,respondentundertooktogivehim20%
commission,laterreducedto10%,oftheattorneysfeesthelatter
wouldreceiveinrepresentingSpousesYapwhomhereferred,ina
nactionforpartitionoftheestateofthespousesrelative.Theiragr
eementwasreflectedinaletterdatedAugust11,1995.However,r
espondentfailedtopayhimtheagreedcommissionnotwithstandin
greceiptofattorneysfeesamountingto17%ofthetotalestateor
aboutP40million.Instead,hewasinformedthroughaletterdated
July16,1997thatSps.Yapassumedtopaythesameafterrespond
enthadagreedtoreducehisattorneysfeesfrom25%to17%.Het
hendemandedthepaymentofhiscommissionwhichrespondentig
nored.
Complainantfurtherallegedthatrespondenthasnotliveduptothe
highmoralstandardsrequiredofhisprofessionforhavingabandon
edhislegalwifewithwhomhehastwochildren,andcohabitedwi
thanotherwithwhomhehasfourchildren.Healsoaccusedrespon
dentofengaginginmoneylendingbusinesswithouttherequireda
uthorizationfromtheBangkoSentralngPilipinas
Inhisdefense,hedisputedtheAugust11,1995letterforbeingafo
rgeryandclaimedthatSps.Yapassumedtopay.

Ruling:

Respondentsdefensethatforgeryhadattendedtheexecutionofth
eAugust11,1995letterwasbeliedbyhisJuly16,1997letteradm
ittingtohaveundertakenthepaymentofcomplainantscommissio
nbutpassingontheresponsibilitytoSps.Yap.Clearly,respondent
hasviolatedRule9.02,Canon9oftheCodewhichprohibitsalaw
yerfromdividingorstipulatingtodivideafeeforlegalserviceswi

thpersonsnotlicensedtopracticelaw,exceptincertaincaseswhic
hdonotobtaininthecaseatbar.
Furthermore,respondentdidnotdenytheaccusationthatheaband
onedhislegalfamilytocohabitwithhismistresswithwhomhebe
gotfourchildrennotwithstandingthathismoralcharacteraswella
shismoralfitnesstoberetainedintheRollofAttorneyshasbeen
assailed.Thesettledruleisthatbetrayalofthemaritalvowoffidel
ityorsexualrelationsoutsidemarriageisconsidereddisgracefulan
dimmoralasitmanifestsdeliberatedisregardofthesanctityofma
rriageandthemaritalvowsprotectedbytheConstitutionandaffir
medbyourlaws.Consequently,SCfindnoreasontodisturbtheI
BPsfindingthatrespondentviolatedtheLawyersOathandRule
1.01,Canon1oftheCodewhichproscribesalawyerfromengagin
ginunlawful,dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct.
However,SCfindthechargeofengaginginillegalmoneylending
nottohavebeensufficientlyestablished.
ATTY.MARIANOR.PEFIANCOwasfoundGUILTYofviolati
onoftheLawyersOath,Rule1.01,Canon1oftheCodeofProfes
sionalResponsibilityandRule9.02,Canon9ofthesameCodean
dSUSPENDEDfromtheactivepracticeoflawONE(1)YEAR.
In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to
Salvacion Delizo and with two children, left his wife and
children to cohabit with another married woman. In
1986, Salvacion and Cordova had a reconciliation where
Cordova promised to leave his mistress. But apparently,
Cordova still continued to cheat on her wife as
apparently, Cordova again lived with another woman
and worse, he took one of his children with him and hid
the child away from Salvacion.
In 1988, Salvacion filed a letter-complaint for disbarment
against Cordova. Eventually, multiple hearing dates were
sent but no hearing took place because neither party
appeared. In 1989, Salvacion sent a telegraphic
message to the Commission on Bar Discipline intimating

that she and her husband has reconciled. The

Commission, since Salvacion failed to submit her
evidence ex parte, merely recommended the reprimand
and admonishment of Cordova.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cordova should be merely
reprimanded.
HELD: No. He should be suspended indefinitely until he
presents evidence that he has been morally reformed
and that there was true reconciliation between him and
his wife. Before a person can be admitted to the bar, one
requirement is that he possesses good moral character.
That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with
upon admission to membership of the bar. On the
contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing
condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community, conduct for instance, which makes a
mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage
such was the case in the case at bar.
CORDOVA V CORDOVA
In 1985, Atty. Laurence Cordova, while being married to
Salvacion Delizo and with two children, left his wife and
children to cohabit with another married woman. In
1986, Salvacion and Cordova had a reconciliation where
Cordova promised to leave his mistress. But apparently,
Cordova still continued to cheat on her wife as
apparently, Cordova again lived with another woman
and worse, he took one of his children with him and hid
the child away from Salvacion.
In 1988, Salvacion filed a letter-complaint for disbarment
against Cordova. Eventually, multiple hearing dates were
sent but no hearing took place because neither party
appeared. In 1989, Salvacion sent a telegraphic
message to the Commission on Bar Discipline intimating

that she and her husband has reconciled. The

Commission, since Salvacion failed to submit her
evidence ex parte, merely recommended the reprimand
and admonishment of Cordova.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cordova should be merely
reprimanded.
HELD: No. He should be suspended indefinitely until he
presents evidence that he has been morally reformed
and that there was true reconciliation between him and
his wife. Before a person can be admitted to the bar, one
requirement is that he possesses good moral character.
That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with
upon admission to membership of the bar. On the
contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing
condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community, conduct for instance, which makes a
mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage
such was the case in the case at bar.

In re Pactolin
In May 2008, the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 161455
(Pactolin vs Sandiganbayan), affirmed the conviction of
Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin for violation of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code (Falsification by a Private Individual).
It was duly proved that Pactolin falsified a letter, and
presented said letter as evidence in a court of law, in
order to make it appear that his fellow councilor acting
as OIC-Mayor illegally caused the disbursement of public
funds. In said decisions, the Supreme Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for

appropriate administrative actions against Pactolin.

ISSUE: What administrative sanctions can be imposed
upon Atty. Pactolin considering his conviction?
HELD: Rodolfo Pactolin should be, and is henceforth
disbarred. The crime of falsification of public document is
contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and,
therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude
includes everything which is done contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
As a rule, the Supreme Court exercises the power to
disbar with great caution. Being the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most
imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. But it
has always been held that it is appropriate to disbar a
lawyer if he is convicted by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude. Further, Pactolins situation is
aggravated by the fact that although his conviction has
been affirmed, he has not served his sentence yet.
IN RE LONTOK
April 7, 1922
Malcolm, J.:
FACTS: On February 27, 1918, Atty. Lontok was convicted of the crime of bigamy by
CFI Zambales. Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts decision as well making it final
and executory. On 1922, Atty. Lontok was granted by the Governor General an executive
pardon. Now, Atty. General seeks the disbarment of Marcelino Lontok because of having
been convicted of the crime of bigamy despite the pardon given to him.
ISSUE: W/N the effect of pardon may prevent Lontok from disbarment.
HELD: YES. It is contended by the government that while the pardon removes the legal
infamy of the crime, it cannot wash out the moral stain; on the other hand it is contended

by the respondent that the pardon reaches the offenses for which he was convicted and
blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.
SC followed the ruling in the case of Ex Parte Garland (1866) wherein the SC held that:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt; so that in the eye of the law, the offender is innocent as if he had
never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restore him to all his civil rights;
it makes him as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.
Atty. Generals petition is denied.

IN RE GUTIERREZ

Attorney Diosdado Gutierrez was convicted for the

murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He was
sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958,
after serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a
conditional pardon by the President. He was released on
the condition that he shall not commit any crime.
Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment
case against Gutierrez by reason of the latters
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder,
is without a doubt, such a crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred
considering the fact that he was granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not
absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his sentence.
It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be
judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without
regard to the pardon (which he invoked in defense). The
crime was actually qualified by treachery and
aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by
taking advantage of his official position (Gutierrez being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor
vehicle. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such
as to justify his being purged from the profession