3rd Week Digest of Inok dakong tao .

Article 1162

RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. vs THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

FACTS:

The defendant Railroad Company operates a line through the district of Daraga in the
municipality of Albay. As one of its trains passed over said line, a great quantity of sparks
were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby communicated to
four houses nearby belonging to the four plaintiffs respectively, and the same were entirely
consumed. All of these houses were of light construction with the exception of the house of
Remigio Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with nipa
and cogon. The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a strong wind
was blowing at the time.
It is alleged that the defendant Railroad Company was conspicuously negligent in relation to
the origin of said fire, in the following respects, namely, first, in failing to exercise proper
supervision over the employees in charge of the locomotive; secondly, in allowing the
locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated without having the smokestack
protected by some device for arresting sparks; thirdly, in using in its locomotive upon this
occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of known inferior quality which, upon combustion, produces
sparks in great quantity.
The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of Remigio Rodrigueza
stood partly within the limits of the land owned by the defendant company, though exactly how
far away from the company's track does not appear. It further appears that, after the railroad
track was laid, the company notified Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the company
and to remove it from its exposed position. Rodrigueza did not comply with this suggestion,
though he promised to put an iron roof on his house, which he never did. Upon this fact it is
contended for the defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of Remigio
Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of the Railroad Company, and that for
this reason the company is not liable.
Issue : Whether or not the defendant is the proximate cause of the fire ?
RULING:
What really occurred undoubtedly is that the company, upon making this extension, had
acquired the land only, leaving the owner of the house free to remove it. Hence he cannot be
considered to have been a trespasser in the beginning. Rather, he was there at the
sufferance of the defendant company, and so long as his house remained in this exposed
position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have resulted from fires
occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care.
But he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the
unlawful negligence acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself
against the possible negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will
use the care of the ordinary prudent man.
In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only cause of the damage that

occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing this fire. The circumstance that
Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant company and
therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that
may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him
as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first, that condition was
not created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this ground by the
toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even
supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in
negligently destroying it.
The circumstance that the defendant company, upon planting its line near Remigio
Rodrigueza's house, had requested or directed him to remove it, did not convert his
occupancy into a trespass, or impose upon him any additional responsibility over and above
what the law itself imposes in such situation. In this connection it must be remembered that
the company could at any time have removed said house in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, but it elected not to do so.

Article 1165

Vda. De Lacson vs. Diaz

FACTS: In 1939, Rosario Vda. De Lacson leased to Abelardo Diaz two parcels of sugar-cane
lands.
The term of the lease was for five crop years beginning with the crop year 1940-41; with an
option in favor of the defendant for another two years, after the expiration of the original
period. The contract provided that the defendant was to pay to the plaintiffs an annual rental
of 1,000 piculs of export sugar, of which 500 piculs were to be paid in the month of January of
every year and the rest at the end of every milling season.
The defendant took possession of the haciendas in question beginning with the crop year
1940-41. In that year he paid to the plaintiffs the corresponding rental of 1,000 piculs of sugar.
On December 8, 1941, the war broke out. The defendant claims that due to the unsettled
conditions which follows, he was unable to mill all his sugar canes so that during the crop
year 1941-42 he produced only the total amount of 966.42 piculs of sugar from the two
haciendas, of which 579.86 piculs went to him as his planter's share. It appears that the
defendant failed to pay the plaintiffs the rentals of 1,000 piculs of export sugar for said crop
year.
The defendant also failed to pay the plaintiffs the stipulated rentals for the remaining crop
years up to the present time, although the plaintiffs had made several demands for their
payment, so that on September 17, 1946, this action was commenced by the plaintiffs for the
rescission of the lease contract.

ISSUE: Is the obligation of the respondent extinguished by reason of a force majeure?

RULING: In binding himself to deliver centrifugal sugar, the defendant promised a generic
thing. It could be any centrifugal sugar without regard to origin or how he secured it. Hence,
his inability to produce sugar, irrespective of the cause, did not relieve him from his
commitment. War, like floods and other catastrophes, was a contingency, acollateral incident,
which he could have provided for by proper stipulation.
In reality there was no fortuitous event which interfered with the exploitation of the leased
property in the form and manner the defendant had intended. We refer to the agricultural
years 1945-46 and 1946-47. It should be observed that the defendant was not bound to keep
the lands during those years; it was entirely optional on his part to put an end to the lease
after the 1944-45 crop year. When he decided to exercise the option he was fully aware that
there were no sugar mills in operation and he did not except to produce sugar, He must have
had an object other than to plant sugar cane when he chose to retain the lands for two more
years. it was established that during the years 1943 and 1944 the haciendas in question were
worked and cultivated by the tenants of the defendant who planted cereal crops thereon like
corn and rice but there was no evidence as to how much was really produced on the land. His
purpose was, beyond doubt, to plant other crops, which he did.
If those crops did not bring good return he can not, under any principle of law or equity, shift
the loss to the lessor. Performance is not excused by the fact that the contract turns out to be
hard and improvident, unprofitable or impracticable, ill-advised, or even foolish.
Article 1168
Delta Motors vs. Genuino G.R. No. 55665, February 8, 1989 Cortes, J.
Facts:
Private Respondents are owners of an iceplant and cold storage who ordered black iron pipes
to Delta Motors (herein petitioner) for which the latter provided two letter quotations indicating
the selling price and delivery of said pipes. The terms of payment are also included in the
letter quotations which must be complied with by the respondents. Private respondents made
initial payments on both contracts but delivery of the pipes was not made by Delta Motors so
that the Genuinos are not willing to give subsequent payments notwithstanding the agreed
terms of payment requiring them of such. In July 1972 Delta offered to deliver the iron pipes
but the Genuinos did not accept the offer because the construction of the ice plant building
where the pipes were to be installed was not yet finished. Three years later, on April 15, 1975,
Hector Genuino, in behalf of Espaa Extension Ice Plant and Cold Storage, asked Delta to
deliver the iron pipes within thirty (30) days from its receipt of the request. But petitioner Delta
is unwilling to deliver said iron pipes unless the Genuinos agree to a new quotation price set
by the former. Private Respondents rejected the new quoted prices and instead filed a
complaint for specific performance with damages seeking to compel Delta to deliver the
pipes. Meanwhile, Delta, in its answer prayed for rescission of the contracts pursuant to Art.
1191 of the New Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not Delta is entitled for rescission of contract as the latter is subject to

suspensive conditions and only upon their performance or compliance would its obligation to
deliver the pipes arise?
Held:
No. While there is merit in Delta's claim that the sale is subject to suspensive conditions, the
Court finds that it has, nevertheless, waived performance of these conditions and opted to go
on with the contracts although at a much higher price. Art. 1545 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition
which is not performed, such party may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waived
performance of the condition. . . it would be highly inequitable for petitioner Delta to rescind
the two (2) contracts considering the fact that not only does it have in its possession and
ownership the black iron pipes, but also the down payments private respondents have paid.
Delta cannot ask for increased prices based on the price offer stipulation in the contracts and
in the increase in the cost of goods. Reliance by Delta on the price offer stipulation is
misplaced. The moment private respondents accepted the offer of Delta, the contract of sale
between them was perfected and neither party could change the terms thereof. Neither could
petitioner Delta rely on the fluctuation in the market price of goods to support its claim for
rescission