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PART I JURISDICTION

1 Alonte vs Savellano
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings Waiver of Right to Due Process
Facts: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice
Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and
had later lured her into Alonetes house who was then the mayor of Bian,
Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Bian. The counsel and the prosecutor
later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change
of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor
continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding
opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano.
Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and
Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the
voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that
they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for
decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano
commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross
examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the
rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding
on the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing
that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it not only
must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence
of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the
courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has
not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by
Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision
earlier promulgated is nullified.
2 People vs Mariano
FACTS: Respondent Mariano was charged with Estafa before the CFI of Bulacan
because of misappropriating and converting for his own personal use, power

cord and electric cables being the person in authority to receive the same in
behalf of mayor Nolasco of SJDM, Bulacan. Respondent Mariano then moved to
quash the information for, inter alia, lack of jurisdiction. He claimed that the
items were the same items used against mayor Nolasco before the Military
commission for Malversation of public property to which mayor Nolasco were
found guilty, hence, the court a quo has no jurisdiction.
The judge granted the motion. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the court has jurisdiction over the Estafa case against Mariano.
RULING: YES. The CFI has jurisdiction In all criminal cases in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more
than two hundred pesos Section 44, paragraph E, Judiciary reorganization act of
1948. The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is penalized
with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years
and four (4) months. By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6)
months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the
accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts
of first instance.
Respondent court therefore gravely erred when it ruled that it lost jurisdiction
over the estafa case against respondent Mariano with the filing of the
malversation charge against Mayor Nolasco before the Military Commission.
Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the case
now before Us the accused in one is different from the accused in the other.
Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular
offense and impose the punishment for it.
3 Antiporda vs Gartichorena
Facts: Accused Mayor Licerio Antiporda and others were charged for the crime of
kidnapping, the case was filed in the first division of Sandiganbayan.
Subsequently, the Court ordered the prosecution to submit amended
information, which was complied evenly and the new information contained the
place where the victim was brought.
The accused filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that a reinvestigation be
conducted and the issuance of warrants of arrest be deferred but it was denied
by the Ombudsman. The accused thereafter filed a Motion for New Preliminary

investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued but
the same was also denied. Subsequently, the accused filed a Motion to Quash
Amended Information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, which was
ignored for their continuous refusal to submit their selves to the Court and after
their voluntary appearance which invested the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over
their persons, their motion for reconsideration was again denied.

Held: No. A reinvestigation is proper only if the accuseds substantial rights


would be impaired. In the case at bar, we do not find that their rights would be
unduly prejudiced if the Amended Information is filed without a reinvestigation
taking place. The amendments made to the Information merely describe the
public positions held by the accused/petitioners and stated where the victim was
brought when he was kidnapped.

Issue (1): WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the offense charged.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially


inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may
be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and
it does not place the persons accused in jeopardy. It is not the occasion for the
full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Held: No. The original Information filed with the Sandiganbayan did not mention
that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the
same was filed that the prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional
fact was omitted therein.

However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion
for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation filed with the same court, it was they
who challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and
clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work
connected.

The purpose of a preliminary investigation has been achieved already and we


see no cogent nor compelling reason why a reinvestigation should still be
conducted.

4 Hernandez vs Albano
It is a well-settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

SHORT VERSION:

We therefore hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case because
of estoppel and it was thus vested with the authority to order the amendment of
the Information.

FACTS: Isabela Rep. Delfin Albano (respondent-appellee) filed a complaint with


the Manila city fiscal against Finance Secretary & Central Bank Monetary Board
Presiding Officer Jaime Hernandez (petitioner-appellant) for violating RPC Art.
216 (possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Commonwealth Act
626 *which provides for the penalty for violations of Article VII, Section 11,
subsection (2) of the Constitution) or RA 265 (Central Bank Act).

Issue (2): WON reinvestigation must be made anew.

Hernandez sought to enjoin the fiscals investigation of charges filed against


him. The courts only do so in extreme cases; Hernandez did not prove that his
belonged to those exceptions.

o
The complaint involved Hernandezs alleged shareholdings in University of
the East, Bicol Electric Co., Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres, DMG inc., and
University of Nueva Caceres and the claim that said corporations obtained dollar
allocations from the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, during
Hernandezs incumbency as presiding officer thereof.
o

In total, there were five charges docketed in the fiscals office.

After joint investigation of the charges before Second Assistant City Fiscal
of Manila Carlos Gonzales (respondent), Albano moved to exclude the alleged
violation of RP Art 216 as the applicability of the statute was pending before the
SC in Solidum v Hernandez (it had since been resolved adversely against
Hernandez). The fiscal granted the motion.
o
Hernandez sought the dismissal of the remaining charges on the grounds
that (a) violation of Article VII, Section 11, subsection (2) of the Constitution,
punishable under Commonwealth Act 626, should be prosecuted at the domicile
of the private enterprises affected there by; and that (b) violation of Section 13
of Republic Act 265 is not criminal in nature. Dismissal and reconsideration
denied.

Hernandez went to the Court of First Instance Manila on certiorari and


prohibition praying for preliminary injunction to restrain the fiscals office from
continuing the investigation.
o

The CFI dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:

could the Manila fiscal be restrained


investigation of the charges against Hernandez?

from

proceeding

with

the

REASONING:

By statute, the prosecuting officer of the City of Manila and his assistants
are empowered to investigate crimes committed within the city's territorial
jurisdiction. Not a mere privilege, it is the sworn duty of a Fiscal to conduct an
investigation of a criminal charge filed with his office. The power to investigate

postulates the other obligation on the part of the Fiscal to investigate promptly
and file the case of as speedily.
o
A rule was formulated that ordinarily criminal prosecution may not be
blocked by court prohibition or injunction.
o
However, in extreme cases, a relief in equity could be availed of to stop a
purported enforcement of a criminal law where it was necessary: (a) for the
orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions;
(d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases,
because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional, or was "held invalid."

Commonwealth Act 626 provides the penal sanction for a violation of


Constitution Art VII sec. 11(2): a fine of not than P5000 or imprisonment of not
more than 2 years, or both.
o
The legal mandate in Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court is that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of
the essential ingredients thereof took place. Where an offense is wholly
committed outside the territorial limits wherein the court operates, said court is
powerless to try the case.
o
Similarly, the Manila fiscal could not investigate a crime committed within
the exclusive confines of another province. Otherwise, they would be
overreaching the territorial limits of their jurisdiction, and unlawfully encroach
upon powers and prerogatives of fiscals of the province.
o
Based on the facts of the case, Possession of prohibited interests is but
one of the essential components of the offense. As necessary an ingredient
thereof is the fact that petitioner was head of a department: Secretary of
Finance. So also, the fact that while head of department and chairman of the
Monetary Board he allegedly was financially interested in the corporations
aforesaid which so the dollar allocations, and that he had to act officially, in his
dual capacity, not in Camarines Sur, but in Manila where he held his office.
o
Since criminal action must be instituted and tried in the place where the
crime or an essential ingredient thereof, took place, it stands to reason to say
that the Manila under the facts obtained here, have jurisdiction to investigate
the violation complained of.


Violation of RA 265 sec. 13 was criminal in nature, as the law clearly
provided the penal sanction for violating its provisions.

RULING: CFI judgment affirmed


5 Brocka vs Enrile
FACTS:

Jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization


(ACTO) a demonstration held in sympathy of this strike, forcibly and violently
dispersed a petitioners arrested by Northern Police District Officers Jan 28 85

Petitioners charged with Illegal Assembly RPC146 par.3 in 3 crim cases


filed before RTC QC

All petitioners released on bail P3,000 each EXCEPT for Lino Brocka, Ben
Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos (Brocka, et al.), who were charged
as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly for whom no bail was recommended

Urgent petition for bail filed before the RTC a daily hearings held between
Feb.1-7 85 a On Feb. 7 or 9 85, RTC QC Judge Miriam Defensor Santiago ordered
Brocka, et als provisional release; recommended bail at P6,0000 each a Brocka,
et al filed respective bail bonds BUT

Despite service of release order, Brocka, et al remained in detention a


respondents-police officers invoked Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly
issued against Brocka, et al on Jan. 28 85
o
al.

Neither original nor certified true copy of this PDA was shown to Brocka, et

Feb 11 85 Brocka, et al charged with Inciting to Sedition in 3 crim cases;


hasty and spurious filing of this second offense as follows:
o
10:30 AM counsel informed by phone that Brocka, et al will be brought
before the QC Fiscal at 2:30PM for undisclosed reasons a another phone call
subsequently received informing counsel that appearance of Brocka, et al was to
be at 2:00PM
o
2:00PM Brocka, et al arrived at office of Asst. City Fiscal a complainants
affidavits had not yet been received

o
3:00PM representative of the military arrived with alleged statements of
complainants against Brocka, et al for alleged inciting to sedition
o
3:15PM counsel inquired from Records Custodian when the charges
against Brocka, et al had been officially received a informed that said charges
were never coursed through the Records Office
o
ALSO, utterances allegedly constituting Inciting to Sedition under RPC142
are, almost verbatim, the same utterances which are the subject of the crim
cases for Illegal Assembly for which Brocka, et al are entitled to be relased on
bail as a matter of Constitutional right a appears that respondents have
conspired to deprive Brocka, et al of the right to bail
o
AND, panel of assistant fiscals demanded that Brocka, et al sign a waiver
of their rights under RPC125 as a condition for the grant of the counsels request
that they be given 7 days within which counsel may conferwith their clients a no
such requirement required under the rules

Brocka, et al released provisionally on Feb.14 85 on orders of then Pres.


Marcos a release narrated in Courts resolution in petition for habeas corpus filed
by Sedfrey Ordonez in behalf of Brocka, et al:
o
In Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, respondents said all accused had
already been released a four on Feb15 85 and one on Feb.8 85
o
Petitioners, nevertheless, still argue that the petition has not become
moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the
law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition.

Hence, this petition. Brocka, et al contend:

1.
bad faith and/or harassment sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal
prosecution
2.
second offense of Inciting to Sedition manifestly illegal premised on one
and the same act of participating in the ACTO jeepney strike a matter of defense
in sedition charge so, only issue here is

ISSUE: Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined YES

RULING: We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution
for the second offense of inciting to sedition.

upon receipt of TCs order of release a violates guideline that PDA shall be
invoked within 24 hrs in Metro, Manila or 48 hours outside Metro, Manila

GEN. RULE: Criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by


injunction, preliminary or final

Despite subpoenas for PDAs production, prosecution merely presented a


purported xeerox copy of it a violates Court pronouncement that individuals
against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, and
the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having
official custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension (Ilagan v Enrile)

EXCEPTIONS:

1.

To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused

2. SolGens manifestation: Brocka, et al should have filed a motion to quash the


information instead of a petition for Habeas Corpus

2.
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions
3.

When there is no prejudicial question which is subjudice

The Court agreed with the contention of the SolGen. However, it noted that such
course of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances
then prevailing:

4.

When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority

1. Spurious and inoperational PDA

5.

Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation

2. Sham and hasty Preliminary Investigation

6.

When double jeopardy is clearly apparent

7.

When the court has no jurisdiction over the offense

8.

Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution

Clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al in detention


until the second offense could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing
a warrant of arrest anew

9.
Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by lust for
vengeance
10.
When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground had been denied
11.
Preliminary injunction has been issued by the SC to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners

In the case at bar, criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, have
been undertaken by state officials in bad faith:
1. Respondents invoked a spurious PDA in refusing Brocka, et als release from
detention BUT this PDA was issued on Jan.28 85 and invoked only on Feb.9 85

"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of


criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from
arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution.

If there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges (as
in this case where petitioners were barred from enjoying provisional release until
such time that charges were filed) and where a sham preliminary investigation
was hastily conducted THEN charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be
enjoined.
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No costs.

6 Defensor Santiago vs Vasquez


Facts: Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act before the Sandiganbayan. An order of arrest was issued against her with
bail for her release fixed at P15,000.00. She filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond". The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
authorizing the Santiago to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of
P15,000.00. Her arraignment was set, but she asked for the cancellation of her
bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The
Sandiganbayan deferred the arraignment. Meanwhile, it issued a hold departure
order against Santiago by reason of the announcement she made, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving
for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard University. She directly filed a
"Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction" with the SC. She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold
departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over her person
as she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered. The hold
departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice and hearing. She
likewise argued that the hold departure order violates her right to due process,
right to travel and freedom of speech.

Issues:

1. Has the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Santiago?

2. Did the Sandiganbayan err when it issued the hold departure order without
any motion from the prosecution and without notice and hearing?

3. Has Santiago's right to travel been impaired?


Held:

1. How the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused
either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The voluntary
appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a
motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's
jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail.
On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty
of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender.

Santiago is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of


respondent court upon the filing of her "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance
of Cash Bail Bond" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered
as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for
purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed
"that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted"
and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the
custody" of said court. Santiago cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by
her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary
after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to
exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

2. The ex parte issuance of a hold-departure order was a valid exercise of the


presiding courts inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of
its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public statement
that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher
studies abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan

in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in


thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order. To reiterate, the hold
departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and
the person of the accused.

3. By posting bail, an accused holds himself amenable at all times to the orders
and processes of the court, thus, he may legally be prohibited from leaving the
country during the pendency of the case.

Since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds
herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may
legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.
Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from
the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass
upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since
they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or
implications thereof. (Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993), G.R.
Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993)
7 Alfelor vs Intia
8 Uy vs CA
9 Rivera vs CA
Lessons Applicable: attempted murder

Laws Applicable:

May 2, 1998 1:00 pm: Ruben went to a nearby store to buy food. Edgardo,
his neighbour, mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for
support and soon a heated exchange of words ensued.

May 3, 1998 7:30 pm (Sunday): Ruben with his 3 year-old daughter went to
the store to buy food and to look for his wife. Suddenly, the brothers Esmeraldo,
Ismael and Edgardo emerged from their house and ganged up on him.
Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows so he fell to the ground.
While lying on the ground, Edgardo hit Ruben 3 times with a hollow block on the
parietal area (narrowly missing the middle which is fatal) while Esmeraldo and
Ismael continued mauling Ruben. People who saw the incident shouted: "Awatin
sila! Awatin sila!" Ruben felt dizzy but managed to stand up. Ismael threw a
stone at him, hitting him at the back. The policemen on board a mobile car
arrived so Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house.
Ruben was brought to the hospital. The doctor declared his lacerated wound
in the parietal area was slight and superficial and would heal from 1-7 days.

Esmeraldo: May 3, 1998 1:00 pm, Ruben arrived at his house, banged the
gate and challenged him and his brothers to come out and fight. When he got
out, Ruben punchd him and they wrestled but Edgardo pushed Ruben aside and
Esmeraldos wife pulled him away and brought to their house.
Ismael: He tried to pacify them but Ruben pulled his hair. Once he got free,
he fled to their house and did not see Edgardo in the scene.

Edgardo: May 3, 1998 1:00 pm, he was throwing garbage in front of their
house when Ruben arrived. He quickly went inside as Ruben banged the gate,
ordered him to get out and even threatened to shoot him. Esmeraldo went out to
ask what Rubens problem was but it led to a fist fight. He rushed outside and
pushed Ruben who fell to the ground. Ruben stood up, grabbed his hair and in
the process, Rubn hit his head on a lamp post.

Eyewitnesses Alicia Vera Cruz and Lucita Villejo: revealed the suddenness
and unexpectedness of the attack of petitioners

FACTS:

RTC: Frustrated murder

April 1998: Ruben Rodil stopped working as a taxi driver after a would-be
rapist threatened his life. He was cited as a Bayaning Pilipino by ABS-CBN for
saving the would-be victim. His wife is a manicurist and they have 3 children.

CA: Attempted murder

Petitioned

o They should be held criminally liable for physical injuries only since no intent
to kill and even if they had intent to kill, the prosecution failed to prove treachery

ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly held it as attempted murder.

HELD: NO. petition is DENIED for lack of merit. CA AFFIRMED WITH THE
MODIFICATION indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4)
months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. No costs.

When a wound is not sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident,
the crime is attempted.
Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove by direct or
circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.
o
evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter
alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under
which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused

Intent to kill was shown by the fact that the 3 brothers helped each other
maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had already fallen to the ground;
that one of them even picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded to hit the
victim on the head with it 3 times; and that it was only the arrival of the
policemen that made them desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben
o
If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to
kill is presumed

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.
overt or external act - some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if
carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense
o
Reason: so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with
certainty what the intent of the accused is
o

overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense

They attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was
walking with his 3-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life.
He had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the
synchronized assault of the 3 siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack on the victim. Even if the attack is frontal but is sudden
and unexpected, giving no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend
himself, there would be treachery
o
There being conspiracy by and among petitioners, treachery is considered
against all of them
Part 2 VENUE R 110 S 15
Lopez v. City Judge
FACTS: Petitioners (Roy Villasor, Angelina Meijia Lopez andAurora Mejia Villasor)
and other heirs of spousesManuel Meijia and Gloria Lazatin entered into
acontract with respondent Trinidad Lazatin for thedevelopment and subdivision
of 3 parcels of landbelonging to the intestate estate. Lazatin transferredhis rights
to Terra Devt Co (TDC).-Petitioners and co-heirs filed an action in CFI QC
forrescission of said contract with Lazatin for allegedgross and willful violation of
its terms.-Respondents (Lazatin and TDC) filed with FiscalsOffice of City of
Angeles a complaint againstpetitioners for violation of A172 in relation to
A171,par4, RPC. Preliminary investigation conducted.Fiscal filed with Court in
Angeles City informationcharging petitioners with crime of falsification of private
document. Allegedly, Aurora and Angelinamade it appear that they were the
guardians of minors George and Alexander Meijia (sons of thespouses?) when
they werent the guardians at thedate of the execution of the document, a

certainCarolina M. de Castro was the judicial guardian of thesaid minors).Petitioners asked for a reinvestigation. Angeles CityFiscal reinvestigated to give
them opportunity topresent exculpatory evidence. After reinvestigation,parties
charged moved for the dismissal of the case

document is actuallyfalsified with the intent to prejudice a 3 rd person,whether


such falsified document is or is not put touse illegally. The improper and illegal
use of thedocument is not material or essential element of thecrime of
falsification of a private document [US vs.Infante, US vs. Barreto]2.

mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the
offensebecause the private document that containedthe alleged false statement
of fact was signedby them outside the territorial limits of saidcity

NO. The motion to quash now provided for in Rule117 of the Rules of Court is
manifestly broader inscope than the demurrer, as it is not limited todefects
apparent upon the face of the complaint orinformation but extends to issues
arising out of extraneous facts, as shown by the circumstance that,among the
grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2of said Rule provides for former
jeopardy or acquittal,extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the
accused etc., which necessarily involve questionsof fact in the determination of
which a preliminarytrial is required.

(One in Makati, the other one in QC).-However, the resolution of their motion to
dismisswas delayed and the City Court already set theircriminal case for
arraignment. Petitioners securedseveral postponements of the arraignment. But
sinceCity Fiscal continually failed to act on their motion todismiss, petitioners
filed a motion to quash instead,on the ground that court had no
jurisdiction.Respondents (with conformity of City Fiscal) filed anopposition to the
motion to quash. Respondent judgedenied motion to quash, set arraignment.
Sopetitioners filed present action.
ISSUE: 1. WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction totry and decide the
criminal case for allegedfalsification of a private document allegedly done bythe
parties named in the info even if the acts of falsification was allegedly done in
Makati and QC,and thus outside the jurisdiction of said court
Other procedural issues
2. WON the motion to quash was improper, andshould not be allowed since by
filing the said motion,the petitioners necessarily assumes the truth of
theallegation of the information to the effect that theoffense was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City3. WON the prayer for writs of
certiorari andprohibition is proper
HELD
1. NO. The place where the criminal offensewas committed not only determines
the venueof the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction
Reasoning.
Petitioners are charged with havingfalsified a private document, not using a
falsifieddocument, so it is essential to determine when andwhere the offense of
falsification of a privatedocument is deemed consummated or committed. The
crime of falsification of a private document isconsummated when such

Reasoning.
The argument of the respondents referto the now obsolete demurrer to an
information.3. YES
Ratio. The general rule is that a court of equity willnot issue a writ of certiorari to
annul an order of alower court denying a motion to quash, nor issue awrit of
prohibition to prevent said court fromproceeding with the case after such denial,
it beingthe rule that upon such denial the defendant shouldenter his plea of not
guilty and go to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same legal
questionscovered by his motion to quash. In this as well as inother jurisdictions,
however, this is no longer thehard and fast rule.-The writs of certiorari and
prohibition, asextraordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimateanalysis,
intended to annul void proceedings; toprevent the unlawful and oppressive
exercise of legalauthority and to provide for a fair and orderlyadministration of
justice.
Reasoning: In several cases, the court already tookcognizance of said writs,
overlooking the flaw in theprocedure followed in the interest of a
moreenlightened and substantial justice. The lack of jurisdiction of the City
Court of Angeles is patent andit would be highly unfair to compel the petitioners
toundergo trial in said court and suffer all theembarrassment and mental
anguish that go with it.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, judgment is herebyrendered declaring that the offense
charged in theinformation filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of theCity Court of
Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore,

saidcourt is hereby restrained and prohibited fromfurther proceedings therein.


Costs against the privaterespondents.

property. For the failure of the Ibasco spouses to settle their account, the Trivinio
spouses filed criminal cases against the former for violation of BP22.

People v. Gorospe

Issue: Whether the checks were for accommodation or guarantee to acquire the
benefits of the interpretation of Ministry Circular 4 of the Department of Justice
in relation to BP 22.

Facts: Manuel Parulan is an authorized dealer of San Mig Corp in Bulacan. He


issued 2checks in connection with beer purchases and which he delivered to the
Sales supervisor (Mr. Cornelio) of San Mig. The checks were dishonored by
Planters Devt Bank (drawee) in Bulacan. From the evidence presented, Parulan
made false assurances that the checks issued by him were good and backed by
sufficient funds. But Judge Grospe of RTC Pampanga dismissed the case for lack
of jusrisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Grospe was correct in dismissing the case.

Held: No. He had jurisdiction to try and decide the case.


Estafa is a
Deceit took
check was
completely
delivered.

transitory crime. There are the elements of deceit and damage.


place in Pampanga and damage was done in Bulacan where the
dishonored. While the check was issued in Bulan, it was not
drawn. It was in Pampanga where the check was uttered and

The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to the consummation of
the obligation. Although the check was received by San Mig in Bulacan, it was
not the delivery contemplated by the law to the payee (San Mig). Mr. Cornelio is
not the person who could take the check as a holder. Thus, he had to forward the
check to the regional office of San Mig in Pampanga. Deceit took place in
Pampanga where the check was legally issued and delivered.
Gamboa,et al. v. CA
Ibasco v. CA
Facts: The Ibasco spouses requested credit accommodation fro the supply of
ingredients in the manufacture of animal feeds from the Trivinio spouses. Ibasco
issued 3 checks for 3 deliveries of darak. The checks bounced and the Ibasco
spouses were notified of the dishonor. Ibasco instead offered a property in Daet.
The property, being across the sea, the Trivinio spouses did not inspect the

Held: Ministry Circular 4, issued 1 December 1981 by the Department of Justice,


provides that where a check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or
secure the payment of the obligation, pre-existing or not, the drawer is not
criminally liable for either estafa or violation of BP 22. Incidents however indicate
that the checks were issued as payment and for value, and not for
accommodation (i.e. pertaining to an arrangement made a favor to another, not
upon a consideration received). as the checks failed to bear any statement for
accommodation and for guarantee to show Ibascos intent. ( It must be noted,
however, that BP22 does not distinguish and applies even in cases where
dishonored checks were issued as a guarantee or for deposit only. The erroneous
interpretation of Ministry Circular 4 was rectified by the repealing Ministry
Circular 12, issued on 8 August 1984).
Isip v. People
The Place Where The Crime Was Committed Determines Not Only The Venue Of
The Action But Is An Essential Element Of Jurisdiction
Manuel and his wife Marrietta were charged with several counts of Estafa and BP
22 for allegedly defrauding Atty. Leonardo Jose and misappropriating several
pieces of jewellery. According to the complainant, all the transactions happened
in his ancestral house in Cavite City while he was on leave from his work at the
Bureau of Customs, hence the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite City. In their defense, Manuel and Marrietta alleged that the transactions
if indeed there was any, happened in Manila, where Atty. Leonardo was then
living in his condominium. After trial, the RTC convicted them for estafa, which
they appealed to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Marrietta died. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the RTC, and held that the
transactions occurred in Cavite City, as shown by numerous pieces of evidence.

In his petition to the Supreme Court, Manuel argues that the RTC and CA should
have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Mere convenience suggests that
all the transactions occurred in Manila, since he and his late wife were residents

of Manila. It does not follow that since complainant have an ancestral house in
Cavite City, the transactions occurred there.
The Supreme Court:

The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is


jurisdictional The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases,
the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the
accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory.
Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows
that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the
action for want of jurisdiction

In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that
the venue was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City. The complainant had
sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by Criminal Case No. 136-84 took
place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on approved leave of
absence from the Bureau of Customs. Since it has been shown that venue was
properly laid, it is now petitioners task to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that
the transaction involved was entered into in Manila. The age-old but familiar
rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations applies.

In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent


evidence that the transaction happened in Manila. Petitioner argues that since
he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience alone unerringly
suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We are not persuaded.
The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that
the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any

person from going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can sell
so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case at bar. It is not improbable
or impossible for petitioner and his wife to have gone, not once, but twice in one
day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they received pieces of jewelry
from complainant. Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by petitioners late
wife in all the transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with
banks in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the
transactions were not entered into in Cavite City.

It is axiomatic that when it comes to credibility, the trial courts assessment


deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.
The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial evidence. It is
to be pointed out that the findings of fact of the trial court have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial courts findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and
binding upon this Court. In the case at bar, we find no compelling reason to
reverse the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and to
apply the exception. We so hold that there is sufficient evidence to show that
the particular transaction took place in Cavite City.
MIRANDA RIGHTS
1 Miranda vs Arizona
Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered incriminating evidence during police
interrogations without prior notification of their rights under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution (the Constitution).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government authorities need to inform individuals of
their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights prior to an interrogation following an
arrest.
Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) consolidated
four separate cases with issues regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained
during police interrogations.

The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (Mr. Miranda), was arrested for
kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an immigrant, and although the officers
did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession after two hours of
investigation. The signed statement included a statement that Mr. Miranda was
aware of his rights.
The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (Mr. Vignera), was arrested for
robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to the robbery to the first officer after the
arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours before he made an
admission to an assistant district attorney. There was no evidence that he was
notified of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.
The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (Mr. Westover), was arrested for two
robberies. Mr. Westover was questioned over fourteen hours by local police, and
then was handed to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, who were
able to get signed confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities did not notify
Mr. Westover of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.
The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (Mr. Stewart), was arrested, along
with members of his family (although there was no evidence of any wrongdoing
by his family) for a series of purse snatches. There was no evidence that Mr.
Stewart was notified of his rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart admitted
to the crimes.
Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the arrested defendants of
their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-incrimination before they
interrogate the defendants?
Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their Fifth
Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their right to remain silent; an
explanation that anything they say could be used against them in court; their
right to counsel; and their right to have counsel appointed to represent them if
necessary. Without this notification, anything admitted by an arrestee in an
interrogation will not be admissible in court.
Dissent. Justice Tom Clark (J. Clark) argued that the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution would apply to
interrogations. There is not enough evidence to demonstrate a need to apply a
new rule as the majority finds here.
The second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) also argues that
the Due Process Clauses should apply. J. Harlan further argues that the Fifth

Amendment rule against self-incrimination was never intended to forbid any and
all pressures against self-incrimination.
Justice Byron White (J. White) argued that there is no historical support for
broadening the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution to include the rights that
the majority extends in their decision. The majority is making new law with their
holding.
Discussion. The majority notes that once an individual chooses to remain silent
or asks to first see an attorney, any interrogation should cease. Further, the
individual has the right to stop the interrogation at any time, and the
government will not be allowed to argue for an exception to the notification rule.
2 US vs Wade
Brief Fact Summary. Two men were indicted for bank robbery and appointed
counsel to defend them. They were brought before the employees to participate
in a line up identification procedure without the benefit of the presence of
counsel, after indictment, but prior to trial.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution) guarantees an accused the right to counsel at post indictment
identification procedures, and the failure to provide the accused with counsel will
result in the suppression of the improperly conducted identification.
Facts: Two men robbed a bank in Eustace, Texas. One man, with two pieces of
tape on his face, went into the bank, pointed a gun at the cashier and demanded
the money. His accomplice waited outside in a stolen getaway car. Wade and his
accomplice were indicted for the robbery and counsel was appointed. About two
weeks later, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent caused the two men
to be part of a lineup consisting of five or six other men at which the bank
employees were asked to make an identification, and at which the two men were
in fact identified.
At trial, Wades defense counsel objected to the identification procedures, but his
efforts to have them stricken were in vain. Wade was convicted of the robbery.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the lineup had violated Wades Sixth
Amendment constitutional right to counsel.
Issue. Whether courtroom identifications of an accused at trial are to be
excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses

before trial at a post indictment lineup conducted for identification purposes,


without notice to, and in the absence of, the accuseds appointed counsel?
Held. Yes. The court must analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to
defendants rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of
counsel to help avoid that prejudice. The in court identification must be found to
have independent origin, free of the primary taint of the improperly conducted
lineup, in order to be admitted.
Discussion. The opinion emphasizes the fact that the Fifth Amendment right
against self incrimination is not implicated because nothing about the lineup
itself violated the long line of cases holding that only testimonial or
communicative evidence must be suppressed if coerced. The Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, however, did attach to pretrial proceedings because of the
importance that they have carrying on an adequate defense. The right has been
interpreted to apply to critical stages of the proceedings. Identification
procedures are critical because of the many dangers that inhere in identification
procedures in general, and in eyewitness identifications in particular. Any
prejudice occurring in an identification procedure without counsel present would
denigrate the right of the defendant to effectively cross examine the witness in
question.
3 Orozco vs Texas
Four armed police officers arrived at Orozcos home at 4 a.m. to question him
about a murder. The officers entered Orozcos bedroom, woke him up, and
questioned him without reading Miranda warnings. Orozco admitted to being
present at the murder scene, owning a firearm, and told the officers its
whereabouts. Tests revealed that the firearm was the gun that fired the fatal
shot.
At trial, an officer testified that from the moment questioning began, Orozco was
under arrest and not free to leave. Orozcos statements were admitted and he
was found guilty. Orozco appealed, arguing that his statements were given while
he was in custody, thus violating Miranda v. Arizona (1966).
When is a suspect in custody? According to Miranda, custody takes place when a
suspect is deprived of freedom of movement in any significant way. To elucidate
this standard, the Orozco Court looked at a variety of situational factors,
including the time of day, the number of officers present, and the officers intent.
Because the questioning took place at 4 a.m. with four armed officers, and an

officer testified that Orozco was under arrest, the Court held that Orozco was in
custody.

The Orozco decision clarifies the definition of custody by elaborating on when


and how a suspects freedom of movement is deprived in a significant way. The
decision illustrates how custody can take place in a suspects home. Finally, it
provides criteria for determining whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of
Miranda.
4 US vs Brown
Brief Fact Summary. The defendant, Jacqueline Panseta Brown (the defendant),
was charged with importing cocaine base and possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute. The cocaine base was found by United States Customs officers in
the defendants luggage cart frames. It was found at the time she was traveling
to Bermuda via Miami from Jamaica.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Federal Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) Rule 703 allows
experts to rely on data which would not have been admissible if the date is
reasonably relied on by experts in their field.
Facts. The defendant was traveling to Bermuda via Miami when United States
Customs officers found cocaine base in the frames of her luggage carts. Cocaine
is derived from cocaine base. The defendant denied knowledge of the drugs, but
she was indicted for the importation of five hundred grams or more of a
substance containing cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute. The
defendant sought to substitute her appointed counsel for her own attorney,
David Rowe (Mr. Rowe). Mr. Rowe was substituted as counsel, but filed a
motion to withdraw seven weeks later. This motion was denied and the
defendant went to trial represented by Mr. Rowe. The government moved, prior
to trial, to exclude any evidence or argument from the defendant, a black
Jamaican national, that she was targeted by United States customs because of
her race. The trial court deferred ruling on this issue. The government used its
first two peremptory strikes against African-Americans, and defense objected
based
on Batson. The trial court found that the government offered credible reasons
unrelated to race as to why they were struck. The government used a third strike
against an African American, and after the defendant objected, offered that the
juror had been on a prior jury panel that was unable to reach a verdict.

The prosecution relied on the testimony of a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)


agent to establish the defendants knowledge of the presence of cocaine in her
luggage carts. The DEA agent was offered as an expert in the field of drug
evaluation. The agent testified that the wholesale value of the cocaine base in
the defendants possession was approximately $217,000. The government
argued that an innocent, unknowing witness would not have been trusted with
such value. The defendant attempted to contradict the estimated value with a
copy of a written DEA price list referred to by the expert, but was not allowed to.
The defendant was convicted on both counts and sentenced to sixty-three
months.
Issue. Did the trial court err in finding the race-neutral reasons offered by the
government for the peremptory strikes were credible?
Did the trial court improperly exclude the DEA drug price list offered by
Defendant?
Held. Circuit Judge Kravitch issued the opinion for the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals and found that the trial court did not err in holding the governments
race-neutral explanations credible in regards to the peremptory strikes.
The trial court did not err in excluding the price list.
Concurrence. Circuit Judge Hill issued a concurring opinion to note that he is
troubled that the defendant went to trial with a lawyer she did not prefer.
Discussion. The price list was not relied on by the DEA agent in forming his
opinion, and it made no reference to drug prices in Bermuda, which was the
defendants destination, or Jamaica, from where she originated. The list did not
reference prices for cocaine base in any market.
5 People vs Andan
Rights of Suspects under Custodial Investigation
Confessions given to a Municipal Mayor
FACTS: Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima was on her
way to her school dormitory in Valenzuelal, Metro Manila when Pablito Andan
asked her to check the blood pressure of the grandmother of Andans wife but
there was nobody inside the house. She was punched in the abdomen by Andan
and was brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the toilet
until it was dark and was dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted her

over the fence to the adjacent vacant lot where she started to move. Andan hit
her head with a concrete block to silence her and dragged her body to a shallow
portion of the lot and abandoned it.
The death of Marianne drew public attention which prompted Baliuag Mayor
Cornelio Trinidad to form a team of police officers to solve the case. Apart from
the vacant lot, they also searched Andans nearby house and found evidences
linked to the crime. The occupants of the house were interviewed and learned
that accused-appellant was in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A police team
lead by Mayor Trinidad located Andan and took him to the police headquarters
where he was interrogated where he said that Dizon killed the girl. The three
were then brought to Andans house where he showed the police where the bags
of Marianne were hidden. They were then brought back to the police station
while waiting for the result of the investigation.
The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at the
police headquarters for the result of the investigation, Mayor Trinidad arrived and
proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant
approved him and whispered a request that they talk privately to which the
mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the Andan agreed to tell
the truth and admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. The mayor
opened the door of the room to let the public and the media representatives
witness the confession. Mayor Trinidad first asked for a lawyer to assist the
appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings
photographed and recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his
relatives, Andan admitted to the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne and
that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because of ill-feelings against them.
However, appellant entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. He
provided an alibi why he was at his fathers house at another barangay and
testified that policemen tortured and coerced him to admit the crime but the trial
court found him guilty and sentenced him to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the
assistance of counsel is in violation of the constitution and cannot be admitted
as evidence in court.
RULING: Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellants
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. A municipal mayor has operational
supervision and control over the local police and may be deemed a law
enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III

of the Constitution. However, Andans confession to the mayor was not made in
response to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question
appellant at all and no police authority ordered the appellant to talk to the
mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor acted as a confidant and not as a law
enforcer and therefore did not violate his constitutional rights.
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having
committed the crime. What the constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we hold that appellants confession to
the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Andan was found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
6 People vs Endino
Facts: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October
1991, an emboldened Gerry Galgarin (@ Toto), uncle of Edward Endino, suddenly
and without warning lunged at Dennis Aquino and stabbed him repeatedly on the
chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the
unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded
momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby
Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward
Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the 2
assailants fled in the direction of the airport. Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and
bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he collapsed on the floor.
He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of some
onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could
receive medical attention. On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of
Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and Gerry Galgarin and warrants
were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the
trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives
without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension. On 19 November
1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the Antipolo
and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo, Rizal. He was
immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the
evening of the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by
PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to

be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly. On their way to the airport, they
stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where Galgarin was interviewed by
reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing Galgarin
admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman .
According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where
his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them
money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they
stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated, with him
heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the
authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program
TV Patrol. During trial, Galgarin disowned the confession which he made over TV
Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police
officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally
infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec. 12, Art.
III, of the Constitution. The trial court found Galgarin guilty of murder qualified by
Treachery, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify
the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages.
Issue: Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarins confession is
admissible as evidence.
Held: The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening
his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such
confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to
police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and
forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into
confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all
likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him. However, because of the
inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt,
and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial
courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting
similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of
unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to
the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice
system. It is not suggested that videotaped confessions given before media men
by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and

conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is


essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was
given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of counsel
then to lower courts: "we should never presume that all media confessions
described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always
remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized.
Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for
the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating
polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant
and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution."
7 People vs Caguioa
Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed on 14 September 1973, in the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan, an information for murder against Paquito Yupo y
Gonzales (Criminal Case 146-V-73), with the case, after the raffle, being assigned
to Branch VIII, presided by Judge Eduardo P. Caguioa. Upon arraignment on 5
October 1973, Yupo pleaded not guilty. The trial of the case then proceeded, the
prosecution having presented 6 witnesses, including the father of the deceased,
Miguel Tribol, and his common-law wife, Lydia Begnotia, who allegedly received
the ante mortem statement of the victim, Rodolfo Tribol. Then, at the hearing on
3 June 1974, the prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the
Meycauayan Police Department, before whom a written statement of Yupo and
his alleged waiver of his right to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of
his own choice was taken. After this witness had identified the statement of Yupo
and the waiver, he was questioned on the incriminating answers in such
statement to the police, but there was an objection on the part of the defense
counsel based on the ground of such statement being inadmissible in evidence,
as the statement was taken by the police without any counsel assisting the
accused in the investigation. Judge Caguioa sustained the objection of the
defense on the view that such judicial confession of the accused is inadmissible
in evidence for being unconstitutional, it appearing that the accused was not
assisted by a counsel when it was given. He likewise stated that such right could
not be waived. Upon his refusal to reconsider such ruling, the petition for
certiorari was filed.
Issue: Whether the right to remain silent and right to counsel during custodial
investigation may be waived.

Held: While there could be a waiver of the rights of an accused, it must be


intelligently waived, otherwise a court's jurisdiction starting at the beginning of
the trial may be lost in the course of the proceeding. Statements made during
the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a clear intelligent
waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to questioning
that he has a right to remain silent, that any utterance may be used against him,
and that he has the right to the presence of a counsel, either retained or
appointed. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the
procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are
devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior
to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does not make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual
is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated,
the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered
some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive
him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. Tested by
such a clear and unequivocal standard, the alleged waiver herein falls far short.
Yupo merely answered in a monosyllabic "Opo" to Corporal Conrado B. Roca of
the Police Force of Meycauayan, worded thus: "Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na ikaw ay
sinisiyasat tungkol sa isang paglabag sa batas na iyong ginawa, bago ko
ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magsalita
kung ayaw mo at may karapatan ka rin na magkaroon ng abogado na iyong
gusto, at dapat mo ring mabatid na anuman ang sabihin mo dito ay maaaring
gamitin ng ayon o laban sa iyo, magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba?" and that was all.
8 People vs Maqueda

Facts: British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house
in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly battered
with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two household helpers of the
victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda
as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a
kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two
accused asked them for directions.
Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag,
Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his
participation in the crime. According to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of
his constitutional rights before he signed such document. Afterwards he was
brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda
filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering
to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least
guilty among the accused in this case."
Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to
Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa.
Issue: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan
Salaysay is admissible as evidence.
Held: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of
his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of the confession, the
accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to
remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and
not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet,
despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still
confessed when he did not have to do so.
The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights
anymore because the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has
been issued already, is untenable. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and
to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights
are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or
information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation
for the commission of an offense."

Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial


admission is inadmissible as evidence.
As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean
Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor
of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because such
testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made
them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in
connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the
other admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible.
Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the
SC:
Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.
Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.
9 People vs Amestuzo
Facts: On February 26, 1991, four days after a reported robbery with multiple
rape, agroup of policemen together with accused Federico Ampatin, who was
then a suspect,went to the handicrafts factory in NIA Road, Pasay City where
accused-appellant was working as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking for a
certain "Mario" and "searched the first and second floors of the building. Failing
to find said Mario, the police hitAmpatin at the back of his neck with a gun and
uttered, "Niloloko lang yata tayo ngtaong ito" and "Magturo ka ng tao kahit sino."
It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to accused-appellant Bagas as he
was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon. Thereafter, Bagas was
arrested and made to board the police vehicle together with accused Ampatin.
They were brought to the Urduja Police Station in Kalookan Cityand placed under
detention together with the other two accused, Amestuzo and Vias. When the
complainants arrived, accused-appellant was brought out, instructed to turn to
the left and then to the right and he was asked to talk. Complainant Lacsamana
asked him if he knew accused Amestuzo and Vias. Accused-appellant answered
int he negative. The policemen told the complainants that accused-appellant
was one of the suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional frenzy,

kicking and hitting him. They only stopped when one of the policemen
intervened .Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court committed a serious
error when it deprived him of his constitutional right to be represented by a
lawyer during his investigation. His singular presentation to the complainants for
identification without the benefit of counsel, accused-appellant avers, is a
flagrant violation of the constitutional prerogative to be assisted by counsel to
which he was entitled from the moment he was arrested by the police and
placed on detention. He maintains that the identification wasa critical stage of
prosecution at which he was as much entitled to the aid of counsel asduring the
trial proper.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not appellant s right to counsel was violated.(2)
Whether or not there was a valid out-of-court identification of appellant to the
complainants.
HELD :(1) NO. Herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke his right to counsel
when he was presented for Identification by the complainants because the same
was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing
that during this identification by the complainants, the police investigators
sought to elicit any admission or confession from accused-appellant. In fact,
records show that the police did not at alltalk to accused-appellant when he was
presented before the complainants. Thealleged infringement of the
constitutional rights of the accused while under custodial investigation is
relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his conviction. In
the present case, there is no such confession or extrajudicial admission.
(2)YES. The out-of-court identification of herein accused-appellant by
complainants in the police station appears to have been improperly suggestive.
Even before complainants had the opportunity to view accused-appellant faceto-face when he was brought out of the detention cell to be presented to them
for identification, the police made an announcement that he was one of the
suspects in the crime and that he was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as
one of culprits.
10 People vs Obrero
Appellant was convicted of robberry with homicide.He executed a written
confession as a result of a custodial ivestigation.The issue is whether such is
valid.

Held: The extrajudicial confession was invalid. The perfunctory reading of the
Miranda rights is inadequate to transmit information to the suspect. Also, Art
IIISec12(1) requires an independent and competent counsel of the suspects
choice. Atty de los Reyes was not an independent counsel being the PC Captain
and Station Commander. As held in P v Bandula, the independent counsel cannot
be a special prosecutor, private or public prosecutor, municipal attorney or
counsel of the police whose interest is adverse to the accused.

While there is evidence to the homicide consisting of the corpus delicti, there is
no evidence of the robbery except the confession. The lack of objection of
appellant to the introduction of the constitutionally proscribed evidence did not
satisfy the burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. Acquitted of robbery
with homicide.
11 Jesalva vs People
EXCLUSIONARY RULE/ FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE
1 Mapp vs Ohio
Facts of the case
Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly
illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on
the basis of freedom of expression.

Question
Were the confiscated materials protected by the First Amendment? (May
evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment be
admitted in a state criminal proceeding?)
Conclusion: The Court brushed aside the First Amendment issue and declared
that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the
Constitution is, by [the Fourth Amendment], inadmissible in a state court." Mapp
had been convicted on the basis of illegally obtained evidence. This was an
historic -- and controversial -- decision. It placed the requirement of excluding
illegally obtained evidence from court at all levels of the government. The

decision launched the Court on a troubled course of determining how and when
to apply the exclusionary rule.

to death, and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D.
Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00. Hence, the automatic review.

People vs. Alicando

Issue: Whether the pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains, evidence
derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from
Alicando, may be admitted as evidence.

Facts: In the afternoon of 12 June 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year
old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus
Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Arnel
Alicando y Briones joined them but every now and then would take leave and
return. Alicando was living in his uncle's house some 5 arm's length from
Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left.
At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, Luisa Rebada saw the victim at the window of
Alicando's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but Alicando closed the
window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She approached Alicando's house and
peeped through an opening between its floor and door. The sight shocked her
Alicando was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She
retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together and informed
her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana
was also overcome with fear and hastily left. Romeo Penecilla returned to his
house at 8:00 p.m.. He did not find Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched for her
until 1:00 a.m. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the Penecillas
were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she knew. Instead,
Rebada called out Alicando from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae
left his house. Alicando replied he was drunk and did not know. As the sun
started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house
to answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under
his house. Her parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m.,
Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife
Julie Ann, that Alicando committed the crime. Forthwith, Alicando was arrested
and interrogated by P03 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the
assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounseled verbal confession and
follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from Alicando's
house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained
pillow and a stained T-shirt. Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide. On 29 June 1994, Alicando was arraigned with the assistance of Atty.
Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of Justice. Alicando pleaded guilty.
After Alicando's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its
evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for Alicando, if he so
desired. On 20 July 1994, the trial court found Alicando guilty and sentenced him

Held: It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as


inadmissible evidence uncounselled confession or admission. Section 12
paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provide that "Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel"; and "Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
against him"; respectively. Herein, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense
to reduce the all-important confession of Alicando in writing. Neither did he
present any writing showing that Alicando waived his right to silence and to have
competent and independent counsel. It is not only the uncounseled confession
that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The
pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from
the uncounseled confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando. The
Court has not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in Philippine
jurisdiction. It has also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the
"fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in
the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the
primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible.
Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the
illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the
same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from
the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on
the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to
gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all
evidence subsequently obtained. The burden to prove that an accused waived
his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession
under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of
the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted

as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and
convincing evidence.
People vs. Januario
Facts: Vicente Dilanco Pons, Santiago Cid's cousin, purportedly acting upon the
instructions of Doris Wolf, borrowed from Myrna Temporas the amount of
P48,500.00 and used the an Isuzu passenger type jeepney (Plate DFB 550) as a
collateral. The amount was given to Pons in P10,000.00 cash and the balance in
a check payable to Doris Wolf. The check was encashed as it was cleared from
Myrna Temporas' account. It bore a signature supposedly of Doris Wolf at its back
portion and a second endorsement by Pons who subsequently deposited it in his
account. On September 11, Temporas asked Pons to secure a special power of
attorney from Doris Wolf. Pons promised to comply in one or two weeks. But Pons
failed to pay the indebtedness. So, Myrna Temporas repeatedly went to his house
in Digmaan, Camarines Sur to collect the amount borrowed but Pons always
promised that he himself would go to her house to pay. Inasmuch as Pons also
failed to produce a deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas lodged a
complaint against him for estafa before the NBI. Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr.
reported the disappearance of his son, Andrew, Jr., the jeepney and its driver to
the police detachment in Bulihan, Silang, Cavite and the police stations in Silang
and Imus, Cavite. Two weeks after 4 September 1987, the body of 23-year-old
Andrew Patriarca, Jr. was found in a sugarcane plantation in Maguyam. His head
was severed from his body. The body of the driver, Geronimo Malibago,
stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of the jeepney, was recovered after the
harvest of sugarcane in the plantation in Maguyam. Malibago's widow identified
the body from its clothing. Acting on the complaint, the NBI contacted the
relatives of the owner of the jeepney who went to Camarines Sur, identified the
jeepney and informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo Malibago) and
conductor (deceased Andrew Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by carnappers.
Patriarca's widow also filed a complaint with the NBI. Upon investigation, an NBI
team led by Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found out that the carnapping of
the jeepney and the killing of Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork" of a
group of 4 persons named Rene Januario, Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Toto,
and Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo. The team also discovered that the jeepney was
disposed of through Cid. Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in
Camarines Sur. The NBI then invited Pons and Temporas to shed light on the
carnapping incident. The jeepney was recovered in an auto shop with its engine
partly dismantled. Upon being informed by the NBI that the jeepney had been
found, an insurance company brought it back to Manila. From the "oral

investigation" they conducted at the Naga City NBI office on 27 March 1988, the
team learned that Sarita and Sarinos took Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar
plantation where presumably they were killed. Because Januario and Canape
volunteered that their companions were their neighbors in Paliparan,
Dasmarias, Cavite who could be in Manila already, the NBI team decided to
take down their statements at the NBI head office in Manila. The team traveled
with Januario and Canape to Manila, arriving there at around 1:00 p.m. of 28
March 1988. At the Taft Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took the
statements of Januario and Canae one at a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar,
who was "just around somewhere," to assist Januario and Canape during the
investigation. Agent Arlis Vela took the statement of Januario while Supervising
Agent Toribio took that of Canape. On 7 November 1988, an Information signed
by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Velasco, Jr., was filed against Rene Januario
and Efren Canape, and their co-accused Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and
Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo charging them with violation of Republic Act 6539
(AntiCarnapping Law). Arraigned on 7 February 1989, Januario and Canape,
assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. On 30 May 1989, Cid, assisted
by counsel de parte, likewise entered a plea of not guilty. Sarita and Sarinos
remained at large. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII in
Tagaytay City, disposing of Criminal Case TG-1392-89, rendered judgment
finding Januario and Canape guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Violation of Section 14, last sentence, of Republic act 6539, otherwise known as
the Anti-Carnapping Law, and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, and ordered them to pay jointly and
severally, but separately, the heirs of their victims, namely, Geronimo Malibago
and Andrew Patriarca, Jr., the sums of: (a) P50,000.00 for moral damages; (b)
P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; (c) P25,000.00 for actual damages, and to
pay the costs of the proceeding. Januario and Canape appealed.
Issue: Whether Saunars presence as counsel in the custodial investigations
satisfies the requirements of Article III, section 12 (1).
Held: Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of Januario
and Canape is, however, not a guarantee that their respective confessions had
been taken in accordance with Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. This
constitutional provision requires that a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have no less than "competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice." Saunar was not the choice of Januario as
his custodial investigation counsel. Arguendo that Saunar's competence as a
lawyer is beyond question, under the circumstances described by the

prosecution however, he could not have been the independent counsel solemnly
spoken of by the Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in the NBI and
therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the confessants. In fact, he
was actually employed by the NBI a few months after. Further, although Saunar
might have really been around to properly apprise Januario of his constitutional
right as reflected in the written sworn statement itself, the same cannot be said
about Canape. Canape was not properly informed of his constitutional rights.
Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he
wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for
counsel if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are
simply not in compliance with the constitutional mandate. In this case, appellant
Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked
whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any
means, be interpreted as a waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice.
Furthermore, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed
of his rights to remain silent and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on
the part of the police investigator to explain and to contemplate an effective
communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Canape's
sworn statement, which reads and sounds so lifeless on paper, fails to reflect
compliance with this requirement. Neither does the testimony of NBI Agent
Toribio. Bearing in mind that Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents
should have exerted more effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights.
The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of Januario's and Canape's
constitutional rights is shown not only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1)
of Article III of the Constitution. They have likewise forgotten the third paragraph
of Section 12 of the same article which mandates that an admission of facts
related to a crime must be obtained with the assistance of counsel; otherwise it
would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting.

charged of the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and penalized under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.The
accused was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea. The lower court found him
guilty. Hence, an automatic review of the case was submitted to the Supreme
Court.
Issues: WON the extrajudicial confession of the appellant was admissible
WON the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
Held: The appellant avers that his extrajudicial confession, and admissions
therein, should be considered a fruit of a poisonous tree and being such, should
be inadmissible as evidence against him. The Court disagrees. The Court finds
the extrajudicial confession in compliance with the strict constitutional
requirements of the right to counsel as enshrined in Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the
Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. The Court observed that
the confession itself expressly states that the investigating officers informed him
of such rights
Further, the appellant claimed that his confession was induced by a threat
against his life. The Court took cognizance, however, of his failure to present
evidence to prove such threat and neither did he file any case against the person
who threatened him nor did he report such incident to his counsel. He also
claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was
read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his
daily discourse.
The Court also noted that even if improper interrogation methods were used at
the start, it does not bar the possibility of having a valid confession by properly
interrogating the subject.

People v. Mojello
Facts: The victim was last seen with the appellant Bebot Mojello. On December
16,200 the body of Lenlen Rayco was found lifeless, naked and bruised on the
seashore. The medico-legal report positively indicated that the victim was raped.
When apprehended by the police officers and was subjected to an investigation
on 17 December 1996, the appellant admitted to the crime. Six days after, on 23
December 1996, during custodial investigation, the appellant, assisted by his
counsel, executed an extrajudicial confession to the crime. The appellant was

Ho Wai Pang versus People, G. R. No. 176229, Oct. 19, 2011


Facts: Petitioner Ho Wai Pang assails the June 16, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals which also affirmed the RTC decision, finding him and his co-accused

guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In this petition for
certiorari, petitioner takes issue on the fact that he was not assisted by a
competent and independent lawyer during the custodial investigation. He also
claimed that he was not
duly informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent counsel of his
choice.

Issue: Aside from extrajudicial confession, what are inadmissible in evidence if


the rights of an accused during custodial investigation have been violated?

Ruling: While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of
a
custodial questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his
constitutional right under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution, we mus
t not, however, lose sight of the fact that what said constitutional provision
prohibits as evidence are only confessions and admissions of the accused as
against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste, the Court categorically ruled that the
infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and are
not otherwise excluded by law or rules, i
s not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
In the present cas
e, petitioner did not make any confession or admission during his custodial
investigation. The prosecution did not present any extrajudicial confession
extracted from him as evidence of his guilt. Moreover, no statement was taken
from petitioner during his detention and subsequently used in evidence against
him.
SURVEILLANCE/ RECORDING OF COMMUNICATIONS
Gaanan vs. IAC

The case: This is a petition for certiorari for an interpretation of RA 4200 or Antiwiretapping Act
Facts:
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client
Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing
the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault
That same morning, Laconico, another lawyer, telephoned the appellant to
come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case
because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to
the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for the settlement
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was
agreeable to the conditions, which the latter answered in affirmative.
Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the
money, he told Laconico to give the money to his wife but the latter insisted
insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. And when he
received the money at a restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant Laconico executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he
heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct
assault. Complainant then charged Laconico with violation of RA 4200 for
listening to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year
imprisonment with costs
The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding
that the communication between the omplainant and Laconico was private in
nature therefore was covered by RA 4200; and that the petitioner overheard
such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant;
and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear
the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the
term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

Issue: WON extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of


the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute
unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a
telephone line.
Held: No.
Ruling:
Our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as
government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing
devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or
gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the
mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of
the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the
view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty.
Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" made between one person and
another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public; the
affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by
merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how
obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller
against the listener's. Such that ". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his
telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform
police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of
using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the
would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous
results.
Telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of
"commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the
same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. Telephone
party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
What the law refers to is a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or
arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording
the communication. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same
category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section
1 of RA 4200 . There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or

the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,


intercept, or record the spoken words.
In statutory construction, in order to determine the true intent of the legislature,
the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Hence, the phrase
"device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA 4200, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the
use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It
refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the
party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or
recording a telephone conversation.
The court also ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if
instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could
hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and
permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in
favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or
not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement",
the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone as
ruled in PP vs. Purisima
Wherefore, the petition is granted, decision of the IAC is annulled and set aside
and petitioner is acquitted for the crime of violating RA 4200.
KATZ V US

Brief Fact Summary.


The petitioner, Katz (the petitioner), was convicted of transmitting wagering
information over telephone lines in violation of federal law. The government had
entered into evidence the petitioners end of telephone conversations that the
government had obtained by placing a listening device to the phone booth that
the petitioner used. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners contention
that the evidence should be suppressed.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution (Constitution), against unreasonable searches and seizures,
follows the person and not the place.

Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering


information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami in violation of federal law.
After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to the top of the
telephone booth and recorded the petitioners end of the telephone
conversations which was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The
petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected
the contention that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted.

Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone


conversations conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from
introduction as evidence against a person?
Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously
asserted that the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area. However,
the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from unreasonable
intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self from
public view when he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the
uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to
a place where he could be seen. A person who enters into a telephone booth
may expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he
assumes that the words he utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the
world. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Governments activities in electron
ically listening to and recording the petitioners telephone conversations
constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a
search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained
is inadmissible.

Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black
observed that eavesdropping was an ancient practice that the Framers were
certainly aware of when they drafted the United States Constitution
(Constitution). Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution they would have added such language that
would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it
plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of
things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to
eavesdropped evidence of conversations.
Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) filed a dissenting opinion. The
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a
twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to those people. First, that a
person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The
critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a telephone booth shuts the
door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to assume that his
conversation is not being intercepted. On the other hand, conversations out in
the open public would not be protected against being overheard as the
expectation of privacy would not be reasonable.
Discussion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides constitutional
protection to individuals and not to particular places. The two-part test for this
protection is introduced by J. Harlan. First, the person must have exhibited an
actual expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must be reasonable.

US V WHITE
Brief Fact Summary. Government authorities, through the use of an informant,
secretly recorded conversations with the Respondent, James A. White (the
Respondent). The informant was not present during the trial, but the recorded
conversations were admitted.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The secret simultaneous (electronic) recording of


conversations between an individual and government agents, without a warrant,
does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(Constitution).

Discussion. The majority notes that the decision stands whether or not the
informer is available at trial because the availability of an informer is
independent of the Fourth Amendment constitutional issue. The reasoning aligns
the court with the prior On Lee decision. The majority strongly affirms On Lee
while distinguishing the Katz decision. Notably, four justices disagreed with the
majority opinions reasoning.

Facts. Federal authorities, working with an informant, were able to electronically


record conversations with the Respondent that were later used to convict the
Respondent. Authorities used radio equipment to record several conversations,
as well as personally overhearing the conversations. The electronic recordings
were shared with other agents.

Issue. Whether the electronic recording of private conversations with the


Respondent for the purpose of instantaneous dissemination with other agents
violates the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution?
Held. The recordings do not violate the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.
The majority affirms that the Respondent cannot rely on the expectation that a
conversation is private, and in doing so affirm a line of cases that upheld the
seemingly private conversations recorded by government agents. The majority
believes that it would be illogical to draw a line between conversations heard
through agents without electronic recording and those without the electronic
recording.

Dissent.
Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) dissented citing a concern for the dilution
of an individuals First Amendment constitutional rights.
Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) dissented, believing that the burden on an
innocent individual is too great when allowing monitoring without a warrant.
Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) dissented, stating that On Lee, in light
of Katz, is no longer good law.
Concurrence. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) concurred because he did
not want to apply Katz retroactively, but he would consider On Lee and Lopez
overruled.

United States Supreme Court


UNITED STATES v. KNOTTS, (1983)
No. 81-1802
Argued:

Decided: March 2, 1983

Having reason to believe that one Armstrong was purchasing chloroform to be


used in the manufacture of illicit drugs, Minnesota law enforcement officers
arranged with the seller to place a beeper (a radio transmitter) inside a
chloroform container that was sold to Armstrong. Officers then followed the car
in which the chloroform was placed, maintaining contact by using both visual

surveillance and a monitor which received the beeper signals, and ultimately
tracing the chloroform, by beeper monitoring alone, to respondent's secluded
cabin in Wisconsin. Following three days of intermittent visual surveillance of the
cabin, officers secured a search warrant and discovered the chloroform
container, and a drug laboratory in the cabin, including chemicals and formulas
for producing amphetamine. After his motion to suppress evidence based on the
warrantless monitoring of the beeper was denied, respondent was convicted in
Federal District Court for conspiring to manufacture controlled substances in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
monitoring of the beeper was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
Held:
Monitoring the beeper signals did not invade any legitimate expectation of
privacy on respondent's part, and thus there was neither a "search" nor a
"seizure" within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. The beeper
surveillance amounted principally to following an automobile on public streets
and highways. A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements. While respondent had
the traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling place insofar as his cabin
was concerned, such expectation of privacy would not have extended to the
visual observation from public places of the automobile arriving on his premises
after leaving a public highway, or to movements of objects such as the
chloroform container outside the cabin. The fact that the officers relied not only
on visual surveillance, but also on the use of the beeper, does not alter the
situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting their sensory faculties with such enhancement as science and
technology afforded them in this case. There is no indication that the beeper was
used in any way to reveal information as to the movement of the chloroform
container within the [460 U.S. 276, 277] cabin, or in any way that would not
have been visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin. Pp. 280-285.
662 F.2d 515, reversed.
REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and
WHITE, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 285.
BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN,
MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 287. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion

concurring in the judgment, in which BRENNAN, and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post,
p. 288.
Deputy Solicitor General Frey argued the cause for the United States. With him
on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen,
Elliott Schulder, and Gloria C. Phares.
Mark W. Peterson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic
signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver. In this case, a beeper was
placed in a five-gallon drum containing chloroform purchased by one of
respondent's codefendants. By monitoring the progress of a car carrying the
chloroform Minnesota law enforcement agents were able to trace the can of
chloroform from its place of purchase in Minneapolis, Minn., to respondent's
secluded cabin near Shell Lake, Wis. The issue presented by the case is whether
such use of a beeper violated respondent's rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
I
Respondent and two codefendants were charged in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota with conspiracy to manufacture controlled
substances, including but not limited to methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. 846. One of the codefendants, Darryl Petschen, [460 U.S. 276, 278] was
tried jointly with respondent; the other codefendant, Tristan Armstrong, pleaded
guilty and testified for the Government at trial.
Suspicion attached to this trio when the 3M Co., which manufactures chemicals
in St. Paul, notified a narcotics investigator for the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal
Apprehension that Armstrong, a former 3M employee, had been stealing
chemicals which could be used in manufacturing illicit drugs. Visual surveillance
of Armstrong revealed that after leaving the employ of 3M Co., he had been
purchasing similar chemicals from the Hawkins Chemical Co. in Minneapolis. The
Minnesota narcotics officers observed that after Armstrong had made a
purchase, he would deliver the chemicals to codefendant Petschen.
With the consent of the Hawkins Chemicals Co., officers installed a beeper inside
a five-gallon container of chloroform, one of the so-called "precursor" chemicals
used to manufacture illicit drugs. Hawkins agreed that when Armstrong next

purchased chloroform, the chloroform would be placed in this particular


container. When Armstrong made the purchase, officers followed the car in which
the chloroform had been placed, maintaining contact by using both visual
surveillance and a monitor which received the signals sent from the beeper.
Armstrong proceeded to Petschen's house, where the container was transferred
to Petschen's automobile. Officers then followed that vehicle eastward towards
the state line, across the St. Croix River, and into Wisconsin. During the latter
part of this journey, Petschen began making evasive maneuvers, and the
pursuing agents ended their visual surveillance. At about the same time officers
lost the signal from the beeper, but with the assistance of a monitoring device
located in a helicopter the approximate location of the signal was picked up
again about one hour later. The signal now was stationary and the location
identified was a cabin occupied by respondent near Shell Lake, Wis. The record
before us does not reveal that the beeper was used after the [460 U.S. 276, 279]
location in the area of the cabin had been initially determined.
Relying on the location of the chloroform derived through the use of the beeper
and additional information obtained during three days of intermittent visual
surveillance of respondent's cabin, officers secured a search warrant. During
execution of the warrant, officers discovered a fully operable, clandestine drug
laboratory in the cabin. In the laboratory area officers found formulas for
amphetamine and methamphetamine, over $10,000 worth of laboratory
equipment, and chemicals in quantities sufficient to produce 14 pounds of pure
amphetamine. Under a barrel outside the cabin, officers located the five-gallon
container of chloroform.
After his motion to suppress evidence based on the warrantless monitoring of
the beeper was denied, respondent was convicted for conspiring to manufacture
controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. He was sentenced to five
years' imprisonment. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction, finding that the monitoring of the
beeper was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment because its use had violated
respondent's reasonable expectation of privacy, and that all information derived
after the location of the cabin was a fruit of the illegal beeper monitoring. * 662
F.2d 515 [460 U.S. 276, 280]
(1981). We granted certiorari, 457 U.S. 1131
(1982), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
II

In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), this Court held that the
wiretapping of a defendant's private telephone line did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because the wiretapping had been effectuated without a physical
trespass by the Government. Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Stone, dissented
from that decision, believing that the actions of the Government in that case
constituted an "unjustifiable intrusion . . . upon the privacy of the individual,"
and therefore a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 478. Nearly 40 years
later, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court overruled Olmstead
saying that the Fourth Amendment's reach "cannot turn upon the presence or
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." 389 U.S., at 353 . The
Court said:
"The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a `search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed
to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have
no constitutional significance." Ibid.
In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), we elaborated on the principles
stated in Katz:
"Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of the
Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can
claim a `justifiable,' a `reasonable,' or a `legitimate expectation of privacy' that
has been invaded by government action. [Citations omitted.] This inquiry, as Mr.
Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, normally embraces [460 U.S.
276, 281]
two discrete questions. The first is whether the individual, by his
conduct, has `exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,' 389 U.S.,
at 361 - whether, in the words of the Katz majority, the individual has shown that
`he seeks to preserve [something] as private.' Id., at 351. The second question is
whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is `one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable,"' id., at 361 - whether, in the words of the
Katz majority, the individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is `justifiable'
under the circumstances. Id., at 353. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S., at 143 -144,
n. 12; id., at 151 (concurring opinion); United States v. White, 401 U.S., at 752
(plurality opinion)." 442 U.S., at 740 -741 (footnote omitted).
The governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper in this case
amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and

highways. We have commented more than once on the diminished expectation


of privacy in an automobile:
"One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function
is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of
personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels
public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view." Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion).
See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 -154, and n. 2 (1978) (POWELL, J.,
concurring); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When
Petschen traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular [460 U.S. 276, 282]
roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact
of his final destination when he exited from public roads onto private property.
Respondent Knotts, as the owner of the cabin and surrounding premises to which
Petschen drove, undoubtedly had the traditional expectation of privacy within a
dwelling place insofar as the cabin was concerned:
"Crime, even in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern
to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing. The
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also of grave concern, not
only to the individual, but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable
security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent." Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), quoted with approval in Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
But no such expectation of privacy extended to the visual observation of
Petschen's automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a public highway,
nor to movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the cabin in
the "open fields." Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
Visual surveillance from public places along Petschen's route or adjoining Knotts'
premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the police. The fact
that the officers in this case relied not only on visual surveillance, but also on the
use of the beeper to signal the presence of Petschen's automobile to the police

receiver, does not alter the situation. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment
prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon
them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them
in this case. In United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927), the Court said: [460
U.S. 276, 283]
"But no search on the high seas is shown. The testimony of the boatswain shows
that he used a searchlight. It is not shown that there was any exploration below
decks or under hatches. For aught that appears, the cases of liquor were on deck
and, like the defendants, were discovered before the motor boat was boarded.
Such use of a searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field
glass. It is not prohibited by the Constitution." Id., at 563.
We have recently had occasion to deal with another claim which was to some
extent a factual counterpart of respondent's assertions here. In Smith v.
Maryland, we said:
"This analysis dictates that [Smith] can claim no legitimate expectation of
privacy here. When he used his phone, [Smith] voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and `exposed' that information to its
equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, [Smith] assumed the
risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. The
switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely the modern
counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for
the subscriber. [Smith] concedes that if he had placed his calls through an
operator, he could claim no legitimate expectation of privacy. [Citation omitted.]
We are not inclined to hold that a different constitutional result is required
because the telephone company has decided to automate." 442 U.S., at 744
-745.
Respondent does not actually quarrel with this analysis, though he expresses the
generalized view that the result of the holding sought by the Government would
be that "twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be
possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision." Brief for Respondent 9
(footnote omitted). But the fact is that the "reality hardly suggests abuse,"
Zurcher v. Stanford [460 U.S. 276, 284] Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978); if such
dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different
constitutional principles may be applicable. Ibid. Insofar as respondent's
complaint appears to be simply that scientific devices such as the beeper

enabled the police to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no


constitutional foundation. We have never equated police efficiency with
unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now.

trespass based on the law of real property were not dispositive in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), neither were they dispositive in Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).

Respondent specifically attacks the use of the beeper insofar as it was used to
determine that the can of chloroform had come to rest on his property at Shell
Lake, Wis. He repeatedly challenges the "use of the beeper to determine the
location of the chemical drum at Respondent's premises," Brief for Respondent
26; he states that "[t]he government thus overlooks the fact that this case
involves the sanctity of Respondent's residence, which is accorded the greatest
protection available under the Fourth Amendment." Ibid. The Court of Appeals
appears to have rested its decision on this ground:

We thus return to the question posed at the beginning of our inquiry in


discussing Katz, supra; did monitoring the beeper signals complained of by
respondent invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on his part? For the
reasons previously stated, we hold it did not. Since it did not, there was neither a
"search" nor a "seizure" within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore

"As noted above, a principal rationale for allowing warrantless tracking of


beepers, particularly beepers in or on an auto, is that beepers are merely a more
effective means of observing what is already public. But people pass daily from
public to private spheres. When police agents track bugged personal property
without first obtaining a warrant, they must do so at the risk that this enhanced
surveillance, intrusive at best, might push fortuitously and unreasonably into the
private sphere protected by the Fourth Amendment." 662 F.2d, at 518.
We think that respondent's contentions, and the above-quoted language from
the opinion of the Court of Appeals, to some extent lose sight of the limited use
which the government made of the signals from this particular beeper. As we
have noted, nothing in this record indicates that the beeper [460 U.S. 276, 285]
signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that the drum containing
the chloroform had ended its automotive journey at rest on respondent's
premises in rural Wisconsin. Admittedly, because of the failure of the visual
surveillance, the beeper enabled the law enforcement officials in this case to
ascertain the ultimate resting place of the chloroform when they would not have
been able to do so had they relied solely on their naked eyes. But scientific
enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance
would not also raise. A police car following Petschen at a distance throughout his
journey could have observed him leaving the public highway and arriving at the
cabin owned by respondent, with the drum of chloroform still in the car. This fact,
along with others, was used by the government in obtaining a search warrant
which led to the discovery of the clandestine drug laboratory. But there is no
indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the
movement of the drum within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been
visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin. Just as notions of physical

Reversed.
[ Footnote * ] Respondent does not challenge the warrantless installation of the
beeper in the chloroform container, suggesting in oral argument that he did not
believe he had standing to make such a challenge. We note that while several
Courts of Appeals have approved warrantless installations, see United States v.
Bernard, 625 F.2d 854 (CA9 1980); United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382 (CA5
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981); United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d
1190 (CA8), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d
489 (CA9), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978); United States v. Cheshire, 569 F.2d
887 (CA5), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d
1153 (CA9 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978); United States v. Abel, 548
F.2d 591 (CA5), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977); United States v. Hufford, 539
F.2d 32 (CA9), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976), we have not before and do not
now pass on the issue.
JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, concurring in the
judgment.
I join JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S and JUSTICE STEVENS' opinions concurring in the
judgment. I should add, however, [460 U.S. 276, 286] that I think this would
have been a much more difficult case if respondent had challenged, not merely
certain aspects of the monitoring of the beeper installed in the chloroform
container purchased by respondent's compatriot, but also its original installation.
See ante, at 279, n. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), made quite clear
that the Fourth Amendment protects against governmental invasions of a
person's reasonable "expectation[s] of privacy," even when those invasions are
not accompanied by physical intrusions. Cases such as Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 -512 (1961), however, hold that, when the
Government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected

area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of


the Fourth Amendment even if the same information could have been obtained
by other means. I do not believe that Katz, or its progeny, have eroded that
principle. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 203-204
(1980).
I am also entirely unconvinced by the Court of Appeals' footnote disposing of the
installation issue with the statement: "we hold that the consent of the owner [of
the chloroform drum] at the time of installation meets the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, even if the consenting owner intends to soon sell the
`bugged' property to an unsuspecting buyer. Caveat emptor." 662 F.2d 515, 517,
n. 2 (1981) (citation omitted). The Government is not here defending against a
claim for damages in an action for breach of a warranty; it is attempting to
justify the legality of a search conducted in the course of a criminal
investigation. I am not at all sure that, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment,
there is a constitutionally significant difference between planting a beeper in an
object in the possession of a criminal suspect and purposefully arranging that he
be sold an object that, unknown to him, already has a beeper installed inside it.
Cf. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305 -306 (1921); Lewis v. United
States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966). [460 U.S. 276, 287]
Respondent claimed at oral argument that, under this Court's cases, he would
not have standing to challenge the original installation of the beeper in the
chloroform drum because the drum was sold, not to him, but to one of his
compatriots. See ante, at 279, n. If respondent is correct, that would only
confirm for me the formalism and confusion in this Court's recent attempts to
redefine Fourth Amendment standing. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
114 (1980) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 156 (1978)
(WHITE, J., dissenting).
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and
JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in the judgment.
The Court's opinion gratuitously refers to the "open fields" doctrine and twice
cites Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Ante, at 282 and 285. For me,
the present case does not concern the open fields doctrine, and I regard these
references and citations as unnecessary for the Court's decision. Furthermore,
and most important, cases concerning the open fields doctrine have been
accepted by the Court for argument and plenary consideration. State v. Brady,
406 So.2d 1093 (Fla.), cert. granted, 456 U.S. 988 (1982); United States v. Oliver,

686 F.2d 356 (CA6 1982), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 1168 (1983). See also United
States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093 (CA5 1982), cert. pending, No. 82-508.
It would be unfortunate to provide either side in these granted cases with
support, directly or by implication, for its position, and I surely do not wish to
decide those cases in this one. Although the Court does not indicate its view on
how such cases should be decided, I would defer all comments about open fields
to a case that concerns that subject and in which we have the benefit of briefs
and oral argument.
I therefore do not join the Court's opinion. I concur only in the result it reaches.
[460 U.S. 276, 288]
JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, and JUSTICE MARSHALL join,
concurring in the judgment.
Since the respondent in this case has never questioned the installation of the
radio transmitter in the chloroform drum, see ante, at 279, n., I agree that it was
entirely reasonable for the police officers to make use of the information
received over the airwaves when they were trying to ascertain the ultimate
destination of the chloroform. I do not join the Court's opinion, however, because
it contains two unnecessarily broad dicta: one distorts the record in this case,
and both may prove confusing to courts that must apply this decision in the
future.
First, the Court implies that the chloroform drum was parading in "open fields"
outside of the cabin, in a manner tantamount to its public display on the
highways. See ante, at 282. The record does not support that implication. As
JUSTICE BLACKMUN points out, this case does not pose any "open fields" issue.
Second, the Court suggests that the Fourth Amendment does not inhibit "the
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them." Ibid. But the
Court held to the contrary in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Although
the augmentation in this case was unobjectionable, it by no means follows that
the use of electronic detection techniques does not implicate especially sensitive
concerns.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment. [460 U.S. 276, 289]

Development and Resources, where Alex and Allan are stockholders. The
corporation built an auto-shop building on Lot 1900-C adjacent to the lot owned
by Bill and Victoria. In April, 2005, Aldo filed a case for injunction and damages
against Bill and Victoria claiming that they were constructing a fence without a
valid permit and the construction would destroy its building. The court denied
the application by Aldo for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its
allegations. To gather evidence against the spouses, Aldo illegally set-up on the
building of Aldo two video surveillance camera facing petitioners party and
through their employees and without the consent of spouses took pictures of
their on-going construction; thus it violates their right to privacy. The spouses
prayed that Alexander and Allan be ordered to remove their video-cameras and
stopped from conducting illegal surveillance.
Answering, Alexander and Allan claimed that they did not install the cameras,
nor ordered their employees to take pictures of the spouses construction; they
also averred that they are mere stockholders of Aldo;
The Regional Trial Court granted the prayer for temporary restraining order and
directed Alexander and Allan to remove their video cameras and install them
elsewhere where the spouses property will no longer be viewed.
Alexander and Allan filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
granted their petition.
Bill and Victoria therefore elevated the case to the Supreme Court:

G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013, SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING,
PETITIONERS, VS. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. AND ALLAN CHOACHUY,
RESPONDENTS.
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained
Bill and Victoria, spouses, filed a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with
prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Alexander and
Allan. According to them, they own the lot adjacent to the lots owned by Aldo

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our laws. It is


defined as the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones person or
from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation
to a persons ordinary sensibilities. It is the right of an individual to be free
from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the
public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned. Simply put,
the right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them
against the States abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right
of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except
in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards, can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.
xxx

Our Code specifically mentions prying into the privacy of anothers residence.
This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy,
because the law covers also similar acts. A business office is entitled to the
same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as
are allowed to enter may come in. x x x[ (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should
not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he
has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase prying into
the privacy of anothers residence, therefore, covers places, locations, or even
situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.
The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code only to residences.
xxx
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the
reasonable expectation of privacy test. This test determines whether a person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been
violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct,
the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is
one that society recognizes as reasonable. Customs, community norms, and
practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individuals reasonable expectation
of privacy. Hence, the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy
must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically
everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these
cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to
pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business office as it would be no
different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or
the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel
respect for [ones] personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and
[non]-interference demands respect.

BANK INQUIRIES
Republic v Judge Eugenio G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008
Sec. 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank
accounts may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial;
namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of
impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and
(4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been
recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to the rule of
absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.[
Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an
application to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez,
Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138,
presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto Marella, Jr. The application
was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the
Deputy Director of the AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the
documentary evidence of the AMLC.[14] Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati
RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the
authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad,
Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed
p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in various bank accounts, details
of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the offense of
violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal
prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations,
Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G Pursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS
proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits, investments and related web
accounts of the four.[16]
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis VillaIgnacio, wrote a letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to
investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved
in the nullified contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to believe that the
bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were
committed a in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the
Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the
investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above

criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the letter of the Special
Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121
Series of 2005,[19] which authorized the executive director of the AMLC to
inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one
maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of
Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the memorandum
attached to the Special Prosecutors letter as extensively justif[ying] the
existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and entities
mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of
Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.

does not entail a full-blown trial. Nevertheless, just because the AMLA
establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that
the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older
law that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature.
Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that
nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.

Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)

Held: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically


legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions
whereby these bank accounts may be examined by any person, government
official, bureau or offial; namely when: (1) upon written permission of the
depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, has been recognized by this Court as constituting an additional exception to
the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar
recognitions as well.

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against


petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing
peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit
and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject of the offense for
violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code,
and Revised Penal Code.

The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11,
the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in
cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable
cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities as
defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4
thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,[certain violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking and other violations
under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the
AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts. It cannot
be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under
Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in one of the exceptions to
the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to
serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such

DAY 4
A GENERALLY

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers,
money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation
proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and
seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially
lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held: Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules,
thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant
did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the
requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers.

Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a


fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if
warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those
taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated
as personality different from that of the corporation.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then
CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, business addresses of the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines,
equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession
and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper,
were seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid
to question the validity of said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate
General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the articles
seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v.
Burgos).
Issue: Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials
may be the basis of the issuance of search warrants.
Held: Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating that no warrant
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the

complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search
warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under PD 885, as amended is a mere conclusion of law and does not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would
justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve
as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with
the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
Facts: On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to
Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect
the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the
package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job
Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an
inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon
opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample
of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents
to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes
opened the suspicious package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case
was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by
the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from
his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.
Issue: Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private
individuals?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas
that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the
state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore


applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who
opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The
mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected
by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the
constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.
People v. Bangcarawan, 384 SCRA 525 (2002)
Facts: The security officer of Super Ferry 5, Mark Diesmo, received a complaint
from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of
her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4) other
members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the
suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was
identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. Bongcarawan was informed of
the complaint and was invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he
was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2)
security agents back to the economy section to get his baggage. The accused
took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested
by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and
small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the
substance to be shabu, the security personnel immediately reported the matter
to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its
contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The
Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized
items. NBI Forensic Chemist later confirmed the substance to be shabu. Accused
was convicted of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act.
Bongcarawan appealed, arguing that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
shabu was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in
violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. Any
evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is
inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends that People v. Marti is not

applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform


the duties of a policeman.
Issue: Whether the drug confiscated is admissible in evidence against accused.
Held: As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti, [i]n the absence of
governmental interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State. The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase
that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and
seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out
without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and
seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one
conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and
tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar
is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In
contrast, police officers are agents of the state tasked with the sovereign
function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them
and other agents of the state that the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures may be invoked.
A violation of ones constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be
the basis for the recovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article
2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code.
U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
Brief Fact Summary. DEA agents met the respondent, Raymond Place, on Friday
at his destination after questionable behavior at his departing airport. They then
proceeded to hold his bags over the weekend and get a search warrant for them
Monday morning.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Seizing a persons luggage for an entire weekend until a
warrant may be obtained violates the Fourth Amendment as beyond the scope of
a valid Terry stop. Also, a sniff by a well-trained narcotics dog that does not
require opening of the luggage is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Facts. The respondent Raymond Place was met on a Friday by drug enforcement
agents on arrival at the airport and he refused to consent to a search of his bags,
leading an agent to tell him that they were going to take the bags to a judge to
get a search warrant. The agents took the bags to another airport to have the
drug detection dogs sniff them, and the dogs reacted positively ninety minutes
after seizure of the bags. The agents kept the bags over the weekend, and on
Monday they were able to get a search warrant for the bags which yielded
cocaine. The trial court convicted the respondent of drug possession, and the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, claiming that such a prolonged seizure
of the respondents baggage amounted to a seizure without probable cause
counter to the Fourth Amendment. The government was granted certiorari.

Issue. Does the seizure of a persons luggage for an entire weekend until a
warrant may be procured violate the Fourth Amendment as exceeding the limits
of a Terry stop?
Is the canine sniff of a narcotics dog a search for Fourth Amendment purposes?
Held. Affirm the decision of the Second Circuit.
When there is reasonable suspicion that a traveler is carrying narcotics in their
luggage, the concepts of Terry allow the officer to detain the luggage temporarily
to investigate the circumstances, as long as the investigative detention is
appropriately limited in scope. However, the actions here went beyond the scope
allowable under Terry since the luggage was held for three days, thus it is in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The agents failure to tell the respondent where the bags were being transported
to, how long they may be gone, and how they would be returned if no suspicion
of criminal activity remained, made the unreasonableness of their actions under
the Fourth Amendment even more clear.

A drug-sniffing dogs actions are not invasive enough of privacy to constitute a


search under the Fourth Amendment.

Concurrence. Justice William Brennan stated that the Fourth Amendment was
violated as soon as the respondents luggage was seized by the officers.
Justice Harry Blackmun expressed the view that the validity of a drug dog sniff
under the Fourth Amendment should not even have been opined upon under
these facts.
Discussion. This opinion clarifies why courts and law enforcement have such
fondness for drug sniffing dogs. The Supreme Court here articulates that
governmental conduct like drug dog sniffing that can reveal whether a substance
is contraband yet no other private fact compromises no privacy interest, and
therefore is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. This appears to be
settled law, even though Justice Blackmun would argue that it is merely dictum,
and that the majority should not have passed an opinion on their validity under
these facts.
B PROCEDURE FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT
Pendon v. CA, 191 SCRA 429 (1990)
Facts: Based on the application and joint deposition, a search warrant was issued
against Siao and the same complaint was filed against petitioner for violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner contends that the application for the search
warrant and the joint deposition of witnesses failed to fulfill the requirements
prescribed by the Constitution on the ground that probable cause was not
personally determined.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the said warrant is valid.
Held: No, Probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
before the issuance of a search warrant.
Silva v. Hon. Presiding Judge of RTC Negros Oriental, 203 SCRA 140
(1991)
Facts:

M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, as chief of the PC NARCOM Detachment in


Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental filed an application for the search warrant with
the RTC against petitioners. The application was accompanied by deposition of
witness executed by Arthur Alcoran and Pat. Leon Quindo.
Judge Hickarter Ontal, Presiding judge issued search warrant no. 1
directing the aforesaid police officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the
residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of the dangerous drugs law.. under the
search warrant its state that :seize and take possession of the following property
marijuana, dried leaves, cigarettes, joint and bring said property to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
In the course of the search, the serving officer also seized money
belonging to Antoinette Silva in the amount of 1231.40. Antoinette filed a motion
the return of the said amount. Acting on said motion Judge Ontal issued an order
stating that the court holds in abeyance the disposition of the said amount
pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court provides for the requisite for the issuance oa a search warrant.
Section 3 a search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the Judge
after eamination under oath
People v. Mamaril, 420 SCRA 662 (2004)
FACTS:
On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 oclock in the evening, SPO4 Alexis Gotidoc, along
with the members of Intel Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station and Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), implemented Search Warrant No. 144C dated
18 March 2003 issued by Judge Alipio Yumul of Branch 66, Regional Trial Court,
Capas, Tarlac against the appellant in her residence at Zone 1, Barangay
Maliwalo, Tarlac City, Province of Tarlac.
Prior to the search, the police team invited Barangay Kagawad Oscar Tabamo of
Barangay Maliwalo to witness the conduct of the search and seizure operation in
the appellants house. With Barangay Kagawad Tabamo, the police team

presented the search warrant to appellant and informed her of the purpose of
the search and her constitutional rights.
Afterwards, SPO4 Gotidoc, the designated searcher, started searching the
appellants house, in the presence of the appellant and Kagawad Tabamo. During
his search, he found on the top cover of the refrigerator one (1) plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance. Thereafter he prepared a Certificate of
Good Search and Confiscation Receipt which the appellant refused to sign.
The plastic sachet was brought to the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory located
at Tarlac Provincial Hospital for qualitative examination.
The examination
conducted by Engr. Marcene G. Agala, the Forensic Chemist who tested the white
crystalline substance, yielded positive results for 0.055 gram of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
The factual version presented by the defense is:
On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 o clock in the evening the police officers arrived at
appellants house and showed her a search warrant. Thereafter, the policemen
searched her house but found nothing. Then a certain Police Officer Pangilinan
asked her where she was sleeping. When she replied that she was inside the hut,
the police officers proceeded to and searched the place and found the plastic
sachet containing the shabu.
Thereafter, she was brought to the sub-station at Maliwalo and was told,
particularly by SPO4 Gotidoc and a certain Maam Dulay that in exchange of
P20,000.00, no case would be filed against her. When she told them that she did
not have money, she was detained. However, on cross-examination, the
appellant admitted that the alleged extortion of P20,000.00 was not reported to
the higher ranking police officers.
Appellant claims that the police officers framed her up and planted the shabu
inside her house because of her refusal to give them money.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is innocent of violating Section 11, Article
II, of RA 9165.

RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence for the prosecution fully proved
beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a
case for illegal possession of a regulated drug, namely, (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated
drug, (b) such possession is not authorized by law and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed said drug.
Centered on the conduct of the search of appellants house that yielded the
prohibited substance, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the finding
that after a careful evaluation and analysis of the arguments presented by the
prosecution and the defense, we hold that the search conducted by the INTEL
Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station, in coordination with the PDEA, on the
residence of the accused-appellant on 25 March 2003 at Zone 1, Barangay
Maliwalo, Tarlac City and the seizure therein of one (1) plastic pack of white
crystalline substance of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing
0.055 gram are legal.
As a consequence of the legal search, the said
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu seized on the occasion thereof, is
admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant.
The accused-appellant, through her new counsel from the Public Attorneys
Office, goes further back, presenting new arguments, that (1) the search warrant
was not based on probable cause, hence, the evidence allegedly obtained
through it may not be admitted to support the accused-appellants conviction
and (2) the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by
public officers cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence.
The original position of the accused which, in this petition, begins with the
contention of non-compliance with all the requisites of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. We agree with the rulings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that there was indeed full satisfaction of the requisites for the conviction
of the accused.
The trial court found that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not
adequately defeated. Re-stating that in illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
there are only three (3) elements to secure conviction: (1) accused is in
possession of the prohibited drugs; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) accused consciously and freely possessed the prohibited drugs, the trial
court held that all these were established beyond doubt. It determined that

appellant failed to proffer evidence enough to discredit the prosecution and


render doubtful his guilt.
The argument is without merit.
In the case at hand, the so-called frame-up was virtually pure allegation bereft of
credible proof. The narration of the police officer who implemented the search
warrant, was found after trial and appellate review as the true story. It is on
firmer ground than the self-serving statement of the accused-appellant of frameup.The defense cannot solely rely upon the constitutional presumption of
innocence for, while it is constitutional, the presumption is not conclusive.
Notably, the accused-appellant herself stated in her brief that no proof was
proffered by the accused-appellant of the police officers alleged ill motive.
Malaloan v CA, 232 SCRA 249 (1994)

FACTS:
Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City an
application for search warrant. The search warrant wassought for in connection
with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions). Firearms, explosive materialsand subversive documents were
seized and taken during the search. Petitioners presented a Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of SearchWarrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally
Acquired Evidence. However, the court denied the quashal of the search warrant
and the validityof which warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines which provides that search warrants can be served
notonly within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the
judicial region of the issuing court.
ISSUE:
W/N a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in
connection with an offense committed outside its territorialboundary and,
thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the court's
supposed territorial jurisdiction
HELD:
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process.

A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction asan order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him tosearch for personal property and bring it before the
court.
5

A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery.


It isa special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary
because of a public necessity.A judicial process is defined as a writ,
warrant , subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is clear,
therefore, that a searchwarrant is merely a judicial process designed by the
Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been
instituted, orin anticipation thereof. Since a search warrant is a judicial process,
not a criminal action, no legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expresslyor
impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability.
Moreover, in our jurisdiction, no period is provided for theenforceability of
warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the warrant
of arrest for execution a return thereon mustbe made to the issuing judge,said
warrant does not become
functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or
recalled. The following are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of
jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court and the
searchwarrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property
intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case:1. The court wherein the
criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants
necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search
warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling
circumstances that theapplicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court
which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the
validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with
primary jurisdiction thereover.2. When the latter court issues the search warrant,
a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court,
withoutprejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the
party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds andobjections

then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent


proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwisethey shall be deemed
waived.3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved
by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court wherethe
criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property
seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein forsaid purpose. Since
two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a
motion to quash a search warrant and amotion to suppress evidence are
alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a
motion to quash shallconsequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule,
provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during
theproceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of
the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion tosuppress
shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.4.
Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the
same and is not otherwise prevented from furtherproceeding thereon, all
personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it
to the court wherein the criminal case ispending, with the necessary safeguards
and documentation therefore.

5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense
is charged in different informations or complaints and filed intwo or more courts
with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of
which court will try the case shall have beenresolved, such court shall be
considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search
warrants incident to the criminalcase.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED
Groh v Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004)
CASE SYNOPSIS
Petitioner federal agent sought a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the decision that a search of
respondent individuals' home was unconstitutional and that the federal agent
was not entitled to qualified immunity. Certiorari was granted to address the
constitutionality of the search and the availability of qualified immunity.

ISSUE
The issues were whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and if so,
whether the federal agent was entitled to qualified immunity, given that a
magistrate, relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in
question, found probable cause to conduct the search.

DISCUSSION

The warrant was plainly invalid as it provided no description of the type of


evidence sought.
The fact that the application adequately described the things to be seized did
not save the warrant from its facial invalidity because the warrant did not
incorporate other documents by reference and neither the affidavit nor the
application accompanied the warrant.
The magistrate's authorization of the search did not render it constitutional
because the warrant's obvious deficiency required the court to consider the
search warrantless and presumptively unreasonable.
The federal agent was not entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable
officer could have believed that a warrant that plainly did not comply with the
Fourth Amendment's particularity requirements was valid nor been unaware of
the basic rule that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search was
presumptively unconstitutional.
The judgment was affirmed.

issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring to the
described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On February 4,
1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized
a number of firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and
the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash before the
trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion
to Quash and a Motion to SuppressEvidence. On March 23, 1995, the RTC
issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners motions. On August 3,
1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid
HELD: The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined
by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the
witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In
the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed
to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero
Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to
possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described
with particularity.
People v. Dichoso, 223 SCRA 174 (1993)
(Constitutional Law Search and Seizure, Search Warrant, General Warrant,
Inadmissible Evidence)

Paper Industries Corp. v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 687 (1984)


FACTS: On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied
for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the
management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
compound, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or
intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept]
and conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search Warrant should be

Facts: A search warrant of marijuana and shabu in appellants residence was


issued after probable cause was personally determined by the judge after
examination of the applicant. Appellant contends that the search warrant is a
general warrant which does not satisfy the particular offense which he violated,
and the search conducted was unconstitutional and the items obtained
inadmissible.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible.

Held: No. The search warrant cannot be assailed as a general warrant, it


particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized and specifies
the offense involved. Items seized are admissible.
People v. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683 (2001)
FACTS:

A search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the police operatives
started searching the house. They found heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white
crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant
refused to sign it. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of
Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal
Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed, and after hearing,
the trial court convicted him in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for
violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively.

The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against


inadmissible because the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.

him

was

ISSUES:

Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana may be included as
evidence in light of the plain view doctrine.

HELD:

Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and
drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the
existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was
no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void.
This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the
police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If
at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu
from Salanguits residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such
warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge
under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of
the plain view doctrine, the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana
was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of
the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguits person or in an area
within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the
search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as
attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court
affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only.

Kho v. Macalintal, 307 SCRA 70 (1999)


Facts: Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent NBI from using the objects
seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed against
them and to return immediately the said items, including the firearms,
ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets,
transceivers, two units of vehicles and motorcycle.

Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the
absence of any probable cause therefor. They contend that the surveillance and
investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to the
application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest
in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or
indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).

Issue: Whether petitioners contention of the absence of probable cause in the


given situation is tenable.

Held: Petitioners contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents
who conducted the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocably that
they saw guns being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and
motor vehicles and spare parts were stored therein. In fact, applicant Max B.
Salvador declared that he personally attended the surveillance together with his
witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 2-3), and the said witnesses personally saw
the weapons being unloaded from motor vehicles and carried to the premises
referred to. NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified that he actually saw the firearms
being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and brought to the aformentioned
house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there inside the compound
posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is therefore
decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was
based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.

In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the
question of whether or not a probable cause exists is one which must be
determined in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations. In Luna v.
Plaza (26 SCRA 310), it held that the existence of a probable cause depends to a
large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required
examination of the applicants and the witnesses.

After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and
conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge after examining the applicants
and witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to assess their
testimonies and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
enough to create a probable cause.
The Judge was the one who personally
examined the applicants and witnesses and who asked searching questions visa-vis the applications for search warrants. He was thus able to observe and
determine whether subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate
accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the premises to
be searched. In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was

recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so


conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability
and correctness of his findings and impressions.

Worldwide Web Corporation v. People, 713 SCRA 18 (2014)

C WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
MOVING VEHICLES
Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925)
Facts of the case
Police arrested Leon Carroll and Daniel Stewart on warrants for violating local
lottery laws and conspiring to run a lottery. Each filed a pre-trial motion to
suppress evidence found at the time of arrest. The district court granted the
motions, citing a lack of probable cause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that the order for suppression of
evidence was appealable.
Question: Was the order for suppression of evidence appealable?
No. In a unanimous decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority
opinion, reversing the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that the United
States had no right to appeal the suppression order. The order was sufficiently
separate from the criminal trial to be final and not appealable under statutes
relating to criminal cases.
People v. Que, 265 SCRA 721 (1996)
(Constitutional Law Publication of Bank Circulars and Regulations)

FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.


dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central
Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign
exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the
claim that the said circular had no force or effect because the same was not
published in the official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said

appellant. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and
2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued
for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to
have force and effect.
HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central
Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before
becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
Caballes v. CA, 373 SCRA 221 (2002)
Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de
Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna,
spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting
that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged
down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taio. When asked
what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and
nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they
discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires
exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor
wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where
the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a town
approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the
vehicle with the highvoltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station.
Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which
were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna.
Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged
with the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During the
arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued.
On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment,
finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a
resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes' motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15
September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari. Issue: Whether
Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter "will

look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive" be


considered as waiver on Caballes part on warrantless search and seizure.
Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be
secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and
seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule
under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain
exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving
vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases
where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events
where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the
latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched
and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search
and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search
warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants
if made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause.
Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or visual
inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the
kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable
wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes'
vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol
became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with
kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The fact
that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to
be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would
justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police
authorities do not claim to have received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which

could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is


replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in
the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the
two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to
conduct the search leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was
flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the
contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those
words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for
permission that they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents
and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will
search his vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In
addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will
be noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for
the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was
established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive submission
be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless search. Casting
aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be established
without violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable
search and seizure.

Police took the footlocker to the FBI building and it was under their exclusive
control when they searched it without a warrant

U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)

COMMENTS:

ISSUE: Is a warrantless search of a footlocker that the police have PC to believe


contains the F&I of crime valid under the 4th Amdt. if it has been seized by
police and under their exclusive control?
HOLDING: No, the footlocker is protected by the 4th Amdt. Warrant Clause, so it
may only be searched with a warrant or under exigent circumstances.
FACTS: Train officials saw D load a 200-lb. footlocker leaking talcum powder into
a train heading for Boston
Police alerted officials in Boston who released their canine to sniff the trunk upon
arriving, and the dog alerted the presence of drugs
Police arrested D and her companions when they loaded the footlocker into a car
to leave

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
Indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
REASONING:
Footlocker protected by 4th Amdt.: By placing the lock on the footlocker, D
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy for the contents inside, and the
4th Amdt. Warrant Clause protects that expectation
Exception if officers believe there are explosives inside
Vehicle exception doesn't apply: Just because the footlocker is mobile does not
mean that it falls under the vehicle exception because luggage is intended as a
repository for personal effects
Footlocker here was securely in police custody, so there was no risk of losing its
contents
Not incident to arrest: Warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized
at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to arrest if the search is
remote in time or place from the arrest
No danger that the arrestee might gain access to it

Take caution in how you use this case. I believe the major reason why this case
graces a criminal procedure casebook is because is shows that not all "inherently
mobile" objects will be relegated to the broad Vehicle Doctrine. A one-line
summary for this case would be, "A footlocker is not a vehicle, so don't apply the
Vehicle Doctrine."
People v. Mariacos, 621 SCRA 327 (2010)
FACTS: October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of
marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for
the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent
described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said

jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana


wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the owner
of the bag, but no one know.

Appellants alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack
of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the
crime charge is malum prohibitum

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with
other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack
from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag
and 3 other bags were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught
up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that
they were under arrest, but on the women got away.

PLAIN VIEW

DOCTRINES: ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION


PROVIDES: The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (6th Cir., 1978)


CASE SYNOPSIS
Defendant was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland on
five counts of mail fraud and three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C.S. 1341,
1343, relating to her receipt of insurance proceeds following the deaths of her
second husband and a former paramour. She was sentenced to, inter alia, 40
years' imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and restitution of $
170,000. She appealed her conviction and sentence.

Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)

CASE FACTS: The indictment alleged that defendant "intentionally caused the
deaths" of both her husband and the paramour and then fraudulently concealed
her role in their murders from insurance companies.

This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought.

DISCUSSION: The court first concluded, as to all counts, that the evidence
supported the jury's finding that she intended to deprive the insurance
companies of their "money" and "property" by means of a fraudulent scheme.

This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid only as long as officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will
find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched.

Second, it determined that the evidence was sufficient to prove that she
intended to defraud an insurer and thus sufficient to support her conviction on
Counts One through Four.

MALUM PROHIBITUM: When an accused is charged with illegal possession or


transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial.
Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.

Third, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the
Government to reopen its case-in-chief for the limited purpose of presenting
testimony from a witness establishing that he mailed the pleadings specified in
Counts Seven and Eight.
Fourth, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain
testimony.
Next, the court determined that her sentence was increased based upon a
factual finding that the jury was not required to make.
It concluded that the district court committed an error that was plain and that
affected defendant's substantial rights.

CONCLUSION: The court affirmed defendant's conviction for mail fraud and wire
fraud. It vacated the sentence, however, and remanded for resentencing in
accordance with Booker.
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987)
Brief Fact Summary. When investigating a shooting in an apartment, a police
officer moved certain stereo equipment, which was very fancy and looked out of
place, and learned that it had been taken during an armed robbery.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Only when a police officer had probable cause, not
reasonable suspicion, could they invoke the plain view doctrine.
Facts. A bullet was fired through the floor of the Respondents apartment, hitting
an individual in the apartment below. In response to the shooting, the police
entered the Respondents apartment and found three weapons and a stokingcap mask. One of the officers who entered the Respondents apartment noticed
expensive stereo equipment that looked out of place and he moved the
components to check their serial numbers. After phoning the police station, the
officer learned that the equipment was taken during a recent armed robbery. The
officer seized some of the equipment immediately and obtained a warrant to
seize the rest of it, which was determined to have been taken during the same
armed robbery.
The Respondent was indicted for robbery. The state trial court granted the
Respondents motion to suppress, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed, the
Arizona Supreme Court refused to review, and the state filed a petition to the
Supreme Court.
Issue. Did the officers conduct constitute a seizure?
Did the officers conduct constitute a search?
Can the plain view doctrine be invoked when the police have less than
probable cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or is
contraband? Was the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment?
Held. No. The majority first observed the mere recording of the serial numbers
did not constitute a seizure.
Yes. The court observed that the officers moving of the equipment did
constitute a search separate and apart from the search for the shooter,
victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry into the

apartment. The officers actions were unrelated to the objectives of the


authorized intrusion, [and] exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment
or its contents, did produce a new invasion of respondents privacy unjustified by
the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.
No. The majority first observed that the general rule dictates that pursuant to
[Coolidge] under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain
view without a warrant. These occasions occur [w]here the initial intrusion that
brings the police within plain view of such [evidence] is supported . . . by one of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The majority then held
that only when a police officer had probable cause, not reasonable suspicion,
could they invoke the plain view doctrine.
In support of this conclusion, the court reasoned that [d]ispensing with the need
for a warrant is worlds apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the
seizure than a warrant would require, i. e., the standard of probable cause. No
reason is apparent why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser grounds,
during an unrelated search and seizure, than would have been needed to obtain
a warrant for that same object if it had been known to be on the premises.

Dissent. Justice Powell, the Chief Justice and Justice Sandra Day OConnor drafted
a dissenting opinion pointing out how the court holds for the first time that the
requirement of probable cause operates as a separate limitation on the
application of the plain-view doctrine. The [dissent observes how the majority]
holds that merely looking at an object in plain view is lawful, but moving or
disturbing the object to investigate a reasonable suspicion is not. In other
words, this distinction between looking at a suspicious object in plain view and
moving it even a few inches trivializes the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Sandra Day OConnor, the Chief Justice and Justice Powell filed a
dissenting opinion arguing that the majority was addressing the wrong question
and the correct questions was whether police must have probable cause before
conducting a cursory inspection of an item in plain view. In answering this
question, the dissenting justices would have found that such an inspection is
reasonable if the police are aware of facts or circumstances that justify a
reasonable suspicion that the item is evidence of a crime.
Discussion. It is interesting to recognize how the different opinions treat the
movement of an individuals property a few inches.

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)


Brief Fact Summary. A police officer initiated a warranted search of a robbery
suspects home. The warrant specified only the proceeds of the robbery, and not
the weapons, even though a description of the weapons was available.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Inadvertence is not a necessary


view seizures. As long as a police officer . . . had a prior
intrusion in the course of which he came . . .across a
incriminating the accused and so long as the scope of
enlarged in the slightest, it is constitutional.

condition to plain
justification for an
piece of evidence
the search is not

Facts. A police sergeant investigating a robbery had a warrant to search


petitioner Hor-tons home. The warrant issued specified a search for the
proceeds of the robbery, spe-cifically, three rings. However, while weapons had
been described in the police report, the warrant did not include them. The
sergeant entered the petitioners home. He did not find the three rings, but he
did find weapons in plain view and seized them.
Issue. [W]hether the warrantless seizure of evidence of crime in plain view is
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment if the discovery of the evidence was not
inadvertent.
Held. No. The court first described the plain view doctrine as an exception to
the general rule that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but
that the doctrine implicates a seizure of an article as an invasion of privacy. A
search is not implicated, as the article is already in plain view. Quoting from
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the court affirmed the basic doctrine that the police
officer . . . had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.
However, the court took issue two limitations: that plain view alone is never
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence, and that the discovery of
evidence in plain view must be inadvertent. The court dismissed the underlying
concern that the doctrine might be used to turn an initially valid . . . limited . . .
search into a general one on two grounds. First, it seems unlikely that the police
officer woul

d deliberately omit a particular description of the item to be seized from the


application of a valid search warrant simply to create a plain view exception.
This was important to the present case because the weapons had been left off of
the warrant. Second, if the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the
terms of a . . . warrant, then the . . . seizure is unconstitutional without more.
Dissent. The dissent argued that the inadvertent discovery requirement . . .
does protect possessory interests.
Discussion. Reliance on privacy concerns . . . is misplaced when the inquiry
concerns the scope of an exception that merely authorizes an officer a lawful
right of access to an item to seize it without a warrant.
People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in
selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by
NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa.
The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and gave the description of
Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.

The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he
successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the
NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his
position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and
asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa
the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani
two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected
it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the
latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the
living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped
away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane
colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa
about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found
dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is
unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be
admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the
plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view of the
object.

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police. They
arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for
other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana
inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the plain view of said
object.

Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally
and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the
Constitution.
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668 (1999)
FACTS: Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one
Jun [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and
arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not
find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the
house of his associate Neneth [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her
house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. Jun
identified her as Neneth, and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked
money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the house].
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table.
One of the box s flaps was open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic,
and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by Jun. His
suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the box. He peeked

inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth and they arrested her.
The bricks were examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA
6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21
[Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
ISSUE AND HOLDING: WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in
plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. NO
RATIO
Re: warrantless arrest
Gaddao s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the
basis of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his
associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked
bills. This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with
Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the person who effected the
warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her
person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana
cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
Plain view issue
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be
introduced in evidence.
Requisites
The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for
an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area
The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure

An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object
seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and
therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. If the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents
of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said
contents. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed
the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the
buy-bust marijuana. Each of the ten bricks of marijuana in the box was
individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags white,
pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that
the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know
exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its
contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of
the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its seizure without the
requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was
fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered
by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao
s house Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime
charged.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the
submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the
seller and the presentation of the drug as evidence in court.
Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he
received, Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the
poseur-buyer
Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria
in the sale of said drug
DORIA SENTENCED TO SUFFER RECLUSION PERPETUA + 500K FINE
GADDAO ACQUITTED

Valeroso v. CA, 598 SCRA 41 (2009)


FACTS: On July 10, 1996, SPO2 Antonio Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation
Section Division, Central Police District Command received a dispatch order
which directed him and three (3) other personnel to serve a warrant of arrest
against petitioner in a case for kidnapping with ransom. After briefing, team
conducted necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his hideouts in Cavite,
Caloocan and Bulacan. Then, the team proceeded to the Integrated National
Police Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was
about to board a tricycle. SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner.
They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily
searched him. Found tucked in his waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial
Number 52315 with five (5) live ammunition.

Petitioner was brought to the police station for questioning. A verification of the
subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed
that it was not issued to the petitioner but to another person. Petitioner was then
charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under PD No. 1866 as
amended.

On May 6, 1998 trial court found petitionerguilty as charged and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum plus fine. Petitioner
moved to reconsider but his motion was denied. He appealed to the CA. On May
4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed the RTC disposition.

SC affirmed CAs decision.


ISSUE: (1) Whether or not retroactive application of the law is valid taken into
account that the commission of the offense was on July 10, 1996 wherein the
governing law was PD 1866 which provides the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
HELD: (1)
YES. RA 8294 amended PD 1866 on July 6, 1997, during the
pendency of the case with the trial court. The law looks forward, never backward
(prospectivity).Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective, not
retroactive, effect. However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a

habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.(Exception and exception to


the exception on effectivity of laws).
Miclat, Jr. v. People, 656 SCRA 539 (2011)
Facts: Police operatives including PDEA conducted a surveillance of drug
trafficking in Palmera SpringII, Bagumbong, Caloocan City. The informant of the
police directed them to the residence of a certainABE PO3 Antonio then
positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the
membersof the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the
curtain-covered window, PO3Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of
1 meters, he saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which
he believed to be containing shabu. At the same instance they arrested the
petitioner. However, the version of the petitioner is that, together with her father
and sister whilewatching television the police operatives barrage themselves
into their house and that the shabu was later planted to the petitioner while
travelling to the police station.The trial court rendered the decision finding the
petitioner guilty of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. The CA
subsequently affirmed the trial court decision. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED WINDOW IS
WITHINTHE MEANING OF PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE FOR A WARRANTLESS
SEIZURE TO BELAWFUL.WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY
APPRAISED (SIC) OF HISCONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF THE
CAUSE AND NATURE OF HIS ARRESTAND RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL
DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST ANDCONTINUED DETENTION.WHETHER OR
NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC SACHETSCONSTITUTE AS A CRIME
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF THERULES OF
COURT.Supreme Court ruled that at the time of petitioners arraignment, there
was no objection raised asto the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the trialcourt. In effect, he is deemed to
have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submittedhimself
to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an
accused is notsufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial freefrom error. It will not even negate the validity
of the conviction of the accused.While it is true that Sec. 2 of the bill of rights
preserves the rights of individuals of illegal searchand seizure. However, a
settled exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of
an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a
previously issued warrant.Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and

valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the RevisedRules on Criminal Procedure, to
wit: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful . a peace office of a private
person may,
without awarrant , arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed,
is actually committing , or isattempting to commit an offense;For the exception
in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements
must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, isactually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following
elements must beestablished: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an
object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely andconsciously aware of being
in possession of the drug.Supreme Court ruled there is no compelling reason to
reverse the findings of fact of the trial court. Noevidence exist that shows any
apparent inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses of
theevents which transpired and led to the arrest of petitioner. After a careful
evaluation of the records, Wefind no error was committed by the RTC and the CA
to disregard their factual findings that petitioner committed the crime charged
against him
WAIVER OR CONSENTED SEARCHES

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)


Brief Fact Summary. Police stopped a vehicle containing the respondent, Robert
Bustamonte (the respondent), and they asked to search the vehicle. Another
passenger in the car gave permission, and the search produced stolen checks
that were entered into evidence against the Respondent.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. To determine whether a search was voluntary does not
require that a person knew of his rights, but whether the totality of
circumstances indicated that the person was voluntarily allowing the search.

Facts. The police stopped the vehicle containing the respondent and five other
passengers after they noticed a broken headlight and license plate light. When
the driver could not produce a license, the police asked for someone who could
produce identification. Another passenger responded, and when the police asked
him if they could search the vehicle he consented. Three stolen checks were
found, and they were used as evidence to convict the respondent.

Issue. The issue is whether the respondent voluntarily consented to the search of
the vehicle.
Held. The consent to a vehicle search did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution (Constitution). The test to
determine if a subject has voluntarily consented is to review the totality of the
circumstances. If the subject knows he or she has a right to refuse, it is a factor
to be considered, but that fact is not the sole consideration.

Dissent. Justice Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall) dissented, reasoning that


unless the respondent knew he had a right to refuse a search, there was no
voluntary consent.
Discussion. The test to determine if consent was not the product of duress or
coercion is to look at all the circumstances rather than one sole factor.
U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)
Brief Fact Summary. The home that a robbery suspect was leasing was searched
by the police after obtaining the consent to enter the home from somebody who
lived with the suspect.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Voluntary consent was not present because the state
did not show actual authority to consent to the search.
Facts. The Respondent, Matlock (the Respondent), was arrested for robbing a
federally insured bank. The Respondent filed a motion to suppress evidence
seized at a home in which he was living. The Respondent leased the home from
the Graff family. The Respondent lived in the home with various other people.
Three police officers went to the Respondents home and were allowed into the
home by Ms. Graff who also lived there. The police were admitted to enter the
home. The officers told Ms. Graff that they were looking for money and a gun

and asked if they could search the home. The trial court found at the suppression
hearing that there was consent to search the home although Ms. Graff denied
consenting. The officers found money in a bag in the closet of the Respondents
bedroom who he shared with the individual that answered the door.
The District Court found that the seized evidence was admissible. The Court of
Appeals affirmed.

Issue. [W]hether the evidence presented by the United States with respect to
the voluntary consent of a third party to search the living quarters of the
respondent was legally sufficient to render the seized materials admissible in
evidence at the respondents criminal trial[?]
Held. The court first observed that recent decisions clearly indicate that the
consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is
valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom that authority is
shared.
It appears to us, given the admissibility of Mrs. Graffs and respondents out-ofcourt statements, that the Government sustained its burden of proving by the
preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Graffs voluntary consent to search the
east bedroom was legally sufficient to warrant admitting into evidence the
$4,995 found in the diaper bag.
Discussion. This case elaborates on the Supreme Courts consent to search
doctrine.

Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)


Brief Fact Summary. An individual was accused of rape and one piece of
evidence used to accuse him was a .22-caliber rifle found in his grandmothers
home.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot


later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was
invalid.

Facts. The petitioner lived with his grandmother, a 66-year-old negro widow, in a
rural area. Two days after an alleged rape, four white police officers went to the
widows house and her that they had a search warrant to search her house. She
told them they could conduct their search and they found a .22 caliber rifle gun
eventually introduced into evidence.
During a suppression hearing, the four officers testified that they relied not on
the search warrant, but on the widows consent to conduct their search. The
widow testified that she believed the officers had a valid search and that she did
not know her grandson was being accused of anything when the search was
conducted. The trial court found that the widow consented to the search.

Issue. [W]hether a search can be justified as lawful on the basis of consent


when that consent has been given only after the official conducting the search
has asserted that he possesses a warrant?
Held. No, there can be no consent under such circumstances.
When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a
search, he has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and
voluntarily given. This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than
acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority. A search conducted in reliance upon
a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the
warrant was invalid. The result can be no different when it turns out that the
State does not even attempt to rely upon the validity of the warrant, or fails to
show that there was, in fact, any warrant at all.
When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a
warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the
search. The situation is instinct with coercion albeit colorably lawful coercion.
Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.
Discussion. It is interesting to recognize that the court in a footnote observed
Mrs. Leath owned both the house and the rifle. The petitioner concedes that her
voluntary consent to the search would have been binding upon him. Conversely,
there can be no question of the petitioners standing to challenge the lawfulness
of the search. He was the one against whom the search was directed, and the
house searched was his home. The rifle was used by all members of the
household and was found in the common part of the house.

STOP AND FRISK


Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the Petitioner), was stopped
and searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly
casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for
questioning and decided to search him first.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for weapons without a
warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that
the person may be armed and dangerous.
Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a
street corner while repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The men
would periodically peer into a store window and then talk some more. The men
also spoke to a third man whom they eventually followed up the street. The
officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were casing a store for a
potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and
given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of
the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a
concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed
weapon.
Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution (Constitution)?
Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that it is a
reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search
for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A
typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from
searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.
Dissent. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) dissented, reasoning that the
majoritys holding would grant powers to officers to authorize a search and
seizure that even a magistrate would not possess.
Concurrence.
Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized an
additional necessity of the reasonableness of the stop to investigate the crime.

Justice Byron White (J. White) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized
that the particular facts of the case, that there was suspicion of a violent act,
merit the forcible stop and frisk.

Held. The majority first discussed the parameters of [Terry] and observed [i]f
the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect
is armed, it is no longer valid under [Terry] and its fruits will be suppressed.

Discussion. The facts of the case are important to understand the Supreme
Courts willingness to allow the search. The suspicious activity was a violent
crime, armed robbery, and if the officers suspicions were correct then he would
be in a dangerous position to approach the men for questioning without
searching them. The officer also did not detain the men for a long period of time
to constitute an arrest without probable cause.

An officer may seize non-threatening contraband detected during a protective


patdown search of the sort permitted by [Terry], if they stay within the bounds of
[Terry].

Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993)


Brief Fact Summary. A police officer patted down a suspect and discovered a
small amount of crack cocaine in his jacket.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspects outer
clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity
immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspects privacy
beyond that already authorized by the officers search for weapons; if the object
is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical
considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.
The Respondent moved to suppress the cocaine, but the trial court concluded
the officers undertook a justifiable [Terry] stop when they stopped the
Respondent. Also, that the officers were justified in patting down the Respondent
to check if he was armed. Finally, pursuant to the plain-view doctrine, the
seizure of the contraband did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Minnesota
Court of Appeals reversed. The court disagreed that the officers were allowed to
seize the cocaine. The court would not adopt the plain feel exception. The
Minnesota State Supreme Court affirmed and like the Court of Appeals found the
seizure to be unconstitutional. Also like the Court of Appeals, the court refused to
extend the plain-view doctrine to encompass a sense of touch. Further, that
the pat search went beyond what was permissible under [Terry].

Issue. [W]hether the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of contraband


detected through a police officers sense of touch during a protective patdown
search[?]

The rationale of the plain-view doctrine is that, if contraband is left in open view
and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage point, there has been
no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy, and thus no search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment or at least no search independent of
the initial intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point. The warrantless
seizure of contraband that presents itself in this manner is deemed justified by
the realization that resort to a neutral magistrate under such circumstances
would often be impracticable, and would do little to promote the objectives of
the Fourth Amendment. The same can be said of tactile discoveries of
contraband. If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspects outer clothing and
feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent,
there has been no invasion of the suspects privacy beyond that already
authorized by the officers search for weapons; if the
object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same
practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.
In rejecting the Minnesota Supreme Courts holding, the majority observed
[f]irst, [Terry] itself demonstrates that the sense of touch is capable of revealing
the nature of an object with sufficient reliability to support a seizure. The very
premise of [Terry], after all, is that officers will be able to detect the presence of
weapons through the sense of touch, and Terry upheld precisely such a seizure.
Even if it were true that the sense of touch is generally less reliable than the
sense of sight, that only suggests that officers will less often be able to justify
seizures of unseen contraband. Regardless of whether the officer detects the
contraband by sight or by touch, however, the Fourth Amendments requirement
that the officer have probable cause to believe that the item is contraband
before seizing it ensures against excessively speculative seizures. The courts
second concern that touch is more intrusive into privacy than is sight is
inapposite in light of the fact th
at the intrusion the court fears has already been authorized by the lawful search
for weapons. The seizure of an item whose identity is already known occasions

no further invasion of privacy. Accordingly, the suspects privacy interests are


not advanced by a categorical rule barring the seizure of contraband plainly
detected through the sense of touch.
[T]he dispositive question before this Court is whether the officer who
conducted the search was acting within the lawful bounds marked by [Terry] at
the time he gained probable cause to believe that the lump in respondents
jacket was contraband. Under the State Supreme Courts interpretation of the
record before it, it is clear that the court was correct in holding that the police
officer in this case overstepped the bounds of the strictly circumscribed search
for weapons allowed under Terry. Further, [w]here, as here, an officer who is
executing a valid search for one item seizes a different item, this Court rightly
has been sensitive to the danger . . . that officers will enlarge a specific
authorization, furnished by a warrant or an exigency, into the equivalent of a
general warrant to rummage and seize at will. Here, the officers continued
exploration of respondents pocket after having concluded that it contained no
weapon was unrelated to [t]he sole justifica
tion of the search [under Terry:] . . . the protection of the police officer and others
nearby. It therefore amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry
expressly refused to authorize, and that we have condemned in subsequent
cases.
Although the officer was lawfully in a position to feel the lump in respondents
pocket, because [Terry] entitled him to place his hands upon respondents jacket,
the court below determined that the incriminating character of the object was
not immediately apparent to him. Rather, the officer determined that the item
was contraband only after conducting a further search, one not authorized by
[Terry] or by any other exception to the warrant requirement. Because this
further search of respondents pocket was constitutionally invalid, the seizure of
the cocaine that followed is likewise unconstitutional.

SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST


Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)
People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 (1999)
Cadua v. CA, 312 SCRA 703 (1999)
Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402 (1997)
People v. Martinez, 637 SCRA 791 (2010)
Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998)
People v. Delos Reyes, 656 SCRA 417 (2011)
People v. Dimalanta, 727 SCRA 20 (2014)

Exigent and emergency circumstances

People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994)


People v. Ayangao, 427 SCRA 428 (2004)

Hot pursuit
People v. De Lara, 236 SCRA 291 (1994)

Discussion. This case should be read alongside [Terry] to see the courts
progression of this line of cases.

Customs searches

People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)

Boac, et.al. v. People of the Philippines, 570 SCRA 533 (2008)

People v. Sy Chua, 396 SCRA 657 (2003)

Bureau of Customs, et.al. v. Ogario, et.al., 329 SCRA 289 (2000)

Romines v. People, 629 SCRA 370 (2010)


People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, 30 July 2015

Airport Searches

People v. Johnson, 348 SCRA 526 (2000)


People v. Canton, 394 SCRA 478 (2002)

U.S. v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir., 1973)