xii Preface critique of scepticism, The book will accordingly endeavor to Sit the wheat from the chal in the septie's argumentation. Tn oulline, the programmatic route of the present work proceeds as follows. Chapters FIV define more sharply the Fines of sceptical argumentation that provide the basis for the purported. infeasibility of obtaining. factual knowledge Chapters V-VIII indicate how this sceptical doctrine rests on Jan improper and incorrect view of the nature of knowledge Chapters IX-XI show how the more realistic conception of Knowledge that ensues can meet various further sceptical denials of knowledge, Chapters XXII argue against the feeplic’s insistence that we could actually “live with” the Unattainabilty of knowledge, maintaining that such agnos- tieism is untenable both from the angle of theory and trom that of practice, Finally the closing Chapter XIV maintains that slthough the sceptics conclusions are wrong. many of his supporting arguments are largely covrect-and convey tiseful and important lessons whose bearing the Sceptic him Sif misinterpret ‘Accordingly, the present examination of scepticism is, rather positive than negative in tendency, combining 4k Structive ertigue of the central doctrines of traditional soe tieism with a constructive assessment of many of 1s Sub- sidiary positions “The first draft of the book was prepared in Oxford during tan academic vist in the summer of 19TT. These materials provided the substance for series of lectures om scepticism Selivered at the University of Pittsburgh during the Winter ‘Term of 1978 and presented again ~ in somewhat modified form ~in the School of Literte Humaniores of Oxford Uni- versity during the Trinity Term of 1978. 1am most grateful to Corpus ‘Christi College for affording me an academic hhome in Oxford on these as on various other occasions. Towe thanks to Jay Garfield and Jean Roberts for reading Graft version of the book and helping me to improve its presentation, And 1 am grateful to Virginia Chestek for the patience and competence with which she steered the typo Seript through its many revisions october 1978 Scepheism Vicholas Kescker Fow ssn TL Laleheld Introduct 16? (1) A survey of some varieties of septicism. The presently felevant sort deals with specifically factual knowledge, The ‘opponent of scepticism is a_cogntivist. but by no means necessarily & dogmatst (2) The tenacity of scepicism 3s one fof these perennial issues where every solution evokes its ‘bjction and every answer is questioning doubts. (3) Seep- tieism isin one sense irefutable ~ one cannot dislodge the Sceptie himself from his postion by rational counterargu- mentation. The best one eam dois to build up a ease capable fof dissuading the uncommitted “ravonal man™ From e\ espousing soptiism in the frst place Scepticism has various forms, There are as many sorts of seepiicism as there ate Iypes of knowledge or purported Knowledge. And there are many of them, as for exampl (1) Factual knowledge relating to, descriptive informa- tion regarding the contents of the natural universe and their modes of operation specieally including ‘un and his works) (2) Formal knowiedge relating (o the structure of the relationships of concepts and the operation of symn= bolle systems (pire mathematics, formal. lowic, Formal linguistics). (3) Normative knowledge relating to such evaluative Issues as rightness, goodaess, besuty, dsirability, (4) Theological knowledge relating to the existence andInroduetion nature ofthe deity, His relations to the world and to man, cosmic ereation, teleology in nature, angelic and demonic spirits, ce “There is thus not only the all-out, global seepie wha takes ail knovledge to fall within the scope of his theory, but also 4 wide variety of specialized or thematic local scepicisms. The religious seeptic questions or denies the veracity of theological doctrines. The ethical seeptie questions or denies the lenabilty of moral rules, The mathematical sceptie ques: tions the validity of mathematical principles. Our concern here, however, is exclusively with cognitive scepticism of {factual orientation ~ a scepticism that questions or denies the prospect of man's capacity {0 attain knowledge or rationally Warranted conviction regarding factual matters. The scepti- ism with which we are conevened questions, doubls, oF denies man's capacity to obtain factual information about © real world,” a scepticism oriented specially towards what Hume characterized as "matters of fact and existence Unlike its other counterparts ~ religious, ethical, ee. this histori form of seepticism is agnostic specifically with regard fo man’s capacity to attain knowledge about his environing world ‘The cognitive seeptic does not hold that what we think we know about the world is fale, He simply maintains that our Knowledge-claims in this domain are unwarranted ~ that we inevitably lack due justifcation for making them. He regards the evidential basis we normally invoke im support of sich claims to factual knowledge as inevitably being probatively insufficient. The sceptic exploits the fact that the sending \why/because cycle of question and answer can aso be taver= sed with respect to claim and its grounding: round:-secking (why?) ground = ates sround-presenting (because!) Introduction 3 Giefully noting the endless regress inherent in such 9 eyele, the septic insists that we ean never know anything because knowledge must be altogether certain ~ secure against every question ~ whereas thelist of potential questions is always dle. His thesis is that whatever we aocept as known always rests on an ultimately defective title in-point of ‘alional warrant Scepties have’ seldom been minded to contest factual claims which are strictly subjective in that they are couched ‘wholly in the language of impressions snd appearances ("l take myself to be seving an apple over there")." Its the issue ofthe validity of claims regarding the objecrive circumstances of "the real world” that they wish primarily to put on the fgenda, The bone of contention isthe versity of our com monplace processes of knowledge-acquistion such as the Sense, memory, and induetive inquiry in science and in every: dy te. ‘The objective of the book is accordingly to examine eii- cally the main arguments in support of such actually ori ‘ented cognitive seeptcism, I will endeavor to show that the Seeptic is wrong and to argue that we are indeed ina position to stake rationally warranted claims to objective knowledge bout the world ‘What is one to call the seeptc’s opponent ~ the person ‘who maintains that empirical Knowledge i accesible that Wwe an stake appropriate claims? The seeptic prefers to char acterize his opponents as dogmatists. But these ofthis pe jorative term distorts the issue. A dogmatst is not simply omcone who claims to now something, but one who closes his mind on the issue — who refuses to entertain objections and heed difficulties. Accordingly, we have adopted the term ognitvst to designate the seeptic’s opponent. The cognit Vist crosses the threshold into dogmatism only i he main- tains that once we claim knowiedge we “close the book” on the matter and take the stance that under no circumstances fr conditions would we ever retract such a claim, The posi- tion to be developed here does not take this dogmatie stance, epropounds a fallibilst theory of factual knowledge which ers rene) we i4 Introduction recognizes that in principle a perfetly vali elaim to know- Tedge may have to be withdrawn in the light of "unforeseen developments.” Recent discussions of scepticism have tended to focus ex clusively on the issue of the availability of knowledge, But historically sepsis have concerned themselves no Tess ‘with aveeptance or belief, Their question has not just been “Do we ever actually know?” but fas moved towards the more ra- cal postion of one who asks “Do we ever really have ade- quately supportive grounds for what we accept?" — "are our belies ever realy justfed?” To focus ob epistemology upon the theory of knowledge (eplstémg) exclusively is to-do ess than justice co this inhefently complex and. diversified enterprise? Teihus emerges that sceptical positions can differ not only in point of scope (ranging from the totalitarian agnosticism of the doctrine that nothing whatsoever can be known to the doctrine that nothing can be known in some particular de- limited domain), but also, and no les importantly, seeptical positions can differ in point of degree ~ ranging from the harrower insistence on the unattanabilty of knowledge 3 Sich, fo a more audacious nd enlarged insistence on the further unattainabilty of “reasonable belief” or plausibility (or probability or suchlike weaker epistemic categories, For in rejecting all prospects of realizing knowledge, a soeplic can yel mitigate the impact of his position with words to some suet effet as: "Accept claims about the world by all means you may well be quite justifed in doing so. Only cal this “reasonable belie” or “justified opinion” or “warranted assertability” (or, as the Greeks had it, to pithanon oF 10 teulogon), but don’t claim it to be actual knowledge (eps tame)" ‘The particular type of scepticism which will primarily con- ‘em us here, however, is that which maintains the unachiey- ability of knowledge in the domain of empirical fact ~ even though, it might be prepared to concede the prospect of something weaker uth ts reasonable ereptanc or plas mS Mad ore an ou api Gert wa 4 (pcre at dB ane Bin Rte i Ha Inroduetion 5 ble belief. For our purpose here is antiseptical and positive: the task of our discussion isto work towards the legitmation of claims to Knowledge, And clearly, if one is able to validate Such claims, one is a fortir’ in position to validate ils tweaker cognates such as “reasonable bei ‘Accordingly, the present discussion wil endeavor to argue that itis proper, appropriate, and legitimate to aecept as the ‘warranting basis for our Knowledge claims the usual stan- dards of everydaylife experience and its systematization in natural science. This strategy, if succesful will defeat not ‘nly the seeptical agnostic who denies knowledge ut also the eadicalseeptic who denies the realizability of any sort of rationally warranted belt. ‘While there are many sorts of sceptics and a wide variety of sceptical positions, the present discussion will thus not endeavor to argue against all of them. The following three Theses are primarily at issue That man is inherently so circamstanced that i i impossible in the epistemic nature of things for him to obtain knowledge of matters of fact. ‘That this isso because knowledge by its very nature requires certainty (precision, finality, and other Such marks of absoluteness) 10 which we cannot ever atuin ‘That this circumstance is something we ean live with Iecause it does not lead to stultf¥ing consequences for thought and action, The sceptical position defined by these theses provides the prime target ofthe present deliberations. ‘After receiving short shrift from the philosophical community during the interval from David Hume to the preset centurs, Scepticism regained the focus of attention after World War6 Introduction 1, when it found a series of important opponents:* The session for these eritieal discussions of scepticism wis pro- Nided by G. E. Moore. His support of our ordinary know: ledgeclaims ~ while not directed against the sceptics but against the idealists — put an antiscepical postion promi ently upon the agenda. Subsequently, the natural dialectic through which any philosophical doctrine generates its own ‘opposition once more roused up defendents of scepticism. (We have here one of those not infrequent episodes in the history of philosophy where attacks upon a "dead horse” brought it to life again.) A host of champions have entered the ists on its behalf, and ther is no exaggeration in ranking i among the main topics of contention in curren episten logical controversy. This revival has re-stablished sept ‘ism as one of the great perennial issues in philosophy? Te is incumbent upon any convinced cognitivst to account for the tenacity of scepticism, Despite rejection, obloguy, and rebuttal over the centuries, septicism has managed time dnd again to rise, Phoenicike, from the ashes. Surly no- thing can explain this fact apart from the recognition that Scepticism embodies a grain of truth and peraps many of| them, This at any rate isthe stance of the present discussion, ‘which will maintain that, while scepticism i, in the end i correct and untenable, nevertheless there #8 much to be std for many sceptical theses and arguments, and a considera tion of the seepics views can contebute grealy to a proper understanding’ of the nature of knowledge. Im his tireless (and sometimes tiresome) probing forthe bass ofthe valid ieee" The Eas of hab a 7 RT) yp Serr rm Dr ri sks Mona tee ee ene ete Inroduetion 4 ity of our belies, the soeptic manages to put his hand on something deep and correct regarding the nature of know- Tedge 23. He IRREFUFAMMLITY oF ScEPTICIM Scepticism is, in a way, irefutable, at any rate in the sense that the standard and straightforward sorts of refutatory frgumentation cannot successfully be deployed against 1 Discusive argumentation standardly proceeds fom premisses and i is clear that scepticism cannot be refuted by counter- frgumentation proceeding along such standard lines. For, insofar as sucht argumentation is scemingly successiul, it is open to the scepic simply to reject the premises at issue (However plausible they seem, the sceptics thick-skinned ‘enough to be as soon hung for a sheep as a lamb.) Factual ‘lnims can never be supported by purely formal considers- tions: any adequately supportive evidence that we could intro- duce to substantiate the thesis that our factual claims are Warranted would itself ave to be ofthe factual sort. Thus it Would itself fall at once under the sceptic’s ax Moreover, iis unlikely that the premisses from which ths Fefutatory reas- bing would proceed ‘would be more plausible than those ‘which support the intial Knowledge claims themselves, and it ‘Seems anomalous to juni something disputed by what is no Tess controversial. As Hume wrote “This sptical doubs, both with respeet to reason and the sensts, is 4 malady, which can never be radically curd... "Tis impossible upon any system to defend fither our understanding or senses; and we but expose them farther when we endeavor to justify them in that But even if the factual sceptic cannot be refuted by an appeal to unproblematic grounds, he can perhaps be re- butted with reference 10 the consequences of his. position. * i Huns, A eta of Huma Na Book PLY.8 Introduetion Might one not manage to invalidate scepticism by showing ‘that it leads to untenable results? Unienable for whom? As one proceeds in the elaboration ofthese refuting consequences ts always open to the seep- tic to defeat these efforts by simply accepting these "unacsept- able” consequences. (The sheep and the lamb again.) The Sceptie can coolly say: “Those so-called "bad consequences’ aren't realy so unacceptable. Indeed we must cept them — siven the correctness of scepticism. That’ just realism = a matter of accepting things as they re." Confronted by such strategy, we have no further recourse. There is no Way of refuting the committed seeptic who is determined to follow ‘the implications of his doctrine “to the biter end.” ‘cis thus rically important to distinguish between rather diferent sorts of "refutations of seepicism,” namely (1) arguments whose probative force is such as to dis lodge the rational septic From his position and @) arguments whose probative foree would impede “the reasonable min" from ever becoming a seepie in the first place ‘This difference is decisive. There is no real prospect of achiev= ing a successful refutation of scepticism in sense (1). What- ver supporting considerations we bring in would be met by the dedicated sexptie with “I don't esept that” — a stance entirely in unison with his position. Seeing that the seeptic fan simply stand pat in his refusal 0 aovept any counter arguments, he holds position from which he eainot be dis lodged by reasoning. I is thus quite impossible to sehieve the fist sort of refuiation. But ultra posse nemo obligatur ~ hatin principle unachievable cannot esonably be asked ‘And so the sot of refutation at issue with (2) comes to the fore. This is quite different matter, For here we do indeed have a basis for resting the Archimedean lever of orthodox rationality ~ iz, the Falfonal commitments of argument Introduction 9 tion and proof to which “the reasonable man" stands com. milted. Accordingly, while it would be absurd to try to refute the seeptie ~ to tackle him head-on and try 10 dislodge him ‘om his vin grounds ~ one eum indeed rebut the seeps post tion before the judgment of a neural arbiter ~ one who has rot yet forsaken orthodox rationality in espousing the seep: eal way, "To be sure, such counterargumentation is not 2 “knock. down, drag-out” refutation to the scepic, bul only an srgi- ment that would prevent someone not lfeady precommited to scepticism ~ and specifically a (hypothetically) “rational rman” who is, at ths stage, neutral as between scepticism and ogntivsm ~ from espousing this doctrine in the fst place. This to repeal is as much as one ean reasonably ask for. Given that the utterly committed soeptic cannot — as a matter of theoretical general prineple ~ be dislodged by any Tine of argumentation, iis clear that the only sort of “refuta- tion” of scepticism that is worth developing is one which proceeds along the lines of this second alternative ‘Our overall strategy’ of argumentation is this to address the question: “Why should one who is not already a pre= committed sexptie abstain from espousing scepticism?” And there the answer is this, tha scepticism ineurs grave sanctions fn both the cognitive and the practic side, exacting a price that is simply not worth paying. ‘The antisceptical argument to be developed inthe ensuing pages will accordingly endea vor lo show that the adoption of scepticism would exact price unaecepiable to the rational man who does not already Share the soeptic's predilections. The central task of the present book is thus to present a rebuttal of scepticism. Yet this nutshell statement fail to do justice to 8 rather complex ventute. For the validity ~ and utility ~of many of the sceptics views and arguments will, in the end, be fully recognized and admitted, The position here defended is that the Sceptic misconsiues the bearing of his ‘own doctrines, in that these do not demonstrate the ut teinabilty of knowledge, but rather indicate certain mun ddancly realistic limitations upon the sort of knowledge we sctualy can and do obtain