TANADA V TUVERA (136 SCRA 27)

FACTS:Petitioners Tanada, et. al, invokes the right of people to be informed on matters of public concern
and the principle that for laws to be valid and enforceable, they must be published in the OG.
Petitioners file for mandamus to compel respondents to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instruction, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and admin orders.
The OSG, representing the respondents, moves dismiss the case, arguing that petitioners have no legal
personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE: w/n publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD: NCC2 does not exclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The object of this provision is to give the general public notice of the
various laws which regulate their actions and conduct. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance. It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the violation of a law which he
had no notice whatsoever.
The very first sentence of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette....
The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced in accordance to the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court held that presidential issuances of general application that
have not been published have no force and effect.
FUENTES V ROCA (GR No. 178902, April 21 2010)
FACTS: Tarciano Roca sold a conjugal property without consent of his estranged wife, Rosario, to the
Fuenteses. The affidavit of consent of Rosario was therein found to be forged by Tarciano and his
counsel. After the death of the Roca spouses, their children questioned the sale of the property on the
ground that the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not obtained and that Rosarios signature
was a mere forgery. The Fuenteses on the other hand, claim that the action has prescribed since an
action to annul a sale on the ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed; and
2. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that
sale.
HELD:
1. Rocas were married under the NCC, the sale was done in 1989, after the effectivity of the FC, which
applies to conjugal partnerships already existing at the enactment of the FC. The sale of conjugal
property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario is completely void under FC124. With regard to
the action already prescribing based on the discovery of the fraud, that prescription period applied to the
Fuentes spouses since it was they who should have assailed such contract bec of the fraud. On the other
hand, the action to assail a sale based on the lack of consent of the other spouse does not prescribe
since the same is a void contract.
2. the Fuenteses argue that it is only the spouse, Rosario, who can file such a case to assail the validity of

the sale but given that Rosario was already dead no one could bring the action anymore. The SC held
that such position is invalid since the sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained
the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, the ownership of the property
to passed to their heirs, namely, the petitioners. As lawful owners, the petitioners had the right, under
NCC429, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTIOMS V HYPERMIX (GR No. 179579, February 1, 2012)
11/7/2003 petitioner issued CMO 27-2003 (Customs Memorandum Order).
Under the memorandum, for tariff purposes: wheat is classified according to: 1. Importer or consignee, 2.
Country of origin, and 3. Port of discharge.
Depending on these factors wheat would be classified as either as food grade or food feed.
The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for food feed grade 7%. A month after the
issuance of CMO 27- 200 respondent filed a petition for declaratory for Relief with the Regional Trial
Court of Las Pias City.
Respondent:
1. CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the RAC on public participation, prior
notice, and publication or registration with the UP Law Canter.
2. the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without prior assessment and
examination, despite having imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the
arrival of the shipment, forcing to pay 133%.
3. the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated and asserted that the retroactive
application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss:
1. The RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
2. an action for declaratory relief (Rule 63, Sec.1 who may file petition) was improper
3. CMO 27-2003 was internal administrative rule not legislative in nature
4. The claims of respondent were speculative and premature, because the Bureau of Customs had yet to
examine respondents products.
RTC held that a petition for declaratory relief was proper remedy, and that respondent was the proper
party to file it.
ISSUE:
1. w/n the CMO 27-2003 of the petitioner met the requirements for the RAC?
2. w/n the content of the CMO 27-2003 met the requirement of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
HELD:
1. No, they did not. petitioners violated respondents right to due process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003
when they failed to observe the requirements under the Administrative Code for filing with the UP Law
Center and Public Participation
ACAAC V AZCUNA JR. (GR No. 187378, Sept 30 2013)
FACTS: PETAL NGO engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood
projects w/in Misamis Occidental. PETAL built cottages on Capayas Island & it rented out to the public
and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries, among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and
Romeo Bulawin.
Respondents Mayor Azcuna and Building Official Bonalos issued Notices of Illegal Construction against
PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the before construction violating the Building
Code and ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas Island.

7/8/2002 - Sangguniang Bayan of Jaena Lopez adopted Municipal Ordinance prohibiting: (a) entry of any
entity, association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries; and (b) construction of any
structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local government.
7/12/2002 - Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; the same was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental, which, conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Notices were posted
at the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and
prohibiting entry.
Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built on
Capayas Island.
Petitioners filed an action praying for TRO, injunction and damages against respondents
Respondents: petitioners have no cause of action against them bec. they are not the lawful owners or
lessees of Capayas Island, which was reclassified as timberland and property belonging to the public
domain.
The RTC declared the ordinance as invalid/void. CA held that the subject ordinance was deemed
approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid w/in 30 days after its submission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners.
HELD: CA AFFIRMED. Presumption of validity of ordinance as SP did not act on w/in 30 days based on
S56 of the LGC. consistent with law and therefore valid.petitioner's own evidence reveals that a
public hearing was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. petitioners failed to
present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made.
KASILAG V RODRIGUEZ (69 PHIL 217)
Facts: Rafaela Rodriguez, et al., children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced a
civil case to recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way
of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio (EA).
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead
to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 plus interest. One year after the execution of the
mortgage deed, it came to pass that EA was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the
land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract
whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not
collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the fruits of
the land, and would introduce improvements thereon.
HELD: The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as integral
elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, because such contract is a lien
and as such is expressly prohibited by Sec 116 of Act No. 2874, as amended. The question to be
answered is w/n the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in GF because he was unaware of any flaw
in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by w/c it is invalidated. Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of
the rule. From the facts as found by the CA, we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was
aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in Sec.
116. This being the case, the question is w/n GF may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of good faith but excusable ignorance
may be such basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant
w/ the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on
the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In
taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist
does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that

the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions
of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the basis of GF. The petitioners being in GF, the respondents may
elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000,
or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by
paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties.
ELEGADO V COURT OF APPEALS (173 SCRA 285)
Facts: On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national, formerly resident of the
Philippines, died in Oregon, USA. As certain shares of stock are left in the Philippines, his son Ward
Graham filed an estate tax return. On the basis of such return, the Commission of Internal Revenue (CIR)
assessed the descendants estate in the amount of P96,509.35. The assessment was protested by the
law firm of Bump, Yang, and Walker on behalf of the estate which was denied by the CIR. Elegado as an
ancillary administrator filed a second estate tax return. The Commissioner imposed an assessment on the
estate in the amount of P72,948.87 based on the SEC return, which was protested by the Agrava Law
Office on behalf of the estate. While the protest was pending, the petitioner filed a motion for the
allowance of the basic estate tax of P96,509.35. He said that this liability had not yet been paid although
the assessment had long become final and executory. Petitioner was denied contending that the first
assessment is not binding on him because it was based on a return filed for by lawyers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the first assessment is binding being filed for by lawyers.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that Elegados contention is flimsy. Elegado cannot be serious when he
argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it
was based were not familiar with our tax laws and procedure. If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot
claim similar preferences, it follows that foreigners cannot be any less bound by laws in our country.
SIMON V CHAN (GR. NO. 157547, FEBRUARY 23 2011)
Facts: On July 11, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed in the MeTC criminal charges
against the late Eduardo Simon (Simon) in violation of BP 22 .That sometime in December 1996 in the
City of Manila, Philippines, Simon, issued to Elvin Chan a Landbank Check payable to cash in the amount
of P336,000.00, knowing full and well that she/he/they did not have sufficient funds. Simon failed to pay
Elvin Chan within five (5) banking day after being noticed.
Respondent Elvin Chan commenced in the MeTC in Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the
principal amount of P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary action.
The MeTC, Pasay City, granted Simons urgent motion to dismiss under the grounds of litis pendentia.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chans complaint.
The CA overturns the RTC citing Rule 111, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ISSUE/S: 1) W/n Chan can file separate civil action for recovery of amount of bounced check?
2) W/n Procedural Laws can have a retroactive effect
HELD:
1) No, due to Supreme Court Circular 55-97 and provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Indemnity
is part of the penalty from crimes as per Article 20 of the NCC, which provide: Every person who,
contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
Though Simon is civilly liable to Chan, no independent civil action to recover the value of the bounced
check can be filed. The SC cites Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Though this rule was not yet in effect
when Chan filed his separate Civil case on August 3, 2000, the abovementioned provisions are
applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right
of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is
simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.

SC agrees with CA ruling that upon commencement of trial criminal cases in violation of BP 22, civil
action for recovery of amount of checks will be consolidated to the former. This is under Section 1(b)
of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
This requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved.
Generally, no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action
in complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of
the complaint.
2) Procedural Laws can have a retroactive effect because they do not impair vested rights.
Citing the SC ruling:It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate
any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.
In this case, the retroactive effects of the provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court that took effect
on December 1, 2000, can apply because they WILL NOT impair any vested rights Chan has to the
recovery of the amount of the bounced check issued to him by Simon.
FRANCISCO V CA (GR. NO. 102330, NOVEMBER 25, 1998)
FACTS: Petitioner, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his second
marriage filed a suit for damages and for annulment of general power of attorney authorizing Conchita
Evangelista (Eusebios daughter in his first marriage) to administer the house and lot together with the
apartments allegedly acquired by petitioner and Eusebio during their conjugal partnership. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of private respondents due to petitioners failure to establish proof that said
properties were acquired during the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained
exclusively to the petitioner. As such, the CA ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio,
and that he has the capacity to administer them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trial
court's ruling that the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital properties
of Eusebio exclusively.
RULING: SC resolved the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on the
provisions of the New Civil Code. Indeed, Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code have been repealed
by the Family Code of the Philippines. Nonetheless, SC cannot invoke the new law in this case without
impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256 in relation to Article 105 (second paragraph) of the
Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code does not operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were
in force. Petition is denied. The Decision of the CA is affirmed.
PESCA V PESCA (GR. NO. 136921, APRIL 17, 2001)
FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her
husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He
was a habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking, her husband
would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill
her in the presence of their children. The children also suffered physical violence. Petitioner and their
children left the home. Two months later, they returned upon the promise of respondent to change. But he
didnt. She was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC
declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed RTCs ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina should be
taken in consideration in deciding in this case.
HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under the
category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force and
effect of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature.

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the
settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law.
DAVID V AGBAY (GR. NO. 199113, MARCH 18, 2015)
Facts: In 1974, petitioner Renato M. David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by
naturalization. Upon their retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot
where they constructed a residential house. However, they came to know that the portion where they built
their house is a public land and part of the salvage zone. In April 2007, David filed a Miscellaneous Lease
Application (MLA) over the subject land wherein he indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private
respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application and she also filed a criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents (Art. 172, RPC). Meanwhile, David re-acquired his Filipino citizenship in
October 2007.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor recommended the filing of the information in court. David filed a
petition for review before (DOJ) but the same was denied. Meanwhile, CENRO rejected Davids MLA,
ruling that the latters subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his
MLA. Thereafter, an information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the Municipal Trial
Court and a warrant of arrest was issued against the David. The latter then filed an Urgent Motion for ReDetermination of Probable Cause, which was denied. Davids petition for certiorari before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
W/N David may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino in his Public Land
Application despite his subsequent re-acquition of Philippin citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225?
Did the MTC properly deny Davids motion for re-determination of probable cause on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused?
RULING:
R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was signed into
law by President Arroyo on August 29, 2003. While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos
who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship, such is qualified by the phrase under the conditions of this Act. Section 3 lays down such
conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs.
Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization
in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens
who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used is different, re- acquired for the first
group, and retain for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian citizen
prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural born Filipinos under the first
paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new
law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath
of allegiance.
In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of
which clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new laws effectivity.

David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time
of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the
governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was
among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he re- acquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act,
the said law having no retroactive effect in so far as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC
therefore did not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article172,
paragraph 1.
NERWIN V PNOC (GR. NO. 167057, APRIL 11, 2012)
FACTS: In 1999, National Electrification Administration (NEA) published an invitation to pre-qualify and to
bid for a contract known as IPB No. 80 for the supply and delivery of about 60,000 pieces of wood poles
and 20,000 of cross-arms. Nerwin was one of the bidders. The contract was awarded to him being the
lowest bidder. However, NEAs board of directors passed a resolution reducing by 50% the material
requirements for IPB 80 to which Nerwin protested. A losing bidder, Tri State and Pacific Synergy filed a
complaint alleging the documents Nerwin submitted during the pre-qualification bid were falsified. Finding
a way to nullify the bid, NEA sought the opinion of Govt Corporate Counsel who upheld the eligibility of
Nerwin. NEA allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for IPB 80 contract. As a result, Nerwin filed a
complaint with prayer of injunction which was granted by RTC Manila. PNOC Energy Devt Corp issued
an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for O-ILAW project. Nerwin filed a civil action in RTC alleging that it
was an attempt to subject portions of IPB 80 to another bidding. He prayed for TRO to enjoin respondents
to the proposed bidding. Respondents averred that this is in violation of a rule that government
infrastructure are not subject to TROs. RTC granted TRO nevertheless. CA ruled in favor of respondents.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant to RA 8975 which prohibits issuance of TRO
except SC to govt projects
HELD: Decision of CA affirmed. Sec 3 of RA 8975 clearly prohibits issuance of TRO, preliminary
injunctions, and preliminary mandatory injunctions against govt.
DM CONSUNJI V CA (GR. NO. 137873, APRIL 20, 2001)
FACTS: A construction worker died when he fell 14 floors when the platform which he was on board fell
from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig City. He works for DM Consunji Inc. It was noted that this happened
because the pin inserted to the platform loosened and there was no safety lock. His widow filed with RTC
of Pasig a complaint for damages against DM Consunji Inc. The employer averred that the widow already
availed benefits from the State Insurance Fund and that she cannot recover civil damages from the
company anymore.
ISSUE: W/N the widow is already barred from availing death benefits under the Civil Code because she
already availed damages under the Labor Code
HELD: Although SC ruled that recovery of damages under the Workers Compensation Act is a bar to
recover under a civil action, the CA ruled that in this case, the widow had a right to file an ordinary action
for civil actions because she was not aware and ignorant of her rights and courses of action. She was not
aware of her rights and remedies. Thus, her election to claim from the Insurance Fund does not waive her
claim from the petitioner company. The argument that ignorance of the law excuses no one is not
applicable in this case because it is only applicable to mandatory and prohibitory laws.
AUJERO V PHILCOMSAT (GR. NO. 193484, JANUARY 18, 2012)
FACTS: It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working for respondent (Philcomsat) as an accountant in
the latter's Finance Department. After 34 years of service, the petitioner applied for early retirement. His
application for retirement was approved, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate equivalent to
one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the petitioner was Philcomsat's

Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of P274,805.00. Petitioner executed a Deed of Release and
Quitclaim in Philcomsats favor.
Almost 3 years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits, claiming that the
actual amount of his retirement pay is P14,015,055.00 and the P9,439,327.91 he received from
Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more than enough
reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void.
Labor Arbiter issued a Decision in the petitioners favor.NLRC granted Philcomsats appeal and reversed
and set aside LAs Decision. By way of the assailed Decision, the CA found no merit in the petitioners
claims, holding that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the
respondents appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsats favor is valid, thereby
foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained. While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and
quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers
seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a
laborer's claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties. Considering the
petitioner's claim of fraud and bad faith against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court finds the
quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.
DONA ADELA V TIDCORP (GR. NO. 201931, FEBRUARY 11, 2015)
Facts: Doa Adela Export International, Inc., filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, after finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, declared Doa
Adela as insolvent and stayed all civil proceedings against Doa Adela. Atty. Arlene Gonzales was
appointed as receiver. After taking her oath, Atty. Gonzales proceeded to make the necessary report,
engaged appraisers and required the creditors to submit proof of their respective claims. Doa Adela,
through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and Technology Resource Center (TRC) entered into a
Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement wherein Doa Adela agreed to transfer a parcel of land with
existing improvements in favor of TRC in full payment of Doa Adelas obligation bearing the conformity of
Atty. Gonzales as receiver. Creditors TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement,
with a waiver of confidentiality provision. Epifanio Ramos, Jr. filed a Manifestation and Motion to the
Proposed Compromise Agreement of TIDCORP and BPI wherein he stated that Doa Adela has a
personality separate and distinct from its stockholders and officers.
The RTC rendered the assailed Decision approving the Dacion En Pago by Compromise Agreement and
the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement. Doa Adela filed a motion for partial reconsideration and claimed
that TIDCORP and BPIs agreement imposes on it several obligations but it is not a party and signatory to
the said agreement.
ISSUE: Is the waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between TIDCORP and BPI bind Doa
Adela despite not being a party and signatory to the same?
RULING: No. In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI and TIDCORP
only. There was no written consent given by Doa Adela or its representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that
Doa Adela is waiving the confidentiality of its bank deposits. The provision on the waiver of the
confidentiality of Doa Adelas bank deposits was merely inserted in the agreement. It is clear therefore
that Doa Adela is not bound by the said provision since it was without the express consent of Doa
Adela who was not a party and signatory to the said agreement.
In addition, considering that Doa Adela was already declared insolvent by the RTC, all its property,
assets and belongings were ordered delivered to the appointed receiver or assignee. Thus, in the order of

the RTC appointing Atty. Gonzales as receiver, Doa Adela was directed to assign and convey to Atty.
Gonzales all its real and personal property, monies, estate and effects with all the deeds, books and
papers relating thereto, pursuant to Section 32 of the Insolvency Law. Such assignment shall operate to
vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by law from execution. Corollarily,
the stipulation in the Joint Motion to Approve Compromise Agreement that Doa Adela waives its right to
confidentiality of its bank deposits requires the approval and conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver
since all the property, money, estate and effects of Doa Adela have been assigned and conveyed to her
and she has the right to recover all the estate, assets, debts and claims belonging to or due to the
insolvent debtor.
THORNTON V THORNTON (AUG 16, 2004)
FACTS: Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married and had one
daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored as a plain housewife and wanted to return to
her old job as GRO in a nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home together with their daughter
and told her servants that she was going to Basilan. The husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
designated Family Court in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan. When he
went to Basilan, he didnt find them and the barangay office issued a certification that respondent was no
longer residing there. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied by CA on the ground that it did
not have jurisdiction over the case since RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding
the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.)
ISSUE: W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in
light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.
HELD: Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing in RA 8369 revoked its
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant be
affirmed because it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course in obtaining custody.
The minor could be transferred from one place to another and habeas corpus case will be left without
legal remedy since family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. Literal interpretation
would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and contradiction. The literal interpretation of
exclusive will result in grave injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of
children.
KIDA V SENATE (GR. NO. 196271, FEBRUARY 28, 2012)
FACTS: These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October 18, 2011,
where it upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional
mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to
the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge
(OICs) to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
ISSUES:
1. Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national and local
elections?
2. Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?
3. Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
4. Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?
HELD: The constitutionality of RA No. 10153 is upheld.
1. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly there was to be a
single election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down to the municipal officials.
Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective

officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. That the
ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on
synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization.
2. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM elections; it
does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In fixing the date of the ARMM
elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA
No. 9054.
Similarly, the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement applies to all amendments of RA No.
9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite requirement set forth in the Constitution is
incorrect. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that the creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose. This means that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned
in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification through a
plebiscite.
3. The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054,
which allows the regional officials to remain in their positions in a holdover capacity..
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can
occupy their offices. Since elective ARMM officials are also local officials, they are, thus, bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should
stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
4.The Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to
another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Both
Section 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have already been scheduled to
take place but do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen
circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In contrast, the
ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization
of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated
by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.
YINLU BICOL V TRANS-ASIA (GR. NO. 207942, JAN 12, 2015)
FACTS:This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Barrio Larap, Municipality of Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, a portion of which was owned and mined by Philippine Iron Mines, Inc.
(PIMI), which ceased operations in 1975 due to financial losses. PIMIs portion was sold in a foreclosure
sale to (MBC) and (PCIB, later Banco De Oro, or BDO).The Government then opened the area for
exploration. Trans-Asia then explored the area from 1986 onwards. In 1996, it entered into an operating
agreement with Philex Mining Corporation over the area, their agreement being duly registered by the
Mining Recorder Section of Regional Office No. V of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
Trans-Asia filed an application for the approval of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) over
the area in that Regional Office of the DENR, through the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), in
Daraga, Albay. The application, which was amended in 1999, was granted on July 28, 2007 under MPSA
No. 252-2007-V, by which Trans-Asia was given the exclusive right to explore, develop and utilize the
mineral deposits in the portion of the mineral lands.

Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter that it had acquired the mining patents
of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of a deed of absolute sale, stating that the areas covered by its mining
patents were within the areas of Trans-Asias MPSA. MGB Regional Office V informed the Office of the
DENR Secretary that there was no record on file showing the existence of the mining patents of Yinlu.
DENR Sec ordered the amendment of Trans-Asias MPSA by excluding therefrom the mineral lands
covered by Yinlus mining patents.
Office of the President affirmed the DENR Secs Order. CA agreed with the DENR Secretary and the OP
that Yinlu held mining patents over the disputed mining areas, but ruled that Yinlu was required to register
the patents under PD No. 463 in order for the patents to be recognized in its favor.
ISSUE: Whether Yinlus mining patents constitute vested rights and could not be disregarded.
HELD: YES
A mining patent pertains to a title granted by the government for the said mining claim. Under the 1935
Constitution, which took effect on November 15 1935, the alienation of natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, was expressly prohibited. Prohibition against the alienation of natural
resources did not apply to a mining claim or patent existing prior to November 15, 1935.
The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is entitled to the exclusive possession
and enjoyment against everyone, including the Government itself. Where there is a valid and perfected
location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the
locator. Moreover, the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public domain when
the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within the prohibition
against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest.In the present case: the mining patents of Yinlu were issued pursuant to the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and were subsisting prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Consequently,
Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral lands that could
not and should not be impaired even in light of their past failure to comply with the requirement of
registration
and
annual
work
obligations.
DE CASTRO V JBC (GR. NO. 191002, APRIL 20 2010)
Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said
decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates
to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue
that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban
on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of
stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela
ruling.
ISSUE Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments
during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?
HELD:The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential
appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice
Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15,
Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism.
Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17,
2010 decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential
appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the
outgoing president does not apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.

TY V BANCO FILIPINO (GR. NO. 188302, JUNE 27, 2012)

Facts: In 1979, the Board of Directors of Banco Filipino warehoused some of its existing properties to
allow more flexibility in the opening of branches, to enable it to acquire more branches, and to circumvent
the General Banking Act which limits a banks real estate holdings to not more than 50% of its capital
assets.
To go about the warehousing scheme, Nancy, a major stockholder and director of the bank, persuaded
two other stockholders, to organise and incorporate Tala Realty to hold and purchase real properties in
trust for respondent. Thus it came to be that Remedios, another sibling of Tomas, Pedro and Nancy
controlled Tala Realty through their respective nominees.
To execute their trust agreement, Banco Filipino sold to Tala Realty some of the properties; Tala Realty
simultaneously leased to the bank the properties for 20 years, renewable for another 20 years and with a
right of repurchase should Tala Realty decides to sell them. However, in 1992, Tala Realty repudiated the
trust, claimed the titles for itself, and demanded that the bank pay rentals, deposits and goodwill, with a
threat to eject the bank.
From 1995 to 1998, Banco Filipino filed 17 complaints against Tala Realty, Nancy and the other nominees
and stockholders of Tala Realty, including this case which was filed before the Malabon City RTC. Nancy
and her co-defendants moved to dismiss this case, citing forum shopping and lis pendencia citing the 16
other cases filed in other courts involving the same issues, same parties and same causes of action.
Issue: W/N res judicata was present in the case
Held: G.R. No. 137533, as reiterated in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608, is
binding and applicable to the present case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere, which means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established. Under
the doctrine, when this Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the
same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same.
Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of
certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.
Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar
to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
VIRTUCIO V ALEGARBES (GR. NO. 187451, AUGUST 29, 2012)
Facts: Alegarbes was granted a 24-hectare Homestead Patent in 1952. In 1955 however, the land was
subdivided into three (3) lots Lot Nos. 138,139 and 140 as a consequence of public land subdivision.
Lot 139 was allocated to Custodio, and Lot 140 was allocated to petitioner Virtucio. Both Custodio and
Virtucio filed Homestead Application and were granted.
Alegarbes filed protest opposing the homesteads of Custodio and Virtucio, claiming that his approved
application covered the whole area, including Lot Nos. 139 and 140, but was denied and he was ordered
to vacate the subject land but he refused. In 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint for "Recovery of
Possession and Ownership with Preliminary Injunction" before the RTC. Alegarbes argued that the his
possession of Lot Nos. 138, 139 and 140 had been open, continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years and had acquired such lots by acquisitive prescription.
Issues: 1. W/N Alegarbes acquired ownership over the subject property by acquisitive prescription.
2. W/N the period of acquisitive prescription was interrupted in 1961 (or in 1954 when Alegarbes filed the
protest)

Held: The SC ruled that "the CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of
Lot 140 entitling him to retain possession of it because he was in open, continuous and exclusive
possession for over thirty (30) years of alienable public land." Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in
relation to its Article 712, provides that prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through the lapse of
time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. Under the same law, it states that
acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten years, while extraordinary
acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years, without need of title or
of good faith. The CA, was correct in finding that: xxx Even if the decision to approve appellee's
homestead application over Lot 140 had become final, appellant could still acquire the said lot by
acquisitive prescription.
In this case, Alegarbes had applied for homestead patent as early as 1949. He had been in exclusive,
open, continuous and notorious possession of Lot 140 for at least 30 years. By the time the DENR issued
its order of execution in 1989, Alegarbes had Lot 140 in his possession for more than 30 years. Even
more so when Virtucio filed the complaint before the RTC in 1997, Alegarbes was already in possession
of the subject property for forty-eight (48) years.
Civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor. When no action is
filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons against the respondents. The period of
acquisitive prescription continues to run. Thus, Virtucios reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling
the period of acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that effectively toll the
period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil interruption.
REPUBLICAN V REHMAN ENTERPRISES (GR. NO. 199310, FEB 19, 2014)
Facts:Respondent filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of
land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077. During
the initial hearing, Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. LLDA filed its
opposition, asserting that the lots were not part of the alienable lands of the public domain
Republic of the Philippines likewise filed its opposition, alleging that the respondent failed to prove that
respondent and its predecessors have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, which led to trial. Petitioner argued that the lots
are not alienable and disposable since purusant to Section 41(11) of RA 4850, lands surrounding the
Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglamentary elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands. RTC
granted respondents application for registration of title to the properties. CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision which granted the application for
registration filed by the respondent.
Conclusion: The decision of the RTC was reversed and set aside. The application for Registration of
petitioner is denied. DENR documents were presented but petitioner was unable to present proof of the
DENR secretarys approval. Although Cerquenas testimony proved that the properties were tended to by
the petitioner and predecessors, it does not necessarily entail ownership.There was an inconsistency with
tax declarations as respondent only declared taxes starting 2002.
PEOPLE V RITTER (194 SCRA 690)
FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot in a hotel
room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario. Afterwards, he inserted a foreign
object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning, Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told
Jessie that Ritter inserted an object inside her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the
object has already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario with bloody
skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City general Hospital. An OB-Gyne
tried to remove the object inside her vagina using forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and
covered by tissues. She was having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the
object to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. RTC found him guilty of

rape with homicide.

ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when the incident with
Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the tender age. As evidence, she received
300 from Ritter the following morning. A doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the
vagina of Rosario Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused her death. Rosario herself said
to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She also told the doctor that a
Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a Caucasian.
However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must award to the victims
heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free from civil liability which is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. Ritter was deported.
ALONZO V PADUA (150 SCRA 379)
FACTS:Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in the
name of their deceased parents. One of them transferred his undivided share by way of absolute sale. A
year later, his sister sold her share in a Con Pacto de Retro Sale. By virtue of such agreements, the
petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing
the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence with their consent,
their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
One of the five coheirs sought to redeem the area sold to petitioners but was dismissed when it appeared
that he was an American citizen. Another coheir filed her own complaint invoking the same right of
redemption of her brother. Trial court dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the right had lapsed,
not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales. Although there was no written
notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.
Respondent court reversed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not actual knowledge satisfied the requirement of Art. 1088 of the New Civil Code.
HELD:
YES. Decision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated. The co-heirs in this
case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no
doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question
and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
While courts may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, courts nevertheless have the right to
read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, courts defer not to the letter that killeth but to the
spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the law makers will.
BARCELLANO V BARZA (GR. NO. 165287, SEPT 14, 2011)
Facts: Baas is an heir of Bartolome Baas who owns in fee simple Lot 4485, PLS-722-D situated in
Hindi, Bacacay, Albay. Next to the said lot is the property of Vicente Medina. On March 17, 1997, Medina
offered to sell his lot to the Baas. Crispino Bermillo, as the representative of the family, agreed to the
offer of Medina, the sale to take place after the harvest season.
On April 3, 1997, Medina sold the property to Armando Barcellano for Php60,000. The heirs of Bartolome
Baas learned about the sale the next day and went to Medinas house to confirm. Medina confirmed and
the heirs conveyed their intention to redeem the properly, but Medina said theres already a deed of sale.
He also states the heirs failed to tender the Php60,000 redemption amount.
The heirs went to the Office of the Barangay Council on April 5, 1997. Medina sent his only tenant to the

proceeding. On April 9, 1997, the heirs and Barcellano (without Medina nor his tenant) went to the Office
of the Barangay Council to settle the dispute. On October 24, 1997, Dolores Baas filed an action for
Legal Redemption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Dolored Baas, represented by her son
Bermillo, filed another action for Legal Redemption on March 11, 1998. Barcellano opposed insisting he
complied with the provisions of Art. 1623 of the NCC but Baas failed to exercise her right within the
period provided by law.
The trial court dismissed the complaint of the heirs. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
ruling of the lower court and granted the heirs the right to redeem the property.
Issue: Whether or not the 30-day period of redemption has expired.
Ruling: There is nothing in the records and pleadings submitted by the parties that shows a written notice
sent to the respondents, hence the period of thirty days within which the right of legal pre-emption does
not start. A written notice is necessary to remove all uncertainties about the sale.
The Court emphasized the mandatory character of a written notice in legal redemption: The right of the
petitioner-heirs to exercise their right of legal redemption exists, and the running of the period for its
exercise has not even been triggered because they have not been notified in writing the fact of sale.
MARTINEZ V VAN BUSKIRK (18 PHIL 79)
FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of the
street when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was attached came
along the street in the opposite direction at great speed. The horses ran into the carromata and wounded
Martinez servely. The defendant presented evidence that the cochero was a good servant and a reliable
and safe cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so he tied the driving lines of the horses to the front
end of the delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered. But while
unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip and made some noises which
frightened the horses and which made it ran away. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon
and was unable to stop the horses. The horses collided with the carromata.
ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero
HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It has
been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to leave horses in
the manner which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public, finding
itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.
TOMAWIS V BALINDONG (GR. NO. 182434, MARCH 5, 2010)
FACTS:The original case was filed by the now private respondents, who are sisters claiming to be the
absolute owners of the property in question being the legal heirs of their late father who have been in
continuous possession of the property prior to his death. Petitioner Tomawis assumed ownership to the
said property on the claim that he bought the same from another Mangoda Radia, who claims to have
inherited the property from his late father. Tomawis reportedly utilized the said land he claimed to have
bought for the construction of small houses bringing forth the said original action before the Sharia Circuit
Court in Marawi. Petitioner prayed to dismiss the case, assailing the jurisdiction of the SDC as it should
be under the regular Civil Court pursuant to the Judiciary Reorganization Act. SDC denied the motion,
affirming its jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines.
Petitioner appealed again with the SDC, reiterating that it does not have jurisdiction over the case
because it involves real property. It was likewise denied. Petitioner appealed to the CA but the CA
immediately denied it claiming that it does not have jurisdiction over cases from the SDC. Petitioner
appealed once more with the SDC and the latter dismissing the same with finality.
ISSUE: WON SDC has jurisdiction over the original civil case filed against the now petitioner, Tomawis
HELD: YES. Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines provides that SDC has exclusive original

jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary to Muslims. While the SC recognizes the
jurisdictions of both the Judiciary Reorganization Act and the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines with the former being the general law and the latter a special one, it considered the rule in
Statutory Construction in applying both laws. Because both laws tackle the same subject matter, they
should be construed in parimateria, taking into account the lawmakers intent that they be harmonized
together. Another principle to be applied is the generaliaspecialibus non derogant, a general law does not
nullify a special law. It must be born in mind that the reason of creation of the special law, particularly the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws, is to acknowledge the need for the Muslims to have a law specific to their
own customs and denying the SDC that jurisdiction will defeat the purpose of the said Code. However, the
said code does not invalidate the generally rules laid upon by the Judiciary Reorganization Act, it merely
provides for the jurisdiction of Sharia Courts over cases where an especially devised law exclusive to the
Muslims is needed, like the case at bar.
INTERNAL REVENUE V PRIMETOWN (GR. NO. 162155, AUG 28, 2007)
FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income
tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because they suffered
losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they
still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR.
Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required
Primetown to submit additional documents to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not
acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the
petition as it was filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund. Since
Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the
petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary
period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period
HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12
calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar without regard
to the number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed
Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed
within the 2-year reglementary period.
MONTAJES V PEOPLE (GR. NO. 183449, MARCH 12, 2012)
FACTS: Alfredo (Montajes) was charged and convicted for Direct Assault against Barangay Captain Jose
(Rellon) when he allegedly tried to hit the latter with a bolo when he stopped a benefit dance which
already exceeded the time allowed for it. The MTC convicted him, and his appeal to the Regional Trial
Court was also denied, hence, Jose filed a petition (motion) for extension of time to file a Petition for
Review with the CA for 15 days, counted from May 21, 2007 or until June 5, 2007. It appears that he
received the copy of the RTCs order denying his motion for reconsideration on May 4, 2007. He then
filed his Petition for Review on June 5, 2007.
On September 21, 2007, the CA dismissed his petition for review outrightly for being filed out of time. The
CA noted that Jose received the copy of the RTC order denying his motion for reconsideration on May 4,
2007, hence he had 15 days within which to file the petition for review. Considering that May 19, 2007 fell
on a Saturday, it was error for Jose to compute his extension of time on the first working day after the
deadline (Saturday, May 19), or on May 21, 2007 since when a party is granted an extension of time, the
15-day reckoning period should start from the last day which is Saturday, Sunday or holiday, according to
the CA. His motion for reconsideration denied, Jose filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court, arguing that his petition was not filed out of time since he filed it pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 22 of the Rules of Court; based on such provision, if the last day to file a petition falls on a Saturday,
the time shall not run until the next working day. Here, the last day of the reglementary period within which
to file the said petition for review with the CA fell on a Saturday, thus, the last day to file the petition was
moved to the next working day which was May 21, 2007, Monday. Hence, he was not wrong in asking the

CA to give him 15 days from May 21, 2007 to file the petition and not from May 19, 2007, Saturday. He
asks that his petition be resolved on the merits rather than on technicalities since he filed his petition for
review long before the CA dismissed the case.
Issue: Whether the Petition for Review was filed on time.
Held:YES. In De la Cruz v. Maersk Filipinas Crewing, Inc., we said: Section 1, Rule 22, as clarified by the
circular, is clear. Should a party desire to file any pleading, even a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading, and the last day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday, he may do so on the next
working day. This is what petitioner did in the case at bar. However, the petition for review on certiorari
was indeed filed out of time. The provision states that in case a motion for extension is granted, the due
date for the extended period shall be counted from the original due date, not from the next working day on
which the motion for extension was filed.
In the case at bar, although petitioners filing of the motion for extension was within the period provided by
law, the filing of the petition itself was not on time. Petitioner was granted an additional period of 30 days
within which to file the petition. Reckoned from the original period, he should have filed it on May 8, 2006.
Instead, he did so only on May 11, 2006, that is, 3 days late.
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, where the last day of the period for doing any act
required by law falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time
shall not run until the next working day. In this case, the original period for filing the petition for review with
the CA was on May 19, 2007, a Saturday. Petitioners filing of his motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review on May 21, 2007, the next working day which followed the last day for filing which fell
on a Saturday, was therefore on time. However, petitioner prayed in his motion for extension that he be
granted 15 days from May 21, 2007 or up to June 5, 2007 within which to file his petition. He then filed his
petition for review on June 5, 2007. The CA did not act on the motion for extension, but instead issued a
Resolution dated September 21, 2007 dismissing the petition for review for being filed out of time.
However, we find the circumstances obtaining in this case to merit the liberal application of the rule in the
interest of justice and fair play. And even assuming that a petition for review is filed a few days late, where
strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, we may relax the stringent
application of technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction.
TENCHAVEZ V ESCANO (15 SCRA 355)
Facts: Tenchavez and Escano entered into a secret marriage before Catholic chaplain, Lt Moises
Lavares. After their marriage was revealed, they were separated as Tenchavez went back to Manila to
work while Escano stayed in Cebu then Misamis In Misamis, Escano asked for petition to annul her
marriage but this was dismissed because of her non-appearance at hearing. Afterwards, she went to the
US without informing Tenchavez and secured a divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty and mental in
character in Nevada. Respondent then married again to Russell Moran, had children and became a US
Citizen. On July 30, 1955 Tenchavez filed the procedings for legal separation and damages against wife
and parents in law
ISSUE: WON divorce in Nevada was legal
HELD: NO, divorce and second marriage are not recognized as valid. As stated in Art 15, since
marriage was contracted by Filipinos in the Philippines, only competent civil court can annul it, thus
remaining valid.
Civil code does not admit absolute divorce and is not even part of the code, instead of divorce, legal
separation is used, wherein marriage is still recognized.

To recognize decree of divorce of foreign courts would be violation on public policy and article 17 of
civil code. It would not make difference if Tenchavez was also in the court of Nevada when divorce was
filed since mere appearance cant confer jurisdiction on court which had none. Tenchavez now has
grounds to divorce respondent since she had intercourse with someone other than her husband, entitling
him to ask for legal separation under basis of adultery. As such, Petitioner has grounds to file for legal

separation, recover 25,000 by way of moral damages and fees.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS V DE LA ROSA (197 SCRA 853)

Facts: On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana
Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, William, then twelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong together
with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued
by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of
foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.

On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an
identification certificate to William. The board of commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice
to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such
included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which
recommended for the reversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Acting commissioner
issued an order affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation ordered the arrest of William and
was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Manila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.

Issue: Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen

Held: William Gatchalian is declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage as valid,
respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a Filipino as legitimate child.
Respondent belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of the constitution.
ATCI OVERSEAS COPR V ECHIN (GR. NO. 178551, OCT 11, 2010)
FACTS: Respondent Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI in behalf of its principal co-petitioner, Ministry of
Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract with a monthly
salary of US$1,200.00.Within a year, Respondent was terminated for not passing the probationary period
which was under the Memorandum of Agreement. Ministry denied respondents request and she returned
to the Philippines shouldering her own fair.
Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint against ATCI for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter rendered
judgment in favor of respondent. ATCI appealed Labor Arbiters decision but was denied. Petitioner
appealed to the CA contending that their principal being a foreign government agency is immune from
suit, and as such, immunity extended to them. CA Affirmed NLRCs decision.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners be held liable considering that the contract specifically stipulates that
respondents employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.
Ruling: Court denied the petition. According to RA 8042: The obligations covenanted in the recruitment
agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminous with
the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the
responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end,
but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees
recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. In international law, the party who
wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. Where
a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the
same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.
AMOS V BELLIS (20 SCRA 358)
FACTS: Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd

wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children. Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in
the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided. Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a
resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The Peoples
Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its Executors Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy
of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3
illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate
children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to
the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.
ISSUE:Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING: It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would
not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of
the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under
the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the
Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
DEL SOCORRO V VAN WILSEM (GR. NO. 193707, DEC 10, 2014)
Facts: Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They have a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However,
since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Norma
filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support his
minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien.
ISSUE: Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law?
RULING: Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his
child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not
obliged to support Normas son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of
provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to
plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation
to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum.
RAYTHEON V ROUZIE (GR. NO. 162894, FEB 26, 2008)
FACTS: Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr.,
an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to
negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed
remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract
with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
Rrespondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, a suit against BMSI and Rust International,
Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal
termination and breach of employment contract.Then respondent instituted an action for damages before
the RTC of La Union. The Complaint named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc.
as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.
Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement between
respondent and BMSI and RUST, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of
the State of Connecticut. Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI
included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State
of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute namely, the parties and
witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located
outside the Philippines that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.
ISSUE: whether or not the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens
RULING: On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a
Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it
may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties
point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is
filed.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as
party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
(as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State
of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are
precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is
fair to both parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of
the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions
on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the parties are not
precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioners averments of the foreign elements in the instant
case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case and the parties involved.
TAMANO V ORTIZ (GR. NO. 126603, JUNE 29, 1998)
FACTS: Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano were married in civil rites. Before Sen. Tamano died, he
married Estrellita in civil rites too. A year after Sen. Tamanos death, Zorayda and her son filed a

complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage of her husband and Estrellita on the ground that it was
bigamous. Zorayda further claimed that her husband claimed to be divorced and Estrellita as single,
hence, their marriage was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that QC RTC has no
jurisdiction because only a party to a marriage could file an action for annulment against the other
spouse. Estrellita also contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in
Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to hear and try the case is vested in Sharia courts. RTC denied the petition
and ruled it has jurisdiction since Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code.
Petitioner referred to SC, which ruled that it should be referred to CA first. The CA ruled that the case
would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places where there are sharia
courts. But in places where there are no sharia courts, the instant petition could be at RTC.
ISSUE: W/N Sharia courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case and the nature of
action.
HELD: SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations. In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were married through a civil wedding. And
whether or not they were likewise married in a Muslim wedding, sharia courts are still not vested with
original jurisdiction over marriages married under civil and Muslim law.
LLAVE V REPUBLIC (GR. NO. 169766, MARCH 30, 2011)
FACTS: Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice initially under the
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony
officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts,
Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been representing
herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon his death, his widow.
11/23/94 private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamanos legitimate children with
Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between
Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in
1993.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.
HELD:Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was
never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil
and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and nonMuslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at
any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of
divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit
Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. But Article 13 of PD 1083 does
not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.
ZAMORANOS V PEOPLE (GR. NO. 193902, JUNE 1 2011)
FACTS: On April 28, 1982, Zamoranos converted into Muslim to wed Jesus de Guzman. They got married
in Islamic rites on May 3, 1982. Subsequently, the two wed again, this time, in civil rites before Judge
Perfecto Laguio of the RTC, Quezon City. A little after a year, on December 18, 1983, the obtained a
divorce by talaq. The dissolution of their marriage was confirmed y the Sharia Circuit District Court, 1 st
circuit, 3rd district, Isabella, Basilan, which issued a Decree of Divorce.

On December 18, 1989, Zamoranos married Samson Pacasum under Islamic rites in Balo-I, Lanao del
Norte. Thereafter, on December 29, 1992, to strengthen the rites of their marriage, they renewed their
marriage vows in a civil ceremony before Judge Valerio Salazar of the RTC, Iligan City. Zamaranos and
Pacasum were blessed with 3 children, namely: Samson, Sr., Sam Jean and Sam Joon.
Despite their 3 children, the two were de facto separated. This escalated into a battle for custody of their
minor children. However, they arrived at a compromise agreement which vested primary custody to
Zamoranos, with Pacasum retaining visitorial rights. This agreement rankled on Pacasum. He filed a
Petition for Annulment of marriage on March 31, 2003. Subsqeuently, on May 31, 2004, he amended the
petition into one for Declaration of a Void Marriage, alleging that Zamoranos and Pacasums marriage
was bigamous and void ab initio because at the time of their marriage, the former was already previously
married to De Guzman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sharia Court has jurisdiction to grant a divorce decree and thus, give the
spouses the right to remarry.
HELD:The Sharia Court has jurisdiction to grant divorce decree. Spouses who had a divorce under such
law is entitled to remarry other person. Therefore, Zamoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed by
an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and,
thus, entitled her to marry Pacsasum in 1989. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash the Information in
Criminal Case No. 06-12305 for Bigamy is granted.
VILLAGRACIA V SHARIA (GR. NO. 188832, APRIL 23 2014)
Facts: Roldan E. Mala (a Filipino Muslim) purchased a 300 Square meter land in Shariff Kabungsuan
from Ceres Canete. On March 3, 1996 Transfer Certificate Title No. 15633 was issued to Roldan. But
upon purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia was occupying the land. By 2002, Villagracia was able to secure a
Katibayan ng Orihinall na Titutlo Blg. P-60912 from LRA covering the same land.
The dispute resulted to barangay conciliation proceedings. With failure to settle, the concern was filed by
Roldan to the Fifth Sharia District Court ordering Villagracia to leave. Roldan was proclaimed the rightful
owner on June 11, 2008 - ordering Villagracia to vacate the land, pay moderate damages and attorneys
fees. Villagracia was issued a notice of writ of execution on December 15, 2008 giving him 30 days to
comply.
On January 13, 2009, Villagracia filed a petition for relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction stating that the court had no jurisdiction over him since he was a Christian (following
Art. 155, par. 2 of Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).
Issues:
1. WON respondent 5th SDC had jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide Roldans action for
recovery/possession
2. WON the summons issued by the 5th SDC vestd with it jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
Villagracia
HELD: Article 143 of the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines clearly state that
concurrent jurisdiction of the SDC requires both parties to be Muslims. Hence, 5 th SDC should have motu
propio dismissed the case. Viviencios raising of jurisdiction issues only after judgment has been rendered
is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal at any stage (even on appeal).
GELUZ V CA (2 SCRA 801)
FACTS: Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to
conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her
marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy

proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred
a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not
know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for
damages based on the third and last abortion.
ISSUE: Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents
may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?
RULING: Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of
course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having
possessed legal personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured,
it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account
of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even
if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality.
It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil
Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition
that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated
from its mothers womb. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights
of the deceased child.
QUIMIGING V ICAO (34 SCRA 134)
Facts: Icao, a married man, succeeded in having sex with Quimiguing several times by force and
intimidation and without her consent; as a result Quimiguing became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by Icao. Quimiguing claims support at Php 120.00/month, damages and attorneys fees. Icao
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action since complainant did not allege that the child
had indeed been born; trial judge sustained defendants motion. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: W/N the case merits the protection of Art. 40 NCC and if so then does the child have the rights,
through the mother, to claim support.
Held: YES. Plaintiff, through an amended complaint, avers that as a result of the intercourse, she had
later given birth to a baby girl. The SC says that since, as provided in Article 40 NCC (the conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes favorable to it, provided, it be born later with the conditions
specified in following article), petitioner Quimiguings child, since time of conception, and as having
fulfilled the requirement of having been born later, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly
of the defendant-appellee.Disposition: Orders of the lower court reversed and set aside and case
remanded to lower court for further proceedings.
DE JESUS V SYQUIA (58 PHIL 866)
Facts: Antonia de Jesus went to court for the purpose of recovering damages from Cesar Syquia
stemming from a breach of a promise to marry and to compel the defendant to recognize and support her
two children. Cesar Syquia had an affair with Antonia de Jesus which resulted in de Jesus giving birth to a
baby boy on June 17, 1931. For a year or so, Syquia supported de Jesus and his child. He, however, lost
interest in the relationship when De Jesus became pregnant with their second child. Syquia left and
eventually married another woman. De Jesus now claims that Syquia broke his promise to marry her.
Issue: Whether de Jesus can claim damages for breach of promise to marry
Held: The trial court did not grant damages to de Jesus for supposed breach of contract. Action for breach
of promise to marry has no standing in civil law. At any rate, such promise was not satisfactorily proven by
De Jesus. During the course of their relationship, defendant never expressed anything to that effect.

CONTINENTAL STEEL V MONTANO (GR. NO. 182836, OCT 13, 2009) from internet
FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA. The claim
was for Hortillanos unborn child who died. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while she was on
her 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during the labor. The company granted Hortillanos
claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and death benefits. Hortillano
claimed that the provision in CBS did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born
alive or must have acquired juridical personality. Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not
contemplate death of an unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. They also claimed that there are
two elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate dependent. None
which existed in Hortillanos case. They further contend that the only one with civil personality could die,
based on Art 40-42 of Civil Code. Hence, according to petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor
Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment
he/she was conceived. Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiters decision. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES: W/N only one with juridical personality can die (NO)
W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent. (YES)
HELD: The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition
of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born,
and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is
extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do not provide at
all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality
first before s/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of the unborn from conception.
Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The fetus would have not reached 38-39 weeks
without depending upon its mother.
LIMJOCO V INTESTATE ESTATE OF PIO FRAGANTE (80 PHIL 776)
FACTS: Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. His intestate estate is financially
capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased through its special or judicial administrator appointed by
the proper court of competent jurisdiction to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the
granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: W/N the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality
HELD: Yes, because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial
juridical person for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his properties. Fragante has rights and
fulfillment of obligation which survived after his death. One of those rights involved the pending
application for public convenience before the PSC. The state or the mass of property, rights left by the
decedent, instead of heirs directly, become vested and charged with his rights and obligations. Under the
present legal system, rights and obligations which survived after death have to be exercised and fulfilled
only by the estate of the deceased.
DUMLAO V QUALITY PLASTICS (70 SCRA 472)
FACTS: Pedro Oria died on April 23, 1959. On June 13, 1960, Quality Plastic Products, Inc. filed a case
against Pedro Oria, Vicente Soliven, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbog, and Juana Darang. On
June 24, 1960, Vicente Soliven received and signed the summons and copies of the complaint in his
behalf and his co-defendants. On February 18, 1962, CFI ordered the defendants to pay P3,667.03 to
Quality Plastic Products Inc to avoid foreclosure of their surety bonds. However, Oria failed to pay the
said amount. Thus the lower court ordered the foreclosure of his surety bond and sale of his public land
which he had given as a security for the bond. On March 1, 1963, Orias land was sold through auction by

the sheriff. Hence, the testamentary heirs of Oria sued Quality Plastic Products and prayed for the
annulment of the judgment against Oria and the sale of his land. Quality Plastics did not know about
Orias death.
ISSUE: W/N the judgment against Oria and his land are valid
HELD: The Quality Plastics only learned about Orias death upon receipt of the summons of Orias heirs.
They acted in good faith in including Oria as a co-defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over
Oria. Hence, the judgment against him is patent nullity. Oria, upon his death, had no more civil personality
and his juridical capacity which made him capable of legal relations was lost through death. However,
Dumlaos (heirs) are not entitled to claim attorneys fee for the corporation.
EUGENIO V VELEZ (185 SCRA 425)
Facts: Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August 28, 1988 filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she
was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas
Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
The court issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning
that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he
had already obtained a burial permit. Petitioner claims that as her common law husband, he has legal
custody of her body.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
Held: The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and
sisters in accordance with Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. In any case, herein petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.
MARCOS V MANGLAPUS (GR. NO. 88211, OCT 27, 1989)
FACTS: On September 15, 1989. The court decided (8-7) that the disapproval of Aquino to issue travel
documents to Marcoses are not made with grave abuse of discretion on the ground that it will post threat
to national security. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Hawaii. President Aquino said in a statement
that the remains of Marcos will not be allowed to be brought to the country until such time as the
government, under Corys or succeeding administration decide otherwise. This was done to prevent any
tranquility of the state and order of society which might arise from those who will take the death of Marcos
passionately. Petitioners, family of Marcos, asserted that they have right to travel and return.
ISSUE: W/N Ferdinand Marcos can still return. W/N he still has this right.
HELD: No. A corpse does not have civil personality. The Civil Code provides that civil personality is
extinguished by death. As such, it can be restricted to enter the country.
VALINO V ADRIANO (GR. NO. 182894, APRIL 22, 2014)
FACTS: Atty. Adriano, a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office, married respondent
Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The couple had children.
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually separated-infact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as

husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and
their children.
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to
shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her
husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her
request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family
of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified and that the remains of
Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than 20
years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together, he had
introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife..
ISSUE: Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
HELD: Based on the Civil Code, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of ones common law partner.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not
a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
JOAQUIN V NAVARRO (93 PHIL 257)
FACTS: During the battle of liberation of Manila on February 6, 1945, the following sought refuge on the
ground floor of German Club building: Joaquin Navarro Sr (70); Angela Joaquin (67); daughter Pilar (3233); daughter Concepcion (23-25); son Joaquin Natividad Jr (30); and wife of Jr Adela Conde (--). The
building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting the daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave the
building. His wife didnt want to leave so he left with his son, Jr., and Jr.s wife and neighbor Francisco
Lopez. As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground and rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets.
German Club collapsed trapping many people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela, and
Francisco sought refuge in an air aid shelter where they hid for 3 days. On February 10, 1945, on their
way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols. Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. The trial court
ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while CA ruled that son outlived his mother.
ISSUE: W/N the son/mother died first before the other.
[If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession. If mother died first, respondent
Antonio, son of Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit]
HELD: Based on the story of Francisco Lopez, Jr. died before his mother did. This presumption was
based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence on which civil
cases are to be decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be direct, indirect,
circumstantial or inferential.
CATALAN V BASA (GR. NO. 159567, JULY 31, 2007)
Facts: On October 20, 1948, Feliciano Catalan was discharged from active military service. The Board of
Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due
to his mental disorder. He married Corazon on September 28, 1949. He allegedly donated to his sister
Mercedes one-half of the real property through the execution of a document. On December 11, 1953,

Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings to declare Feliciano incompetent.
On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order of Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing
Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance of Feliciano. Thus, (BPI), was appointed to be his guardian
by the trial court. Mercedes sold the property donated by Feliciano to her in issue in her. On April 1, 1997,
BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian filed a case against herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of
Absolute Donation of Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away.
Issues:Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the donation
Whether or not the property donated to Mercedes and later on sold to her children is legally
in possession of the latter
HELD: A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it. Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. The parties
intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation
voidable. A person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his competence to intelligently
dispose his property. By merely alleging the existing of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of
his mental facilities.
Since the donation was valid. Mercedes has the right to sell the property to whomever she chose. Not a
shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes sale of property to her children
was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is sufficient for the Supreme Court to note that even if it prospered,
the deed of donation was still a voidable, not a void, contract.
MERCADO V ESPIRITU (37 PHIL 215)
Facts: Margarita Espiritu was the owner of a 48 hectare land. In 1897, she died and the land was left to
her husband and her children and 3 other siblings. Apparently however, during the lifetime of Margarita in
1894, she executed a deed of sale transferring about 71% of her land to her brother Luis Espiritu (father
of Jose Espiritu) for P2,000.00. After her death, her husband had a hard time making ends meet for his
family and so he took out a loan from Luis in the amount of P375.00. The loan was secured by the
remainder of the lot. Later, that loan was increased to P600.00.
In May 1910, Luis entered into a notarized agreement with Domingo and Josefa whereby the two, while
purporting to be of legal age, acknowledged the sale and the loan previously entered into by their parents
with Luis. In the same agreement, the siblings agreed that for and in consideration of the amount of
P400.00, they are transferring the remainder 29% to Luis.
But later, the siblings contested the said agreement. Luis later died and he was substituted by Jose. It is
the contention of Domingo et al that the agreement is void because they were only minors, when the
contract was entered into in May 1910.
ISSUE: Whether or not the agreement between Luis and Domingo et al in May 1910 is valid despite the
minority of the latter party.
HELD: Yes. In the first place, their minority of Domingo and Josefa was not proven with certainty because
of the loss of official records (got burned down). However, even assuming that they were indeed minors,
they are bound by their declaration in the notarized document where they presented themselves to be of
legal age. Domingo claimed he was 23 years old in the said document. The Supreme Court declared: the
sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and
they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them,
or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law.Further, there was no showing that the
said notarized document was attended by any violence, intimidation, fraud, or deceit.