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TEAM CODE:

BEFORE THE HONBLE


COURT OF SESSIONS
DURG

CASE NUMBER: _____/2014

STATE OF XANADU
(PROSECUTION)
VS.
MANOHAR & RAHUL
(DEFENCE)

FOR OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER THE SECTIONS 302, 465 r/w 34, 120B and 109 OF
THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 & SECTIONS 66 & 66C OF THE INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 ( AS AMENDED BY THE IT AMENDMENT ACT, 2008)

MEMORIAL FOR THE PROSECUTION

Contents
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................................3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES..................................................................................................................5
BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES REFERRED...............................................................................5
CASES CITED..................................................................................................................................7
ACT, RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS..............................................................................................9
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION....................................................................................................10
STATEMENT OF FACTS...................................................................................................................11
STATEMENT OF CHARGES.............................................................................................................12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.........................................................................................................13
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED..............................................................................................................15
ISSUE.1.

MANOHAR AND RAHUL ARE CULPABLE UNDER SECTION 66 AND SECTION

66C OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000..........................................................15


ISSUE.2.

WHETHER MANOHAR IS GUILTY OF THE MURDER OF KARAN?..................19

ISSUE.3.

WHETHER MANOHAR IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY?............................................21

ISSUE.4.

WHETHER

MANOHAR

AND

RAHUL

ARE

GUILTY

OF

CRIMINAL

CONSPIRACY?..............................................................................................................................23
ISSUE.5.

WHETHER THE ACTS OF MANOHAR AND RAHUL WERE IN FURTHERANCE

OF THEIR COMMON INTENTION DEFINED UNDER S. 34 OF THE IPC...............................25


ISSUE.6.

WHETHER RAHUL IS LIABLE FOR ABETMENT.................................................27

PRAYER.............................................................................................................................................29

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
&
A.P.
AIR
All.
Art.
Bom.
Cal.
Co.
Corp.
Cri.
Cri. L.J./ Cr L.J.
Cri.
CrPC
Del.
Dr.
Ed. / Edn.
Etc.

And
Andhra Pradesh
All India Reporter
Allahabad
Article
Bombay
Calcutta
Company
Corporation
Criminal
Criminal Law Journal
Criminal
Code of Criminal Procedure
Delhi
Doctor
Edition
Et cetera

Evidence Act

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Guj.
HC
Honble
IPC
Kar.
Ker
Ltd.
M. P.
Mad.
No.
NOC
Ors.
p.
pp.
Punj.
Pvt.
Raj.
SC

Gujarat
High Court
Honorable
Indian Penal Code, 1860
Karnataka
Kerala
Limited
Madhya Pradesh
Madras
Number
Notes on cases
Others
Page
Pages
Punjab
Private
Rajasthan
Supreme Court

SCC
SCR
Sec.
T.N
U.P.
US/USA

Supreme Court Cases


Supreme Court Reports
Section
Tamil Nadu
Uttar Pradesh
United States of America

v
Vol.

Versus
Volume

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES REFERRED
1. Dr. Umadethan, Principles and practice of forensic medicine, 1st Edn. 2008, Swamy
Law House, Kochi.
2. Bernard Knight, Lawyers Guide to Forensic Medicine, 2nd Edn. 1998, Cavendish
Publishing Ltd., London.
3. C J Vyas, Determination of Death, 1993, Macmillan India Ltd.
4. B S Nabar, Forensic Science in Crime Investigation, 3rd Edn. Reprint 2008, Asia Law
House, Hyderabad.
5. Parikhs Textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 6th Edn. Reprint 2004,
Medical Publications, Bombay.
6. Jaspal Singh J., Indian Penal Code, 1st Edn. 1998, AIR Publication, Nagpur.
7. B R Sharma, Forensic Science in Criminal Investigation and Trials, 4th Edn. 2003,
Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.
8. Modis Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 23rd Edn., LexisNexis Butterworths.
9. Textbook of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology, 14th Edn. Reprint 2007, Paras
Publishing, Hyderabad.
10. Ratanlal and Dhirajlals Law of Crimes, Vol I, 25th Edn. Reprint 2004, Bharat Law
House, New Delhi.
11. Ratanlal and Dhirajlals Law of Crimes, Vol II, 25th Edn. Reprint 2004, Bharat Law
House, New Delhi.
12. Basus Code of Criminal procedure, Vol I, 10th Edn. 2007, Ashoka Law House, New
Delhi.
13. C D Field, Expert Evidence, 4th Edn. Reprint 2009, Delhi Law House.
14. R A Nelsons Indian Penal Code, 9th Edn. 2003, LexisNexis Butterworths.
15. Forensic Science in Investigation of a crime, Padmashri Dr. S Subramanian, 1st Edn.
2007, S Gogia and Company, Hyderabad.
16. Justice V V Raghavan, Law of Crimes, 5th Edn. Reprint 2001, India Law House, New
Delhi.
17. S M A Qadri, Ahmad Siddiques Criminology, 5th Edn. Reprint 2007, Eastern book
Company.
18. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal , The Indian Penal Code, 29th Edn. 2002, Wadhwa Nagpur.

19. B R Sharma, Scientific Criminal Investigation, 2006 Edn., Universal Law Publishing
Company.
20. Sarkar on Criminal Procedure, 8th Edn. Reprint 2004, India Law House.
21. S V Joga Rao, Law of Evidence, 17th Edn. 2001, Butterworths, New Delhi.
22. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, Law of Evidence, 21st Edn. Reprint 2005, Wadhwa and
Company, Nagpur.
23. P S A Pillai, Criminal Law, 9th Edn. 2000, Butterworths, New Delhi.
24. Rodney D Ryder, Guide to Cyber Laws, 2nd Edn. 2003, Wadhwa Nagpur.
25. Justice Yatindra Singh, Cyber Laws, 3rd Edn. Reprint 2008, Universal Law Publishing
Company.
26. Cyber Law Text and Cases, 2nd Edn. 2004, Thomson South-Western West.
27. R P Kathuria, Supreme Court on Criminal Law, 3rd Edn. 1984, Kathurias Publication.
28. Dr. Gupta and Agarwal, Information Technology Law and Practice, 1st Edn. 2009,
Premier Publishing Company .
29. Dr. (Sir) Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India, 11th Edn. in 4 volumes Reprint 2004,
Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd.
30. J C Smith, Smith and Hogan Criminal Law Cases and Materials, 8th Edn. 2002,
LexisNexis Butterworths.
31. Basus Indian Penal Code (Law of Crimes), Vol I, 9th Edn. Reprint 2004, Ashoka Law
House.
32. Cases and Materials on Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, 2nd Edn. 1982, Eastern
Book Company.
33. Criminal Manual 2005, Universal Law Publishing Company.
34. Sudipto Sarkar and B R Manohar, Sarkars Law of Evidence, Vol II, 16th Edn. Reprint
2008, Wadhwa and Company, Nagpur.
35. Dr. K N Chandrasekharan Pillai, R V Kelkars Criminal Procedure, 5th Edn. 2008,
Eastern Book Company.
36. Sarkars Commentary on the Law of Evidence, Vol I, 2nd Edn. Reprint 2008, Dwivedi
Publishing Company.
37. C. Gringas, To be great is to be misunderstood: the Computer Misuse Act,
1990(1997) 3 Computer and Telecommunication Law Review.

CASES CITED
1. Amiruddin Salebhoy AIR 1923 Bom 44
2. Ammini v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 260
3. Barendra Kumar Ghose AIR 1925 PC 1
4. Barendra Kumar Ghose v. King Emporer, (1910) 11 Cri LJ 453
5. Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682
6. Chunku AIR 1931 All 258
7. Dhansai v. State of Orissa, AIR 1969 Ori 105
8. Dhunum Kazee (1882) 9 Cal 53
9. E. K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066
10. Faguna Kanta Nath AIR 1959 SC 673
11. Feda Hossein (1881) 10 CLR 184
12. George Kutly v. State of MP, 1992 Cr Lj 1663 (ker)
13. Gurbachan Singh v Satpal Singh AIR 1990 SC 209
14. Hardev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 179
15. State of Maharashtra v. Kalu Shrinivasam, AIR 1980 SC 879
16. Intel Corps v. Hamidi, 7/P3d 296[Cal 2003]
17. International Airport Centres v. Citrin, 440 F3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
18. La Aung (1906) 12 Burma LR 70
19. Lennart Schussler v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1970 SC 549
20. Lim Hoe (1894) 1 UBR (1892-1896) 279
21. Maqsoodan v. State of UP, 1983 Cr LJ 218 (SC)
22. Mohan Lal Pangasa AIR 1974 SC 1144
23. Govinda Reddy Krishna AIR 1960 SC 29
24. Mohanan Kani v. State of Kerala, (1993) Cur Cri R 702 (DB) (Ker)
25. Rajurant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874
26. Nga Maung v. Emperor, (1905) 6 Cri LJ 389
27. Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216
28. Bhopal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1968 Raj 305
29. Parimal Chatterji AIR 1932 Cal 760
30. Pauna v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 2011 SC 2545.
31. Muhammad Saeed Khan (1898) 21 All 113, 115.
32. Prem Narain AIR 1957 All 177
33. Province of Bihar v Surendra Prasad Ojha AIR 1951 Pat 86
34. R. v. Bow Street Magistrate Court and Allison, [2000] 2 AC 216
35. RK Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821
36. Sarojini v. State of MP, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 632
37. Sharif Ahmad Alias Achhan, (1956) 2 All 188
38. Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 555
39. State of HP v. Krishnan Lal, AIR 1987 SC 773
40. State of UP v. Iftikhar Khan, 1973 Cr LJ 636 (SC)
41. Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 Cr LJ 1111 (SC)
42. State of Punjab v. Mann Singh, 1983 Cr LJ 229 (SC)
43. Tukaram Ganpet Pandave v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 514
44. Vinod Kaushik v. Madhvika Joshi, MANU/ CY/0001/2011
45. Yash Pal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2433

ACT, RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS


1.
2.
3.
4.

The Indian Penal Code, 1860


The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
The Computer Misuse Act, 1998

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The prosecution, State of Xanadu hereby submits the Memorandum for the Prosecution filed
under S.26 (a) (ii) read with Schedule I & S. 220 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973
before this Honble Sessions Court charging the accused under S.302, S. 465 r/w S. 34,
S.120B & S.109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and S. 66 & S. 66C of the Information
Technology Act, 2000 (as amended by the IT Amendment Act, 2008).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Manohar lived with his uncle Karan, after losing his parents, he was intelligent and
got admission in TMC college in 2011. There, He befriended Rahul, who was a tech
freak, and became habitual of borrowing money from him. Rahul once decrypted

Karans online banking password by using a device and transferred money.


Karan was obese and having other ailments too. On May 21, 2014 when he was ill, he
informed Manohar about 2 Crore insurance policy that was taken for his (Manohars)

benefit. He also gave permission to transfer money in case of emergency.


Devika (Karans wife) didnt pay Manohars College fee when Karan was ill, this led
to an altercation when manohar inquired about this. The next day Karan asked
Manohar to transfer some money to his account for college fee. Manohar transferred

2.5 Lakhs.
The next day Manohar visited Karan, Suddenly Karan started coughing heavily and
complained of chest pain. Dr. Choudhry was not in town and unreachable. Manohar
wrote name of medicine Angispan in liquid form and asked Raghav to get it and he
administered it. Karan was quite for about half an hour. Suddenly he developed fits

and seizers and regardless of Manohars attempt to retrieve him, he passed away.
Dr. Chaudhary said though the medicine as such was harmless, but the its

combination with other medicines could be fatal. if proper care wasnt taken.
While arranging belongings of karan, Devika found the insurance policy of 2 Crores
in Manohars name and got awfully suspicious of Manohars actions. She
immediately called the police and informed about her suspicion of the circumstances
leading to Karans death. The police filed the final report before the Magistrates
Court who took cognizance of the report and therefore committed the case to the
Court of sessions in Durg, Xanadu.

STATEMENT OF CHARGES

Manohar and Rahul Gulati has been charged under Section 302, 120B, 465 r/w 34, 109 of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 66 and 66C of IT Act, 2000 for the crime of Murder,
Conspiracy, Forgery, Abetment and Hacking

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The prosecution has charged the accused persons under S.66 and 66C of the IT Act, 2000,
S.302, S.465 r/w S.34 and S.120B of the IPC. Furthermore, Rahul has been held liable under
S.107 of the IPC.
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR HACKING ?
On the charges in the IT Act, it is contended that Rahul is liable for the offence of hacking by
the fact of the insertion of the key logger device to crack Karans online banking password
and the subsequent withdrawals made from the account and Manohar is liable for
unauthorised access in the folders of Karans laptop to find his online banking password and
for transferring Rs.25, 000 more than he was authorized to.
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY FOR MURDER ?
On the charge of murder under S.302, the prosecution has proved that Manohar caused a
bodily harm on Karan with the intent of doing so and with the knowledge of special
circumstances that made him believe that the injury so caused was likely to cause the death of
Karan.
WHETHER THE ACCUSES IS GUILTY OF FORGERY ?
On forgery, it is contended that Manohar dishonestly or fraudulently forged the prescription
in Dr. Chaudharys name with the intent of causing damage to the public or a particular
person and with the intent of committing fraud.
It is contended that the acts were done in furtherance of the common intention of both
Manohar and Rahul to commit the crimes so as to fulfil their final object of amassing Karans

wealth for themselves. Therefore, they are both to be held jointly and severally liable for all
these acts.
WHETHER THE ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY ?
It is contended that the illegal acts of hacking, murder and forgery that were committed were
in reference to an agreement between Manohar and Rahul to do an illegal act or a legal act by
illegal means. They are therefore both to be held liable for all the crimes committed in
reference to such an agreement and the crime of criminal conspiracy also.
WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF ABETMENT ?
Rahul had instigated and goaded Manohar into committing the murder of Karan by frequent
reminders of the riches that Manohar would see if his uncle would die one day. Furthermore,
Rahul helped Manohar out with the commission of the crimes through his participation in the
conspiracy to commit these crimes. Rahul is therefore liable for abetment by instigation as
well as abetment by conspiracy.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE.1.

MANOHAR AND RAHUL ARE CULPABLE UNDER SECTION

66 AND SECTION 66C OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT,


2000.
It is submitted that Manohar and Rahul are liable under Section 66 and Section 66c of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act). Here motive could be sufficiently established
which becomes extremely relevant in cases dealing with circumstantial evidence.1 The motive
of their act could easily be deduced from the fact circumstances. Manohars inherent need to
match up to his much more affluent friends forced him to borrow money from Rahul on
multiple occasions. To fulfil these monitory needs he had to resort to the aforementioned
criminal acts.
There are two acts which will be scrutinized to find out the culpability under the said sections
of the Information Technology Act. The first act would be the act of inserting a device called
key logger to track and extract password from Karans personal computer and then using the
password for transferring money into Manohars account on multiple occasions. The second
act would be the act of Manohar extracting the password of Karans bank account from his
Laptop and then using it to transferring the sum of 2.5 Lakhs into his account instead of the
authorised 2.25 Lakhs by Karan. The two acts will be referred to as Act 1 and Act 2 hereafter
for the matter of convenience.
Section 66 imposes criminal liability on a person who commits any crime under Section 43 of
the said Act, who fraudulently or dishonestly, without permission of the owner or anyone in
1 Pauna v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 2011 SC 2545

charge of a computer (a) accesses or secures access to such computer, computer system or
network, (b) extracts any data, (g) provides access to any person to facilitate access to a
computer, computer system or network in contravention to the provision of the Act. Whereas
section 66C imposes punishment for identity theft on any person who fraudulently and
dishonestly makes use of electric signature, password or any other unique identification
features of any other person.
1.1.

THE ACTIONS OF MANOHAR AND RAHUL COULD BE DEEMED TO BE


CRIMINAL

ACTS

UNDER

SECTION

66

OF

THE

INFORMATION

TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000.


The requisite mens rea required here is specifically mentioned in the Section itself which
state that the act shall be done dishonestly or fraudulently, which means, with the intention to
deceive or cause injury and with the intention to cause wrongful gain to oneself or wrongful
loss to another.2 With respect to Crimes related to cyber trespass in US law too, persons
cannot be charged for such offences unless the accused is not sufficiently and adequately
warned or had had the mens rea of committing a criminal act. 3 In the present case, Rahul
and Manohar hacked into Karans banking account with the use of a device called key logger
and transferred sums of money into Manohars account clearly trying to defraud Karan and
cause him a wrongful loss meanwhile enriching themselves with Karans money and
therefore the requisite mental element is clearly established in the following case. The
wordings of Section 43 seem to clearly run parallel to the Sections of the computer misuse
statute in England. The word permission could be read in reference to words such as
Access and authorisation in the Computer misuse Act, 1990.
2 Sections 24 and section 25 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
3 Intel Corps v. Hamidi, 7/P3d 296[Cal 2003]

Section 17(2) and 17(5) of the computer misuse Act, 1990 sets out ways in which a person
secures access and define authorized access by reference to access of the kind in question.
The actus reus related to such acts to commit an offence is stated under s.1 (1) of the Act. In
the R. v. Bow Street Magistrate Court and Allison case4, it was held that it is not the access to
the computer that the person is working on which is contention but the fact that if that person
had the permission to access that very document on the computer. The Act does not sanction
those who access computers, its sanctions those who use computers to secure access to data
and programs.5 In the case at hand, assuming but not contending that Manohar did have
access to Manohars personal computer, he would still not have the authorization over the
documents that he allegedly retrieved through the act of hacking and therefore the access of
those documents could be found to be unauthorized and liable under Information Technology
act, 2000. Rahul and Manohar, getting the key logger and inserting it in Karans computer,
caused Karan wrongful loss and wrongful gain to themselves. With the intent that is clearly
deducible to commit a crime under Section 66 of the Act and gain wrongful access to Karans
computer. The intention becomes much clearer as an act under Section 66 was committed in
pursuance of committing a future crime of misappropriation and identity theft under section
66C of the Information Technology act. This invariably leads to the guilt of Manohar and
Karan sub clause (a), (b) and (g) of Section 66 of the act.
Rahul with his established knowledge relating to computer technology and Manohars access
to the computer lead us to the conclusion that this act could not have been committed with
just any of the two persons singularly. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that Manohar and

4 R. v. Bow Street Magistrate Court and Allison, [2000] 2 AC 216


5 C. Gringas, to be great is to be misunderstood: the Computer Misuse Act, 1990 (1997) 3 Computer
and telecommunication law review 213.

Rahul were co-partners in the commission of the crime. 6 Furthermore, the presence of key
logger which was found plugged into Karans computer, them being seen by Raghav working
on the PC for hours and Rahul connecting his laptop to the PC further establish the claim. 7
Regardless of the fact that whether a person knew the passwords, or made intelligent guesses,
or used some software to crack the passwords, it is clear that there is unauthorised access if
that authorisation did not exist at that very moment.8
1.2.

MANOHAR WAS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 66 AND SECTION 66C OF


THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000.

It is hereby submitted that Manohar was allowed to withdraw money from Karans account
only under the condition that Karan be kept informed of withdrawals. Manohars fraudulent
and dishonest intent is clear in his withdrawal of more than the normal amount. Assuming but
not contending that Manohar had the permission in this case to withdraw the money, the fact
that Rs.25, 000 more was withdrawn is evidence of such a fraudulent intent on his behalf.
Moreover, it could be proved beyond doubt that there was no permission of authorisation
given to Manohar to snoop through his Laptop and open any specific folder, which combined
with the requisite mental element mentioned in Section 66, is itself a criminal offence. The
onus is primarily on the person receiving the limited authorisation to act appropriately rather
than on the person granting it and therefore the person granting it need not set out the acts
which are permitted from the acts that are not.9 A mere reading of the wording of Section
66C, would be enough to comprehend that the act of using Manohars email and password to
6 Sarojini v. State of MP, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 632
7 George Kutly v. State of MP, 1992 Cr Lj 1663 (ker)
8 Vinod Kaushik v. Madhvika Joshi, MANU/ CY/0001/2011
9 International Airport Centres v. Citrin, 440 F3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).

transfer money into his account to be an offence under the said section. Manohar, dishonestly
and fraudulently acquired Karans password without his authorisation and therefore
committing identity theft as mentioned in the section using Karans banking password
identification in cyber space. Further, Manohar took advantage of the sordid condition of his
uncle, seeing this as an opportunity to dishonestly defraud him. If the hypothesis suggested
by the accused is fanciful, far-fetched or improbable, the court may reach to the conclusion
that the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused,10 and therefore such arguments
should be dismissed at face value by the honourable court.
ISSUE.2.

WHETHER MANOHAR IS GUILTY OF THE MURDER OF

KARAN?
It is humbly submitted by the prosecution that Manohar is indeed guilty of the murder of
Karan under Cl. (2) of S.300 of the IPC. Cl. (2) does not as such require that the person
committing the crime have the intent to cause death of that person. All is required to prove
murder under Cl. (2) of S.300 is the intention of the offender to cause such bodily injury
coupled with the offenders knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of
the particular person concerned11. Therefore, if the accused has special knowledge of certain
ailments of the deceased (2.1), and causes such bodily injury with the intent (2.2) and
knowledge that due to that particular ailment, there is all likelihood to cause the death of that
individual through the infliction of this bodily harm (2.3), he shall be liable for murder under
this section12.

10 Mohan Lal Pangasa AIR 1974 SC 1144; Govinda Reddy Krishna AIR 1960 SC 29
11 Mohanan Kani v. State of Kerala, (1993) Cur Cri R 702 (DB) (Ker); Rajurant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR
1966 SC 1874

12 Nga Maung v. Emperor, (1905) 6 Cri LJ 389

2.1.

MANOHAR HAD KNOWLEDGE OF CERTAIN AILMENTS THAT KARAN


WAS SUFFERING FROM.

It is submitted by the prosecution that Manohar had knowledge of the specific ailments that
Karan was suffering from. It has been established that Manohar had been taking care of
Karan ever since Karans illness was detected. Furthermore, as a medical student, and a good
one more so, Karan would understand the doctors diagnosis of Karan. Therefore, it can be
sure that Manohar had indeed an idea of the ailments that Karan was suffering from.
2.2.

MANOHAR HAD THE INTENT OF CAUSING SUCH BODILY INJURY AS


LIKELY TO CAUSE THE DEATH OF KARAN.

It is known that Manohar, as a medical student, has learned of the effect of medicines.
Therefore, with such knowledge, the act of Karan of injecting a higher dosage of Angispan
than necessary is proof of the intent to commit the requisite bodily harm. Furthermore, from
the frequent discussions between Manohar and Rahul, and Manohars subsequent acting upon
such discussion by killing Karan, intent to commit the murder can be understood. Lastly, it is
contended by the prosecution that the act of murder was in furtherance of the common
intention of both Manohar and Rahul to fulfill their common object of amassing Karans
wealth for their benefit.
2.3.

THERE WAS A LIKELIHOOD OF CAUSING THE DEATH OF KARAN


FROM THE INJURY INFLICTED UPON HIM.

It is submitted by the prosecution that there was likelihood to cause the death of Karan from
the injury inflicted on him by Manohar. From the list of the items taken as evidence from the
scene of the crime for the sake of the investigation, it can be seen that a total of four syringes
were used. Furthermore, in taking care of Karan, Manohar would have had an idea about the

medicines he took as well. Lastly, Manohar also had the knowledge that due to Karans liver
disease, his body would be able to metabolize medicines much faster. This knowledge can be
inferred from the fact that he was a third year medical student and would have as such
learned about the same. Also, from his internship, Manohar would have gained valuable
experience working with alcoholics. Therefore, the above facts fall under S.4 of the Evidence
Act as those facts that the Court shall presume.
Therefore, it is clear that Manohar had the knowledge of the effect of an overdose of
medicines, and that Manohar knew of Karans faster metabolizing rate. Hence, it can be
understood from the facts thus proved, that Manohar had the knowledge that the bodily injury
thus inflicted on Karan was likely to cause his death.
Therefore, with proof of Manohars actions against Karan, it is submitted that he be held
criminally liable for Karans murder and that Rahul be held liable for the same as the act was
done so in furtherance of the common intention of both the accused persons, making them
liable for the act under S.34 and S.120B of the IPC.
ISSUE.3.

WHETHER MANOHAR IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY?

It is humbly contended that Manohar is guilty of forgery under section 463 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860. It is to be noted that essential elements to be satisfied to constitute the offense of
forgery are proof that the document or part of the document has been falsified (1.1)
dishonestly or fraudulently (1.2). Furthermore, an intent of the accused (a) to cause damage
or injury to i) public, or ii) any person; or (b) to cause any person to enter into express or
implied contract (c) to commit fraud or so that fraud may be committed(1.3) must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution
3.1.

A FALSE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN MADE.

To constitute the offence of forgery the simple making of a false document is sufficient,
with the intention that it should injure other.13 It includes dishonestly or fraudulently making,
signing, sealing or executing a document, or a part of a document, with the intention of
causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was made, signed, sealed
or executed, by authority of a person by whom or by whose authority it was not made, signed,
or executed. In this case the use of prescription by Manohar for getting Angispan without any
authority given to him by Dr Choudhry amounts to making of false document.
Making of a document does not necessarily mean signing or otherwise executing it. It only
means creating or bringing into existence. 14 Making a false document does not consist in
writing without doing anything towards its execution. 15 In this case Manohar brought the
false document in existence and executed it by asking Raghav to use it to get the medicine.
3.2.

THE DOCUMENT HAS BEEN MADE DISHONESTLY OR


FRAUDULENTLY.

To constitute the offence of forgery false document should be made dishonestly or


fraudulently. The test as to the fraudulent character of a deception for criminal purpose as
explained by Stephen16 is whether an advantage that could have derived a benefit that could
not have been derived if the document were true. In this case the author derived advantage as
the prescription was made with expectation of advantage, as to get medicine, and to deceive
the shopkeeper so that he give the medicine by thinking that it is prescribed by doctor.

13 Feda Hossein (1881) 10 CLR 184


14 Province of Bihar v Surendra Prasad Ojha AIR 1951 Pat 86
15 Lim Hoe (1894) 1 UBR (1892-1896) 279
16 History of Criminal Law, Vol II, P 121. This extract is quoted in several Indian cases.

3.3.

MANOHAR HAD THE INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIME.

Intention is the necessary requirement for the offence of forgery. It is sufficient that there
should be the intention of causing it. 17 According to Sind judicial commissioners court the
proper administration of justice is so vital to the ordered existence of a civilised community
that intent to defraud justice is something very closely affecting the public and hence can be
said to cause damage or injury to the public and to the party concerned in the particular
case.18 Where there is an intention to deceive and by means of the deceit to obtain an
advantage there is a fraud, and if a document is fabricated with such intent is a forgery. 19 A
general intention to defraud, without the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or
wrongful loss to another is not forgery.20
ISSUE.4.

WHETHER MANOHAR AND RAHUL ARE GUILTY OF

CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY?
S.120B provides for the punishment for the crime of criminal conspiracy. As per S.120A of
the IPC, two or more people are guilty of criminal conspiracy when they agree to do an
illegal act or a legal act by illegal means (4.1). Therefore, Rahul and Manohar are together
liable for criminal conspiracy as well as all criminal acts committed by either in reference of
such an agreement(4.2).
4.1.

THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT IN THIS CASE TO DO AN ILLEGAL ACT


OR A LEGAL ACT BY ILLEGAL MEANS

17 Chunku AIR 1931 All 258


18 Emperor v. Ahmed Khan S/o Fateh Khan and Ors,AIR 1943 Sind 46 (49)
19 Per Bannerji, J, in Muhammad Saeed Khan (1898) 21 All 113, 115
20 Dhunum Kazee (1882) 9 Cal 53

It is not necessary that there should be an express proof of the agreement for from the facts
and conduct of the parties, the agreement can be inferred 21. It is not even necessary to
establish by direct evidence that the accused person did enter into such an agreement 22. It is
generally a matter of inference deduced from certain special acts of the accused, done in
pursuance of an apparent criminal purpose in common between them 23. The evidence of
transition of thoughts and the sharing of the unlawful design need only be proved 24. In the
present case, numerous instance showing that Manohar was a highly ambitious person and his
talks with Raghav where he equated money with success which have been corroborated by
the statements of Raghav and Devika. Furthermore, the fact that Manohar was in debt to
Rahul and the fact that Rahul was in need of the money, therefore demanding it to be returned
at the earliest is proof of the similar interest of Rahul in Karans money. Also, Rahuls
frequent reminders to Manohar of the money that Manohar would inherit if Karan met an
early demise are evidence of each accused having the knowledge of the others intention.
Once, a reasonable grounds for conspiracy has been established, anything said, done or
written by one of the conspirators in reference to common intention, is relevant against the
other not only for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy, but also for proving
that the other person was party to it 25. Therefore, the hacking of the deceased, Karans
password by both Manohar and Rahul is proof of their conspiracy to amass all of Karans
wealth. Lastly, an agreement to do an illegal act which amounts to a conspiracy will continue
21 Ibid
22 Barendra Kumar Ghose v. King Emporer, (1910) 11 Cri LJ 453
23 Ammini v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 260
24 E. K. Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 1066
25 Bhagwan Swarup v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 682

as long as the members of the conspiracy remain in agreement and as long as they are acting
in accord and in furtherance of the object for which they entered into the agreement 26.
Therefore, due to their being no evidence that the conspiracy had indeed ended, or that their
object was indeed fulfilled, it is contended that the conspiracy continued to include the crimes
of murder and forgery conducted. Therefore, all the criminal acts conducted in this case, can
be looked at as one entire criminal conspiracy, punishable under S.120B of the IPC.
4.2.

BOTH RAHUL AND MANU ARE LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY


AND ALL THE ACTS COMMITTED IN REFERENCE TO THE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE TWO

If pursuant to the criminal conspiracy, the conspirators commit several offenses, then all of
them will be liable for the offenses even if some of them had not actively participated in the
commission of the offense27. It is not necessary that all conspirators must know each and
every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-conspirators in the main objects of the
conspiracy28. Even if some steps are resorted to by one or two of the conspirators without the
knowledge of others, it will not affect the culpability of those others when they are associated
with the object of the conspiracy29. In this case, Rahuls persistent instigating of Manohar to
kill his uncle is evidence of his involvement and knowledge of Karans murder. However,
assuming but not contending that Rahul did not actually know that Karan would be murdered
by Manohar to further the ultimate objectives of the conspiracy, he would still be liable for
Karans murder under S. 120B of the IPC as this act was still committed in reference to the
26 Lennart Schussler v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1970 SC 549
27 State of HP v. Krishnan Lal, AIR 1987 SC 773
28 RK Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1962 SC 1821
29 Yash Pal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 2433

common objectives of Manohar and Rahul, solidified by their agreement to enter into a
criminal conspiracy.
ISSUE.5.

WHETHER THE ACTS OF MANOHAR AND RAHUL WERE IN

FURTHERANCE OF THEIR COMMON INTENTION DEFINED UNDER


S. 34 OF THE IPC
It is contended by the prosecution that both Manohar and Rahul had a common intention to
commit the crimes in order to attain their common final object of amassing Karans wealth.
S.34 has been applied to cases wherein the offense was committed by only one of two or
three persons, although all of them had the common intent to commit the same. In furtherance
of the common intention, several persons must have done several acts which together
constitute an offense. In such a situation S.34 provides for each to be liable for the entire act
as a whole30. The major elements that are required to be proved while proving an individual's
liability under S. 34 of the IPC include the commission of an illegal act by several persons
(5.1) and that such an act was done in the furtherance of the common intention (5.2).
5.1.

THERE WAS THE COMMISSION OF AN ILLEGAL ACT

It is not necessary to prove an overt act by a particular person in order to convict the person.
Criminal act done by all or one of them in furtherance of the common intention of all would
suffice to convict all the people31. It is contended that each criminal act of hacking, murder
and forgery were all done by one of them in the furtherance of their common intention.

30 Dhansai v. State of Orissa, AIR 1969 Ori 105


31 State of UP v. Iftikhar Khan, 1973 Cr LJ 636 (SC); Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1983 Cr LJ 1111 (SC);
State of Punjab v. Mann Singh, 1983 Cr LJ 229 (SC)

Lastly, culpability of a person under S. 34 cannot be excluded merely because he was not
present at the scene of the occurrence of the particular offense for which he has been
charged32.
5.2. THE CRIMINAL ACT WAS DONE IN FURTHERANCE OF THE COMMON
INTENTION OF MANOHAR AND RAHUL
Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act in point of time 33.
Therefore, there need be a prior plan to commit a crime. This pre-arranged plan however need
not be an elaborate one34. A mere existence of a pre-arranged plan that the offense be
conducted is enough to satisfy this element. In most circumstances, proof of common
intention has to be inferred from the act or conduct or other relevant circumstances of the
case at hand35. In the case of hacking, the bringing of the key logger by Rahul to Manohars
house beforehand in order to insert in Manohars computer is proof of the existence of a
common intention between the two to commit the offense of hacking. Also, a single criminal
act may involve and give rise to several offenses. The common intention must be to commit
the particular crime, though the actual crime may be conducted by anyone sharing the
common intention36. Therefore, it is contended by the prosecution that while the act of murder
was conducted in furtherance of the common intention between the two accused which can be
inferred from their frequent discussions on what it would mean if Karan were to die one day,

32 Tukaram Ganpet Pandave v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 514


33 Sharif Ahmad Alias Achhan, (1956) 2 All 188; Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 555
34 Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216; Bhopal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1968 Raj 305
35 Maqsoodan v. State of UP, 1983 Cr LJ 218 (SC)
36 Hardev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 179; State of Maharashtra v. Kalu Shrinivasam, AIR 1980
SC 879

a common intention to commit the offense of forgery can be inferred as it is merely an


offense that was given rise to in the commission of the initial intended crime of murder.
ISSUE.6.

WHETHER RAHUL IS LIABLE FOR ABETMENT

It is humbly submitted that Rahul is liable for abetment by instigation under Section 107,
where one person is urged forward by a person who will not himself act, but who procures or
instigates another to put in execution his criminal intention. 37 Under the section, a person who
actively suggests another to do an act by any means or language, direct, or indirect, whether it
takes the form of express solicitation, or of hints, insinuation or encouragement is liable for
abetment by instigation (6.1).38
6.1.

MANOHAR WAS INSTIGATED BY RAHUL TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE

The word instigate means to goad or urge forward or to provoke, incite, urge or encourage
doing an act.39 There has to be a reasonable certainty in regard to the meaning of the words
used by the incitor in order to judge whether or not there was an incitement, but it is not
necessary in law to prove the actual words used for the incitement. 40The offence is complete
as soon as the abettor has incited another to commit a crime, whether the latter consents or
not, or whether, having consented he commits the crime or not. This form of abetment
depends upon the intention of the person who abets, and not upon the act, which is actually

37 M & M 83
38 Amiruddin Salebhoy AIR 1923 Bom 44
39 Parimal Chatterji AIR 1932 Cal 760
40 Prem Narain AIR 1957 All 177

done by the person whom he abets.41 Abetment does not in itself involve the actual
commission of the crime abetted. It is a crime apart.42
The Supreme Court has laid down that a person who engages with another in a conspiracy for
the doing of an act which is an offence; he abets such an offence and would be guilty of
abetment under section 115 or section 116, even if the offence abetted is not committed in
consequence of the abetment. The offence of abetment is complete when the alleged abettor
has instigated another or engaged with another in a conspiracy to commit the offence. It is not
necessary for the offence of abetment that the act abetted must be committed.

43

For the

purpose of abetment by instigation it is immaterial whether the person instigated commits the
offence or not or the persons conspiring together actually carryout the object of the
conspiracy.44

41 La Aung (1906) 12 Burma LR 70


42 Barendra Kumar Ghose AIR 1925 PC 1
43 Gurbachan Singh v Satpal Singh AIR 1990 SC 209
44 Faguna Kanta Nath AIR 1959 SC 673

PRAYER

Wherefore, in light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited; this Honble Court may be pleased to:
Find that
A. The deceased, Mr. Karan was murdered.
B. The accused Mr. Manohar Lal and Mr. Rahul Gulati have committed the offences
under the sections 302, 465 r/w 34, 120B and 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 &
sections 66 & 66c of the Information Technology Act, 2000 ( as amended by the IT
Amendment Act, 2008).
And pass any other order that it may deem fit in the ends of justice, equity, and good
conscience. All of which is respectfully submitted.

Place:

S/d_________________

Date:

(Counsel on behalf of the Prosecution)