Calalang vs.

Williams
Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17,
1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca
to Dasmarias Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from
1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18,
1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in
pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No.
548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to
promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the
use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the
Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila
and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a
consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to
pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned

to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding

public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act
NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate
business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty
and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law,
the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire
to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the
public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the
promulgation of the said law and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail
over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because
then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in
the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely
the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism,

nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State
so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through
the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi
estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the
necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units
of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting health,
comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about the
greatest good to the greatest number.
Association of Small Landholders of the Philippines vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform
FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal
questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No.
27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the

constitutional limitation that no private property shall be

taken for public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the
power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for
violation
of
the
constitutional
provisions
on
just
compensation, due process and equal protection. They
contended that the taking must be simultaneous with
payment of just compensation which such payment is not
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228
and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the
said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that
no private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation which was denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject
their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so
far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They
therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to issue the said rules.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise
of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.
RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though
there are traditional distinction between the police power and
the power of eminent domain, property condemned under
police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the
compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to

compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent

Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner of the property
expropriated.

Cayetano and Tiongson vs. Court of Appeals

agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is

agricultural production; and 5) there is consideration

Facts:
-

Manotok delivered and transferred to his 8 children and 2

grandchildren a 34 hectare lot in Old Balara QC. There
were no tenants or other people occupying said property.
Manotok allowed Macaya to live on the property to guard
the fruit trees and prevent squatters on the condition that
he has to vacate the property when the heirs already
want to live in it. He was also allowed to plant trees and
raise animals but can only use 3 hectares. The agreement
was not put into writing.
The owners organized themselves as a real estate
business known as Manotok Realty Inc. and used the 34
hectare land as capital.
Macaya was requested to remit 10 cavans of palay every
year for his contribution for the realty taxes and was
asked for an increase of 10 but cannot afford to pay
anymore as the palays dried up.
Manotok Realty Inc. executed a Unilateral Deed of
Conveyance of the property to Tiongson and other
Manotoks.
The Manotoks told Macaya that they needed the property
to build their houses. Macaya requested that he be
allowed to stay longer only to harvest his palay. He did not
vacate the property.
Macaya brought the matter to Ministry of Agrarian
Reform. The Manotoks threatened him that they will
bulldoze the properties of Macaya.
Macaya brought the matter to Court of Agrarian Relations
for peaceful possession. It ruled in favor of the Manotoks.
CA reversed the decision.
Issue: W/N a tenancy relationship exists between the
parties.
Essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: 1) the
parties are the landholder and the tenant; 2) the subject is

Petition is granted.
-

Caballes vs. DAR

Andrea Millenes allowed Bienvenido Abajon to construct a
house on a portion of her landholding, paying a monthly
rental of P2.00. Millenes likewise allowed Abajon to plant a
portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would
be shared by both on a 50-50 basis.
When Millenes sold her land to the spouses Arturo and
Yolanda Caballes, the spouses told Abajon that they intended
to build a poultry close to his house and persuaded him to
transfer his dwelling to another portion of the landholding.
Abajon refused to leave, even after confrontation before the
Barangay Captain of the locality.
Subsequently, Yolanda filed a criminal case against Abajon
for malicious mischief for harvesting bananas and jackfruit
from their property without her knowledge. All the planting
on the property however, had been done by Abajon. The trial
court ordered the referral of the case to the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform for a preliminary determination of the
relationship between the parties. The Ministry ruled that a
tenancy relationship existed between the parties, and, as
such, the case is not proper for hearing.
On appeal, the DAR (the new MAR) reversed the findings and
declared that the case was proper for trial as the land
involved was residential. The new minister of the DAR,
however, set aside thesaid order and declared that the
criminal case was not proper for trial, as there was an
existing tenancy relationship between the parties.
Issue: W/N Abajon is an agricultural tenant.
NO. To invest Abajon with the status of a tenant is
preposterous. He only occupied a miniscule portion (60m
lot, which cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered
as an economic family-sized farm. Planting camote, bananas,

and corn on such a size of land cannot produce an income

sufficient to provide a modes standard of living to meet the
farm familys basic needs. Thus, the order sought to be
reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of RA
3844.Moreover, there exists no tenancy relationship between
the parties because Abajons status is more of a caretaker
who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or
compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of
some sort. Agricultural production as the primary purpose
being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that Abajon was
never a tenant of Millenes.
Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship:(7)The parties
are the landowner and the tenant;(8)The subject is
agricultural land;(9)There is consent;(10)The purpose is
agricultural production;(11)There is personal cultivation;
and(12)There is sharing of harvests. Unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled
to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform
Program of the Government under existing laws. Tenancy
status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural
production.
Obiter: If justice can be meted out now,why wait for it to drop
gently from heaven?

Hilario vs. IAC

Facts:
-

Baltazar filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian

Relations alleging he had been in continuous possession
as a share tenant of a parcel of land with an area of
about 2 hectares situated in San Miguel, Bulacan, which
was previously owned by one Socorro Vda. de Balagtas.
The complaint was against Spouses Hilario who allegedly
began to threaten him to desist from entering and
cultivating a portion.
Baltazar claims that he became a tenant by virtue of a
Kasunduan.
Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in determining whether
or not respondent Baltazar is the tenant of the
petitioners ruled that the land in question is not an
agricultural landholding but plain "bakuran," hence,
Baltazar is not a tenant on the land.
CA remanded back to lower court as CAR decision was
not supported by substantial evidence.
CAR ruled Baltazar not a tenant and ordered his
ejectment from the property.
IAC reversed the decision saying that Baltazar is a
leasehold tenant entitled to security of tenure on the
land in question.

Issue: W/N Baltazar is a tenant

Ruling: No. In favor of petitioners.
Spouses Hilario gave sufficient evidence that Baltazar is not a
tenant.
Corazon Pengzon (daughter of Vda. De Balagtas) said she did
not receive any fruit from the land after her mother died and
she knew that spouses Hilario were now the owner of the
parcels of land.

The respondent court also failed to note that the alleged

tenant pays no rental or share to the
landowners. Baltazar made a vague allegation that he shared
70-30 and 50-50 of the produce in
his favor. The former owner flatly denied that she ever
received any thing from him.
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy
relationship, to wit: (1) The parties are the landholder and
tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural land; (3) The purpose is
agricultural production; and (4) There is consideration; have
not been met by the private respondent.
Petition granted.

Tan vs. Pollescas

Ruling: Yes

Facts:

Section 7 of RA 3844 as amended provides that once there is

a leasehold relationship, as in the present case, the
landowner cannot eject the agricultural tenant from the land
unless authorized by the court for causes provided by law.27
RA 3844 as amended expressly recognizes and protects an
agricultural leasehold tenants right to security of tenure.

Tan heirs own a coconut farmland in Ozamis City.

Esteban Pollescas is the original tenant of the land.
After his death, his son Enrique was appointed as
tenant by Tan.
Reynalda Pollescas, Estebans second wife, demanded
she be appointed as tenant. Tan did not agree.
Reynalda then filed before DARAB a complaint for
Annulment of Compromise Agreement, Quieting of
Tenancy Relationship and damages.
DARAB declared Reynalda as the lawful tenant of the
land. DARAB apportioned the harvests between the
Tan Heirs and Reynalda based on the customary
sharing system which is 2/3 to the landowner and 1/3
to the tenant.
Reynalda failed to deliver to the Tan Heirs 2/3 of the
harvests amounting to P3,656.70. The Tan Heirs
demanded Reynalda to pay such amount. Reynalda
ignored the demand.
Tan heirs filed estafa against Reynalda before MTC.
She was found to be guilty.
Tan heirs filed an ejectment case against Reynalda
before DARAB-Misamis as she failed to deliver the
fruits. It terminated the tenancy relationship between
the parties. Reynalda was ordered to vacate the
property.
Reynalda appealed before DARAB, which reversed the
decision of DARAB-Misamis.
CA affirmed. held that Reynaldas failure to deliver the
full amount of the Tan Heirs share could not be
considered as a willful and deliberate intent to deprive
the Tan Heirs of their share.

Issue: W/N Reynalda is a tenant

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that for nonpayment of the lease rental to be a valid ground to
dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the
amount of the lease rental must first of all be lawful. If the
amount of lease rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by
law, non-payment of lease rental cannot be a ground to
dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding.
Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of the harvest
as lease rental, Reynalda is not obliged to pay such lease
rental for being unlawful. There is no legal basis to demand
payment of such unlawful lease rental. The courts will not
enforce payment of a lease rental that violates the law. There
was no validly fixed lease rental demandable at the time of
the harvests. Thus, Reynalda was never in default.
Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease
rental. Accordingly, the DAR must first fix the provisional
lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to
the second paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended.
Until the DAR has fixed the provisional lease rental, Reynalda
cannot be in default in the payment of lease rental since
such amount is not yet determined. There can be no delay in
the payment of an undetermined lease rental because it is
impossible to pay an undetermined amount.