1st Batch Cases For Special Proceedings

1ST BATCH OF CASES IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
1.
LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO MONTAER, JR.,
LILLIBETH MONTAER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA
ELEANOR MONTAER-DALUPAN,
Petitioners,
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174975
Present:
- versus SHARIA DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARIA
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING
DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAER,
Respondents.
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
Promulgated:
JANUARY 20, 2009
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DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Sharia District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial
District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006[1] and September 21, 2006.[2]
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in
Cubao, Quezon City.[3]Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children. [4] On
May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.[5]
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a Complaint for the
judicial partition of properties before the Sharia District Court. [6] The said complaint was entitled Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M.
Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and
Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer, and docketed as Special Civil Action No. 7-05. [7] In the said complaint, private respondents made the following
allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the
decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the
estimated value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent. [8] Private respondents prayed for the Sharia District Court to
order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the
decedent.[9]
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate
of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and
(3) private respondents complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent,
pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.[10]
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint. The district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was
not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims. [11]

On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [12] On December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an Opposition
to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing. [13] On January 17, 2006, the Sharia District
Court denied petitioners opposition.[14]Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration lacked notice of hearing, the district court held that
such defect was cured as petitioners were notified of the existence of the pleading, and it took cognizance of the said motion. [15] The Sharia District
Court also reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration. [16]
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated November 22, 2005.
[17]
The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence. [18] In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Sharia
District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference. [19]
Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN
CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.
II.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATES AND
PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH
CAPACITY TO BE SUED.
III.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.
IV.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK
OF A NOTICE OF HEARING.
V.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS
THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR.
WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.
In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Sharia District Court must be given the opportunity to hear and
decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction. [20]
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims
Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of fact, whether the late Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that there has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It
bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a
hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the
Sharia District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:

ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of
letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the
property.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or
petition.[21] The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation.
Rather than rely on a falsa descriptio or defective caption, courts are guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings. [22]
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia District Court as a Complaint for judicial partition of
properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient
jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, [23] such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the
allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private
respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court.
Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent.
[24]
These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator
of the said estate.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the case because of an
allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its
subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer [25] or a motion to dismiss.[26] Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely on the defendant[27] or result in having a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem. [28] Indeed, the
defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction. [29]
The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss. [30] In the case at bar, the Sharia District Court is not deprived of
jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the
authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a
Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that the proceeding before the Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil action
against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to
the proceeding before the Sharia District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated
as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. [31] In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedents
heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. [32] Here, the

respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be
recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action [33] applies to a
special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a
special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this
difference. A civil action, in which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong[34] necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. [35] On the other hand, a special proceeding, by which a
party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact, [36] has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or
particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of
action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, [37] pay its
liabilities,[38] and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same. [39]
Docket Fees
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to
private respondents petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the decedents estate as the basis for
the conclusion that what private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether
the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter.[40] If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of
court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court. [41] In such a case, the lower court concerned will not
automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts insufficient assessment of the docket fees. [42] As every citizen has
the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with law, the
party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient assessment. [43] However, the party concerned will be required to pay the
deficiency.[44]
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this
assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of courts assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for reconsideration before the Sharia District Court is defective for lack of a
notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every
written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned. [45] The Rules also provide that no
written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof. [46] However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of
its provisions in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. [47] Moreover,
this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where a rigid application will result in a manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not
apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein. [48] In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that no party can even claim a vested
right in technicalities, and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities. [49]

The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a
petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to
ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a
miscarriage of justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners were not affected.
This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected.
[50]
The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process, [51] for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or
objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition. [52] In probate proceedings, what the law prohibits is
not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. [53] In the case at bar, as evident from the
Sharia District Courts order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners
were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Sharia District
Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion
in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation
Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the
decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including
prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding. [54] The court, in its capacity as a probate court,
has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent. [55] In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an
affirmative answer to the question of whether the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006
respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
2. THIRD DIVISION
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER,
G.R. No. 157912
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,
REYES, JJ.
VICTORIA S. MEDINAAdministratrix,
Promulgated:

Respondent.
December 13, 2007

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DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC)
dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
The undisputed facts are as follows.
The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as
reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1)
the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification
against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by
respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum shopping, failing which such
claim should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the
time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written explanation on
the service and filing by registered mail?[2]
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping,
a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.[3]
The petition is imbued with merit.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is
not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as
practicable.
The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished .[4] This means
that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are
inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for
complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims
against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent
estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a
contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated
upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate
administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions. [5]
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in
the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the
progress of the case in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to
incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the main object of the action
and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the
claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an
initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's
fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment
of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the
trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. [9]After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the
action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for
dismissing a money claim against the estate.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held
thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a
court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution on a pleading,
motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail,
considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who,
wanting to appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch
opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive pleadings or an

opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other paper from
the adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby
causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal service whenever
practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the
other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service
was not done in the first place.The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal
service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause whenever practicable.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes
be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to
begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of
the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section
11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied Section
11 of Rule 13:
As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done
personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not
be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where
the petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable
time, effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been
superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of may, signifying permissiveness, a
violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it
is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of
substantial justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes personal service
impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done personally might have been superfluous.
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed where, among other
cases, the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed
orders are both in Iligan City.The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed
not practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a written
explanation why service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under
Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to
residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid. [13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on
money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibaez,[14] thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage case
of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:
x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible ,
pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again
in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003,
respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take
appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
3. SECOND DIVISION
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ G.R. No. 164108

SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST
FARMERS HOLDING Present:
CORPORATION,
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
BRION, JJ.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE HONORABLE Promulgated:
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court of Manila, May 8, 2009
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent
Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. [1] At the time of his death, there were two
pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending
with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs
therein.[2]
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A.
Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, net of liabilities.[3] On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC
issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her
favor.[4] In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate
of her deceased husband.[5] In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the abovementioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.[6] Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability
corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.[7] Thereafter, the
Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate. [8]
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,[9] praying that they be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the
personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion,
petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of
the decedents estate.[10] Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her
administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties
within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. [11] After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in
the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision [12] dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according
to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the
decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings. [13]
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished
copies of all processes and orders issued by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.
[14]
Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete
inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal
of the fair market value of the same. [15] Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and
other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. [16]
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of
Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor must be actual and material,
direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.[17]
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special
proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, [18] not the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as
far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent
whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs
they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared
that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought
before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested persons or any persons interested in the estate to participate in varying
capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the
right of any person interested to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which
mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to any other persons believed
to have interest in the estate; (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a person interested in the estate to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6
of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein; (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of
the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrators account to persons interested; (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires
the court to give notice to the persons interested before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of
the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows any person interested in the estate to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the
estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if
contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by
the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice. [19] However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they
arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class
of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. [20] These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent
and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto,
as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case [21] was already pending review
before this Court at the time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate
proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet
until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration
of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case,
learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier.
Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-inintervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased,
and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and

took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already
entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case,
and the Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to
protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only
property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of
said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and
have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case
No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the
close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending
determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration
proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained.
Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or
to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action against the
administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without
first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions
concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a
separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered
nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x
x[23] (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we
can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this court have
always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein
to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action. [24]
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of
Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also any person interested or persons interested in the estate various specified capacities to
protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or
diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in
every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or
reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the
estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three
prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the
pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted
of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue
the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if
property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate
proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the
intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no
matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to
anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would
ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses
the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,[25] the Court heard a petition
for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate
proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that the records of every
court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x. The Court ruled that petitioners were
interested persons entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the
preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the
submission by the Administratrix of an annual accountingappears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of
money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact
"interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x [26]
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating
the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved
and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the
service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the
administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all interested parties the petitioners as
interested parties will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85
in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the
petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1,
Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged
in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified
and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and
other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one
(1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to
perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did
delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under
Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator
in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not
doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates
to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill
such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be
deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto,
are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the
Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

4. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA
GRIMM, respondents.
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.
AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in anintestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the
Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the Utah district court).
Antecedents. Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived
by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris
and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal
property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of
the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this country, the testator said: t.hqw
I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden
(Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of my Philippine property. (First
clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third
Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe
Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated April 10,
1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April
4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first
wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their
mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in
Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the
attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's
Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be
less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable
estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita
Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated
April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).

Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter of
the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First
Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024for the settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the
ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She
submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B.
Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint
administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in
the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the so-called
Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out
that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90,
testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares of RFM
Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two
children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and oneeighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who on August 9, moved to
defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the motion moot considering that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and
project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when the
Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue
Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that
Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no objection to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153,
Record). The court noted the certification as in conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita
Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the
present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as counsel for
Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that the firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March
11, 1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm
was then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of
Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that
the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that
Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah
compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the
decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated
and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23,
Rollo).
Ruling. We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to
dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It
is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion
to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of
orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189121
July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision
rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589, 1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto. 2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. 3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among
others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth 4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was
alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo
and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the
letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. 5 The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 the
petition for settlement of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper
venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower
court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos last
residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC decision reads:

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision 10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV
No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time
of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached
by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND
THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO
ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in
the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial
Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want
of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 15 In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. 16 It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. 18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement
of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas,
Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents residence at the
time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been
living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact
that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that
their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders
untenable petitioners position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court. 21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void
marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime
of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is
why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage
can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. 24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may
impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking
the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the
case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, 26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo
and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedents marriage to
Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no
less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in
Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information
relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first
marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given
the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time
Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio. 27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if
the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party.
With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the
right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the
law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. 29Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his
natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008
Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 204029
June 4, 2014
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY,Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision 1 and Resolution2 dated March 30, 2012 and September 25,
2012, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035, which reversed and set aside the Decision dated January 20, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 10407.
The antecedent facts may be summarized as follows:
On October 26, 2004, petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and Salvador Orosco (Salvador) filed a Complaint for annulment and
revocation of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 6, 2002 before the court a quo.
In it, petitioners alleged that Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio Abarientos (Eulalio) and Victoria Villareal (Victoria). Eulalio died intestate on
July 3, 1964, survived by his wife Victoria, six legitimate children, and one illegitimate child, namely: (1) Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo, petitioner in
this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco, the mother of petitioner Salvador; (3) Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos; (5) Feliciano Abarientos;
(6) Abraham Abarientos; and (7) Carlos Abarientos. His wife Victoria eventually died intestate on June 30, 1983.
On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City consisting of two thousand eight hundred sixty-nine(2,869) square meters,
more or less, which was covered by Tax Declaration ARP No. (TD) 0141.
In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by her daughter Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-in-law
Domingo Gualvez (Domingo), respondents in this case, on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only in
2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
respondents.
As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to them, Avelina sought the intervention of the RTC to declare null and void the two (2)
documents in order to reinstate TD0141 and so correct the injustice done to the other heirs of Eulalio.
In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the titling
of the subject property. Paragraph 9 of their Answer reads:
Sometime in the year 2001, [petitioner] Avelina together with the other heirs of Eulalio Abarientos brought out the idea to [respondent] Emelinda
Rebusquillo-Gualvez to have the property described in paragraph 8 of the complaint registered under the Torrens System of Registration. To facilitate

the titling of the property, so that the same could be attractive to prospective buyers, it was agreed that the propertys tax declaration could be
transferred to [respondents] Spouses [Emelinda] R. Gualvez and Domingo Gualvez who will spend all the cost of titling subject to reimbursement by
all other heirs in case the property is sold; That it was agreed that all the heirs will be given their corresponding shares on the property; That pursuant
to said purpose Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo with the knowledge and consent of the other heirs signed and executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [respondents] Gualvez. In fact, [petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was given an advance sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) by [respondent] spouses and all the delinquent taxes paid by [respondents]. 3
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009 annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Avelina on the grounds that (1) with regard to the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her parents and was not therefore
solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the case of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Avelina did not really intend to sell her share in the property as it was
only executed to facilitate the titling of such property. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. The subject Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the Estate of the Deceased Spouses Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria Villareal, dated
December 4, 2001 as well as the subject Deed of Absolute Sale, notarized on February 6, 2002, covering the property described in par. 8
of the Amended Complaint are hereby ordered ANNULLED;
2. That defendant City Assessors Officer of Legazpi City is hereby ordered to CANCEL the Tax Declaration in the name of private
[respondents] spouses Gualvez under ARP No. 4143 and to REINSTATE the Tax Declaration under ARP No. 0141 in the name of Eulalio
Abarientos;
3. By way of restitution, [petitioner] Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo is hereby ordered to return or refund to [respondents] spouses Domingo
Gualvez and Emelinda Gualvez, the P50,000.00 given by the latter spouses to the former. 4
Assailing the trial courts decision, respondents interposed an appeal with the CA arguing that the Deed of Sale cannot be annulled being a public
document that has for its object the creation and transmission of real rights over the immovable subject property. The fact that Avelinas testimony
was not offered in evidence, so respondents argued, the signature on the adverted deed remains as concrete proof of her agreement to its terms.
Lastly, respondents contended that the Complaint filed by petitioners Avelina and Salvador before the RTC is not the proper remedy provided by law
for those compulsory heirs unlawfully deprived of their inheritance.
Pending the resolution of respondents appeal, Avelina died intestate on September 1, 2009 leaving behind several living heirs 5 including respondent
Emelinda.
In its Decision dated March 30, 2012, the appellate court granted the appeal and reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA held that
the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on petitioners allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that
issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that
the Deed of Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face.
Aggrieved by the CAs Decision, petitioner Avelina, as substituted by her heirs except respondent Emelinda, and petitioner Salvador are now before
this Court ascribing reversible error on the part of the appellate court.
We find merit in the instant petition.
It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this
Court had likewise held that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling
reason for such recourse.6 Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil
case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined
during the pre-trial.7 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,8 this Court held:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs
of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners
as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in

light of the fact that the parties to the civil case - subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration proceedings
since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate
the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial x x x. (emphasis
supplied)
Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from
Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of
petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents spouses Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact
that petitioner Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land.
As confirmed by the RTC in its Decision, respondents have stipulated and have thereby admitted the veracity of the following facts during the pretrial:
IV UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the stipulation of facts in the Pre-Trial Order)
A. x x x
B. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez admitted the following facts:
1. Identity of the parties;
2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private [respondents] to sue and be sued;
3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is not the only surviving heir of deceased spouses Eulalio and Victoria Abarientos;
4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-owner/possessor of a portion of the subject property;
5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco is the sister of Avelina Abarientos;
6. [Respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualves is a daughter of [petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo;
7. [Petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was born on Nov. 10, 1923;
8. The existence of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of Estate of the Deceased and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by [petitioner] Avelina A.
Rebusquillo on the subject property.9 (emphasis supplied)
In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with more reason that a resort to special proceeding will be but an unnecessary
superfluity. Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As
pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The second sentence of
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is patently clear that self-adjudication is only warranted when there is only one heir:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. x x x If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by
means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs
by right of representation of his mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is "the only
daughter and sole heir of spouses EULALIO ABARIENTOS AND VICTORIA VILLAREAL." 10 The falsity of this claim renders her act of adjudicating to
herself the inheritance left by her father invalid. The RTC did not, therefore, err in granting Avelinas prayer to declare the affidavit null and void and
so correct the wrong she has committed.
In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of respondents was correctly nullified and voided by the RTC. Avelina was not
in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject property is still subject to partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership of the subject
property but only an aliquot portion. What she could have transferred to respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent
from the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the
property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter,
when the parties conceal their true agreement. (emphasis supplied)

Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for
any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their real agreement.
In Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta, 11 this Court explained the concept of the simulation of contracts:
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic
of an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation
of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have
given under the contract. However, if the parties state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively
simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation
refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable between the parties and their successors in
interest. (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale is immediately apparent from respondents very
own Answer to petitioners Complaint. As respondents themselves acknowledge, the purpose of the Deed of Absolute Sale was simply to "facilitate
the titling of the [subject] property," not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them. Furthermore, respondents concede that petitioner Salvador
remains in possession of the property and that there is no indication that respondents ever took possession of the subject property after its supposed
purchase. Such failure to take exclusive possession of the subject property or, in the alternative, to collect rentals from its possessor, is contrary to
the principle of ownership and is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void. 12
Contrary to the appellate courts opinion, the fact that the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and notarized does not accord it
the quality of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the parole evidence rule. The form of a contract does not make an otherwise simulated and
invalid act valid. The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Sec. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. x x x
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (emphasis supplied)
The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the contracting parties was clearly put in issue in the present
case. Again, respondents themselves admit in their Answer that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale were only executed
to facilitate the titling of the property. The RTC is, therefore, justified to apply the exceptions provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to
ascertain the true intent of the parties, which shall prevail over the letter of the document. That said, considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has
been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated, petitioners are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the written agreement.13
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated January 20, 2009 in Civil Case No. 10407 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 4 in Legazpi City is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 115181
March 31, 2000
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO
and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as
its Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of administration to an action
for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina
Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino,
Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No.
Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She
asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for
judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order which reads:
Acting on the "Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition", considering that the petitioner is the only heir not amenable
to a simple partition, and all the other compulsory heirs manifested their desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate of the deceased
Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the estate of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to
submit a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties left by the deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial partition on APRIL
13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Notify all the parties and their counsel of this assignment.
SO ORDERED.1
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated June 16, 1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to convert the judicial
proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. Her petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574.
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision, stating that the "petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and
accordingly dismissed. 2
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE
PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF
THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.3
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole issue here is whether respondent appellate court committed an error of law
and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character and
extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles v.Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the existence of
other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be reckoned with, administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the same. 4 In
addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and attend to it.

Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action
for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus, procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or
fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall
appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78. 5 The exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
746 which provide:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. . .
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died
testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of
the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than three
(3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may
proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if
any there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it among them after
the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age
and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and
enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just
respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the
office of the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper register's office.1awp++i1
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's death. 7 Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving
pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator by
the court.8
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age." 9 With this finding, it is
our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to partition yet, as the nature and character of the
estate have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially
since the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did not err in converting
petitioner's action for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition.
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition
has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It
provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for
partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the
heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. 10 The trial court appropriately converted petitioner's
action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the
Court of Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.n
8. THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO

and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO
substituted by their heirs, namely:
Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and
Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and
G.R. No. 161220

SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO and
Present:
ROSIE M. BENATIRO,
Respondents,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus -
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS,
CHICO-NAZARIO
namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian,
NACHURA, and
Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,
REYES, JJ.
Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos,

represented by their attorney-in-fact,
Salud Cuyos,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
July 30, 2008

x----------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners seeking to annul the Decision [1] dated July 18, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution[2] dated November 13, 2003 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 65630.[3]
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were
blessed
with
nine
children,
namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba,
Lope, Salud,
Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. OnAugust 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered by Tax
Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the name of Agatona Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition[4] for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled In the
Matter of the Intestate Estate of EvaristoCuyos, Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner. The petition was opposed by Glorias brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty.
Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to
an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date issued an Order[5] appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the undivided half accruing to his
spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after
posting a nominal bond of P1,000.00.[6]
Subsequently, in the Order[7] dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria and
her brother, oppositorFrancisco, together with their respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray, Franciscos counsel, manifested that the parties had come to an
agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to
effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for the approval of the court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed
Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a project of partition within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report[8] dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause
their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement;
that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend; that per return of the service, these three heirs could not be located in their
respective given addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided outside the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:
1.
Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the time that Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was administering
the properties of the estate (without appointment from the Court) as having been properly and duly accounted for.
2.
Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during the administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the
Court) also one of the heirs as having been properly and duly accounted for.
3.
Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding an accounting from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as
having been withdrawn.
4.
Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00 subject to the condition that
should any of the heirs would be in a position to buy the properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just receive only Four
Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) each.
5.
Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be deducted from their respective share of P4,000.00.[9]
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs, informed all those present in the conference of her desire to buy the
properties of the estate, to which everybody present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in the submission of the Report was due to
the request of respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to make some consultations on what was already agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it was only
on July 11, 1976 that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo,with the information that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed
upon, provided she be given the sum of P5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray their father's
hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioners Report, the CFI issued the assailed Order[10] dated December 16, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the same being not contrary to law, said compromise
agreement as embodied in the report of the commissioner is hereby approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the deed of
sale covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the payment to her of the sum of P36,000.00. The said sum
of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the
remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs. [11]
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of P5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly disregarded by the heirs present during the
conference.
In an Order[12] dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of the estate, purportedly on the basis of the motion to
relieve respondent Gloria,as it appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental to the early termination of the proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[13] over the six parcels of land constituting the intestate estate of the
late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum of P36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos,
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731 and 000732,
which were all in the name of their late mother AgatonaArrogante, were canceled and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132,
2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in Columbas name; and that later on, Original Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor
of Columba; that some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and daughter-inlaw, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently discovered the existence of
the assailed CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department
of Justice, which on June 13, 2000 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.[14]
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at the barangay level, but was unsuccessful.[15]
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation[16] of the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano,[17] and
Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order dated December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976 was null and void and of no effect, the same being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was
patently false and irregular; that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share of their father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed
an affidavit, as well as the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no meeting ever took place for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the estate of their
parents and that they never received any payment from the supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the report was done in close confederacy with their coheir Columba, who stood to be benefited by the Commissioner's recommendation, should the same be approved by the probate court; that since the report was a falsity,
any order proceeding therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in favor of respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity, since the CFI which
issued the assailed order did not appear to have been furnished a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not in custodia legis of the consideration of the
sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide the remainder of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the administration expenses and estate taxes;
that the intestate case had not yet been terminated as the last order found relative to the case was the appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria; that they never

received their corresponding share in the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in manifest connivance with administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their right to the
property without due process of law, thus, clearly showing that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered the assailed order dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was
preposterous, as respondents were represented by counsel in the intestate proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this was only a ploy so that
they could claim that they filed the petition for annulment within the statutory period of four (4) years; that they have been in possession of the six parcels of land since May
25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed order;
that Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having received his share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents were estopped from
assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had already attained the status of finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order issued by the Court of First
Instance of Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as well as the Certificates of Title issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the
subsequent transfer of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Further, SP Proc.
Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be continued.[18]
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established was the veracity and truthfulness of the Commissioners Report, which was used by the trial
court as its basis for issuing the assailed Order. The CA held that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all the concerned parties to be present in the
conference; however, such was not the scenario since in their separate sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent attested to the fact that no meeting or
conference ever happened among them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence, there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of an
official duty, the same may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence to prove the contrary.
The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference was not held accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioners Report never mentioned the
names of the heirs who were present in the alleged conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the names of those who were present were equally
essential, if not even more important, than the names of those who were absent; (2) the Report also failed to include any proof of conformity to the agreement from the
attendees, such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent as regards the agreed mechanisms for the estates settlement; (3) there was lack or absence of physical
evidence attached to the report indicating that the respondents were indeed properly notified about the scheduled conference. The CA then concluded that due to the absence of
the respondents' consent, the legal existence of the compromise agreement did not stand on a firm ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report was given to Atty. Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco Cuyos,
respectively, the same cannot be taken as notice to the other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyers authority to compromise cannot be simply presumed, since what was
required was the special authority to compromise on behalf of his client; that a compromise agreement entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is
void and has no legal effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;[19] that being a void compromise agreement, the assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were procured fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the properties to Columba CuyosBenatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of P36,000.00 to the administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the
testimony of Numeriano Cuyosadmitting that he received his share of the proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that he received; that even so, such alleged
payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with the trial courts order for the administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all properties of the estate in favor

of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after the payment to the administratrix of the sum ofP36,000.00; that said sum of money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims
and administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court nor was said money placed under custodia legis as agreed
upon; that the Certification dated December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet been terminated and that the last Order in the
special proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the parcels of land, which included the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new Tax Declarations and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted
with fraud. Consequently, the CA concluded that the compromise agreement, the certificates of title and the transfers made by petitioners through fraud cannot be
made a legal basis of their ownership over the properties, since to do so would result in enriching them at the expense of the respondents; and that it was also evident that
the fraud attendant in this case was one of extrinsic fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by
petitioners to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper remedy where the aggrieved party had other
appropriate remedies, such as new trial, appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to take through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24 year old Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of
Court - an official act which enjoys a strong presumption of regularity -based merely on belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of said
official act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic fraud existed which is a sufficient ground to annul the
lower court's order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. [20]
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were in possession of affidavits of waiver and desistance executed by the heirs
of Lope Cuyos[21] and respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares[22] on February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004, respectively. In both affidavits, the affiants stated that they
had no more interest in prosecuting/defending the case involving the settlement of the estate, since the subject estate properties had been bought by their late
sister Columba, and they had already received their share of the purchase price.Another heir, respondent Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier executed an
Affidavit[23] dated December 13, 2001, stating that the subject estate was sold to Columba and that she had already received her share of the purchase price on May 18,
1988. In addition, Numeriano had issued a certification[24] dated May 18, 1988, which was not refuted by any of the parties, that he had already received P4,000.00 in
payment of his share, which could be the reason why he refused to sign the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the filing of the petition with
the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved the
Commissioners Report embodying the alleged compromise agreement entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character[25] and will not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.:

Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional .ground therefor.[26]
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. [27] Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent
act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception
practiced on him by the prevailing party.[28] Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it
operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.[29]
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there
is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and to prepare the project of partition for submission and approval of
the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his Commissioners Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the
appearance of all the heirs of Evaristo Cuyosand Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the place, where the subject properties were located for settlement, by sending
them subpoenae supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the conference scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the nine heirs, only six
attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly found, the Commissioner did not state the names of those present, but only those heirs who failed to attend the
conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based on the return of service, could not be located in their respective given
addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled
conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact, respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably present in the conference, as she was not
mentioned as among those absent, had executed an affidavit [30]dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a meeting nor was there any telegram or
notice of any meeting received by her. While Patrocenia had executed on December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance [31] regarding this case, it was only for the
reason that the subject estate properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and that she had already received her corresponding share of the purchase price, but
there was nothing in the affidavit that retracted her previous statement that she was not called to a meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an unnotarized statement[32] that there
was no meeting held. Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneos holding of a conference with the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they
were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the
heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto.

It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a compromise agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was
imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests. Considering that no separate instrument of
conveyance was executed among the heirs embodying their alleged agreement, it was necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a conference among the
heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in the Report.
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a disinterested party and that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on Evidence,
there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection with the performance of an official act in the line of his duty was
legally done, such presumption may be overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence of the names of the persons
present in the conference, absence of the signatures of the heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of evidence showing that respondents were notified of the
conference, to be competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference was not held accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification[33] dated August 7, 2003 issued by the Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to show that copies of
the Commissioners Report were sent to all the heirs, except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion
of the Report with the accompanying registry receipts.[34]
In Cua v. Vargas,[35] in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the
estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who
do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent
out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the
said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the
instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it
because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never
intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint.
Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at, which
was not established, and not whether they were notified of the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report
despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs
attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee

that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's
Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners contentions that all the parties in the intestate estate proceedings in the trial court were duly represented by respective
counsels, namely, Atty. Lepitenfor petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to settle the case amicably, they manifested such
intention through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated January 30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate of a deceased person need not hire his own
lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented by the judicial administrator who retains the services of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal
representative not only of the estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose interest he represents; that when the trial court issued the assailed Order dated
December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's Report, the parties lawyers were duly served said copies of the Order on December 21, 1976 as shown by the
Certification[37] dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of Court; that notices to lawyers should be considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is represented by
counsel, service of notices of orders and pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the respondents could have
taken the appropriate remedy such as amotion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time, but they failed to do so
without giving any cogent reason for such failure.
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioners Report was received by Attys. Yray and Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and Francisco,
respectively, but not the lawyers of the other heirs. As can be seen from the pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was Glorias counsel when she filed her
Petition for letters of administration, while Atty. Yray was Franciscos lawyer when he filed his opposition to the petition for letters of administration and his Motion to
Order administrarix Gloria to render an accounting and for the partition of the estate.Thus, the other heirs who were not represented by counsel were not given any notice
of the judgment approving the compromise. It was only sometime in February 1998 that respondents learned that the tax declarations covering the parcels of land, which
were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were canceled; and new Tax Declarations were issued in Columbas name,and Original Certificates of Titles
were subsequently issued in favor of Columba. Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or of any
obligation.[38]
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,[39] we stated the consequences of a void judgment, thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the
aforementioned decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and executory. In contemplation of
law, that void decision is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks &
Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative
by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding
effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection
to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same
position they were in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and
all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said
to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. [40] (Emphasis
supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches.[41] Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it must be declared null and void and
set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the judgment after the lapse of 24 years from its finality on ground
of laches and estoppel.
Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years from its
discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[42]
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. [43] The
question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to
defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the
doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result.[44]
In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998 and filed the petition for annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find
that respondents' right to due process is the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing that an action to declare the nullity of a void judgment
does not prescribe.[45]
Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is nonexistent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and
the subsequent transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error was thus committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003 and Resolution dated November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Cebu and the Heirs of Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No. 24-BN for the
settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

9. [G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005]
EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHINGPACIOLES, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a persons estate remains,
providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a
mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute over the estate of their loved one.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent,
assailing the Court of Appeals Decision[1]dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution [2] dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571. [3] The
Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioners motion for
partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock investments
worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner
herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition [4] for the settlement of Miguelitas estate. He prayed
that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters
of administration on the grounds that (a)petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelitas
estate is composed of paraphernal properties. Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead. [5] Afterwards, she also
filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix. [6]
Petitioner moved to strike out respondents opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a
compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law. [7]
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on
condition that both of them would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business partners.[8]
In her omnibus motion[9] dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate. [10] Both
were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12, 19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims
were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas estate. [11] Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita. [12]
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion [13] praying, among others, that an Order be issued directing
the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys fees.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is premature and precipitate,
considering that there is yet no determination whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.
[14]
Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelitas estate as an heir and co-owner. Thus, she prayed that a hearing be
scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorneys fees but denied petitioners prayer for
partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed premature. The intestate court ratiocinated as follows:
On the partition and distribution of the deceaseds properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be
premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositors claim as indicated in her opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine whether the

properties listed in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a coownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate courts Order dated
January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioners prayer for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature,
indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondents claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and Resolution, the intestate court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in entertaining private respondents unsupported
claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is
inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed upon in the
course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondents
claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following
assignments of error:
I
RESPONDENT COURTS DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR BEING CONTRARY TO
THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER TO CONDUCT HEARING ON THE
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE
INTESTATE COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURTS ORDER AND RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
RESPONDENT CHINGS OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS.
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of ownership
involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the
settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings.[15] The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. [16]
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership
when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental
and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals,[17] we held:
x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass
upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on
respondents claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court
in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory . The
facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition [18] dated September 18, 1995, respondent expressly adopted
the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:

6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994, and filed only on November 4,
1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation placed
on the real estate properties and reserves her right to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each.
Respondent could have opposed petitioners inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or
considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real
estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondents son and representative in the settlement of Miguelitas estate, did not submit his own inventory. His
mandate, as co-administrator, is to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge. [19] He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those
properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with
petitioners inventory.
Obviously, respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or should not be included in
the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over
properties comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate. The intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its
Resolution[20] dated May 7, 1996, thus:
On petitioners motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed that since oppositor had interposed
a claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for
appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of oppositors claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the
properties, which she allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and direct
interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court.
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to determine the propriety
of oppositors (respondents) claim. According to the intestate court, if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelitas)
properties, then it means that she has a material and direct interest in the estate and, hence, she should be given her day in court. The
intended day in court or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondents contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of
Miguelitas estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondents ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of resolving her blanket claim against
Miguelitas estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the accuracy of petitioners inventory, however, a close review
of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off
stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to
ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of
any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the
course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must
be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.[21] Jurisprudence teaches us that:
[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for
a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.[22]
Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for
the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima facie determination of the issue of ownership, still
respondents claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelitas estate, as stated in petitioners inventory, comprises real estates
covered by the Torrens System which are registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the
owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action . We find this Courts pronouncement
in Bolisay vs. Alcid[23] relevant, thus:
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a
Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law
itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. x x x

x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, The Property Registration Decree, proscribes collateral attack against Torrens Title, hence:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing evidence to bolster her bare assertion of ownership.
We quote her testimony, thus:
Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which I quote: In accordance with
the Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to give only a token to our daughter
Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that being the son he will take full responsibility of the
rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?
A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.
Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to Emmanuel.
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also , is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount.
xxxxxx
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect to the estate
of your late husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?
A: Wala po.[24]
She further testified as follows:
Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank accounts and deposits both here and
abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per
your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these properties be partitioned or what should be done with these
properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis,
is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San Lazaro, in Sta.
Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo
ni Emil?

A: Kung ano ang sa akin
xxxxxx
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong paghahatian or hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir.[25]
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioners inventory belong to her. Neither could she present
any document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted
that the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties. [26]Sensing that such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership,
she opted to change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were business partners and that she gave to the latter most of her properties
to be used in a joint business venture.[27] Respondent must have realized early on that if the properties listed in petitioners inventory are paraphernal,
then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over them and upon her death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs,
petitioner herein and their two minor children.[28]
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of whatever rights or properties she
believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted
to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. [29]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are
hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.
10. SECOND DIVISION

CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, G.R. No. 156021
FRANCIS COLLADO, JOSE
P. COLLADO, JUDITH Present:
PROVIDO, CLARITA PROVIDO,
ALFREDO PROVIDO, MANUEL PUNO, J.,
PROVIDO, JR., LORNA DINA Chairman,
E. PROVIDO, SEVERO ARENGA, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
JR., SERGIO ARENGA, EDUARDO CALLEJO, SR.,
ARENGA, CAROL ARENGA, RUTH TINGA, and
BABASA, NORMA HIJASTRO, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
DOLORES M. FLORES, ANTONIO
MARIN, JR., JOSE MARIN, SR., and
MATHILDE MARIN, Promulgated:
Petitioners,
September 23, 2005
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS and

FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO,

Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This
is
petition
for
review
of
the Resolutions[1] of
the
[2]
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69221, dismissing petitioners petition for annulment of judgment.
On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, docketed as SP Proc. No. 00-135, for the probate of
the Last Will and Testament[3] of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent), who died on 26 October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo. [4] Respondent
alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort
North, Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision,[5] allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent.[6]
More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. [7] Likewise, they
filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, [8] claiming that they are
the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct
docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because:
(1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the
attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress
and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not know the
properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary
issued to respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession. [9]
On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order[10] denying petitioners motion for being unmeritorious. Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC
held that petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the
outright dismissal of the petition. It merely required respondent to pay the deficiency. [11] Moreover, the RTCs Decision was already final and executory
even before petitioners filing of the motion to reopen. [12]
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition [13] with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTCs Decisiondated
30 May 2001 and Order dated 11 January 2002. They claimed that after the death of the decedent, petitioners, together with respondent, held
several conferences to discuss the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing to a one-sixth (1/6) portion as his share.
Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise agreement to implement the division of the estate. Despite receipt of the agreement, respondent refused
to sign and return the same. Petitioners opined that respondent feigned interest in participating in the compromise agreement so that they would not
suspect his intention to secure the probate of the will. [14] They claimed that they learnt of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of
which they filed their motion to reopen the proceedings and admit their opposition to the probate of the will only on 4 October 2001. They argued that
the RTC Decision should be annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. [15]

In its Resolution[16] promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail
of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own.
[17]
Moreover, the CA declared as baseless petitioners claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended by extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any
showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for new trial or petition for relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA added. [18]Petitioners sought
reconsideration of the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA for lack of merit. [19]
Petitioners now come to this Court, asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed
their petition for the alleged failure to show that they have not availed of or resorted to the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment or other remedies through no fault of their own, and held that petitioners were not denied their day in court during the proceedings before
the RTC.[20] In addition, they assert that this Court has yet to decide a case involving Rule 47 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, the instant petition
should be given due course for the guidance of the bench and bar. [21]
For his part, respondent claims that petitioners were in a position to avail of the remedies provided in Rules 37 and 38, as they in fact did when they
filed a motion for new trial.[22] Moreover, they could have resorted to a petition for relief from judgment since they learned of the RTCs judgment only
three and a half months after its promulgation. [23] Respondent likewise maintains that no extrinsic fraud exists to warrant the annulment of the
RTCs Decision, since there was no showing that they were denied their day in court. Petitioners were not made parties to the probate proceedings
because the decedent did not institute them as her heirs. [24] Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are heirs of the decedent, lack of notice to
them is not a fatal defect since personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. [25] Finally,
respondent charges petitioners of forumshopping, since the latter have a pending suit involving the same issues as those in SP No. 00-135, that is
SP No. 1181[26] filed before Branch 23, RTC of General Santos City and subsequently pending on appeal before the CA in CA-G.R. No.74924. [27]
It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores (Flores), who is a niece of the decedent, filed a petition for letters of
administration with the RTC of General Santos City, claiming that the decedent died intestate without any issue, survived by five groups of collateral
heirs. Flores, armed with a Special Power of Attorney from most of the other petitioners, prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of
the decedent. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating that the probate court in Janiuay, Iloilo has jurisdiction
since the venue for a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is the place where the decedent died. This is also in accordance with the
rule that the first court acquiring jurisdiction shall continue hearing the case to the exclusion of other courts, the RTC added. [28] On 9 January 2002,
Flores filed a Notice of Appeal [29] and on 28 January 2002, the case was ordered forwarded to the CA. [30]
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they
could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the
ruling of the CA. They aver that respondents offer of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of the probate of the will constitute extrinsic
fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTCs judgment. [31]
The petition is devoid of merit.
Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. The same
Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision
or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. [32] Both motions should be filed within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15)
days from notice of the judgment or final order.
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any
other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party may file a
petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months after entry thereof. [33]
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the
assailed
judgment is rendered.[34] In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail
of a petition for relief from judgment.[35]
However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate proceedings.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time
after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. [36] Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be
published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, [37] as well as furnished to the designated or other
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. [38] Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with
the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of
the decedent.[39]
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case
and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. [40] Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they
eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for
relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening
of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became
final and executory.

Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final, they could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after
the denial of their motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or almost four (4) months from the
time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to avail of the remedy.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition
for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence. [41]
Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites,
as the appellate court ruled.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered.
[42]
The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in
cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner, [43] and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. [44] A person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by
the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby. [45]
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. [46] Fraud is regarded as
extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not
to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. [47]
To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of respondents deliberate omission or concealment of their names,
ages and residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus
they were denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that respondents offer of a false compromise even before the filing of the petition
prevented them from appearing and opposing the petition for probate.
The Court is not convinced.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. [48] A perusal of the
will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither

compulsory nor testate heirs[49] who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to
mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice.
After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite. [50]
The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute
extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their
case before the probate court.
One other vital point is the issue of forum-shopping against petitioners. Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits in different courts,
either simultaneously or successively, involving the same parties, to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially same reliefs,[51] on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. [52] Obviously, the parties in the instant
case, as well as in the appealed case before the CA, are the same. Both cases deal with the existence and validity of the alleged will of the
decedent, with petitioners anchoring their cause on the state of intestacy. In the probate proceedings, petitioners position has always been that the
decedent left no will and if she did, the will does not comply with the requisites of a valid will. Indeed, that position is the bedrock of their present
petition. Of course, respondent maintains the contrary stance. On the other hand, in the petition for letters of administration, petitioner Flores prayed
for her appointment as administratrix of the
estate on the theory that the decedent died intestate. The petition was dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and it is this order of dismissal
which is the subject of review in CA-G.R. No. 74924. Clearly, therefore, there is forum-shopping.
Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said pending case in their certification against forum- shopping. Neither have they
done so at any time thereafter. The Court notes that even in the petition for annulment of judgment, petitioners failed to inform the CA of the
pendency of their appeal in CA-G.R. No. 74924, even though the notice of appeal was filed way before the petition for annulment of judgment was
instituted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
11. THIRD DIVISION

VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO JAKE TAN and
GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO
NIERRAS,
G.R. No. 166520
Present:
Petitioners,
- versus -
Chairperson,
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS

CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC
CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN
RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM,
Respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 14, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision [1] dated 29 July 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order [2] dated 17 July 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003 whereby it appointed
Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator to the estate of the late Gerardo Tan.
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:
Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001, private respondents, who are claiming to be the
children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding
No. 4014-0 and was raffled to Branch 12. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take
possession and charge of Gerardos estate until the Petition can be resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They
prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to private
respondents Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not
residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their copetitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.
On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de
facto administratrix, to wit:
b.1.) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the fiduciary account of the Court all money and
or cash at hand or deposited in the bank(s) which rightfully belong to the estate of the decedent within five (5) days from receipt
hereof;
b.2.) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any
crop harvest, if any, done in the past or is presently harvesting or about to undertake, which belong to the estate of the decedent;
b.3.) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also required to submit a financial report to the
Commission as regards the background of the cash at hand or deposited in bank(s), if any, the expenses incurred in course of
her administration and other relevant facts including that of the proceeds of the sugarcane/crop harvest, which submission will be
done upon deposit of the foregoing with the court as above-required. [3]
More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private respondents Urgent Ex-parte Motion to resolve pending incident,
gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.
Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order [4] appointing Romualdo as special administrator of
Gerardos Estate, the fallo of which states:
Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special administrator is hereby GRANTED. Mr. Romualdo
D. Lim is hereby appointed as Special Administrator and shall immediately take possession and charge of the goods, chattels,
rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, upon
his filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 and upon approval of the same by this Court. [5]
Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that petitioner Vilma should be the one
appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of the deceased.
On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity as RTC Executive Judge, issued an Order [6] denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the 17 July 2003 Order, again insisting on
petitioner Vilmas right to be appointed as special administratix. Petitioners likewise prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO) to enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and acting as special administrator thereof.

On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying petitioners Petition. On 6 December 2004, the Court of Appeals similarly
denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING and DISMISSING
the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed order in Special Proceeding No. 4014-0. [7]
On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assigning the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA TO BE
GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR FATHERS ESTATE.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND
THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.[8]
On 14 February 2005, this Court issued a Resolution [9] denying the Petition on the ground of late filing, failure to submit an affidavit of
service of a copy of the Petition on the Court of Appeals and proof of such service, failure to properly verify the Petition, and failure to pay the deposit
for the Salary Adjustment for the Judiciary (SAJ) fund and sheriffs fee. Upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, however, this Court
issued on 18 July 2005 a Resolution[10] reinstating the Petition.
Petitioners contend[11] that they should be given priority in the administration of the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate heirs of the
late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are purportedly Gerardos illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that generally, it
is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedents estate.
Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private respondents or their attorney-in-fact to administer Gerardos
estate. Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo Jake Tan (Jake) claim to have lived for a long time and continue to reside on Gerardos estate, while
respondents are not even in the Philippines, having long established residence abroad.
Petitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the administratrix of the estate since Gerardos death on 14 October
2000 and is thus well steeped in the actual management and operation of the estate (which essentially consists of agricultural landholdings). [12]
As regards the denial of petitioners plea for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO, petitioners argue that such denial
would leave Romualdo, private respondents attorney-in-fact, free to enter Gerardos estate and proceed to act as administrator thereof to the
prejudice of petitioners.

The appeal is devoid of merit.
The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such
person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to
apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of
the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may
select.
However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted
provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. [13] The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of
kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the
discretion of the court, and is not appealable.[14]
Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[15]
We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge
Menchavezs appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special
administratrix of Gerardos estate, but decided against her appointment for the following reasons:
Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed commissioner, directed oppositor Vilma Tan in the latters
capacity as de fact[o] administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the court all money and cash at hand or deposited in
the banks which rightfully belong to the estate within five days from receipt of the directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan was likewise
directed to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop from the estate of the decedent. She
was likewise directed to submit a financial report as regards the background of the cash on hand, if any, the expenses incurred in
the course of her administration. The directive was issued by Atty. Nuevo on March 18, 2002 or more than a year
ago. OnMay 23, 2003, this Court, acting on the urgent ex parte motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma Tan
another ten days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.
This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the benefit of all heirs be that heir is (sic) the nearest
kin or the farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not satisfy the requirement of a special administrator
who can effectively and impartially administer the estate of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs. [16]
(Emphases supplied.)
Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as special administratrix, as opposed to
Romualdo, who was actually appointed by the court as special administrator of Gerardos estate, the latters appointment, at best, would constitute a
mere error of judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of
was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.[17] The Court of Appeals could not have reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari petition.
Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their co-petitioner Vilma would have been the more
competent and capable choice to serve as the special administratrix of Gerardos estate. Contrary to petitioners bare assertions, both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals found that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial requirements after the lapse of a
considerable length of time certainly militates against her appointment.
We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same cannot be said as regards their attorney-in-fact,
Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as special administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can,
thus, personally administer Gerardos estate.
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so that
petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over administration of Gerardos estate, they should already pursue the
appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The appointment
of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or
administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause. [18] The principal object of the
appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs.[19]
In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special administrator due to the delay caused by
the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were
still appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or
its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with the
court the income of Gerardos estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of the fact that Gerardos estate had no income. This defense is
clearly specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilmas non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners should have
simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the courts orders.
Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents, there is no longer any need to discuss petitioners arguments
regarding the denial by the appellate court of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying
reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator of the estate of Gerardo Tan,
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
12. SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the dismissal [2] of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreement [3] in the amount
of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In
view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual
amortizations of P43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31 st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, [4] this time in the amount of P123,156.00. It was intended
to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside
from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement [5] for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. [6] Subsequently in March 1981, testate proceedings commenced before
the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the
special administrator of the estate of the decedent. [7] During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement [8] dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities [9] was executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed
to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complaint [11] for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against
both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of
his return to the Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer [13] and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was
not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null
and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 63. [14] Consequently, trial on the merits ensued
and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit. [15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late
Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that
the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the
decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now defunct Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S.
Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedents account.
Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioners cause of action against respondent
Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the following as errors of the trial
court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE
PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL AFTER THE
WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.

3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RELITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.[16]
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate children and heirs, in this case, Edmund
and Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit A estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot
deny her liability under the said document; as the agreement had been signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to
present the same before the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those enumerated in the
holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary
civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the petitioner should have been presented before the
probate court.[17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as
provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no
valid partition may be had until after the will has been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the
subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as all other properties. Moreover, the active participation of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[18]
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE PROBATE
COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM
SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE CLAIM RELITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ
ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00
CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE
LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION BANK. [19]
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was
thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the
obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from
asserting any position contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include nor mention any of the
tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The active participation and resistance of respondent Florence
S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate
proceedings, and to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors under
consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to consider the fact that respondent Florence S.
Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and
his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by

the late Efraim Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are
concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes
executed by the named respondents, the latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to
file its money claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective personal
capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum of money from the
deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court
which might delay payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the agreement was null and void. She asserts that even if
the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that
the claim should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was there any document
presented as evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or
not the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. [20] The said court is primarily concerned with
the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate. [21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and
the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by
will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. [22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will. [23] In the present case, the
deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will[24] which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in
the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent
which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the
three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement [25] executed by
Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a
pending proceeding for the probate of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
allow.[26] Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. [27] Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the
nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over
that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. [28] In the instant
case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the
will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent
Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors
who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding. We rule in the negative.
Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use
the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor
of First Countryside Credit Corp.[29] The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take

possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in
effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have
thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they
may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or
administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer
the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due,
or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. [30] As we held in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong
v. Herrera:[31]
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is
the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly
requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. [32]
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her
late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may
only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses
Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve
into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings
and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities. [33] The petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines [34] However, the
documentary evidence[35] clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioners participation therein as a party be
found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in
fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not apply here. The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by
the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504). [36]
This being the case, the petitioners personality to file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish its cause of action. Thus, the
trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
13. SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004]
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and
ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA,
LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P.
ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA,respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 42053 dated January 31, 1997, as well as its Resolution[2] dated March 26, 1997, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles
City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. [3] He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom
he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden,
Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada. [4]
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero,
who became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza
sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica[5], Alberto and Rowena.[6]
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio
and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the
decedent located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985
in favor of petitioners Teodora Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also found out
that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the
properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement. [7]
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118
before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to
him.[8]
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related
Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.[9]
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested
deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero [10] and that the titles thereof were
delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his name. [11] Petitioners also raised the affirmative
defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the
administration proceedings.[12] On April 29, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing[13] on the aforesaid ground.
The lower court denied the motion in its Order[14] dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest
especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed in S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration [15] but the
motion was likewise denied.[16]
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as CA
G.R. S.P. No. 42053.[17] Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order which denied the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. [18]
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision[19] dated January 31, 1997, stating that it discerned no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when he denied petitioners motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing
in view of its discretionary nature.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied.[20] Hence, the petition before this Court.
The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the
deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings. [21]
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense that the
proper party to bring the action is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. It must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on
an affirmative defense lies in the discretion of the court. This is clear from the Rules of Court, thus:

SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be
pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. [22] (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, the incorporation of the word may in the provision is clearly indicative of the optional character of the preliminary hearing. The word
denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. [23] Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was firmed up beyond
cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase in the discretion of the Court, apart from the retention of the word may in
Section 6,[24] in Rule 16 thereof.
Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower courts doorstep for not hearing petitioners affirmative defense, it cannot
likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as heirs to bring the suit.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the
decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent. The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. [25]
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been
appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule
3[26] and Section 2, Rule 87[27] of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,[28] this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to
represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules,[29] while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the
heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But
no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet
no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait
further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the
meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or
refuses to bring suit;[30] and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of [31] and he is made a party defendant.
[32]
Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed
administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of
administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of the lower court, recourse to this Court is not warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
14. THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156403. March 31, 2005]
JOSEPHINE PAHAMOTANG and ELEANOR PAHAMOTANG-BASA, petitioners, vs. THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB) and the HEIRS
OF ARTURO ARGUNA, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65290, to wit:
1. Decision dated March 20, 2002,[1] granting the appeal and reversing the appealed August 7, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial
Court at Davao City; and
2. Resolution dated November 20, 2002, denying herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration. [2]

The factual background:
On July 1, 1972, Melitona Pahamotang died. She was survived by her husband Agustin Pahamotang, and their eight (8) children, namely:
Ana, Genoveva, Isabelita, Corazon, Susana, Concepcion and herein petitioners Josephine and Eleonor, all surnamed Pahamotang.
On September 15, 1972, Agustin filed with the then Court of First Instance of Davao City a petition for issuance of letters administration over
the estate of his deceased wife. The petition, docketed as Special Case No. 1792, was raffled to Branch VI of said court, hereinafter referred to as
the intestate court.
In his petition, Agustin identified petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as among the heirs of his deceased spouse. It appears that Agustin was
appointed petitioners' judicial guardian in an earlier case - Special Civil Case No. 1785 also of the CFI of Davao City, Branch VI.
On December 7, 1972, the intestate court issued an order granting Agustins petition.
On July 6, 1973, respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Agustin executed an Amendment of Real and Chattel Mortgages with
Assumption of Obligation. It appears that earlier, or on December 14, 1972, the intestate court approved the mortgage to PNB of certain assets of
the estate to secure an obligation in the amount of P570,000.00. Agustin signed the document in behalf of (1) the estate of Melitona; (2) daughters
Ana and Corazon; and (3) a logging company named Pahamotang Logging Enterprises, Inc. ( PLEI) which appeared to have an interest in the
properties of the estate. Offered as securities are twelve (12) parcels of registered land, ten (10) of which are covered by transfer certificates of title
(TCT) No. 2431, 7443, 8035, 11465, 21132, 4038, 24327, 24326, 31226 and 37786, all of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City, while the remaining
two (2) parcels by TCTs No. (3918) 1081 and (T-2947) 562 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Norte and Davao del Sur, respectively.
On July 16, 1973, Agustin filed with the intestate court a Petition for Authority To Increase Mortgage on the above mentioned properties of
the estate.
In an Order dated July 18, 1973, the intestate court granted said petition.
On October 5, 1974, Agustin again filed with the intestate court another petition, Petition for Declaration of Heirs And For Authority To
Increase Indebtedness, whereunder he alleged the necessity for an additional loan from PNB to capitalize the business of the estate, the additional
loan to be secured by additional collateral in the form of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-7131 registered in the
name of Heirs of Melitona Pahamotang. In the same petition, Agustin prayed the intestate court to declare him and Ana, Genoveva, Isabelita,
Corazon, Susana, Concepcion and herein petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as the only heirs of Melitona.
In an Order of October 19, 1974, the intestate court granted Agustin authority to seek additional loan from PNB in an amount not
exceeding P5,000,000.00 to be secured by the land covered by OCT No. P-7131 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao Oriental, but denied Agustins
prayer for declaration of heirs for being premature.
On October 22, 1974, a real estate mortgage contract for P4,500,000.00 was executed by PNB and Agustin in his several capacities as: (1)
administrator of the estate of his late wife; (2) general manager of PLEI; (3) attorney-in-fact of spouses Isabelita Pahamotang and Orlando Ruiz, and
spouses Susana Pahamotang and Octavio Zamora; and (4) guardian of daughters Concepcion and Genoveva and petitioners Josephine and
Eleonor. Offered as securities for the additional loan are three (3) parcels of registered land covered by TCTs No. T-21132, 37786 and 43264.
On February 19, 1980, Agustin filed with the intestate court a Petition (Request for Judicial Authority To Sell Certain Properties of the
Estate), therein praying for authority to sell to Arturo Arguna the properties of the estate covered by TCTs No. 7443, 8035, 11465, 24326 and 31226
of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City, and also TCT No. (T-3918) T-1081 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Norte.
On February 27, 1980, Agustin yet filed with the intestate court another petition, this time a Petition To Sell the Properties of the
Estate, more specifically referring to the property covered by OCT No. P-7131, in favor of PLEI.
In separate Orders both dated February 25, 1980, the intestate court granted Agustin authority to sell estate properties, in which orders the
court also required all the heirs of Melitona to give their express conformity to the disposal of the subject properties of the estate and to sign the deed
of sale to be submitted to the same court. Strangely, the two (2) orders were dated two (2) days earlier than February 27, 1980, the day Agustin
supposedly filed his petition.
In a motion for reconsideration, Agustin prayed the intestate court for the amendment of one of its February 25, 1980 Orders by canceling the
requirement of express conformity of the heirs as a condition for the disposal of the aforesaid properties.
In its Order of January 7, 1981, the intestate court granted Agustins prayer.
Hence, on March 4, 1981, estate properties covered by TCTs No. 7443,11465, 24326, 31226, 8035, (T-2947) 662 and (T-3918) T-1081, were
sold to respondent Arturo Arguna, while the property covered by OCT No. P-7131 was sold to PLEI. Consequent to such sales, vendees Arguna
and PLEI filed witt the intestate court a motion for the approval of the corresponding deeds of sale in their favor. And, in an Order dated March 9,
1981, the intestate court granted the motion.

Thereafter, three (3) daughters of Agustin, namely, Ana, Isabelita and Corazon petitioned the intestate court for the payment of their respective
shares from the sales of estate properties, which was granted by the intestate court.
Meanwhile, the obligation secured by mortgages on the subject properties of the estate was never satisfied. Hence, on the basis of the real
estate mortgage contracts dated July 6, 1973 and October 22, 1974, mortgagor PNB filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
Petitioner Josephine filed a motion with the intestate court for the issuance of an order restraining PNB from extrajudicially foreclosing the
mortgage. In its Order dated August 19, 1983, the intestate court denied Josephines motion. Hence, PNB was able to foreclose the mortgage in its
favor.
Petitioners Josephine and Eleanor, together with their sister Susana Pahamatong-Zamora, filed motions with the intestate court to set aside
its Orders of December 14, 1972 [Note: the order dated July 18, 1973 contained reference to an order dated December 14, 1972 approving the
mortgage to PNB of certain properties of the estate], July 18, 1973, October 19, 1974 and February 25, 1980.
In an Order dated September 5, 1983, the intestate court denied the motions, explaining:
"Carefully analyzing the aforesaid motions and the grounds relied upon, as well as the opposition thereto, the Court holds that the supposed defects
and/or irregularities complained of are mainly formal or procedural and not substantial, for which reason, the Court is not persuaded to still disturb all
the orders, especially that interests of the parties to the various contracts already authorized or approved by the Orders sought to be set aside will be
adversely affected.[3]
Such was the state of things when, on March 20, 1984, in the Regional Trial Court at Davao City, petitioners Josephine and Eleanor, together
with their sister Susana, filed their complaint for Nullification of Mortgage Contracts and Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages against
Agustin, PNB, Arturo Arguna, PLEI, the Provincial Sheriff of Mati, Davao Oriental, the Provincial Sheriff of Tagum, Davao del Norte and the City
Sheriff of Davao City. In their complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 16,802 which was raffled to Branch 12 of the court, the sisters Josephine,
Eleanor and Susana prayed for the following reliefs:
"1.) The real estate mortgage contracts of July 6, 1973 and that of October 2, 1974, executed by and between defendants PNB AND PLEI be
declared null and void ab initio;
2.) Declaring the foreclosure proceedings conducted by defendants-sheriffs, insofar as they pertain to the assets of the estate of Melitona L.
Pahamotang, including the auction sales thereto, and any and all proceedings taken thereunder, as null and void ab initio;
3.) Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Doc. No. 473; Page No.96; Book No.VIII, Series of 1981 of the Notarial Registry of Paquito G.
Balasabas of Davao City evidencing the sale/transfer of the real properties described therein to defendant Arturo S. Arguna, as null and
void ab initio;
4.) Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Doc. No. 474; Page No. 96, Book No. VIII, series of 1981 of the Notarial Registry of Paquito G.
Balasabas of Davao City, evidencing the sale/transfer of real properties to PLEI as null and void ab initio;
5.) For defendants to pay plaintiffs moral damages in such sums as may be found to be just and equitable under the premises;
6.) For defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the expenses incurred in connection with this litigation;
7.) For defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally attorney's fees in an amount to be proven during the trial;
8.) For defendants to pay the costs of the suit. [4]
PNB moved to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court granted in its Order of January 11, 1985.
However, upon motion of the plaintiffs, the trial court reversed itself and ordered defendant PNB to file its answer.
Defendant PNB did file its answer with counterclaim, accompanied by a cross-claim against co-defendants Agustin and PLEI.
During the ensuing pre-trial conference, the parties submitted the following issues for the resolution of the trial court, to wit:
"1. Whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage contracts executed on July 6, 1973 and October 2, 1974 (sic) by and between defendants
Pahamotang Logging Enterprises, Inc. and the Philippine National Bank are null and void?
2. Whether or not the foreclosure proceedings conducted by defendants-Sheriffs, insofar as they affect the assets of the Estate of Melitona
Pahamotang, including the public auction sales thereof, are null and void?

3. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of defendant Arturo Arguna entered as Doc. No. 473; Page No. 96; Book No. VIII, series
of 1981 of the Notarial Register of Notary Public Paquito Balasabas is null and void?
4. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of defendant Pahamotang Logging Enterprises, Inc. entered as Doc. No. 474; Page No.
96; Book No. VIII, series of 1981 of the Notarial Register of Notary Public Paquito Balasabas is null and void?
5. On defendant PNB's cross-claim, in the event the mortgage contracts and the foreclosure proceedings are declared null and void, whether
or not defendant Pahamotang Logging Enterprises, Inc. is liable to the PNB?
6. Whether or not the defendants are liable to the plaintiffs for damages?
7. Whether or not the plaintiffs are liable to the defendants for damages? [5]
With defendant Arturo Argunas death on October 31, 1990, the trial court ordered his substitution by his heirs: Heirs of Arturo Alguna.
In a Decision dated August 7, 1998, the trial court in effect rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. We quote the decisions dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the Mortgage Contracts of July 6, 1973 and October 22, 1974, as well as the foreclosure proceedings, void insofar as it affects the
share, interests and property rights of the plaintiffs in the assets of the estate of Melitona Pahamotang, but valid with respect to the other parties;
2. Declaring the deeds of sale in favor of defendants Pahamotang Logging Enterprises, Inc. and Arturo Arguna as void insofar as it affects the
shares, interests and property rights of herein plaintiffs in the assets of the estate of Melitona Pahamotang but valid with respect to the other parties
to the said deeds of sale.
3. Denying all the other claims of the parties for lack of strong, convincing and competent evidence.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
From the aforementioned decision of the trial court, PNB, PLEI and the Heirs of Arturo Arguna went on appeal to the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 65290. While the appeal was pending, the CA granted the motion of Susana Pahamatong-Zamora to withdraw from the case.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated March 20, 2002,[7] reversed the appealed decision of the trial
court and dismissed the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 16,802, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed August 07, 1998 Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
12, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 16,802.
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court ruled that petitioners, while ostensibly questioning the validity of the contracts of mortgage and sale entered into by their
father Agustin, were essentially attacking collaterally the validity of the four (4) orders of the intestate court in Special Case No. 1792, namely:
1. Order dated July 18, 1973, granting Agustins Petition for Authority to Increase Mortgage;
2. Order dated October 19, 1974, denying Agustins petition for declaration of heirs but giving him authority to seek additional loan from PNB;
3. Order dated February 25, 1980, giving Agustin permission to sell properties of the estate to Arturo Arguna and PLEI; and
4. Order dated January 7, 1981, canceling the requirement of express conformity by the heirs as a condition for the disposal of estate
properties.
To the appellate court, petitioners committed a fatal error of mounting a collateral attack on the foregoing orders instead of initiating a direct action to
annul them. Explains the Court of Appeals:
"A null and void judgment is susceptible to direct as well as collateral attack. A direct attack against a judgment is made through an action or
proceeding the main object of which is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment, if not carried into effect; or if the property has
been disposed of, the aggrieved party may sue for recovery. A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, an attack
on the judgment is made as an incident in said action. This is proper only when the judgment, on its fact, is null and void, as where it is patent that
the court which rendered such judgment has no jurisdiction. A judgment void on its face may also be attacked directly.

xxx xxx xxx
Perusing the above arguments and comparing them with the settled ruling, the plaintiffs-appellees [now petitioners], we believe had availed
themselves of the wrong remedy before the trial court. It is clear that they are collaterally attacking the various orders of the intestate court in an
action for the nullification of the subject mortgages, and foreclosure proceedings in favor of PNB, and the deeds of sale in favor of Arguna. Most of
their arguments stemmed from their allegations that the various orders of the intestate court were issued without a notification given to them. An
examination, however, of the July 18, 1973 order shows that the heirs of Melitona have knowledge of the petition to increase mortgage filed by
Agustin, thus:
`The petitioner testified that all his children including those who are of age have no objection to this petition and, as matter of fact, Ana Pahamotang,
one of the heirs of Melitona Pahamotang, who is the vice-president of the logging corporation, is the one at present negotiating for the increase of
mortgage with the Philippine National Bank.'
The presumption arising from those statements of the intestate court is that the heirs were notified of the petition for the increase of mortgage.
The same can be seen in the October 19, 1974 order:
`The records show that all the known heirs, namely Ana, Isabelita, Corazon, Susana, including the incompetent Genoveva, and the minors
Josephine, Eleanor and Concepcion all surnamed were notified of the hearing of the petition.'
On the other hand, the February 25, 1980 order required Agustin to obtain first express conformity from the heirs before the subject property be sold
to Arguna. The fact that this was reconsidered by the intestate court in its January 07, 1981 is of no moment. The questioned orders are valid having
been issued in accordance with law and procedure. The problem with the plaintiffs-appellees is that, in trying to nullify the subject mortgages and the
foreclosure proceedings in favor of PNB and the deeds of sale in favor of Arguna, they are assailing the aforesaid orders of the intestate court and in
attacking the said orders, they attached documents that they believe would warrant the conclusion that the assailed orders are null and void. This is
a clear collateral attack of the orders of the intestate court which is not void on its face and which cannot be allowed in the present action. The
defects alleged by the plaintiff-appellees are not apparent on the face of the assailed orders. Their recourse is to ask for the declaration of nullity of
the said orders, not in a collateral manner, but a direct action to annul the same. [8]
The same court added that petitioners failure to assail said orders at the most opportune time constitutes laches:
"In their complaint below, plaintiffs, appellees are assailing in their present action, four orders of the intestate court namely: July 18, 1973, October
19, 1974, February 25, 1980 and January 07, 1981 orders which were then issued by Judge Martinez. It should be recalled that except for the
January 07, 1981 order, Judge Jacinto, upon taking over Sp. No. 1792, denied the motion of the plaintiffs-appellees to set aside the aforesaid orders.
Aside from their motion before Judge Jacinto, nothing on the records would show that the plaintiffs-appellees availed of other remedies to set aside
the questioned orders. Further, the records would not show that the plaintiffs-appellees appealed the order of Judge Jacinto. If an interval of two
years, seven months and ninety nine days were barred by laches, with more reason should the same doctrine apply to the present case, considering
that the plaintiffs-appellees did not avail of the remedies provided by law in impugning the various orders of the intestate court. Thus, the questioned
orders of the intestate court, by operation of law became final. It is a fundamental principle of public policy in every jural system that at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law (interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum). The very object
of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. Once a judgment or an order of a court has become final, the issues raised
therein should be laid to rest. To date, except as to the present action which we will later discuss as improper, the plaintiff-appellees have not availed
themselves of other avenues to have the orders issued by Judge Martinez and Judge Jacinto annulled and set aside. In the present case, when
Judge Jacinto denied the motion of the plaintiffs-appellees, the latter had remedies provided by the rules to assail such order. The ruling by Judge
Jacinto denying plaintiffs-appellees motion to set aside the questioned orders of Judge Martinez has long acquired finality. It is well embedded in our
jurisprudence, that judgment properly rendered by a court vested with jurisdiction, like the RTC, and which has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Litigation must have and always
has an end. If not, judicial function will lose its relevance.
In time, petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution of November 20, 2002.
Hence, petitioners present recourse, basically praying for the reversal of the CA decision and the reinstatement of that of the trial court.
We find merit in the petition.
It is petitioners posture that the mortgage contracts dated July 6, 1973 and October 22, 1974 entered into by Agustin with respondent PNB, as
well as his subsequent sale of estate properties to PLEI and Arguna on March 4, 1981, are void because they [petitioners] never consented thereto.
They assert that as heirs of their mother Melitona, they are entitled to notice of Agustin's several petitions in the intestate court seeking authority to
mortgage and sell estate properties. Without such notice, so they maintain, the four orders of the intestate court dated July 18, 1973, October 19,
1974, February 25, 1980 and January 7, 1981, which allowed Agustin to mortgage and sell estate properties, are void on account of Agustins noncompliance with the mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.

Prescinding from their premise that said orders are completely void and hence, could not attain finality, petitioners maintain that the same could
be attacked directly or collaterally, anytime and anywhere.
For its part, respondent PNB asserts that petitioners cannot raise as issue in this proceedings the validity of the subject orders in their desire to
invalidate the contracts of mortgage entered into by Agustin. To PNB, the validity of the subject orders of the intestate court can only be challenged in
a direct action for such purpose and not in an action to annul contracts, as the petitioners have done. This respondent adds that the mortgage on the
subject properties is valid because the same was made with the approval of the intestate court and with the knowledge of the heirs of Melitona,
petitioners included.[9]
Upon the other hand, respondent Heirs of Arturo Arguna likewise claim that petitioners knew of the filing with the intestate court by Agustin of
petitions to mortgage and sell the estate properties. They reecho the CAs ruling that petitioners are barred by laches in filing Civil Case No. 16,802.
[10]
As we see it, the determinative question is whether or not petitioners can obtain relief from the effects of contracts of sale and mortgage
entered into by Agustin without first initiating a direct action against the orders of the intestate court authorizing the challenged contracts.
We answer the question in the affirmative.
It bears emphasizing that the action filed by the petitioners before the trial court in Civil Case No. 16,802 is for the annulment of several
contracts entered into by Agustin for and in behalf of the estate of Melitona, namely: (a) contract of mortgage in favor of respondent PNB, (b) contract
of sale in favor of Arguna involving seven (7) parcels of land; and (c) contract of sale of a parcel of land in favor of PLEI.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case upon the allegations in the complaint that said contracts were entered
into despite lack of notices to the heirs of the petition for the approval of those contracts by the intestate court.
Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, the action which petitioners lodged with the trial court in Civil Case No. 16,802 is not an action to
annul the orders of the intestate court, which, according to CA, cannot be done collaterally. It is the validity of the contracts of mortgage and sale
which is directly attacked in the action.
And, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the trial court made a factual finding in its decision of August 7, 1998 that petitioners were, in fact, not
notified by their father Agustin of the filing of his petitions for permission to mortgage/sell the estate properties. The trial court made the correct
conclusion of law that the challenged orders of the intestate court granting Agustins petitions were null and void for lack of compliance with the
mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, particularly Sections 2, 4, 7 thereof, which respectively read:
Sec. 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty to pay debts and legacies through personalty not exhausted. When the personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts, expenses of administration, and legacies, or where the sale of such
personal estate may injure the business or other interests of those interested in the estate, and where a testator has not otherwise made sufficient
provision for the payment of such debts, expenses, and legacies, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator and on written notice
to the heirs, devisees, and legatees residing in the Philippines, may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
encumber so much as may be necessary of the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for the purpose of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies,
if it clearly appears that such sale, mortgage, or encumbrance would be beneficial to the persons interested; and if a part cannot be sold, mortgaged,
or otherwise encumbered without injury to those interested in the remainder, the authority may be for the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of
the whole of such real estate, or so much thereof as is necessary or beneficial under the circumstances.
Sec. 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested persons. Disposal of proceeds. - When it appears that the sale of the
whole or a part of the real or personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon
application of the executor or administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold,
authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies, or expenses of
administration; but such authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the proceeds shall be
assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper proportions.
Sec. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. - The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the
deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate; in cases
provided by these rules and when it appears necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations:
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the debts due from the deceased, the expenses of
administration, the legacies, the value of the personal estate, the situation of the estate to be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise
encumbered, and such other facts as show that the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance is necessary or beneficial;
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice stating the nature of the petition, the
reason for the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may
cause such further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper; (Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx
Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that when an order authorizing the sale or encumbrance of real property was issued by the testate or
intestate court without previous notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees as required by the Rules, it is not only the contract itself which is null and
void but also the order of the court authorizing the same. [11]
Thus, in Maneclang vs. Baun,[12] the previous administrator of the estate filed a petition with the intestate court seeking authority to sell portion
of the estate, which the court granted despite lack of notice of hearing to the heirs of the decedent. The new administrator of the estate filed with the
Regional Trial Court an action for the annulment of the sales made by the previous administrator. After trial, the trial court held that the order of the
intestate court granting authority to sell, as well as the deed of sale, were void. On appeal directly to this Court, We held that without compliance with
Sections 2, 4 and 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, the authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio.
In Liu vs. Loy, Jr.,[13] while the decedent was still living, his son and attorney-in-fact sold in behalf of the alleged decedent certain parcels of
land to Frank Liu. After the decedent died, the son sold the same properties to two persons. Upon an ex parte motion filed by the 2nd set of buyers
of estate properties, the probate court approved the sale to them of said properties. Consequently, certificates of title covering the estate properties
were cancelled and new titles issued to the 2 nd set of buyers. Frank Liu filed a complaint for reconveyance/ annulment of title with the Regional Trial
Court. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. When the case was appealed to us, we set aside the
decision of the appellate court and declared the probate court's approval of the sale as completely void due to the failure of the 2 nd set of buyers to
notify the heir-administratrix of the motion and hearing for the sale of estate property.
Clearly, the requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and failure to give notice to the heirs would invalidate the authority
granted by the intestate/probate court to mortgage or sell estate assets.
Here, it appears that petitioners were never notified of the several petitions filed by Agustin with the intestate court to mortgage and sell the
estate properties of his wife.
According to the trial court, the [P]etition for Authority to Increase Mortgage and [P]etition for Declaration of Heirs and for Authority to
Increase Indebtedness, filed by Agustin on July 16, 1973 and October 5, 1974, respectively, do not contain information that petitioners were
furnished with copies of said petitions. Also, notices of hearings of those petitions were not sent to the petitioners. [14] The trial court also found in Civil
Case No. 16,802 that Agustin did not notify petitioners of the filing of his petitions for judicial authority to sell estate properties to Arturo Arguna and
PLEI.[15]
As it were, the appellate court offered little explanation on why it did not believe the trial court in its finding that petitioners were ignorant of
Agustins scheme to mortgage and sell the estate properties.
Aside from merely quoting the orders of July 18, 1973 and October 19, 1974 of the intestate court, the Court of Appeals leaves us in the dark
on its reason for disbelieving the trial court. The appellate court did not publicize its appraisal of the evidence presented by the parties before the trial
court in the matter regarding the knowledge, or absence thereof, by the petitioners of Agustins petitions. The appellate court cannot casually set
aside the findings of the trial court without stating clearly the reasons therefor. Findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight, and absent any
indication to believe otherwise, we simply cannot adopt the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals.
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
either abandoned or declined the right. [16]The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3)
lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. [17]
In the present case, the appellate court erred in appreciating laches against petitioners. The element of delay in questioning the subject orders
of the intestate court is sorely lacking. Petitioners were totally unaware of the plan of Agustin to mortgage and sell the estate properties. There is no
indication that mortgagor PNB and vendee Arguna had notified petitioners of the contracts they had executed with Agustin. Although petitioners
finally obtained knowledge of the subject petitions filed by their father, and eventually challenged the July 18, 1973, October 19, 1974, February 25,
1980 and January 7, 1981 orders of the intestate court, it is not clear from the challenged decision of the appellate court when they (petitioners)
actually learned of the existence of said orders of the intestate court. Absent any indication of the point in time when petitioners acquired knowledge
of those orders, their alleged delay in impugning the validity thereof certainly cannot be established. And the Court of Appeals cannot simply impute
laches against them.
WHEREFORE, the assailed issuances of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision dated August 7, 1998
of the trial court in its Civil Case No. 16,802 REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. G.R. No. 178933
Petitioner,
Present:
Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,* and
PERALTA, JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) Promulgated:
and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE,
Respondents. September 16, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the May 4, 2007 Resolution [1] and July 6, 2007 Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98764, entitled Nelia S. Silverio-Dee and Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (impleaded as necessary party) v.
Reinato G. Quilala, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Makati, Branch 57, Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Edmundo S. Silverio, represented by
Nestor Dela Merced II, and Sheriff Villamor R. Villegas.
The assailed resolution granted private respondents prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order against public respondent
Judge Quilala. On the other hand, the assailed decision set aside the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007 and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19,
2007 while directing the respondent lower court to give due course to the appeal of herein private respondent.
The Facts
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse,
Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-2629 entitled In Re:
Estate of the Late Beatriz D. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., et al. pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 57 (RTC).
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the
administrator of the subject estate. On November 22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C.
Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.
On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while
appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.
On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other
related orders.

On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate
Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court. [3]
Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order [4] affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying private respondents
motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise
his duties as administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3,
Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.
Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 on June 8, 2005.
On June 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 15, 2005[5] of the Omnibus Order. This was later
denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005, which was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005.
Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 2005 [6] also recalled its previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of
administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the administrator.
From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an Order
dated October 31, 2006. In the same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to
partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due thereon. Among the properties authorized to be sold was the one located
at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.[7]
Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5, 2006 [8] from the Order dated December 12,
2005 while the Record on Appeal dated January 20, 2006 [9] was filed on January 23, 2006.
Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution [10] against the
appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order [11] denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary
period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the
premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City. The writ of execution was later issued on April 17, 2007[12] and a Notice to
Vacate[13] was issued on April 19, 2007 ordering private respondent to leave the premises of the subject property within ten (10) days.
Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction)
dated May 2, 2007[14] with the CA.
On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled
that the Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court applying the fresh rule period enunciated by this
Court in Neypes v. Court of Appeals[15] as reiterated in Sumaway v. Union Bank.[16]
Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition of private respondent. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE. Accordingly,
the Order, dated April 2, 2007, the writ of execution, dated April 17, 2007, and the Notice to Vacate, dated April 19, 2007,
are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Further, the court a quo is hereby directed to give due course to the appeal of Nelia S.
Silverio-Dee.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
-AThe Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 (Annex G of Annex C) and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory
Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41;
-BThe respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction,
in deliberately failing to decide that the basis of the occupancy of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee are fraudulent documents, without any
authority from the Intestate Court;
-CThe respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction,
in issuing precipitately the temporary restraining order (TRO) in its Resolution dated May 4, 2007 (Annex A-1);
-DThe respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in
annulling the Order dated April 2, 2007, the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007, and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007
because the respondent Silverio-Dees occupancy of the Intestate property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City
(Annex N of Annex C) will prevent the sale authorized by the Order dated October 31, 2006 to secure funds for the payment of
taxes due which are now high and rapidly increasing payment of which must not be enjoined. [17]
The Courts Ruling

This petition is meritorious.
The May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC Is
an Interlocutory Order, Not Subject to an Appeal
To recapitulate, the relevant facts to the instant issue are as follows:
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the property located at No.
3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, MakatiCity. She received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on
Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December
12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal
while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.
Thus, in denying due course to the Notice/Record on Appeal, the RTC, in its Order dated April 2, 2007, ruled:
Verily, the appeal taken by the movant Nelia Silverio-Dee from the Order of this Court dated December 12, 2005
denying the Motion for Reconsideration is misplaced as no appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion for
reconsideration (see Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court). Furthermore, assuming that what said movant had appealed is the final Order dated May 31, 2005, still, the appeal
cannot be given due course as the Record on Appeal had been filed beyond the thirty-day period to appeal (see Section 3 Rule
41 of the Rules of Court)
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Nelia Silverio is hereby DENIED due course.
Let a writ of execution issue to enforce the Order dated May 31, 2005 against Nelia Silverio-Dee requiring her to
vacate the premises at No. 3 Intsia, Forbes Park, Makati City.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, the denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order
denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on
Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.
Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 41
APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal.An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated December 12, 2005 which denied her
motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus,
petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and should have filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead.
The CA, however, ruled that the filing of the Notice of Appeal in this case was proper saying that the appeal pertained to the earlier
Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005. The CA, citing Apuyan v. Haldeman,[18] argued that an order denying a motion for reconsideration may be
appealed as such order is the final order which disposes of the case. In that case, we stated:
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., We held, thus:
[T]his Court finds that the proscription against appealing from an order denying a motion for reconsideration
refers to an interlocutory order, and not to a final order or judgment. That that was the intention of the above-quoted
rules is gathered from Pagtakhan v. CIR, 39 SCRA 455 (1971), cited in above-quoted portion of the decision in
Republic, in which this Court held that an order denying a motion to dismiss an action is interlocutory, hence, not
appealable.
The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory order is to prevent
undue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are
promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single appeal. The appropriate remedy is thus for the party
to wait for the final judgment or order and assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.
The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an
interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or settles
definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than to execute the
order.
Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.
The reference by petitioner, in his notice of appeal, to the March 12, 1999 Order denying his Omnibus
MotionMotion for Reconsideration should thus be deemed to refer to the January 17, 1999 Order which declared him
non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.
If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration is applied to any order,
then there would have been no need to specifically mention in both above-quoted sections of the Rules final orders or
judgments as subject to appeal. In other words, from the entire provisions of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking
that what is proscribed is to appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, the question posed is whether the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an interlocutory order.
On this aspect, the CA ruled that the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 was a final order, to wit:
We note that the Order, dated December 12, 2005, is an offshoot of the Omnibus Order, dated May 31, 2005. In the
Omnibus Order, the court a quo ruled that the petitioner, as an heir of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, had no right to use and occupy
the property in question despite authority given to her by Ricardo Silverio, Sr. when it said, thus:
x x x In the first place, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee cannot occupy the property in Intsia, Forbes Park, admittedly
belonging to the conjugal estate and subject to their proceedings without authority of the Court. Based on the
pretenses of Nelia Silverio-Dee in her memorandum, it is clear that she would use and maintain the premises in the
concept of a distributee. Under her perception, Section 1 Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court is violated. x x x
xxxx
For the property at Intsia, Forbes Park cannot be occupied or appropriated by, nor distributed to Nelia S.
Silverio-Dee, since no distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations mentioned in the aforestated
Rule is made. In fact, the said property may still be sold to pay the taxes and/or other obligations owned by the estate,
which will be difficult to do if she is allowed to stay in the property.
Moreover, the alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to occupy the property
dated May 4, 2004, assuming it is not even antedated as alleged by SILVERIO, JR., is null and void since the
possession of estate property can only be given to a purported heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1
Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right
to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration (See Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court).
With this in mind, it is without an iota of doubt that the possession by Nelia S. Silverio-Dee of the property in question
has absolutely no legal basis considering that her occupancy cannot pay the debts and expenses of administration, not
to mention the fact that it will also disturb the right of the new Administrator to possess and manage the property for the
purpose of settling the estates legitimate obligations.
In the belated Memorandum of Nelia Silverio-Dee, she enclosed a statement of the expenses she incurred
pertaining to the house renovation covering the period from May 26, 2004 to February 28, 2005 in the total amount of
Php12,434,749.55, which supports this Courts conclusion that she is already the final distributee of the property.
Repairs of such magnitude require notice, hearing of the parties and approval of the Court under the Rules. Without
following this process, the acts of Nelia Silverio-Dee are absolutely without legal sanction.
To our mind, the court a quos ruling clearly constitutes a final determination of the rights of the petitioner as
the appealing party. As such, the Omnibus Order, dated May 31, 2002 (the predecessor of the Order dated December 12,
2002) is a final order; hence, the same may be appealed, for the said matter is clearly declared by the rules as
appealable and the proscription does not apply.[19] (Emphasis supplied.)
An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final order, was defined in Tan v. Republic:[20]
A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory
order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be
included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such
interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.
[21]
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the
premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of
the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned, each
heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a particular property. In Alejandrino v. Court of
Appeals, we succinctly ruled:

Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso
exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure
the interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of each
cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully
settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the coowners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.[22] (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property is part of an estate and subject to intestate
proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule 84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties
of the estate to the heirs upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the estate shall only be
distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included therein are under the control of the
intestate court. And not even the administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court.
In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never
approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia
Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an
appeal.
Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the
improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed. [23]
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May
31, 2005 Order of the RTC.
Therefore, there is no longer any need to consider the other issues raised in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the May 4, 2007 Resolution and July 6, 2007 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 98764 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Thus, the Decision dated April 2, 2007 of the RTC denying due course to the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee; the Writ of Execution dated April
17, 2007; and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 are hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

16. FIRST DIVISION
CORAZON M. GREGORIO, as administratrix of the

estate litigated in the case below, RAMIRO T.
MADARANG, and the heirs of CASIMIRO R.
MADARANG, JR., namely: Estrelita L. Madarang,
Consuelo P. Madarang, Casimiro Madarang IV, and
Jane Margaret Madarang-Crabtree,
Petitioners,
G.R. No. 185226

Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
- versus ATTY. JOSE R. MADARANG and VICENTE R.

MADARANG,
Respondents.
Promulgated:
February 11, 2010
x-------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on June 3, 1995, leaving real and personal properties with an estimated
value of P200,000.00.[1] He was survived by his wife Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose, Ramiro, Vicente and Corazon.
In the intestate proceedings filed by the couples son Jose which was lodged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, Dolores
was appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of Casimiro, Sr. [2]
Dolores submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the decedents estate. Jose filed his Comment on the Report, alleging that it omitted
six lots including Lot 829-B-4-B located in Cebu City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125429.
A hearing was thus conducted to determine whether the six lots formed part of the estate of the decedent. By Order of April 5, 2002, [3] the RTC,
noting the following:
x x x The said properties appear to have been acquired by the spouses after [their marriage on] December 27, 1931 and during
their marriage or coverture. Article 160 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines (which is the governing law in this particular
case) is very explicit in providing that all properties of the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. This
presumption, to the mind of the Court, has not been sufficiently rebutted by the special administratrix. [Dolores] This presumption
applies and holds even if the land is registered under the wifes name as long as it was acquired during marriage (De Guinoo vs.
Court of Appeals. G.R. No. L-5541, June 26, 1955) or even if the wife purchased the land alone (Flores, et.al. Vs. Escudero,
et.al., G.R. No. L-5302, March 11, 1953).[4] (underscoring supplied),
instructed Dolores to revise her Inventory Report to include the six lots.
Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be referred to as oppositors, [5] questioned the RTC order of inclusion of the six
lots via motion for reconsideration during the pendency of which motion the court appointed herein petitioner Corazon as co-administratrix of her
mother Dolores.
As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been transferred during the lifetime of the decedent, they were ordered to
submit their affidavits, in lieu of oral testimony, to support the allegation. Only herein respondent Vicente complied. In his Affidavit, Vicente declared
that one of the six lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him by a Deed of Donation executed in August 1992 by his parents Dolores and Casimiro,
Sr.[6]

It appears that petitioners later manifested that they no longer oppose the provisional inclusion of the six lots, except Lot 829-B-4-B.
The RTC, by Order of January 20, 2003,[7] thus modified its April 5, 2002 Order as follows:
Of the six lots directed included in the inventory, Lot 829 B-4-B should be excluded. The administratrix is directed within
sixty (60) days: (1) to submit a revised inventory in accordance with the Order dated April 5, 2002, as here modified; and (2) to
render an accounting of her administration of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang. (underscoring supplied),
Jose moved to reconsider the RTC January 20, 2003 Order, arguing that since the title to Lot 829-B-4-B remained registered in the name of his
parents, it should not be excluded from the Inventory; and that the Deed of Donation in Vicentes favor was not notarized nor registered with the
Register of Deeds. Joses motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order of February 5, 2003, he filed a Notice of Appeal.
In his Brief filed before the Court of Appeals, Jose claimed that the RTC erred in excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory as what the
lower court should have done was to . . . maintain the order including said lot in the inventory of the estate so Vicente can file an ordinary action
where its ownership can be threshed out.
Jose later filed before the appellate court a Motion to Withdraw Petition which his co-heirs-oppositors-herein petitioners opposed on the ground
that, inter alia, a grant thereof would end the administration proceedings. The appellate court, by Resolution of January 18, 2008,[8] granted the
withdrawal on the ground that it would not prejudice the rights of the oppositors.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts grant of Joses Motion to Withdraw Petition was, by Resolution of November 6, 2008,
[9]
denied in this wise:

xxxx
In the instant case, the Probate Court found that the parties of the case interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of
Lot No. 829-B-4-B in the inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have consented thereto. x x x
xxxx
Moreover, [herein petitioners] in their appeal brief, ha[ve] extensively argued that . . . Vicente Madarang [to whom
the questioned lot was donated] and his family have been in continuous, actual and physical possession of the donated
lot for over twenty (20) years, even before the execution of the so called donation inter vivos in 1992. . . . Vicente Madarang has
his residential house thereon and that his ownership over the donated lot has been fully recognized by the entire Madarang Clan ,
including all his brothers and sisters, except the much belated objection by the appellant (Jose), allegedly resorted to as an act of
harassment. [10] (emphasis and underscoring supplied),
thus affirming the RTC order of exclusion of the questioned lot.

Hence, the present petition for review filed by the oppositors-herein petitioners. Casimiro, Jr. having died during the pendency of the case,
he was substituted by his wife petitioner Estrelita and co-petitioners children Consuelo, Casimiro IV, and Jane Margaret.
Petitioners contend that since the only issue for consideration by the appellate court was the merit of Joses Motion to Withdraw Petition, it exceeded
its jurisdiction when it passed upon the merits of Joses appeal from the RTC order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory.
Petitioners contention does not lie.
In their Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate courts grant of Joses Motion to Withdraw Petition, petitioners, oddly denying the
existence of a petition, raised the issue of the propriety of the RTC Order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B from the Inventory. Their prayer in their Motion
clearly states so:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Oppositors-Appellees [petitioners] respectfully PRAY for this Honorable Court to
RECONSIDER its questioned Resolution and rendering [sic], forthwith, a decision resolving the merits of the Partial Appeal of
petitioner-appellant Jose Madarang.[11] (capitalization in the original; emphasis supplied)

The appellate court did not thus err in passing on the said issue.
More specifically, petitioners question the appellate courts finding that as the parties interposed no objection to the non-inclusion of Lot No. 829-B-4B in the inventory of the estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, in effect, they have consented thereto. [12]
A review of the voluminous records of the case shows that, indeed, there was no accord among the parties respecting the exclusion
of Lot 829-B-4-B.
While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act on questions of title and ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or
exclusion in the inventory of properties of a decedent, make a provisional determination of ownership, without prejudice to a final determination
through a separate action in a court of general jurisdiction.
The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate court to make a provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4B. It bears stress that the question is one of collation or advancement by the decedent to an heir over which the question of title and ownership can
be passed upon by a probate court.[13]
As earlier reflected, Vicentes claim of ownership over Lot 829-B-4-B rests upon a deed of donation by his father (decedent) and his mother.
Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of
partition. (underscoring supplied)
in relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. Questions as to advancement made, or alleged to have been made, by
the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been donated by the decedent and his wife to their son-respondent
Vicente, should not be excluded from the inventory of the properties of the decedent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed November 6, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Corazon M.
Gregorio and her co-administratrix Dolores Madarang are DIRECTED to include Lot 829-B-4-B in the Inventory of the properties of the intestate
estate of Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr.
Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 57, which is DIRECTED to
proceed with the disposition of the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
17. THIRD DIVISION

ANITA REYESMESUGAS, G.R. No. 174835
Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,
- v e r s u s - NACHURA,
PERALTA and
ABAD, JJ.*
ALEJANDRO AQUINO REYES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 22, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari [1] seeking to reverse the June 23, 2006 and September 21, 2006 orders [2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (RTC), Branch 62 denying the petitioners motion to cancel a notice of lis pendens.
Petitioner Anita Reyes-Mesugas and respondent Alejandro A. Reyes are the children of Lourdes Aquino Reyes and Pedro N. Reyes. Lourdes died
intestate, leaving to her heirs, among others, three parcels of land, including a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 24475.
On February 3, 2000, respondent filed a petition for settlement of the estate of Lourdes, [3] praying for his appointment as administrator due
to alleged irregularities and fraudulent transactions by the other heirs. Petitioner, her father Pedro and Arturo, a sibling of the petitioner, opposed the
petition.
On August 30, 2000, a compromise agreement[4] was entered into by the parties whereby the estate of Lourdes was partitioned. A decision [5] dated
September 13, 2000 was rendered by the RTC pursuant to the said compromise agreement. The compromise agreement with respect to TCT No.
24475 is reproduced below:
5. That the parties hereto hereby agree to recognize, acknowledge and respect:

5.1. the improvements found on the parcel of land covered under TCT No. 24475 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
consisting of two lots namely Lot 4-A and Lot 4-B of the new survey with two (2) residential houses presently
occupied and possessed as owners thereof by Antonio Reyes and Anita Reyes-Mesugas to constitute part of
their shares in the estate of Lourdes Aquino Reyes;
5.2 further, the improvement consisting of a bakery-store under lease to a third party. The proceeds thereof shall be
shared by Antonio Reyes and Pedro N. Reyes;
5.3 that the expenses for the partition and titling of the property between Antonio Reyes and Anita ReyesMesugas shall be equally shared by them.
On December 7, 2004, petitioner filed a motion to cancel lis pendens annotation for TCT No. 24475 [6] in the RTC in view of the finality of judgment in
the settlement of the estate. Petitioner argued that the settlement of the estate proceeding had terminated; hence, the annotation
of lis pendens could already be cancelled since it had served its purpose.
Respondent opposed the motion and claimed that the parties, in addition to the compromise agreement, executed side agreements which
had yet to be fulfilled. One such agreement was executed between petitioner [7] and respondent granting respondent a one-meter right of way on the
lot covered by TCT No. 24475. However, petitioner refused to give the right of way and threatened to build a concrete structure to prevent access.
He argued that, unless petitioner permitted the inscription of the right of way on the certificate of title pursuant to their agreement, the notice
of lis pendens in TCT No. 24475 must remain.
In its order[8] dated January 26, 2006, the RTC denied the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotation for lack of sufficient merit. It found
that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens was unnecessary as there were reasons for maintaining it in view of petitioner's non-compliance with
the alleged right of way agreement between the parties. It stated that:
A careful perusal of the compromise agreement dated September 13, 2000 revealed that one of the properties mentioned is a
parcel of land with improvements consisting [of] two hundred nine (209) square meters situated in Makati covered under TCT No.
24475 of the Registry of Deeds [of] Rizal in the name of Pedro N. Reyes married to Lourdes Aquino Reyes and form[s] part of the
notarized right of way agreement on TCT No. 24475, considering that the movant Anita Reyes is still bound by the right of way
agreement, the same should be complied with before the cancellation of the subject annotation. [9] (Citations omitted)
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal.[10] Because the denial of a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotation was an interlocutory order, the
RTC denied the notice of appeal as it could not be appealed until the judgment on the main case was rendered. [11] A motion for reconsideration was
filed by petitioner but the same was also denied.[12]
Hence, this petition.
We find for petitioner.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. [13] Once
submitted to the court and stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere private contract binding upon the parties; having the
sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any judgment. [14]
Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately executory as there is no appeal from such
judgment.[15] When both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending litigation and request that a decision be rendered approving said
agreement, such action constitutes an implied waiver of the right to appeal against the said decision. [16]
In this instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Lourdes. The RTC therefore took
cognizance of the case as a probate court.
Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to the estate but never on the rights to
property arising from the contract. [17] It approves contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules
of Court.[18] It is apparent therefore that when the RTC approved the compromise agreement on September 13, 2000, the settlement of the estate
proceeding came to an end.
Moreover, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to
be recorded.[19] The compromise agreement did not mention the grant of a right of way to respondent. Any agreement other than the judicially
approved compromise agreement between the parties was outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court. Thus, any other agreement entered
into by the petitioner and respondent with regard to a grant of a right of way was not within the jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a probate court.
Therefore, there was no reason for the RTC not to cancel the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 24475 as respondent had no right which needed to
be protected. Any alleged right arising from the side agreement on the right of way can be fully protected by filing an ordinary action for specific
performance in a court of general jurisdiction.
More importantly, the order of the probate court approving the compromise had the effect of directing the delivery of the residue of the
estate of Lourdes to the persons entitled thereto under the compromise agreement. As such, it brought to a close the intestate proceedings [20] and
the probate court lost jurisdiction over the case, except only as regards to the compliance and the fulfillment by the parties of their respective
obligations under the compromise agreement.

Having established that the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Lourdes came to an end upon the RTCs promulgation of a
decision based on the compromise agreement, Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Recording the order of partition of estate. - Certified copies of final orders and judgments of the court relating to the real
estate or the partition thereof shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province where the property is situated.
In line with the recording of the order for the partition of the estate, paragraph 2, Section 77 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529[21] provides:
Section 77. Cancellation of Lis Pendens xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of the action such as to terminate
finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice
of lis pendens has been registered as provided in the preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed
cancelledupon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating the
manner of disposal thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, when the September 13, 2000 decision was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal pursuant to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court, the notice of lis pendensinscribed on TCT No. 24475 was deemed cancelled by virtue of Section 77 of PD No. 1529.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62 dated June 23, 2006 and
September 21, 2006 are SET ASIDE. The notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. 24475 is hereby declared CANCELLED pursuant to Section
77 of the PD No. 1529 in relation to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 174975

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

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of the said estate.

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ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER,

G.R. No. 157912

ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,

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December 13, 2007

The undisputed facts are as follows.

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The petition is imbued with merit.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

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The Court rules in the affirmative.

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ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ G.R. No. 164108

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

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July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

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G.R. No. 115181

March 31, 2000

MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner,

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SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO

G.R. No. 161220

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HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS,

namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian,

Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos,

July 30, 2008

Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were

namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba,

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Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:

We rule in the negative.

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