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SISON V. PEOPLE
Background
of
the
Case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
STATE V. TATUM
PEOPLE V. CARPO
One
evening,
Carpo
with
Warlito
Ibao
and
his
sons
Oscar
and
Roche
all
went
to
the
house
of
Dulay.
Oscar
hurled
grenades
inside
the
house
of
Dulay.
Seconds
later,
a
loud
explosion
occurred,
killing
the
Dulay
family
members
except
Noemi
Dulay.
The
witness
herein,
Mr.
Ruben
Meriales,
witnessed
the
incident.
TIJING V. CA
1.
Investigation
coursed
through.
Fearful
however
that
the
culprits
would
return,
Ruben
Meriales
refused
to
give
any
statement
but
intimated
to
Police
Officer
Guillermo
Osio
that
he
would
go
to
the
police
station
after
the
burial,
which
he
2.
3.
4.
Ruling:
5.
6.
7.
8.
PEOPLE V. VALLEJO
Background
of
the
Case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
From
accused-appellant's
house,
Daisy
then
went
to
the
house
of
Jessiemin
Mataverde
where
she
watched
television.
Accusedappellant
thereafter
arrived
and
whispered
something
to
Daisy,
and
the
latter
went
with
him
towards
the
"compuerta."
At
about
4:30
o'clock
in
the
afternoon,
the
spouses
Iluminado
and
Charito
Yepes
saw
accused-appellant
coming
out
of
the
"compuerta,"
with
his
clothes,
basketball
shorts,
and
t-shirt
wet,
although
his
face
and
hair
were
not.
According
to
these
witnesses,
he
looked
pale,
uneasy,
and
troubled
(balisa).
He
kept
looking
around
and
did
not
even
greet
them
as
was
his
custom
to
do
so.
The
fishing
boat
which
accused-appellant
used
as
a
bomber
(a
boat
for
catching
6.
7.
8.
9.
During
the
initial
investigation,
accused-
appellant
had
scratches
on
his
feet
similar
to
those
caused
by
the
thorns
of
an
aroma
tree.
10.
11.
12.
1)
2)
3)
PEOPLE V. UMANITO
Background
of
the
Case:
1.
Decision
of
the
Lower
Courts:
3.
Argument
of
the
Accused-appelant:
4.
8.
9.
PEOPLE V. YATAR
HERRERA V. ALBA
2.
3.
Issue
presented
before
us:
6.
Ruling
of
the
Court:
7.
8.
LUCAS V. LUCAS
Background
of
the
Case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Decision
of
the
Lower
Courts:
7. The
RTC
dismissed
Jesses
petition
for
DNA
testing
to
establish
paternity
and
filiation.
8. It
held
that
there
are
four
significant
procedural
aspects
of
a
traditional
paternity
action
which
the
parties
have
to
face:
a. a
prima
facie
case,
b. affirmative
defenses,
c. presumption
of
legitimacy,
and
d. physical
resemblance
between
the
putative
father
and
the
child.
The
court
opined
that
petitioner
must
first
establish
these
four
procedural
aspects
before
he
can
present
evidence
of
paternity
and
filiation,
which
may
include
incriminating
acts
or
scientific
evidence
like
blood
group
test
and
DNA
test
results.
9. The
court
observed
that
the
petition
did
not
show
that
these
procedural
aspects
were
present.
Petitioner
failed
to
establish
a
prima
facie
case
considering
that
(a)
his
mother
did
not
personally
declare
that
she
had
sexual
relations
with
respondent,
and
petitioner's
statement
as
to
what
his
mother
told
him
about
his
father
was
clearly
hearsay;
(b)
the
certificate
of
live
birth
was
not
signed
by
respondent;
and
(c)
although
petitioner
used
the
surname
of
respondent,
there
was
no
allegation
that
he
was
treated
as
the
child
of
respondent
by
the
latter
or
his
family.
The
court
opined
that,
having
failed
to
establish
a
prima
facie
case,
respondent
had
no
obligation
to
present
any
affirmative
defenses.
10. On
motion
for
reconsideration,
the
RTC
reversed
its
previous
decision,
allowing
compulsory
DNA
testing.
The
court
also
dismissed
Jesus
arguments
that
there
is
no
basis
for
the
taking
of
DNA
test,
and
that
jurisprudence
is
still
unsettled
on
the
acceptability
of
DNA
evidence.
It
noted
that
the
new
Rule
on
DNA
Evidence
allows
the
conduct
of
DNA
testing,
whether
at
the
court's
instance
12
Ruling:
12. The
petition
must
be
granted.
13. The
statement
in
Herrera
v.
Alba
34
that
there
are
four
significant
procedural
aspects
in
a
traditional
paternity
case
which
parties
have
to
face
has
been
widely
misunderstood
and
misapplied
in
this
case.
A
party
is
confronted
by
these
so-called
procedural
aspects
during
trial,
when
the
parties
have
presented
their
respective
evidence.
They
are
matters
of
evidence
that
cannot
be
determined
at
this
initial
stage
of
the
proceedings,
when
only
the
petition
to
establish
filiation
has
been
filed.
The
CA's
observation
that
petitioner
failed
to
establish
a
prima
facie
case
the
first
procedural
aspect
in
a
paternity
case
is
therefore
misplaced.
A
prima
facie
case
is
built
by
a
party's
evidence
and
not
by
mere
allegations
in
the
initiatory
pleading
(thus
a
hearing
is
required
to
be
made
first)
14. Clearly
then,
it
was
also
not
the
opportune
time
to
discuss
the
lack
of
a
prima
facie
case
vis--vis
the
motion
for
DNA
testing
since
no
evidence
has,
as
yet,
been
presented
by
petitioner.
More
essentially,
it
is
premature
to
discuss
whether,
under
the
circumstances,
a
DNA
testing
order
is
warranted
considering
that
no
such
order
has
yet
been
issued
by
the
trial
court.
In
fact,
the
latter
has
just
set
the
said
case
for
hearing.
15. At
any
rate,
the
CA's
view
that
it
would
be
dangerous
to
allow
a
DNA
testing
without
corroborative
proof
is
well
taken
and
deserves
the
Court's
attention.
In
light
of
this
observation,
we
find
that
there
is
a
need
to
supplement
the
Rule
on
DNA
Evidence
to
aid
the
courts
in
resolving
motions
for
DNA
testing
order,
particularly
in
paternity
and
other
filiation
cases.
We,
thus,
address
the
question
of
whether
a
prima
facie
showing
is
necessary
before
a
court
can
issue
a
DNA
testing
order
16. Section
4
of
the
Rule
on
DNA
Evidence
merely
(a)
A
biological
sample
exists
that
is
relevant
to
the
case;
(b)
The
biological
sample:
(i)
was
not
previously
subjected
to
the
type
of
DNA
testing
now
requested;
or
(ii)
was
previously
subjected
to
DNA
testing,
but
the
results
may
require
confirmation
for
good
reasons;
HCSEIT
(c)
(d)
(e)
The
existence
of
other
factors,
if
any,
which
the
court
may
consider
as
potentially
affecting
the
accuracy
or
integrity
of
the
DNA
13
PEOPLE V. SANCHEZ
Q:
A:
A:
(1
priority)
at
the
place
where
the
search
warrant
is
served;
or
nd
PEOPLE V. MENDOZA
11
of
RA
No.
9165.
HELD:
YES,
it
did.
Accused
is
hereby
acquitted.
1.
I.
II.
specifically
recalling
having
marked
the
confiscated
sachets
of
shabu
with
the
initials
of
the
accused
immediately
after
the
seizure,
did
not
state,
as
the
following
excerpts
from
his
testimony
indicate,
if
he
had
made
his
marking
in
the
presence
of
the
accused
himself
or
of
his
representative,
and
in
the
presence
of
a
representative
from
the
media
or
the
Department
of
Justice,
or
any
elected
public
official
In
all,
the
buy-bust
team
had
about
48
days
the
period
intervening
between
July
10,
2007,
when
the
test
buy
was
conducted,
and
August
28,
2007,
when
the
crimes
charged
were
committed
within
which
to
have
the
media
and
the
Department
of
Justice
be
represented
during
the
buy-bust
operation,
as
well
as
to
invite
an
elected
public
official
of
the
place
of
operation
to
witness
the
operation.
It
puzzles
the
Court,
therefore,
that
the
buy-
bust
team
did
not
prudently
follow
the
procedures
outlined
in
Section
21
(1),
supra,
despite
their
being
experienced
policemen
who
knew
the
significance
of
the
procedures
in
the
preservation
of
the
chain
of
custody
Secondly,
the
records
nowhere
indicated,
contrary
to
the
claim
of
P/Insp.
Lim,
that
the
buy-bust
team,
or
any
member
thereof,
had
conducted
the
physical
inventory
of
the
confiscated
items.
We
know
this
because
the
State's
formal
offer
of
evidence
did
not
include
such
inventory,
Without
the
inventory
having
been
made
by
the
III.
seizing
lawmen,
it
became
doubtful
whether
any
shabu
had
been
seized
from
the
accused
at
all.
And,
thirdly,
although
PO1
Diocena
asserted
that
photographs
of
the
confiscated
items
and
the
marked
money
were
taken
at
the
police
station,
20
it
still
behooved
him
to
justify
why
the
photographs
of
the
seized
shabu
was
not
taken
immediately
upon
the
seizure,
and
at
the
place
of
seizure.
The
State
did
not
explain
this
lapse.
The
pictorial
evidence
of
the
latter
kind
would
have
more
firmly
established
the
identity
of
the
seized
shabu
for
purposes
of
preserving
the
chain
of
custody.
PEREZ V. ALCUIZAR
Section 21.
21
sign.
22
PEOPLE V. GARCIA
A:
laboratory
Thus,
other
than
the
markings
made
by
PO1
Garcia
and
the
police
investigator
(whose
identity
was
not
disclosed),
(c)
Pp vs Casimiro
FACTS:
On
August
16,
1999,
a
civilian
informer,
named
Rose,
walked
into
the
office
of
Police
Chief
Inspector
Benson
Dagiw-a
Leleng
at
the
14th
Regional
Narcotics
Office,
DPS
Compound
in
Baguio
City.
She
informed
Chief
Inspector
Leleng
and
PO3
Juan
Piggangay
that
a
certain
Albert
Casimiro,
accused-appellant
herein,
was
engaged
in
the
distribution
or
sale
of
marijuana.
As
proof,
Rose
told
the
police
officers
to
wait
and
accused-appellant
would
call
them
up
on
that
day.
Accused-appellant,
however,
did
not
call
up.
Nonetheless,
Police
Chief
Inspector
Leleng
formed
a
buy-bust
team.
25
26
FACTS:
Plaintiff,
a
civil
engineer,
was
a
member
of
a
group
of
48
Filipino
pilgrims
that
left
Manila
for
Lourdes
on
March
30,
1958.
On
March
28,
1958,
the
defendant,
Air
France,
through
its
authorized
agent,
Philippine
Air
Lines,
Inc.,
issued
to
plaintiff
a
'first
class'
round
trip
airplane
ticket
from
Manila
to
Rome.
From
Manila
to
Bangkok,
plaintiff
traveled
in
'first
class',
but
at
Bangkok,
the
Manager
of
the
defendant
airline
forced
plaintiff
to
vacate
the
'first
class'
seat
that
he
was
occupying
because,
in
the
words
of
the
witness
Ernesto
G.
Cuento,
there
was
a
'white
man',
who,
the
Manager
alleged,
had
a
'better
right
to
the
seat.
When
asked
to
vacate
his
'first
class'
seat,
the
plaintiff,
as
was
to
be
expected,
refused,
and
told
defendant's
Manager
that
his
seat
would
be
taken
over
his
dead
body;
a
commotion
ensued,
and,
according
to
said
Ernesto
G.
Cuento,
many
of
the
Filipino
passengers
got
nervous
in
the
tourist
class;
when
they
found
out
that
Mr.
Carrascoso
was
having
a
hot
discussion
with
the
white
man
[manager],
they
came
all
across
to
Mr.
Carrascoso
and
pacified
Mr.
Carrascoso
to
give
his
seat
to
the
'white
man;
and
plaintiff
reluctantly
gave
his
'first
class'
seat
in
the
plane.
Petitioner
charges
that
the
finding
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
that
the
purser
made
an
entry
in
his
notebooks
reading
"First
class
passenger
was
forced
to
go
to
the
tourist
class
against
his
will,
and
that
the
captain
refused
to
intervene"
is
predicated
upon
evidence
[Carrascoso's
testimony
above]
which
is
incompetent.
Petitioner
assails
respondent
court's
award
of
moral
damages
and
that
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
fails
to
make
a
finding
of
bad
faith.
On
the
question
of
bad
faith,
the
Court
of
Appeals
declared:
"That
the
plaintiff
was
forced
out
of
his
seat
in
the
first
class
compartment
of
the
plane
belonging
to
the
defendant
AirFrance
while
at
Bangkok,
and
was
transferred
to
the
tourist
class
not
only
without
his
consent
but
against
his
will,
has
been
sufficiently
established
by
plaintiff
in
his
testimony
before
the
court,
corroborated
by
the
corresponding
entry
made
by
the
purser
of
the
plane
in
his
NOTEBOOK
ISSUE:
incompetent
WON
Carrascosos
testimony
RULING:
was
PP vs Tan
FACTS:
H
o
n
.
B
i
e
n
v
e
n
i
d
o
M
.
Ta
n
,
t
h
e
n
p
r
e
s
i
d
i
n
g
i
n
t
h
e
c
o
u
r
t
b
e
l
o
w
,
interrupted
the
proceeding
holding
that
the
triplicates
are
not
admissible
unless
it
is
first
proven
that
the
originals
were
lost
and
can
not
be
produced.
After
the
cross-examination
of
the
last
witness,
the
prosecution
again
went
back
to
the
identification
of
the
triplicate
invoice.
It
was
at
this
stage
that
the
judge
below
told
the
prosecution
that
the
law
applicable
is
Section
46,
Rule
123
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
which
requires
the
production
of
the
originals.
In
response
to
the
above
ruling,
the
special
prosecutor
claimed
that
the
evidence
of
the
prosecution
the
originals
on
account
of
their
loss.
ISSUE:
WON
the
carbon
copy
of
the
invoice
is
admissible
RULING:
The
admissibility
of
duplicates
or
triplicates
has
long
been
a
settled
question
and
we
need
not
elaborate
on
the
reasons
for
the
rule.
This
matter
has
received
consideration
from
the
foremost
commentator
on
the
Rules
of
Court
thus:
"When
carbon
sheets
are
inserted
between
two
or
more
sheets
of
writing
paper
so
that
the
writing
of
a
contract
upon
the
outside
sheet,
including
the
signature
of
the
party
to
be
charged
thereby,
produces
facsimile
upon
the
sheets
beneath,
such
signature
being
thus
reproduced
by
the
same
stroke
of
the
pen
which
made
the
surface
or
exposed
impression,
all
of
the
sheets
so
written
on
are
regarded
as
duplicate
originals
and
either
of
them
may
be
introduced
in
evidence
as
such
without
accounting
for
the
nonproduction
of
the
others.'
The
said
confession
Exhibit
B,
being
carbon
copy
of
the
original
and
bearing
as
it
does
the
signature
of
the
appellant,
is
admissible
in
evidence
and
possess
all
the
probative
value
of
the
original,
and
the
same
does
not
require
an
accounting
for
the
non-production
of
the
original.
Two
principal
authors
on
the
law
on
evidence
have
sustained
the
theory
of
the
admissibility
of
duplicate
originals,
as
follows:
"SEC.
386.
.
.
.
the
best
evidence
rule
is
that
rule
which
requires
the
highest
grade
of
evidence
obtainable
to
prove
a
disputed
fact
p.
616.
A
"duplicate
sales
slip
has
been
held
to
be
primary
evidence"
SEC.
420.
Duplicate
originals.
Where
letters
are
produced
by
mechanical
means
and,
concurrently
with
the
original,
duplicate
are
produced,
as
by
placing
carbon
PP vs Tandoy
FACTS:
FACTS:
On
August
11,
1952
the
Compaia
Maritima
and
the
Allied
Free
Workers
Union
entered
into
a
written
contract
whereby
the
union
agreed
to
perform
arrastre
and
stevedoring
work
for
the
company's
vessels
at
Iligan
City.
It
was
stipulated
that
the
company
could
revoke
the
contract
before
the
expiration
of
the
term
if
the
union
failed
to
render
proper
service.
The
union
agreed
to
the
stipulation
that
the
company
would
not
be
liable
for
the
payment
of
the
services
of
the
union
"for
the
loading,
unloading
and
deliveries
of
cargoes"
and
that
the
compensation
for
such
services
would
be
paid
"by
the
owners
and
consignees
of
the
cargoes"
as
"has
been
the
practice
in
the
port
of
Iligan
City"
The
union
found
out
later
that
stipulation
was
oppressive
and
that
the
company
was
unduly
favored
by
that
arrangement.
Under
the
contract,
the
work
of
the
union
consisted
of
arrastre
and
stevedoring
services.
FACTS:
On
13
June
1984,
petitioner
filed
before
the
RTC
of
Manila
a
complaint
for
recovery
of
sum
of
money
against
respondents,
impleading
the
spouse
of
respondent
Narciso
O.
Morales.
Petitioner,
a
domestic
banking
and
trust
corporation,
alleges
therein
that
on
23
April
1982,
it
extended
in
favor
of
respondents
a
loan
in
the
amount
of
One
Million
Pesos
(P1,000,000.00)
as
evidenced
by
a
promissory
note
executed
by
respondents
on
the
same
date.
Under
the
promissory
note,
respondents
Del
Monte
Motor
Works,
I
nc.
(respondent
corporation)
and
Morales
bound
themselves
jointly
and
severally
to
pay
petitioner
the
full
amount
of
the
loan
through
twenty-five
monthly
installments
of
P40,000.00
a
month
with
interest
pegged
at
23%
per
annum.
As
respondents
defaulted
on
their
monthly
installments,
the
full
amount
of
the
loan
became
due
and
demandable
pursuant
to
the
terms
of
the
promissory
note.
Petitioner
attached
to
its
complaint
as
Annexes
"A,"
"B,"
and
"C,"
respectively,
a
photocopy
of
the
promissory
note
supposedly
executed
by
respondents,
a
copy
of
the
demand
letter
it
sent
respondents
dated
20
January
1983,
and
statement
of
account
pertaining
to
respondents'
loan.
During
the
trial
on
the
merits
of
this
case,
petitioner
presented
as
its
sole
witness,
Liberato
A.
Lavarino
(Lavarino),
then
the
manager
of
its
Collection
Department.
Lavarino
also
identified
the
following
exhibits
for
petitioner:
photocopy
of
the
duplicate
original
of
the
promissory
note
attached
to
the
complaint
as
Exhibit
"A;"
30
Arceo vs PP
FACTS:
On
March
14,
1991,
[petitioner],
obtained
a
loan
from
private
complainant
Josefino
Cenizal
[]
in
the
amount
of
P100,000.00.
Several
weeks
thereafter,
[petitioner]
obtained
an
additional
loan
of
P50,000.00
from
[Cenizal].
[Petitioner]
then
issued
in
favor
of
Cenizal,
Bank
of
the
Philippine
Islands
[(BPI)]
Check
No.
163255,
postdated
August
4,
1991,
for
P150,000.00,
at
Cenizal's
house
located
at
70
Panay
Avenue,
Quezon
City.
When
August
4,
1991
came,
[Cenizal]
did
not
deposit
the
check
immediately
because
[petitioner]
promised
[]
that
he
would
replace
the
check
with
cash.
Such
promise
was
made
verbally
seven
(7)
times.
When
his
patience
ran
out,
[Cenizal]
brought
the
check
to
the
bank
for
encashment.
The
head
office
of
the
Bank
of
the
Philippine
Islands
through
a
letter
dated
December
5,
1991,
informed
[Cenizal]
that
the
check
bounced
because
of
insufficient
funds.
Thereafter,
[Cenizal]
went
to
the
house
of
[petitioner]
to
inform
him
of
the
dishonor
of
the
check
but
[Cenizal]
found
out
that
[petitioner]
had
left
the
place.
So,
[Cenizal]
referred
the
matter
to
a
lawyer
who
wrote
a
letter
giving
[petitioner]
three
days
from
receipt
thereof
to
pay
the
amount
of
the
check.
[Petitioner]
still
failed
to
make
good
the
amount
of
the
check.
As
a
consequence,
[Cenizal]
executed
on
January
20,
1992
before
the
office
of
the
City
Prosecutor
of
Quezon
City
his
affidavit
and
submitted
documents
in
support
of
his
complaint
for
32
FACTS:
In
February
2001,
respondent
Lolita
Alcazar,
proprietor
of
Legazpi
Color
Center
(LCC),
instituted
through
her
attorney-in-fact
Delfin
Chua
a
Complaint
for
sum
of
money
against
the
petitioners,
spouses
Fernando
and
Ma.
Elena
Santos,
to
collect
the
value
of
paint
and
construction
materials
obtained
by
the
latter
from
LCC
amounting
to
P1,456,000.00,
which
remained
unpaid
despite
written
demand.
Respondent's
cause
of
action
is
based
on
a
document
entitled
"Acknowledgment"
apparently
executed
by
hand
by
petitioner
Fernando.
In
their
Answer,
petitioners
sought
the
dismissal
of
the
Complaint
On
November
8,
2005,
respondent
presented
her
evidence
and
testified
in
court
as
the
lone
witness.
On
November
21,
2005,
she
made
a
formal
offer
of
her
evidence
and
rested
her
case.
Petitioners
filed
a
Demurrer
to
Evidence,
which
respondent
opposed.
Petitioners
argued
that
the
Acknowledgment
respondent's
Exhibit
"A"
which
was
presented
in
court
was
not
an
original
copy
and
thus
inadmissible;
petitioners'
receipt
of
the
written
demand
was
not
proved;
the
alleged
deliveries
of
paint
and
construction
materials
were
not
covered
by
delivery
receipts;
and
respondent's
testimony
was
merely
hearsay
and
uncorroborated.
The
CA
held
that
petitioners
failed
to
deny
specifically
under
oath
the
genuineness
and
due
execution
of
the
Acknowledgment;
consequently,
1)
its
genuineness
and
due
execution
are
deemed
admitted,
2)
there
was
thus
no
need
to
present
the
original
thereof,
and
3)
petitioners'
liability
was
sufficiently
established.
Petitioners,
in
their
Petition
and
Reply,
assert
that
during
the
proceedings
below,
only
a
photocopy
of
the
Acknow
ledgment
w
as
presented
and
identified
by
respondent
even
as
the
original
was
not
lost,
the
same
having
been
made
part
of
the
record
of
the
case
when
respondent's
evidence
was
first
presented
ex
parte.
For
this
reason,
they
argue
that
the
photocopy
presented
and
offered
in
evidence
is
inadmissible
and
could
not
be
the
basis
for
arriving
at
a
finding
of
liability
on
their
part,
pursuant
to
the
best
evidence
rule.
ISSUE:
WON
presentation
of
a
mere
photocopy
of
the
Acknowledgment
materially
affects
the
outcome
of
the
case.
RULING:
Respondent's
failure
to
present
the
original
copy
of
the
Acknowledgment
during
the
taking
of
her
testimony
for
the
second
time,
and
the
presentation
of
a
mere
photocopy
thereof
at
said
hearing,
does
not
materially
affect
the
outcome
of
the
case.
It
was
a
mere
procedural
inadvertence
that
could
have
been
cured
and
did
not
affect
petitioners'
cause
in
any
manner.
As
conceded
by
them
and
as
held
by
the
CA,
the
original
exists
and
was
made
part
of
the
records
of
the
case
when
respondent's
evidence
was
first
taken.
Though
respondent
now
claims
that
she
had
lost
the
original,
the
CA
proclaimed
that
the
document
resides
in
the
record.
This
would
explain
then
why
respondent
cannot
find
it
in
her
possession;
it
is
with
the
court
as
an
exhibit.
Besides,
it
evidently
appears
that
there
is
no
question
raised
on
the
authenticity
and
contents
of
the
photocopy
that
was
presented
and
identified
in
court;
petitioners
merely
insist
that
the
photocopy
is
inadmissible
as
a
result
of
respondent's
failure
to
present
the
original,
which
they
nevertheless
admit
to
exist
and
is
found
and
included
in
the
record
of
the
case.
While
it
is
a
basic
rule
of
evidence
that
the
original
copy
prevails
over
a
mere
photocopy,
there
is
no
harm
if
in
a
case,
both
the
original
and
a
photocopy
thereof
are
authenticated,
identified
and
formally
off
ered
in
evidence
by
the
party
proponent.
More
to
the
point
is
the
fact
that
petitioners
failed
to
deny
specifically
under
oath
the
genuineness
and
due
execution
of
the
Acknowledgment
in
their
Answer.
The
effect
of
this
is
that
the
genuineness
and
due
execution
of
the
Acknowledgment
is
deemed
admitted.
"By
the
admission
of
the
genuineness
and
due
execution
[of
such
document]
is
meant
that
the
party
whose
signature
it
bears
admits
that
he
signed
it
or
that
it
was
signed
by
another
for
him
with
his
authority;
that
at
the
time
it
was
signed
it
was
in
words
and
figures
exactly
as
set
out
in
the
pleading
of
the
party
relying
upon
it;
that
the
document
was
delivered;
and
that
any
formal
requisites
required
by
law,
such
as
a
seal,
an
acknowledgment,
or
revenue
stamp,
which
it
lacks,
are
waived
by
him.
Hence,
such
defenses
as
that
the
signature
is
a
forgery
.
.
.;
or
that
it
was
unauthorized
.
.
.;
or
that
the
party
charged
signed
the
instrument
in
some
other
capacity
than
that
alleged
in
the
pleading
setting
it
out
.
.
.;
or
that
it
was
never
delivered
.
.
.,
are
cut
off
by
the
admission
of
its
genuineness
and
due
execution."
"There
is
no
need
for
proof
of
execution
and
authenticity
with
respect
to
documents
the
genuineness
and
due
execution
of
which
are
admitted
by
the
adverse
party."
With
the
consequent
admission
engendered
by
petitioners'
failure
to
properly
deny
the
Acknowledgment
in
their
Answer,
coupled
with
its
proper
authentication,
identification
and
offer
by
the
respondent,
not
to
mention
petitioners'
admissions
in
paragraphs
4
to
6
of
their
Answer
that
they
are
indeed
indebted
to
respondent,
the
33
FACTS:
On
November
20,
1986,
petitioners
filed
an
action
for
reconveyance
with
damages
against
private
respondents
involving
a
parcel
of
land.
In
their
complaint,
petitioners
assert
that
the
subject
land
was
bought
by
their
predecessor-in-interest
from
the
private
respondents,
Madrid
brothers,
for
P4,000.00
in
a
deed
of
sale
executed
on
May
18,
1959,
and
since
then
they
have
been
in
actual,
physical,
continuous
and
open
possession
of
the
property.
However,
sometime
in
October
1986,
much
to
their
dismay
and
surprise,
private
respondents
managed
to
obtain
a
Torrens
Title
over
the
said
land.
On
the
other
hand,
the
Madrids
denied
having
MEYERS v US
FACTS:
This
involved
criminal
prosecution
for
subornation
of
perjury.
Three
counts
against
Meyers.
Meyers
was
a
government
official
connected
with
the
department
of
defense
of
the
US.
Now,
after
the
war
and
wanting
to
investigate
reports
of
corruption
perpetrated
by
officers
of
department
of
defense,
the
US
Senate
conducted
an
investigation.
One
of
those
investigated
was
Mr.
Meyers
who
was
accused
of
maintaining
financial
interest
in
a
certain
business
entity
which
conducted
substantial
business
transactions
with
the
government.
This
corporation,
Aviation
Electric
Corporation,
was
engaged
in
the
business
of
manufacturing
airplane
parts
and
accessories.
It
was
alleged
that
this
corporation
cornered
substantial
transactions
with
the
government.
One
of
the
witnesses
and
also
accused
in
the
case
was
Mr.
Lamarre
who
was
the
president
of
Aviation
Electric
Corporation.
During
his
testimony
before
the
Senate
Committee,
he
testified
under
oath
that
Mr.
Meyer
had
no
financial
interest
or
has
no
connection
to
Aviation
Electric.
It
was
also
established
that
somewhere
in
the
testimony,
he
also
made
a
contradictory
claim
that
indeed
Mr.
Meyer
SEILER vs LUCASFILM
FACTS:
35
FACTS:
In
their
complaint
for
quieting
of
title
and
damages
against
Margarita
Prodon,
3
the
respondents
averred
as
the
plaintiffs
that
their
parents,
the
late
spouses
Maximo
S.
Alvarez,
Sr.
and
Valentina
Clave,
were
the
registered
owners
of
that
parcel
of
land
covered
by
Transfer
Certificate
of
Title
(TCT)
No.
84797
of
the
Register
of
Deeds
of
Manila;
that
their
parents
had
been
in
possession
of
the
property
during
their
lifetime;
that
upon
their
parents'
deaths,
they
had
continued
the
possession
of
the
property
as
heirs,
paying
the
real
property
taxes
due
thereon;
that
they
could
not
locate
the
owner's
duplicate
copy
of
TCT
No.
84797,
but
the
original
copy
of
TCT
No.
84797
on
file
with
the
Register
of
Deeds
of
Manila
was
intact;
that
the
original
copy
contained
an
entry
stating
that
the
property
had
been
sold
to
defendant
Prodon
subject
to
the
right
of
repurchase;
and
that
the
entry
had
been
maliciously
done
by
Prodon
because
the
deed
of
sale
with
right
to
repurchase
covering
the
property
did
not
exist.
Consequently,
they
prayed
that
the
entry
be
cancelled,
and
that
Prodon
be
adjudged
liable
for
damages.
During
trial,
the
custodian
of
the
records
of
the
property
attested
that
the
copy
of
the
deed
of
sale
with
right
to
repurchase
could
not
be
found
in
the
files
of
the
Register
of
Deeds
of
Manila.
Trial
Court
ruled
in
favor
of
it
opined
that
although
the
deed
itself
could
not
be
presented
as
evidence
in
court,
its
contents
could
nevertheless
be
proved
by
secondary
evidence
in
accordance
with
Section
5,
Rule
130
of
the
Rules
of
Court,
upon
proof
of
its
execution
or
existence
and
of
the
cause
of
its
unavailability
being
without
bad
faith.
It
found
that
the
defendant
had
established
the
execution
and
existence
of
the
deed.
ISSUE:
whether
the
pre-requisites
for
the
admission
of
secondary
evidence
had
been
complied
with.
RULING:
The
Best
Evidence
Rule
stipulates
that
in
proving
the
terms
of
a
written
document
the
original
of
the
document
must
be
produced
in
court.
The
rule
excludes
any
evidence
other
than
the
original
writing
to
prove
the
contents
thereof,
unless
the
offeror
proves:
(a)
the
existence
or
due
execution
of
the
original;
(b)
the
loss
and
36
37
FACTS:
Nelson
Santos
(Santos)
applied
for
a
license
with
the
National
Food
Authority
(NFA)
to
engage
in
the
business
of
storing
not
more
than
30,000
sacks
of
palay
valued
at
P5,250,000.00
in
his
warehouse
at
Barangay
Malacampa,
Camiling,
Tarlac.
Under
Act
No.
3893
or
the
General
Bonded
Warehouse
Act,
as
amended,
the
approval
for
said
license
was
conditioned
upon
posting
of
a
cash
bond,
a
bond
secured
by
real
estate,
or
a
bond
signed
by
a
duly
authorized
bonding
company,
the
amount
of
which
shall
be
fixed
by
the
NFA
Administrator
at
not
less
than
thirty-three
and
one
third
percent
(33
1/3%)
of
the
market
value
of
the
maximum
quantity
of
rice
to
be
received.
38
by
Lagman.
Lagman's
insistence
on
novation
depends
on
the
validity,
nay,
existence
of
the
allegedly
novating
1990
Bond.
Country
Bankers
understandably
impugns
both.
We
see
the
point.
Lagman
presented
a
mere
photocopy
of
the
1990
Bond.
We
rule
as
inadmissible
such
copy.
Under
the
best
evidence
rule,
the
original
document
must
be
produced
whenever
its
contents
are
the
subject
of
inquiry.
A
photocopy,
being
a
mere
secondary
evidence,
is
not
admissible
unless
it
is
shown
that
the
original
is
unavailable.
Before
a
party
is
allowed
to
adduce
secondary
evidence
to
prove
the
contents
of
the
original,
the
offeror
must
prove
the
following:
(1)
the
existence
or
due
execution
of
the
original;
(2)
the
loss
and
destruction
of
the
original
or
the
reason
for
its
non-
production
in
court;
and
(3)
on
the
part
of
the
offeror,
the
absence
of
bad
faith
to
which
the
unavailability
of
the
original
can
be
attributed.
The
correct
order
of
proof
is
as
follows:
existence,
execution,
loss,
and
contents.
In
the
case
at
bar,
Lagman
mentioned
during
the
direct
examination
that
there
are
actually
four
(4)
duplicate
originals
of
the
1990
Bond:
the
first
is
kept
by
the
NFA,
the
second
is
with
the
Loan
Officer
of
the
NFA
in
Tarlac,
the
third
is
with
Country
Bankers
and
the
fourth
was
in
his
possession.
A
party
must
first
present
to
the
court
proof
of
loss
or
other
satisfactory
explanation
for
the
non-production
of
the
original
instrument.
When
more
than
one
original
copy
exists,
it
must
appear
that
all
of
them
have
been
lost,
destroyed,
or
cannot
be
produced
in
court
before
secondary
evidence
can
be
given
of
any
one.
A
photocopy
may
not
be
used
without
accounting
for
the
other
originals.
Despite
knowledge
of
the
existence
and
whereabouts
of
these
duplicate
originals,
Lagman
merely
presented
a
photocopy.
He
admitted
that
he
kept
a
copy
of
the
1990
Bond
but
he
could
no
longer
produce
it
because
he
had
already
severed
his
ties
with
Country
Bankers.
However,
he
did
not
explain
why
severance
of
ties
is
by
itself
reason
enough
for
the
non-availability
of
his
copy
of
the
bond
considering
that,
as
it
appears
from
the
1989
Bonds,
Lagman
himself
is
a
bondsman.
Neither
did
Lagman
explain
why
he
failed
to
secure
the
original
from
any
of
the
three
other
custodians
he
mentioned
in
his
testimony.
While
he
apparently
was
able
to
find
the
original
with
the
NFA
Loan
Officer,
he
was
merely
contented
with
producing
its
photocopy.
Clearly,
Lagman
failed
to
exert
diligent
efforts
to
produce
the
original.
Having
discounted
the
existence
and/or
validity
of
the
1990
Bond,
there
can
be
no
novation
to
speak
of.
39
FACTS:
Both
petitions
stemmed
from
a
construction
contract
denominated
as
Agreement
for
the
Execution
of
Builder's
Work
for
the
EDSA
Shangri-la
Hotel
Project
4
that
ESHRI
and
BF
executed
for
the
construction
of
the
EDSA
Shangri-la
Hotel
starting
May
1,
1991.
Under
this
arrangement,
BF
shall
submit
a
monthly
progress
billing
to
ESHRI
which
would
then
re-
measure
the
work
accomplished
and
prepare
a
Progress
Payment
Certificate
for
that
month's
progress
billing.
From
May
1,
1991
to
June
30,
1992,
BF
submitted
a
total
of
19
progress
billings
following
the
procedure
agreed
upon.
Based
on
Progress
Billing
Nos.
1
to
13,
ESHRI
paid
BF
PhP86,501,834.05.
According
to
BF,
however,
ESHRI,
for
Progress
Billing
Nos.
14
to
19,
did
not
re-
measure
the
work
done,
did
not
prepare
the
Progress
Payment
Certificates,
let
alone
remit
payment
for
the
inclusive
periods
covered.
In
this
regard,
BF
claimed
having
been
misled
into
working
continuously
on
the
project
by
ESHRI
which
gave
the
assurance
about
the
Progress
Payment
Certificates
already
being
processed.
After
several
futile
attempts
to
collect
the
unpaid
billings,
BF
filed,
on
July
26,
1993,
before
the
RTC
a
suit
for
a
sum
of
money
and
damages.
RTC
and
CA
ruled
in
favor
of
BF
ordering
the
ESHRI,
Rufo
B.
Colayco,
Rufino
L.
Samaniego,
Kuok
Khoon
Chen,
and
Kuok
Khoon
Tsen
to
pay
jointly
and
severally
respondent
BF
Corporation
(BF)
a
sum
of
money
with
interests
and
damages.
ISSUE:
Petitioners
fault
the
CA,
and
necessarily
the
trial
court,
on
the
matter
of
the
admission
in
evidence
of
the
photocopies
of
Progress
Billing
Nos.
14
to
19
and
the
complementing
Project
Manager's
Instructions
(PMIs)
and
the
Work
Variation
Orders
(WVOs).
Ruling:
The
only
actual
rule
that
the
term
"best
evidence"
denotes
is
the
rule
requiring
that
the
original
of
a
writing
must,
as
a
general
proposition,
be
produced
and
secondary
evidence
of
its
contents
is
not
admissible
except
where
the
original
cannot
be
had.
Rule
130,
Section
3
of
the
Rules
of
Court
enunciates
the
best
evidence
rule:
40
41
NPC V. CODILLA
42
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
44
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
FACSIMILE
COPY
What
about
a
FACSIMILE
COPY?
Facsimile
copies
are
considered
electronic
subject
to
the
qualification
provided
for
under
the
case
of
MCC
Industrial
Sales
vs.
Ssanyong
Corporation.
MCC
Industrial
Sales
vs.
Ssanyong
Corp.
v MCC
Industrial
Sales
is
a
domestic
corporation
engaged
in
the
business
of
importing
and
selling
stainless
steel
bars.
One
of
the
suppliers
of
its
products
is
Ssanyong,
an
international
trader.
Ssanyong
also,
sourced
their
products
from
manufacturers
abroad.
Over
the
years,
they
entered
into
various
transactions
and
their
practice
was
for
Ssanyong
to
send
by
fax,
the
invoices
detailing
the
specifications,
design,
qualities
and
quantities
of
the
products
ordered.
And
if
MCC
Sales
approves
it,
then
45
50
Indeed,
why
would
petitioner
open
an
L/C
for
the
second
half
of
the
transaction
if
there
was
no
first
half
to
speak
of?
The
logical
chain
of
events,
as
gleaned
from
the
evidence
of
both
parties,
started
with
the
petitioner
and
the
respondent
agreeing
on
the
sale
and
purchase
of
220MT
of
stainless
steel
at
US$1,860.00
per
MT.
This
initial
contract
was
perfected.
NUEZ V. CRUZ-APAO
IN
AUTHENTICATING
1
This
is
not
a
kulang
list
as
per
Sirs
discussion.
After
parties
to
the
MALIKSI V. COMELEC
revision
In
his
Extremely
Urgent
Motion
for
Reconsideration,
Maliksi
raises
the
following
argument:
I.
WITH
ALL
DUE
RESPECT,
THIS
HONORABLE
SUPREME
COURT
EN
BANC
GRAVELY
ERRED
IN
DISMISSING
THE
INSTANT
PETITION
DESPITE
A
CLEAR
VIOLATION
OF
PETITIONER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT
TO
DUE
PROCESS
OF
LAW
CONSIDERING
THAT
DECRYPTION,
PRINTING
AND
EXAMINATION
OF
THE
DIGITAL
IMAGES
OF
THE
BALLOTS,
WHICH
IS
THE
BASIS
FOR
THE
ASSAILED
14
SEPTEMBER
2012
RESOLUTION
OF
THE
PUBLIC
RESPONDENT,
WHICH
IN
TURN
AFFIRMED
THE
15
AUGUST
2012
RESOLUTION
OF
THE
COMELEC
FIRST
DIVISION,
WERE
DONE
INCONSPICUOUSLY
UPON
A
MOTU
PROPRIO
DIRECTIVE
OF
THE
COMELEC
FIRST
DIVISION
SANS
ANY
NOTICE
TO
THE
PETITIONER,
AND
FOR
THE
FIRST
TIME
ON
APPEAL.
II.
I.
Due
process
requirements
The
picture
images
of
the
ballots
are
electronic
documents
that
are
regarded
as
the
equivalents
of
the
original
official
ballots
themselves.
6
In
Vinzons-Chato
v.
HRET,
7
the
Court
held
that
"the
picture
images
of
the
ballots,
as
scanned
and
recorded
by
the
PCOS,
are
likewise
'official
ballots'
that
faithfully
capture
in
electronic
form
the
votes
cast
by
the
voter,
as
defined
by
Section
2
(3)
of
R.A.
No.
9369.
As
such,
the
printouts
thereof
are
the
functional
equivalent
of
the
paper
ballots
filled
out
by
the
voters
and,
thus,
may
be
used
for
purposes
of
revision
of
votes
in
an
electoral
protest."
(l)
xxx
xxx xxx
(m)
xxx
xxx xxx
PEOPLE V. CHATO
58
So,
remember:
ORDINARY
FACSIMILE
(Traditional)
NOT
electronic
59
In
some
ballot
boxes,
when
the
key
was
inserted
intothe
padlock,
the
upper
portion
of
the
lock
disconnected
from
its
body,
which
means
that
the
lock
had
been
previously
tampered
with.
c.
In
the
municipalities
where
Petitioner
(Panotes)
was
ableto
seal
the
ballot
boxes
with
packing
tape,
this
tape
seal
was
broken/cut/sliced,
which
means
that
the
ballot
boxes
had
been
opened
prior
to
the
initial
revision.
d. Some
of
the
self-locking
security
seal
was
not
properlyattached.
Inner
condition:
a. The
contents
of
the
ballot
box
e.g.,
ballots
and
the
documents
were
in
total
disarray,
which
means
that
it
was
tampered
with.
b. Some
of
the
Minutes
of
Voting
and
Election
Returns
were
MISSING
and
only
the
ballots
were
found
inside
the
ballot
box.
c. The
ballots
were
unnecessarily
folded
and/or
crumpled
inthe
clustered
precincts
where
the
votes
of
(Panotes)
were
60
HELD:
EDHCSI
GARCILLANO V. HRET
NACHURA,
J
p:
More
than
three
years
ago,
tapes
ostensibly
containing
a
63
64
majority
of
Senators
to
"constitute
a
quorum
to
do
business".
Applying
the
same
reasoning
in
Arnault
v.
Nazareno,
the
Senate
under
the
1987
Constitution
is
not
a
continuing
body
because
less
than
majority
of
the
Senators
continue
into
the
next
Congress.
The
consequence
is
that
the
Rules
of
Procedure
must
be
republished
by
the
Senate
after
every
expiry
of
the
term
of
twelve
Senators.
47
The
subject
was
explained
with
greater
lucidity
in
our
Resolution
48
(On
the
Motion
for
Reconsideration)
in
the
same
case,
viz.:
On
the
nature
of
the
Senate
as
a
"continuing
body",
this
Court
sees
fit
to
issue
a
clarification.
Certainly,
there
is
no
debate
that
the
Senate
as
an
institution
is
"continuing",
as
it
is
not
dissolved
as
an
entity
with
each
national
election
or
change
in
the
composition
of
its
members.
However,
in
the
conduct
of
its
day-to-day
business
the
Senate
of
each
Congress
acts
separately
and
independently
of
the
Senate
of
the
Congress
before
it.
The
Rules
of
the
Senate
itself
confirms
this
when
it
states:
RULE
XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
CASES
39-46
YU TEK & CO., plaintiff -appellant, vs.
BASILIO GONZALEZ, defendantappellant.
FACTS:
The
basis
of
this
action
is
a
written
contract
which
66
FACTS:
On
July
20,
1981,
herein
petitioner,
Guillermina
Baluyut
(Baluyut),
loaned
from
the
spouses
Eulogio
and
Salud
Poblete
the
sum
of
P850,000.00.
As
evidence
of
her
indebtedness,
Baluyut
signed,
on
even
date,
a
promissory
note
for
the
amount
borrowed.
Under
the
promissory
note,
the
loan
shall
mature
in
one
month.
To
secure
the
payment
of
her
obligation,
she
conveyed
to
the
Poblete
spouses,
by
way
of
a
real
estate
mortgage
contract,
a
house
and
lot
she
owns.
The
Poblete
spouses
subsequently
decided
to
extrajudicially
foreclose
the
real
estate
mortgage.
On
August
27,
1982,
the
mortgaged
property
was
sold
on
auction
by
the
Provincial
Sheriff
of
Rizal
to
the
Poblete
spouses
who
were
the
highest
bidders,
as
evidenced
by
a
Certificate
of
Sale
issued
pursuant
thereto.
Baluyut
failed
to
redeem
the
subject
property
within
the
period
required
by
law
prompting
Eulogio
Poblete
to
execute
an
Affidavit
of
Consolidation
of
Title.
Subsequently,
TCT
No.
43445
was
issued
in
the
name
of
Eulogio
and
the
heirs
of
Salud,
who
in
the
meantime,
died.
However,
Baluyut
remained
in
possession
of
the
subject
property
and
refused
to
vacate
the
same.
Hence,
Eulogio
and
the
heirs
of
Salud
filed
a
Petition
for
the
issuance
of
a
writ
of
possession
with
the
RTC
of
Pasig.
However,
before
Eulogio
and
the
heirs
of
Salud
could
take
possession
of
the
property,
Baluyut
filed
an
action
for
annulment
of
mortgage,
extrajudicial
foreclosure
67
FACTS:
68
FACTS:
The
petitioner
filed
a
complaint
for
forcible
entry
with
damages
against
the
private
respondents.
She
alleged
that
they
appropriated
the
produce
thereof
for
themselves,
and
refused
to
surrender
the
possession
of
the
same
despite
demands
made
by
the
petitioner.
The
complaint
was
dismissed.
RULING:
The
appellate
court
acted
correctly
in
upholding
the
trial
court's
action
in
admitting
the
testimony
of
Leoncia
Lasangue.
The
petitioner
claims
that
Leoncia
Lasangue
was
the
vendor
of
the
disputed
land.
The
petitioner
denies
that
Leoncia
Lasangue
sold
Lot
No.
5522
to
her.
She
alleges
that
this
lot
was
sold
to
her
by
one
Leonora
Lasangue,
who,
however,
was
never
presented
as
witness
in
any
of
the
proceedings
below
by
herein
petitioner.
As
explained
by
a
leading
commentator
on
our
Rules
of
Court,
the
parol
evidence
rule
does
not
apply,
and
may
not
properly
be
invoked
by
either
party
to
the
litigation
against
the
other,
where
at
least
one
of
the
parties
to
the
suit
is
not
party
or
a
privy
of
a
party
to
the
written
instrument
in
question
and
does
not
base
a
claim
on
the
instrument
or
assert
a
right
originating
in
the
instrument
or
the
relation
established
thereby.
In
Horn
v.
Hansen
(57
N.W.
315),
the
court
ruled:
70
FACTS:
The
lot
originally
belonged
to
Pastor
Pacres
(Pastor)
who
left
it
intestate
to
his
heirs
Margarita,
Simplicia,
Rodrigo,
Francisco,
Mario
(petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest)
and
Vearanda
(herein
petitioner).
Petitioners
admitted
that
at
the
time
of
Pastor's
death
in
1962,
his
heirs
were
already
occupying
definite
portions
of
Lot
No.
9.
The
front
portion
along
the
provincial
highway
was
occupied
by
the
co-owned
Pacres
ancestral
home,
and
beside
it
stood
Rodrigo's
hut
(also
fronting
the
provincial
highway).
Mario's
house
stood
at
the
back
of
the
ancestral
house.
Four
of
the
Pacres
siblings
(namely,
Rodrigo,
Francisco,
Simplicia
and
Margarita)
sold
their
shares
in
the
ancestral
home
and
the
lot
on
which
it
stood
to
Ramirez.
The
deeds
of
sale
described
the
subjects
thereof
as
"part
and
portion
of
the
300
square
meters
actually
in
possession
and
enjoyment
by
vendee
and
her
spouse,
Hilario
Ramirez,
by
virtue
of
a
contract
of
lease
in
their
favor."
Rodrigo,
Francisco,
and
Simplicia
sold
their
remaining
shares
in
Lot
No.
9
to
respondent
Cecilia
Ygoa
(Ygoa).
In
1983,
Margarita
also
sold
her
share
to
Ygoa.
The
total
area
sold
to
Ygoa
was
493
square
meters.
The
Pacres
siblings
executed
a
Confirmation
of
FACTS:
Lucia
Paras
(Lucia)
was
a
"concessionaire
of
a
sand
and
gravel
permit
at
Kabulihan,
Toledo
City[.]"
9
Kimwa
is
a
"construction
firm
that
sells
concrete
aggregates
to
contractors
and
haulers
in
.
.
.
Cebu."
On
December
6,
1994,
Lucia
and
Kimwa
entered
into
a
contract
denominated
"Agreement
for
Supply
of
Aggregates"
(Agreement).
Pursuant
to
the
Agreement,
Kimwa
hauled
10,000
cubic
meters
of
aggregates.
Sometime
after
this,
however,
Kimwa
stopped
hauling
aggregates.
Claiming
that
in
so
doing,
Kimwa
violated
the
Agreement,
Lucia,
joined
by
her
husband,
Bonifacio,
filed
the
Complaint
for
breach
of
contract
with
damages
that
is
now
subject
of
this
Petition.
72
FACTS:
Desiderio
Dalisay,
Sr.
(Dalisay,
Sr.)
bought
from
Juan
Abrea
and
R
i
c
a
r
t
e
A
g
u
d
o
n
g
t
w
o
p
a
r
c
e
l
s
o
f
l
a
n
d.
The
Deeds
of
Sale
indicated
the
name
of
Desiderio
Dalisay,
Jr.
(Dalisay,
Jr.)
as
vendee
per
instructions
of
Dalisay,
Sr.
for
expediency
and
convenience.
Dalisay,
Sr.
maintained
possession
of
the
two
parcels
of
land
from
the
date
of
sale
in
1973
until
his
death
in
1989.
They
became
part
of
the
landholdings
of
Desidal
Fruits,
Inc.
which
is
owned
by
Dalisay,
Sr.
In
1981,
the
parcels
of
land
were
leased
by
Dalisay,
Sr.
to
Davao
Premier
Fruits
Corporation.
Petitioner,
having
been
appointed
as
administratrix,
donated
100
square
meters
thereof
to
the
Barangay
San
Miguel
Water
System
Association,
Inc.
to
be
used
as
a
site
for
the
installation
of
the
water
pump
and
reservoir
of
the
said
water
system.
Petitioner
Dalisay,
Jr.
sold
Lot
No.
729-A
to
petitioner
Silvano
B.
Gaje
(Gaje).
Likewise,
on
even
date,
the
former
sold
Lot
No.
729-F
to
Emilio
C.
Mellonida
(Mellonida)
Patricia,
for
herself
and
in
her
capacity
as
special
administratrix
of
the
testate
estate
of
Dalisay,
Sr.,
initiated
with
the
RTC
a
Complaint
for
Annulment
of
Deeds
of
Sale
and
Reconveyance
with
prayer
for
Preliminary
Injunction
and
Temporary
Restraining
Order.
In
fine,
the
Complaint
prayed
for
the
declaration
of
nullity
of
the
Deeds
of
Sale
executed
by
Dalisay,
Jr.
in
favor
of
Gaje
and
Mellonida.
The
courts
a
quo
ruled
in
favor
of
the
respondent.
ISSUE:
WON
the
CA
gravely
erred
in
affirming
in
toto
the
ruling
of
the
trial
court
stating
that
the
parcel
of
land
belonged
to
Dalisay
Sr.
RULING:
Petitioners'
contention
that
the
Deeds
of
Sale
indicating
the
name
of
Dalisay,
Jr.
as
vendee
is
the
best
evidence
to
prove
his
ownership
of
the
parcels
of
land
does
not
hold
water.
In
the
case
at
bar,
Patricia,
is
not
party
to
the
Deeds
of
Sale.
The
rule
excluding
extrinsic
73
FACTS:
This
action
was
instituted
in
the
Court
of
First
Instance
of
Occidental
Negros
by
Zacarias
Robles
against
Lizarraga
Hermanos,
a
mercantile
partnership
organized
under
the
laws
of
the
Philippine
Islands,
for
the
purpose
of
recovering
compensation
for
improvements
made
by
the
plaintiff
upon
the
hacienda
"Nahalinan"
and
the
value
of
implements
and
farming
equipment
supplied
to
the
hacienda
by
the
plaintiff,
as
well
as
damages
for
breach
of
contract.
Hacienda
"Nahalinan,"
belonged
originally
to
the
spouses
Zacarias
Robles
and
Anastacia
de
la
Rama,
parents
of
the
present
plaintiff,
Zacarias
Robles.
Upon
the
death
of
Zacarias
Robles,
sr.,
several
years
ago,
his
widow
Anastacia
de
la
Rama
was
appointed
administratrix
of
his
estate;
she
leased
the
hacienda
to
the
plain-
tiff,
Zacarias
Robles,
for
the
period
of
six
years
beginning
at
the
end
of
the
milling
season
in
May,
1915,
and
terminating
at
the
end
of
the
milling
season
in
May,
1920.
It
was
stipulated
that
any
permanent
improvements
necessary
to
the
cultivation
and
exploitation
of
the
hacienda
should
be
made
at
the
expense
of
the
lessee
without
right
to
indemnity
at
the
end
of
the
term.
Three
years
before
the
lease
was
to
expire,
Anastacia
de
la
Rama
died,
leaving
as
heirs
Zacarias
Robles
(the
plaintiff),
Jose
Robles,
Evarista
Robles,
Magdalena
Robles,
Felix
Robles,
and
the
children
of
a
deceased
daughter,
Purificacion
Robles.
Shortly
thereafter
Zacarias
Robles,
Jose
Robles,
and
Evarista
Robles
acquired
by
purchase
the
shares
of
their
coheirs
in
the
entire
inheritance;
and
at
this
juncture
Lizarraga
Hermanos
came
forward
with
a
proposal
to
buy
from
these
three
all
of
the
property
belonging
to
the
Robles
estate.
In
course
of
the
negotiations
an
obstacle
was
encountered
in
the
fact
that
the
lease
of
Zacarias
Robles
still
had
over
two
years
to
run.
It
was
accordingly
proposed
that
he
should
surrender
the
last
two
years
of
his
lease
and
permit
Lizarraga
Hermanos
to
take
possession
as
purchaser
in
June,
1918.
The
plaintiff
agreed
to
the
proposal
that
the
Cases
47-52
SPOUSES WILFREDO and ANGELA
AMONCIO, petitioners, vs. AARON
GO BENEDICTO, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioners
Wilfredo
and
Angela
Amoncio
entered
into
a
contract
of
lease
with
a
certain
Ernesto
Garcia.
Petitioners
entered
into
another
contract
of
lease,
this
time
with
respondent
Aaron
Go
Benedicto
over
a
240
sq.
m.
portion
of
the
same
property.
Garcia
pre-terminated
his
contract
with
petitioners.
Respondent,
on
the
other
hand,
stayed
on
until
June
8,
2000.
According
to
petitioners,
respondent
stopped
paying
his
monthly
rentals
in
December
1999.
Shortly
thereafter,
petitioners
claimed
they
discovered
respondent
putting
up
improvements
on
another
120
sq.
m.
portion
of
their
property
which
was
never
leased
to
him
nor
to
Garcia.
They
added
he
had
also
occupied
Garcia's
portion
immediately
after
the
latter
left.
Petitioners
filed
in
the
RTC
of
Quezon
City
a
case
for
recovery
of
possession
of
real
property
against
respondent.
respondent
denied
petitioners'
accusations
and
alleged
that
it
was
them
who
owed
him
money.
According
to
him,
he
and
petitioner
Wilfredo
Amoncio
agreed
to
construct
five
commercial
buildings
on
petitioners'
property.
One
of
the
buildings
was
to
go
to
Garcia,
two
to
petitioners
and
the
last
two
to
him.
They
also
agreed
that
he
was
to
finance
the
construction
and
petitioners
were
to
pay
him
for
the
two
buildings
assigned
to
them.
Respondent
added
he
was
to
pay
the
rentals
for
five
years
and
surrender
the
buildings
(on
his
leased
portion)
to
petitioners
after
the
lapse
of
said
period.
However,
in
June
2000,
he
vacated
the
premises
after
he
and
petitioners
could
no
longer
settle
things
amicably.
RTC
gave
credence
to
respondent's
version
and
dismissed
petitioners'
case
for
lack
of
factual
and
legal
basis.
On
appeal,
petitioners
likewise
contended
the
trial
court
disregarded
the
parol
evidence
rule
which
disallowed
the
court
from
looking
into
any
other
evidence
relating
to
the
agreement
of
the
parties
outside
the
written
75
mistake
or
misrepresentation . . .
FACTS:
Song
Fo
&
Co.,
of
Manila,
through
its
manager
Carlos
Palanca,
entered
into
a
contract
with
Fred
Wilson
&
Co.
for
the
purchase
of
a
distilling
apparatus.
Wilson
&
Co.
ordered
the
apparatus
of
Turner,
Schon
&
Co.,
London.
Five
months
after
the
machine
was
installed,
Palanca
wrote
Wilson
&
Co.
that
the
rectifying
machine
had
been
examined
by
a
number
of
competent
persons
who
stated
that
the
machine
was
not
capable
of
producing
the
amount
of
alcohol
stipulated
in
the
contract.
Getting
no
satisfaction
from
the
reply
of
Wilson
&
Co.,
action
for
damages
for
breach
of
contract
was
begun
It
is
around
the
first
clause
of
the
contract
(Exhibit
D)
that
all
the
argument
centers.
Appellant
would
require
that
all
the
terms
of
the
contract
be
given
effect
with
special
emphasis
upon
the
phrase
"de
un
grado
de
96-97
Gay
Lussac.
Carlos
Palanca,
the
manager
of
Song
Fo
&
Co.,
and
now
the
successor
of
the
company,
testified
that
he
told
the
agents
of
Wilson
&
Co.,
that
he
need
a
machine
that
would
produce
at
least
6,000
liters
of
alcohol
a
day.
The
agent
of
Wilson
&
Co.,
James
F.
Loader,
squarely
contradicted
this
on
the
stand
and
said
that
Palanca
asked
him
to
get
a
price
on
an
apparatus
to
treat
6,000
liters.
ISSUE:
Lalis
sila
kay
ingon
ang
plaintiff
the
apparatus
cant
produce
6,000
liters
of
alcohol
per
24
hour
work,
respondent
on
the
other
hand
said
that,
it
has
complied
with
the
terms
of
the
agreement
because
the
apparatus
has
the
capacity
of
6,000
liters
per
day
and
produces
an
alcohol
grade
96-97
Gay
Lussac.
RULING:
In
connection
with
the
distilling
of
liquor,
the
FACTS:
The
evidence
of
record
discloses
the
following
facts:
On
November
6,
1956,
plaintiffs
entered
into
a
contract
of
conditional
sale
with
one
Pedro
del
Rosario
covering
a
parcel
of
land
in
Quezon
City
described
in
Transfer
Certificate
of
Title
No.
11483
which
has
a
total
area
of
77,772
square
meters
in
consideration
of
a
purchase
price
of
P10.00
per
square
meter.
To
guarantee
the
performance
of
the
conditions
stipulated
therein
a
performance
bond
in
the
amount
of
P100,000.00
was
executed
by
Pedro
del
Rosario.
Del
Rosario
was
given
possession
of
the
land
for
development
as
a
subdivision
at
his
expense.
He
undertook
to
pay
for
the
subdivision
survey,
the
construction
of
roads,
the
installation
of
light
and
water,
and
the
income
tax
plaintiffs
may
be
required
to
pay
arising
from
the
transaction,
in
consideration
of
which
Del
Rosario
was
allowed
to
buy
the
property
for
P600,000.00
within
a
period
of
two
years
from
November
6,
1956
with
the
condition
that,
upon
his
failure
to
pay
said
price
when
due,
all
the
improvements
introduced
by
him
would
automatically
become
part
of
the
property
without
any
right
on
his
part
to
reimbursement
and
the
conditional
sale
would
be
rescinded.
Unable
to
pay
the
consideration
of
P600,000.00
as
agreed
upon,
and
in
order
to
avoid
court
litigation,
plaintiffs
and
Del
Rosario,
together
with
defendant
Socorro
A.
Ramos,
who
turned
out
to
be
a
partner
of
the
latter,
entered
into
a
contract
of
rescission
on
November
24,
1958.
To
release
the
performance
bond
and
to
enable
defendant
to
pay
some
of
the
lots
for
her
own
purposes,
plaintiffs
allowed
defendant
to
buy
20
of
the
lots
herein
involved
at
the
rate
of
P16.00
per
square
meter
on
condition
that
she
will
assume
the
payment
of
P50,000.00
as
her
share
in
the
construction
of
roads
and
other
improvements
required
in
the
subdivision.
This
situation
led
to
the
execution
of
the
contract
of
sale
Exhibit
A
subject
of
the
present
foreclosure
proceedings.
Defendant
contends
that
the
contract
of
sale
Exhibit
A
does
not
express
the
true
agreement
of
the
parties
because
certain
important
conditions
agreed
upon
were
not
included
therein
by
plaintiffs'
counsel
among
which
is
the
promise
assumed
by
plaintiffs
that
they
would
FACTS:
This
is
an
action
for
specific
performance
filed
by
the
petitioner
for
the
unpaid
balance
from
the
purchase
of
tractors
by
the
latter
from
the
former.
The
defendants,
in
their
Answer,
admitted
the
execution
of
the
two
promissory
notes,
but
contended
that
the
same
had
been
novated
by
a
subsequent
agreement
contained
in
a
letter
(Exh.
L)
sent
by
Filomeno
C.
Kintanar,
Manager,
Board
of
Liquidators
of
the
LASADECO,
giving
the
defendant
Salud
C.
de
Garcia
an
extension
up
to
May
31,
1957,
within
which
to
pay
the
account,
and
since
the
complaint
was
filed
on
February
20,
1957,
they
claimed
that
the
action
was
premature
and
prayed
that
the
complaint
be
dismissed.
The
plaintiff
in
the
reply
and
answer
to
the
counterclaim,
admitted
the
due
execution
and
genuineness
of
the
letter
marked
Exhibit
L,
but
contended
that
the
same
did
not
express
the
true
intent
and
agreement
of
the
parties,
thereby
placing
the
fact
in
issue,
in
the
pleadings.
At
the
trial,
the
defendant
admitted
all
the
documentary
evidence
adduced
by
the
plaintiffs,
showing
that
they
were
indebted
to
said
plaintiff.
However,
when
the
plaintiff
presented
Atty.
Lucido
A.
Guinto,
Legal
Officer
79
agreement.
SEAOIL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
AUTOCORP GROUP and PAUL Y.
RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Defendant-appellant
Seaoil
purchased
one
unit
of
LC
Excavator,
from
plaintiff-appellee
Autocorp.
Furthermore,
it
was
agreed
that
despite
delivery
of
the
excavator,
ownership
thereof
was
to
remain
with
Autocorp
until
the
obligation
is
fully
settled.
Seaoil's
contractor,
Romeo
Valera,
issued
12
postdated
checks.
However,
Autocorp
refused
to
accept
the
checks
because
they
were
not
under
Seaoil's
name.
Hence,
Yu,
on
behalf
of
Seaoil,
signed
and
issued
12
postdated
checks
for
P259,376.62
each
with
Autocorp
as
payee.
The
relationship
started
to
turn
sour
when
the
first
check
bounced.
However,
it
was
remedied
when
Seaoil
replaced
it
with
a
good
check.
However,
the
remaining
10
checks
were
not
honored
by
the
bank
since
Seaoil
requested
that
payment
be
stopped.
It
was
downhill
from
thereon.
Despite
repeated
demands,
Seaoil
refused
to
pay
the
remaining
balance.
Autocorp
filed
a
complaint
for
recovery
of
personal
property
with
damages
and
replevin.
Seaoil,
on
the
other
hand,
alleges
that
the
transaction
is
not
as
simple
as
described
above.
It
claims
that
Seaoil
and
Autocorp
were
only
utilized
as
conduits
to
settle
the
obligation
of
one
foreign
entity
named
Uniline
Asia
(herein
referred
to
as
Uniline),
in
favor
of
another
foreign
entity,
Focus
Point
International,
Incorporated
(Focus
for
short).
Paul
Rodriguez
(Rodriguez
for
brevity)
is
a
stockholder
and
director
of
Autocorp.
He
is
also
the
FACTS:
Alfonso
Ureta(Alfonso)
begot
14
children,
namely,
Policronio,
Liberato,
Narciso,
Prudencia,
Vicente,
Francisco,
Inocensio,
Roque,
Adela,
Wenefreda,
Merlinda,
Benedicto,
Jorge,
and
Andres.
The
children
of
Policronio
(Heirs
of
Policronio),
are
opposed
to
the
rest
of
Alfonso's
children
and
their
descendants
(Heirs
of
Alfonso).
Sometime
in
October
1969,
Alfonso
and
four
of
his
children,
namely,
Policronio,
Liberato,
Prudencia,
and
Francisco,
met
at
the
house
of
Liberato.
Francisco,
who
was
then
a
municipal
judge,
suggested
that
in
order
to
reduce
the
inheritance
taxes,
their
father
should
make
it
appear
that
he
had
sold
some
of
his
lands
to
his
children.
Accordingly,
Alfonso
executed
four
(4)
Deeds
of
Sale
covering
several
parcels
of
land
in
favor
of
Policronio,
Liberato,
Prudencia,
and
his
common-law
wife,
Valeriana
Dela
Cruz.
The
Deed
of
Sale
executed
on
October
25,
1969,
in
favor
of
Policronio,
covered
six
parcels
of
land,
which
are
the
properties
in
dispute
in
this
case.
Alfonso
continued
to
own,
possess
and
enjoy
the
Issue:
whether
under
the
"Continuing
Guaranty"
signed
on
April
2,
1979
petitioner
Willex
Plastic
may
be
held
jointly
and
severally
liable
with
Inter-Resin
Industrial
for
the
amount
by
Interbank
to
Manilabank.
HELD:
SC
disagreed
and
ruled
that
PER
can
be
waived
by
failing
to
object.
Willex
failed
to
object
to
the
oral
testimony
tending
to
prove
the
actual
intention
of
the
parties.
What
Willex
Plastic
has
overlooked
is
the
fact
that
evidence
aliunde
was
introduced
in
the
trial
court
to
explain
that
it
was
actually
to
secure
payment
to
Interbank
(formerly
IUCP)
of
amounts
paid
by
the
latter
to
Manilabank
that
the
"Continuing
Guaranty"
was
executed.
In
its
complaint
below,
ALVAREZ V. RAMIREZ
1.
rule are:
other
or
the
latter's
direct
descendants
or
ascendants."
The
reasons
given
for
the
1.
There
is
identity
of
interests
between
husband
and
wife;
2.
If
one
were
to
testify
for
or
against
the
other,
there
is
consequent
danger
of
perjury;
3.
The
policy
of
the
law
is
to
guard
the
security
and
confidences
of
private
life,
even
at
the
risk
of
an
occasional
failure
of
justice,
and
to
prevent
domestic
disunion
and
unhappiness;
and
4.
Where
there
is
want
of
domestic
tranquility
there
is
danger
of
punishing
one
spouse
through
the
hostile
testimony
of
the
other.
SC
said
the
purpose
of
this
rule
is
to
preserve
marital
relations.
The
reason
for
the
rule
does
not
exist
anymore,
there
is
no
basis
to
apply
the
disqualification
rule.
It
should
be
stressed
that
as
shown
by
the
records,
prior
to
the
commission
of
the
offense,
the
relationship
between
petitioner
and
his
wife
was
already
strained.
In
fact,
they
were
separated
de
facto
almost
six
months
before
the
incident.
Indeed,
the
evidence
and
facts
presented
reveal
that
the
preservation
of
the
marriage
between
petitioner
and
Esperanza
is
no
longer
an
interest
the
State
aims
to
protect.
REQUISITES
A.
Valid
Marriage:
what
happens
in
void
marriage?
The
popular
opinion
is
that
if
the
marriage
is
void,
this
prohibition
rule
will
not
apply.
But
this
must
be
revisited
to
be
in
line
with
recent
case
where
SC
held
that
a
void
marriage
is
presumed
valid
unless
declared
void
by
the
court.
B.
Witness
Spouse
can
be
or
cannot
be
a
party
to
the
case,
but
the
OTHER
spouse
for
whom
or
against
whom
the
testimony
of
the
witness
spouse
is
offered,
must
be
a
party
to
the
case.
C.
This
disqualification
rule
exist
so
long
as
the
marriage
subsist.
84
Different
in
Privileged
Communication
Rule
between
SPS
because
the
H
nor
the
W
cannot
disclose
any
information
s/he
may
have
obtained
during
the
existence
of
the
marriage
even
if
the
marriage
is
dissolved.
__________________________________________________
_____________________________________
Isidoro
>
Andres
>
[entrusted
to
Cristina]
>
Heirs
of
Andres
-
-
-
Manuel
>
Nieces
and
Nephews
of
Manuel
(?)
[basta
they
are
the
children
of
Felicisimo
Guerrero
who
helped
Manuel
file
an
application
for
registration
of
land
with
the
RTC.]
>
St
Claire
-
Manuel
is
a
cousin
of
the
Heirs
of
Andres
__________________________________________________
______________________________________
The
spouses
Isidoro
Guerrero
and
Panay
Ramos
were
the
absolute
owners
of
the
disputed
property,
which
is
a
parcel
of
land
located
at
San
Dionisio,
Paraaque,
Rizal,
with
an
area
of
42,299
square
meters,
more
or
less.
The
spouses
had
six
children,
named
Andres,
Juliana,
Aurelio,
Leona,
Jose
and
Cristina,
and
all
surnamed
Guerrero.
Panay
Ramos
predeceased
Isidoro
Guerrero.
Before
his
demise,
Isidoro
Guerrero
verbally
willed
and
ordained
that
the
questioned
lot
be
assigned
and
adjudicated
to
Andres
Guerrero
as
his
share
in
the
inheritance,
the
other
children
having
been
assigned
other
lots.
Accordingly,
upon
the
death
of
Isidoro
Guerrero,
Andres
Guerrero
physically
possessed
the
lot
and
cultivated
it
through
his
tenant
Dominador
Ramirez,
who
earned
a
50%
share
in
the
net
produce,
the
other
50%
being
retained
by
Andres
Guerrero
who
defrayed
the
cultivation
expenses
and
real
estate
taxes
on
the
property.
Shortly
after
the
beginning
of
the
Japanese
occupation,
Andres
Guerrero
entrusted
the
land
to
his
sister,
Cristina
Guerrero,
and
allowed
her
to
have
the
property
cultivated
and
to
retain
the
owner's
share
in
the
harvests.
The
arrangement
between
brother
and
sister
was
that
Cristina
Guerrero
could
continue
in
the
cultivation
of
the
land
and
enjoyment
of
the
owner's
share
in
the
produce
for
as
long
as
she
needed
the
property.
Dominador
Ramirez
continued
his
tenancy
until
shortly
before
the
death
of
Andres
Guerrero.
Sometime
in
July
1943,
Andres
Guerrero
died
survived
by
his
widow,
Segunda
Laquindanum,
and
their
children,
who
are
the
petitioners
in
this
case.
Cristina
Guerrero
continued
as
trustee
of
the
deceased
Andres
Guerrero.
The
complaints
further
alleged
that
as
early
as
December
10,
1957,
the
land
was
surveyed
by
the
Bureau
of
Lands
for
and
in
the
name
of
Andres
Guerrero
as
Lot
No.
4752,
Case
No.
4,
Cadastre
No.
229
of
the
Paraaque
Cadastre.
Sometime
during
the
latter
part
of
1971
certain
people
who
introduced
themselves
as
agents
or
buyers
of
the
land
approached
some
of
the
plaintiffs
in
order
to
85
HELD:
Laura
and
Jose
Cervantes
must
be
allowed
to
testify.
Upon
the
facts
and
under
the
law,
this
Court
is
fully
persuaded
that
the
affirmative
rulings
of
both
the
trial
court
and
the
Court
of
Appeals
were
made
in
error.
I.
The
plain
truth
is
that
Laura
Cervantes
and
Jose
Cervantes
are
1.)
not
parties
in
the
present
case,
and
2.)
neither
are
they
assignors
of
the
parties
3.)
nor
"persons
in
whose
behalf
a
case
is
prosecuted."
They
are
mere
witnesses
by
whose
testimonies
the
plaintiffs
aimed
to
establish
that
it
was
not
Cristina
Guerrero,
but
Andres
Guerrero,
who
owned
the
disputed
land
at
the
time
of
its
alleged
sale
to
Manuel
Guerrero;
that
Cristina
Guerrero
did
not
really
sell
but
merely
mortgaged
the
property
to
Manuel
Guerrero.
"Following
this
rule
of
construction,
it
may
be
said
that
incompetency
to
testify
established
in
the
provision
above
quoted,
affects
only
the
persons
therein
mentioned,
and
no
others,
that
is,
only
parties
plaintiff
or
their
assignors,
persons
in
whose
behalf
a
case
is
prosecuted.
Mere
witnesses
who
are
neither
parties
plaintiff,
nor
their
assignors,
nor
persons
in
whose
behalf
a
case
is
prosecuted,
are
not
included
in
the
prohibition."
(Moran,
Comments
on
the
Rules
of
Court,
1970
ed.,
Vol.
5,
p.
166.)
II.
ABRAHAM V. RECTO-KASTEN
Parties
to
the
case:
Background
of
the
Case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
87
5.
Decision
of
the
lower
courts:
6.
7.
The
issue
presented
before
us:
8.
Ruling
of
the
Supreme
Court:
9.
However,
there
was
a
waiver
of
the
prohibition
when
the
counsel
for
the
administratrix
extensively
cross-examined
the
witness
on
the
very
matters
subject
of
the
prohibition.
It
was
for
this
reason
that
the
trial
judge
eventually
overruled
the
counsel's
previous
general
and
continuing
objection
and
admitted
the
testimony
of
the
witness.
13. Furthermore,
it
is
difficult
to
believe
that
the
counsel's
lengthy
cross-examination
on
the
prohibited
matters
was
merely
for
the
purpose
of
establishing
the
"motive,
prejudices
and
predilection"
of
the
witness.
In
this
connection,
it
has
been
said:
".
.
.
The
reason
for
the
rule
apparently
is
that
a
litigant
cannot
be
permitted
to
speculate
as
to
what
his
examination
of
a
witness
may
bring
forth.
Having
made
his
selection
of
one
of
two
courses
which
he
may
pursue,
he
has
no
light,
after
he
discovers
that
the
course
selected
is
not
to
his
advantage,
and
after
he
has
put
the
opposite
party
to
the
expense,
and
has
consumed
the
time
of
the
courts
in
a
trial
of
the
case
in
accordance
with
the
course
selected,
to
change
his
position
and
make
another
and
different
selection.
Such
course
would
be
unfair
both
to
the
opposite
party
and
to
the
court
and
should
not
be
countenanced
in
any
court
of
justice.
(IV
Francisco,
RULES
OF
COURT,
876,
877,
citing
the
case
of
Comstock's
Adm'r
vs.
Jacobs,
89
VT.
133,
94
A.
497,
Ann.
Cas.
1913A,
465)".
88
GONI V. CA
2.
3.
4.
Villegas
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Tabacalera
(where
Villanueva
Vicente
Hacienda
Sarria
Sale)
Villanueva
|
|
(Guarantor
for
(Offeree
for
Fields
3,
4,
and
13
of
Hacienda
Dulce)
5.
Either
because
the
amount
realized
from
the
transaction
between
Villanueva
and
Villegas
still
fell
short
of
the
purchase
price
of
the
three
haciendas,
or
in
consideration
of
the
guaranty
undertaken
by
private
respondent
Vicente,
Villanueva
contracted
or
promised
to
sell
to
the
latter
fields
nos.
3,
4
and
13
of
Hacienda
Dulce
Nombre
de
Maria
for
the
sum
of
12.
13.
14.
15.
Decision
of
the
lower
courts:
16. The
trial
court
ordered
the
defendants-heirs
to
deliver
to
Vicente
field
no.
3,
to
execute
a
formal
deed
of
sale
over
fields
3,
4,
and
13.
The
decision
of
the
RTC
was
affirmed
by
the
CA
with
slight
modification
as
to
damages.
Issues
presented
before
us:
17. Petitioners
(the
heirs
of
Villanueva)
presents
this
question
of
law
on
evidence
among
others
upon
appeal
by
certiorari:
May
respondent
Gaspar
Vicente
testify
on
matters
of
fact
occurring
before
the
death
of
Villanueva,
which
constitutes
a
claim
or
demand
upon
his
estate
in
violation
of
rule
130,
Sec.
20,
par
(a)?
Ruling
of
the
Supreme
Court:
18. The
decisions
of
the
lower
courts
must
be
affirmed
insofar
as
the
admissibility
of
the
testimony
of
Vicente
is
concerned.
We
find
that
neither
the
trial
nor
appellate
court
erred
in
ruling
for
the
admissibility
in
evidence
of
private
respondent
22.
23.
24.
25.
1.
DMS
does
not
apply
if
the
estate
of
the
deceased
interposes
a
counterclaim
against
the
complainant
Anastacia
Vianzon
FACTS:
92
FACTS:
Main
issue
in
the
case
is
the
ownership
of
1,500
shares
of
stock
in
E.
Razon
Inc.
covered
by
a
certificate
of
stock
registered
under
the
name
of
Juan
T.
Chuidian
in
the
books
of
the
corporation.
In
his
complaint,
Vicente
B.
Chuidian
prayed
that
defendants
be
ordered
to
deliver
certificates
of
stocks
representing
the
share
holdings
of
the
deceased
Juan
T.
Chuidian
in
the
E.
Razon,
Inc.
with
a
prayer
for
an
order
to
restrain
the
defendants
from
disposing
of
the
said
shares
of
stock,
for
a
writ
of
preliminary
attachment
v.
properties
of
defendants
having
possession
of
shares
of
stock
and
for
receivership
of
the
properties
of
defendant
corporation
.
.
..
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Manila,
declared
that
Enrique
Razon,
the
petitioner
in
G.R.
No.
74306
is
the
owner
of
the
said
shares
of
stock.
Court
of
Appeals,
however,
reversed
the
trial
court's
decision
and
ruled
that
Juan
T.
Chuidian,
the
deceased
father
of
petitioner
Vicente
B.
Chuidian
in
G.R.
No.
74315
is
the
owner
of
the
shares
of
stock.
Petitioner
Enrique
Razon
assails
the
appellate
court's
decision
on
its
alleged
misapplication
of
the
dead
man's
statute
rule
under
Section
20
(a)
Rule
130
of
the
Rules
of
Court.
According
to
him,
the
"dead
man's
statute"
rule
is
not
applicable
to
the
instant
case.
Moreover,
the
private
respondent,
as
plaintiff
in
the
case
did
not
object
to
his
oral
testimony
regarding
the
oral
agreement
between
him
and
the
deceased
Juan
T.
Chidian
that
the
ownership
of
the
shares
of
stock
was
actually
vested
in
the
petitioner
unless
the
deceased
opted
to
pay
the
same;
and
that
the
FACTS:
FACTS:
Dr.
Sityar,
the
victim
of
the
murder
was
the
physician
who
performed
surgical
operation
upon
the
defendants
wife.
After
her
release
from
the
hospital
she
was
required
to
go
several
times
to
the
clinic
of
Doctor
Sityar
On
these
occasions
she
was
accompanied
by
her
husband,
the
defendant.
The
defendant
states
that
on
one
of
the
visits,
that
of
March
20,
1924,
Doctor
Sityar
sent
him
out
on
an
errand
to
buy
some
medicine,
and
that
while
the
defendant
was
absent
on
this
errand
Doctor
Sityar
outraged
the
wife.
The
defendant,
suffering
from
some
stomach
trouble,
entered
the
Philippine
General
Hospital
where
he
remained
until
May
18,
1924,
and
where
he
was
under
the
care
of
two
other
physicians.
While
in
the
hospital
he
received
a
letter
(Exhibit
5)
from
Doctor
Sityar
asking
for
the
immediate
settlement
of
the
account
for
the
professional
services
rendered
his
wife.
Shortly
after
his
release
from
the
hospital
the
defendant
sought
an
interview
with
Doctor
Sityar
and
went
to
the
latter's
office
several
times
without
finding
him
in.
On
one
of
these
occasions
he
was
asked
by
an
employee
of
the
office,
the
nurse
Cabanera,
if
he
had
come
to
settle
his
account,
to
which
the
defendant
answered
that
he
did
not
believe
he
owed
the
doctor
anything.
In
the
afternoon
of
May
26th
the
defendant
again
went
to
the
office
of
the
deceased
and
found
him
there
alone.
According
to
the
evidence
of
the
prosecution,
the
defendant
then,
without
any
preliminary
quarrel
between
the
two,
attacked
the
deceased
with
a
fan-knife
and
stabbed
him
twice.
The
deceased
made
an
effort
to
escape
but
the
defendant
pursued
him
and
overtaking
him
in
the
hall
outside
the
office,
inflicted
another
wound
upon
him
and
as
a
consequence
of
the
three
wounds
he
died
within
a
few
minutes.
The
defendant
made
his
escape
but
surrendered
himself
to
the
Constabulary
at
Malolos,
Bulacan,
in
the
evening
of
the
following
day.
The
defendant
admits
that
he
killed
the
deceased
but
maintains
that
he
did
so
in
self-defense.
97
FACTS:
98
Regala vs Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
The
matters
raised
herein
are
an
offshoot
of
the
institution
of
the
Complaint
on
July
31,
1987
before
the
Sandiganbayan
by
the
Republic
of
the
Philippines,
through
the
Presidential
Commission
on
Good
Government
against
Eduardo
M.
Cojuangco,
Jr.,
as
one
of
the
principal
2.
3.
100
101
PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
Background
of
this
case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Issues
presented
before
us:
5.
Ruling
of
the
Court:
6.
7.
102
clients
3.
4.
5.
6.
US v. Gordon-Nikkar
2.
9.
intended crime.
PURPOSE:
To
encourage
free
flow
of
information
between
the
lawyer
and
the
client,
the
objective
being,
to
enable
the
lawyer
to
effectively
perform
his
official
function
as
counsel.
Facts:
REQUISITES:
1.
2.
3.
Issue
presented
before
the
Court:
Held:
No.
The
privilege
still
covers
instances
where
the
common/joint
defense
exists.
When
a
client
communicates
with
the
lawyer
of
the
other
party
pursuant
to
a
common
defense,
the
lawyer
of
the
other
party
is
deemed
the
lawyer
of
the
other.
As
in
this
case,
but
when
there
is
no
client-lawyer
relationship
between
the
accused
and
the
lawyer
of
the
other
accused
who
hired
the
services
of
the
investigator
who
interviewed
the
accused
it
is
obvious
that
the
interview
was
contracted
pursuant
to
a
matter
of
common
defense--to
discredit
the
testimony
of
Mr.
Benton
and
his
diary;
where
it
not
for
this
common
purpose,
the
interview
would
not
have
been
conducted.
SC
called
this
as
the
Common
Defense
or
Joint
Interest
Privilege.
SC
said
that
any
communication
that
one
party
disclose
to
another
party
on
matters
of
common
interests
covered/protected
by
the
client-lawyer
privilege
communication
rule.
This
US
case
has
persuasive
effect
in
our
jurisdiction.
50
1.
The
McPartlin
Statements
and
the
Attorney-Client
Privilege
Among
Co-
defendants
and
Their
Counsel
51
Throughout
the
period
covered
by
the
indictment,
Benton
kept
diaries,
or
appointment
calendars,
in
which
he
made
notes
concerning
meetings
and
telephone
conversations,
naming
the
persons
involved
and
often
recording
the
substance
of
the
conversations.
The
Benton
diaries
figured
prominently
in
the
government's
case,
for
they
corroborated
much
of
his
testimony.
52
Destroying
Benton's
credibility
was
important
to
Ingram,
as
it
was
to
the
other
59
Ingram
argues
that
the
co-defendants'
defenses
must
be
in
all
respects
compatible
if
the
joint-defense
privilege
is
to
be
applicable.
The
cases
do
not
establish
such
a
limitation,15
and
there
is
no
reason
to
impose
it.
Rule
503(b)(3)
of
the
proposed
Federal
Rules
of
Evidence,
as
approved
by
the
Supreme
Court,
stated
that
the
privilege
applies
to
communications
by
a
client
"to
a
lawyer
representing
another
in
a
matter
of
common
interest."
See
2
J.
Weinstein,
Evidence
503-52
(1977).
The
Advisory
Committee's
Note
to
proposed
Rule
503(b)
makes
it
clear
that
the
joint-
interest
privilege
is
not
limited
to
situations
in
which
the
positions
of
the
parties
are
compatible
in
all
respects:
60
The
third
type
of
communication
occurs
in
the
"joint
defense"
or
"pooled
information"
situation,
where
different
lawyers
represent
clients
who
have
Some
interests
in
common.
.
.
.
The
rule
does
not
apply
to
situations
where
there
is
No
common
interest
to
be
promoted
by
a
joint
consultation,
and
the
parties
meet
on
a
purely
adversary
basis.
61
Quoted
in
2
J.
Weinstein,
Supra,
at
503-6
to
503-7.
(Emphasis
supplied
and
citations
omitted.)
Although
the
Congress,
in
its
revision
of
the
Federal
Rules
of
Evidence,
deleted
the
detailed
privilege
rules
and
left
the
subject
of
privilege
in
federal
question
cases
to
"be
governed
by
the
principles
of
common
law
as
they
may
be
interpreted
by
the
courts
of
the
United
States,"
R.
501
Fed.R.Evid.,
the
recommendations
of
the
Advisory
Committee,
approved
by
the
Supreme
Court,
are
a
useful
guide
to
the
federal
courts
in
their
development
of
a
common
law
of
evidence.
2
J.
Weinstein,
Supra,
at
501-20.4
to
501-20.5.
In
this
instance
we
follow
the
recommendation.
The
privilege
protects
pooling
of
information
for
any
defense
purpose
common
to
the
participating
defendants.
Cooperation
between
defendants
in
such
circumstances
is
often
not
only
in
their
own
best
interests
but
serves
to
expedite
the
trial
or,
as
in
the
case
at
bar,
the
trial
106
NELLY LIM V. CA
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
64
Inasmuch
as
McPartlin
was
entitled
to
assert
the
privilege
whether
Ingram
was
tried
jointly
or
separately,
no
prejudice
would
have
resulted
from
the
joint
trial
by
reason
of
the
exclusion
of
the
McPartlin
8.
"SECTION
24.
Disqualification
by
reason
of
privileged
communication.
The
following
persons
cannot
testify
as
to
matters
learned
in
confidence
in
the
following
cases:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The
Issue
presented
before
the
Court:
10. The
petitioner
appeals
before
the
Court
to
reverse
the
decisions
of
the
lower
courts
in
not
finding
that
all
the
essential
elements
of
the
rule
on
physician-patient
privileged
communication
under
Section
21,
Rule
130
of
the
Rules
of
Court
(Section
24,
Rule
130
of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Evidence)
exist
in
the
case
at
bar.
Ruling
of
the
Court:
11. The
petition
must
be
denied.
12. The
law
in
point
is
paragraph
(c),
Section
24
of
the
Revised
Rules
on
Evidence
which
reads:
(c)
A
person
authorized
to
practice
medicine,
surgery
or
obstetrics
cannot
in
a
civil
case,
without
the
consent
of
the
patient,
be
examined
as
to
any
advice
or
treatment
given
by
him
or
any
information
which
he
may
have
acquired
in
attending
such
patient
in
a
professional
capacity,
which
information
was
necessary
to
enable
him
to
act
in
that
capacity,
and
which
would
blacken
the
reputation
of
the
patient."
13. This
is
a
reproduction
of
paragraph
(c),
Section
21,
Rule
130
of
the
1964
Revised
Rules
of
Court
with
two
(2)
modifications,
namely:
(a)
the
inclusion
of
the
phrase
"advice
or
treatment
given
by
him,"
and
(b)
substitution
of
the
word
reputation
for
the
word
character.
14. Said
Section
21
in
turn
is
a
reproduction
of
paragraph
(f),
Section
26,
Rule
123
of
the
1940
Rules
of
Court
with
a
modification
consisting
in
the
change
of
the
phrase
"which
would
tend
to
blacken"
in
the
latter
to
"would
blacken."
9
Verily,
these
changes
affected
the
meaning
of
the
provision.
15. Under
the
1940
Rules
of
Court,
it
was
sufficient
if
the
information
would
tend
to
blacken
the
character
of
the
patient.
In
the
1964
Rules
of
Court,
a
stricter
requirement
was
imposed;
it
was
imperative
that
the
information
would
blacken
such
character.
With
the
advent
of
the
Revised
Rules
on
Evidence
on
1
July
1989,
the
rule
was
relaxed
once
more
by
the
substitution
of
the
word
character
with
the
word
reputation.
There
is
a
distinction
between
these
two
concepts.
"'Character'
is
what
a
man
is,
and
'reputation'
is
what
he
is
supposed
to
be
in
what
people
say
he
is.
'Character'
depends
on
attributes
possessed,
and
'reputation'
on
attributes
which
others
believe
one
to
possess.
The
former
signifies
reality
and
the
latter
merely
what
is
accepted
to
be
reality
at
108
3)
4)
the
information
was
necessary
to
enable
him
to
act
in
that
capacity;
and
5)
the
information
was
confidential,
and,
if
disclosed,
would
blacken
the
reputation
(formerly
character)
of
the
patient."
14
This
element
of
confidentiality
must
be
essential
to
the
full
and
satisfactory
maintenance
of
the
relation
between
the
parties.
3)
4)
1.
professional employment
2.
OBSTETRICS
KROHN V. CA
Facts:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
Decision
of
the
Lower
Courts:
8)
9)
Arguments
of
the
Petitioner
on
Appeal:
10) Petitioner
now
seeks
to
enjoin
the
presentation
and
disclosure
of
the
contents
of
the
psychiatric
report.
She
argues
that
since
Sec.
24,
par.
(c),
Rule
130,
of
the
Rules
of
Court
prohibits
a
physician
from
testifying
on
matters
which
he
may
have
acquired
in
attending
to
a
patient
in
a
professional
capacity,
"WITH
MORE
REASON
should
a
third
person
(like
respondent-husband
in
this
particular
instance)
be
PROHIBITED
from
testifying
on
privileged
matters
between
a
physician
and
patient
or
from
submitting
any
medical
report,
findings
or
evaluation
prepared
by
a
physician
which
the
latter
has
acquired
as
a
result
of
his
confidential
and
privileged
relation
with
a
patient."
11) She
further
argues
that
to
allow
her
husband
to
testify
on
the
contents
of
the
psychiatric
evaluation
report
"will
set
a
very
bad
and
dangerous
precedent
because
it
abets
circumvention
of
the
rule's
intent
in
preserving
the
sanctity,
security
and
confidence
to
the
relation
of
physician
and
his
patient."
Arguments
of
the
Respondent
on
Appeal:
12) Private
respondent
Edgar
Krohn,
Jr.,
however
contends
that
"the
rules
are
very
explicit:
the
prohibition
applies
only
to
a
physician.
Thus
.
.
.
.
the
legal
prohibition
to
testify
is
not
applicable
to
the
case
at
bar
where
the
person
sought
to
be
barred
from
testifying
on
the
privileged
communication
is
the
husband
and
not
the
physician
of
the
petitioner."
16
In
fact,
according
to
him,
the
Rules
sanction
his
testimony
considering
that
a
husband
may
testify
against
his
wife
in
a
civil
case
filed
by
one
against
the
other.
13) Besides,
private
respondent
submits
that
privileged
communication
may
be
waived
by
the
person
entitled
thereto,
and
this
petitioner
expressly
did
when
she
gave
her
unconditional
consent
to
the
use
of
the
psychiatric
evaluation
report
when
it
was
presented
to
the
Tribunal
Metropolitanum
Matrimoniale
which
took
it
into
account
among
others
in
deciding
the
case
and
declaring
their
marriage
null
and
void.
Private
respondent
further
argues
that
petitioner
also
gave
her
implied
consent
when
she
failed
to
specifically
object
to
the
admissibility
of
the
report
in
her
Answer
where
she
merely
described
the
evaluation
report
as
"either
unfounded
or
irrelevant."
The
issue
presented
before
us:
111
The
Ruling
of
the
Court:
15) The
appeal
should
be
denied.
16) The
treatise
presented
by
petitioner
on
the
privileged
nature
of
the
communication
between
physician
and
patient,
as
well
as
the
reasons
therefor,
is
not
doubted.
Indeed,
statutes
making
communications
between
physician
and
patient
privileged
are
intended
to
inspire
confidence
in
the
patient
and
encourage
him
to
make
a
full
disclosure
to
his
physician
of
his
symptoms
and
condition.
17) Petitioner's
discourse
while
exhaustive
is
however
misplaced.
Lim
v.
Court
of
Appeals
clearly
lays
down
the
requisites
in
order
that
the
privilege
may
be
successfully
invoked:
(a)
the
privilege
is
claimed
in
a
civil
cases;
(b)
the
person
against
whom
the
privilege
is
claimed
is
one
duly
authorized
to
practice
medicine,
surgery
or
obstetrics;
(c)
such
person
acquired
the
information
while
he
was
attending
to
the
patient
in
his
professional
capacity;
(d)
the
information
was
necessary
to
enable
him
to
act
in
that
capacity;
and,
(e)
the
information
was
confidential
and,
if
disclosed,
would
blacken
the
reputation
(formerly
character)
of
the
patient."
18) In
the
instant
case,
the
person
against
whom
the
privilege
is
claimed
is
not
one
duly
authorized
to
practice
medicine,
surgery
obstetrics.
He
is
simply
the
patient's
husband
who
wishes
to
testify
on
a
document
executed
by
medical
practitioners.
Plainly
and
clearly,
this
does
not
fall
within
the
claimed
prohibition.
Neither
can
his
testimony
be
considered
a
circumvention
of
the
prohibition
because
his
testimony
cannot
have
the
force
and
effect
of
the
testimony
of
the
physician
who
examined
the
patient
and
executed
the
report.
19) Counsel
for
petitioner
indulged
heavily
in
objecting
to
the
testimony
of
private
respondent
on
the
ground
that
it
was
privileged.
In
his
Manifestation
before
the
trial
court
dated
10
May
1991,
he
invoked
the
rule
on
privileged
communications
but
never
questioned
the
testimony
as
hearsay.
It
was
a
fatal
mistake.
For,
in
failing
to
object
to
the
testimony
on
the
ground
that
it
was
hearsay,
counsel
waived
his
right
to
make
such
objection
and,
consequently,
the
evidence
offered
may
be
admitted.
2.
3.
4.
5.
112
Disputable
The
CHAN V. CHAN
Background
of
the
case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Decisions
of
the
Lower
Courts:
6. The
RTC
sustained
Johnnys
opposition
7. The
CA
denied
Josies
appeal.
It
ruled
that,
if
courts
were
to
allow
the
production
of
medical
records,
then
patients
would
be
left
with
no
assurance
that
whatever
relevant
disclosures
they
may
have
made
to
their
physicians
would
be
kept
confidential.
The
prohibition
covers
not
only
testimonies,
but
also
affidavits,
certificates,
and
pertinent
hospital
records.
The
CA
added
that,
although
Johnny
can
waive
the
privilege,
he
did
not
do
so
in
this
case.
He
attached
the
Philhealth
form
to
his
answer
for
the
limited
purpose
of
showing
his
alleged
forcible
confinement.
The
Issue
presented
before
us:
8. The
issue
is
whether
the
refusal
of
the
lower
courts
to
issue
the
subpoena
to
obtain
Johnnys
hospital
records
in
the
light
of
the
privileged
character
of
the
physician-patient
communication
was
proper.
The
Ruling
of
the
Court:
9. Josies
petition
should
be
denied.
10. The
physician-patient
privileged
communication
rule
essentially
means
that
a
physician
who
gets
information
while
professionally
attending
a
patient
cannot
in
a
civil
case
be
examined
without
the
patient's
consent
as
to
any
facts
which
would
blacken
the
latter's
reputation.
st
11. 1
-
The
case
presents
a
procedural
issue,
given
that
the
time
to
object
to
the
admission
of
evidence,
such
as
the
hospital
records,
would
be
at
the
time
they
are
offered.
The
offer
could
be
made
part
of
the
physician's
testimony
or
as
independent
evidence
that
he
had
made
entries
in
those
records
that
concern
the
patient's
health
problems.
Section
36,
Rule
132,
states
that
objections
to
evidence
must
be
made
after
the
offer
of
such
evidence
for
admission
in
court.
Thus:
SEC.
36.
Objection.
Objection
to
evidence
offered
orally
must
be
made
immediately
after
the
offer
is
made.
12. Since
the
offer
of
evidence
is
made
at
the
trial,
Josielene's
request
for
subpoena
duces
tecum
is
premature.
Here,
the
case
is
still
in
the
PRE-TRIAL
stage.
She
will
have
to
wait
for
trial
to
begin
before
making
a
request
for
the
issuance
of
a
subpoena
duces
tecum
covering
Johnny's
hospital
records.
It
is
when
those
records
are
produced
for
examination
at
the
trial,
that
Johnny
may
opt
to
object,
not
just
to
their
admission
in
evidence,
but
more
so
to
their
disclosure.
Section
24
(c),
Rule
130
of
the
Rules
of
Evidence
quoted
above
is
about
non-disclosure
of
privileged
matters.
nd
13. 2
-
It
is
of
course
possible
to
treat
Josielene's
motion
for
the
issuance
of
a
subpoena
duces
tecum
covering
the
hospital
records
as
a
motion
for
production
of
documents,
a
discovery
procedure
available
to
a
litigant
prior
to
trial.
Section
1,
Rule
27
of
the
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
provides:
SEC.
1.
Motion
for
production
or
inspection;
order.
Upon
motion
of
any
party
showing
good
cause
therefor,
the
court
in
which
an
action
is
pending
may
(a)
order
any
party
to
produce
and
permit
the
inspection
and
copying
or
photographing,
by
or
on
behalf
of
the
moving
party,
of
any
designated
documents,
papers,
books,
accounts,
letters,
photographs,
objects
or
tangible
things,
not
privileged,
which
constitute
or
contain
evidence
material
to
any
matter
involved
in
the
action
and
which
are
in
his
possession,
custody
or
control;
or
(b)
order
any
party
to
permit
entry
upon
designated
land
or
other
property
in
his
possession
or
control
for
the
purpose
of
inspecting,
measuring,
surveying,
or
photographing
the
property
or
any
designated
relevant
object
or
operation
thereon.
The
order
shall
specify
the
time,
place
and
manner
of
making
the
inspection
and
taking
copies
and
photographs,
and
may
prescribe
such
terms
and
conditions
as
are
just.
(Emphasis
supplied)
114
14.
15.
16.
17.
Mrs.
Valenzuela;
(7)
Schedule
of
devaluation
of
CB
premises
of
Paseo
de
Roxas
of
same
report;
(8)
Schedule
of
BF's
realizable
assets
from
P5,159.44
B
to
P3,909.23
B
as
of
January
25,
1985;
(9)
Documents
listed
in
BF's
letter
to
Mrs.
Carlota
Valenzuela
dated
October
25,
1985.
3.
4.
Argument
of
the
Monetary
Board
of
the
BSP:
5.
Ruling
of
the
Court:
9.
116
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Arguments
of
Neri:
10. Neri
contends
that
respondent
Committees'
show
cause
Letter
and
contempt
Order
were
issued
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion
amounting
to
lack
or
excess
of
jurisdiction.
He
stresses
that
his
conversations
with
President
Arroyo
are
"candid
discussions
meant
to
explore
options
in
making
policy
decisions."
According
to
him,
these
discussions
"dwelt
on
the
impact
of
the
bribery
scandal
involving
high
government
officials
on
the
country's
diplomatic
relations
and
economic
and
military
affairs
and
the
possible
loss
of
confidence
of
foreign
investors
and
lenders
in
the
Philippines."
Arguments
of
the
Senate
Committee:
20.
21.
22.
23.
1)
2)
3)
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
122